THE BATTLE OF HARTSVILLE AND MORGAN'S SECOND KENTUCKY RAID

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ATTENTION:

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By the beginning of the fourth week in November 1862, General Braxton Bragg had concentrated his recently redesignated Army of Tennessee in Middle Tennessee. In a letter from his Tullahoma headquarters (dated the 24th) Bragg sketched for President Jefferson Davis the projected plan of operations, which he had presented to his subordinates four days before. As the first step in the bushy-browed North Carolinian's master plan the three corps, then constituting the army, would be massed at Murfreesboro. Next, screened by the three cavalry brigades commanded respectively by Brigadier Generals Joseph Wheeler, John Pegram, and John A. Wharton, the Army of Tennessee would take position covering the roads leading south and east out of Nashville. (At this time Major General William S. Rosecrans was busy converting Nashville into a base of operations for his powerful Army of the Cumberland.) Once General Bragg's troopers had established and manned their roadblocks, he believed it would be all but impossible for the Army of the Cumberland to forage on the south side of the Cumberland River. ¹

Simultaneously, the cavalry brigade led by Colonel John H. Morgan would cross the Cumberland River east of Nashville. After
reaching the river's north bank Morgan's "terrible men" would endeavor to break the supply lines linking Nashville with Louisville. It was over these lines that the Union brass funneled supplies to the Army of the Cumberland. Bragg expressed himself to Davis as confident Morgan's raiders would be successful in their efforts to "prevent the enemy from using the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which is not yet in running order, and their wagon trains will be in constant danger." 2

A second raiding force led by the redoubtable Brigadier General Nathan B. Forrest was to operate to the south and west of Nashville. Forrest's initial mission would be to attack the Union shipping plying the Cumberland River. This task accomplished, Forrest would cross the Tennessee River. Invading west Tennessee, Forrest's troopers were expected to smash the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. At this stage of the conflict, the Mobile and Ohio served as the supply line for Major General Ulysses S. Grant's Army of the Tennessee. (At the moment, Grant's army was regrouping and establishing magazines in North Mississippi. When this operation was completed, the aggressive Grant planned to launch a massive offensive designed to cave in the defense line which Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton had established behind the Tallahatchie River.) In his letter to the President, Bragg noted, "Thus we may create a diversion in favor of Pemberton, and, if successful, force the enemy to retire from Mississippi." 3
Bragg believed that if Morgan and Forrest succeeded in their efforts to cut the Army of the Cumberland's communication lines, while Wheeler's, Pegram's, and Harston's troopers blockaded the roads leading south and east out of Nashville, great benefits would accrue to the Confederacy; because, he theorized, the Union brass would find itself confronted by two unpleasant alternatives. The Army of the Cumberland would have to either evacuate Nashville and fall back toward Louisville or leave the protection afforded by its earthworks in an effort to drive the Confederates from the city's approaches. In case Rosecrans should choose the second of these alternatives, the combative Bragg expressed himself as "confident of beating him in the open field ... ." 4

After Bragg had circulated his master plan, his subordinates proceeded to carry out their respective assignments. The two divisions of Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk's corps, then stationed at Tullahoma, prepared to move to Murfreesboro. At Murfreesboro these two units would rendezvous with the division commanded by Major General John C. Breckinridge. (The former vice president's command, which had been stationed in the Murfreesboro area since October 28, had been assigned to Polk's corps on November 7.) 5 Simultaneously, Lieutenant General William J. Hardee massed his corps (consisting of the divisions commanded by Major General Simon B. Buckner and Brigadier General Patton Anderson) in the Shelbyville area. 6 The two divisions of
Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith's corps (those of Major Generals Carter L. Stevenson and John P. McCown), which were in the process of being shuttled by rail from Knoxville to Middle Tennessee, detrained at Manchester. For the time being, these two units remained at Manchester — their mission, to serve as the Army of Tennessee's strategic reserve. 7

Wheeler's cavalry brigade had reached Murfreesboro from East Tennessee on November 13. Reporting to General Breckinridge, who at this time was in charge of the Confederate forces stationed in Middle Tennessee, Wheeler was directed to take command of all the cavalry operating on the approaches to Nashville. In addition to his own brigade, Wheeler would be held responsible for the activities of Forrest's and Morgan's commands. 8 His brigade being somewhat jaded by the march from East Tennessee, Wheeler decided to allow his command to catch its second wind before it moved to the front. Accordingly, the troopers were permitted to remain encamped in the Murfreesboro area for another 48 hours.

By the morning of the 15th, the troopers and horses had recouped their strength. Informed of this, Wheeler ordered his brigade into the field. Reaching Stewarts Creek, Wheeler's troopers relieved Forrest's command. Wheeler's cavalrymen, supported by two regiments of infantry, would be responsible for manning the line of outposts to the west of Stones River. Breckinridge had established these posts to cover the approaches
to Murfreesboro from the northwest. For the time being, Morgan's brigade would continue to patrol the area east of Stones River. On being relieved Forrest's troops moved to Spencer's Springs, three miles west of Murfreesboro. Here Forrest regrouped, reorganized, and equipped his command preparatory to undertaking a raid on the Union supply lines.  

Five days later (on the 20th) Bragg issued an important General Order. In this document Bragg, in addition to ordering his three corps into their advance staging areas, sketched for Wheeler the cavalry's role in his projected campaign designed to drive the Federals out of Middle Tennessee. The three cavalry brigades commanded by Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram were expected to cover the Army of Tennessee's front as it moved into position near Murfreesboro. Bragg evidently had not been notified that Wheeler had relieved Forrest's unit on the 15th, because he directed his chief of cavalry to recall Forrest's and Morgan's units from outpost duty, as soon as Wharton's brigade arrived from East Tennessee. Upon being relieved Morgan and Forrest would be assigned special missions by Bragg. The hard-bitten Bragg noted in his order, "Much is expected by the army and its commander from the operations of these active and ever-successful leaders."  

On the following day Bragg contacted Forrest. The general notified the cavalryman of the nature of the "special mission" to which he had been assigned. Forrest was directed to "proceed, as
soon as practicable, with your whole command to the west of the Nashville and Columbia road, for the purpose of carrying on operations against the enemy in the west of Middle, and, if practicable, in West Tennessee." At Waynesboro, Forrest would rendezvous with a regiment drawn from Colonel Philip D. Roddey's north Alabama command. If it was feasible Forrest was to cross the Tennessee River. Invading West Tennessee, Forrest would fall "upon the enemy's depots and lines of communications, destroying them and capturing his guards and hospitals." Bragg expressed the opinion that the very existence of Grant's army, then operating in north Mississippi, would be jeopardized if Forrest were able to get astride its supply lines. 11

Simultaneously, Bragg issued instructions for Wheeler to co-operate with Forrest. The chief of cavalry was directed to assist Forrest in readying his brigade for its raid on the Union supply lines. While the two cavalry leaders were exerting themselves to carry out this task, Wharton's brigade reached the Murfreesboro area. When Wharton's combat-wise brigade moved to the front it took position on Wheeler's left. Wharton selected Nolensville as his base of operations. The Texan's brigade was charged with the responsibility of screening the Confederates' left flank. Wharton's picket line tied in with Wheeler's on the right and extended in a southwesterly direction as far as Franklin. 12
afternoon of the 29th when Pegram's troopers finally reached Murfreesboro. Another 48 hours elapsed before Wheeler issued orders directing Pegram to relieve Morgan. General Pegram's understrength brigade then moved to Baird's Mills, where the general established his headquarters. After Pegram's troopers had relieved Morgan's men on the picket line, the Kentuckian concentrated his brigade in the Baird's Mills staging area.

Bragg, on being advised that Pegram's brigade had been ordered to the front, decided the time was now ripe to send Morgan's grim raiders to prey on the Union supply lines north of the Cumberland. Therefore, the general (on the 1st) drafted a set of instructions for Morgan's guidance. Bragg informed Morgan that upon being relieved he would proceed, "by the most practicable route and with the least delay, to operate on the enemy's lines of communications in rear of Nashville." Morgan was directed "to assail his guards where your relative force will justify it; capture and destroy his trains; burn his bridges, depots, trestlework, etc." All told, Morgan was expected to harass the bluecoats "in every conceivable way in ... [his] power." To cloak his operations in a veil of secrecy Morgan was directed, if feasible, to send all prisoners captured by his command to the rear; but, if it should become necessary, Morgan would parole his captives, and forward the rosters to Bragg's GHQ. The cavalry commander was authorized to induct men into his command "to the
extent of... [his] captured arms and horses." The recruits would be assigned to the various regiments constituting the brigade. Morgan was expected to exert himself in an effort to prevent Rosecrans' army from "forging north of the Cumberland River, and especially toward Clarksville." If practicable, Morgan was to communicate and co-operate with Forrest's brigade. (At the moment the latter officer's unit was busy preparing for its dash into West Tennessee.) Continuing, Bragg all but gave Morgan a blank check as he wrote, "You are not limited in the extent of your operations, every confidence being reposed in your zeal, discretion, and judgement." 16

While his brigade was resting and regrouping preparatory to crossing the Cumberland River, Morgan paid a visit to Bragg's Murfreesboro GHQ. The hard-hitting cavalryman had some information that he felt would prove of interest to Bragg. During the period his brigade had been on outpost duty, Morgan had learned that the Northerners had established strong garrisons at Gallatin, Castalian Springs, and Hartsville. From these bases the foe was in the habit of sending strong foraging parties into the fertile area lying south of the Cumberland River. Morgan, as a result of his careful observations, had decided it would be possible for a fast-moving Rebel task force to slip through the Union outposts and destroy the Hartsville Yankees. The cavalryman expressed himself as confident the Confederates could effect their escape
before the supporting Union forces at Castalian Springs and
Gallatin could intervene. Morgan felt certain that the Federal
brass would not be expecting such a daring move on the
Confederates' part, because any raiding force coming from the
south would of necessity expose its flank and rear to attack by
the Northern forces operating out of Nashville. Convinced that
he could take the Hartsville Yankees by surprise, Morgan urged
Bragg to sanction the proposed attack. 17
Notes to Chapter I
General Bragg Drafts a Plan

1 The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 422. (Cited hereafter as O. R.) The Army of the Mississippi had been redesignated Army of Tennessee on November 20, 1862. At this time Bragg's three corps commanders were: Lieutenant Generals Leonidas Polk, E. Kirby Smith, and William J. Hardee.

2 Ibid. Morgan's brigade was stationed at Baird's Mills, seven miles southwest of Lebanon.

3 Ibid. At this time Forrest's brigade was based at Spencer's Springs, three miles west of Murfreesboro.

4 Ibid.


7 Ibid., 411, 423.

8 Ibid., 402. Immediately following Wheeler's arrival, Forrest forwarded a request to Breckinridge asking for a leave of absence.
Breckinridge, taking cognizance of Forrest's past services, gave
his stamp of approval to the cavalryman's application.

9 Ibid., 402, 404.
10 Ibid., 411.
11 Ibid., 415.
14 Ibid., 428.
15 Ibid., 429-430, 433-434. Pegram's brigade consisted of the
following units: 1st Georgia Cavalry, 1st Louisiana Cavalry; 1st
Tennessee Cavalry, 16th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, and Hwald's
Tennessee Battery.
THE BATTLE OF HARTSVILLE AND MORGAN'S SECOND KENTUCKY RAID

Chapter II

The Battle of Hartsville

In the end Bragg accepted Morgan's thesis that a fast-moving task force would be able to penetrate the Union security cordon, cross the Cumberland, and surprise the Hartsville garrison. Furthermore, Morgan convinced Bragg that once this Rebel force had bagged the Hartsville Federals, it would be able to recross the river before any Union reinforcements put in an appearance. Accordingly, Bragg, on the 4th, drafted a complex set of instructions. Bragg's plan of operations was designed to implement Morgan's projected attack on Hartsville.

To draw Rosecrans' attention away from the Hartsville area, Bragg believed it would be a good idea to bluff the Union general into expecting an attack on a different sector. The general determined to use some of his combat-wise infantry to support the attack on Hartsville. Bragg, therefore, alerted Generals John C. Breckinridge and B. Franklin Cheatham to hold certain units drawn from their respective divisions ready to take the field. Colonel Roger W. Hanson's brigade, of Breckinridge's division, was alerted to move from Murfreesboro to Baird's Mills. Upon reaching Baird's Mills, Hanson's troops would go into camp. During the Orphan Brigade's scheduled 48-hour stay at the mills, Hanson would throw
out strong patrols to reconnoiter the roads leading toward Nashville. In addition, Hanson was ordered to honor any request Morgan might make for troops to accompany his brigade when it moved against Hartsville. General Cheatham, accompanied by two brigades, was to move from Murfreesboro to Lavergne. The Nashville pike would serve as the axis of Cheatham's advance. After rendezvousing with Wheeler's cavalry, Cheatham's troops would go into bivouac. On the following day, Cheatham's infantry, accompanied by Wheeler's troopers, would make a forced reconnaissance in the direction of Nashville. At nightfall the Confederates were to retire to the Lavergne area. The next day Cheatham, after detaching one brigade to support Wheeler, was slated to return to Murfreesboro with the other. 1

When they took the field, Cheatham's troops would carry three days' cooked rations in their haversacks, while Hanson's carried four. Each of the three infantry brigades would be permitted to take along ten wagons in addition to their ambulances. The division commanders were directed to hold their men ready to move on an hour's notice. 2

At the same time, in an effort to further confuse the Union brass and capitalize on Cheatham's and Hanson's feints, Bragg determined to move Hardee's and Smith's corps closer to the foe. Hardee was directed to transfer his corps from Shelbyville to Eagleville. Reaching Eagleville, Hardee would throw one
brigade into Triune. Smith's corps was alerted to be ready to march from Manchester to Readyville, as soon as practicable. 3

On the morning of the 5th, Bragg issued a directive ordering Cheatham and Hanson to implement the instructions which they had received from army headquarters on the previous day. It was 2 p.m. before the troops finally received the word to draw 40 rounds of ammunition from the ordnance wagons. By the time the officers had formed and mustered their respective units, it had commenced to snow. The two columns then moved off. Hanson's brigade turned into the Lebanon pike, while Cheatham's troops tramped along the Nashville pike. 4

It was midnight when Hanson's brigade reached Baird's Mills, 18 miles north of Murfreesboro. By this time the ground was blanketed by a full four inches of snow. After Hanson had halted his command, the soldiers received the welcomed order to camp. The men of the Orphan brigade immediately fell out of ranks and commenced to comb the area in search of wood with which to build fires. After securing the necessary fuel, the troops kindled themselves a number of roaring camp fires. Next, the soldiers "scraped the snow off the ground", spread their blankets on the frozen earth, and went to sleep. Reveille was beaten at an early hour on the 6th. As soon as the soldiers were mustered, they were issued rations of bacon, flour, sugar and coffee. After being directed to cook rations to last for two days the soldiers,
having been warned to remain close to their camps, were dismissed. Meanwhile, Morgan, in accordance with Bragg's memorandum of the 4th, called upon Hanson for troops to support his projected attack on Hartsville. The cavalry leader asked Hanson to designate the 2d and the 9th Kentucky Infantry, and Cobb's Kentucky Battery as the units to accompany his command. Hanson immediately complied with Morgan's request. Colonel Thomas H. Hunt, a veteran of the battles of Shiloh and Baton Rouge and the siege of Corinth, was placed in charge of the combat team slated to see service with the cavalry. The remainder of the Orphan Brigade (the 41st Alabama, and the 4th and the 6th Kentucky) would remain at Baird's Mills following the departure of Morgan's task force. During Morgan's absence, combat patrols, drawn from these three regiments, were expected to carry out extensive reconnaissances in the direction of Nashville.

At Baird's Mills, Hanson's infantry rendezvoused with Morgan's cavalry. The troopers had been resting their horses and taking it easy in their camps, which were located in and around the mills, following their relief by Pegram's command on the evening of the 1st. At this time only five of the seven units (the 7th, the 8th, and the 11th Kentucky, and the 9th Tennessee Regiments, and Stoner's Kentucky Battalion) which constituted Morgan's brigade were present. A shortage of forage in Rutherford and Wilson counties had compelled Morgan to send his two other
organizations (the 2d Kentucky and Breckinridge's Kentucky Battalion) to the Fayetteville, Tennessee, area. The two detached commands had not rejoined the brigade. Morgan, realizing he would undoubtedly have to devote his entire attention to regulating the task force's movements, placed Colonel Basil W. Duke in charge of the cavalry brigade. In addition to the four cavalry regiments and one battalion Duke's command included one battery -- Corbett's. The artillerists were equipped with two mountain howitzers and a pair of Ellsworth rifled guns. All told, Duke's brigade mustered about 1,400 officers and men.

This was the first time the hard-bitten infantrymen of the Orphan Brigade had been in close contact with Morgan's raiders. As expected, the veteran infantrymen "looked a little askant at the cavalry". It appears that only a few of Duke's horsemen, who were designated to accompany Hunt's combat team, had been in the service for any length of time. The 7th, the 8th and the 11th Kentucky, and Stoner's battalion were recently organized regiments. These units' personnel had been recruited in August and September during the Confederate invasion of the Bluegrass state. Duke's other regiment -- the 9th Tennessee -- had been in service for some time, but it had a reputation for being poorly disciplined.

On the morning of the 6th the cavalry officers moved their troopers from their camps in the surrounding countryside to Baird's
Hills. As his first order of business, Morgan called for the leader of his scouts -- Captain Thomas Quirk. During the course of the ensuing discussion, Quirk was given his assignment. He was directed to have men reconnoiter in the direction of Hartsville, watch the enemy at Castalian Springs, and picket the numerous Cumberland River fords.

By 11 a.m. Colonels Hunt and Duke reported to Morgan that their commands were ready to move. Upon receipt of this information, Morgan ordered them to move out. Preceded by Duke's mounted brigade, Hunt's infantrymen left Baird's Mill and their cheering and jeering comrades-in-arms behind. Departing from their advance operating base the greyclads headed northward. The expedition's route of march was the macadamized Lebanon pike. In the wake of yesterday's storm the weather had turned exceedingly cold. Consequently, the snow which had fallen to a depth of about four inches covered the entire area. The snow and slush made marching conditions very unpleasant for both man and beast.

For security reasons Morgan determined not to tell anyone except his highest ranking subordinates the task force's objective. Therefore, the rank and file, as they swung along, were able to keep their minds occupied weighing the various rumors which circulated through the column concerning the purpose behind this unpleasant march.

Their horses being shod the cavalry encountered no
difficulty in reaching Lebanon, eight miles north of Baird’s Mills. But the infantry, following in rear of the cavalry, was slowed to a marked degree by the snow and slush. It took Hunt’s veterans three hours to cover the same distance. In an effort to encourage the infantrymen, the officers told them that arrangements had been made for a "ride and tie" system. According to the scheme worked out by the Rebel brass the cavalry, on leaving Lebanon, was to ride for five or six miles and then leave their horses. The dismounted troopers, after tying their mounts, would then march an equal distance. Coming up with the horses the infantry would mount up. After they had overtaken and passed the cavalry, the infantry in its turn would dismount and leave the horses. In theory, this seemed like a workable and a reasonable proposition. 11

Before leaving Lebanon, Morgan conferred briefly with several of his scouts. These individuals had recently returned from the Hartsville area. The scouts assured the colonel "no change had been made in the number of the Federals at Hartsville, their number being still about 900 infantry and 400 cavalry, with two pieces of artillery". Satisfied that the foe was unaware of his approach, Morgan prepared to push on toward his objective, which lay 17 miles to the northeast. 12

Morgan’s column had not proceeded very far beyond Lebanon before the colonel instructed the cavalry to dismount and tie their horses. The rugged infantrymen of Hunt’s combat team, who
had been patiently trudging along through the snow and slush, were cheered by this order. Arriving at the point where the cavalry had left their horses, the soldiers eagerly mounted. Their rejoicing, however, soon changed to groans. During the course of the afternoon's march the shoes of the infantrymen had been thoroughly saturated by the icy slush. Now that they were riding, and no longer exercising themselves, the soldiers found that the bitterly cold weather had numbed their limbs. Unaccustomed to the ways of the troopers, the infantrymen did not know the secrets of keeping warm while on horses. Consequently, long before they had traveled their allotted distance, the soldiers were begging their officers to have the cavalry come and get their accursed beasts. By this time the troopers had also had their fill of walking. Therefore, they were overjoyed when Morgan told them to remount. After making the exchange the cavalymen discovered that their boots had become thoroughly soaked. Within a short while the troopers were chilled to the bone. Henceforth, during the course of the march to Hartsville, the infantry and cavalry suffered more than they would have if each had stuck to his own branch of the service.

To make matters worse, the horses had been scrambled during operation "ride and tie". This caused the owners to curse and abuse everybody and everything connected with the expedition. A participant recalled, "The cavalry cussed the infantry, and the
infantry cussed the cavalry, and between them they cussed everybody they knew anything about." In fact, the situation quickly became so ridiculous that upon mature reflection, the soldiers commenced to recover their good humor. Subsequently, one of the greyclads was forced to admit, "It was a gloomy opening for so glorious a campaign." 14

Unlike their comrades-in-arms the artillerists belonging to Cobb's and Corbett's batteries, suffered very little discomfort as the column pushed forward. With the drivers riding and the gunners perched on the limbers and caissons, the cannoneers were divorced from all contact with the slush. By constantly rubbing and stamping their feet, the artillerists were able to keep their extremities warm. Therefore, it was with a marked degree of complacency that the artillerists gazed upon their less fortunate companions, who were trudging along the pike. 15

Shortly before the head of the column reached the Cumberland River, the news that Hartsville was the objective began to circulate through the ranks. This intelligence helped to dispel the gloom. Morgan's entire task force suddenly seemed to become imbued with enthusiasm for the success of the mission. Within a matter of moments, the men had forgotten about how cold they were. One of the cavalrmen recalled, "the horsemen and the 'footmen' made up, jollied each other, and swore they were glad they had come." 16
Before gaining the river, Morgan divided his command. Morgan, accompanied by the infantry and artillery, would cross the river at Purier's Ferry, several miles below Hartsville. Colonel Duke's cavalry was directed to ford the river several miles further downstream. After crossing the river, the infantry and the artillery would rendezvous at Hager's Shop, two miles from the Union encampment.

The road along which the infantry and artillery moved became very rough and difficult as it neared the Cumberland River. Private John W. Green, of the Orphan Brigade, recalled, "One long hill was up rocks like stair steps, each step being about two feet rise. The infantry had to take hold of each wheel of the artillery & almost lift it up that hill." 18

Before his departure from Baird's Mills, Morgan had been advised that his scouts had located and hidden two flatboats at Purier's Ferry. The colonel proposed to use these craft to transfer his infantry and artillery to the right bank of the river. It was about 10 p.m. when Morgan's column reached the ferry, where the flatboats were secreted. Since leaving camp, eleven hours before, the infantry and artillery had traveled almost 20 miles. This was not too bad when allowance was made for the horrible marching conditions. 19

Heavy precipitation on the headwaters of the Cumberland
had caused the river to rise considerably since Morgan had 
received the latest reports regarding its stage. Therefore, it 
would not be an easy task for the colonel to cross his infantry 
and artillery in the five hours he had allotted for this purpose. 
Accordingly, there was a great rush on the part of the 
Confederates to get across the river by 3 a.m. Even after the 
butternuts had gained the north bank of the river, the troops 
still had another five miles to negotiate before reaching the 
Union encampments. Inspecting the two small flatboats, the Rebel 
officers found them to be in "miserable condition". As there was 
no other way to get across the icy river, the butternuts were 
forced to press the two battered boats into service. Both the 
vessels leaked badly. Consequently, the soldiers found it was 
necessary to bail constantly as they poled their way across the 
booming river. To make matters worse, Private Green reported, 
"the restlessness of the horses /\ belonging to the officers and 
the artillery\ nearly pushed a plank off the bottom of the boats 
..."). The passengers, therefore, had to bail with might and 
main to keep the flats from foundering. 20

When the first troops reached the opposite side of the 
river, they quickly established a line of outposts covering the 
bridgehead. Colonels Morgan and Hunt seemed to be omnipresent, 
as they closely supervised the crossing. Moving among the men of 
the Orphan Brigade, Colonel Hunt sought by words of encouragement
to cheer his tired, half-frozen men. The few flickering torches which cast ghastly shadows on the muddy, sloppy bank" gave a strange and supernatural aspect to the desperate venture. 21

Between the high water and the "miserable" flatboats, Morgan's column lost considerable time in crossing the river. By the time the last of the infantry and artillery reached the right bank, it was 5 a.m. It had taken seven hours, instead of the scheduled five, to ferry the river. When Hunt reported that all his men were across, Morgan ordered the advance resumed. The troops realized, as they trudged along, that Morgan's plan to have them in position and ready to attack by daybreak had been frustrated. Nevertheless, Morgan's column pushed rapidly forward over a "very bad" road, in a desperate bid to make up the lost time. It took the Confederates approximately 30 minutes to reach Hager's Shop. At the shop, Morgan rendezvoused with a portion of Colonel Duke's command. The troopers had reached the scheduled meeting place only minutes before the infantry and artillery. 22

Duke's cavalry had also experienced considerable difficulty in getting across the river. When the cavalrymen reached the ford, where Morgan had directed them to cross, Colonel Duke discovered, much to his dismay, "that the river had risen so much since the last reconnaissance that it was past fording". Undaunted by this unforeseen obstacle, Duke asked his scouts if they knew the location of any other fords in the immediate vicinity. These
individuals replied in the affirmative. They told the colonel "there was a ford farther down the river, where it was likely he could get his men and horses across." Quickly assembling his command, Duke, preceded by the scouts, moved off across the snow-covered fields at a fast trot. 23

When the troopers reached the second ford, they found the approach to the crossing very difficult. This ford was not in general use. Therefore, the cavalrmen discovered it was impossible to reach the bank of the river except by a crooked bridle path which admitted only one horse at a time. Gaining the bank, Duke observed that there was a sharp descent into the frigid water. If the Rebels were going to cross the river at this ford, they would be compelled to leap their horses into the river "from the bluff about four feet high". Duke knew if he were to keep his scheduled rendezvous with Morgan that time was of the essence. Accordingly, the colonel ordered his men to ford the river. Putting their spurs to their mounts the troopers, one at a time, forced the beasts to plunge into the chilling water. On making the leap horse and rider would generally be submerged -- thus experiencing a most unpleasant "cold bath". One of the participants recalled the plunge into the cold river had "a fearfully chilling effect upon the ardor of any patriot". 24 Within a relatively short period the previously unbeaten trail leading to the ford was churned into a sea of mud and slush. When the troopers
reached the right bank of the Cumberland, they encountered equal difficulties. The ascent was steep and slippery, therefore, the "shivering" horses had considerable difficulty in bearing their riders up the narrow rough pathway. Colonel Duke reported, "The cold (after the ducking in the river) affected the men horribly; those who got across first built fires, at which they partially warmed themselves while the others were crossing."

Subsequent to the event one of Morgan's raiders recalled:

Even the horses, with the vision of the misfortunes to... /the beasts/ ahead, were reluctant to make the plunge down into the river. The brutes saw the sad plight of those who were just in front, and watching them struggling in the water, they hesitated to follow on such difficult role. Spurring, pushing, driving, belaboring... /the cavalrmen/ drove them one by one into the stream. The... /troopers/, shaking with cold, almost wished they were back by their happy firesides in central Kentucky, but they were game enough for any contingency war might develop, and as the leaders rode into the stream none hesitated, but all took the plunge. 25

As to be expected these natural obstacles caused the crossing to proceed very slowly. By 3 a.m. Duke realized that dawn would undoubtedly break before he could get his entire brigade across the Cumberland. Fearing that if he delayed longer he would not reach Hager's Shop at the stipulated hour, Duke decided to press on. At this time, two of Duke's units -- the 8th Kentucky and Stoner's battalion -- had not forded the river. Before departing for the rendezvous, Duke left instructions for
the officer in charge of the 7th Kentucky, Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Huffman, to get his unit across the river as best he could. After his regiment had reached the north bank of the river, Huffman was to press on toward Hartsville in an effort to overtake the main column. Major Robert G. Stoner's battalion would not ford the river. Instead Stoner's battalion, accompanied by the detachment of Corbett's battery which manned the two mountain howitzers (the Bull Pups), would take position on the south side of the river opposite the Union encampment. Besides establishing a roadblock on the Lebanon pike, designed to prevent the Yankees from using that road as an escape route, Stoner's troopers would bluff an attack on the bluecoats' cantonment. Duke felt this diversion on Stoner's part might distract attention from the main Confederate thrust.

Swinging into their saddles the Rebel cavalymen resumed the advance. When Duke's column moved off, it was discovered that 15 men had been so benumbed by their immersion in the Cumberland that they were unable to accompany their comrades-in-arms. These unhappy individuals were left huddled around the camp fires which dotted the river bank. En route to Hager's Shop, Duke detached several patrols. These groups were given the task of picketing the column's line of march. Their primary mission was to keep the road cleared of Yankees, thus facilitating Huffman's efforts to overtake the brigade. Before reaching the rendezvous, Duke called for the commander of the 9th Tennessee.
Colonel James D. Bennett. The colonel was ordered to take his regiment and establish roadblocks on the roads connecting Hartsville with Castalian Springs and Carthage. Once this mission had been accomplished Bennett's Tennesseans would occupy Hartsville, attacking any bluecoats that might be holed up in the town. 27

Duke's depleted brigade reached Hager's Shop (which was about five miles from the ford) a few minutes before Morgan arrived. On conferring with Duke, Morgan learned that the cavalry leader's command had been considerably reduced. Morgan, taking cognizance of the late hour (dawn had started to break), determined to attack immediately. He would not wait for Huffman's regiment to put in an appearance. The reason behind this decision was Morgan's fear that the news he had crossed the Cumberland River would be carried to the commander of the strong Yankee force which was known to be stationed at Castalian Springs. Morgan felt that the Castalian Springs Unionists, once they were alerted to his presence, should be able to reach Hartsville in two and one-half hours. If Federal reinforcements arrived before he had destroyed the Hartsville bluecoats, Morgan knew escape for at least a portion of his task force would be all but impossible. Duke's cavalry, in case of a crisis, might be able to scatter and escape, but it would be impossible for Hunt's infantry and artillery to again reach the south bank of the Cumberland.
Therefore, a quickly won victory was Morgan's only escape from the dilemma in which he found himself. 28

Nine days before Morgan's task force departed from Baird's Mills, the Federal brass made a change in the disposition of the units charged with the defense of their supply line north of the Cumberland River. Major General George H. Thomas' powerful wing had been charged with guarding the Army of the Cumberland's communication lines. At the beginning of the fourth week in November, Thomas ordered one of his division commanders, Brigadier General Ebenezer Dumont, to send one of his brigades to Hartsville. When it reached Hartsville, this unit would relieve the troops stationed there. A brigade drawn from Brigadier General Speed S. Fry's division commanded by Colonel John M. Harlan had been based at Hartsville since the middle of November. 29

Following the receipt of Thomas' instructions charging him to send a brigade to Hartsville, Dumont issued marching orders to Colonel Joseph R. Scott's unit. At this time Scott's brigade was posted at Tompkinsville, Kentucky, 55 miles by road northeast of Hartsville. Breaking camp on November 24, Scott's brigade, marching via Goose Creek Valley, reached Hartsville on the 28th. 30

Entering Hartsville, Scott proceeded to Harlan's headquarters. During their interview Harlan informed Scott that the camp currently occupied by his brigade "was strong and defensible". Since Harlan had been on the ground for over two weeks, Scott
accepted his statement at face value. Therefore, as soon as Harlan's men had evacuated the encampment, Scott's moved in. Prior to his departure from Hartsville, Harlan ordered his attached cavalry -- the 2d Indiana -- to report to Colonel Scott. After being relieved, Harlan's brigade proceeded to Castalian Springs. Harlan's troops, for the time being, would garrison Castalian Springs where they would be in close supporting distance of the Hartsville troops.

