“The Sea Is My Country”:

The Maritime World of the Makah, an Indigenous Borderlands People

By

JOSHUA LEONARD REID
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M.A. (University of California, Davis), 2005

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Approved:

Professor Louis Warren, Dept. of History (advisor)

Professor Alan Taylor, Dept. of History

Professor Ari Kelman, Dept. of History

Professor Steven J. Crum, Dept. of Native American Studies

Committee in Charge

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Joshua Leonard Reid
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Abstract

Histories of American Indians typically avoid marine waters, instead exploring the loss of ancestral lands. This narrative does not fit the experience of the Makah of Washington state. Instead, Makahs shaped marine space rather than terrestrial space as the primary location of identity and success. Strategic exploitation of this marine borderland enabled them to participate in global exchange networks, to resist assimilation, and to retain greater autonomy than many other reservation communities. The 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay between the U.S. and the Makah did not circumscribe the tribe's autonomy. Instead, the incremental loss of their marine space at the hands of non-indigenous rivals better able to capture the regulatory power of the state undermined Makah autonomy three generations after the treaty.

"The Sea Is My Country" explores centuries of interactions among Makahs, other indigenous peoples, and non-Indians. Late-eighteenth century accounts reveal that the waters around Cape Flattery, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and the west coast of Vancouver Island were a pre-European borderland. During the first half of the nineteenth century, influential Makah chiefs engaged trade and colonization efforts to exercise authority; however, their actions helped make colonialism possible in this region. During the treaty negotiations, Makahs forced the U.S. to alter the document to fit their unique maritime needs. In the immediate post-treaty years, customary Makah waters remained a space of connections rather than a boundary, as imagined by European Americans. In the later

nineteenth century, Makah whalers and sealers combined customary practices and strategies with modern opportunities and technology to maintain a unique Makah identity in the changing cultural and environmental world. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, national conservation laws and international agreements – in response to overhunted sea mammal populations – circumscribed Makah marine space and practices, cutting them out of profitable maritime industries. The Makah entered the twentieth century as an impoverished rather than wealthy people, thereby undercutting tribal autonomy. The dissertation concludes by connecting to the contemporary struggle over Makah whaling rights, arguing that current whaling efforts represent actions to regain control of their marine space and to articulate a traditional future.

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Introduction

Just Where *Does* One Get a License to Kill Indians?

On the morning of May 17, 1999, eight Makahs paddled the *q^{w}itiiq^{w}ich* (*Hummingbird*) up to the three-year-old gray whale. Ignoring the drizzling weather, buzz of news copters above, and watchful eyes of the National Marine Fisheries biologist, Theron Parker hurled the harpoon. Unlike his misses on the prior two days of hunting, this throw sank into the thirty-ton leviathan and stuck. From a nearby support craft, the modified .577 caliber rifle roared three times. Fired by an experienced game hunter and decorated Vietnam War veteran, the third shot lanced through the water and into the whale's brain, killing it within seconds. As the female whale died off Washington state's Pacific coast, harpooner Theron led the crew in prayer, thanking her for offering herself to the Makah. Surrounded by a small fleet of canoes from neighboring American Indian nations, the *Hummingbird* brought the whale ashore at Neah Bay about twelve hours later. Men pulled on two heavy chains, hauling her onto the beach where generations of whalers had beached them before. Theron sprinkled eagle feathers on the whale's head while the tribe welcomed her to their nation. This was the first successful Makah whale hunt in seventy years.[1]

A coalition of indigenous peoples and non-Natives throughout the world supported the hunt at several critical stages. Whaling peoples of the North Pacific assisted Makahs with the revival of whaling. When the United States removed the gray whale

[1] For a more complete account of this hunt, see Janine Bowechop, "Contemporary Makah Whaling," in *Coming to Shore*, ed. Marie Mauzé, Michael E. Harking, and Sergei Kan (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 415-19; Robert Sullivan, *A Whale Hunt: Two Years on the Olympic Peninsula with the Makah and Their Canoe* (New York: Scribner, 2000), 238-65. See also Robert J. Miller, "Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe Goes Whaling," *American Indian Law Review* 25, no. 2 (2002).

from the list of endangered wildlife in 1994, the tribe expressed interest in resuming an active whaling practice.[2] With the support of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, in 1997, the Makah petitioned the International Whaling Commission (IWC) for approval of annual subsistence hunts. The IWC granted the tribe a yearly quota of five whales – one for each ancestral Makah village at Cape Flattery – after Alaska Eskimos traded twenty bowhead whales to the Chuktchis, a Siberian people, for five gray whales.[3] Chuktchis have an annual quota of 200 grays, and this deal undercut one potential criticism of whaling, specifically that a Makah hunt would put additional stress on the species.

Indigenous peoples continued to provide encouragement during the 1999 hunt and afterward. A few years earlier, several Vancouver Island Nuu-chah-nulth carvers, relatives of the Makah people, helped to make the *Hummingbird*, and American Indian tribes and Canadian First Nations from across North America offered the hunters prayers for their success. After landing the whale at Neah Bay, members of the tribe stripped blubber and meat from the carcass and hosted a large feast, reminiscent of potlatches from earlier centuries. As Makah elder Dale Johnson remembers, getting the whale "brought a gathering of people; tribes from all over came in" as the whalers shared the

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[2] U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, and U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Remove the Eastern North Pacific Population of the Gray Whale from the List of Endangered Wildlife," *Federal Register*, Vol. 59, No. 115, 16 June 1994, 31094-95 (available at http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/federal_register /fr2597.pdf), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Website [accessed June 2009].

[3] For a discussion of the IWC negotiations in 1996 and 1997, see Marybeth Long Martello, "Negotiating Global Nature and Local Culture: The Case of Makah Whaling," in *Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance*, ed. Sheila Jasanoff and Maybeth Long Martello (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 267-69.

catch.[4] In addition to American Indians from Alaska, the Great Plains, and the West Coast, indigenous peoples from Canada, Fiji, and Africa were honored guests at the celebratory feast. Billy Frank, Jr., a Nisqually elder, president of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, and veteran of the Indian fishing wars of the 1960s and 1970s, spoke passionately about the importance of exercising treaty rights. A Massai warrior from Kenya expressed the need to preserve unique cultural characteristics in the world today.[5] Moreover, the 1999 hunt has inspired self-determination struggles by others. Currently negotiating treaties with the Canadian government, Nuu-chah-nulths point to the Makah whale hunt to support their efforts to resume a customary lifestyle based on whaling.[6] Many non-Natives also supported the hunt because whaling is a treaty right that Makahs reserved for themselves in the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay, which the tribe signed with the United States.

Coming at the close of the twentieth century, however, the whalers' actions drew impassioned responses. Long-time foes of American Indian treaty rights, such as Congressman Jack Metcalf (R-Washington), railed against the federal government's bias of "giving Indians special rights."[7] A vocal minority argued that whaling is barbaric and out-of-step with today's more "enlightened" views. Echoing criticisms levied against Washington's American Indians during the fishing rights conflict of earlier decades,

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[4] Dale Johnson, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 18 May 2009, Makah Culture and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA.

[5] Bowechop, "Contemporary Makah Whaling," 418; and Lynda V. Mapes, "Celebrating the Whale - Native Peoples from All over Share Makah Potlatch," *Seattle Times*, May 23, 1999.

[6] Richard Blow, "The Great American Whale Hunt," *Mother Jones* (September/October 1998); Lieff Gutthiudaschmitt, "Makah Whale Hunt Scores Victory for Rights of Indigenous People," *The Militant*, June 28, 1999.