Moving into the camp formerly occupied by Harlan's brigade, Scott's troops found that it was situated on a rocky hill, about one mile south of Hartsville. The Southern boundary of the encampment rested on the left bank of the Cumberland River which at this point was "steep and rocky". Close at hand, a short distance to the east of the cantonment, was the ford where the Lebanon pike crossed the river. The pike itself flanked the camp on the east. On the west the encampment was bounded by "a dense grove of beech wood." As his first order of business on assuming responsibility for the defense of the Hartsville area, Scott sought to provide for the security of his command. The section of artillery manned by the cannoneers of the 13th Indiana Battery commanded by Lieutenant Ezekiel Green was unlimbered near the Lebanon pike ford. Green's artillerists were given the mission of covering this crossing of the Cumberland. A line of outposts was established
on the right bank of the river at an average distance of one-half mile from the encampment. The vedettes took position a mile beyond the outposts. As the result of an oversight on Scott's part, no attempt was made to cover the little-used ford across the Cumberland which lay between the camp and the town. This mistake was compounded by the Federals' failure to station any outposts or vedettes on the south side of the river. In addition, the road leading from Hartsville to Gallatin was left unguarded. One company was assigned to provost duty in Hartsville. 33

On the 2d, four days after the brigade reached Hartsville, Colonel Scott received orders to rejoin his regiment, the 19th Illinois. At this time, the 19th Illinois was stationed at Nashville. Following Scott's departure, Colonel Absalom B. Moore, the ranking officer in the brigade, assumed command of the Hartsville garrison. The only change Colonel Moore effected in the dispositions made by Scott was to increase the strength of the detachments assigned to outpost and vedette duty. 34

To guard against a surprise attack on his force Colonel Moore ordered Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Stewart, the officer in charge of his cavalry, to send out patrols daily. These groups were to reconnoiter the countryside lying to the south and east of Hartsville. Accordingly, between the 2d and the afternoon of the 6th a number of mounted Union patrols crossed the Cumberland River. Several of these detachments even penetrated as far as
Lebanon. On the 5th several Union scouts, who had just visited Lebanon, informed Moore that the Confederates were picketing the town. The next afternoon a patrol drawn from the 2d Indiana Cavalry reconnoitered Lebanon. This was several hours before the arrival of Morgan's vanguard. Accordingly, they found the town unoccupied by any organized Confederate force. On interrogating the inhabitants, the Yankees were unable to obtain any information which might indicate the foe was planning to raid the Union bases north of the Cumberland. Mission accomplished, the Hoosiers returned to Hartsville where they relayed this information to Colonel Moore. 35

During the day (the 6th) Colonel Moore found it necessary to send the brigade's provision train to Gallatin to draw supplies. To protect the train against a possible foray by Rebel partisans, Moore detached a force of about 200 men. This guard detail consisted of three companies of infantry, one of cavalry, and 30 mounted infantrymen. It was 16 miles to Gallatin, therefore, the earliest Moore could anticipate the return of the train would be the evening of the 8th. In addition, the brigade's effective strength was further reduced as a result of a large number of men being on sick call and confined to the hospital. 36

When he retired on the evening of the 6th, Colonel Moore undoubtedly felt confident of his position. His cavalry, during the course of its sweep south of the Cumberland, had been unable
to discover any signs of Confederate activity. Furthermore, the colonel reasoned that the foul weather, which had covered the roads with ice and snow, would undoubtedly keep the butternuts confined to their camps. He also calculated that the Cumberland's recent rise would accrue to the Federals' advantage. The colonel believed the Rebels would find it very hazardous to send a large force across the booming river. Finally, the colonel reasoned, the presence of a strong supporting force at Castalian Springs would surely serve to discourage even the most daring or foolhardy of the greyclad leaders. Because of these factors, the colonel made no effort to further implement the measures he had previously taken to guarantee the security of his camp.

Having determined to attack the Union garrison, Morgan ordered the advance resumed. With Duke's reduced cavalry brigade in the van, Morgan's task force departed from Hager's Shop. Duke's troopers undoubtedly caught the Yankee vedettes napping, because they were able to penetrate to within one-half mile of the foe's encampment before being challenged. At this point, however, the greyclads' approach was discovered by the Unionists manning the outpost which guarded the road leading from Hager's Shop to the Federals' camp. After firing one volley the Union pickets beat a hasty retreat. 37

Morgan knew that this noise would undoubtedly arouse the Northerners' encampment. He would have to alter his plans. It
had been the colonel's intention to capture the sentries before they could sound the alarm. After this had been accomplished, Duke's cavalry would ride down the pickets and shoot up the surprised camp. Hunt's infantry would then drive forward and mop up the survivors. Morgan realized it was now impossible to take the Yankees by surprise. Already he could distinctly "see and hear the officers ordering their men to fall in", as they prepared to meet the Rebel attack. Furthermore, Morgan, taking cognizance of the large number of camp fires, decided the reports he had received placing the foe's strength at 1,500 officers and men were understatements. Accordingly, Morgan quickly matured a new plan of operations.

Undertaking a hurried reconnaissance Morgan discovered that the Union encampment was located on a rocky wooded hill which abutted against the river. Northwest of the hill occupied by the Federals was a large meadow. This open ground was separated from the encampment by a small watercourse. This ravine debouched southward into the Cumberland River. As it approached the river the draw became deeper and wider. Morgan decided to utilize the cover afforded by the ravine to form Hunt's infantry. But before the panting men of the Orphan Brigade could be brought forward, the Union battle line had formed. Worse, however, the Federals frustrated Morgan's plans by establishing their main line of
resistance near the eastern edge of the watercourse. With the bluecoats already in position, Morgan realized it would be impracticable for Hunt to deploy his men as ordered. Furthermore, upon sighting the massed Union infantry Morgan realized his earlier fears concerning the Yankees' strength were well founded.

While he anxiously watched the foe's deployment, Morgan was joined by Colonel Duke. The latter officer casually remarked to his chief, "You have more work cut out for you than you bargained for." "Yes", Morgan replied, "and you gentlemen must whip and catch these fellows and cross the river in two hours and a half, or we'll have six thousand more on our backs." Morgan then ordered Duke to form his command opposite to and partially outflanking the right of the enemy's line. Duke's mission was to crush the bluecoats' right flank and drive it back upon their center. Morgan then directed Colonel Hunt to bring his infantry forward and deploy it on the cavalry's right.

At this time only two of Duke's regiments -- the 8th and the 11th Kentucky -- were on the field. (Stoner's and Bennett's commands had been sent on detached assignments; while Huffman's, which had been delayed in crossing the river, had not yet overtaken the column.) After deducting the men needed to hold the horses, Duke realized he would carry into combat only about 450 men. Nevertheless, the able colonel, having implicit confidence in his chief, proceeded to form his two regiments in the field northwest
of the Union camp. Colonel Roy S. Cluke's 8th Kentucky took position opposite the 108th Ohio. The Buckeye regiment anchored the foe's right flank. The 11th Kentucky, Colonel David W. Chenault commanding, was deployed on Cluke's left. Chenault's unit formed an obtuse angle to Cluke's battle line. From their position Chenault's troopers would be able to enfilade the Yankees' main line of resistance, once they had moved into closer quarters. 41

When his troopers had penetrated to within 400 yards of the Yankees' battle line, Duke ordered them to dismount. Swinging off their horses, the cavalrymen handed the reins to the men previously designated to perform this necessary but unpopular duty. Glancing to the right and observing that Hunt had deployed his infantry and artillery, Duke ordered his men to attack. Covered by a line of skirmishers, the cavalrymen advanced on the double. As his troopers surged forward, Duke's morale was buoyed up by their "ringing shouts" which the Federals answered with "very feeble cheers". This was especially encouraging when the hard-hitting colonel remembered that, "These two regiments [the 8th and the 11th Kentucky] had never been under fire before, with the exception of one small skirmish which Cluke's had witnessed in Kentucky ... ." Moving on with perfect steadiness the greyclads drove in the Yankee skirmishers. During the advance Cluke's regiment had obliqued to the right. Accordingly, it
veered toward the portion of the Union line held by the 106th Ohio. The open formation adopted by the attacking butternuts enabled Cluke's regiment to cover the entire front of the 106th Ohio with a smaller number of men, while at the same time denying the bluecoats a massed target. When the yelling Kentuckians came surging forward, the Yankees' battle line started to fire by rank. By this time, however, Cluke's dismounted troopers had reached the ravine fronting the Union main line of resistance. Therefore, the volley crashed harmlessly overhead. Not waiting to give the Northerners time to reload, the Confederates dashed eagerly toward the foe. It was only after their men had closed to within 80 yards of the Federals that the Rebel officers passed the word to commence firing at will. While Cluke's troopers moved against the 106th Ohio's front, Chenault's passed beyond the right flank of the 108th Ohio, and were threatening to capture the Union encampment. Confronted by this terrible onset, the Northern line began to erode away, slowly at first, but within a short time in complete disorder. 42

When the soldiers constituting Hunt's combat team reached a point from where the Union camp was clearly visible, they discovered the Union infantry had already formed. The men of the Orphan Brigade observed that the Yankees had established their main line of resistance on the crest of a slight ridge, a deep ravine to their immediate front. Colonel Hunt, in accordance with
the instructions he had received from Morgan, proceeded to deploy his command. The 2d Kentucky took position on the left and the 9th Kentucky on the right. Robert Cobb's gunners unlimbered their four guns in the interval between the 2d and the 9th Kentucky. As they were forming, the Rebel infantrymen came under a punishing fire from the two 10-pounder Parrotts manned by Green's Hoosiers. In addition, Hunt's men were also harassed by the Union sharpshooters. These individuals had taken position covering the Yankees' right flank. Fortunately for the Orphan Brigade, these snipers were quickly driven in when Duke's dismounted troopers moved to the attack. 43

Colonel Hunt, observing that the dismounted troopers had scored a major success against the Union right, determined to attack immediately. His objective was to crush the foe's center and left. Accordingly, the rugged infantrymen of the Orphan Brigade moved forward en echelon, the 2d Kentucky leading.

Subsequent to the war, Colonel Duke recalled:

The infantry had marched quite ... [237] miles, over slippery roads and through the chilling cold, and I saw some of them stumble as they charged with fatigue and numbness; but the brave boys rushed in as if they were going to a frolic.

After surging across the ravine which separated them from the enemy's main line of resistance, one of the 2d Kentucky's officers (probably its commander, Major James W. Hewitt) noticed that his unit's battle line had been thrown into confusion. Therefore, he
bellowed out instructions for his regiment to halt and "dress". Colonel Duke thought there was no necessity for this order, because as he reported, "the regiment was within fifty yards of the enemy, who were dropping and recoiling under its fire."

Several officers, taking cognizance of this situation, sprang to the front, countermanded the order, and called on the men to resume the advance. Color-Sergeant John Oldham leaped forward with his colors, "waved them in the dim light of the early morning and bade the men to follow where he would lead." Urged on by these stalwart individuals, the regiment again rushed forward. During this brief halt, however, the 2d Kentucky sustained the greater portion of the losses which the regiment suffered in the attack on Hartsville. 44

In the meantime, Cobb's battery had been engaged in a spirited duel with Green's Hoosier artillerists. As the 9th Kentucky was moving to the support of the 2d Kentucky, a projectile from one of the Union Parrots scored a direct hit on one of Cobb's caissons. The loaded caisson blew up with a terrific explosion, killing and wounding a number of Confederates. Private Green recalled, "Our infantry [the 9th Kentucky] double quicked to the attack. Just as we double quicked past our battery, they [the Yankees] sent a shell into one of our caissons [sic], blew it up & killed several of our men & wounded Craven Peyton ... a little
courier on Genl. Morgan's Body Guard, a gallant little fellow only 16 years old." 45

Undaunted by the mishap, Captain James T. Morehead led his regiment, the 9th Kentucky, toward the foe. Pressing forward the soldiers found that their line of advance crossed some very rugged terrain and passed through a deep ravine. Ascending the opposite ridge, Morehead's cheering greyclads drew abreast of the 2d Kentucky. (At this time Major Hewitt's regiment had stopped to readjust its lines.) Taking position on the 2d Kentucky's right, Morehead's soldiers halted. They then commenced to fire by volley -- their target the Union battle line, less than 50 paces to their immediate front. To steady and encourage his men, Colonel Hunt shouted, "Boys kill a man with every shot." Captain Morehead observed that the Union line, punished as it was by these well-aimed volleys, had commenced to waver. The regimental commander then bellowed out the command, "Charge bayonets! Forward march!" Responding to the captain's order with alacrity, the soldiers of the 9th Kentucky, their bayonets flashing, surged forward, emitting the terrible "Rebel yell." 46

Immediately after the Yankees had registered their direct hit on the caisson, Colonel Hunt ordered Captain Cobb to shift his guns further to the left. Limbering up their four pieces the Kentucky artillerists proceeded to carry out Hunt's instructions.
Within a short time Cobb's gunners again placed their weapons in battery. From this new position the cannoneer began to hammer the left flank of the Yankees' main line of resistance. 47

Meanwhile, back in the Union camp at 6:30 a.m. some of the Yankees were busy preparing their breakfasts. Others, since this was a Sunday, were getting a few minutes extra sleep. Suddenly, everything was thrown into confusion when an excited Negro dashed into camp. This individual, who was employed as a servant by an officer of the 108th Ohio, shouted at the top of his lungs, "The Rebels are coming." As soon as the Negro had raised the alarm, Colonel Moore had the "long-roll" beaten. Dashing from their tents the Union officers quickly formed their units on the "color-line". One of the Union officers, Joseph Good, of the 108th Ohio, reported, "The first notice I had of the enemy approaching I heard, 'Company fall in.' I ran to my company parade-ground ordered my men to fall in; formed my company in about two minutes ready for action ... ." 48

By the time the officers had formed and mustered their respective commands, the sound of firing from the direction of the old Lebanon road became distinctly audible. Moments later the pickets who had been manning the outpost guarding the old Lebanon road, were seen to be falling back. Even before these men reached the camp, the Rebel vanguard was sighted as it topped a ridge three-quarters of a mile away. From their vantage point the Union officers anxiously observed the Confederates as they
formed. Realizing that it was mandatory to check the foe's advance for a sufficient length of time to permit him to deploy his command, Colonel Moore called for his chief of cavalry. When Colonel Stewart reported to his headquarters, Moore told him to take his entire force of cavalry and delay the foe. Quickly mustering his command -- the 2d Indiana Cavalry and Company E, 11th Kentucky Cavalry, Stewart ordered his men to mount. The cavalry leader then gave the order to move out. Departing from the encampment, the troopers had ridden only a short distance when Stewart passed the order to halt. All the cavalrymen, except those belonging to Company G, were dismounted and deployed astride the old Lebanon road. Once the roadblock had been established Company G was thrown forward to skirmish with the oncoming Confederates. 49

Screened by his cavalry, Colonel Moore proceeded to establish his main line of resistance along the military crest of a low ridge one-quarter mile northwest of the encampment. The 106th Ohio commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Tafel anchored the left flank of Moore's battle line. At the time the alarm was raised only six of the eight companies constituting the regiment were in camp. Companies F and H had been temporarily detached. One of the absent companies has been sent to Gallatin as an escort for the supply train, the other was on outpost duty. When the "long-roll" was beat the regiment fell in promptly with
a minimum of confusion. Tafel, in accordance with the instructions relayed to him from Colonel Moore, quickly formed his regiment on the left of the 104th Illinois. On moving into position the Buckeyes observed Colonel Duke's cavalry being massed on the opposite ridge.

When Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Hapeman assembled his command -- the 104th Illinois -- on the color-line, his regiment was short one of its ten companies. (The absent unit, Company A, had been assigned to provost duty in Hartsville.) With their colonel in the van, the Illini moved off on the double. Colonel Hapeman deployed his regiment, which was slated to form the center of Moore's battle line, on the right of the 106th Ohio. The troops took cover in the edge of the grove of beech trees. An open field, undoubtedly used for grazing since it was "rocky and broken", sloped down into a ravine to the Illinoisans' immediate front. Looking across the valley Hapeman's soldiers could see the foe wheeling into line one-fourth mile away. Two companies, H and K, were deployed and thrown out as skirmishers. The former reinforced the roadblock manned by Stewart's cavalry, while the latter covered the ground between the left flank of Moore's battle line and the river. Here the men of Company K were joined by the troopers of Company G, 2d Indiana Cavalry. The cavalrymen had fallen back, after they had been brushed aside by
Morgan's advance. During the retreat a patrol led by Lieutenant Demetrius Parsley had been cut off and captured by the butternuts. When the cry, "The Rebels are coming", was raised, Captain Carlo Piepho, the commander of the 108th Ohio, had his drummers beat the "long-roll". After mustering seven of his regiment's eight companies (Company H had accompanied the supply team to Gallatin), Piepho waited for instructions. Before any orders emanating from Colonel Moore's headquarters reached him, Piepho formed five of his companies into line of battle covering the camp of the 108th Ohio. The regimental adjutant, Henry Huhn, was placed in charge of these troops. Accompanied by his other two companies (A and B) deployed as skirmishers, Piepho moved forward. The Ohioans had not gone very far before they sighted the greyclads drawn up in line of battle in a stubble field on the crest of the ridge opposite the Yankees' camp. The aggressive Piepho decided to seize the initiative by attacking first. However, if Piepho was to undertake this desperate gamble, he knew he would have to bring up the remainder of his command. Accordingly, a messenger was sent galloping to the rear with instructions for Adjutant Huhn to hasten to the front. By this time, however, Huhn had received marching orders from Colonel Moore's headquarters. In response to those instructions Huhn's battalion occupied the crest of a bald on the right of the 104th Illinois. Realizing
it would be suicidal to attack the butternuts with two companies, Piepho was forced to discard his daring plan. 52

Shortly before Huhn's battalion reached the bald hill, Colonel Tafel of the 106th Ohio noticed that the eminence commanded both the ridge on which the Yankees had established their main line of resistance and the one of which the Rebels were massing their forces. Believing it was vital that the Federals secure possession of the commanding ground, Tafel called Colonel Moore's attention to the situation. Moore agreed with Tafel's estimate of the situation, and ordered him to occupy the bald hill. Quickly assembling his regiment, Tafel marched it by the right flank. Passing to the rear of the 104th Illinois, the Buckeyes moved forward on the double. However, before he gained his objective, Tafel saw that Huhn's battalion had beaten him to the punch and secured possession of the knob. The colonel immediately relayed this information to the brigade commander. Moore, upon being advised of this situation, issued instructions for Tafel to form his command in the gap between the 104th Illinois and the 108th Ohio. Before Tafel could complete his deployment, Duke's hard-hitting troopers launched their smashing attack on the Union right. 53

Once he had completed his deployment, Colonel Moore sent one of his aides galloping forward. Hailing Colonel Stewart, the staff officer directed him to fall back and regroup his command.
Until this time, the butternuts had made no move to attack the troopers manning the roadblock. In response to Moore's instructions, Stewart ordered his men to mount. The soldiers of Company H accompanied the cavalry as it fell back. Retiring on Moore's main line of resistance, Stewart divided his command. One battalion took position on the infantry's right; the other on their left. The cavalry's mission was to prevent the Confederates from turning Moore's flanks. 34

Long before Duke's troopers had closed to within 400 yards, the Union skirmishers started to blaze away. Not until they had closed to within 80 yards did the Rebels return the Yankees' fire. About this time, Cobb's battery also began to hammer the Union battle line with shot and shell. On the Union left, the ground held by the 104th Illinois was not directly threatened by Duke's advance. Therefore, Colonel Hapeman, to shelter his soldiers from the projectiles fired by Cobb's guns, had them lie down. Either the 106th Ohio was protected by the configuration of the ground, or the aim of the Rebel gunners was poor, because Colonel Tafel reported, "This attack was preceded by the firing of their artillery, which, on account of its bad aim, produced no effect whatever." To neutralize the fire of Cobb's battery, Moore ordered Lieutenant Green to put his two 10-pounder Parrottts into action. The Hoosiers had previously unlimbered their pieces near the left flank of the 106th Ohio. Training their guns on Cobb's
battery, the Union cannoneers began to deliver counter-battery fire. Within a short time, the Hoosiers registered a direct hit on one of Cobb's caissons. 55

The Union cavalrymen posted on the right of Moore's battle line, in the face of Chenault's turning movement, quickly gave way. Falling back in disorder the cavalrymen fled to their camp. This debacle laid bare the 108th Ohio's right flank. Making a desperate effort to stabilize the situation, the Buckeyes fell back about 100 yards and refused their right flank. Bypassing the 108th Ohio, Chenault's butternuts swept around the Yankees' right flank. Chenault was impressed by the formidable position occupied by the 108th Ohio atop the bald hill. Accordingly, he decided to leave a small force behind to contain the Federals while the remainder of his command continued its rapid push toward the Union encampment. 56

Meanwhile, Cluke's regiment had closed with the 106th Ohio. As the Rebels' battle line surged forward, Colonel Moore believed he saw it falter. At this time, the dismounted troopers were exposed to the massed volleys of the Union infantry. This caused the colonel to feel "confident that we could cut our way through the rebel ranks". Moore, therefore, ordered the 104th Illinois and the 106th Ohio to go over to the attack. By this time, however, Cluke's hard-charging Kentuckians had driven to within 80 yards of the Ohioans' battle line. Furthermore, the bluecoats'
volleys had failed to check the butternuts' onslaught. Instead of obeying their officers' orders to attack, the Yankees bolted for the rear. In his "After Action Report", Colonel Moore commented bitterly, "The One hundred and six Ohio acted shamefully, and left us in the midst of the fight, many of the men running for shelter in the tents of the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, which were in the rear of our line of battle." Colonels Moore and Stewart failed in their efforts to rally the panic-stricken men of the 106th Ohio. When the 106th Ohio stampeded, Colonel Moore was forced to suspend his order to attack. 57

While Cluke's troopers were busy mopping up the remnants of the 106th Ohio and Chensult's were containing the 108th Ohio, Colonel Moore sought to organize a new defense line. It was the brigade commander's design to prolong the engagement, expecting that reinforcements from Castalian Springs would arrive in time to prevent the annihilation of his command. Colonel Hapeman, of the 104th Illinois, was directed to hold his ground at all costs. A determined stand by the Illinoisans was mandatory if the Federals were to withdraw Green's two guns. Moore planned to have Green's Hoosiers emplace their two Parrots on top of the bluff next to the river. In addition, the colonel issued orders for the officers of the 106th and 108th Ohio to rally their men on the guns. 58
The sudden collapse of the 106th Ohio had left Green's artillerymen without any infantry support -- an exceedingly embarrassing situation for the Hoosiers to be in, with Cluke's cheering Kentuckians rapidly closing in. Undaunted, the Hoosiers quickly limbered up their pieces. Putting their horses to the gallop, the cannoneers succeeded in reaching the lines of the 104th Illinois in safety. After they had placed their rifles in battery, the Union artillerists resumed their duel with Cobb's gunners; but before the guns could be moved to the bluff, in accordance with Moore's orders, Hunt's combat team had moved to the attack.

Spearheaded by the crack 2d Kentucky, the men of the Orphan Brigade forced their way across the ravine which fronted the position of the 104th Illinois. Quickly giving away, the Union skirmishers retired on their main line of resistance. Closing to within less than 50 paces, the butternuts halted and commenced to trade volleys with the Illini. Both the Union and Confederate officers agreed on the "desperate" nature of the ensuing contest. Battle-hardened Colonel Hunt observed, "My whole command was now engaged. The crest of the hill was reached, and here commenced a desperate struggle, as the contestants were only from 30 to 50 paces apart, where they fought for the space of ten minutes, when the order to charge was given . . . ." 59 The
commander of the 9th Kentucky, Captain Morehead, recalled,

"Ascending the hill, the regiment advanced to the right of the
second Kentucky, halted and immediately became engaged, at less
than 50 paces, with the enemy. After fighting for a short time,
I ordered a charge ... .” 60

On only one point did the officers of the 104th Illinois
disagree with the Kentuckians, and that was on the duration of
the contest. Captain John Wadleigh reported, "after sustaining
the united fire of two regiments of Kentucky infantry ... for
something like thirty minutes, they [the Yankees] were compelled
to fall back, and did so in some little confusion ... ." 61 A
lieutenant in Company G, 104th Illinois, Robert V. Simpson, wrote
of the fighting:

After we had been engaged half an hour, one of
my men shot down the enemy's color-bearer. At this
I observed the enemy [probably the 2d Kentucky when
it halted to dress its lines] fall back in good
order. About this time, or rather while this was
taking place, the word came along our line that the
One hundred and eighth had retreated on the run and
surrendered. [There was no substance to this report.]
The enemy then closed in upon our front and flanks,
and poured in upon us an unceasing shower of bullets.
The artillery was ordered to the rear, and, when
out of the way, the One hundred and fourth was
ordered to fall back, which it did, with some
confusion. 62

The 104th Illinois' regimental historian, William W.
Calkins, recalled:
The 104th now supported both pieces of artillery, and encouraged by Colonel Hapeman and Major John H. Widner, and all the officers, continued the unequal contest for 20 minutes longer -- and until the Rebels poured in on the flank, and were within 15 paces, so near, in fact, that we saw the whites of their eyes. Then it was that Colonel Moore, who had ridden the lines all through with unflinching bravery, gave the order to retreat to the hills on the river. 63

The Confederates' fire had killed the horses and kept Green's gunners from removing the field piece emplaced on the right flank of the 104th Illinois. Limbering up their other piece the artillerists fell back. They emplaced this Parrott on the bluff adjoining the river, where Colonel Moore proposed to establish his new line of resistance. A detachment drawn from Company B, 104th Illinois, led by Captain George W. Howe, observed that the cannoneers had abandoned one of their guns. Howe determined to try to save the piece. Taking the gun, the infantrymen started to manhandle it toward a nearby ravine. They planned to conceal the piece, and thus keep it from falling into the butternuts' possession. The bluecoats, however, were frustrated in their efforts to save the gun, because the Confederates, divining their intentions, opened a scathing fire on them. Abandoning the Parrott, the Yankees scampered for cover. 64

Just as the men of the 104th Illinois started to pull back, in accordance with their officers' orders, Hunt's combat veterans
5 urged forward. This was more than the already shaken Illinoisans who had been in service for only a little more than three months could sustain. The planned retreat quickly degenerated into a rout. Private Green recalled:

We rushed forward, their line broke & we pressed them hard; here & there some gallant man in blue half hidden behind a tree or rock would stubbornly hold his position & fire at us.

One man raised his gun to fire at Jim Burba running towards him while placing a cap on his gun. Jim called to him, "Surrender or I'll kill you!" The fearless hearted Yankee heard this threat with scorn & fired point blank at Jim; by some mysterious intervention he missed him, though not ten feet from him. Jim at once executed the threat & sent that poor fellow beyond all the cares of this world.

Closely pursued by the hard-charging men of the Orphan Brigade, the Illini passed rapidly through their camp. By the time the 104th Illinois reached the bluff by the river, where Colonel Moore planned to reform his brigade, the officers were able to rally less than one-half their men. Taking position in support of Green's remaining gun, the survivors of the 104th's debacle grimly waited for the Confederates to resume the attack. To make matters worse, Colonel Moore had been unable to reform the shattered fragments of the 106th and 108th Ohio which had taken cover near the river bank.

Immediately following the stampede of the 106th Ohio, Colonel Duke halted and regrouped his command. When reformed
Duke's battle line was at right angles to its initial line of advance. A detachment of Chenault's regiment was given the task of containing the bypassed portions of the 108th Ohio. By the time Duke had completed these dispositions, Hunt's infantry had forced the 104th Illinois to give way. Observing that the bluecoats were endeavoring to establish a new defense line on the bluff next to the river, Duke ordered his men to prepare to resume the attack. Before Duke could wave his eager troopers forward, he observed a mounted detachment approaching rapidly from the southwest. The colonel suspended his assault pending the newcomers' identification. Within a few moments, Duke was able to ascertain that the approaching horsemen, about 100 strong, belonged to the 7th Kentucky.

As soon as the advance elements of his command had forded the river, Colonel Huffman decided to press on. Huffman undoubtedly realized it would be unwise to wait until all of his command had crossed the Cumberland before pushing forward to his comrades-in-arms' support. Having first left word for the remainder of his unit to follow after all the troopers had reached the right bank of the river, Huffman headed for Hartsville -- the sound of battle pounding in his ears. In spite of their fears that the engagement would end before they reached the scene, Huffman's hard-riding troopers arrived in time to participate in the final onslaught.
Hailing Huffman, Duke directed him to dismount and deploy his troopers in support of Cluke's and Chenault's men. Once Huffman's cavalrymen had moved into position, Duke's attack jumped off. Letting go with a terrible "Rebel yell", the dismounted greyclads moved toward the shaken foe on the double. The Confederates swept forward unchecked until they reached the 108th Ohio's wagon park. Approaching the wagons, the Southerners were exposed to a galling fire. The soldiers holed up in the wagon park consisted of some hard-core elements of the 106th Ohio led by Colonel Tafel. Following the collapse of his regiment, the colonel had rallied a portion of his command which took cover in the abandoned wagons. From the protection afforded by these vehicles, the Buckeyes blazed away at Duke's onrushing troopers. Having momentarily checked the Confederate onslaught, Tafel glanced to his left and observed that Hunt's infantry had occupied the camps belonging to the 104th Illinois and the 108th Ohio. Realizing this rendered his position untenable, Tafel ordered his men to retire to the bluff abutting on the river. Evacuating the wagon park, Tafel's troops headed for the high ground; Duke's troopers in hot pursuit. Before the bluecoats could gain their objective, Tafel learned that "Colonel Moore had already surrendered the battery and that part of the brigade which had rallied on the hill back of the camps." 69
In conjunction with the advance of Duke's dismounted troopers, the soldiers of the Orphan Brigade closed in for a second time on the decimated 104th Illinois. Debouching from the captured Union encampment, the butternuts began to trade lethal volleys with the Illinoisans. A few minutes sufficed to finish the affair. His men being "crowded together like sheep in a pen" and being cut down by the screaming minies, Colonel Moore had but one option and that was to capitulate. When confronted by an officer of the 9th Kentucky, Captain N. A. Crouch, Colonel Moore amounted "that he surrendered himself and all the men around him ..." 70

Immediately following Moore's surrender, Colonel Hunt noted that a strong force of armed Federals (Tafel's command) was rapidly approaching. Hunt told Moore to send several of his cavalrymen to acquaint the oncoming bluecoats with the situation. When Hunt noticed that these soldiers seemed intent on ignoring Moore's instructions, he called for Captain Morehead. The captain was directed to take his regiment and compel the recalcitrant individuals to lay down their arms. At the same time, the 2d Kentucky was given the task of disarming the troops which Moore had surrendered. 71

Learning that Colonel Moore had surrendered, Colonel Tafel halted his command. While the colonel was debating his next
move, he sighted several cavalrymen clad in United States uniforms
eriding toward him. These individuals waved their hats and
shouted for Tafel "to surrender like the rest". Colonel Tafel,
however, determined to ignore this order. He bellowed
instructions for his men "not to listen, and that General Dumont
was near with re-enforcements". Accordingly, the men rallied
preparatory to attempting another stand. But time had run out
for Tafel's command. The Buckeyes were quickly surrounded by the
9th Kentucky. It was now a question of annihilation or surrender.
Tafel chose the latter of these two unpleasant alternatives. 72

Duke, having satisfied himself that Hunt's combat team
would be able to disarm the Union troops in and around the camp,
prepared to mop up the isolated pockets of resistance left behind
during the course of the Confederates' victorious sweep.
Accordingly, Duke issued instructions for the horse-holders to
bring the beasts forward.

Following Moore's surrender, Piepho's detachment of the
108th Ohio which had been bypassed endeavored to escape. Cutting
their way through Chenault's small containing force, the Yankees
moved off on the double. After a march of about three-quarters
of a mile, during which they were joined by a number of stragglers
from other commands, the Buckeyes reached a small creek on the
right of the Hartsville road. The creek was covered by a thin
sheet of ice which was not strong enough to support the soldiers. Captain Good advanced the suggestion that the column "countermarch down the stream about a quarter of a mile to where a small bridge crossed." While the officers were arguing the merits of Good's suggestion, the question was rendered academic, when Duke's troopers, having secured their mounts, arrived on the scene. A demand that the Yankees lay down their arms was made by the Confederates. The ranking officer present, Major Lauritz Barentzen of the 106th Ohio, stepped forward and acknowledged the surrender. The bluecoats, accompanied by their captors, returned to the camp formerly held by them.

Meanwhile, the 9th Tennessee and Stoner's battalion had not been inactive. Once his regiment had been detached by Duke, Colonel Bennett detailed a portion of his command to establish a roadblock on the Hartsville-Castalian Springs road. Having accomplished this part of his mission, Bennett led the remainder of his regiment toward Hartsville. As the Tennesseans approached the town's outskirts, they were fired upon. Being advised of the greyclads' approach, the commander of the provost guard (Company A, 104th Illinois) Captain James M. Leighton turned out his men. Undaunted by the Yankees' fire, the hard-riding Tennesseans thundered forward. After a brief skirmish in the streets of the town, in which casualties were suffered by both sides, Colonel Bennett's troopers forced the Illini to lay down their arms. In
addition to the provost guards, the Tennesseans bagged themselves a large number of other Union soldiers in and around the town -- some 450 in all. Among these were the patients in the military hospital and a large number of stragglers. By the time Colonel Bennett's troopers had rounded up their prisoners, Duke's and Hunt's men had forced Colonel Moore to surrender. The Tennesseans, having successfully completed their mission, rejoined the task force. 74

Unlike Bennett's Tennesseans, Stoner's Kentuckians did not become directly engaged with the foe. Nevertheless, Stoner's troopers did make a contribution to the Confederate success. Taking position on the opposite side of the river from the Union encampment shortly after Colonel Moore had formed his battle line, Stoner had Corbett's artillerists unlimber the two "Bull Pups". Once the two mountain howitzers were in battery, the Rebel cannoneers began to shell the Federal camp. This bombardment served to disconcert the Yankees. Accordingly, they greatly overestimated the strength of Stoner's command. (Major Samuel Hill of the 2d Indiana reported that Stoner's force consisted of one regiment of cavalry, two of infantry, and a six-gun battery.) Consequently, Colonel Moore determined to recall his cavalry and use them to counter this new threat. In accordance with Moore's orders, Colonel Stewart recalled his troopers and used them to
cover the Lebanon pike ford. At this time, the Union cavalry was guarding the flanks of the Union main line of resistance. Thus at a critical point in the engagement, Stoner had compelled the foe to redeploy their cavalry. Furthermore, when the Yankees had fallen back to the high bluff, the presence of Stoner's battalion on the south side of the Cumberland prevented them from escaping across the river.

From the time the first shots were exchanged with the Union outpost stationed on the old Lebanon road until Colonel Moore had surrendered his command, about 90 minutes had elapsed. During this relatively short period, Morgan stated his task force had:

... defeated and captured three well-disciplined and well-formed regiments of infantry, with a regiment of cavalry, and took two rifled cannon -- the whole encamped on their own ground and in a strong position -- taking about 1,800 prisoners, 1,800 stand of arms, a quantity of ammunition, clothing, quartermaster's stores, and 16 wagons.

The Confederates had scored this smashing success at a moderate cost. Morgan reported that the attack on Hartsville had cost his task force a total of 129 officers and men -- 21 killed, 104 wounded, and 14 missing. In addition to the 1,834 men captured or missing, the Yankees reported they lost 58 killed and 204 wounded in the battle.

The battle had ended in results exceeding Morgan's "own expectations". But the colonel knew that his "position was a most perilous one", because it was within eight miles of the big
Union base at Catallan Springs. From his scouts, Morgan had learned that Catallan Springs was garrisoned by a "force of at least 8,000 men, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery". Morgan realized that these troops "would naturally march to the aid of their comrades on hearing the report of our guns". Therefore, the colonel, assisted by his staff, quickly assembled all the captured wagons. When loaded with the booty (arms, ammunition, and stores), the vehicles were sent across the river, crossing at Hart's Ferry. 78

After the fatigue parties had loaded the wagons, Morgan permitted his men to take what they wished from the Union tents and supply dumps. Undoubtedly, the most desired items found by the greyclads in the encampment were shoes, boots, and clothing. The shoes and boots were especially appreciated by the troopers belonging to the 8th and 11th Kentucky. These two units which had only recently been mustered into Confederate service, had been unable to draw any shoes or boots from the quartermaster department. Therefore, during the march to Hartsville, many of the troopers had been forced to wrap their feet in "pieces of blanket".

Even the Yankees' personal gear fell prey to the equipment-starved Confederates. Private Johnny Green recalled:

They [the bluecoats] were bountifully supplied with everything a soldier could wish. In our [the Orphan Brigade's] campaigns at Shiloh & Vicksburg &
Baton Rouge we had used up or lost nearly all our clothes so we ransacked their camp for good clothes. It was Dec. 7th & I had no over coat. I rushed into the tent of Col. Moore & found his over coat on his cot & at once put it on & helped myself to some good flannel shirts in his valise; just then he [Colonel Moore] came in & said, "My good fellow dont take my clothes."

I gave him back his shirts & he said, "Oh! do give me my over coat," but I drew the line at the over coat, I said, "No you wont need it; you will be kept warm in prison & I'll need it."

He replied, "Do give me my over coat & get the Major's [probably Captain Cholson's] in the next tent; he was killed in the fight." [The Union returns fail to list any major killed in the battle/]

But I was hard hearted & replied, "You may have the Major's; I'll keep this." 79

Captain Wadleigh in his "After Action Report" had some strong words to say about the Rebels' conduct:

... during the time that the One Hundred and Fourth were in the hands of the enemy, they were shamefully abused by the said enemy, by not being half fed, and by having their clothing stripped from them, by order of one John Morgan. Not being satisfied with taking the overcoats and blankets from the well, they stooped to the meanness of stripping the blankets from the sick .... 80

While the Confederate demolition teams were busy applying the torch to the tents and gear which could not be removed, the rattle of musketry from the direction of Castalian Springs became distinctly audible. Shortly, thereafter, a courier galloped up on a sweat-lathered horse. The soldier informed Morgan that Captain Quirk's scouts were in contact with a strong Union force
estimated to number at least 5,000. Morgan, in spite of this grave threat to his task force, kept his composure. Colonel Cluke's regiment was sent to reinforce the hard-pressed scouts. Hastening to the point of danger, Cluke's troopers quickly established a roadblock on the Castalian Springs road. The remainder of the 7th Kentucky having reached the captured encampment, Morgan ordered Colonel Huffman to support Cluke's troopers.

Covered by the two cavalry regiments, Morgan's task force prepared to cross the river. Time was of the essence for the Confederates, because it was apparent to all that two cavalry regiments would not be able to hold in check the advancing Union force for very long. The artillery and booty-laden wagons forded the river first. Reaching the south bank of the Cumberland, Cobb's cannoneers unlimbered their four pieces as well as the two captured Parrotts. These six pieces, along with the "Bull Pups", were trained on the approaches to the ford.

Courtesy to the conquered ceased to be the watch word. The Union prisoners were double-timed toward the ford. Some of the bluecoats "were hesitant about going", but as one of the Rebels recalled, "war knows nothing of the law of politeness" and the captors demanded the utmost speed from the crestfallen and distressed prisoners.
As the butternuts neared the ford, the men of Hunt's combat team began "to be very chummy with the cavalry". It was apparent that the foot soldiers had no desire to wade the "breast-deep" frigid river. Taking cognizance of this situation, the officers issued instructions for the troopers to share their mounts with the infantry. Accordingly, each man in Chenault's and Bennett's regiments reined in his horse, while an infantryman was permitted to climb on behind him. Riding double, the troopers were able to ferry a portion of Hunt's command across the icy river. By this time, however, the pursuing Federals were beginning to exert considerable pressure on Cluke's and Huffman's commands. Therefore, the remainder of the infantry, along with the prisoners, would have to wade the river. One of the soldiers recalled, "it [the water] was still terribly cold but victory had raised our spirits so that we could stand any thing." 34

The captured bluecoats' morale, however, had not been buoyed by their defeat. Undoubtedly many of the soldiers, noting that the rattle of musketry was rapidly drawing nearer, felt that if they procrastinated long enough the relief column would arrive in time to prevent a trip to a Southern prison camp. To force the Yankees to take to the chilling water, the provost guards were compelled to use "threats of violence". Since the water was to be "preferred to bullets", the bluecoats reluctantly, and with

51
oud protests against such violation of the laws of war", were driven across the river. In the confusion accompanying the crossing, several of the bluecoats escaped, but the majority were safely escorted to the opposite side. 85

Several days before Morgan's task force launched its blitzkrieg, a second Union brigade had been sent to Castalian Springs. This brigade commanded by Colonel Abram O. Miller like Moore's belonged to Dumont's division. It was the Union brass' intention to have Miller's brigade relieve Harlan's unit. The latter officer's unit would then be transferred south of the Cumberland. By the morning of the 7th, however, Harlan's brigade had not received its marching orders. Thus, on this fateful morning, there were two brigades (mustering a total of 4,999 officers and men) stationed at Castalian Springs. 86

The first intimation that Colonels Harlan and Miller received indicating there might be trouble at Hartsville was about 7:30 a.m. At that time the rumble of distant artillery fire became distinctly audible. As soon as the cannonading commenced, Colonel Harlan, who was the senior officer present, sent a courier racing toward Hartsville. His mission was to ascertain the cause of the firing. A second messenger departed close on the heels of the first. The latter individual was "to proceed rapidly up the road, and if he heard musketry, or could learn any facts which indicated that a fight was probably going
on at Hartsville, to return with all possible speed to ... 

[Harlan's] camp and report". At the same time, the two brigade 
commanders alerted their regimental commanders to hold their 
respective units ready to march on a moment's notice. 87

Shortly after the departure of the second courier, Colonel 
Harlan received a report from Captain James I. Hudnall of the 4th 
Kentucky. The captain, who was in charge of an outpost on the 
Hartsville road, informed the colonel "that he thought he could 
hear heavy musketry in the direction of Hartsville". Harlan 
immediately relayed this intelligence to Colonel Miller.

Furthermore, Harlan advanced the suggestion that Miller's command 
move to Hartsville. Miller readily acceded to Harlan's proposition. 
Within a few minutes Miller's brigade, its vanguard screened by 
a detachment drawn from the 7th Kentucky Cavalry commanded by 
Major John K. Faulkner, moved out of the Castalian Springs 
staging area. Colonel Harlan, accompanied by two infantry 
regiments (the 4th Kentucky and the 74th Indiana) and two sections 
of Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, followed closely in 
Miller's wake. The remainder of Harlan's brigade (the 4th Kentucky 
and the 10th Indiana and Battery C's other section) were left to 
guard the camps. 88

By the time his command had reached a point within three 
miles of Hartsville, Harlan received a message from Miller. 
Opening the dispatch, Harlan found that Miller had sighted the 
foe. In addition, Miller wished Harlan to "come forward rapidly
with ... [his] men and assume command, as there were some indications of a fight". Before ordering his men forward, Harlan sent an aide pounding for Castalian Springs. The staff officer was directed to have the 4th Kentucky take the field. This task taken care of, the colonel led his men forward on the double.

Arriving within one and one-half miles of Hartsville, Harlan found Miller's brigade drawn up in line of battle. Miller's attached battery -- two sections of the 13th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery -- had been unlimbered. Previous to Harlan's arrival, the Hoosier artilleryists had dropped one or two shells into the woods beyond, where they had spotted some of the foe. Up until he had overtaken Miller's brigade, Harlan had not encountered a single Union fugitive from the Hartsville debacle. Accordingly, Harlan had been unable to obtain any information concerning the fate of Colonel Moore's command. The firing having ceased "some little while before", Harlan was thrown into a quandary. He was unable to ascertain, "Whether the enemy had been repulsed and had retired, or whether our entire force [Moore's command] had been captured". Harlan's dilemma was soon solved when he spotted a dense cloud of smoke rising from the direction of Colonel Moore's camp. Convinced that Moore's brigade had been overwhelmed, Harlan determined to push forward, and, if possible, catch and destroy the Rebels before they could escape across the river. To implement this decision, Harlan sent his
men forward on the double. Spearheaded by the 7th Kentucky Cavalry, the bluecoated infantry moved cross-country toward Moore's smoldering encampment. Harlan knew from previous experience that this was the "shortest route to the ford, near Hartsville, where the rebels would necessarily recross the river". 90

When Faulkner's cavalrymen reached the deserted encampment which was about 400 yards from the ford, they caught sight of Morgan's rear guard (the 7th and the 8th Kentucky). Having been advised that the last of Hunt's infantry and the Union prisoners had crossed the river, Cluke's and Huffman's troopers had fallen back to the ford. Accordingly, by the time Faulkner's Kentuckians reached the ransacked encampment, Cluke's and Huffman's horsemen were in the process of crossing the river. Without hesitating a moment, Faulkner's troopers opened fire on the escaping butternuts. Abandoning ll wagons which had been entrusted to their care, the greyclads, who were still on the north bank of the Cumberland, "fled precipitately across the river". Joining Faulkner, Harlan noted that in addition to the Rebel cavalry fording the Cumberland, several hundred other butternuts could be seen scaling a hill on the opposite side of the river. In an effort to harass the butternuts' retreat, Harlan ordered the gunners of the 13th Indiana to unlimber their four pieces. Once they had placed their pieces in battery, the Union gunners opened fire. The Confederate field pieces emplaced on the south side of the river
immediately replied. This artillery duel continued until the last of the Confederate horsemen had passed from view. As soon as their comrades-in-arms had reached safety, the butternut artillerists limbered up their pieces and retired down the Lebanon pike. 91

Colonel Harlan made no effort to follow the Confederates across the Cumberland. The colonel believed, "Pursuit was utterly impracticable; it would have required at least an hour and a half to cross the river at that point [Hart's Ferry] and ascend the high bank on the south side." In addition, Harlan had learned from some of Moore's men (the wounded and those who had escaped from the foe) that the Confederates had a strong strategic reserve stationed on the left bank of the Cumberland. Accordingly, Harlan deemed it unwise "to cross the river with the force then at ... [his] disposal, being entirely unadvised as to what strength the enemy had on the south side" of the river. On broaching the subject to his brother officers, they concurred in Harlan's decision not to pursue. 92

Correctly believing it was his duty to salvage as much of the public property belonging to Colonel Moore's shattered brigade as possible, Harlan sent a staff officer to Castalian Springs. The aide was directed to have 25 of the wagons assigned to Miller's brigade sent to the point of disaster. Simultaneously, fatigue details were organized and put to work -- succoring the wounded, burying the dead, and policing the battlefield. By
nightfall, the working parties had completed their tasks. After
the wagons had been loaded, Harlan's and Miller's brigades
returned to Castalian Springs. 93

Several days after the battle the citizens of Ottawa,
Illinois, where the 104th had been organized, sent a committee of
three -- Reverend Z. Coleman, Dr. C. Hard and J. W. Calkins -- to
Hartsdale. These men brought with them letters, food and
bandages for the wounded. Before returning to Illinois, the three
men buried a number of Union dead overlooked by Harlan's command;
reinterred those who had been partially covered with dirt; and,
when the soldier could be identified, marked their graves. 94

With the cavalry bringing up the rear, the Confederate
column, after leaving the ford, pushed rapidly southward. Before
the greyclads had proceeded very far, it became apparent there
would be no pursuit. Therefore, the pace of the march became
more leisurely. It was after 10 p.m. when Morgan's task force
reached Baird's Mills. If, on returning to their base, the
column swung along with a confident and jubilant air, the
butternuts could be excused. Morgan's command had accomplished
a brilliant feat which the participants would refer to with pride
for the rest of their lives. In 30 hours, the men of Morgan's
task force had marched 50 miles, crossed the Cumberland River
twice, and annihilated a formidable Union brigade. 95
The march from Hartsville to Baird's Hills was anything but a pleasant experience for the disgruntled prisoners. The 104th Illinois' historian recalled:

No one had eaten a bite since the night before. The rebel soldiers had little in their haversacks -- and that little -- corn pone. Many of them kindly shared it with our men. Having gone 25 miles we were put in bivouac for the night in a cedar brake. Even the wood was hard to get for fires, as we had no axes to cut it. The weather being very cold and several inches of snow on the ground, there was much suffering. No food was given us. We realized what it meant to be prisoners. With several rebel regiments on guard about the camp the long night finally ended. 96

During Morgan's absence, the remainder of the Orphan Brigade had not been idle. On the 6th Colonel Hanson, accompanied by the 41st Alabama, and the 4th and the 6th Kentucky, had left Baird's Hills. Advancing along the Statesville-Nashville pike, Hanson's troops pushed westward. Hanson's mission was to reconnoiter the countryside between Baird's Hills and Stones River and make a diversion to cover Morgan's attack on Hartsville. After marching a number of miles up the pike and encountering no signs of enemy activity, Hanson's brigade camped for the night. The next day (the 7th), Hanson's command returned to Baird's Hills. 97

On the morning of the 6th Morgan disbanded his task force. As soon as Hunt's combat team had reported to him, Hanson alerted the Orphan Brigade to get ready to return to Murfreesboro. Once
the soldiers had squared their gear away, the brigade, accompanied by the prisoners, moved out. By nightfall the Orphan Brigade had reached Murfreesboro. The soldiers "well supplied with Yankee sutler's stores & good humor", reoccupied their tents and prepared to celebrate a "joyous Christmas which was only 17 days off". 98

Concurrent with Morgan's attack on Hartsville, Cheatham and Wheeler had carried out their mission. On the 6th these two officers feinted a thrust against the southeastern approaches to Nashville. Cheatham's infantry, their advance screened by Wheeler's troopers, left the Lavergne staging area on the morning of the 6th. Tramping along the snow-covered road, the Rebels pushed cautiously forward. About noon Wheeler learned from his scouts that a large Union foraging party was operating near Kimbrough's Mill. When he was advised of this, the hard-bitten Cheatham ordered Wheeler to bag the foragers. Quickly assembling his command, Wheeler moved to the attack. 99

While Cheatham's and Wheeler's greyclads were getting ready to leave Lavergne, two Union foraging parties were being organized preparatory to going into the countryside southeast of Nashville. The larger one, belonging to Brigadier General Joshua W. Sill's division, was commanded by Colonel Harvey M. Buckley. Sill's train was escorted by three infantry regiments (the 1st and the 93d Ohio, and the 5th Kentucky), two sections of Battery H, 5th
U. S. Light Artillery, and two companies of the 3d Indiana Cavalry. The second forage train was made up of wagons drawn from Colonel George D. Wagner's division. Wagner's train was guarded by the 97th Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Milton Barnes commanding. Initially, the Union brass had not intended for the two trains to travel together. However, when Barnes reached Sill's camp, Buckley "informed ... [him] that it would not be safe to venture out beyond with one regiment only, and suggested that I should accompany him, and unite our forces". Barnes readily acquiesced to Buckley's suggestion.

Passing beyond the line of Union outposts, the forage train (Buckley's wagons in the van) proceeded out the Nolensville pike as far as Mill Creek. Here the forage-master called a halt. He then estimated how many wagons could be filled from the adjoining corn fields. Having reached his decision, he detached 15 wagons from the rear of the column. The wagoners in charge of the designated vehicles drove them into the nearby fields. Three companies of the 97th Ohio were detached to guard these wagons. Once the wagons had pulled off, the remainder of the train, accompanied by its escorting infantry, continued to push forward. Before the train had proceeded very far, its advance was brought up short when Colonel Buckley sighted between 15 and 20 mounted butternuts about one-half mile ahead. The colonel called for artillery support. Accordingly, the cannoneers of Battery A
quickly unlimbered one of their pieces. After the artillerists had fired two shells, the Rebel troopers scattered. Not wishing to take any chances, Buckley deployed his command. The 1st Ohio took position on the right of the pike, the 5th Kentucky on the left, while the troopers of the 3d Indiana Cavalry covered the ground immediately in front of the train.

When Colonel Barnes, whose regiment was bringing up the rear, heard the artillery go into action, he prepared to march to the sound of the guns. Accompanied by his remaining seven companies, Barnes moved forward on the double. Reaching Colonel Buckley's command post, Barnes received instructions to support the 5th Kentucky. Without a moment's hesitation, the colonel formed his regiment (the 97th Ohio) into line of battle immediately in the Kentuckians' rear. One company (E), however, was deployed as skirmishers and thrown out on the left. Advancing rapidly the men of Company E entered a large open field. On doing so, they spotted a strong detachment of Wheeler's cavalry. A brisk fire fight quickly developed between the Union infantry and the Rebel troopers. Observing this, Barnes, accompanied by his six remaining companies, dashed forward. But before the panting reinforcements could get within range, the butternuts beat a hasty retreat. While the colonel was deciding what his next move should be, it became apparent that considerable firing had broken
near the rear of the train. Furthermore, Barnes noticed that the 5th Kentucky had started to retire in the direction of the pike. The colonel halted his command to await fresh instructions. When none were forthcoming, however, he passed the word to fall back.

Reaching the head of the stalled train, Barnes was greeted by Colonel Charles Anderson of the 93d Ohio. From Anderson, Barnes learned that Colonel Buckley had determined to have the forage train return to Nashville. The reason behind Buckley's sudden decision to retrace his steps was his fear that the Rebels might establish a roadblock, reinforced with artillery, on the pike. If the foe accomplished this mission, it would separate the train from its base. Accordingly, Buckley, accompanied by the 5th Kentucky, the 1st Ohio and Battery H, moved to the rear of the column. Prior to his departure, Buckley had given Colonel Anderson the task of serving as the rear guard when the train returned to Nashville. Riding along the pike, Colonel Buckley shouted instructions for the wagoners to turn their vehicles around. Before Buckley was able to reach Mill Creek, however, one of Wheeler's combat patrols swept down into the valley and captured 11 wagons. The three companies drawn from the 97th Ohio which were guarding these vehicles were deterred from making any effort to recapture them when fired upon by several guns belonging
to Wiggins' Arkansas Battery. Wheeler's cannoneers had emplaced their pieces on a nearby hill which commanded the creek. 103

Approaching Mill Creek, Buckley ordered the regulars to emplace one of their guns. After several shots, the butternuts were seen to limber up their heavy ordnance and fall back. The forage train then commenced its return journey to Nashville. The 5th Kentucky, the 1st Ohio and Battery H guarded the column's van while the rear was protected by the 93rd and the 97th Ohio and the 3rd Indiana Cavalry. As the column was ascending the hill lying to the west of Mill Creek, Colonel Anderson's Buckeyes, who were marching to the right of the road, suddenly sighted a strong force of dismounted cavalry led by three officers on horseback rushing toward the train. To prevent the butternuts from intercepting the forage train, Colonel Anderson led his Ohioans forward on the double. Having a shorter distance to travel, the blueclads were able to interpose between the wagons and Wheeler's onrushing troopers. During the desultory skirmishing which ensued, the men of the 93rd Ohio more than held their own. The Confederates were forced to give ground. After this brief flurry of excitement, the train succeeded in reaching the Union lines without encountering any further difficulties. 104

Having captured 11 wagons and 57 prisoners during their running battle with the Union foragers, Wheeler's troopers
retraced their steps. After the cavalry had rendezvoused with Cheatham's infantry, the Confederate force returned to Lavergne. The next day Cheatham's infantry, except for one brigade detached for outpost duty on Stewarts Creek, returned to Murfreesboro.\(^{105}\)

News of the Confederate attack on Hartsville was not long delayed in reaching Gallatin where General Thomas maintained his GHQ. Lieutenant Colonel William B. Carroll of the 10th Indiana had been left in charge at Castalian Springs following the departure of the relief column. As soon as Carroll received the message from Harlan telling of the destruction of the Hartsville garrison, he had relayed this distressing intelligence to Thomas. In turn, Thomas passed this information on to General Rosecrans.\(^{106}\)

Shortly, thereafter, a second dispatch reached Thomas' headquarters from the front. On perusing this message, Thomas learned that the foe had succeeded in escaping across the river. Before forwarding this news to Rosecrans, Thomas sent a staff officer racing off with instructions for Harlan to occupy Hartsville. At the same time a scout was directed to contact Colonel Albert S. Hall, whose brigade was en route from Glasgow, Kentucky, to Carthage, Tennessee, and ordered him to hasten to the same point. Thomas dutifully kept Rosecrans acquainted with these developments.\(^{107}\)

Thomas' telegrams served to initiate considerable activity
at Rosecrans' GHQ. The shocked commander of the Army of the
Cumberland wired Thomas, "Do I understand that they [The Rebels] have captured an entire brigade of our troops without our knowing it, or a good fight?" In a postscript to this message, the general added, "Answer quick." Furthermore, Rosecrans wanted to know the location of the various brigades constituting Dumont's division.

Replying to Rosecrans' dispatches, the harassed Thomas reported that Colonel Harlan had garnered considerable information from Major Hill of the 2d Indiana Cavalry. The cavalryman had told Harlan that the entire Hartsville garrison "which stood was captured; about half gave way." Continuing, Hill stated, "The fight lasted about an hour and a quarter." In addition to relaying Harlan's estimate of the strength of the attacking force (three cavalry and two infantry regiments north of the river, and two infantry regiments and five guns south of the stream), Thomas confidently noted, "The enemy can be intercepted before reaching Murfreesborough". In a second telegram to his chief, Thomas pinpointed Dumont's brigades as follows: Colonel William T. Ward's brigade at Gallatin, Miller's at Castalian Springs, and Moore's (which had been annihilated) at Hartsville.

However, before Rosecrans was able to acknowledge these dispatches from Thomas, he received several distressing reports.
from other sources. The general was told by his scouts that Polk's entire corps had left Murfreesboro via the Lebanon pike on the 5th. (Actually, only the Orphan Brigade had moved to Lebanon on the day in question.) Furthermore, Rosecrans had garnered information indicating that Forrest's brigade had left Columbia, Tennessee, on the following day. According to the reports flowing into Nashville, Forrest's raiders were headed for Kentucky. (Again, as in Polk's case, the Union scouts were misinformed, because Forrest's objective was West Tennessee, not Kentucky.) Finally, Rosecrans was deeply disturbed by the attack on the Union foraging party, near Kimbrough's Mill, carried out by Wheeler's cavalry on the 6th. To make matters worse, the general was advised that Wheeler's brigade had been supported by infantry (two brigades drawn from Cheatham's division). 112

Accordingly, Rosecrans, for the moment, seemed to forget all about catching Morgan's raiders. Instead, the general began to mature plans for combating what looked to him like a dangerous Confederate offensive. A number of telegrams were quickly dispatched from Rosecrans' Nashville GHQ. These dispatches alerted the general's principal subordinates to hold their respective commands ready to take the field on a moment's notice. In addition to Thomas, Brigadier Generals John M. Palmer, James S. Negley, Lovell H. Rousseau, David S. Stanley, and James D.
Morgan were directed to have their troops prepare cooked rations and draw ammunition. Guides, who were familiar with the countryside south and east of Nashville, would be secured by these Union officers. 113

Simultaneously, Thomas was directed to verify Polk's purported advance. Furthermore, Thomas was to take steps to provide for the security of Hall's brigade, because Rosecrans, on glancing at his maps, realized if Hall's brigade had reached Carthage, it would be in a dangerously exposed position. In closing Rosecrans asked Thomas, "How many men can you command for offensive, how many for defensive, operations at Gallatin?" 114 In reply Thomas observed, "If I knew the locality of the enemy [Folk's corps], I could use [Brigadier General Speed S.] Fry's entire division, about 8,000. I believe, and leave General Dumont to defend Gallatin." 115 In a second dispatch, Thomas informed Rosecrans one of his scouts had reported "about 2,000 rebel cavalry in Lebanon". Continuing, Thomas observed his scout's information had been "confirmed by citizens who have run off to avoid conscription". The general believed the Lebanon Confederates "might be captured by sending a force from Nashville to get between them and Murfreesborough". 116 The hour was late, however, and Rosecrans made no effort to implement Thomas' suggestion.

Therefore, the bluecoats became overly engrossed with
Bragg's feints and made no attempt to pursue or intercept Morgan's task force while the trail was still hot. Thus, to General Bragg's well-thought-out master plan, and to his subordinates' skill in carrying out their stipulated assignment, must be given some of the credit for the ease with which Morgan's raiders effected their escape.

Before retiring on the evening of the 7th, Rosecrans sent two more telegrams dealing with the Hartsville affair— one to the War Department and the other to Thomas. After waiting all day, in vain, for some favorable news to accompany his message, Rosecrans advised the Washington authorities of the surprise and destruction of the Hartsville garrison. In his communication to Thomas, Rosecrans (not knowing that Harlan's command had already attended to it) asked his subordinate to have the battle field policed and the abandoned arms salvaged. Rosecrans closed his message on a plaintive thought, "It seems to me impossible that the entire brigade could have surrendered. Are there none left?"

On the 8th, Rosecrans started bombarding Thomas at an early hour with a barrage of telegrams. Not wishing to have any of his garrison caught napping in the future, Rosecrans directed Thomas to have "all post commanders to throw up small intrenchments, and picket all roads leading out from their positions with cavalry." Continuing, Rosecrans pointed out, "Disaster at Hartsville seems attributable to neglect of these precautions."
In a second message Rosecrans asked Thomas three questions, "Any more news of Hartsville affair or of the enemy? Could one of Dumont's brigades come down [to Nashville] immediately? How soon will you be ready to move whole force?" 120

In response to Rosecrans' inquiries, Thomas reported that Colonel Harlan had advised him that the "enemy recrossed the river on the arrival of his troops". While there were no Rebels north of the river, Thomas commented, scouts, who had crossed to the opposite side, found greyclad horsemen hovering in the area south of the Cumberland. Thomas promised, if Rosecrans wished, to send Ward's brigade of Dumont's division to Nashville on the 9th. Furthermore, Thomas stated he was ready to bring his entire command to Nashville, whenever Rosecrans gave the word. But, he continued, other units would have to relieve his troops of the responsibility of guarding the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and the Cumberland River fords. In this respect, Thomas pointed out for his chief's benefit there were, at present, no readily available troops to relieve his men of this vital mission. 121

Rosecrans replied immediately to Thomas' dispatch. After requesting the latest data concerning the movements of Hall's brigade, Rosecrans directed Thomas to hasten Fry's division to Nashville. Following the departure of Fry's command, Dumont's division reinforced by Hall's brigade would be given the responsibility of guarding the portion of the Louisville and

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Nashville Railroad between Mitchellsville, Tennessee, and Nashville. 122 Answering Rosecrans' telegram Thomas observed that General Dumont was too sick to take the field. Accordingly, Thomas proposed that Dumont's division be disbanded. In its place Thomas would constitute two new commands. One of these, a special force to be commanded by Brigadier General Eleazer A. Paine, would be charged with the protection of the vital railroad between Mitchellsville and Nashville. The brigade led by Colonel Ward was to be assigned to Paine's command. Dumont's other brigade -- Miller's -- and Hall's brigade when it arrived from Glasgow, were to be organized into a division commanded by Brigadier General Joseph J. Reynolds. This newly constituted division would be given the mission of guarding the crossing of the Cumberland. His hands freed, Thomas proposed to concentrate his other four divisions "at or near Nashville, or, as ... [He] would recommend, near Lebanon". 123

Rosecrans upon perusing Thomas' plan gave it his sanction. A dispatch was immediately drafted informing Thomas he was authorized to carry out the proposed reorganization at once, and concentrate Fry's division preparatory to taking the field. In closing, Rosecrans inquired, "How long will it take?" 124 On receipt of Rosecrans' wire Thomas informed his chief, if Hall's brigade reached Hartsville on the 9th, he would mass Fry's division on the following day. Hall's overdue brigade, however,
did not reach Hartsville until the 10th. It had taken the brigade four days to cover the 55 miles which separated Hartsville and Glasgow. 125

During the morning a refugee was ushered into Thomas' Gallatin headquarters. The civilian on being interrogated told Thomas, "Kirby Smith left Murfreesborough for Lebanon this morning with a pretty large force." This seemingly important intelligence was immediately relayed to Rosecrans' GHQ. 126 Rosecrans responded immediately with the questions, "Do you hear anything of Polk? Did that refugee see or hear of Kirby Smith's operations?" 127 Further questioning of the citizen by Thomas failed to divulge any data concerning Polk's activities. In addition, the bluecoats discovered the refugee had only heard of and not witnessed the purported march of Kirby Smith's column toward Lebanon. 128 (At this time two divisions of Kirby Smith's corps were en route from Manchester to Readyville. Evidently the civilian had picked up and relayed to the Federals an inaccurate bit of information pertaining to the movements of Kirby Smith's corps.)