[7] Blow, "The Great American Whale Hunt." Metcalf spearheaded a Congressional resolution denouncing the U.S. delegation's intention to request at the IWC 1996 meeting an exemption for Makah whaling. See Martello, "Negotiating Global Nature and Local Culture," 267.

much of the rhetoric exhibited racism.[8] Calling Makahs "Red" necks with rifles and accusing them of "playing Indian," local non-Natives revealed strong anti-Indian sentiments still present in mainstream society. For example, one letter to the editor of the *Seattle Times* asked, "I am anxious to know where I can apply for a license to kill Indians. My forefathers helped settle the west and it was their tradition to kill every Redskin they saw. The only good Indian was a dead Indian, they believed. I also want to keep with the faith of my ancestors."[9] Protestors blocked the road to Neah Bay, issued bomb threats, and harassed gray whales in local waters in order to chase them away from Makah hunters. Anti-Indian sentiment became so vociferous that the National Guard went to the reservation to protect Makah lives and the U.S. Coast Guard defended the whalers at sea from activist organizations such as the Sea Shepherd Society.[10]

Critics of the Makahs' continuing efforts to whale reveal a deep lack of understanding about this issue. They have overlooked the historical and cultural connections Makahs have to the ocean. Calling themselves the *q*^{w}*idičča*ʔ*a·tx̌* (pronounced "Kwi-dich-cha-at-h"), "the People of the Cape," Makahs shaped marine space in and around the Strait of Juan de Fuca, rather than terrestrial spaces, as the primary locus of

[8] Education scholar Michael Marker explores the racist backlash against the Makah whale hunt, comparing it to the fishing rights conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s. Michael Marker, "After the Makah Whale Hunt: Indigenous Knowledge and Limits to Multicultural Discourse," *Urban Education* 41, no. 5 (2006). For more on the earlier fish wars in Washington state, see American Friends Service Committee, *Uncommon Controversy: Fishing Rights of the Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Nisqually Indians* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970).

[9] These racist criticisms have already been explored in Karen Samantha Barton, "'Red Waters': Contesting Marine Space as Indian Place in the U.S. Pacific Northwest" (Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2000), 200-18. The quotations from various letters to editors of Washington newspapers are excerpted in her dissertation.

[10] Mapes, "Celebrating the Whale"; Bowechop, "Contemporary Makah Whaling," 418-19; Sullivan, *A Whale Hunt*.

their identity.[11] Strategic exploitation of customary waters enabled them to participate in global networks of exchange, to resist assimilation, and to retain greater autonomy than many other land-based reservation communities until the end of the nineteenth century. The People of the Cape placed marine space at the center of their culture. When explorers and maritime fur traders entered the Pacific Northwest at the end of the eighteenth century, Makah chiefs protected their control over customary waters and resources. Similarly, during the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay, Makah negotiators forced Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens to alter the treaty language to fit the tribe's maritime needs. Networks of exchange, kinship, and conflict made the waters around the Strait of Juan de Fuca, today a bordered space that separates the state of Washington from British Columbia, into a space of connections. Indigenous whalers, sealers, and fishermen combined customary practices with modern opportunities and technology to maintain Makah identity in the changing cultural and environmental world of the nineteenth century. These changes included the depletion of marine species due to overfishing, assimilation policies, rising state power, and conservation efforts. By understanding the contours of the Makahs' connection to the ocean, we can see more easily why reviving the active practice of whaling is critical to the People of the Cape today.

The Environmental and Cultural Context of the Northwest Coast

As a marine people, Makahs have developed a deep understanding of and relationship with the waters around them. Oceanographic features create what some

[11] For the sake of clarity, I will largely stick with using the past tense, except where the present or future tense is necessary. However, many of these past conditions have persisted into the present and will continue to shape the future of the Makahs. For example, Makahs continue to shape marine space as the primary site of their identity. In using the past tense, I am in no way arguing that Makah no longer exist or are irrelevant today.

scholars call a bioregion. Historian Beth LaDow argues that powerful forces of the natural environment are more important than divisions created by borders.[12] Her study on the Medicine Line country of the Alberta-Montana borderland demonstrates that environment and geography – rather than gender, age, ethnicity, or nationality – dictated community bonds in this region. Unpredictable and difficult forces of nature exerted a "constant push and pull" on the lives of those living in the Medicine Line country.[13] Natural forces such as the ebb and flow of tides, winds and currents, powerful storms, spawning salmon, breaching whales, and gamboling seals and sea otters exerted a constant push and pull on the lives of the People of the Cape and other indigenous inhabitants of the Northwest Coast.[14]

Environmental features make these marine waters a complex, rich space that has drawn many peoples to this region and encouraged a spectrum of exchanges ranging from violence to trade. Surface and submarine geological features bound this marine space in three dimensions. At the seascape's edges, the watersheds of mountainous Vancouver Island and the glaciated ramparts of the Olympic and Cascade ranges send mineral-laden fresh water into inshore coastal waters. Separating Vancouver Island from the Olympic Peninsula, the Strait of Juan de Fuca funnels cold seawater into the warmer waters of

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[12] Sterling Evans, *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays on Regional History of the Forty-Ninth Parallel* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 354.

[13] Beth LaDow, *The Medicine Line: Life and Death on a North American Borderland* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 109. Embracing a bioregional approach allows LaDow to read documents in different ways, a process that Binnema explains is an advantage of this type of approach. See Theodore Binnema, "The Case for Cross-National and Comparative History: The Northwestern Plains as Bioregion," in *Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests*, 18-19.

[14] For a more terrestrial-oriented perspective on the environment of the region, see Wayne Suttles, "Environment," in *Northwest Coast*, ed. Suttles, *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990).

Puget Sound.[15] Underwater west of the Olympic Peninsula, the continental shelf works with seasonal currents to keep winter waters several degrees warmer, thereby improving conditions for marine organisms during the cold months. Numerous reefs, rocky outcrops, and other localized submarine features attract many types of fish.

Makahs understood that distinct water masses circulate in a complex yet regular manner because currents interact with seasonally changing winds and geological features. Permanent ocean currents move water masses into and out of this fluid space on an oceanic scale. Flowing east across the Pacific Ocean, the North Pacific Current splits when it smashes into the coast of North America.[16] One branch, the Alaska Current System, heads north along the west coast of Vancouver Island. Pushing warmer water northward, it moderates conditions in the southeast Bering Sea. A second branch, the California Current System, heads south along the Washington coast to the Baja Peninsula. Current systems such as this are complex, three-dimensional masses of water. The surface component of this current system meanders southward, pushing cold water from the Subarctic Current down the coast. Possessing greater concentrations of oxygen and phosphates, this mass of water from the higher latitudes helps marine life thrive. Another component of the California Current System, the northerly-flowing Davidson Current, transports warmer, equatorial water along the slope and outer continental shelf. It appears off the Washington coast in September and is well established by January. From the middle of November to mid-February, this is the dominant inshore transporter

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[15] Kathleen A. Edwards and Parker MacCready, "The Strait of Juan De Fuca as Seen from Satellite," in *2001 Puget Sound Research Conference* (Bellevue: Puget Sound Action Team, 2002), 2.

[16] For more on the subarctic-subtropical transition zone, see Gunnar I. Roden, "Subarctic-Subtropical Transition Zone of the North Pacific: Large-Scale Aspects and Mesoscale Structure," in *Biology, Oceanography, and Fisheries of the North Pacific Transition Zone and Subarctic Frontal Zone: Papers from the North Pacific Transition Zone Workshop, Honolulu, Hawaii, 9-11 May 1988*, ed. Jerry A. Wetherall (Honolulu: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1991).

of water and suspended material along the coast. Most important for marine life, the Davidson Current helps to keep inshore water temperatures warmer than water farther offshore during the winter months. It diminishes in the spring when the offshore surface current of the California Current System swings closer to the coast. This change results in the seasonal upwelling of colder, nutrient-rich water. A third component of the California Current System, the California Undercurrent, flows northward along the upper continental shelf at 660 feet and deeper.[17]

Coastal indigenous peoples knew of these larger currents because they affected local marine space and the resources within it. These currents deposited flotsam on beaches. During the winter, the Davidson Current would have brought giant redwood logs from northern California; in the summer, the North Pacific Current would have brought bamboo and other tropical flora from Asia. More importantly, these water masses affected the marine biology of local waters, thereby making species available at regular times. For example, when the California Current System swings closer to the coast each spring, it brought fur seals, migrating to their breeding grounds on the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea, near ancestral Makah villages and within safe reach of hunters in canoes.

The effects of regional movements of water also benefitted Makahs. Regional rivers discharge nutrient-rich water into local marine space. Fresh water from the numerous smaller watersheds of Vancouver Island and the Olympic Peninsula carries minerals into this environment. Large outlets such as the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the mouth of the Columbia River funnel plumes seaward. Draining an approximate area of

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[17] One oceanographer neatly summarizes the complexity of this current system: "Although there is a seasonal reversal of surface flow along the coast, there is a constant northward flow along the continental slope that could greatly influence the behavior and migrations of anadromous, pelagic and bottom fish." F. Favorite and Northwest Fisheries Center, *The Ocean Environment* (Seattle: Northwest Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1975), 28.