Throughout the following day (the 9th) Thomas exerted himself in an effort to secure additional information regarding Kirby Smith's activities. From his scouts, who had been operating south of the Cumberland, Thomas learned that the Confederates had established outposts on the Lebanon and Gallatin pikes. These

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pickets prevented his scouts from approaching Lebanon. These individuals, however, had been told by the citizens "that Kirby Smith is in Lebanon, with from 10,000 to 15,000 men." Furthermore, Thomas reported the residents of Gallatin were of the opinion that the Confederates "will attack this place [Gallatin] if they get a chance." Advising Rosecrans of these developments Thomas observed, if Fry's division was transferred to Nashville, as scheduled (on the night of the 9th), he feared Gallatin would be lost. In addition, Thomas informed his superior he had been unable to contact Hall's brigade. Accordingly, Thomas believed it would be courting disaster if he moved Fry's division before Generals Reynolds and Paine could complete their dispositions. 129

Following the receipt of Thomas' telegram, Rosecrans suspended his orders transferring Fry's division to Nashville. After notifying Thomas that he was sending him a regiment of cavalry, Rosecrans inquired, "What truth do you think there is in report of Kirby Smith's being at Lebanon?" Thomas was also directed to select a good defensive position, in case Kirby Smith should attack. If Thomas could defeat Smith, Rosecrans promised to try Bragg's army. 130 In reply to Rosecrans' dispatch the able Thomas observed, "I think we can handle Smith here."

Commenting on the intelligence he had received pertaining to Kirby Smith's activities, Thomas wrote, "The report of Smith's force and position was brought me by a very reliable scout, whose
information I have always found to be correct. I have two or
three men out now, and expect more news to-morrow morning." 131

The next day (the 10th) one of the spies sent out by
Thomas returned to Gallatin. Upon questioning this man Thomas
learned that he had visited Lebanon, and Kirby Smith was not there.
On making inquiries, however, the spy was told by the inhabitants
that Smith was expected. This intelligence was immediately
relayed to Rosecrans' GHQ. 132 It was noon on the 11th before
another scout reached Thomas' headquarters with information
regarding the situation south of the Cumberland River. Being
ushered into the general's presence, the scout reported that
Kirby Smith had not reached Lebanon, though his early arrival was
anticipated by the inhabitants. These reports garnered by the
two scouts were corroborated by information gleaned from two
Confederate deserters and a civilian who had recently passed
through Lebanon. 133

During the evening Thomas received additional data
concerning the Confederate activities in the Lebanon area. The
previous night an 8-man patrol had crossed the Cumberland River.
Penetrating to within two miles of Lebanon the bluecoats stopped
at a house occupied by an "intelligent woman". Representing
themselves as deserters, the Yankees asked for information as to
where they might find the Southern camp. Taken in by the scouts' story, the lady told them "there were no officers or forces in
the neighborhood of Lebanon, but they would have to go to Black's Shop ... 18 miles from Lebanon; that there had been some troops at Baird's Mills, 7 miles south, but they had now all gone to the former place." Continuing, the woman observed "the troops at Black's Shop were commanded by Kirby Smith and Morgan, and numbered about 22,000 men; that it was a part of their force that had so nicely trapped the Yankees at Hartsville."

Returning to their base the Federals stopped at a second house and asked for information. Before the Unionists could resume their journey, however, the dwelling was surrounded by a Rebel patrol. After surrendering the Northerners informed the Confederates "they had deserted, and were only hunting some one to parole them." Before leaving for Lebanon the bluecoats were informed by the Southerners' leader "he would have to take them 13 miles south of Lebanon to get to an officer who could parole them; that this place was Black's Shop; that Morgan was in command, some other general being there with him." En route to Black's Shop, two of the Yankees, after first making an excuse to step aside, took to the brushes and escaped. Reaching the Cumberland River, the two scouts immediately reported to their commanding officer -- Colonel Ferdinand Van Derveer. He in turn relayed the intelligence which they had obtained to Thomas.

The sum total of these reports served to convince Thomas.
that Kirby Smith was not at Lebanon. While the Union brass were exerting themselves to locate Smith's corps, considerable valuable time had been lost. Instead of concentrating his powerful corps at Nashville, Thomas had remained at Gallatin. Accordingly, it was the end of the third week in December before Thomas was able to transfer Fry's division to Nashville. It is to Morgan's blitzkrieg on Hartsville that this tendency of the Yankees to see Confederates everywhere must be attributed. Thus in addition to the destruction of Moore's brigade the daring Morgan had upset Rosecrans' master plan by forcing the Union general to delay (by at least a week) his scheduled concentration on Nashville. 135

But by this time the Washington authorities had become very interested in the Hartsville affair. On the morning of the 9th Rosecrans received a wire from Major General Henry W. Halleck. In a curtly worded telegram the general in chief inquired, "The President directs that you immediately report why an isolated brigade was at Hartsville, and by whose command; and also by whose fault it was surprised and captured." 136 Rosecrans immediately passed the buck to Thomas. The corps commander was informed of the President's request. Thomas was directed to, "Report in detail exact position, strength, and relative distance of your troops between Gallatin and Hartsville at that time, and causes of the disaster as far as known to you." 137
Thomas' report of the Hartsville disaster was in Rosecrans' hands before 11 p.m. Prior to the arrival of Thomas' dispatch, Rosecrans had drafted a message in which he sought to explain why an isolated brigade had been stationed at Hartsville. In reference to this point the general stated, "it was necessary to cover the crossing of the Cumberland River against rebel cavalry, who would essay to attack our railroad and capture our trains."

Continuing, Rosecrans observed, he had less than 4,000 cavalry to cover an "immense" front, while the foe had "not less than 10,000, who are much relieved by guerrilla scouts, and can concentrate for mischief with almost perfect secrecy and impunity". In closing, the general commented, "That outpost [Hartsville] was stronger and better supported than our outpost at Rienzi, 7 miles below Corinth, last summer. The difference was in the superiority and number of rebel cavalry." 138 (On August 26 at Rienzi, Mississippi, a Union force commanded by Colonel Philip H. Sheridan had beaten off an attacking force of Rebels led by Colonel William C. Falkner.) After having subjoined a copy of Thomas' report of the attack to his dispatch, Rosecrans replied to Halleck's inquiry.

The general in chief was anything but impressed by Rosecrans' explanation of the affair. Accordingly, Halleck dashed off another telegram. This wire, which was dated the 10th, read, "The most important of the President's inquiries has not been answered, what officer or officers are chargeable with the surprise at
Hartsville and deserve punishment." In reply Rosecrans observed he had been advised by several officers, who had escaped the debacle, of the very lax measures taken to insure the camp's security. According to these statements (which were untrue) no cavalry vedettes, outposts, or camp guard had been thrown out to cover the approaches to the Union encampments. Continuing, Rosecrans wrote:

... the first notice in camp of the presence of the enemy was given by an orderly, or servant, that the enemy's cavalry was coming up and wheeling by fours, into line on the opposite side of a ravine about 400 yards distant from our camp. According to most reports, the Confederates' initial deployment took place from three-quarters to one mile from the encampment; that they were quietly formed without a shot being fired at them; that the artillery did nothing to disturb them; that only two companies (at least three) of skirmishers turned out; that the infantry stood in line of battle at "order arms", and allowed the enemy to dismount and advance, as skirmishers, within 100 yards before they commenced firing. All the Confederate sources indicate that they came under fire at a much longer range. The artillery allowed the enemy's ... artillery to move up into position without disturbing them. It was finally brought out of the woods, and fired a few shots, with little effect, as the enemy advanced in line of skirmishers. Again, as before, the Confederate reports all tend to indicate that the firing of Green's section was very effective. Closing in, our troops soon fell into confusion, ran to their camp in a crowd, where the enemy's artillery played on them, and they soon hoisted a white flag and surrendered. The behavior of the Second Indiana Cavalry seems to have been as spiritless as their picketing. The enemy hastily exchanged their Austrian for our Springfield rifles,
leaving many arms on the field; drove their prisoners across the river, waist-deep, and retreated so hastily that, when our succor arrived, a light battalion of cavalry [7th Kentucky] pursued them across the river and retook three wagon loads of arms.

In conclusion, Rosecrans noted, "These facts indicate pretty clearly where the blame lies. It is pretty certain that the enemy's force did not exceed 2,500 men -- two regiments of mounted, and possibly, two dismounted cavalry." 140

Twelve days later (the 22d) Rosecrans transmitted all the "After Action Reports" pertaining to the Battle of Hartsville, then in his possession, to the War Department. 141 On January 13 these documents were returned to Rosecrans' GHQ. Annexed to the reports was an order from Halleck reiterating his request for Rosecrans to ascertain and report who are the guilty officers concerned in the surrender of Hartsville, Tenn." 142 Rosecrans wasted no time in appending an endorsement to Halleck's message.

The commander of the Army of the Cumberland noted:

The written reports and statements show that the United States forces captured at ... [Hartsville], were either surprised or that great negligence was displayed in failing to prepare for the enemy's attack. The rebels were in sight before any dispositions for action were made of the infantry, a part of which was assaulted before being fairly in line. [This charge is false. All reports indicate that Colonel Moore had deployed his infantry before the Confederates moved to the attack. What actually happened was that the 106th Ohio attempted to shift positions once the assault had commenced. A somewhat similar situation led
to Rosecrans' downfall at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863. The fight lasted less than one hour and a half. The loss was about 150 (actually 262) in killed and wounded. Two brigades of our troops under Colonel Harlan, were at Castalian Springs, only 9 miles distant from the scene, but their commander had no intimation of an anticipated attack from Colonel Moore ..., or he could have moved forward, so as to be able to co-operate immediately upon the morning of the fight. Colonel Moore ... was a prisoner at the time the within documents were submitted, and his own report does not, therefore, appear; but, from the evidence given, the disaster seems to be attributable mainly to his ignorance or negligence. 143

Upon digesting the contents of Rosecrans' communications

Halleck on February 13 issued an order recommending "that Colonel Moore ... be dismissed from the service for neglect of duty, in not properly preparing for the enemy's attack on Hartsville, Tenn." 144 Colonel Moore, however, was not dismissed from the service; instead, his resignation on account of disability, to take effect on September 9, 1863, was accepted by the War Department. 145
1 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 439. Roger W. Hanson, a native of Kentucky, had cast his lot with the South. Hanson entered Confederate service as a colonel of the 2d Kentucky Infantry Regiment. Hanson was captured at Fort Donelson on February 16, 1862. Following his exchange Hanson was assigned to Breckinridge's division and placed in command of the Orphan Brigade. At this time, the three regiments drawn from Breckinridge's division, which had been posted in support of Wheeler's and Pegram's troopers, were recalled and rejoined their parent units.

2 Ibid., 435, 438.

3 Ibid., 439. On evacuating Shelbyville, Hardee would leave one regiment behind to guard the magazines. At Eagleville, Hardee's corps would continue to draw its supplies from the Shelbyville depots.


6 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 68-69; Bennett H. Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle (Boston, 1914), 226. At this
time, the 2d Kentucky, Major James W. Hewitt commanding, numbered 375 strong, while the 9th Kentucky led by Captain James T. Morehead carried into battle 320 officers and men. Cobb's battery was equipped with six guns (two 6-pounders and four 12-pounder Napoleons).


7th Kentucky, Lieutenant Colonel John M. Huffman; 8th Kentucky, Colonel Roy S. Cluke; 11th Kentucky, Colonel David W. Chenault; 9th Tennessee, Colonel James D. Bennett; Stoner's Battalions, Major Robert G. Stoner.

8 Young, Confederate wizards of the Saddle, 227. The 7th Kentucky had been organized on September 2, and the 8th and 11th Kentucky on September 10.


10 Johnny Green, 55.

11 Young, Confederate wizards of the Saddle, 227–228.


14 Young, Confederate wizards of the Saddle, 228.

15 Ibid., 229.

16 Ibid.; Johnny Green, 55.

18 Johnny Green, 55.


21 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 231.


23 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 232; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 221.

24 Ibid.

25 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 233.


27 Ibid.


History of the 104th Illinois, 53-60. Approaching Hartsville on the afternoon of the 26th, Scott's vanguard clashed with a mounted patrol drawn from the 9th Tennessee Cavalry. After a few shots were exchanged, the butternuts scattered, leaving two prisoners in the Yankees' hands. These Confederates informed their captors that they had left the Baird's Mills staging area the previous evening to reconnoiter the countryside north of the Cumberland. Scott's brigade was composed of the following units: 104th Illinois, Colonel Absalom B. Moore; 106th Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Gustavus Taft; 108th Ohio, Colonel George T. Limberg; Company E, 11th Kentucky Cavalry, Captain Frederick Slater; Section, 13th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (2 guns), Lieutenant Ezekiel Green.


32 Ibid., 59.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., 53. The 19th Illinois was assigned to the brigade of Brigadier General James S. Negley's division commanded by Colonel Timothy R. Stanley.
The ravine at its deepest point had a depth of ten feet.
48 Ibid., 52, 57-59; Calkins, History of the 104th Illinois, 61.
49 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 52. A claimant for the
distinction of having fired the initial shot at the Confederates
was Joseph T. Older, of Company H, 104th Illinois. Older, who
was stationed at the outpost, "though a stripling of 17, did not
lose his head or fail to do his duty, but was captured before he
could escape". Calkins, History of the 104th Illinois, 61.
most of the Civil War infantry regiments, contained only eight
companies when mustered into Federal services. Companies I and
K were not organized until the autumn of 1864. Captain William Y.
Gholson, who was serving as regimental adjutant, had relayed to Tafel,
Moore's instructions relative to the position where the unit was
to deploy. Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio
in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1866, Vol. VII (Cincinnati,
1883), 601-626.
51 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 55, 57; Calkins, History of
the 104th Illinois, 61-62. When the alarm sounded, the men of
the 104th Illinois seized their overcoats, guns and equipment,
and fell in on the company parade ground, and were then marched
to the regimental color-line.
the 106th, had only eight companies when mustered into Federal service. It was not until February 1864 that the regiment was expanded to ten companies. Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio, VII, 663-683.

54 Ibid., 52.
55 Ibid., 56-58, 60-61.
56 Ibid., 60-61, 66; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 224.
57 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 53-54, 56-58, 66; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 224. In addition to Colonel Moore, several other Union officers called attention to the collapse of the 106th Ohio. 1st Lieutenant Robert V. Simpson reported, "As soon as the enemy appeared, the officer commanding the artillery [Lieutenant Green] complained that the One hundred and sixth had fired one volley and run." Captain Good noted, "At this instant I noticed one of the regiments fire one volley and retreat in confusion. I could not say what regiment this was, but I think [it was] the One hundred and sixth Ohio." In commenting on the rout of the 106th Ohio in his "After Action Report", Colonel Moore wrote: "I will say I love every man that fought; I hate every dog that ran." O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 55.

59 Ibid., 70.
60 Ibid., 72.
The 106th Ohio's regimental colors were saved when one of the soldiers tore them off the staff and hid them on his person.

Bennett's regiment suffered four casualties, one killed and three wounded; while Company A, 104th Illinois, lost one killed and two wounded.
78 Ibid., 67
79 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 240; Duke, Morgan’s Cavalry, 226.
81 O. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 67; Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 241. Quirk’s scouts manned the outpost guarding the approaches to Hartsville, via the road to Castalian Springs.
83 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 241.
84 Ibid.; Johnny Green, 58.
85 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 243. Among the Yankees who escaped was Captain Good of the 108th Ohio. Writing of his escape, Good reported:

‘When near camp [the captured Union cantonment] we got scattered among the horses of the rebels, when I was asked by one of the rebel officers whether we were prisoners (myself and Lieutenant /Louig/ Habel, of Company A). I told him that we were. He then told me that we had to go to the river and cross. I then asked if I could go up to camp and get my books, etc. He told me that I could not; that he wanted us to cross immediately, as he feared the Yankees would come; so we started to go to the river. When I got near the river I stepped to the right about 5 paces, followed by Lieutenant Habel. Then I told the Lieutenant to stand still for a few minutes until I got away. Then I leaped off the bank in a by-road leading to the ford; walked quick time down the river, when I met 1 cavalryman with 2 wounded rebels on a cart, with a negro driving the cart. They seemed to be
in dispute about something -- the road, I think. I told them that they were on the wrong road to ford the river, and that they had to go to the upper road to ford the river, and I passed on about 10 or 15 paces, when I leaped down the bank, ran up the ravine, and got under the roots of a tree, followed by the lieutenant. Remained there until our re-enforcements came up ... 

According to the Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio, VII, 663-683, Habel is the correct spelling of the lieutenant's name.

86 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 43; Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. II, 93. The following units constituted Miller's brigade: the 98th Illinois, the 17th, the 72d and the 75th Indiana, and two sections of the 13th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery.


88 Ibid., 47-48. Harlan planned to proceed to a point within three or four miles of Hartsville, "and thus keep within supporting distance both of my own men at the springs, and of Colonel Miller's in his advance to Hartsville." In other words his force would constitute a strategic reserve.

89 Ibid., 48.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.: Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 227; Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 245.


93 Ibid., 49. The detail in charge of burying the slain found 55
dead Union soldiers. A large number of these were identified by papers found in their pockets as belonging to the 104th Illinois. Among these buried was Captain Gholson, Colonel Moore's acting assistant adjutant. He was the only dead Union officer found on the field by the burial parties. Fifteen Confederates, including three officers, were also interred by the bluecoats. Approximately 100 wounded Union soldiers, a majority belonging to the 104th Illinois, were hospitalized in Hartsville. In a house near the battle field the Federals found a number of wounded Rebels. These Harlan paroled. On inspecting the abandoned arms and equipment belonging to Moore's men, Harlan found, "The average number of cartridges found to be missing out of the three hundred and odd cartridge-boxes saved was about six, and in a large number there did not appear to be any cartridges missing. Fully three-fourths of the guns recaptured were loaded, and many of them capped."

Ibid., 49-50.

94 Calkins, History of the 104th Illinois, 69.
95 Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 227; Johnny Green, 58; Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 245. On December 12 General Bragg issued a congratulatory order calling the Army of Tennessee's attention to Morgan's exploit. After giving a brief resume of the attack, Bragg noted:

To Brigadier-General Morgan and to Colonel Hunt the general tenders his thanks, and assures them of the admiration of his army. The intelligence,
zeal, and gallantry displayed by them will serve as an example and an incentive to still more honorable deeds. To the other brave officers and men composing the expedition the general tenders his cordial thanks and congratulations. He is proud of them, and hails the success achieved by their valor as but the precursor of still greater victories. Each corps engaged on the action will in future bear upon its colors the name of the memorable field. Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 64.

96 Calkins, History of the 104th Illinois, 74.
98 Johnny Green, 58. On the 11th all the Yankees captured at Hartsville, except the field officers, signed paroles. The soldiers then started for Nashville, where they arrived on the 13th. From Nashville they were sent to Camp Lew Wallace at Columbus, Ohio.
100 Ibid., 34, 37-39.
101 Ibid., 34-35, 39.
102 Ibid., 37.
103 Ibid., 35, 37, 39, 63.
104 Ibid., 35-38. The Confederates made no report of their losses in this clash, and the Yankees listed theirs as: 2 killed, 4 wounded and 1 missing.

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 Colonel Hall's brigade had left Glasgow on December 6. The following units constituted Hall's brigade: the 80th and the 123d Illinois, the 101st Indiana, and the 105th Ohio Infantry Regiments. Albion W. Tourgee, The Story of a Thousand (Buffalo, 1896), 398.

 Ward's brigade consisted of: the 102d and the 105th Illinois, and the 70th and the 79th Ohio Infantry Regiments.


 Ibid., 130-131.

 Ibid.

 Ibid., 131.

 Ibid.

 Ibid., 131.

 Ibid., 42.

 Ibid., 136.

 Ibid.


 Ibid., 136.

 Ibid., 138.

 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid., 144.
130 Ibid., 145.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 151.
133 Ibid., 155-156.
134 Ibid., 157. The two soldiers who escaped from the Confederates were: Sergeant Ephraim A. Day and Private John W. Primrose.
135 Ibid., 166. When Fry's division was transferred to Nashville, Paine's and Reynolds' commands assumed responsibility for the defense of the railroad and the Cumberland fords.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., 43.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., 43-44.
141 Ibid., 44. At this time, Rosecrans had not received the reports prepared by: Colonel Moore, Captain Piepho, and Lieutenant Simpson.
142 Ibid.
The battle of Hartsville and Morgan's second Kentucky Raid

Chapter III

Morgan's Second Kentucky Raid

The Hartsville blitzkrieg brought Morgan his long-expected and delayed promotion to brigadier general. For a considerable time before his elevation in command Morgan had been styled general by his rugged troopers, and of late he had been so addressed in official correspondence emanating from Bragg's GHQ. Numerous applications had been made by influential parties (both civil and military) requesting Morgan's promotion. General Kirby Smith, in a strongly worded memorandum, had asked the Richmond authorities to make Morgan a brigadier general. General Bragg had concurred with Smith's suggestion. But while brigadiers were being commissioned almost as rapidly as the press printed "Confederate money", Morgan remained a colonel. This situation, however, was changed when President Davis visited Murfreesboro several days after the attack on Hartsville. Before leaving for the Mississippi theater of operations, Davis, on December 11, signed Morgan's commission. Colonel Duke recalled that General Hardee urged the President to make Morgan a major general, but Mr. Davis replied, "I do not wish to give my boys all of their sugar plums at once." 

At the time that Morgan received his well-merited
promotion, he had established his headquarters at Black's Shop. Here the 2d Kentucky and Breckinridge's battalion rejoined the brigade. These two units had spent the past fortnight in the Fayetteville area taking it easy, and recouping their strength. Immediately following the return of Breckinridge's battalion from Fayetteville, it was consolidated with Stoner's battalion, and a new regiment -- the 9th Kentucky Cavalry -- constituted. Colonel William C. P. Breckinridge assumed charge of this regiment; Stoner was promoted to lieutenant colonel and became its second in command. A unit, Colonel Adam R. Johnson's 10th Kentucky Cavalry, which had not seen previous service with the brigade, reported to Morgan shortly after his return from Hartsville. Johnson's regiment, which had been raised in western Kentucky, had considerable strength on paper but, due to sickness and the fortunes of war, had been reduced to less than 400 effectives. In Colonel Duke's opinion, the 10th Kentucky "was a fine body of men and splendidly officered". In addition to the seven cavalry regiments, Morgan's command included two batteries of artillery, Palmer's and Corbett's. 4

All told, Morgan's brigade (seven cavalry regiments and two batteries of artillery) represented an aggregate force of over 4,000 officers and men. This figure, however, did not make any allowance for the several hundred men who were dismounted and lacked either arms or accouterments. Even so, it was apparent to all that the brigade was too unwieldy to be handled by one man.
Accordingly, General Morgan determined to divide his brigade into two roughly equal commands. These two units were organized as brigades, and only lacked Bragg's sanction to make them official. 5 (Morgan hoped eventually to secure Bragg's approval of this reorganization.)

Initially, Morgan planned to place Colonels Duke and Johnson in charge of his two provisional brigades; but when Johnson declined to accept the command of either brigade, and signified his willingness to serve in a subordinate capacity, Morgan was forced to make another choice. At this time, only one of Morgan's subordinates (Johnson) had received his commission, although the various officers' rank was informally recognized by the Richmond authorities. Consequently, there was considerable discussion among the Confederate officers as to whether Cluke or Breckinridge should command one of the brigades after Johnson had declined. It was a moot question whether Cluke's rank as colonel dated from the date he received his commission to raise a regiment, or from the time his organization had been mustered into service. If the former counted, Cluke would rank Breckinridge; if the latter, he would not. Actually there were no bad feelings between the two officers and their partisans, because at first each declined and urged the appointment of the other. Morgan finally settled the matter by placing Breckinridge in charge of the 2d brigade. 6
When organized the 1st brigade commanded by Colonel Duke consisted of: the 2d Kentucky led by Lieutenant Colonel John B. Hutcheson; the 7th Kentucky, Colonel Huffman; the 8th Kentucky, Colonel Cluke; and Palmer's Tennessee Battery, Captain Baylor Palmer commanding. The 2d brigade (Breckinridge's) was composed of: the 9th Kentucky, Colonel Stoner; the 10th Kentucky, Colonel Johnson; the 11th Kentucky, Colonel Chenault; the 9th Tennessee, Colonel Bennett; and Corbett's Kentucky Battery commanded by Lieutenant Corbett. Palmer's battery was armed with four guns (two 12-pounder howitzers and two 6-pounder guns); Corbett's was equipped with three guns (two mountain howitzers and one 10-pounder Parrott rifle). 7

By the end of the third week in December, Morgan's command had moved from Black's Shop to Alexandria. Morgan now prepared to implement the instructions he had received from Bragg on the 1st. According to these orders, Morgan was to "proceed with ... [his] whole command, by the most practicable route and with the least delay, to operate on the enemy's lines of communications in rear of Nashville." 8 Two events, however, served to delay the beginning of Morgan's "Second Kentucky Raid". The first postponement had been occasioned when the brigade was diverted to Hartsville, the second came as a result of Morgan's becoming a bridegroom.

On December 14, one week after he had scored his
greatest success, General Morgan took as his bride Miss Mattie Reddy, a belle of the Murfreesboro area. Theirs was a military wedding in the complete sense of the word. The marriage ceremony was performed by General Polk, who donned his episcopal vestments over his uniform, the general's stars on his grey coat collar eclipsed by the sign of the cross. The residence of Charles Reddy, the bride's father, held a happy assembly that night. In addition to Morgan's friends and comrades-in-arms, Generals Bragg, Hardee, Cheatham, and Breckinridge were present to see the knot tied.

When Duke reviewed his brigade at Alexandria on the 1st he found that he had approximately 1,800 effective. His numerically strongest regiment -- the 2d Kentucky -- mustered 740 troops; the 7th and the 8th Kentucky numbered about 600 each. In addition, there were nearly 200 men present who were mounted but unarmed. All told, the brigade, including Palmer's artilleryists, contained approximately 2,100 officers and men. Breckinridge's brigade, counting Corbett's cannoniers, was about 1,800 strong. The 2d brigade, like the 1st, had a number of unarmed men in its ranks. These individuals without firearms were not completely useless, because (when it had been satisfactorily ascertained that the lack of a weapon was not the troopers' fault, and they could be trusted) they were employed as horse holders. All told, Morgan's provisional division,
including Quirk's accounts which reported directly to the general, numbered about 3,900 officers and men. 10

In his "After Action Report", Morgan estimated his strength at 3,100 armed effectives. Colonel Duke blamed the general's adjutant for this discrepancy. Duke contended that "The proportion of men unarmed was nothing like so large." To justify his point, Duke explained that while the raiders were deep in the throes of making last minute preparations, Morgan's adjutant, Colonel Grenfell, resigned. In Grenfell's place Morgan appointed Captain W. M. Maginis. Having assumed his new duties at a chaotic time, it was not difficult to see why the young captain made this error in reporting the strength of Morgan's column. 11

During the days immediately preceding the raiders' departure from the Alexandria staging area, the farriers were kept busy shoeing the horses. Inspections were a daily occurrence, and the officers closely scrutinized the cavalrymen's gear and horses. The troopers and their mounts were examined by the surgeons and veterinarians; ammunition was sorted and counted. The sick soldiers and broken down beasts were carefully winnowed out. Only the able-bodied men and serviceable horses would be permitted to accompany the expedition. Never were the troopers (the vast majority were under 25 years of age) in higher spirits or better humor. Most of Morgan's men hailed from Kentucky, and
longed to see the bluegrass and hills of their native state. By night and day, the buttermilk made the air ring "with their cheers and laughter and songs and sallies of wit". Heretofore, the division had never operated as a unit, therefore, each trooper was determined to make his regiment the crack organization in Morgan's cavalry. Colonel Breckinridge recalled:

It was a magnificent body of men -- the pick of the youth of Kentucky [and Tennessee]. No commander ever led a nobler corps -- no corps was ever more nobly led. It was splendidly officered by gallant, dashing, skillful men in the flush of early manhood; for of the seven colonels who commanded those seven regiments, five became brigade commanders -- the other two gave their lives to the cause -- Colonel Bennett dying early in January, 1863, of a disease contracted while in the army, and Colonel Chenault being killed on July 4, 1863, gallantly leading his men in a fruitless charge upon a breastworks at Green river bridge. Reveille sounded before daybreak on the 22d. At the morning's muster, the regimental adjutants read Morgan's orders. As these officers droned out the day's instructions, the eager men gained an intimiation of the expedition's objectives. In closing, the adjutants alerted the men to be ready to move at 9 a.m., with Duke's brigade taking the lead. As the order was read, one of the participants recalled:

... the utmost deathless silence of disciplined soldiers standing at attention was broken only by the clear voice of the adjutant reading the precise but stirring words of the beloved hero-chieftain; then came the sharp word of command dismissing the
parade; then the woods trembled with the wild hurrahs of the half crazy men, and regiment answered regiment, cheer re-echoed cheer, over the wide encampment. Soon came Duke and his staff, and his column -- his own gallant regiment /the 2d Kentucky/ at the head -- and slowly regiment after regiment filed out of the woods into the road, lengthening the long column.

Upon his departure from Alexandria, Morgan had under his command the largest force he ever handled, previously or subsequently. The general was determined that nothing would stop him from obtaining his objective -- the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland's supply line.

Advancing along the Carthage pike, the Confederate vanguard was able to cover eight miles by the time two hours had elapsed. Suddenly the stillness was disturbed. The men of the 2d Kentucky were able to hear distant shouts. Instinctively they knew what this meant. Morgan was coming. Colonel Breckinridge wrote of Morgan's approach:

... soon General Morgan dashed by, with his hat in his hand, bowing and smiling his thanks for these flattering cheers, followed by a large and well mounted staff. Did you ever see Morgan on horseback? If not, you missed one of the most impressive figures of the war. Perhaps no general in the army surpassed him in the striking proportion and grace of his person, and the ease and grace of his horsemanship. Over six feet in height, straight as an Indian exquisitely proportioned, with the air and manner of a cultivated and polished gentleman, and the bearing of a soldier, always handsomely and tastefully dressed, and elegantly mounted, he was the
picture of the superb cavalry officer. Just now he was in the height of his fame and happiness...

Toward the end of the first day's march, the head of the column reached the Cumberland River at Sand Shoals Ford. Discovering that the river to be crossed was "easily fordable", Morgan sent Duke's brigade across. About three or four miles north of the river, a suitable camp ground was located. Here Duke's brigade, having covered 18 miles since leaving Alexandria, bivouacked. It had already started to get dark when Breckinridge's brigade reached the ford. Accordingly, it was determined by the officers of the brigade not to hazard a night crossing. This decision having been reached, Breckinridge's unit camped on the left bank of the river. While his men were taking it easy and preparing for the next day's march, Morgan had been questioning the inhabitants of the area. The general "found the people generally well disposed, and that vague rumors of...[his] coming had preceded...[his]." 16

At daybreak the next morning (the 23d), Breckinridge's brigade forded the river. As on the previous day, Duke's brigade took the lead when the division resumed its rapid advance toward the Kentucky-Tennessee boundary line. Nightfall found the raiders at Centerville. During the course of the day's march, the Confederates had made 30 miles. Considering the rough roads encountered and the necessity to hold the pace of the march down,
to enable the artillery to keep up, Morgan was satisfied with the distance covered. Furthermore, the Rebel officers felt better about the situation when they remembered that the artillery would come in handy in reducing the stockades and blockhouses, which the Federals had erected to protect the bridges and trestles on the vital Louisville and Nashville Railroad. 17

The next day, the Rebel raiders pushed forward to within six miles of Glasgow. Once the Confederates had established their camp, Morgan summoned Colonels Duke and Breckinridge to his headquarters. At this meeting Breckinridge was directed to send two companies to take possession of Glasgow; Duke would support Breckinridge's patrol with two companies drawn from the 7th Kentucky commanded by Major Theophilus Steele, and one of the "Bull Pups". Rejoining his brigade, Breckinridge called for Captain William E. Jones. The captain was placed in charge of the two companies of the 9th Kentucky and given the mission of reconnoitering Glasgow. Jones' patrol reached Glasgow after dark. Covered by Steele's detachment, Jones' troopers cautiously rode into town. 18

The Federal brass received their initial warning on December 16 concerning Morgan's projected raid into Kentucky. On that date a Mrs. Bowen, who had just reached Gallatin from Gordonsville, informed General Thomas that General Morgan was "preparing to invade Kentucky, by way of Burkesville". 19
Three days later, Rosecrans learned from one of his scouts that Morgan's cavalry, 5,000 to 6,000 strong, had evacuated its Black's Shop encampment. It was reported to the general that the Confederate raiders' objective was the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Furthermore, this report pinpointed Morgan's command in the Hartsville area. Rosecrans immediately relayed this information to the two officers charged with the responsibility of defending the section of that vital railroad lying in the state of Kentucky -- Brigadier Generals Jeremiah T. Boyle and Robert S. Eranger. (The former officer, who maintained his headquarters at Louisville, was in charge of the District of Western Kentucky; the latter commanded the post at Bowling Green.) In reply to Rosecrans' dispatch, General Boyle inquired, "Cannot the forces at Gallatin cut Morgan off?" After observing that Hartsville was only 16 or 17 miles from Gallatin, Boyle observed "... it seems to me the force there [at Gallatin] could whip and capture ... Morgan's whole concern". In closing, Boyle noted, "I have a force one-third the size of the force at Gallatin, and cannot concentrate them without abandoning important points. I still hope you will head off the scoundrel [Morgan], and stop the Hartsville hole." Major General Horatio G. Wright, the commander of the Department of the Ohio, was also the recipient of a message from Rosecrans telling of Morgan's activities. As soon as he had read
Rosecrans' dispatch, Wright, in a cocky frame of mind, wired Boyle, "If our force at Bowling Green and Mumfordville fight, they can whip Morgan's force, and if he really comes (which I do not believe), all the troops at Columbia and other points must combine to intercept him." In conclusion, Wright observed, "Our troops must understand that they are expected to fight, and if they do half their duty they can whip Morgan's rascals." 22

Later in the day (the 19th) Rosecrans received two additional messages. These dispatches tended to corroborate the earlier one locating Morgan at Hartsville. Both these telegrams came from General Fry's Gallatin headquarters. The initial one originated with the surgeon, who had been left in charge of the Union hospital at Hartsville. The doctor reported that Morgan, accompanied by a considerable force, was within a short distance of Hartsville. In fact, he continued, the Rebels' camp fires could be easily distinguished from the town. Furthermore, he stated, some of the greyclad troopers were already across the river. 23 In his second communication to Rosecrans, Fry informed his superior that several of Colonel Frank Wolford's scouts had confirmed the doctor's report. These individuals, on their return from the Hartsville area, had informed Fry that the Southerners were there in force with artillery, infantry, and cavalry. If the reported Confederate concentration at Hartsville were true, Fry continued, he would have to be reinforced. Specifically, Fry asked Rosecrans for additional cavalry. 24
Simultaneously, Rosecrans had also received a message from General Reynolds' headquarters concerning the Confederate activities in the Hartsville area. During the day, Reynolds had spent considerable time with Colonel Hall's brigade which was encamped on Bledsoe's Creek. While there, the general had learned from his scouts that a force of butternuts of unknown strength had occupied Hartsville. In an effort to discover the foe's intentions, provided they did not attack Hall's unit in the meantime, Reynolds proposed to have Colonel Wolford's command make a forced reconnaissance of the Hartsville area. Being advised of Reynolds' plan, Thomas directed his subordinate to sustain Wolford's cavalry with infantry. At the same time, Thomas directed Fry to hold his division ready to move to Reynolds' aid, in the event the Confederates had decided to seize the initiative. In addition, Thomas alerted General Paine to be ready to concentrate his command on Gallatin if such an emergency should develop.

Responding to Fry's request for mounted troopers, Rosecrans ordered his chief of cavalry, General Stanley, to station one of his regiments on the north side of the Cumberland River. This unit would be given the mission of watching all the river crossings "by which the railroad could be assailed between Gallatin and Nashville. Furthermore, the cavalry chieftain would see that a number of his scouts and spies crossed Stones
River in an effort to penetrate the heart of Wilson County. The task of these men would be to observe and report on Confederate activities in the Lebanon sector. 27

Rosecrans gave special attention to Fry’s telegram reporting Rebel infantry and artillery operating in the Hartsville area. The general remembered the persistent rumors which had been afloat only ten days before concerning Kirby Smith’s purported occupation of Lebanon. Therefore, it was not very difficult for Rosecrans to decide that the infantry and artillery reported by Fry belonged to Smith’s corps. To verify this intelligence, Rosecrans determined to have one of Major General Thomas L. Crittenden’s divisions make a forced reconnaissance toward Lebanon. Accordingly, orders were drafted alerting Crittenden to have one of his units ready to move in the morning. Crittenden was informed that the objective of this reconnaissance was to ascertain if Kirby Smith were supporting Morgan’s cavalry. If he were, Rosecrans noted, "... we will probably march immediately upon Murfreesborough, and endeavor at the same time to cut Smith off from the main body" of Bragg’s army. 28 Simultaneously, Rosecrans addressed a communication to General Stanley. The chief of cavalry was acquainted with Rosecrans’ plan to send one of Crittenden’s divisions into the region east of Nashville. In addition, Stanley was directed to support the reconnaissance with one of his regiments. 29
Following the receipt of Rosecrans' dispatch, Crittenden alerted the division commanded by Brigadier General John M. Palmer. The division commander was directed to be ready to take the field at 7 a.m. on the 20th. Before retiring for the evening, Palmer was handed the order which would govern his movements on the morrow. Perusing the dispatch, Palmer found that after his division had crossed Stones River at Stewart's Ford, he should send one brigade in the direction of Rural Hill; another toward Silver Springs; the third would be held in reserve at the crossing. Furthermore, the general learned that General Stanley, in accordance with Rosecrans' instructions, was sending the 4th Michigan and the 4th Ohio Cavalry to co-operate with his column.

On the 20th only one of the two Union command which had been scheduled to undertake forced reconnaissances in order to develop the Confederates' intentions carried out their assignment. During the night General Reynolds and Pry had held a meeting. Between them the two officers concluded it would be unwise to weaken the Gallatin garrison. Instead of moving on Hartsville in force, the two officers proposed to send out a strong force of scouts. When informed of this change in plans, Rosecrans apparently raised no objection.

Accordingly, only one Union column took the field on the 20th. It was 8 a.m., one hour after the scheduled time of departure, before Palmer's division was able to get under way. Moving along the Lebanon road, the bluecoats reached Stewart's
Ferry without encountering any excitement. Here, the general called a halt, while he quickly organized two special task forces. Colonel William B. Hazen was placed in charge of the one built around his own brigade, reinforced by the 4th Michigan Cavalry; Colonel David A. Emory commanded the other (his brigade bolstered by the 4th Ohio Cavalry). After crossing Stones River, Hazen's unit proceeded to Rural Hill and Emory's to Silver Springs. Colonel William Grose's brigade remained behind to guard the ferry.

Hazen's and Emory's commands reached their objectives without sighting a single enemy soldier. Only the far-ranging troopers of the 4th Michigan found any buttermilk. Then that was only a few stragglers, who fired on one of the regiment's patrols. One and one-half miles east of Rural Hill, a detachment drawn from the Michigan regiment was fired on by a small Rebel patrol. When the Yankees gave chase, the Southerners beat a hasty retreat. Interrogating the inhabitants, the Union officers learned that the Confederates had maintained outposts at Rural Hill and Silver Springs until the 18th when they had been withdrawn. About the only information the Yankees were able to obtain was an item concerning the location of the 1st Louisiana Cavalry of Pegram's brigade. This regiment was reported to be stationed at Oak Grove. Having accomplished their missions, Hazen's and Emory's commands retraced their steps. At Stewart's Ferry they rendezvoused with
Grose's brigade. The division then returned to its Nashville camps. 32

The scouts sent out from Gallatin to reconnoiter the Hartsville area were unable to contact any Confederates. One patrol even penetrated to within three or four miles of Lebanon without meeting any Rebels. From the civilians, the scouts learned that the foe had withdrawn their outposts from Lebanon on the 18th. Questioning Mrs. B. F. Smith, who had left McMinnville on the 16th, the Yankees learned she had passed through Alexandria, Rome, and Hartsville. The lady told her interrogators that she had not seen any greyclads at the two latter towns, but there were about 200 at Alexandria. Thomas immediately relayed this intelligence to Rosecrans' Nashville headquarters. 33

It now began to dawn on Rosecrans that perhaps Generals Fry and Reynolds had been mistaken when they had reported Morgan at Hartsville. (What the Union surgeon and scouts had probably seen and reported as Morgan's command were patrols drawn from Pegram's brigade.) What plagued the general was his inability to pinpoint the location of Morgan's raiders, following their departure from Black's Shop. Rosecrans realized that Morgan was up to some mischief. The question was what?

In an effort to keep the troops charged with the defense of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad abreast of developments,
Rosecrans dashed off a wire to General Granger. The Bowling Green commander was informed, "Morgan appears to have no force near Hartsville, he may have taken circuitous route. Look out sharp, therefore." In reply, Granger, with an air of confidence, noted, "We are all right. Scouts out, and will lose no opportunity to find Morgan." 35

The next day, the 21st, Rosecrans finally received some reliable data regarding Morgan's activities. On that day, Charles Marsham, a deserter from Morgan's command, reached Gallatin. When asked by the Union officers for information, the Confederate readily talked. He started off by telling the Yankees that the Southerners had evacuated Lebanon. Continuing, the soldier stated, "He was at Morgan's headquarters Thursday [the 17th]. Heard Morgan's adjutant general (G. St. Leger Grenfell) say they were going into Kentucky to cut the Louisville and Nashville Railroad; would take some 5,000 or 6,000 cavalry." Furthermore, the talkative one noted the bakers had prepared bread to last for eight days which had then been loaded in the wagons. In relaying this intelligence to Rosecrans, Thomas commented, "I judge from the information given by the deserter, who seems to be honest, that Morgan may attempt to enter Kentucky high up the [Cumberland] river;" 36

Over 48 hours were to pass before the Union brass received any additional information pertaining to Morgan's movements.
On the evening of the 23d, the day following Morgan's departure from Alexandria, Rosecrans received two interesting reports concerning Morgan. One of these came from the new Union commander at Bowling Green, Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson (Manson had relieved Oranger on the 20th); the other from General Reynolds.

Scanning Manson's telegram, Rosecrans learned that a contraband had approached the Union authorities at Franklin, Kentucky, with an interesting bit of information. The Negro told the officers that Morgan, accompanied by 1,200 cavalrymen, had passed through Brackentown, going in the direction of Port Oliver. It was reported by the Negro that the Rebels planned to cross the Big Barren River at the latter place. From Reynolds' dispatch, Rosecrans learned the Union scout, who had visited Lebanon, had been told, "Morgan has left Alexandria, to cross the Cumberland at Carthage or Gainesborough and go into Kentucky."

Shortly after Rosecrans had filed these two telegrams, he received another wire from Reynolds. The division commander informed his superior:

> Have had three reports from Colonel Hall, at Bledsoe's Creek, since dark. The last, just received, says the information is undoubted that a mounted force of 7,000 to 10,000 is now advancing on the camp at Bledsoe's Creek or this place [Gallatin]. I have notified all the commanders when to be ready.

Rosecrans immediately replied to his subordinate's
disturbing message. Reynolds was directed to try to ascertain the enemy's strength and see if the cavalry were supported by infantry. Scouts were to be thrown out in all directions. In case the telegraph should be cut, Reynolds was to make other arrangements for communicating with Nashville. In closing, Rosecrans, besides promising Reynolds reinforcements, urged him to, "Concentrate your forces and fight like the devil." 40

The intelligence reporting that the Confederates were advancing on Gallatin in force caused Rosecrans to draft plans for vigorous counter-measures. Rosecrans determined to seize the initiative. He would exert every effort to cut off the retreat of the Rebel force reportedly threatening Gallatin. In a letter to Crittenden, Rosecrans observed that Bragg's army would probably make a demonstration in support of Morgan's attack on the supply line of the Army of the Cumberland. If Bragg did, Rosecrans promised "to make him pay for it". Accordingly, Rosecrans issued instructions for his three wing commanders — Major Generals George H. Thomas, Thomas H. Crittenden, and Alexander McD. McCook — to have their troops prepare three days' cooked rations, preparatory to taking the field at daybreak. 41

Having acquainted his three wing commanders with the situation, Rosecrans dashed off a second telegram to Reynolds. The Gallatin commander was informed of Rosecrans' plan to intercept the advancing butternuts. In addition, Rosecrans informed Reynolds
that he had neglected to indicate on which side of the Cumberland the foe was operating. 42 Replying immediately, Reynolds noted, "This force came from Alexandria; crossed, probably, at Carthage." 43

Before retiring, Reynolds advised Rosecrans, "Last report from Colonel Hall (9:30 p.m.) placed ... [the Rebels] about 4 miles northeast of Bledsoe's Creek." 44

Rosecrans was advised by his wing commanders on the morning of the 24th that their respective units would be unable to take the field in time to reach their designated objectives. Accordingly, he issued orders postponing the scheduled general advance until Christmas Day. 45

During the day the situation in the Bledsoe's Creek sector was finally clarified. When it was, however, it was undoubtedly to General Reynolds' and Colonel Hall's embarrassment. Before daybreak a Union officer reached Gallatin from Hartsville. (This officer was serving as an escort for the body of a Union soldier, who had died in the Hartsville hospital.) Although the Yankee had seen only one Confederate during the course of his journey, he had been informed by the inhabitants that from 6,000 to 10,000 Rebels had crossed the river, and would attack Colonel Hall's brigade at daybreak. In a telegram advising Rosecrans of this development, Reynolds promised, "We will try to give them [the greyclads] a warm breakfast if they call." Shortly thereafter, one of Reynolds' scouts reached Gallatin with additional
information. This individual, who had just returned from Rome, informed the general, "Morgan left Alexandria Monday morning [the 21st] with 12,000 men, cavalry and infantry, to cross at Gainsborough, on route for Glasgow, Ky., and Kitty Smith is following him." 46

By 9 a.m. when no attack developed on Colonel Hall's position, Reynolds began to suspect that he had been hoodwinked. In a desperate effort to locate the "All-o'-the-wisp raiders," Reynolds threw out scouting parties in all directions. Informing Rosecrans of these developments, the harassed Reynolds commented, "The conviction on all minds here [Gallatin] is strengthened that the enemy has gone around us and aims at the railroad." 47

Following the receipt of Reynolds' dispatch indicating there was no substance to the purported threat to Gallatin, Rosecrans ordered his subordinate to send reconnaissance patrols toward Scottsville. These scouts were to ascertain if Morgan's cavalry was supported by infantry. Furthermore, Reynolds was told to keep the Union officers at Bowling Green and Louisville abreast of the situation. If reinforcements were needed to protect the vital railroad, Rosecrans promised to send them immediately. 48

A second dispatch emanating from Rosecrans' GHQ advised Reynolds of the projected advance on Murfreesboro. In addition, the Gallatin commander was alerted to hold his command ready to move to Bowling Green in case it was threatened by the
It was after dark before Reynolds received any additional intelligence pertaining to Morgan's movements. At that time, L. L. Carter, one of Truesdale's scouts, reached Gallatin. Being interviewed, Carter told the general he had been at Sand Shoals Ford when Morgan's cavalry had crossed the Cumberland River. Continuing, the scout summarized Morgan's strength as follows: 3,000 cavalry or mounted infantry, two or three pieces of artillery, and about 25 wagons. After crossing the river, the Confederate column had headed northward. Questioning the inhabitants, Carter reported, "Some people said he [Morgan] was going to Scottsville for salt; others said he was off for a raid into Kentucky." Furthermore, Carter noted, he knew of no unfriendly troops operating between Carthage and Gallatin.

So well had Morgan concealed his movements that it was the evening of the 24th (forty-eight hours after Duke's brigade had reached the north bank of the Cumberland) before the Union brass was able to pinpoint where he had crossed the river and his probable line of march. By this time, however, the Confederates had stolen several marches on the Federals.

Throughout the day, the 24th, Rosecrans endeavored to keep Generals Wright, Boyle, and Granger posted on the latest developments relating to Morgan. (Manson was absent and Granger was again in command at Bowling Green.) It looked to Rosecrans
as if Bowling Green might be Morgan's initial objective.
Accordingly, he ordered Colonel Sanders D. Bruce's brigade, then
stationed at Russellville, Kentucky, to move by forced marches to
Bowling Green. In the meantime, pending the arrival of Bruce's
brigade, Granger would send out scouts and spies. These
individuals were charged with the mission of ascertaining
Morgan's strength and intentions. 51 Rosecrans authorized
Granger to pay any amount of money necessary to learn "Morgan's
exact strength and position." 52

During the afternoon several disturbing reports reached
General Boyle's Louisville headquarters. First, came the news
from General Reynolds indicating that Morgan had bypassed
Gallatin and was striking for the railroad. Following the
receipt of this message, Boyle informed Rosecrans that Bowling
Green was defended by only "about 1,700 effectives". Boyle was
afraid Morgan's hard-hitting raiders would take the fortifications
at Baker's Hill, and then demolish the railroad bridge spanning
the Big Harren River "in two minutes". After having made his
point, that Bowling Green was inadequately garrisoned, Boyle
inquired, "Shall Colonel Bruce be ordered back, or will you send
other forces to Bowling Green." 53 The second telegram was from
J. W. Gorin, provost marshal at Glasgow. Gorin advised Boyle he
had learned from what he considered an unimpeachable source that
"Morgan will be at Glasgow to-day." Furthermore, Gorin had warned,
Confederate scouts would soon cut the telegraph. When they did, Gorin assured Boyle, Morgan's telegrapher would undoubtedly contact the general directly. 54

After examining the "monthly returns", Rosecrans replied to Boyle's message. Fortified by what he had discovered, Rosecrans proceeded to take issue with Boyle regarding the strength of the Bowling Green garrison. Rosecrans informed the Louisville commander, "There are 3,000 men, besides convalescents, at Bowling Green." 55 Rosecrans gave Boyle satisfaction on one point. The commander of the Army of the Cumberland advised the Louisville commander that Bruce's brigade had been directed to hasten to Bowling Green. 56

General Wright being advised of Morgan's thrust toward Kentucky, ordered Major General Gordon Granger, whose headquarters were at Lexington, to begin to concentrate his troops. Once this had been accomplished, Granger would throw strong detachments into Mumfordville. To emphasize his point, Wright noted, "... Mumfordville must be held. It is too weak now." 57 In addition, Wright addressed a communication to the governor of Indiana, Oliver P. Morton. The governor was asked if there were any troops in his state's camps of instruction ready for service in the field. If there were, Wright requested that they be ordered to Kentucky on Boyle's requisition. Morton readily agreed to cooperate with the general's request. 58 Wright kept Boyle
advised of these efforts to bolster his command. 59

When he informed Wright of his projected advance on Murfreesboro, Rosecrans put forward several suggestions for his comrade-in-arms' consideration. Rosecrans believed it would be a wise move, if Wright threw part of his command into Murfurdville and Glasgow. These troops, Rosecrans theorized, would prove sufficient to compel Morgan to turn back. Furthermore, once the Army of the Cumberland had commenced to push forward, Reynolds with four brigades would be left to cover the Cumberland River fords. Rosecrans believed between them Wright and Reynolds should be able to administer the coup de grace to Morgan's heretofore troublesome raiders. 60 In replying Wright pointed out, "... my force in Kentucky is small and scattered, and that if any rebel movement into it Kentucky in force is made, I must look to you for prompt assistance." Continuing, Wright observed he had partially complied with Rosecrans' request by ordering Gordon Granger to move toward Murfurdville. In closing, Wright had a word of warning for Rosecrans, "Be wary of telegrams received. The rebels have good operators, and Morgan may telegraph you direct." 61

To allay Wright's fears regarding a Confederate advance in force into Kentucky, Rosecrans wired him on the evening of the 24th, "We have just received information, deemed reliable, confirming previous rumor of Kirby Smith having gone to Mississippi." 62
(Actually, only one division of Smith's corps, Major General Carter L. Stevenson's, had been transferred to the Mississippi theatre of operations.)

On the evening of the 24th, a battalion of the 2d Michigan Cavalry (C, H, L and M) commanded by Captain Frank W. Dickey approached Glasgow. Dickey's battalion, which was reconnoitering the country to the east of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad in search of Morgan's raiders, had left Gallatin the previous afternoon. As they were preparing to enter Glasgow, the bluecoats captured a straggler belonging to Morgan's command. The butternut proved to be quite verbose. He informed his captors that Glasgow was occupied by a large force of Confederates. Dickey determined to investigate the prisoner's story. Spearheaded by Company C led by Lieutenant Russel T. Darrow, the Yankees, their carbines at the ready, cautiously resumed their advance. 63

Actually, it seems the captured butternut's tale concerning the occupation of Glasgow was premature. It appears that Darrow's and Jones' combat patrols entered the town at the same time, but from different directions. Near the center of Glasgow, the two patrols collided head-on. Shots were exchanged. In the darkness, everything quickly degenerated into utmost confusion. Many of the Southerners were clad in Union uniforms and this made it difficult to tell friend from foe. Among the
first to fall was Captain Jones, mortally wounded. Following the loss of their leader, the greyclads beat a hasty retreat. Among the men left behind by the Rebels was 1st Lieutenant Samuel O. Peyton of the 2d Kentucky. Peyton had been shot in the arm and thigh, but he was unwilling to surrender. When the Yankees shouted for him to lay down his arms, the lieutenant dropped one of his assailants with a ball from his Colt Navy. A second he wrestled to the ground and cut his throat with a pocket knife. Having gained elbow room as a result of his savage onslaught, Peyton succeeded in making his escape. In addition to Jones, the Confederates had one other man -- Will Webb -- mortally wounded, and seven captured. 64

Realizing it would not be very long before the Confederates returned with reinforcements, Dickey quickly assembled his battalion. Evacuating Glasgow, the Michiganders headed for Cave City where the nearest telegraph was located. It was 8:05 p.m. when Dickey burst into the office and dashed off a telegram to Rosecrans' Nashville headquarters. After notifying the general of the clash at Glasgow, Dickey gave him an estimate of the situation. "Rebels supposed to be strong -- have two batteries." 65

As expected, a number of other Union telegraphers picked up Dickey's message, announcing that the Confederates had been encountered at Glasgow. These men quickly relayed the news to the interested officers. The Union officer in charge of the
defenses of Mumfordville at this stage of the conflict was
Colonel Edward H. Hobson. During the day, Hobson had received
a telegram from General Reynolds. Scanning the dispatch, the
colonel learned that Morgan had crossed the Cumberland River and
was making for Glasgow. Before dark, Reynolds' message had been
corroborated by wires from Brigadier Generals Charles C. Gilbert
and Boyle. (The latter officer was in charge of the troops
guarding the railroad between Mumfordville and Louisville.)
Therefore, when Hobson learned of the skirmish at Glasgow, he
rushed the 12th Kentucky Cavalry, Colonel Quintus C. Shanks
commanding, to Cave City. Reaching Cave City, the Kentuckians
rendezvoused with the Michiganders. After a hurried conference,
Shanks and Dickey determined to fall back to Mumfordville. The
two officers realized it would be foolhardy to contest Morgan's
powerful striking force with their outnumbered commands. Covered
by the 12th Kentucky, the Federals headed for Mumfordville where
they arrived well before dawn on the 25th. Following their
return to their base, the Kentuckians proceeded to the ordnance
depot to draw their Christmas presents -- new carbines -- which
had just arrived. The Michiganders, having marched 60 miles in
less than 24 hours, were ordered into camp. Before permitting
his exhausted men to retire, Dickey checked the rolls. On
mustering the troopers, it was discovered that the battalion had
suffered 18 casualties -- one dead, one wounded, and 16 missing -- in the Glasgow skirmish. 66

Major Steele's combat patrol occupied Glasgow immediately following the Yankees' withdrawal. During the ensuing mopping up operations, Steele's troopers bagged 22 Federals (members of the 2d Michigan and provost guard). After paroling their prisoners, Steele's troopers retraced their steps and rendezvoused with the main column. 67

Breaking camp at an early hour on Christmas Day, Morgan's raiders passed through Glasgow and turned into the Bear Wallow pike. This road crossed the Green River several miles east of Mumfordville. Captain Quirk's scouts, supported by a detachment drawn from Duke's brigade, screened the division's advance. The Rebel vanguard encountered several roving Union patrols during the morning's march. These, however, were easily brushed aside, before they had time to deploy. About 10 miles south of the Green River, Quirk's scouts sighted a battalion of Union cavalry. The bluecoats were dismounted and drawn up in line of battle. Informed of this situation, Morgan ordered Duke to support Quirk with two companies and a section of artillery. But before these reinforcements reached the point of danger, the combative Quirk had moved to the attack. 68

Immediately after the return of the 12th Kentucky and
2d Michigan from Cave City, Colonel Hobson turned out the Mumfordville garrison. Shortly, thereafter, the colonel was cheered when a train chugged into the depot. Loaded aboard the flat cars was a shipment of eagerly awaited siege guns (two 30-pounder Parrots). A working party was immediately put to work unloading the big rifles. Before his men had completed this detail, however, they made an alarming discovery which pained Colonel Hobson. Some agency, probably the Louisville Ordnance Depot, had neglected to forward the sponges, rammers, sights, and elevating screws necessary to insure the guns' operation. Undaunted, the colonel put his artificers to work manufacturing these badly needed "technical fixtures." When ready for mounting the siege guns were emplaced on the north side of the Green River.

At the same time, Hobson put a second detail to work planking the railroad bridge. This task was undertaken with a view to facilitating the transfer of troops from one side of the river to the other as required. Hobson also endeavored to get in touch with his superior — General Boyle.

At 5 a.m., Hobson summoned his cavalry officers to his headquarters. Having temporarily lost contact with the Southerners, Hobson determined to use his cavalry in an effort to develop the foe's intentions. Colonel Shanks with the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 12th Kentucky, was directed to make a forced reconnaissance.
to Cave City and Bear Wallow. His 3d battalion led by Major Ira H. Stout would operate north of the Green River. Stout's troopers were to patrol the Greensburg road, as far as Burnt Bridge Ford. Four companies drawn from the 4th and 5th Indiana Cavalry, Colonel Isaac Gray commanding, were to move out on the Burkesville road. The leaders of these three patrols were ordered to find and attack the raiders, and, if overpowered by superior numbers, to fall back on Woodsonville. During their absence from Mumfordville, the cavalrymen would keep headquarters advised of developments, through the use of couriers. The colonel then dismissed the assembled cavalrymen, and they hurried off to rejoin their respective units.

Once they had mustered their men, the officers ordered their troopers to mount. The three patrols departed from Mumfordville, each going in a different direction. Colonel Gray's Hoosiers made the initial contact with the foe. As the Indians approached Green's Chapel six miles southeast of Mumfordville, they sighted Morgan's vanguard. Before deploying his command, Gray sent a messenger racing for Hobson's headquarters with the news that the Rebels had been spotted. This business taken care of, Gray, preparatory to engaging the foe, had his men throw down the fences on either side of the road. Once this had been accomplished, Captain George H. Purdy's company of the 4th Indiana Cavalry was dismounted and deployed in the field to the
right of the pike. Hardly had Purdy's troopers taken position before Quirk's scouts surged to the attack. Sighting the oncoming greys, Gray shouted instructions for Lieutenant James A. Smith to have his unit -- Company C, 5th Indiana -- take cover in the hollow lying to the left of the road. Here, Smith's Hoosiers were concealed from the approaching Confederates' view. Their horses at the gallop, Quirk's men rapidly closed in on the Union roadblock. Apparently taken aback by the butternuts' audacity, Purdy's troopers, after firing a few random shots, called for their horses and beat a hasty retreat. Evidently Quirk's scouts failed to spot Smith's men, who were lying in ambush, until they had closed to within 50 yards. Therefore, when the blueclads suddenly opened fire, they succeeded in throwing the attacking Kentuckians into momentary confusion. By this time, however, Gray had observed that additional contingents of Morgan's command were hastening to Quirk's support. Quickly assembling his command, Gray fell back on Mumfordville.

Colonel Duke vividly recalled Quirk's charge:

He [Quirk] went through them [Gray's troopers] at a gallop and as he dashed back again, with his head bent low, he caught two balls on the top of it which (coming from different directions) traced a neat and accurate angle upon his scalp. Although the wounds were not serious at all, they would have stunned most men; but a head built in County Kerry with especial reference to shillelagh practice scorned to be affected by such trifles.
Immediately after Quirk's scouts had scattered the Hoosiers, Shanks' combat patrol spotted Morgan's rear guard at Bear Wallow, twelve miles southeast of Mumfordville. Quickly deploying, Shanks' Kentuckians moved to the attack. In the series of sporadic clashes which ensued, the buttermilk succeeded in holding the bluecoats at bay. For their trouble, however, Shanks' troopers succeeded in bagging a number of stragglers from Morgan's column without loss to themselves. 72

In the meantime, Colonel Hobson had been able to ascertain from the reports brought in by the couriers, dispatched by Gray and Shanks, the strength and position of Morgan's column. Accordingly, the colonel determined to recall his cavalry. Aides were immediately sent forth with the necessary instructions. Upon receipt of these orders Shanks, Gray, and Stout assembled their commands. After detaching a few scouts to shadow the Confederate raiders, the three patrols returned to Mumfordville. 73

Throughout the day Hobson kept his telegrapher constantly at the key in an effort to keep Generals Boyle, Gilbert, and Gordon Granger abreast of developments. These officers were advised of the reports sent in by the scouts. These indicated that Morgan had between 3,000 and 4,500 men, supported by eight guns, the largest 12-pounders. When his operator told him he was unable to get through to General Boyle, Hobson was deeply
disturbed. The Mumfordville commander knew that it was to
Louisville that he would have to look for reinforcements (both
men and matériel). It was late in the afternoon before Hobson
was able to contact Boyle. By then, however, it was too late to
effect anything before the next day. When he was finally able
to get through to Louisville, Hobson informed Boyle that additional
small-arms ammunition and the missing artillerists' implements
were badly needed at Mumfordville. Boyle was also warned that
Morgan's probable objective was the tunnel which carried the
tracks of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad under Muldraugh's
Hill. 74

During the day, General Gilbert visited Hobson's
headquarters. Learning of the clash at Glasgow, Gilbert had
decided to visit Mumfordville. Leaving Lebanon Junction by train,
Gilbert hastened to the point of danger. Detraining, Gilbert
found Hobson's troops well posted. Furthermore, the general was
relieved to discover that the new earthworks, which had been laid
out on the north side of the Green River, were nearly completed.
Only one thing troubled Gilbert, and that was the lack of enough
heavy ordnance. Besides the two 30-pounder Parrots which had
reached Mumfordville earlier in the day, several more of these
powerful rifled guns had supposedly been forwarded to Hobson's
command. Therefore, Gilbert determined to go to Louisville, to
see if he could locate the missing pieces. Leaving a member of
his staff -- Captain J. Edward Stacey -- to assist Hobson. Gilbert proceeded to Louisville. Visiting the ordnance depot, Gilbert found both the missing Parrotts and gunners' implements. Under the general's personal supervision, these siege guns and tools were loaded aboard a special train. As a result of this delay, it was the 26th before the train pulled out of the Louisville yards en route to the front. 75

Once Quirk's scouts had routed Gray's Indians, Morgan's column pushed on toward the Green River. Before reaching the river, Morgan called for Colonel Breckinridge. The colonel was directed to organize a two-company patrol which would be sent to threaten Woodsonville. Morgan hoped this demonstration would lead the Federals to believe that Mumfordville was his objective. Breckinridge assigned this mission to two companies drawn from Colonel Johnson's 10th Kentucky. After successfully carrying out their task, the two companies overtook their parent unit before it had crossed the river. 76

Following the patrol's departure, Morgan's raiders resumed the advance. It was beginning to get dark, when the Confederate vanguard reached the Green River at Burnt Bridge Ford. After making a brief reconnaissance, Morgan realized the steep and muddy banks would render even a daylight crossing difficult. Since time was of the essence, the general realized he would have to send his command across immediately. Duke's brigade, being in
advance, was able to gain the opposite side of the river before darkness had completely blanketed the area. Therefore, Duke's command experienced comparatively little difficulty in fording the river, although Captain Palmer's cannoneers had to exert energy and skill to get their guns across. Breckinridge's troopers, however, had a difficult time reaching the right bank of the river, because it was pitch-dark by the time their turn to cross had arrived. Furthermore, the horses belonging to Duke's brigade had churned the muddy banks into a viscous slime.