258,200 square miles, the Columbia River discharges nutrients that advect north along the coast as the Davidson Current picks them up. In the Strait of Juan de Fuca, estuarine run-off from the Fraser River mixes with deep, nutrient-rich sea water before being discharged into the ocean.[18] This mixture contributes substantially to the nutrient supply and the resultant phytoplankton production off Cape Flattery. The wide continental shelf off the west coast of Vancouver Island creates an extensive foundation for spreading this nutrient-rich water mass into ocean waters farther offshore. Experienced Makah mariners used the strong tidal current around Cape Flattery to get to and from fishing grounds off the cape and to travel among villages.[19]

Because they could literally see it, the People of the Cape also knew about one of the most important regional oceanographic processes, upwelling.[20] This process raises cold, nutrient-rich water into the photic zone where sunlight fuels photosynthesis, thereby resulting in very high biomass productivity. Promontories and capes, such as Cape Flattery and the related Juan de Fuca Eddy, create "upwelling centers" in the surrounding waters.[21] The deep California Undercurrent and the outflow from the strait interact with the submarine canyon system off the cape to facilitate upwelling from an extreme depth.

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[18] This mixing happens in three dimensions. Surface water outflows north along the coast of Vancouver Island away from the Washington coast while, at deeper levels, salt water from the Pacific gets funneled into the strait.

[19] Oral histories highlight Makah knowledge of local currents and tides and how indigenous mariners used them to their advantage. See Johnson Interview and John McCarty, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, MCRC.

[20] Makah fisherman Dave Sones speaks of being able to see the change in the ocean when one arrives at the upwelling. See Dave Sones, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, MCRC. Modern oceanographers categorize the coastal waters from California to Vancouver Island as a region of upwelling.

[21] David F. Purdy, *A Summary of the Physical Oceanography of the Pacific Northwest Coast*, OCS Information Report ([Washington, DC]: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Pacific OCS Region, 1990), 14. Amy MacFadyen, Barbara Hickey, and William Cochlan, "Influences of the Juan De Fuca Eddy on Circulation, Nutrients, and Phytoplankton Production in the Northern California Current System," *Journal of Geophysical Research* 113 (2008). Today's Makah fishermen and whalers simply refer to it as the "Big Eddy."

The Juan de Fuca Eddy makes this marine space into a site of high phytoplankton biomass, which, in turn, enhances the quantity of larger marine species. During its peak, the edyy propels dissolved inorganic nutrients about one hundred kilometers from the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. It also facilitates the mixing of fresh and salt water in the strait and flushes the inlets of the west coast of Vancouver Island.[22]

The physical features of this complex marine environment support a rich food web, which radiates out from phytoplankton, microscopic, single-cell plants.[23] These plants get energy from sunlight and dissolved inorganic nutrients. In the spring, the Juan de Fuca Eddy facilitates an explosive bloom of these microorganisms, which feed the large amount of krill at the coastal-oceanic interface along the Washington coast. A type of zooplankton, krill is a keystone species, the primary food source for most other marine life. This includes fish, sea birds, and marine mammals, especially whales, all significant to Makahs and Nuu-chah-nulth peoples of Vancouver Island. Found throughout the Strait of Juan de Fuca and along the coast, kelp beds form dense marine forests of important nearshore habitats that support fish, invertebrates, marine mammals, and sea birds. [24] Together, these winds, geological features, the circulation of water masses, and marine

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[22] This annual flushing action helps to support healthy benthic communities in these inlets. The strong force from the Big Eddy flushes features, such as Alberni Inlet, that push deep into Vancouver Island. See Beak Consultants and Patricia Bay Institute of Ocean Sciences, *An Examination of the Variability of Upwelling on the West Coast of Vancouver Island and Its Relationship to the Flushing of Alberni Inlet* (Sidney: Institute of Ocean Sciences, Patricia Bay, 1979).

[23] Oceanographers discuss the importance of conceptualizing the complex interactions of marine biology as a *food web* rather than a *food chain*. The latter term implies a linear, hierarchical chain from the lower trophic levels (phytoplankton) to the higher trophic levels (orca whales). Rather, *food web* more properly describes the feedback and recycling mechanism in marine environments. For example, gammarid amphipods consume lower-trophic phytoplankton and scavenge from carcasses of higher-trophic organisms such as fish and whales. See Favorite and Center, *The Ocean Environment*, 48.

[24] For a more complete discussion of kelp forests in the Pacific Northwest, see Helen Berry, Amy Sewell, and Bob Van Wagenen, "Temporal Trends in the Areal Extent of Canopy-Forming Kelp Beds Along the Strait of Juan De Fuca and Washington's Outer Coast," in *2001 Puget Sound Research Conference* (Bellevue: Puget Sound Action Team, 2002).

biology composed the oceanography of marine space in which the People of the Cape and neighboring indigenous peoples lived.

Located on the shores of the Pacific Northwest, Makahs were part of the Northwest Coast culture. Anthropologists extend this cultural area along the Pacific coast from the Copper River delta on the Gulf of Alaska to the Oregon-California border and inland to the Coast Mountains of British Columbia and the Cascade Mountains of Washington and Oregon.[25] The second-most diverse linguistic area of indigenous North America, the region included many distinct peoples.[26] Despite this diversity, however, these peoples shared several commonalities differentiating them from the interior peoples east of the Cascades, far northern peoples of the Pacific, and those in California.[27]

Northwest Coast peoples exploited a range of natural resources, but most relied upon cedar and salmon. Indians used cedar, an evergreen tree found throughout the region, for so many necessities that some referred to the spirit of the tree as "Long Life Maker" or "Rich Woman Maker." They spun, wove, and plaited its fibrous bark into clothing, baskets, and rope. Due to its durable, decay-resistant wood, Indians split cedar into planks for longhouses, steamed boards into bentwood boxes, carved totem poles and masks, and fashioned canoes from logs. Northwest Coast peoples fished five different

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[25] For a standard and concise overview of this culture area, see Wayne Suttles, "Introduction," in *Northwest Coast*. Throughout the dissertation, I use modern place names where appropriate so that readers will more easily understand the setting. Where appropriate, I introduce readers to indigenous place names and reference earlier terms used by non-Natives.

[26] Scholars have organized Northwest Coast languages into thirteen linguistic families representing forty-five distinct languages. See Laurence C. Thompson and M. Dale Kinkade, "Languages," in *Northwest Coast*.

[27] For an overview of these other culture areas, see Deward E. Walker, ed., *Plateau*, *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1998); June Helm, ed., *Subarctic*, *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1981); and Robert Heizer, ed., *California*, *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978).

species of salmon, an anadromous fish which hatches in freshwater streams, swims to the ocean to spend most of its life, and returns to natal streams to spawn and die. Using reef nets, seines, weirs, lines, and spears, Indians took from 300 to 1,000 pounds of salmon per person each year. Because the separate species return to spawn at different seasons and only for limited durations, Natives developed a range of methods for preserving and storing salmon. The differential availability of cedar and particular species of salmon – and other food and natural resources – fueled a vast trade network encompassing this culture area and beyond. For example, Makahs had access to enormous amounts of halibut, whales, and seals, which they traded to other Northwest Coast peoples for salmon and cedar, two resources which they did not have in abundance.[28]

Indigenous communities formed around villages situated to access seasonal resources. Makahs resided at five year-long villages – Biheda, Neah Bay, Wayatch, Tsoo-yess, and Ozette – located at Cape Flattery. During the spring and summer, families moved to residences located to access seasonal resources more easily. For example, during the late-eighteenth century, thousands of Makahs annually relocated to the village on Tatoosh Island, about half a mile northwest of Cape Flattery, to fish halibut and hunt

[28] For more on the importance of salmon and cedar to Northwest Coast peoples, see Barbara Lane, "Political and Economic Aspects of Indian-White Culture Contact in Western Washington in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," 10 May 1973, unpublished manuscript, Washington State Library, Olympia, WA, 1-13; Hilary Stewart, *Indian Fishing: Early Methods on the Northwest Coast* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977); Stewart, *Cedar: Tree of Life to the Northwest Coast Indians* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984); Joseph E. Taylor, *Making Salmon: An Environmental History of the Northwest Fisheries Crisis* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), 13-38; and David R. Montgomery, *King of Fish: The Thousand-Year Run of Salmon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), 39-58. For the 300-1,000 pound estimate, see Gordon Winant Hewes, "Indian Fisheries Productivity in Pre-Contact Times in the Pacific Salmon Area," *Northwest Anthropological Research Notes* 7, no. 2 (1973): 136. Hewes estimated that Nuu-chah-nulths regularly harvested around 300 pounds, probably because they relied on other marine resources such as whales, seal, and halibut; he ties the 1,000-pound estimate to those living in the Fraser River delta in British Columbia. Pre-contact trade networks in the Northwest Coast are discussed in detail in Chapter One.

whales.[29] Others lived at smaller villages such as Kydikabbit – called "Warm Houses" in English because of the many smokehouses for drying fish – and fishing camps along the Hoko River, where they caught and preserved a variety of fish. During the stormy winter months, they relocated back to more sheltered, permanent villages. People moved from one area to another because they had ownership and usufruct rights based on kinship to specific resources. These rights shifted as social connections changed due to marriages and divorces, births and deaths, and the waxing and waning power of particular individuals and communities.[30] Due to these changes, and periodic fluctuations in the availability of particular species, families did not always follow the same particular pattern of seasonal movements.[31]

Northwest Coast peoples recognized the status of individuals within a tripartite system of social stratification, which included chiefs, commoners, and slaves. A range of ranked leaders occupied the highest social stratum. Claiming ancestral ties to supernatural ancestors, chiefs owned the rights and titles to leadership positions within communities. Titleholders owned lucrative fishing and hunting grounds and other resource areas.

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[29] British trader John Meares estimated that about five thousand Makahs lived on Tatoosh Island when he passed by it in June 1788. He found this surprising because the island appeared to be "barren rock, almost inaccessible, and of no great extent; but the surface of it, as far as we could see, was covered with inhabitants, who were gazing at the ship. We could by no means reconcile the wild and uncultivated appearance of the place, with such a flourishing state of population." John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, Bibliotheca Australiana (Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1967), 153 and 231.

[30] The complex networks of kinship are discussed in detail in Chapters One and Two. For an excellent analysis of this topic, see Alexandra Harmon, *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

[31] For more on seasonal movements among Northwest Coast peoples, see Ruth Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast: The Makah, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Southern Kwakiutl and Nuxalk* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 105-38; and Kenneth M. Ames and Herbert D. G. Maschner, *Peoples of the Northwest Coast: Their Archaeology and Prehistory* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1999), 120-21. The diaries of James Swan, the first Anglo-American teacher assigned to the reservation, contain numerous references to Makahs' seasonal movements during the second half of the nineteenth century. See James G. Swan Papers, 1833-1903 (Manuscript collection 1703), University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle.

"Outside resources" – called such because they were in marine spaces outside bays, inlets, and rivers – were the most important property rights, and only the highest-ranking chiefs owned them. Among the Makah, the most powerful chiefs were whalers. In addition to tangible property such as cranberry bogs, freshwater streams, driftwood, game, timber, and wild plants, chiefs owned intangible items, like names, dances, songs, and stories. These propertied items passed within kinship networks and crossed gender lines. Except for personal items such as canoes, clothing, and fishing gear, commoners did not own any culturally significant property such as resource areas and titles. However, they did have access to hunting and fishing grounds because chiefs extended these rights to their people. Seized during conflicts between communities and traded throughout the Northwest Coast, slaves occupied the lowest social stratum and composed from twenty to forty percent of a village's population. Because they did a range of labor and augmented a master's wealth, slaves were both valuable property and status items. Makah chiefs kept many slaves, and the People of the Cape were key traders in the regional slave trade.[32]

Ownership of important titles and rights provided Northwest Coast chiefs with their foundation for leadership within villages and sometimes across larger socio-political spaces. Chiefs exercised leadership through influence and authority rather than coercion. Although chiefly titles, rights, and privileges passed from one generation to the next through kinship networks, an individual had to maintain his – and sometimes her – noble status by providing for the people. Within a Makah village, for example, whaling chiefs

[32] For an overview on the tripartite social structure, see Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); and Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast*, 36-56. For a more specific discussion related to Nuu-chah-nulth and Makah peoples, see Philip Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951), 243-73; and Ann M. Renker and Erna Gunther, "Makah," in *Northwest Coast.*

who harvested several thirty- to forty-ton whales each year provided a wealth of subsistence and trade goods. This system of leadership, however, made authority competitive both within villages and across larger areas. The wealthiest chiefs – those who could provide the most for their people – had more influence than others who provided less. These leaders could muster hundreds of warriors from several villages. They protected their people from raiders or led war expeditions against neighboring villages to seize slaves and lucrative resources such as salmon streams or marine fishing and hunting grounds. Chiefs strengthened their social status by marrying members of other noble families throughout the region. Marriages often brought more property items, including fishing rights, slaves, titles, and other tangible goods.[33]

Chiefs displayed and distributed wealth through rituals and feasts, which non-Native scholars have lumped together under the name "potlatch." These events ranged from simple affairs, during which a chief shared a substantial catch of salmon, for example, to more elaborate rituals such as a marriage between two noble families. The largest events involved hundreds of guests, whom the host would feast for several consecutive weeks. Potlatches incorporated speeches, dances, songs, and other ritual activities. These feasts commonly featured the giving of gifts, ranging from food items to valuable commodities and trade items. Within the framework of leadership rivalries in the Northwest Coast, potlatching became competitive when chiefs expanded their influence over people by demonstrating the ability to provide increasing amounts of wealth for supporters. S'Klallams, a separate people living to the east of Cape Flattery, called the People of the Cape *Makahs*, a name that means "generous with food," probably

[33] The previously cited literature discusses the power of chiefs. For a different perspective on chiefly power, see Bruce G. Miller and Daniel L. Boxberger, "Creating Chiefdoms: The Puget Sound Case," *Ethnohistory* 41, no. 2 (1994).

because of the abundance they harvested from rich marine resources, which allowed them to host lavish potlatches.[34]

As seen in the narrative that follows, the Northwest Coast characteristics of marine resources, hierarchy, competitive power, and potlatches worked together to allow influential Makah chiefs to produce tribal space. As the French intellectual Henri Lefebvre argued, spaces are products of societies. Makah society produced marine and terrestrial spaces – made them Makah spaces – through the ways they conceived and lived these spaces. Many factors shaped the historical process of producing space in the Northwest Coast, including the environment, competing Native and non-Native societies and empires, the actions of individuals and groups, differing attitudes on how to best make a living, and connections to other spaces. Makah marine space became a social reality through villages of distinct borderland peoples and through the networks of kinship, trade, and violence drawing these peoples together.[35] The availability of large

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[34] For the meaning of the name *Makah*, see Charlotte June Coté, "'It's Who We Are': Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002). Like other Northwest Coast characteristics, the literature on potlatches is extensive. For a concise overview, see Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast*, 57-69; and Philip Drucker, *Indians of the Northwest Coast* (New York,: Published for the American Museum of Natural History [by] McGraw-Hill, 1955), 123-33. Drucker also discusses potlatching as specific to Nuu-chah-nulths, which would have been very similar to Makah practices. See Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes*, 370-86. Over fifty years old, the classic text still remains Helen Codere, "Fighting with Property : A Study of Kwakiutl Potlatching and Warfare, 1792-1930. With Tribal and Linguistic Map of Vancouver Island and Adjacent Territory" (Thesis - Columbia University, University of Washington Press, 1950). For a newer interpretation, see Wayne Suttles, "Streams of Property, Armor of Wealth: The Traditional Kwakiutl Potlatch," in *Chiefly Feasts: The Enduring Kwakiutl Potlatch*, ed. Aldona Jonaitis (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991). For a critique of Codere's argument that potlatching replaced warfare, see Joan A. Lovisek, "Aboriginal Warfare on the Northwest Coast: Did the Potlatch Replace Warfare?" in *North American Indigenous Warfare and Ritual Violence*, ed. Richard J. Chacon and Rubén G. Mendoza (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2007).

[35] Many spatial theorists and historical geographers have shaped my understanding of the production of space. Two key works include Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1974); and Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, 25th Anniversary Edition ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977). With respect to the Makah production of space, their concepts and the ideas of others are discussed in greater detail throughout the dissertation, most especially in Chapters One and Two.

quantities of whales, seals, and halibut made the People of the Cape different from others, and Makahs funneled these unique resources into Native and non-Native trade networks. Makah leaders recognized the foundation of their power, an understanding captured in the words of Tse-kaw-wootl, a Makah chief, during the negotiations for the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay. He told Governor Stevens, "I want the sea. That is my country."[36] Influential chiefs exploited these resources to expand and maintain their power, which allowed them to interrupt imperial processes such as trade and colonization.