It was midnight before the greyclads entered Hammonsville. Here Morgan planned to spend the night. Before permitting his men to bivouac, Morgan summoned Colonel Duke to his headquarters. In an effort to maintain the deception that Mumfordville was his objective, Morgan had Duke send two companies to bluff an attack on that key Union base. The general felt that this feint might divert the blueclads' "attention from the combined attack which ... [he] intended to make the succeeding day [the 26th] on the stockades at Bacon Creek and Nolin". After wolfing down their Christmas supper, the dog-tired Confederates retired.

At 9 p.m., Colonel Hobson was advised by his scouts "that 100 of the enemy were crossing the river at Burnt Bridge Ford." This distressing news was confirmed during the night. At that time, reports reached Mumfordville indicating Morgan's entire
force was crossing the Green River and moving in the direction of Hammontsville. Correctly interpreting this data to indicate the Rebels were striking for Bacon Creek, Hobson determined to reinforce the small garrison guarding the railroad bridge at that point. Having arrived at this decision, Hobson issued marching orders to Dickey’s Michiganders. As a consequence of the battalion’s recent forced march, Dickey discovered he had less than 80 men fit for duty when ordered to Bacon Creek. Before leaving Mumfordville, Dickey was admonished by Hobson to report all developments to headquarters. In an effort to see if the greyclads had occupied Hammontsville, Hobson sent Colonel Shanks’ Kentuckians to reconnoiter in that direction. 79

In addition to the many orders that had to be drafted as a result of his decision to postpone his scheduled advance on Murfreesboro for another 24 hours, Rosecrans spent a busy Christmas Day working on plans which he hoped would culminate in the destruction of the troublesome Morgan. 80 General Reynolds was alerted to hold his division ready to block Morgan’s escape route. 81 Rosecrans thought it might be of material assistance if Reynolds’ command, as a temporary expedient, could be converted into mounted infantry. Accordingly, Rosecrans inquired of Reynolds, “How many pack and other horses can you raise, with saddles or bare backs, to put infantry on, to pursue them [the Rebels] with, say, one-half ride, the others walk, and change horses ... .” In closing,
Rosecrans asked for Reynolds' comments on this suggestion. 82
Evidently, Reynolds did not think very much of Rosecrans' idea of converting his division into mounted infantry, or he lacked the necessary beasts to carry it out. When he replied to the general's telegram, Reynolds made no mention of the plan. Instead, Reynolds advised his superior that he would leave Gallatin early on the following morning. Reynolds reported that when his division took the field it would number about 4,500 effectives, supported by two six-gun batteries. Following his departure from his base, Reynolds planned to proceed to Scottsville. 83
Simultaneously, Rosecrans issued instructions disposing of the other Federal unit, Harlan's brigade then stationed at Gallatin. General Fry, to whose division Harlan's unit was assigned, received a telegram from the Nashville GHQ directing him to place Harlan's brigade on standby. Harlan's troops were to be sent to Cave City, Kentucky, as soon as the necessary rolling stock was marshalled in the Gallatin yards. Fry was shocked when he received this order. He knew that if Reynolds' and Harlan's commands were sent in pursuit of Morgan, it would leave Gallatin garrisoned by convalescents and the 102d Illinois. Therefore, Fry felt called upon to bring this matter to Rosecrans' attention. After advising his superior that Harlan's brigade would be ready to move on a few hours' notice, Fry protested, "I deem it unsafe to move both General Reynolds and Colonel Harlan..."
from Gallatin .... The place [will] be entirely unprotected. I should think the troops at Bowling Green could be better spared than those here." In closing, Fry inquired, "Would it not be best to send cavalry in pursuit of Morgan?" 84

Answering Fry's message Rosecrans' chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Julius P. Garesché, misinterpreting the Confederate raiders' intentions, noted, "Morgan's delay at Glasgow shows hesitation, which increases probability of driving him back on Reynolds." Furthermore, Garesché believed the Army of the Cumberland's projected advance on Murfreesboro rendered it unlikely that the Confederates would attack Gallatin. In answer to Fry's question pertaining to the use of cavalry against Morgan, it was pointed out that Rosecrans preferred to use infantry. Fry's argument in favor of drawing troops from Bowling Green was demolished by a simple sentence, "Force at Bowling Green is weak." 85

Fry replied immediately to the chief of staff's message. Garesché was informed that if Harlan's brigade were sent to Cave City, sufficient cars to entrain 2,300 men and one six gun battery would be needed. Fry also asked when the prerequisite rolling stock would arrive. In addition, Fry sought permission to use the brigade commanded by Brigadier General James B. Steedman which was stationed at Pilot Knob to bolster the Gallatin garrison. 86

The chief of staff immediately sanctioned the proposed transfer of Steedman's unit. 87 It was the next morning, however, before
the railroad authorities were able to assemble the necessary transportation for the use of Harlan's brigade.

During the day, Rosecrans again exchanged telegrams with the commander of the Department of the Ohio. A message from General Wright informed Rosecrans that Morgan had penetrated to within five miles of Mumfordville. The strength of the raiding force was enumerated by Wright as "three regiments and eight guns." Wright advised his comrade-in-arms that General Boyle was under orders to mass his cavalry, if he could, and follow Morgan. In closing, Wright observed, "Think Boyle has cavalry enough to whip ... /Morgan/ if he can catch him." 38 Replying, Rosecrans repeated for Wright's benefit the intelligence garnered by L. L. Carter -- namely, that Morgan's column consisted of 3,000 troopers, supported by two guns. Rosecrans felt certain that, if the Federals displayed any vigor, Morgan would be trapped. 39

In his messages to General Boyle discussing Morgan's strength, Rosecrans was not quite so polite. Boyle was abruptly informed, "He /Morgan/ has no eight pieces of artillery at all; he has only two." Continuing, Rosecrans observed, "It is probable Morgan has taken the fore-wheels of wagons and mounted them with logs, to make our men think they were batteries." 90 Seeking to bolster Boyle's self-confidence Rosecrans noted, "You need not fear; the brigade at Lebanon can, or the garrison at Mumfordville can, whip Morgan to death; but I will take care that he has a good time getting home, as well as of his support, if he has any."
Boyle was cautioned not to credit the stories allegedly put afloat by Morgan greatly exaggerating the raiders' strength. 91

Following the receipt of the inaccurate intelligence scaling down the strength of Morgan's force to three regiments, General Wright decided the Mumfordville garrison was strong enough to cope with the situation. Accordingly, Wright countermanded his orders to General Gordon Granger transferring Brigadier General Abaalom Baird's division. Baird's troops, which were based at Danville, had been alerted to move to Mumfordville. Pending further developments, Baird's command was not to go beyond Lebanon. 92 Advising Boyle of his decision not to use any units drawn from Granger's district to reinforce the troops guarding the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, Wright observed that he didn't "think the raid as formidable as represented." Furthermore, Boyle was to send all the troops he could spare to Bowling Green or Glasgow, once Baird had massed his division at Lebanon. Boyle was also notified that Governor Morton was sending two recently organized regiments. 93

Unlike Rosecrans, Wright didn't think it was feasible to catch Morgan with infantry. Therefore, Boyle was urged to mass all the cavalry in his district. Counting the 5th Indiana, Wright believed Boyle had more cavalry available than Morgan. Since Wright had based these instructions on the misleading information which gave Morgan credit for having three instead of seven regiments, Boyle would be courting disaster if he carried
them out. Fortunately for the Federals, Boyle didn't.

It started to rain in the Kentucky-Tennessee theatre of operations on Christmas night. The precipitation was still pouring down when Morgan's raiders hit the road early the next morning. Pressing forward through a driving rain, along a road churned into a sea of mud by the thousands of horses' hooves, the greyelads pushed slowly toward their objective -- the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Before his column had proceeded very far, Morgan determined to organize a strong combat team. This group would be given the mission of burning the bridge which carried the tracks of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad across Bacon Creek. Morgan had been warned by his scouts that the bridge which he had marked for destruction was guarded by a 100-man garrison. These Federals were reportedly quartered in a stockade. Furthermore, since Bacon Creek was only eight miles north of Mumfordville, Morgan knew that the force sent to burn the bridge would have to be strong enough to beat off any relief column which the Federals might rush to the point of danger. Therefore, it was mandatory that a strong force commanded by an able leader be given the Bacon Creek assignment. Accordingly, when Morgan constituted the combat team, it was composed of picked companies drawn from the 2d and 7th Kentucky, supported by a section of Palmer's guns. The commander of the 2d Kentucky, Colonel Hutcheson, was placed in charge of this force. Immediately
following the organization and departure of Hutcheson's combat
team, the main column headed for Upton. 95

Reaching the Bacon Creek area, Hutcheson's vanguard
encountered several Union vedettes. Without hesitating a moment,
the combative Hutcheson called for Captain John B. Castleman.
The captain was directed to take companies B and C, 2d Kentucky,
and drive in the Yankee outposts. At a word from Castleman, the
greyclads, shouting wildly, thundered forward. Observing that
they were greatly outnumbered, the Northerners quickly scattered.
These pickets belonged to Captain Dickey's cavalry command.
Dickey's Michiganders had arrived at Bacon Creek several hours
before the butternuts put in an appearance. Following a brief
conference with Captain Joseph A. James whose unit -- Company B,
91st Illinois -- garrisoned the stockade, Dickey had established
a line of outposts covering the approaches to Bacon Creek from
the east. Once his vedettes had been driven in by the Rebels,
Dickey quickly assembled his outnumbered command. Leaving James'
infantrymen to fend for themselves, Dickey's battalion fell back
toward Mumfordville. A courier was sent racing ahead to advise
Colonel Hobson that the Bacon Creek garrison was under attack.
Castleman's troopers pursued Dickey's Michiganders for some
distance, capturing one officer and 26 men. Having penetrated
to within a few miles of Mumfordville, Castleman's troopers gave
up the chase. Castleman then prepared to return to Bacon Creek. 96
While Castleman was disposing of the Union cavalry, the remainder of the combat team had surrounded the stockade. When Captain James refused his demand for surrender, Hutcheson ordered his artillery into action. Unlimbering their two pieces, Palmer's artillerists began to pound the stockade with shot and shell. Although subjected to a heavy shelling, the Yankees held out. They resolutely rejected any and all demands to lay down their arms. The hot-headed Hutcheson now lost his temper. He ordered "the bridge to be fired at all hazards". This was a desperate undertaking, because the bridge was within less than one hundred yards of and commanded by the stockade. Volunteers readily came forward. These individuals were able to dash forward and apply the torch to the structure. Each time they did, however, the rain quickly extinguished the blaze. It became apparent to Hutcheson that if the bridge were to be destroyed, combustibles with a lower kindling point would have to be found and piled on the structure. The necessary inflammable materials were easily secured, but the Confederates experienced considerable difficulty in placing them on the bridge. Several men were wounded as they dashed forward in an effort to keep the fire supplied with fuel. Among these was Captain John H. Wolfe of the 7th Kentucky, who was struck in the head by a spent ball as he boldly mounted the bridge. When the captain was knocked unconscious, his comrades-in-arms believed him dead. The rain beating him in the face soon revived
the captain. Leaping to his feet, Wolfe rejoined his command, suffering no greater inconvenience than a colossal headache. In an effort to avoid the Yankees' fire, several of the Southerners took cover behind the abasements of the bridge. From the cover thus afforded, these men tried to keep the blaze going by tossing lighted firebrands onto it. The Confederates, however, were frustrated in this endeavor when Captain James had his men fire by volley. After the Rebels had several pieces of wood shot out of their hands, they rapidly lost their incentive for this type of work.

In the meantime, Morgan's main column had occupied Upton, seven miles north of Bacon Creek. Entering the town at 11 a.m., the Confederates tapped the telegraph line. Morgan's operator quickly established contact with a number of posts, including Louisville and Cincinnati. Only one important message was received, however. This one told of the impending arrival of a train loaded with ammunition, small arms, and cannon. (Aboard this train were the badly needed supplies which General Gilbert had prevailed upon the Louisville Ordnance Depot to rush to Mumfordville.) Following the receipt of this message, Morgan, in expectation of capturing the train, had his men take cover. It appears; however, that intelligence of the Confederates' descent on the railroad was already abroad. Accordingly, instructions were issued by the Federal authorities to hold up the train.
Before the train reached Nolin, it was flagged down and the engineer ordered to return to Louisville. After it became apparent that something had happened to delay the anxiously expected train, Morgan put his men to work wreaking havoc on the railroad. To warp the rails and burn the ties, the cavalrymen built a number of large fires on the roadbed. All told, the raiders, before they had ceased their work, had destroyed between three and four miles of track. 98

Throughout the early afternoon the sound of artillery fire from the south was distinctly audible at Upton. By 3 p.m. Morgan began to fret. The general was afraid that the duration of the contest at Bacon Creek indicated the Federals had succeeded in reinforcing the stockade from Mumfordville. Accordingly, Morgan decided to give his personal attention to the Bacon Creek situation. When he moved to Hatcheson's support, Morgan proposed to take with him the 10th Kentucky and the other section of Palmer's battery. Simultaneously, Morgan directed Colonel Duke to proceed with the remainder of the division to Nolin, eight miles north of Upton. The Confederates then swung into their saddles and Morgan's and Duke's commands departed from Upton; one going north and the other south. 99

Reaching Bacon Creek, Morgan found Hatcheson's combat team grimly laying siege to the stockade. Morgan, not wishing to waste any further time, sent forward an aide covered by a flag of
truce. Approaching the stockade, the Confederate informed Captain James that Morgan demanded the unconditional surrender of the stockade. James, expecting that Colonel Hobson would send a relief column, sought to purchase additional time by prolonging the negotiations. But the captain's clever scheme failed when Morgan proved adamant. Laying down their arms after an obstinate defense, the Federals -- 93 officers and men -- marched out of the stockade. During the attack the garrison had suffered only three casualties -- all slightly wounded; the Confederates had four men wounded. After burning the railroad bridge and the stockade, Morgan headed northward.

Meanwhile, Duke's column had reached Nolin. The Union officer in charge of the stockade guarding the bridge across Nolin Creek did not have as much intestinal fortitude as Captain James. When called upon by Colonel Duke to surrender, the Federal commandant announced he would, if the Confederates would show him their artillery. To comply with the Yankee's request, Duke ordered Lieutenant Corbett to bring on the two "Bull Pups". Evidently the officer was not impressed with the two little mountain howitzers, because he told Duke that "he would return and consult with his officers". Duke permitted the officer to retrace his steps, but only after Corbett's gunners had unlimbered the "Bull Pups" near the stockade. At the same time, the cavalrymen dismounted and took positions from where they could
command the loopholes of the fort. Following a brief conference with his subordinates, the commandant announced his decision to surrender. After paroling his 76 prisoners who belonged to the 91st Illinois, Duke organized several demolition teams. One of these teams put the torch to the railroad bridge and stockade; the other burned "several culverts and cow-gaps" on either side of Nolin. 101

By the time Morgan reached Nolin, where he rendezvoused with Duke, darkness had fallen. Accordingly, the general ordered his division to bivouac.

Informed by Dickey's messenger of the Confederate attack on the Bacon Creek stockade, Colonel Hobson sent a staff officer to get in touch with Colonel Shanks. When he contacted Shanks, the aide handed the colonel his instructions. Opening the message from Hobson, Shanks discovered he was to leave two companies to patrol the Greensburg road, while he used the remainder of his regiment to cover Dickey's retreat. Furthermore, if the Confederates sought to close with his regiment, Shanks was to feign a withdrawal. The colonel's task was to decoy the raiders into a trap which Hobson was preparing. 102

After detaching the two companies, Shanks prepared to carry out Hobson's instructions. Approximately midway between Bacon Creek and Mamfordville, Shanks' Kentuckians encountered Dickey's retreating Michiganders. By this time, Castleman's greyclads,
despairing of overtaking the Northerners, had slowed the pace of their advance. In an effort to fool the Rebels, Shanks quickly deployed his men into line of battle. Once he had formed his men, Shanks ordered them to give ground slowly. In the meantime, Hobson's infantry had taken position north of Mumfordville. Fortunately for the Confederates, Castleman smelled a rat. After exchanging a few shots with the Federals, the Rebels fell back to Bacon Creek. Here they rendezvoused with Hutcherson's combat team. When it became apparent that the Confederates were not going to fall into his trap, Hobson permitted his troops to return to their respective camps. 103

On the morning of the 26th three trains, each drawn by a single engine, chugged into the Gallatin yards. Within a short time Colonel Harlan had entrained the five regiments and one battery that constituted his brigade aboard the waiting cars. Colonel Harlan in his "After Action Report" caustically commented, "The cars furnished to him by the railroad authorities were barely sufficient to contain the men, horses, and guns of the brigade .... ." As soon as the men and gear were aboard, the trains pulled away from the depot. Near South Tunnel, six miles north of Gallatin, the engine attached to the rear train broke down; (The 4th Kentucky, three companies of the 74th Indiana, the battery horses, and part of the battery were on this train.)
Consequently, the Federals had to send to Nashville for another locomotive. While the troop train was halted waiting for the engine to arrive, the passenger train from Nashville (Conductor Taylor in charge) puffed into view. Colonel Croxton, who was in command of the stalled train, asked Taylor to let him use his engine. Taylor refused even after Croxton had "advised him of the great importance of the expedition upon which the brigade was sent, and the imminent danger which might result to the entire Louisville and Nashville Railroad from any delay." 104

As a result of the delay the train with Croxton's troops aboard did not reach Bowling Green until 10 p.m. The two other troop trains had arrived a number of hours before, but Harlan decided not to push on until all his men were present.

Before departing from Bowling Green, Harlan learned that Morgan was operating north of Mumfordville. According to his instructions, Harlan was to proceed to Cave City which was south of the Green River. But it was now apparent to Harlan that he would have to cross the Green River and follow Morgan beyond Mumfordville, if he were to save the "railroad from destruction".

In addition, Harlan had received no information as to whether the raiders had inflicted any damage on the railroad's right of way between Bowling Green and Mumfordville. A wire from Colonel Hobson stating that the track was clear caused Harlan to decide
to proceed immediately. After supplying his command with one
day's rations from the Bowling Green commissary depot, Harlan
started for Mumfordville shortly after daybreak on the 27th. 105

Simultaneous with the departure of Harlan's brigade
from Gallatin, Reynolds' division tramped out of the town en route
to Scottsville. If all went according to Rosecrans' master plan,
Morgan's raiders would be hemmed in and destroyed by Reynolds'
and Harlan's powerful commands.

During the night of the 26th Morgan had been advised
by his scouts "that some seven or eight companies of United States
troops were stationed at Elizabethtown". This information
determined Morgan's next move. He would attack Elizabethtown
which was eight miles north of Nolin, and capture the garrison.
Following an early reveille the raiders, after gulping down a
hurried breakfast, swung into their saddles. At a word from
Morgan the long column again hit the road. 106

There were seven companies of the 91st Illinois
stationed along the railroad north of Elizabethtown on the
afternoon of the 26th. These units had been given the task of
guarding the Louisville and Nashville Railroad's trestles in the
Muldraugh's Hill area. (The regiment's three other companies
garrisoned the stockades at Bacon Creek and Nolin.) Advised of
Morgan's approach, Lieutenant Colonel Harry S. Smith, the 91st's
commander, determined to concentrate his command at Elizabethtown.
The colonel knew there were three stockades under construction at that point. When he reached Elizabethtown, however, Smith was shocked to discover that the work had lagged. Accordingly, the stockades were not in a defensible condition. (Subsequently, a high Union officer was cashiered for his failure to see that the work on the stockades was expedited.) Consequently, Colonel Smith was forced to post most of his men in several brick houses located on the southern outskirts of the town. 107

When Morgan's vanguard arrived within sight of Elizabethtown, the Confederates were hailed by a party bearing a flag of truce. The leader of this group, a corporal with a pronounced German accent, handed Morgan a dispatch from Colonel Smith. This document, couched in peremptory terms, was scrawled in pencil on the back of an envelope. The message which was addressed "To the Commander of the Confederate Forces", read, "I demand an unconditional surrender of all your forces. I have you surrounded, and will compel you to surrender." When Morgan advised his subordinates of Smith's proposal, Colonel Duke called it "the most sublimely audacious I ever knew to emanate from a Federal officer." General Morgan knew that Smith was bluffing. Dictating his reply, Morgan noted that he knew the Federals' strength, and Smith was in error in supposing he had the Confederates surrounded. On the contrary, Morgan commented, the Rebels had the Yankees encircled. Morgan closed his communication
with a peremptory demand for Smith's surrender. The message was
given to the "Dutch" corporal for delivering to the Union
commander. In his answer, which was soon in Morgan's hands, Smith
bravely stated, "it was the part of a United States officer to
fight, and not to surrender". 108

While the parleying was taking place Morgan formed his
division. Morgan ordered Duke's brigade to take position on the
right and Breckinridge's on the left. The railroad would serve
as the boundary between the two brigades. One regiment and a
howitzer drew the task of guarding the division's train. Before
their men took position, Breckinridge and Duke were directed to
cover their respective fronts with skirmishers. Accordingly,
Duke dismounted and deployed the 8th Kentucky; Breckinridge did
the same with the 9th Kentucky. Several mounted companies moved
forward, taking position to the left and right of the dismounted
troopers. These cavalrymen were given a dual mission -- cutting
off the Yankees' line of retreat, and forewarning Morgan in
event the Federals sought to reinforce the Elizabethtown garrison.
The remainder of the division was held in reserve, ready to
exploit any success the 8th and 9th Kentucky might register. 109

Before the negotiations had been terminated, a detachment
of Corbett's battery had emplaced their 10-pounder Parrott
(captured at Hartsville) on the Nolin pike. As soon as Morgan
had digested the contents of Colonel Smith's business "of a United
States officer's message, he ordered the attack to begin. The gun captain in charge of the Parrott pulled the lanyard. A rifled projectile from his gun was sent hurtling into the town. Hardly had the muzzle blast from the Parrott dispersed into the surrounding air before Captain Palmer's four guns roared into action. Palmer's Tennesseans had unlimbered their pieces on a hill to the left of the pike about 600 yards south of Elizabethtown. Morgan, who had established his command post on this knoll, superintended the firing of Palmer's battery.

Once the artillery had softened up the Union positions, Colonels Culke and Stoner ordered their troopers to charge. The men of the 9th Kentucky, Colonel Stoner in the lead, dashed forward, their right flank guiding on the railroad embankment. As they advanced on the run, Stoner's greyclads drew the fire of the Union sharpshooters. These Yankees were enconced in the brick houses on the southern outskirts of the town. Fortunately for the greyclads, the open ground which they had to negotiate in gaining the defiladed area next to the walls of the buildings was limited. In addition, the Yankees' sharpshooters seemed to have been badly shaken by the fire of the Rebels' artillery. Therefore, the bluecoats were only able to get off a few rounds before the Kentuckians were upon them. Reaching the houses, some of Stoner's troopers started to beat down the doors with their rifle butts;
the remainder, in a successful effort to keep the Northerners pinned down, blasted away at the windows. Bursting into the houses, Stoner's Kentuckians quickly compelled the inmates to surrender. 111

Meanwhile, to the east of the railroad, Cluie's cavalrymen were cautiously feeling their way forward. His men were made wary by the sight of the three unfinished stockades to their immediate front. Even though these fortifications were unoccupied, they served as a threat in being. Only after they were satisfied that the stockades contained no defenders, did the men of the 8th Kentucky quicken the pace of their advance. Except on their extreme right, where there was a little sporadic sniping, Cluie's troopers encountered no opposition as they swept into Elizabethtown. 112

While the raiders were busy securing the houses at the edge of Elizabethtown, they were fired upon by the Union soldiers who had barricaded themselves inside several buildings near the center of the town. It was apparent that these pockets of resistance would have to be quickly dealt with. In the ensuing street fighting, the buttermilk had one big advantage -- their artillery. They, therefore, proceeded to skillfully employ their guns. When the call for artillery was first raised, Captain Palmer's Tennesseans quickly limbered up their two 6-pounders.
These two pieces were displaced forward and placed in battery at the point where one of the roads entered the town. Opening fire, the gunners focused their attention upon a large building over which the Union flag floated. It was in this structure that Colonel Smith maintained his headquarters and "the enemy seemed thickest." When the Federals continued to hold out, Colonel Duke sent for one of the "Bull Pups." In response to the colonel's summons Lieutenant Corbett, accompanied by several of his men, manhandled one of the mountain howitzers forward. In accordance with Duke's instructions, Corbett emplaced the piece on the railroad embankment. From this vantage point Corbett's gunners began to blast away at the headquarters building. To afford protection to the howitzer, in case the Unionists should make a sortie, Breckinridge posted Company A, 9th Kentucky, in support of Corbett's cannoniers. Taking cover behind the embankment, the cavalrymen carefully bided their time. 113

It appears that Duke had selected an excellent emplacement for Corbett's piece, because there were no windows in the side of the building facing the gun. After each discharge, however, the bluecoats would dash out into the street. Taking a quick aim, the Yankees blasted away at the gunners while they were reloading. Every time the Federals debouched from the building, the dismounted troopers, lying behind the embankment, would retaliate in like style. Finally, a member of Morgan's staff
rode up. Observing the situation, he decided that Company A was not accomplishing anything where it was. Accordingly, with more zeal than discretion, he ordered the company to charge. Springing to their feet, the men moved to the attack. As they dashed forward, the dismounted troopers veered around from the blind side of the building to its front where the windows were located. In doing so, they were exposed to a scathing small-arms fire.

The company officers now realised that the aide had overstepped his authority; therefore, they ordered their men to fall back. Seeing that the greycoats were retiring in "some confusion", the Federals flocked out of the house and poured a sweeping fire down the street. Several of the gunners were hit; the remainder abandoned the little howitzer. Lieutenant Corbett, however, refused to take to his heels. He remained calmly seated on the carriage while the minie's glanced off the piece. When the Federals retired within the building, having failed to capitalize on their temporary success, Corbett rallied his men. Once he had reassembled his crew, the lieutenant had them resume firing.

Almost immediately there appeared "to be a commotion among" the defenders, and a white flag was hoisted from one of the buildings. The division quartermaster -- Major D. H. Llewellyn -- then galloped into town waving a white handkerchief, oblivious of the continued firing. While Colonel Smith was not yet prepared to surrender, his men were. Pouring out of the
building, the bluecoats threw down their arms. The entire
garrison, consisting of 652 officers and men, was captured and
paroled. In addition, the fruits of the victory included more
than 600 altered flintlock muskets, enough to arm all the raiders
who had left Alexandria without arms. 115

The raiders spent the night of the 27th at Elizabethtown.
After the men had established their camps, Morgan sent out
demolition teams. Before rejoining their comrades-in-arms,
these groups burned three railroad bridges and destroyed several
miles of track on either side of Elizabethtown. 116

Colonel Harlan on the 27th, as he sought to overtake
the raiders, continued to experience considerable difficulties
with the engines which the railroad officials had placed at his
disposal. About ten miles beyond Bowling Green, the locomotive
attached to the rear train again broke down. The engineer, on
examining his engine, informed the officer in charge of the train
that the locomotive would have to be sent to the shop for repairs.
Accordingly, the officer was forced to send to Bowling Green for
another engine. As a result of this second unfortunate breakdown
considerable valuable time was lost. It was 10 p.m. before the
troop train reached Mumfordville. 117

At Mumfordville, Harlan learned that Morgan's raiders
had cut the railroad at Bacon Creek and Molin. Realizing it
would be impossible to proceed any further by rail, Harlan
detrained his command. The 40-hour trip from Gallatin to Mumfordville had been very hard on the brigade's horses, because it had been impossible to provide the beasts with either water or forage. As soon as the animals were unloaded, they were watered and fed. Furthermore, Colonel Harlan discovered when he inspected his command that his men appeared to be more fatigued by the long train ride. (As a result of the crowded condition of the cars, the men had slept very little.) than by a forced march. Throwing themselves on the damp ground, without tents to shelter them, the soldiers endeavored to catch a few hours of sleep.

At Cave City, Harlan had received a telegram from General Fry. Glancing at the dispatch, Harlan was elated to discover that Fry had given his stamp of approval to the colonel's decision to take his brigade to Mumfordville. Now, however, Harlan deemed it his duty to give Fry's orders a broader interpretation. Harlan feared that if he followed Fry's instructions to the letter and remained at Mumfordville, Morgan would be able to destroy every bridge on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. If the Confederate raiders were able to accomplish this task with impunity, Harlan reasoned, the flow of supplies to the Army of the Cumberland would be greatly curtailed. Since the Rebels had already destroyed the bridges spanning Bascou and Nolin creeks, Harlan knew he would have to move fast if he were to save the immense trestle-work at Muldraugh's Hill; and,
failing in that, to save the bridges over Rolling Fork, near Lebanon Junction, and over Salt River, at Shepherdsville."

Therefore, without awaiting authorization from Fry's headquarters, Harlan decided to resume the advance. Mustering his command, Harlan appealed to the officers and men "to bear up under any privations" in order to save the vital trestles and bridges. 119

At 3 a.m. Harlan's brigade tramped out of Mumfordville and started northward. Before its departure, the brigade was reinforced by two of Colonel Hobson's regiments -- the 13th Kentucky Infantry and the 12th Kentucky Cavalry. The addition of these two units gave Harlan a striking force of about 2,900 effectives. 120

Learning that Morgan had reached Elizabethtown, General Fry on the 27th wired Rosecrans, "Now is our time to catch him [Morgan]." Fry felt that if Rosecrans would give him 2,000 or 3,000 cavalry, he would "catch ... [Morgan] before he could possibly get out of Kentucky." If the necessary troopers were made available, Fry promised to start after the raiders on the following morning. In closing, Fry noted, "It is thought ... [Morgan] was making for the tunnel at Muldraugh's Hill. He should never be allowed to escape out of Kentucky again." 121

Fry's message, however, reached Rosecrans' headquarters at a most inopportune time. At this time, the limited cavalry force
attached to the Army of the Cumberland had its hands full screening the Union advance on Murfreesboro. Denied the use of any cavalry, Fry was left with but one alternative -- to sanction Harlan's decision to proceed beyond Murfardville with his infantry brigade.

General Reynolds, whose division constituted one arm of the pincers in which Rosecrans proposed to embrace Morgan's raiders, reached Scottsville on the evening of the 27th. Informed that the Rebels had crossed the Green River, Reynolds planned to move his command toward Glasgow on the morrow. 122

As to be expected, Rosecrans found almost all his time and energy engrossed by his drive on Murfreesboro. Therefore, the general was able to devote comparatively little time to the efforts to snare Morgan's raiders. During the day, Rosecrans received a request from the Bowling Green Federals for reinforcements; these troops would be used to garrison Fort Baker. In reply, the general noted that it was mandatory to hold Fort Baker. However, he added, at the moment he was unable to furnish any troops for that purpose. Accordingly, the soldiers for holding the fort would have to be drawn from Bowling Green.