Thematic Overview

Histories about interactions between Native peoples and non-Native empires often frame their subject in problematic ways. First, scholars usually limit these narratives to their respective national framework. For example, histories of interactions among First Nations and British (and then Canadian) peoples in the Canadian West rarely stray south of the current boundary separating the U.S. and Canada. Similarly, narratives about American Indians and Anglo-Americans in the U.S. West often confine themselves to the geopolitical space of the present nation.[37] From the perspective of Northwest Coast

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[36] "Ratified Treaty No. 286: Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Makah Indians," Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-69 (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publication T494, roll 5), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), RG 75, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., 2.

[37] For a representative sampling of Pacific Northwest histories that confine themselves to these national boundaries, see Clifford E. Trafzer, *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils: Northwestern Indian Policy, 1850-1855* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986); Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992); Cole Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997); Brad Asher, *Beyond the Reservation: Indians, Settlers, and the Law in Washington Territory, 1853-1889* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999); Daniel W. Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); and Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002). These monographs would have benefitted from looking across the international border, especially when examining periods before the 1846 boundary settlement. Some

peoples, however, confining scholarship to one side of the border appears odd because non-Native empires (American and British) and nation-states (U.S. and Canada) did not come into existence until late in indigenous histories, which span thousands of years. Northwest Coast peoples and the histories they tell encompass an area that has only recently become carved up into the political entities we see today. Moreover, histories about Northwest Coast peoples need to include other non-Native actors besides Anglos of American or British affiliation. More inclusive histories should involve Russians, Spaniards, Kanakas (native Hawai'ians), French, and Japanese who also came – or were brought to – the region. Similarly, indigenous peoples from both sides of the current international border should figure more prominently in these narratives.

Writing history from an indigenous perspective pushes scholars to examine the ways Natives engaged the non-Native world and directly contributed to colonial projects and processes. However, this type of interpretation should not be misconstrued as indigenous acquiescence or a belief in the superiority of non-Natives. For example, Makahs interacted with non-Natives for their own reasons and on their own terms for a longer period than most historians acknowledge. Similarly, Makahs approached the expanding settler-colonial world in a variety of contested ways – just because they

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scholars of the Pacific Northwest are beginning to explore cross-border themes. See Lissa Wadewitz, "The Nature of Borders: Salmon and Boundaries in the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004); Jennifer Seltz, "Embodying Nature: Health, Place, and Identity in Nineteenth-Century America" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 2005); and Alexandra Harmon, *The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest* (Seattle: Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest in association with University of Washington Press, 2008). For examples of historians examining both the Canadian and U.S. Wests, see Ken S. Coates, "A Matter of Context: The Pacific Northwest in World History," in *Terra Pacifica: People and Place in the Northwest States and Western Canada*, ed. Paul W. Hirt (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1998); LaDow, *The Medicine Line*; Michel Hogue, "Disputing the Medicine Line: The Plains Crees and the Canadian-American Border, 1876-1885," *Montana* 52 (2002); John M. Findlay and Kenneth Coates, *Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies* (Seattle: Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest in association with University of Washington Press, 2002); Sheila McManus, *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), and Evans, *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests.*

constitute one tribe today does not mean that Makahs in either the past or present act, much less believe, in a monolithic way. Approaching history in this manner complicates the stories we tell about encounters, resistance, and conquest.

Living at Cape Flattery, the most northwestern point of the continental United States and just south of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Makahs have long been a part of both the U.S. and Canadian Wests. This narrative of the People of the Cape embraces the *place*-centered approach of "New Western" historians, while exploring the *processes* in which various historical actors engaged.[38] Specifically, "The Sea Is My Country" examines the way Makahs and other indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast engaged settler-colonial processes such as non-Native trade, colonialism, settlement, treaty-making, law, bureaucracy, and property.[39] Too often, studies overlook the role of indigenous peoples in the processes that transformed the North American West into separate U.S. and Canadian Wests.

Histories of the North American West problematically end at the coastline. For example, terrestrial extractive industries, such as mining and timber, are a common subject. Historian Patricia Limerick has characterized these industries as "get in, get rich,

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[38] Two models of New Western histories that emphasize place over process include Patricia Nelson Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987); and Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). White provides an overview of the differences between Old Western and New Western historians in White, "Trashing the Trails," in *Trails: Toward a New Western History*, ed. Patricia Nelson Limerick, Clyde A. Milner, and Charles E. Rankin (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991). For a spirited, if generous, defense of Frederick Jackson Turner's "frontier thesis," which characterizes the frontier as a process by which western spaces evolved and became part of the United States, see William Cronon, "Revisiting Turner's Vanishing Frontier," in *Major Problems in the History of the American West*, ed. Clyde A. Milner (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989). For the classic 1893 Turner essay about the importance of the frontier to U.S. history, see Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in *Major Problems in the History of the American West*.

[39] I am pursuing the strategy advocated by historian Donald Worster, who writes, "We want to concentrate our attention first on how people have tried to wrest their food, their energy, their income from the specific land in question and what influence that effort has had on the shaping of the West's society and culture." See Worster, "New West, True West," in *Major Problems in the History of the American West*, 150.

get out."[40] But similar patterns were first established in the Pacific Northwest during the late-eighteenth century maritime fur trade and repeated in marine-oriented extractive industries such as whaling, sealing, and fishing. Indigenous peoples had a much larger role in these activities than most realize. Other themes characteristic of narratives of the U.S. West – such as the role of the federal government, industry, and capital in shaping the region – also highlight new dimensions when applied to marine spaces and industries west of the continent's coastline.[41] For example, the nineteenth-century whaling and sealing industries helped to bring new places such as the Pacific Northwest, Hawai'i, and Alaska into the U.S. A few scholars have begun to look at the extension of the U.S. West into the Pacific Ocean and the reciprocal role of Pacific places and industries on the development of the nation. However, these narratives present a traditional story of non-Native commercial interests overwhelming and replacing indigenous economies. Native peoples, if they appear at all, only seem to react to more dynamic Europeans and Anglo Americans.[42] "The Sea Is My Country" interrogates this standard assumption, exploring

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[40] Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest*, 100.

[41] For the classic argument about the role of the federal government, industry, and capital, see White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own"*. For more of an emphasis on commodification of the U.S. West, see William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991).

[42] See Thomas Hinckley, "The Westward Movement and Historical Involvement of the Americas in the Pacific Basin; Conference Proceedings" (paper presented at the Conference on the Westward Movement and Historical Involvement of the Americas in the Pacific Basin, San Jose State College, California, 1965); James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1758-1841* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992); Arrell Morgan Gibson, *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993); Donald D. Johnson, *The United States in the Pacific: Private Interests and Public Policies, 1784-1899* (Westport: Praeger, 1995); and Jean Heffer, *The United States and the Pacific: History of a Frontier*, trans. W. Donald Wilson, English Language Edition ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002). However, some are beginning to chart a new direction for this scholarship. See David Igler, "Diseased Goods: Global Exchanges in the Eastern Pacific Basin, 1770-1850," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (2004); and Jean Barman and Bruce McIntyre Watson, *Leaving Paradise: Indigenous Hawaiians in the Pacific Northwest, 1787-1898* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006).

the critical role of marine-oriented indigenous peoples – specifically the Makah – in the settler-colonial processes shaping the North American West.

Some historians have turned to borderlands concepts to examine the complex interactions of local peoples – both Native and non-Native – with each other, with regional spaces broader than nations, and with socio-cultural networks engaging capital, trade, kinship, and identity. However, this focus differs from what is offered here. "The Sea Is My Country" argues that borderlands are spaces shared and contested by distinct peoples. Specific social, economic, political, cultural, and environmental networks cross these spaces, binding together borderland inhabitants and specific places. Because two or more societies construct these networks, they change over time and across space and make borderlands products of history. Similar to frontiers, borderlands are messy social creations of amalgamation, accommodation, and contention. But unlike frontiers, borderlands have defined – yet contested – geographic and cultural borders.[43]

The story of the maritime world of the Makah complicates the current approach to borderlands, frontiers, and boundaries. Many scholars agree with the formulations of these three concepts as expressed by historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, who argue that the key distinction between frontiers and borderlands is the competitive nature of European imperialism that defines the latter. They define *frontier* as a "meeting place

[43] Several texts have shaped my perspective on borderlands. These include Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in between in North American History," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999); John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (1999); LaDow, *The Medicine Line*; Findlay and Coates, *Parallel Destinies;* James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Hogue, "Disputing the Medicine Line"; Igler, "Diseased Goods"; Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); McManus, *The Line Which Separates*; David G. McCrady, *Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth-Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Evans, *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests*; and Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined." Frontiers are "borderless lands," and they produce cultural and ethnic mixing and accommodation. They reserve *borderlands* for "contested boundaries between colonial [European] domains." Natives exploited both frontiers and borderlands when resisting submission to a single European power and to negotiate more favorable intercultural relations. Adelman and Aron argue that when borderlands turned into borders, indigenous peoples lost their ability to play off imperial rivalries. Once borders separating nation-states hardened, these political entities could then better dictate and control property rights, citizenship, and population movements.[44]

"The Sea Is My Country" presents an alternative borderlands history. The actions of Makahs and other indigenous peoples challenge the problematic formulation that only *European* imperialism produces borderlands.[45] They also complicate the borderland-to-border process Adelman and Aron describe. Although the U.K. and U.S. settled on the northern border of Oregon Territory in 1846, dividing what became Washington state and British Columbia along the forty-ninth parallel and Strait of Juan de Fuca, the People of the Cape and neighboring tribes continued to cross this boundary line marked by the strait well into the twentieth century. The precise nature of this porous marine border meant that frontier-like conditions continued long after the borderland-to-border transition that Adelman and Aron detail. Embedded within characteristic Northwest Coast cultural

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[44] Adelman and Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," 814-17.

[45] Recent scholarship, such as Hämäläinen's *Comanche Empire*, challenges this core assumption by demonstrating that borderlands also existed where powerful indigenous polities such as the Comanche were the dominant shaping force instead of non-Native empires. Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*. Hämäläinen and Jon Wunder addressed this critical flaw in "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays." Pre-dating the recent spate of borderlands literature, Jack Forbes's *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard* makes the case for pre-European borderlands in the U.S. Southwest. See Jack D. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).

traits, borderland qualities of contestation and sharing among distinct peoples interfered with settler-colonial efforts to produce national spaces in the Pacific Northwest.

The first two chapters of "The Sea Is My Country" discuss the indigenous marine borderland that stretched from the mouth of the Columbia River to the northwestern edge of Vancouver Island and east through the Strait of Juan de Fuca into Puget Sound. Chapter One opens with the 1788 encounter between Chief Tatoosh, the highest-ranked Makah titleholder at the time, and John Meares, a British maritime fur trader, and focuses on regional trade and kinship networks. This chapter explains that borderland networks and related diplomatic protocols already existed when Europeans and Anglo Americans arrived in this corner of the Pacific. Moreover, indigenous networks and protocols shaped the initial period of Native and non-Native interactions on the Northwest Coast from the late-eighteenth century into the 1800s. This chapter also explains that Makahs used customary marine practices, such as hunting sea otters and fishing, to engage expanding networks of exchange. Providing sea otter pelts and provisioning ships were the first examples of this, a pattern that the dissertation traces throughout Makah history. By exploiting networks of trade and kinship, Native chiefs controlled spaces on their own terms and interrupted imperial processes. Their ability to do so reveals how the broader processes of encounter, resistance, and conquest reshaped the indigenous world.

Chapter Two explores the role of violence and theft during the maritime fur trade within this indigenous borderland. Although violence and theft marked encounters among Natives and non-Natives, they were much more than simple conflicts and plundering. Violence marked encounters because rival chiefs competed with each other to control space, resources, and people in this borderland. When imperial actors entered the

borderland, they exacerbated older lines of tension, created new opportunities for conflict, and applied their own tools of violence. In this indigenous borderland where distinct peoples contested over and shared spaces and resources, violence was not an anomaly or a result of miscommunications: threats and violence were mechanisms central to both Native and imperial processes of this period. More importantly, indigenous leaders such as Tatoosh utilized violence to expand their influence and to frustrate imperial designs for domination of tribal space. The first two chapters explore how these networks and protocols changed to accommodate and incorporate non-Natives into Northwest Coast societies.

Chapter Three begins with Makahs "pillaging" a Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) ship and concludes with a smallpox epidemic, two critical events in the early 1850s. These incidents exemplify the changing nature of the indigenous borderland during the first half of the nineteenth century, specifically the transition from maritime to land-based fur trade, the rising power of the HBC, and the arrival of British and U.S. settlers. Moreover, Native and non-Native reactions to the pillaging of the ship and to the smallpox deaths highlight the way indigenous peoples such as Makahs engaged the emerging settler-colonial world to maintain their ability to control space. However, as non-Native power in the region grew, Makahs divided over how to deal with newcomers. This chapter explores the tensions between chiefs Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom, two Makah leaders who exemplified the divergent reactions to rising settler-colonial power.

Focusing on the 1850s and 1860s, Chapter Four examines the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay, arguing that Makahs used the treaty to protect customary marine space. This chapter also explores the meaning of the Chief Tse-kaw-wootl's words – "The sea is my

country" – detailing Makahs' conceptions of marine tenure circa the mid-nineteenth century. By describing the sea as his country, Tse-kaw-wootl articulated a Makah perspective on marine space, namely that local waters were sovereign tribal space. Moreover, post-treaty data drawn from a portion of the diaries of James Swan, the first Anglo teacher at Neah Bay, illustrates that marine space continued to be a space of indigenous connections, despite the rise of an American-British boundary along the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Indigenous borderland networks persisted past the official 1846 demarcation of the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary between American and British possessions west of the Rockies. Additionally, Chapter Four discusses how the Makah perspective on marine space challenged the emerging Anglo-American view on coastal waters as both a commons and appropriate boundary.

Chapter Five focuses on whaling and pelagic sealing in the second half of the nineteenth century, arguing that these activities best demonstrate that Makahs combined customary marine practices with modern technology and opportunities to succeed during a period when most American Indian tribes fell into poverty. Like Chapter Four, it explores how indigenous borderland networks remained important into the early twentieth century. For example, individuals leveraged kinship networks to raise the capital necessary to purchase expensive sealing schooners and to crew them with Native laborers. While engaging non-Native markets of exchange, wealthy Makahs such as the Claplanhoos, a high-ranking family, continued to follow Northwest Coast customs. Makah successes and capital investments in extractive industries in the North Pacific allowed them to mitigate some of the worst assimilation efforts and counter them on their own terms, to a certain degree. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, national

conservation laws and international agreements circumscribed Makah marine space and practices, cutting them out of profitable industries to privilege more influential Anglo Americans. Working in conjunction with the collapse of sea mammal populations, conservation laws transformed the Makah from a wealthy people to an impoverished tribe by the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, these conservation efforts codified into law the Anglo assumption that indigenous peoples only hunted for subsistence purposes.

The end of the nineteenth century was a turning point for Makahs. They began the twentieth century with far fewer advantages and opportunities than they had ever had. With poverty came the increasing power of agents bent on assimilating the Makah. Schools run by Anglo Americans, the establishment of Christian churches, a renewed emphasis on farming, and strong-arm tactics to prohibit cultural practices attempted to undermine the Makah relationship with marine space. Although Makahs suspended an active whaling practice in 1928 – a decision they made for their own reasons – they maintained the whaling tradition and kept a strong connection to the sea.

Returning to the current controversy over Makah whaling, the Conclusion relates the dissertation's themes to the tribe's efforts to revive this customary practice. Opponents criticize the Makah desire to renew whaling as a naive and anti-modern wish to live in the past. Giving the benefit of the doubt to the individual who inquired where he could get a license to hunt Indians, this critic invoked the ugly past of racial violence in a sarcastic – and racist – attempt to cast modern Makah whaling as a barbaric and bygone practice. However, the historical perspective uncovered by "The Sea Is My Country" reveals that generations of Makahs have exploited marine space and borderland networks to chart a traditional future. Even in the twenty-first century, whaling illustrates that this

American Indian nation is living in the present and moving into the future while retaining important traditions. The current whaling efforts exemplify how the People of the Cape are using customary practices to reclaim their marine space, lost during the early twentieth century, while protecting their sovereignty and charting a course for Makah identity in the modern world.