Continuing, Rosecrans told the Bowling Green officers that they should take their troubles to General Wright. Rosecrans noted that Colonel Harlan, who was operating in the area, would be able to help in case of emergency. In closing, the general observed,
"Morgan is in the toils, and being rapidly hemmed in. He [Morgan] will find it so difficult to escape that he will have little leisure to think of offensive operations." 123

Throughout the 27th General Wright continued to underestimate Morgan's strength. Boyle was again informed by his superior, "Morgan, from best accounts, has but three regiments -- not exceeding 1,800 men in all. Deduct 600 for holding horses, and he has but 1,200 for his fighting force, and you should whip him at your important points." About the only thing which seemed to worry Wright was the possibility that Morgan might make a sudden dash on Louisville. In a message warning Boyle of this, Wright noted that he had ordered Colonel Henry B. Carrington (the officer in charge of mustering the Indiana regiments into Federal service) to hurry forward any troops the Louisville commander might request of Governor Morton. 124 Later in the day, Wright, who continued to fret about the relative defenseless condition of Louisville, issued orders transferring the 114th Ohio from Camp Dennison, Ohio, to the point of danger. 125 In addition, Wright dashed off a message to General Gordon Granger. The Lexington commander was directed to rush a regiment to Louisville. 126

The presence of Morgan's "terrible men" in central Kentucky naturally caused the Union garrisons to become very jittery. During the day the Bardstown authorities advised
General Boyle that firing was distinctly audible from the directions of Elizabethtown and Lebanon. Boyle immediately relayed this intelligence to Cincinnati. Wright was surprised by this intelligence. Examining his maps, Wright noted that Elizabethtown was southwest of Bardstown, while Lebanon lay to the southeast. Unless Morgan had divided his force, Wright did not see how this report could be true. The commander of the Union garrison stationed at Lebanon, Colonel William A. Hoskins, had also reported that he had heard cannonading. Hoskins located this firing at New Market, six miles southwest of Lebanon. When informed of this situation, Wright ordered General Gordon Granger to have General Baird reinforce the Lebanon Federals with two or three regiments. 127

The grand prizes which had lured the Confederates into Kentucky lay about six miles beyond Elizabethtown. These were two mighty railroad trestles, one 350 yards in length and the other only 50 yards shorter. Both of these structures, which were about a mile apart, were approximately 60 feet in height. One of these trestles was located on the south slope of Muldraugh's Hill and the other on the north. The bridges and trestles, heretofore, destroyed by the raiders were small in comparison to these two gigantic structures. Reports garnered by Morgan's scouts indicated that these two trestles were strongly guarded.
If the Confederates could destroy them, it would be a number of weeks before the Union authorities would be able to use the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to funnel supplies to Rosecrans' army. 128

These strategic trestles were guarded by the 71st Indiana Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Courtland C. Maston. Earthworks and artillery emplacements for the protection of the trestles had been erected by the Hoosiers. No cannons had been mounted, because the Louisville ordnance depot had been unable to requisition any "suitable pieces". Inspecting the defenses, General Gilbert reported, "There was partial shelter for the men, and ... [he] hoped that with their muskets they could make good their hold on the place for one day, sufficient to allow the pursuing force [Harlan's brigade] to overtake the rebels." Prior to Morgan's arrival, the Indianians were reinforced by Companies B and C, 78th Illinois. These two units had been ordered forward from New Haven where the regiment was stationed. 129

Breaking camp on the morning of the 28th, Morgan's raiders moved forward at a leisurely pace. The Rebels destroyed the railroad as they advanced. Four miles north of Elizabethtown, Morgan called a halt. Before proceeding he organized two striking forces. Colonel Breckinridge's brigade was given the mission of capturing the lower or Sulphur Fork trestle; the general, accompanied by Duke's unit, would attack the upper. 130
Advised of the butternuts' approach, Colonel Matson took position with most of his troops (about 500 strong) at the Sulphur Fork trestle. A 200-man detachment was posted at the upper trestle. Once they had surrounded the Yankees, Morgan and Breckinridge sent forward aides covered by flags of truce. After the bluecoats at the two trestles had refused their demands for unconditional surrender, the Confederates prepared to attack. It was almost 3 p.m. before the greyclads had completed their dispositions. When Morgan and Breckinridge gave the word, the Confederates' artillery roared into action. Palmer's battery pounded the defenders of the upper trestle; Corbett's hammered away at the Unionists defending the Sulphur Fork structure. After undergoing a shelling of about an hour's duration, the Yankees raised the white flag. Neither side suffered any casualties during the engagement. Besides 700 prisoners, including 27 officers, the Southerners found they had captured a considerable amount of medical, quartermaster, and commissary stores. While the officers designated to perform the duty were paroling the bluecoats, demolition teams applied the torch to the trestles and the war matériel.

Their work of destruction completed, the raiders again hit the road. Leaving the railroad, the Rebels turned into the Bardstown Road. Nightfall found the Confederates camped on the south bank of Rolling Fork. During the late afternoon's march,
patrols were thrown out in all directions by Morgan. Besides burning the Cave Run bridge, these groups destroyed two bridges on the Lebanon Branch. 132

With the destruction of the two great Muldraugh's Hill trestles, Morgan had successfully accomplished his mission. He now prepared to return to Middle Tennessee. The general would have liked to pay another visit to the Bluegrass region, but he had been admonished by Bragg not to delay his return. 133

Except for a ten minute break every hour, and several slightly longer halts to allow the men to bolt their rations, the hard-driving Harlan marched his troops from Mumfordville to Elizabethtown without any prolonged stops. Harlan's badly fagged out column reached Elizabethtown on the morning of the 29th. Entering the town, Harlan learned that the previous afternoon Morgan's raiders had burned the Muldraugh's Hill trestles. More interesting, however, was the intelligence that Morgan's troopers had spent the night camped ten miles from Elizabethtown. These reports placed the butternuts on Rolling Fork where the Bardstown road crossed the stream. With his quarry this near, Harlan determined to press on. As the brigade tramped out of town, Harlan directed Colonel Shanks' Kentucky Cavalry to take the lead. 134

On the morning of the 28th the Union commander at Lebanon, Colonel Hoskins, received a distressing dispatch from General Boyle. Colonel Hoskins learned, on digesting this dispatch,
that General Baird had decided to recall the reinforcements then en route from Danville to Lebanon. During the afternoon things began to look serious when the sound of heavy cannonading from the direction of Elizabethtown became distinctly audible in Lebanon. Hastening to the telegraph office, Hoskins dashed off a wire to General Baird advising him of this situation. In reply, Baird promised to send the worried Hoskins two strong regiments, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James M. Henderson. These regiments, Baird assured Hoskins, would reach Lebanon on the 30th.

Shortly thereafter, Hoskins received information that Boyle had decided to shift Colonel William P. Reid's brigade from Columbia to Lebanon. In view of Baird's decision to reinforce him with Henderson's combat team, Hoskins wired Boyle advancing the suggestion that it would be better to send Reid's troops to Muldraugh's Hill. By this time, however, the Rebels had cut the telegraph connecting Lebanon with Louisville. Accordingly, Hoskins was unable to contact Boyle's GHQ. No one else took it upon himself to stop Reid's brigade, which reached Lebanon on the morning of the 29th. 135

During the day (the 28th) Wright finally admitted that he had underestimated the strength of Morgan's command. In a message acknowledging his error, Wright inquired of General Gordon Granger, "Can't you send troops at once to Louisville?" If Granger couldn't, Wright expressed himself as fearful lest the foe capture
the city. In closing, Wright observed, "I fear the Louisville and Nashville Railroad is seriously injured." In addition, Wright addressed a telegram to the Ohio chief executive, David Tod. The governor was informed by the general, "The raid into Kentucky may be more serious than our information has led us to believe, and we may want all the force we can raise." Tod was requested to hold any troops, then stationed in his state's camps of instruction, ready for service in the field.

At an early morning briefing (on the 29th), Morgan outlined for his subordinates their respective assignments. The 8th Kentucky, supported by one of Palmer's 6-pounders, was to burn the railroad bridge which carried the Louisville and Nashville tracks across Rolling Fork. Morgan had scheduled other duties for Colonel Cluke; therefore, Major Robert S. Bullock would lead the 8th Kentucky in its attack on the bridge. Colonel Chenault's 11th Kentucky, accompanied by one piece of artillery, was given the task of destroying the stockade and the trestle belonging to the Lebanon Branch at Boston. Three companies drawn from the 9th Kentucky, reinforced by one of the "Bull Pups", would attack New Haven. After accomplishing their missions, the three detached forces were to rendezvous with the main column at Bardstown.

As soon as the troopers constituting these three combat teams had departed, the remainder of the division broke camp and
co-enced to cross Rolling Fork. The ford selected by Morgan for traversing Rolling Fork lay about one mile above the point where the Bardstown road crossed the stream. A rear guard consisting of approximately 300 men covered the division as it forded the river. 139

In the meantime, Morgan had convened a court-martial; the purpose was to try Colonel Huffman for alleged violation of the terms granted by General Morgan to the prisoners at the surrender of the Bacon Creek stockade. In addition to the two brigade commanders -- Duke and Breckinridge -- the members of the court were: Colonels Cluke, Stoner, and Hutcheson. The trial was conducted in a brick house about 600 yards south of the river. As the court-martial acquitting Huffman was placing its verdict in writing, several couriers came galloping up. These men excitedly announced that a large Union force consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry was close at hand. Dashing from the building, the Rebel brass heard the sound of bursting shells, from the Union artillery as it roared into action. The Confederates had known that Harlan's brigade was trailing them, but they were shocked to discover that the Yankees had overtaken them. Morgan reacted to this dangerous situation with his customary vigor. Duke was ordered to send a messenger to recall Bullock's command. Morgan knew that if Bullock's troopers were unable to capture the stockade, they would be isolated on the left bank of Rolling Fork. In this case, the capture of Bullock's
command would be rendered extremely likely. Once the aide was on his way, Morgan directed Duke to deploy the units which had not yet crossed Rolling Fork. These troopers would be given the task of holding the enemy in check, until the entire command had passed the ford. Accordingly, Duke, assisted by Breckinridge, dismounted and deployed several companies drawn from the 7th, 8th, and 9th Kentucky in line of battle. Five other companies were held in reserve. Having made these dispositions, Duke anxiously awaited Bullock's return. Morgan, accompanied by the main column, proceeded to Bardstown after fording the river. 140

The terrain on which Duke had posted the Confederate rear guard was suited for a holding action. The greyclads' flanks rested in a dense growth of woods which extended for more than a mile south of Rolling Fork. Between the two patches of woods there was a large meadow about 300 yards wide by 600 to 800 yards long. This open ground was bounded on one side by the river and on the other three by woods. Near the northern limit of the meadow, approximately 200 yards from the stream, was a deep ravine. Duke's dismounted troopers took cover in this depression. On the Confederates' left the ground, in addition to being wooded, was very rugged. The Rebel officers felt confident that they would be able to hold that portion of the bridgehead against all comers. About the only thing troubling Duke was the absence, except on his extreme left, of adequate
protection for his horses. Duke knew that his men's mounts would constitute a high priority target for the Union artillery. When his vanguard reached a point five miles beyond Elizabethtown, Colonel Harlan received a very anxiously awaited report from his scouts. These men corroborated the earlier intelligence pinpointing the grayclads on Rolling Fork. Continuing, the scouts told the colonel that the butternuts "would probably soon cross the river". Without hesitating a moment, Colonel Harlan determined to constitute a special striking force. This group consisted of the 12th Kentucky Cavalry, supported by a section of Battery C, 1st Ohio, Light Artillery. Colonel Shanks was placed in charge of this force. Racing ahead, Shanks' combat patrol, pending Harlan's appearance on the scene, would engage the Rebels and seek to prevent their escape across the river.

When Shanks arrived within one mile of the ford, he spotted in the valley below a strong force of Rebel cavalry. Shanks immediately shouted for the section commander to have his cannoneers unlimber their two guns. Quickly placing their two pieces in battery, the Buckeyes opened fire. This shelling caused the Confederates, including those who had just emerged from the court-martial, to scatter. Harking to the rear of the artillery, Harlan's infantry moved forward on the double. It was about 1 p.m. when Harlan joined Shanks on the ridge overlooking the valley. Here the colonel, without the aid of his field glasses, "saw quite
distinctly a very large body of cavalry formed in line of battle near the river. The Confederate officers could be distinguished as they rode along their line, apparently giving encouragement to their men. 24]

Since he knew that Morgan's command outnumbered his, Harlan decided to proceed with caution. After making a hasty reconnaissance, Harlan formed his brigade into double line of battle. Once they had formed their units, the regimental commanders (both cavalry and infantry) covered their respective fronts with skirmishers. These dispositions completed, Harlan waved his men forward. As the blueslads swept toward the foe's main line of resistance, the skirmishers on the Union left quickly established contact with the grayclads. Supported by the guns of Battery C, the Yankees in this sector forced the Confederates to give ground. However, before he could capitalize on this success, Harlan observed that the Southerners appeared to be grouping for a counterattack. The colonel believed the butternuts planned to occupy a knoll which commanded the Union right flank. Accordingly, Harlan suspended his advance, to permit the 10th Indiana to take possession of this eminence.

His Hoosiers having gained the commanding ground, Colonel Carroll sent four of his companies to mop up the Confederate sharpshooters. These snipers were ensconced in the woods to his immediate front. After Carroll's Indians had accomplished their mission, Harlan shifted his entire battle line
to the right. The 4th Kentucky, the 14th Ohio, and the 74th Indiana took position on the 10th Indiana's left. One of Battery C's sections was emplaced on the knoll; the 10th Kentucky massed in its support. The Union left was held by the 13th Kentucky, reinforced by two of the Ohioans' guns. Immediately following Harlan's redeployment, the skirmishing on the right flank of the Union battle line suddenly increased in intensity.

During the initial stage of the bluecoats' advance, Duke had thrown out a number of snipers. Taking cover in the woods, these individuals traded shots with Harlan's skirmishers. Simultaneously, the Confederate officers maneuvered the men posted in the meadow in a fashion calculated to give the Federals an exaggerated opinion of their strength. Duke's position began to deteriorate, though, when the 10th Indiana seized the knoll to his left. Shortly thereafter, it became more critical when the Unionists emplaced two guns on the hill. Moments later Carroll's Hoosiers flushed Duke's sharpshooters from the woods which bounded the meadow on the south. In addition, the Confederates were compelled to abandon the brick house and outbuildings where the court-martial had been held. Just as things were looking darkest, however, the crew manning the 6-pounder which had accompanied Bullock's combat patrol, thundered into view. Better yet, a defiant yell emitted by the troopers of the 8th Kentucky told Duke that "Cluke's war dogs" were at hand. (The courier with the message ordering Bullock's recall had reached the major, while he
was deploying his command preparatory to attacking the Rolling Fork bridge. The bridge was guarded by two companies of the 78th Illinois.) Realizing that the powerful Union artillery would quickly knock out his little 6-pounder, Duke ordered Palmer's eager Tennesseans to keep their piece limbered up. Furthermore, Duke "wished to avoid everything which might warm the affair into a hot fight, feeling pretty certain that when that occurred we [the Confederate rear guard] would all, guns and men, 'go up' together." 145

Accordingly, Duke ordered the cannoneers to remove their gun to the opposite side of the river. In doing so, the artillerists were to make no attempt to conceal their movements. They were to endeavor to draw the foe's attention to the upper ford. A roadway was hacked through the timber, and the gun was taken across the river. In the meantime, Duke having assumed command of his unit upon its return, sent one battalion across the river. The other battalion was fed into position alongside the other units holding the bridgehead. 146

Following the return of Bullock's detachment, Duke began to reflect on the possibility of extricating the rear guard from its increasingly precarious position. The colonel knew that, confronted as he was by a force much superior to his own, he was likely to find it a hazardous undertaking. While the colonel was debating his next move, the question was rendered academic, for a
courier galloped up and handed Duke a message from Morgan. Opening the dispatch, Duke found that he was to withdraw. Subsequently, Duke recalled his thoughts at that moment:

In common with quite a number of others, I devoutly wished I could [withdraw]. The enemy's guns -- the best served of any, I think, that I ever saw in action -- were playing havoc with the horses (four were killed by one shell), and actually bursting shells in the lower ford with such frequency as to render the crossing at it by a column out of the question.

The addition of Cluke's battalion had increased the strength of the Confederate force occupying the bridgehead to nearly 800 officers and men. By this time, however, Harlan had redeployed his brigade. Covered by a strong force of skirmishers, the Union battle line, bayonets glistening, swept forward. At the same time, it seemed to the hard-pressed butternuts that the gunners of Battery C had redoubled the speed with which they served their pieces. To make matters worse, the Federal cavalry could be observed taking position on the infantry's right. Taking cognizance of this formidable array and with his back against the river, Duke confessed that his blood "ran cold." It appeared to the colonel:

The final moment seemed at hand when that gallant rear guard must give way and be driven into the stream [Rolling Fork] or be bayoneted on its banks. But not one fear or doubt seemed to trouble for a moment our splendid fellows. They welcomed the coming attack with a glad and defiant cheer and could scarcely be restrained from rushing to meet it.
Fortunately for the raiders, the Yankee skirmishers recoiled momentarily when they came under the Confederates' fire. In order to capitalize on this situation, Duke ordered Captain Virgil M. Pendleton of Company D, 8th Kentucky, to mount three companies. Once Pendleton's troopers had swung into their saddles, they would charge the two Yankee cannon emplaced on the knoll to the Rebels' left. Covered by Pendleton's sortie, the remainder of the rear guard would escape to the opposite side of the river. Hardly had Duke finished issuing the orders implementing these plans, when a shell from one of the enemy's guns exploded near his command post. One of the fragments from the projectile struck Duke on the side of the head, knocking him unconscious from his horse. Even before the injured colonel was lifted from the ground by his devoted aides, the able Colonel Breckinridge had taken charge. Duke's orders would stand as issued.

Putting their spurs to their horses, Pendleton's detachment surged forward. Apparently taking the bluecoats by surprise, the greyclads drove directly for the guns. Rallying to protect their cannon, the Buckeye artillerists succeeded in beating off the Rebel horsemen. In doing so, however, they saw their section commander -- Lieutenant Henry W. Pollis -- mortally wounded. The Confederates had also lost their leader, Captain Pendleton, who was wounded while leading the attack.
Covered by this diversion, Breckinridge bellowed instructions for his subordinates to have their men mount. Once their troopers had swung into their saddles, the officers formed their respective units into columns and headed for the river. Dame Fortune smiled on the Southerners, because at this time Cluке's troopers discovered a third ford. This enabled the greyclads quickly to gain the right bank of the river. Those of the butternuts who were unable to reach the stream before the Northerners recovered their wits, melted into the woods to the east of the meadow. Having placed Rolling Fork between themselves and the pursuing Unionists, the Confederate rear guard headed for Bardstown. There they rendezvoused with the main column.

Meanwhile, Colonel Chenault's 11th Kentucky had successfully carried out its mission and captured the Boston stockade. After applying the torch to the stockade and the trestle belonging to the Lebanon Branch, Chenault's troopers rejoined the division. Morgan's command spent the night of the 29th at Bardstown.

When the Rebel rear guard suddenly broke off the contest, either retreating across Rolling Fork or scattering into the surrounding timber, Harlan's troops pressed forward. When the Federals reached the bank of the stream, however, they made no effort to cross. One look at the swollen river served to convince Colonel Harlan that, in view of the exhausted condition of his command (The troops had just completed a 43-mile forced
march in 31 hours.), further pursuit was impossible. Furthermore, his men had exhausted their rations and many of them had worn out their shoes and socks. (When he reached a telegraph station, Harlan called upon the Union quartermaster to furnish his unit 1,000 pairs of shoes and 2,000 pairs of socks.) Accordingly, Harlan ordered his men to bivouac in the meadow where Duke's main line of resistance had formerly stood. 152

Inspecting the area, the Federal officers were somewhat disconcerted when they failed to locate any dead or wounded Confederates. What especially aroused their curiosity was the discovery of 10 dead horses, all lying within a space of 20 square feet. In an effort to solve this mystery, Harlan questioned several of the inhabitants. These individuals told the colonel "that the rebel wounded were taken off and some of their dead thrown into the river." It appears, however, a great deal of powder was burned in this engagement without either side suffering very greatly. In his "After Action Report", Colonel Harlan listed his casualties as three dead and one wounded; General Morgan gave his losses as three wounded. 153

After his men had established their camps, Harlan sent a messenger to see if the Confederates had burned the bridge which carried the tracks of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad across Rolling Fork. By 11:30 p.m. the messenger returned with the news that the vital structure was still standing. This intelligence caused Harlan to awaken his slumbering command. Once the officers
had mastered their units, the march for the bridge was taken up.
Harlan's troops reached the strategic structure before daybreak
on the 30th, and encamped on the south side of Rolling Fork.
Upon his arrival at the bridge, Harlan wired General Boyle for
instructions. In return, Harlan received a message from Boyle
directing him to remain where he was, rest his men, and hold his
command ready to resist an attack "on the long bridge over Salt
River at Shepherdsville, 20 miles from Louisville." 154

It was after dark when the combat patrol, consisting of
three companies drawn from the 9th Kentucky, reached New Haven.
At this time, the New Haven stockade was held by Company H, 78th
Illinois (80 strong). Since the regimental headquarters were also
located at New Haven, Colonel William H. Bennerson took charge of
the defense of the stockade. Since the hour was quite late, the
Confederates decided to postpone their attack until the following
morning. Taking advantage of this respite, the Illinoisans spent
the night grimly preparing for action. 155

Colonel Hoskins, his telegraphic communications with all
points to the north and west of Lebanon interrupted, spent the
29th trying to pick up something concrete regarding Morgan's
movements. A 25-man reconnaissance patrol drawn from the 9th
Kentucky Cavalry commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Porter was sent
out. Porter's instructions were "to proceed in the direction of
New Haven and Bardstown until he could learn something definite
of Morgan's force and movements. A citizen-scout or spy was also sent out by Hoskins. His orders were similar to those issued to Porter. Neither Porter's patrol nor the spy returned to Lebanon during the day. Hoskins, therefore, remained in the dark as to what the foe's movements were. 156

Rosecrans, who had his hands full keeping his drive on Murfreesboro rolling, found it difficult to control his temper when he thought of the way Morgan was eluding his pursuers. On the 29th in a dispatch to General Manson (The general, on his return to duty, had again assumed charge at Bowling Green.), Rosecrans testily observed, "If General Wright, with 20,000 men, cannot take care of Morgan, I shall not send any more troops up [into Kentucky]." Continuing, Rosecrans noted that he had already sent three brigades (Harlan's, Hall's and Miller's, the latter two belonging to Reynolds' division) to help run Morgan down. Furthermore, Rosecrans wanted to know if Colonel Bruce's command had occupied Clarksville. If Bruce had, Manson was to direct him to start gathering provisions and forage for the use of the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans knew that with the Louisville and Nashville Railroad out of operation, he would have to rely on foraging parties and the Cumberland River supply line for his logistic support. 157

General Wright, when informed of the extensive damage
inflicted on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad by Morgan's
raiders, realized he was confronted by two tremendous problems.
The railroad would have to be immediately repaired, and at the
same time Rosecrans' army would have to be supplied with the
sinews of war. Wright wired General Boyle that the railroad
"must be repaired as quickly as possible". Boyle was directed to
engage "competent superintendents for the repair work, who can
tell what timber is needed." Once these individuals had determined
what was required, Wright promised to see that its procurement
and shipment was expedited. In addition, the harassed Boyle
was informed by his superior "it is imperative to supply
Rosecrans' army by way of the Cumberland River, if possible".
Boyle was to rush 1,000,000 rations by boat to the Army of the
Cumberland. Communications were also addressed by Wright to
two naval officers -- Captain Alexander M. Pennock and Lieutenant
Commander Le Roy Fitch. The former officer was in charge of the
big Cairo, Illinois, naval base, while the latter commanded the
squadron operating on the Ohio and Tennessee rivers. The general
inquired into the possibility of the navy's furnishing gunboats
to convoy the ration-loaded transports up the Cumberland River.
The army commander at Cairo, Brigadier General James M. Tuttle,
was also the object of a telegram emanating from Wright's GHQ.
In his message to Tuttle, Wright inquired into the possibility of
supplying Rosecrans' army by boat from Cairo. The reason behind
Wright's requests was that the news had reached Cincinnati indicating there were a large number of light-draught steamers and tincrads available for convoy duty at Cairo. Furthermore, it would be shorter for the Yankees to supply Rosecrans' army by river from Cairo than from Louisville. 161

Even though most of his time was taken up with measures to repair the railroad and rush supplies to Rosecrans' army, Wright continued to devote considerable attention to the efforts to catch Morgan. Boyle was urged to take the field at the earliest opportunity. Wright felt that with the addition of the 1st Tennessee (Union) Cavalry, Boyle would have as strong a striking force as Morgan. 162 In a dispatch sent on the evening of the 29th Wright told Gordon Granger, "Morgan is near Sheperdsville with force of 3,000 men and some guns". Wright believed if Granger would transfer an additional regiment to Louisville, it would render that strategic city secure from Confederate attack. 163

Morgan's division left Bardstown on the morning of the 30th. Marching via Fredericksburg, the raiders entered Springfield at dusk. Here Morgan billeted his command, while he closely questioned his scouts and the inhabitants. From them Morgan learned that the foe had withdrawn all his force from the southern portion of the state and had concentrated them at Lebanon. (Reid's brigade, formerly stationed at Columbia, had reached Lebanon on
the 28th.) Morgan's informants placed the strength of the Lebanon Federals at nearly 8,000 men, supported by several pieces of artillery. (This was an exaggerated figure. At this time, the Union units operating in the Lebanon sector — which included Hoskins' command, Reid's brigade, Henderson's combat team, and the 6th and 9th Kentucky Cavalry — mustered some 6,000 officers and men.) Furthermore, intelligence had filtered through to Morgan indicating that a Union "column nearly 10,000 strong was moving from Glasgow to Burkesville to intercept" him, in case he succeeded in evading the Lebanon Yankees. This information was true. On the evening of the 29th, Reynolds' hard-marching division, mustering 6,000 bayonets, had trudged into Glasgow. Learning that Morgan had wreaked havoc on the railroad, Reynolds correctly deduced that the Rebel raider would soon return to Tennessee. Accordingly, Reynolds decided to move southeastward — his mission to reach the crossing of the Cumberland River in the Burkesville area ahead of Morgan. Furthermore, Harlan's brigade was not so far in the rear that Morgan could afford to dally. These reports served to convince Morgan that his situation was extremely hazardous. Confronted as he was by this emergency, Morgan "determined to make a detour to the ... [west] of Lebanon, and, by a night march, to conceal ... [his] movements from the enemy, outstrip the column [Reynolds'] moving from Glasgow to Burkesville, and cross the Cumberland
before it came within striking distance." 164

Having made his decision to execute a night march across
the front of the Lebanon Federals, Morgan called for Colonel
Johnson. The colonel was directed to have two companies drawn
from his regiment, the 10th Kentucky, move out on the Lebanon
road. After the troopers had driven in the Union outposts, they
were to build a number of large camp fires. Morgan hoped these
activities would "induce the enemy to believe that ... [his] whole
force was in position, and that ... [his] was only waiting for
daylight to attack." 165

Following the patrol's departure, the remainder of the
troopers threw themselves on the ground. The cavalrymen wished
to get a few hours' sleep before again hitting the road. In the
meantime, Morgan sought to obtain guides who were familiar with
the area to lead his division over the route desired. Finally,
after considerable difficulty, Morgan secured the services of
several individuals. 166

About 9 a.m. on the 30th, the commander of the patrol
which Morgan had sent to capture the New Haven stockade called
upon Colonel Benneson to surrender. When the colonel refused,
the greyclads took position on the south side of the railroad
within 1,000 yards of the stockade. Wheeling their little
mountain howitzer into position, the butternuts started to
bombard the Federals' position. After firing several rounds,
the Southerners shifted their gun closer to the stockade. This
operation was repeated. Emboldened by their success, the Rebels sought to move their howitzer still closer to the Union strong point. But before Corbett's gunners could advance their gun any nearer, it would be necessary for the troopers to build up a base of fire. Dashing forward, the dismounted troopers took position in a corn field within 600 yards of the stockade. From this point they opened fire with their small arms. Colonel Benneson, observing that the Confederates were wheeling their howitzer forward, bellowed out the order to open fire. Springing up onto the banquette, the bluecoats began to blaze away. The effect of these volleys was quickly apparent. Not only did the Rebels abandon their advance position, but the cannoneers deserted their gun. When the Yankees failed to make a sortie, however, the gunners were able to retrieve their gun. Rebuffed in their effort to reduce the New Haven stockade, the combat patrol rejoined the division at Springfield on the night of the 30th. 167

The command was aroused at 11 p.m. After the officers had mustered their respective units, the division moved off. A short distance south of Springfield, the head of the column left the pike, turning into a little-traveled byroad which passed to the west of Lebanon. The night was dark, stormy, and bitterly cold. Not only was the road rough but the guides were inefficient. Accordingly, the division floundered along blindly. The men were worn out and half-frozen, and the horses stumbled at every step.
Colonel Duke recalled that "nothing preserved organization and carried the column along but the will of its commander and the unerring sagacity which guided him." Subsequent to the conflict many of Morgan's raiders referred "to the night march around Lebanon as the most trying event of their entire wartime experience." 168

Daybreak on the 31st found the Confederates only eight miles south of Springfield and two and one-half miles west of Lebanon. Fortunately for the greyclads, the Yankee commander at Lebanon, Colonel Hoskins, had fallen for Morgan's diversion. At this time, the Lebanon garrison was deployed astride the Springfield pike, several miles north of town. 169

The spy sent out by Colonel Hoskins on the 29th returned to Lebanon on the following morning. He informed the colonel that he had breakfasted with 15 of Morgan's men at Fredericksburg. Porter's patrol rode into town several hours later. The army officer confirmed the scout's report. Both Porter and the spy placed Morgan's strength at from 7,000 to 11,000. Following the receipt of this intelligence, Hoskins ordered out strong detachments drawn from the 6th and 9th Kentucky Cavalry. The former were commanded by Colonel Dennis J. Halisy and the latter by Lieutenant Colonel John Boyle. These patrols were to reconnoiter the countryside lying to the north and west of
Lebanon. Their mission was to pinpoint the raiders' line of march. By nightfall the two detachments were back at Lebanon. Colonels Boyle and Halisy informed Hoskins that the foe was encamped at Springfield. As expected, this news caused Hoskins to sound the alarm. Hoskins' three regiments and Reid's brigade took position north of Lebanon. A section of artillery was emplaced in a masked portion near the Springfield pike. These dispositions completed, the Federals grimly awaited the foe's advance. While the Union infantry was being formed into line of battle, a Confederate combat patrol (the two companies drawn from the 10th Kentucky) swooped down on one of Hoskins' outposts. Before they could be driven off, the greyclads had captured one of the vedettes. 170

Shortly after Hoskins had completed his dispositions, a report reached his command post indicating that Morgan had divided his command. According to this information, 2,000 Confederates were advancing on Haysville, nine miles east of Lebanon. To verify this rumor, Hoskins ordered out a mounted patrol commanded by Major William H. Fidler. Simultaneously, Hoskins, having learned that Henderson's combat team was camped near Haysville, sent an aide to contact the colonel's command. Henderson was to be directed to have his combat team establish an ambuscade near Bethel Church. 171

By the time Fidler's patrol reached Barber's Hill, it became apparent that there was no substance to the rumored
Confederate advance on Haysville. Fidler then headed toward Springfield. After capturing one of the enemy's pickets and satisfying himself that Morgan's division was bedded down for the night, Fidler returned to Lebanon. Convinced by the intelligence garnered by Fidler's patrol that the reported Confederate movement on Haysville was the figment of some scout's overactive imagination, Hoskins issued orders for Henderson's combat team to join him. Instead of proceeding to Lebanon, Henderson, for some unexplained reason, fell back toward Danville. When Henderson's combat team failed to put in an appearance, Hoskins quickly abandoned any ideas he might have had of attacking Morgan. 172

To keep track of the Confederates' movements, Hoskins ordered out a reconnaissance patrol commanded by Major Louis A. Gratz. This patrol departed from Lebanon at 3 a.m. on the 31st. Gratz returned about daybreak with the news that the enemy was slowly closing in on the town. After Hoskins had made some slight changes in his dispositions which he believed would insure the Confederates a hot reception, he called for Colonel Halsby. The cavalryman was ordered to take his command and reconnoiter the Springfield pike. He was "to ascertain whether the enemy was really advancing with a view of attacking". At 11 a.m. a courier galloped into town with a dispatch from Halsby. The messenger reported that the Confederates had evacuated Springfield. Replying, Hoskins directed Halsby "to pursue, hang upon their rear."
General Boyle received a telegram from General Wright on the afternoon of the 30th directing him to:

Send a courier to nearest telegraph station having connection with Nashville, with dispatch to General Rosecrans, telling him that the railroad is seriously damaged, and that supplies will be sent him as rapidly as possible by the Cumberland ...

Following the receipt of this order, Boyle dashed off a message to Rosecrans. The commander of the Army of the Cumberland was informed that Morgan had cut the Louisville and Nashville. Furthermore, it would take several weeks to restore service on the railroad. In the meantime, however, steamboats would be used to supply the Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans was also informed that Morgan, following his engagement with Harlan's brigade, had fallen back on Bardstown. While not discounting the possibility that Morgan might invade the Bluegrass region, Boyle expressed the opinion that the raiders were about to return to Middle Tennessee. If they were, Boyle believed, Morgan's line of retreat would be either through "Greensburg, or Campbellsville, or Columbia, and by Burkesville and Tompkinsville".