Chapter One

The Power of Wickaninnish Ends Here

The clear, sunny June afternoon made it easy for the Makahs to spot the sails of a non-Native ship approaching one of their seasonal villages. Chief Tatoosh had anticipated the vessel's arrival since it began creeping down the west coast of Vancouver Island three weeks earlier, after spending a month at Nootka Sound. These strangers had been trading with neighboring rival chiefs, Maquinna and Wickaninnish, and they had recently agreed to an exclusive trading arrangement with the latter. In preparation for the strangers' arrival, Tatoosh's warriors clothed themselves in the skins of *kar-tówe* (sea otters), painted their faces with red and black ochre, and armed themselves with bows, barbed arrows, and mussel-shell-tipped harpoons. In order to show his stout, courageous heart, Tatoosh simply painted his face black and added glittering sand.[1] When the vessel entered customary Makah waters in 1788, Tatoosh led his warriors as their large war canoes surrounded the intruding ship, the first of its kind to visit his people.

Tatoosh boarded the vessel, the *Felice Adventurer* captained by John Meares. Although he was a British national and Royal Navy veteran who had seen action during the Revolutionary War, Meares sailed under a Portuguese flag in order to avoid the monopolies of the South Sea Company and East India Company.[2] Meares noted this

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[1] James Swan, one of the earliest Anglo residents of Neah Bay, noted that Makahs painted their faces black for several reasons, including to show their "stout and courageous hearts" or because they were depressed. Because Tatoosh confronted Meares in a hostile manner, it seems clear that he had painted himself for the former reason. See James Gilchrist Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery, at the Entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca, Washington Territory," in *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, ed. Smithsonian Institution (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1870), 17.

[2] For more on the background of this British trader, see J. Richard Nokes, *Almost a Hero: The Voyages of John Meares, R.N., to China, Hawaii, and the Northwest Coast* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1998).

encounter in the official account of the voyage, writing, "The chief of this spot, whose name is Tatootche, did us the favour of a visit, and so surly and forbidding a character we had not yet seen.... He informed us that the power of Wicananish ended here, and that we were now within the limits of his government, which extended a considerable way to the Southwest."[3] Meares gave the imposing chief a "small present," which insulted Tatoosh, who ignored it and failed to reciprocate as he might normally have done. The Makah chief promptly departed and did not allow his people to trade with the newcomers.

After leaving the *Felice*, Tatoosh watched the British send out their longboat to look for safe anchorage for the evening. Meares hoped to sail deeper into the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which opened up east of Tatoosh Island, in order to determine whether it was the fabled Northwest Passage. A firm believer in the existence of this important waterway, Meares wanted to find it so he could claim it for the glory of his nation – not to mention the £20,000 reward the British Parliament had offered to the first captain to discover and sail through the elusive body of water.[4] Canoes followed the longboat as it headed toward the shore. Knowing their chief's dissatisfaction with these strangers, Makahs intimidated them, jumping into the longboat from their canoes and stealing whatever they could pry loose. These brazen thefts enraged the crew, but Meares and his officers maintained order throughout this tense encounter. Fearing violence, the sailors returned the longboat to the *Felice*, and the vessel sailed three leagues into the Pacific Ocean to prevent a Makah ambush under the cover of darkness.

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[3] John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, Bibliotheca Australiana (Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1967), 153-54.

[4] Parliament began offering this award in 1745. Nokes, *Almost a Hero*, 3.

The following morning, Tatoosh led 400 warriors in canoes out to the vessel. They circled the *Felice*, demonstrating the sea power that the chief could deploy.[5] Tatoosh paired this show of force with a peaceful overture as his warriors sang a song similar to the ones of friendship that Meares and his crew had heard previously at Nootka Sound. However, Meares ignored the gesture and compounded his earlier insults by failing to reciprocate in any manner. Keenly aware of their isolation, Meares decided to withdraw his crew and vessel from Makah waters.[6] The British captain's exploration of the Strait of Juan de Fuca would need to wait, as the *Felice* fled on the first wind.

After sailing south of Cape Flattery, Meares met few Indians. But those he did meet – such as the father and son who paddled out from Shoalwater Bay and offered sea otter skins for exchange – had probably heard of the non-Native trade vessel's presence. As Meares wrote in his account, "it is more than probable that some of the natives of Tatootche's district may have occasionally roamed this far, and communicated the intelligence of strangers arriving in ships to trade for furs."[7] Meares's impression of communication in this region was accurate – news spread quickly along this stretch of the North American coast.

Less than two weeks later, the *Felice* returned to the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Meares and his crew spent several more weeks at the entrance to the strait, but on the Vancouver Island side to avoid any further encounters with Tatoosh. Still hoping to discover the Northwest Passage, the captain sent the longboat out to explore the strait.

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[5] *Sea power* is defined as "the ability to ensure free movement on the sea for oneself and to inhibit, if need be, a similar capacity in others." See Warren Tute and Claire Francis, eds., *The Commanding Sea: Six Voyages of Discovery* (London: Book Club Associates, 1981), 175.

[6] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 156.

[7] Ibid., 165.

However, indigenous warriors attacked the small craft and sent it limping back to the *Felice*.[8] Fearing the possibility of more attacks, Meares returned to the safety of Nootka Sound, where he hoped that Maquinna's authority would protect him from any hostile Natives.

When considered alongside the logs of other explorers, accounts of maritime fur traders, and oral histories, Meares's record of his time on the Northwest Coast reveals that he had ventured into an indigenous borderland, whose existence pre-dated the arrival of Europeans in this far corner of the Pacific Ocean. Meares and his contemporaries found themselves in an indigenous seascape defined by particular borderland networks and protocols. Their interactions with the distinct peoples of this region went well when they conformed to indigenous expectations. On the other hand, they encountered befuddling and often violent resistance – or felt the need to resort to violence themselves – when they ignored or misunderstood the cultural rules of this particular borderland.

Like any borderland, a combination of diplomatic protocols and overlapping networks defined the specific characteristics of what I will call the *ča·di·* (pronounced "cha-dee") borderland, after the Makah name for Tatoosh Island, a key location in the region.[9] By interacting with each other and with outsiders from beyond the borderland, the distinct peoples inhabiting this region developed protocols to guide these interactions and unfolding encounters. These networks connected places within this dynamic region, revealing how indigenous borderlanders shared and contested marine space. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the *ča·di·* borderland stretched from the mouth

[8] For more on the attack on the longboat, see Ibid., 173-79. This incident is analyzed in detail in Chapter Two.

[9] Maria Pascua, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 13 October 2008, Makah Cultural and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA (hereafter cited as Pascua Interview 1).

of the Columbia River to the northern tip of Vancouver Island and east into Puget Sound. A series of trade networks facilitated the distribution of goods while providing opportunities for chiefs to compete over controlling the terms of exchange. Similarly, an intricate web of kinship networks drew families and communities together across the *ča·di·* borderland. Yet even these intimate connections were sites of tension because high-ranking families competed for kin throughout this region. During the generations prior to the arrival of non-Natives in the 1770s, indigenous leaders and groups had shaped and contested these protocols and networks of trade and kinship in the *ča·di·* borderland.[10]

Characterizing Makah marine space as an indigenous borderland is more than an academic exercise or historical conceit. During the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, those living in the *ča·di·* borderland engaged the social dynamics specific to this region. Participation in borderland protocols and networks had important meanings to them. More importantly, individuals such as Chief Tatoosh had enough power to interrupt imperial processes – he prevented Meares from exploring the Strait of Juan de Fuca and from expanding British claims in the area. Meares and his contemporaries wanted to create imperial corridors of transportation and trade through Makah marine space. However, Tatoosh resisted European market penetration in this region, except when such processes conformed to his own agendas and priorities.

Due to his mastery of local networks of trade and kinship, Tatoosh possessed enough power to produce space on his own terms.[11] Through chiefly influence and

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[10] I agree with Neil Salisbury, who characterizes pre-encounter American Indian societies as "products of a complex set of historical forces, both local and wide-ranging, both deeply rooted and or recent origin." Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," *William and Mary Quarterly* 53 (1996): 453.

[11] As French sociologist Henri Lefebvre argues, spaces "attain 'real' existence by virtue of networks and pathways." Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell

authority, he decided which Natives and non-Natives were allowed to trade and on what terms. More dramatically, Tatoosh deployed his sea power to control the movement of others in and through Makah marine space. In this period, he projected his influence and ability to produce space into the *ča·di·* borderland through his sea power and along networks of trade and kinship.