As soon as the paroled prisoners from the Elizabethtown debacle reached Louisville, Boyle had them closely questioned. At least two of the officers involved, Colonel Smith and Captain Benjamin Newman, gave Boyle exaggerated reports of Morgan's strength. The former placed the Confederates' strength at not
less than "8,000 and eighteen pieces of artillery"; the latter believed there were from 12,000 to 20,000 raiders. In his message advising Wright of these reports, Boyle noted, "If half they tell is true, Louisville must fall. I have no forces here to resist it, yet I shall attempt it, until the city is demolished." 176

During the evening Boyle received a disturbing report from Colonel Edward P. Fyffe, the commander of the Union force stationed at Shepherdsville. The colonel advised the general that Morgan's patrols were operating in the immediate vicinity. To reinforce the Shepherdsville garrison, Boyle shifted the 103rd Ohio from Louisville. The Buckeye regiment had been previously alerted to proceed to Frankfort. There had also been rumors afloat indicating that the Kentucky capital was Morgan's objective. In addition, instructions were drafted transferring Harlan's brigade from Rolling Fork to Shepherdsville. These orders, however, did not reach Harlan until the morning of the 31st. Breaking camp, Harlan's troops crossed Rolling Fork. By the time Harlan's brigade tramped into Lebanon Junction, it had become apparent that there was no substance to the reported Confederate advance on Shepherdsville. Accordingly, Harlan was directed to encamp his unit at Lebanon Junction, pending the receipt of further instructions. 177

By 1 p.m. on the 31st the head of Morgan's column had reached the crest of Muldraugh's Hill. Before commencing the
descent, Morgan trained his glasses on Lebanon. The general was able to distinguish the enemy's soldiers in the valley below.

The march was then resumed. When the Confederates' rear guard reached the foot of the hills, they caught their first glimpse of a pursuing column of Union cavalry. Two of the Rebel officers -- Captain Alexander Treble and Lieutenant George Eastin -- had lagged some distance behind. Sighting these two stragglers the Yankee troopers gave chase. Mounted on powerful steeds, the butternuts easily kept ahead of their eager pursuers. Finally, as they cantered down a long, straight stretch of road, the two glanced to the rear. There they saw within 300 yards of them three bluecoats who had outdistanced their comrades-in-arms.

Treble and Eastin were high-spirited individuals who disdained to forego a fight, when the odds were anywhere near equal. Rounding a bend in the road, the two Confederates reined in their horses. They planned to gun down the first two Yankees who popped into view, and then deal with their companion. However, before the Federals reached the turn in the road, one of them dropped behind. When the two northern officers (Colonel Halsby and a lieutenant) rounded the bend, Treble and Eastin fired. Although both the greyclads were crack shots, they missed their targets. The Yankees then closed in. Several additional shots were exchanged by the combatants without effect. In
desperation the men started to grapple with one another. Falling off their horses, the four cavalrymen continued to wrestle on the ground. Finally, Treble forced the head of his antagonist (the lieutenant) into a pool of water. Having half drowned the Federal, Treble accepted his surrender. Meanwhile, Eastin had compelled Halisy to surrender. Halisy did so, but retained his pistol. As Eastin allowed his enemy to get off the ground, Halisy drew his pistol and fired, grazing his captor's cheek. Eastin's shot, in return, killed Halisy. Remounting their horses, Treble and Eastin, accompanied by their unhappy prisoner, galloped off and quickly overtook the rear guard. As the victorious Confederates disappeared down the road, the remainder of the late officer's command popped into view. 179

Morgan's raiders spent the night of the 31st at Campbellsville. Fortunately for the Southerners, the Yankees had established a large commissary depot there. Taking charge of these supplies, Morgan saw that they were issued to his command. The rations were especially welcome, because the division had had very little to eat during the past two days. Not until after he had established a strong line of outposts covering the approaches to Campbellsville, did Morgan permit his men to bed down. 180

About noon on the 31st several very excited civilians dashed into Lebanon. These people informed Colonel Hoskins that Morgan was advancing on the town from the direction of St. Mary's.
To check on this report, Hoskins ordered out Colonel Boyle with a 300-man mounted patrol. Simultaneously, Hoskins, in anticipation of pursuing Morgan, ordered the regimental commanders to have their men draw five days' rations. In addition, these officers were to hold their units ready "to move without camp or garrison equipage at a moment's warning." 181

It was 5 p.m. before Hoskins received any further intelligence regarding the raiders' movements. At that time, he received a report from Halsey's detachment. This intelligence indicated the foe was moving in the direction of Muldraugh's Hill. Shortly thereafter, Boyle's patrol returned, bringing in several Confederate stragglers. Conferring with Hoskins, Boyle assured his superior that Morgan's main body had passed beyond St. Mary's. This news served to arouse the cautious Hoskins. Marching orders were issued and the Lebanon garrison prepared to take the field. 182

Within one hour of Boyle's return, Hoskins' command moved out, taking the Campbellsville road. Near New Market, Hoskins encountered a civilian, who told him of Colonel Halsey's death. Furthermore, the citizen continued, the Rebels were encamped on Rolling Fork. While the colonel was deploying his troops into line of battle, several mounted patrols were thrown out. These units were assigned the task of locating the Rebels' bivouac. Pending the return of these groups, the troops slept on their arms, without fires. 183
On the 31st, the Union officers at Louisville received another shock. Two scouts galloped into the city with the startling news that Forrest, accompanied by 9,000 of his hard-riding cavalrmen, had reached the Elizabethtown area. (This was the wildest sort of rumor, because at this time Forrest was several hundred miles southwest of Louisville.) After forwarding this report to Rosecrans' and Wright's headquarters, General Boyle turned his thoughts to possible ways of preventing Morgan's escape. For the second day in a row, a message was sent to Rosecrans outlining the raiders' probable line of retreat. Boyle wanted to know if Rosecrans' troops would be able to intercept the Rebels as they fell back into Middle Tennessee. Boyle concluded his dispatch to Rosecrans on a favorable note, "General [Brigadier] Carter reported to have taken Knoxville and destroyed East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad." 184 (Carter's raiding force had left Goose Creek, Kentucky, on December 25. The colonel's task was to cut the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. However, Carter's bluecoats did not reach the railroad until the evening of the 31st and never did capture Knoxville. Therefore, one-half of the information concerning Carter's movements was premature and the remainder untrue.) 185

During the day, Wright sent several messages to Boyle and Gordon Granger pertaining to Morgan's activities. General
Boyle was directed to collect all the cavalry in his district. "If not strong enough to whip" Morgan, Boyle was instructed to harass the daring raider. Granger was informed of Morgan's movement toward Springfield. Continuing, Wright observed that if Morgan was pressed to the eastward, or if the Cumberland River rose, he might "determine to pass out [of Kentucky] at Cumberland Gap, and thus interfere with Carter". If at all possible, Granger was to keep Morgan from intercepting Carter on his return from East Tennessee. Wright closed this telegram with a word of warning, "Morgan ... seems to be in no haste to leave the State, and may double on you if you advance too far without leaving sufficient force behind." 187

Besides having to worry about Morgan's future intentions, Wright was confronted by the immediate problem of rushing supplies to the Army of the Cumberland. The general had received no replies to his messages of the 29th addressed to the two naval officers (Pennock and Fitch) and General Tuttle, regarding convoys and the shipment of supplies from Cairo. Therefore, Wright decided to send a follow-up telegram. A dispatch was sent to Tuttle, informing him of the contents of the previous communications. After having warned Tuttle that unless Rosecrans was supplied by water, he would have to fall back, Wright noted, "A dozen or more boats will be sent from here [Cincinnati] and Louisville." Continuing, the general asked
Tuttle to make arrangements with Captain Pennock to have several
gunboats rendezvous with these transports at the mouth of the
Cumberland. Furthermore, Tuttle was directed to send 1,000,000
rations from Cairo to Rosecrans' army, if he could. 188

It was fortunate for the Federals that Wright decided
to pursue the convoy situation, because it appears that the
messages sent to Cairo on the 29th had not reached the individuals
for whom they were intended. On the 31st, when he first learned
of Wright's request for gunboats, Pennock sprang into action. A
telegram was dashed off to Commander Fitch, directing him to
"render ... such aid as in your power." Simultaneously, Pennock
sent a message to General Wright, acquainting him with Fitch's
instructions. As soon as the responsible army officers had been
informed of the navy's co-operation, a number of transports
(loaded with supplies for Rosecrans' army) pulled away from the
Louisville wharf en route down the Ohio River. 189

New Year's morning found Morgan's raiders in the saddle
and heading southward from Campbellsville. During the day's march,
many of the cavalymen distinctly heard the distant rumble of
artillery. Since the heavy command was to the southwest, the
troopers speculated that perhaps Bragg's and Rosecrans' armies
were locked in bloody combat. (The Confederates were correct.
The Battle of Stones River had commenced on the previous day.)
At 3 p.m. when the column rode into Columbia, the greyclads "breathed more freely, as the first danger post was passed." Morgan, however, knew that his division would not be safe until the Cumberland River was crossed. Accordingly, the general decided to make a night march. Once the troopers had eaten and rested, the general gave the order to remount. Just as darkness was descending, the raiders departed from Columbia. In spite of the inky blackness and bitter cold, the butternuts entered Burkesville (having traveled 50 miles in 24 hours) at daybreak on the following morning. The Cumberland was crossed on the 2d and the danger of interception was over. On the following morning (the 3d) when the march was resumed, the division, no longer worried about pursuit, moved along at a leisurely pace. Passing through Livingston, the troopers crossed Caney Fork at Sligo Ferry and rode into Smithville, Tennessee, on the 5th. Here, Morgan's command remained for several days to allow the exhausted men and horses to recoup their strength.

About daybreak on New Year's Day one of the patrols which Colonel Hoskins had sent out the previous evening returned with the information that the Rebels had broken camp. Hoskins immediately turned out his command and the pursuit was resumed. When he reached the summit of Muldraugh's Hill, Hoskins was informed by the inhabitants that the Confederate rear guard had
passed a number of hours before. Hoskins' troops now pressed forward "with all possible celerity" in hopes they might overtake the foe at Campbellsville. Arriving within two miles of Campbellsville, Hoskins was hailed by several citizens and paroled soldiers. These individuals told the colonel that some of Morgan's troopers were still in the town, busy destroying the commissary stores left behind by Reid's brigade when it had been recalled to Lebanon. With his column closed up, Hoskins ordered his cavalry to charge and occupy the town. Surging forward in "handsome style" the troopers dashed into Campbellsville. For their trouble they bagged a few stragglers, since Morgan's division had left for Columbia five hours prior to their arrival.

Hoskins knew that a considerable quantity of forage had been collected and stored at the Green River bridge. The foe, he believed, would stop there to rest and feed their horses. Therefore, the colonel ordered his cavalry, supported by a section of Battery M, to press on. Hoskins hoped his "flying column" would be able to prevent the Southerners from burning the bridge. Racing ahead, the Union cavalry reached the Green River at 2 p.m., only to find the bridge a smoldering ruin. After the Rebels had crossed the river, Morgan's rear guard had applied the torch to the bridge. To signal any other friendly troops which might be operating in the area, the Illinois gunners unlimbered their guns and fired several rounds. Once the main column arrived on the
scene, Hoskins ordered the troops into camp. While the soldiers were feeding the stock and cooking dinner, Hoskins called for the company of pioneers attached to Reid's brigade. The engineers were put to work clearing the obstructions from the dirt road which crossed the river at a ford several hundred yards below the ruins of the bridge. Hoskins had not yet abandoned hope of overtaking the enemy at the Cumberland River. 192

While the pioneers were removing the obstructions, Hoskins learned that Colonel Wolford was at Greensburg with three regiments of cavalry. (Wolford's cavalry command had accompanied Reynolds' division on its march from Gallatin. At Glasgow, Reynolds had detached Wolford, and sent him to Greensburg. Wolford reached Greensburg on the 30th. Instead of throwing out patrols to locate Morgan's line of march, Wolford, certain in his own mind that Morgan would cross the Green River at Greensburg, refused to budge.) Hoskins immediately dispatched a message to Wolford, advising the cavalryman of his arrival at the Green River. Furthermore, Hoskins suggested that Wolford "should press on to Columbia, and, in the event that he should find Morgan in camp ..., to quietly await our arrival, which would be some time during the night."

By 10 p.m., the pioneers pronounced the road open for traffic. Hoskins then mustered his command preparatory to resuming the chase. The cavalry, accompanied by a section of
artillery, again took the lead. Colonel Hoskins remained with
the artillery until the major portion of Reid's brigade had
forded the river. Pressing forward, the colonel, after riding
about six miles, overtook his cavalry. At this time, the troopers
were halted alongside the road. When Hoskins asked the officer in
charge, Colonel Boyle, why he had stopped, the cavalryman replied,
"a citizen had told ... [him] that Morgan had left Columbia at 8
o'clock the previous night, and that their horses were worn down".
As soon as the infantry and artillery came into view, the march
was renewed. Hoskins' command reached Columbia about noon on the
2d. Informed by the civilians that the Cumberland was fordable,
Hoskins abandoned the pursuit and ordered his men to bivouac. 194

Shortly after Hoskins' troops had gone into camp,
General Fry rode into town. (Fry had left Gallatin on the 28th
to take charge of the efforts to bag Morgan.) After he had
assumed command of the units operating in the Columbia area, Fry,
believing there was still a possibility of catching the elusive
Morgan, ordered the chase resumed. However, by the time the
troops had reached a point three miles south of town, Fry had
changed his mind. The soldiers were directed to retrace their
steps. During its pursuit of Morgan's raiders, Hoskins' command
had captured about 150 stragglers, a number of horses and trappings,
some arms, two caissons, and ammunition (both artillery and small-
arms). 195
The rumors placing a strong Confederate force in the Elizabethtown area continued to flow into Boyle's Louisville headquarters on New Year's Day. In the day's initial telegram to Wright, Boyle noted, "All rebels lie and ruse to give Morgan a chance to escape. Citizens are yet fleeing from Forrest, and avow that he is coming." Later in the day, the harassed Boyle informed his superior:

After full interview with these citizens who left Elizabethtown this morning, I am persuaded there is a rebel force advancing from that place, though do not know that it is Forrest. If this is so, Morgan will be near the city [Louisville] by daylight.

At both Louisville and Evansville on the 1st, the quartermaster department spent the day loading transports with bread and meat destined for Rosecrans' army. Before the day was over, however, Wright and Boyle received discouraging information from Commander Fitch. In an undated telegram addressed to the two army officers, Fitch advised them:

Gunboats can not get to Nashville just now; probably there may be water in a few days. Might possibly get within 35 miles of ... [Nashville].

Will ... [have] two gunboats ready to convoy in case you choose to risk the probability of a rise.

The next day, the 2d, Fitch received reports indicating the Cumberland had started to rise. Evidently the transports
which were scheduled to leave Louisville on the evening of the 31st had not reached Evansville, because in his telegram advising Boyle that there had been an improvement in navigation conditions on the Cumberland, Fitch inquired, "Have transports started? If not, when will they?" 200

In the meantime, General Halleck had learned of Morgan's attack on the Louisville and Nashville, and of the necessity of supplying the Army of the Cumberland by water. On the 2d, the general in chief telegraphed Colonel Robert Allen, the officer in charge of the quartermaster corps in the western theatre of operation with headquarters at St. Louis. Allen was directed to co-operate with General Wright in forwarding assistance to "General Rosecrans by the Cumberland River." 201 Simultaneously, Halleck had advised Wright to look to Allen for assistance. 202

General Wright on the 3d replied to Fitch's New Year's Day message. The departmental commander observed, "It is of the utmost importance that supplies be got to Nashville without delay, and I shall send the boats if they can not get nearer than 25 miles." Continuing, Wright observed that not only did he rely on Fitch for gunboats to convey the steamers, but for getting the vessels as near Nashville as possible. 203 During the day Boyle addressed a dispatch to Rosecrans regarding the efforts to rush supplies to the Army of the Cumberland. After advising Rosecrans
that it would take from four to five weeks to repair the railroad.
Boyle wrote, "I am sending fleet of boats up Cumberland; if they
cannot pass the Harpeth Shoals by lighters, can stores be wagoned
the 24 miles to Nashville? I am sending boats up Green River to
Bowling Green, and can supply you in that way." 204

It was the 5th before 14 steamers loaded with supplies
for Rosecrans' army rendezvoused at Evansville. Casting off at 4
p.m. the transports proceeded down the Ohio to Smithland, Kentucky.
Here they were joined by the gunboats St. Clair and Brilliant. The
convoy then entered the Cumberland River. In the meantime, the
river had risen enough to permit the vessels to pass over the
Harpeth Shoals. Therefore, the boats were able to reach Nashville
on the 8th. Three heavily laden boats had also ascended the Green
River to Bowling Green where they arrived on the 5th. When he
communicated this news to Rosecrans, Boyle announced, "I can feed
your army for a year, if necessary. What glorious fighting you
have done [refers to the battle of Stones River]. 205

By the 2d Boyle had learned there was no substance to
the reported Confederate concentration in the Elizabethtown area.
Apparently chagrined by the way he had been taken in by this wild
rumor, Boyle made no mention of it in his subsequent correspondence
with General Wright. During the day, however, Boyle kept Wright
posted on Morgan's activities. The Cincinnati commander was
advised that Morgan had passed through Columbia on the evening of the 1st. According to the latest reports reaching Louisville, Boyle noted the Confederates were being pursued by two Union commands -- Hoskins' and Wolford's. Advising Wright of the destruction of the Green River Bridge, Boyle inquired, "Shall I have it rebuilt?" 206

When it became apparent on the 3d that Morgan had escaped across the Cumberland River, the Federal brass decided to recall all the pursuing units except Wolford's cavalry. Reynolds' division and Harlan's brigade were ordered to proceed to Gallatin; Hoskins' command would return to Lebanon. 207 When the orders suspending the chase reached Reynolds, his division was camped at Bear Wallow. As the first step on his return to Middle Tennessee, Reynolds moved his command to Cave City. Leaving Cave City on the 4th, the division marched to Nashville, where it arrived on the 7th. 208 Harlan's brigade marched out of Lebanon Junction on the morning of the 4th and took two days to reach Mumfordville. After detaching the units belonging to Hobson's command, Harlan ordered his troops aboard the waiting trains. The brigade detrained at Gallatin on the 7th. 209

While Hoskins' soldiers retraced their steps to Lebanon, Wolford's troopers made a halfhearted attempt to overhaul Morgan's raiders. 210

The repair of the "most complete wrecking" the Louisville and Nashville Railroad was to suffer during the course of the war.
occupied most of Rosecrans' attention in the period following the battle of Stones River. When the Army of the Cumberland left Nashville on December 26 to drive on Murfreesboro, the supplies stores in the magazines located in and around the city were very limited. With the railroad out of operation it was impossible to forward sufficient supplies to meet the Army of the Cumberland's needs by water. During the first several weeks that the army was encamped at Murfreesboro, the troops were on half rations. Many of the articles constituting the "ration" had to be omitted. The soldiers were forced to subsist on a very restricted diet. The surrounding country for miles around was scoured for forage and provisions. Almost everything that was edible by man or beast was gathered in by foraging parties. Of necessity, scant attention was paid to the needs and wants of the inhabitants. Indeed, at times the shortage of foodstuffs was so acute that the officers with means to purchase such provisions as could be obtained thought that potatoes and onions were luxuries. For a short time in early January, the army was threatened by scurvy. In the end, however, enough supplies were transported to Nashville by boat (pending the repair of the railroad) to prevent such a disaster. 211
THE BATTLE OF HARTSVILLE AND MORGAN'S SECOND KENTUCKY RAID

Notes on Chapter III

Morgan's Second Kentucky Raid


4 Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 229. Duke described the field officers of the 9th Kentucky as follows: "Colonel Johnson had already won reputation for courage, energy and capacity, and Robert W. Marlin, the lieutenant-colonel, was a man of extraordinary dash and resolution, and very shrewd in partisan warfare. G. Washington Owens, the major, was a very gallant man and excellent disciplinarian."

5 Ibid., 230.

6 Ibid., 230-231.


9 Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 229-230; Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Indianapolis, 1941), 195. Duke reported that Morgan's adjutant, Colonel Grenfell:
... was in a high state of delight; although he had regretted General Morgan's marriage -- thinking that it would render him less enterprising -- he declared that a wedding, at which a bishop-militant clad in general's uniform, officiated and the chief of an army and his corps commanders were guests, certainly ought not to soften a soldier's temper. On his way home that night he sang Moorish songs with a French accent to English airs, and was as mild and agreeable as if some one was going to be killed. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 230.


11 Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 232. Maginis had been acting assistant adjutant general of Duke's brigade. In spite of his youth, Maginis had seen considerable arduous service. He had served in the infantry for more than a year, having participated in the battles of Belmont, Shiloh, Farmington, and Perryville. Maginis had been assigned to staff duty a short time before his transfer to the cavalry.

12 Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 424; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 233.

13 Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 233.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 233-234; Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 426.

17 Ibid.; Young, Confederate Wizards of the Saddle, 427.
20 Ibid., 200.
21 Ibid., 200-201.
22 Ibid., 208-209.
23 Ibid., 201.
24 Ibid., 202.
27 Ibid., 204.
28 Ibid., 201.
29 Ibid., 204.
30 Ibid., 204-205.
31 Ibid., 210.
32 Ibid., 211.
33 Ibid., 212.
34 Ibid., 210.
35 Ibid., 211.
36 Ibid., 214.
37 Ibid., 216.

38 Ibid., 217. At the same time, Reynolds' scouts had gathered information locating Pegram's brigade at Baird's Mills.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 216, 218.

42 Ibid., 217.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 218.

45 Ibid., 221, 228.

46 Ibid., 226.

47 Ibid., 227.

48 Ibid., 225.

49 Ibid., 226.

50 Ibid., 230.

51 Ibid., 222. The following units constituted Bruce's brigade: the 17th and 28th Kentucky, and the 102d Ohio Infantry; the 1st and 2d Battalions, 8th Kentucky Cavalry; and the 1st Battery, Tennessee Light Artillery.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 230.

54 Ibid., 229.

55 Ibid., 230.
On returning to Mumfordville, Gray reported he had inflicted 36 casualties (9 killed, 22 wounded, and 5 prisoners) on the Rebels. The Union colonel listed his losses as: 1 killed and two captured. Morgan, however, makes no mention of any Confederate casualties in the skirmish at Green's Chapel.

Colonel Shanks enumerated
the Southerners' losses as follows: 1 killed, 2 wounded, and 12 captured.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid., 148-149.


77 Ibid.

78 Ibid. A wagon, loaded with sutler's stores, provided the foodstuffs for the butternuts' dinner. Colonel Duke recalled:

A day before the 25th, just upon the bank of the Green River, the most enormous wagon perhaps ever seen in the State of Kentucky was captured. It was loaded with an almost fabulous amount and variety of Christmas nicknacks; some enterprising sutler had prepared it for the Glasgow market, intending to make his fortune. It was emptied at an early date, in shorter time, and by customers who proposed to themselves a much longer credit than he anticipated. There was enough meat to furnish every mess in the division something to eke out a Christmas supper with. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 235-236.


81 Ibid., 236.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., 237-238.
85 Ibid., 238.
86 Ibid., 237.
87 Ibid., 238.
88 Ibid., 239.
89 Ibid., 240.
90 Ibid., 237.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 239.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
97 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 155; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 236; Ltr. Victor Gondos to Edwin C. Bearss, Jan. 15, 1960. Mr. Gondos, the Archivist in Charge of the Civil War Branch, National Archives, reports that Wolfe signed his name as John H. or J. Henry.

vii
100 Q. R., Series I, Vol. XX, pt. I, 155; Duke, *Morgan's Cavalry*, 236-237. A number of shells had exploded within the Bacon Creek stockade. Some shots had penetrated the palisades and an old barn which had been foolishly enclosed within the stockade.


103 *Ibid.* From left to right Hobson formed his command as follows: the 13th Kentucky, the convalescent battalion, and the 25th Michigan.


The defense of Elizabethtown had cost the 91st Illinois a relatively small number of casualties; seven dead, and an unreported number of wounded, several of whom subsequently died. On the 28th the paroled prisoners left for Louisville. Morgan made no report of the losses suffered by his division in the battle of Elizabethtown.

117 Ibid., 138.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
122 Ibid., 251; Tourgée, The Story of a Thousand, 398.
124 Ibid., 251.
125 Ibid., 252.
126 Ibid.
It appears that Morgan was displeased by the liberal terms granted the Bacon Creek garrison by Colonel Huffman.

The Bardstown road descended into the valley of Rolling Fork along one of the numerous spur ridges branching off from Muldraugh's Hill.
146 Ibid., 242-243.
147 Ibid., 243.
148 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
153 Ibid., 139, 157.
154 Ibid., 140.
155 Ibid., 151; Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois, V, 23.
158 Ibid., 273.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., 273-274.
161 Ibid., 274.
162 Ibid., 273.
163 Ibid., 274.
166 Ibid.

xi
Benneson reported that his command suffered no losses in this clash. The Confederates made no report of their casualties. In his "After Action Report", Benneson noted, "From information obtained since this affair, we have reason to believe he [the foe] lost 3 killed and 10 or 12 wounded." 

Ibid., 152.

Ibid.; Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 245.

Ibid.

Ibid., 142-143.

Ibid., 143.

Ibid.

Ibid., 143-144.


Ibid., 281-282, 286.

Ibid., 281.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid., 145. Departing from Lebanon, Hoskins' order of march
was: Gratz's squadron, 6th Kentucky Cavalry; section, Battery M, 1st Illinois Light Artillery; 9th Kentucky Cavalry; section Battery M, supported by Company A, 16th Kentucky; 16th Kentucky; section Battery M, supported by Company I, 16th Kentucky; 12th Kentucky, riding in wagons; Colonel Reid's brigade.

187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
192 Ibid., 146.
193 Ibid. Wolford's command consisted of three regiments; the 1st, 7th, and 11th Kentucky Cavalry Regiments.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid., 147.
197 Ibid., 291-292.
198 Ibid., 291.
200 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
205 Ibid., 301, 302, 308; Q. R. N., Series I, Vol. 24, p. 5.
207 Ibid., 296.
208 Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, V.
211 Henry M. Cist, The Army of the Cumberland, 138-139.
APPENDIX A

CONFEDERATE ORDER OF BATTLE

MORGAN'S SECOND KENTUCKY RAID

December 22, 1862 - January 5, 1863

Morgan's Provisional Division - Brigadier General John H. Morgan.

1st Brigade - Colonel Basil W. Duke
   2d Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel J. B. Hutcheson.
   7th Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. Colonel J. M. Huffman.
   8th Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel R. S. Clarke.
   Palmer's Tennessee Battery (4 guns) - Captain B. Palmer.

2d Brigade - Colonel William P. C. Breckinridge.
   9th Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. Colonel R. G. Stoner.
   10th Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel A. R. Johnson.
   11th Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel D. W. Chenault.
   9th Tennessee Cavalry - Colonel James D. Bennett.
   Corbett's Kentucky Battery (3 guns) - Lt. C. C. Corbett.
UNION ORDER OF BATTLE

MORGAN'S SECOND KENTUCKY RAID

December 22, 1862 - January 5, 1863

Department of the Cumberland - Major General William S. Rosecrans.

Center Wing XIV Army Corps - Major General George H. Thomas.

Third Division - Brigadier General Speed S. Fry.

2d Brigade - Colonel John M. Harlan.
- 10th Indiana Infantry - Colonel W. B. Carroll.
- 74th Indiana Infantry - Colonel C. W. Chapman.
- 4th Kentucky Infantry - Colonel J. T. Croxton.
- 14th Ohio Infantry - Colonel G. P. Este.
- Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery (6 guns) -
  Captain D. K. Southwick

3d Brigade - Brigadier General James B. Steedman.
- 87th Indiana Infantry - Colonel K. G. Shryock.
- 2d Minnesota Infantry - Colonel J. George.
- 9th Ohio Infantry - Colonel G. Kammerling.
- 35th Ohio Infantry - Colonel F. Van Derveer.
- Battery I, 4th U. S. Light Artillery (4 guns) -
  Lt. F. G. Smith.
Fifth Division - Brigadier General Joseph J. Reynolds.

1st Brigade - Colonel Albert S. Hall.
   80th Illinois Infantry - Colonel T. G. Allen.
   123d Illinois Infantry - Colonel J. Monroe.
   101st Indiana Infantry - Colonel W. Carver.
   105th Ohio Infantry - Colonel W. R. Tolles.

2d Brigade - Colonel Abram O. Miller.
   98th Illinois Infantry - Colonel J. J. Funkhouser.
   17th Indiana Infantry - Colonel J. T. Wilder.
   72d Indiana Infantry - Major H. M. Carr.
   75th Indiana Infantry - Colonel M. C. Robinson.

Artillery
   18th Indiana Battery (6 guns) - Captain E. Lilly.
   19th Indiana Battery (6 guns) - Captain S. J. Harris.

Miscellaneous


Ward's Brigade - Brigadier General William T. Ward.
   70th Indiana Infantry - Colonel B. Harrison.
   79th Indiana Infantry - Colonel H. G. Kennett.
   13th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (4 guns) - Captain B. S. Nicklin.
Wolford's Cavalry Command - Colonel Frank Wolford.
1st Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel Wolford.
7th Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. Colonel J. K. Faulkner.
11th Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. Colonel W. E. Riley.
District of Western Kentucky - Brigadier General Jeremiah T. Boyle.

Post of Columbia
34th Brigade - Colonel William P. Reid.
80th Indiana Infantry - Colonel C. Denby.
50th Ohio Infantry - Colonel S. A. Strickland.
98th Ohio Infantry - Colonel C. L. Poorman.
121st Ohio Infantry - Lt. Colonel W. S. Irwin.
Battery N, 1st Illinois Light Artillery (6 guns) -
Captain J. B. Miller.

Post of Mumfordville - Colonel Edward H. Hobson.
13th Kentucky Infantry - Major W. E. Holson.
27th Kentucky Infantry - Lt. Colonel J. H. Ward.
33rd Kentucky Infantry - Captain M. T. Hall.
4th Company Ohio Sharpshooters - Captain J. Flegle.
Battalion, 4th Indiana Cavalry - Colonel I. P. Gray.
12th Kentucky Cavalry - Colonel Q. C. Shanks.
Section, Battery K, 1st Illinois Light Artillery (2 guns) -

Section, 6th Battery, Michigan Light Artillery (2 guns) -
Lt. L. F. Hale.
APPENDIX

BATTLE OF HARTSVILLE

ORDER OF BATTLE

December 7, 1862

Confederate Forces Engaged

Morgan's Task Force - Colonel John H. Morgan

Duke's Cavalry Brigade - Colonel Basil W. Duke
Staff
7th Kentucky Cavalry - Lt. Col. J. H. Huffman
8th Kentucky Cavalry - Col. R. S. Cluke
11th Kentucky Cavalry - Col. D. W. Chenault
9th Tennessee Cavalry - Col. J. D. Bennett
Stoner's Kentucky Cavalry Battalion - Major R. G. Stoner
Corbett's Kentucky Battery (4 guns) - Lt. C. C. Corbett

Total Casualties Duke's Brigade

Hunt's Combat Team - Colonel Thomas H. Hunt
2d Kentucky Infantry - Major J. W. Hewitt
9th Kentucky Infantry - Capt. J. T. Morehead
Cobb's Kentucky Battery (4 guns) - Capt. R. Cobb

Total Casualties Hunt's Combat Team

Total Casualties Morgan's Task Force

Union Forces Engages

Thirty-Ninth Brigade - Colonel Absalom B. Moore
104th Illinois Infantry - Lt. Col. D. Hapeman
106th Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. C. Tafel
108th Ohio Infantry - Lt. Col. G. T. Limberg
2d Indiana Cavalry - Lt. Col. R. R. Stewart
Company E, 11th Kentucky Cavalry - Capt. F. Slater
Section, 13th Indiana Battery (2 guns) - Lt. E. Green

Total Casualties Thirty-ninth Brigade

K. W. M.