The arrival of non-Native navigators and traders in the *ča·di·* borderland resulted in clashing perceptions of both terrestrial and marine spaces. On the one hand, Northwest Coast societies rooted their spatial perceptions in locality and historically contested boundaries separating distinct peoples. On the other hand, non-Natives possessed an imaginative geography rooted in distant imperial control.[12] While Tatoosh probably did not understand all the intricacies of the imperial vision, he understood that they were attempting to impose their own rules and control over this indigenous marine borderland. He knew that keeping his leadership status in the borderland depended on the ability to control customary waters while expanding his regional influence and authority. Within this indigenous marine borderland where titleholders competed for influence and authority, he and his followers understood the importance of using power to produce and control social spaces.[13] Traditional narratives assume that a European imperial vision

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Publishing, 1974), 84. For more on the production of space, see also Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, 25th Anniversary Edition ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).

[12] Edward Said explores the topic of colonial "imaginative geographies" through his examination of Orientalism. He argues that the study of the Orient is rooted in an imaginative geography that "legitimates a vocabulary, a universe of representative discourse peculiar to the discussion and understanding of Islam and the Orient" within the dynamic of power that places the Occident – Europe – in a position superior to the Orient. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 71. Although systematic studies of indigenous peoples did not develop for another century under the discipline of anthropology, non-Native navigators and traders who visited the Northwest Coast from the 1770s onward assumed the colonial dynamic of power based on the perception of European superiority.

[13] Perhaps Tatoosh would have understood Lefebvre's argument that a society that fails to produce its own space disappears. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 53.

quickly crushed indigenous visions of space. But the story of the Makah reveals that influential chiefs followed Tatoosh's lead and produced customary marine space long after Meares departed the Strait of Juan de Fuca for good. As we shall see, Makah actions had far-reaching consequences for Europeans and Native peoples in the region.[14]

Distinct Peoples of the *ča·di·* Borderland

Most scholars characterize the Northwest Coast region as a bountiful environment; however, the reality was more complex. Local oceanographic features, seasonal variations, and long-range cycles and fluctuations in marine life made specific places and times richer than others. When non-Natives began sailing into the Pacific Northwest, customary Makah waters off Cape Flattery were among the most abundant of all nearshore microenvironments in the *ča·di·* borderland. This natural wealth of the sea attracted many distinct peoples to the region and helped to ensure that this would be a contested and shared borderland space. By 1788, when Chief Tatoosh confronted Meares and his imperial vision, the Makah leader and his ancestors had already spent generations strengthening their control over these rich waters and transforming them into Makah marine space.

In the *ča·di·* borderland, particular peoples became known by their locations and the natural wealth tied to these places. Prior to the appearance of non-Natives on the

[14] Histories revisiting American Indians in the North American West continue to uncover similar examples of indigenous peoples who are able to control space on their own terms and for much longer than traditional narratives assume. See David F. Arnold, *The Fishermen's Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 13-74; Pekka Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Pekka Hämäläinen, "The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures," *Journal of American History* 90, no. 3 (2003); Richard White, "The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of American History* 65, no. 2 (1978).

Northwest Coast, Makahs already possessed the beginnings of what became their tribal identity in the mid-nineteenth century. They called themselves *q*^{w}*idiččaʔa·tx̌*, "the People of the Cape."[15] Across the strait, Nuu-chah-nulth peoples called them *Kla-iz-zarts*, which means "southerly people." But this name also has the important connotation of "outside, toward the sea," due to their access to oceanic resources such as whales, seals, and halibut, which they considered "outside resources."[16] The S'Klallam, neighbors on the Olympic Peninsula, called them *Makahs*, the name they are known by today. Meaning "generous with food," this term reflects the abundance Makahs could reap from customary waters.[17] The People of the Cape likely earned this name because of the many extravagant feasts they threw, some which lasted for weeks. Oil and whale sinew were among their most important trade goods; they exchanged these commodities with peoples throughout this marine borderland. They were known by non-Makahs for providing both

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[15] Charlotte June Coté, "'It's Who We Are': Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002), 37. The name has been spelled in many different ways. In the mid-nineteenth century, James Swan, the first Anglo schoolmaster at Neah Bay, noted it as Kwe-nēt-che-chat, "the people who live on a point of land projecting into the sea" or "Cape People." Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery," 1.

[16] John Rodgers Jewitt and Hilary Stewart, *The Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt: Captive of Maquinna* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 96. Anthropologist Hilary Stewart clarifies the linguistic details of this name. See also Eugene Y. Arima, *Between Ports Alberni and Renfrew: Notes on West Coast Peoples* (Hull: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1991), 12. This is very similar to what Swell, one Makah, told Swan. He explained that the Nuu-chah-nulth name for them meant "persons living on an island in the sea." James Swan, 29 October 1859, Diary 2, James G. Swan Papers, University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle, WA (hereafter cited as Swan Papers). During the late-eighteenth century, non-Natives came to know Makahs as Classets, what they heard when Nuu-chah-nulth peoples such as the Mowachaht said Kla-iz-zarts. Anthropologist Susan Kenyon references the term "outside resources," and she argues that these belonged to the highest-ranked titleholders in a community. Susan Mary Kenyon, *The Kyuquot Way: A Study of a West Coast (Nootkan) Community* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1980), 35.

[17] Coté, "'It's Who We Are'," 37.

the greatest quantity and highest quality of these goods, and this became a central component of their identity.[18]

When Meares and other non-Natives began arriving in the *ča·di·* borderland, they entered a zone already contested by many ranked leaders, each representing a distinct people and controlling a specific area. In the north section of the borderland, Europeans and Anglo Americans encountered Maquinna, the most powerful leader of the Mowachaht during the maritime fur trade era. In the mid-eighteenth century, Maquinna had begun to unite several villages in Nootka Sound into what scholars have called the Yuquot-Tahsis confederacy. Southeast along the Vancouver Island coastline, non-Native traders encountered Wickaninnish, who had recently consolidated his chiefly authority by conquering villages around Clayoquot Sound.[19] On the southwestern entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca lay the Cape Flattery villages over which the Makah chief Tatoosh held authority. [See Map 1]

As non-Native navigators and traders sailed from one village to another, they crossed indigenous boundaries. These lands and waters were geopolitical spaces over which leaders such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh exercised a type of Northwest Coast indigenous sovereignty. Scholar Joanne Barker argues that "sovereignty is historically contingent" because it is "embedded within specific social relations in which it is invoked and given meaning."[20] In the late-eighteenth century when Meares

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[18] John R. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt, Only Survivor of the Ship Boston, During a Captivity of Nearly Three Years among the Savages of Nootka Sound; with an Account of the Manners, Mode of Living, and Religious Opinions of the Natives* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1824), 107.

[19] Philip Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951), 219-21, 28-31, & 40-42.

[20] Joanne Barker, *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 21. However, Barker (Delaware) and political scientist Taiaiake Alfred (Mohawk) warn that current sovereignty discourse fails to capture the full

and other non-Natives appeared on the scene, Northwest Coast societies rooted sovereignty in chiefly power and authority. Although leadership emanated from lineage-based titleholders, belonging to a high-ranking family did not guarantee that lower-ranked people would respect one's authority. Leaders maintained authority by providing for their people through the management of resources and by challenging outsiders. Chiefs such as Tatoosh produced sovereign spaces, both marine and terrestrial, in this manner.

Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh saw themselves as equals because they were the highest-ranked individuals within their respective societies. They owned local outside resources, such as whales and halibut banks, which were lucrative. The fact that these resources were owned challenges a core assumption of contact narratives, namely the idea that property-oriented Western societies claimed lands and resources that Natives only held in common and did not fully use. From the Northwest Coast perspective, the non-Native vessels laden with trade goods represented new, outside resources for chiefs to own and manage to the advantage of their people.[21] Titleholders took actions to monopolize trade with these ships when in their sovereign waters. From the beginning of his sojourn at Friendly Cove in 1778, Captain Cook and his crew witnessed Maquinna's efforts to control access to the British vessels. When several canoes of "Strangers" arrived in Friendly Cove intending to trade with the British, Maquinna marshaled his

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range of indigenous meanings, perspectives, and identities about law, governance, and culture. See Taiaiake Alfred, "Sovereignty," in *A Companion to American Indian History*, ed. Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 465. Therefore, it is critical to be historically and culturally specific when discussing terms like *sovereignty*.

[21] Similar to drift whales, which chiefs also owned, these vessels came into a chief's waters. Geographer Robert Galois hints at a similar argument in his introduction to James Colnett's journals of his voyages to the Northwest Coast. James Colnett and Robert Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America: The Journals of James Colnett, 1786-89* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 33. Colnett's expedition was the fifth to visit Nootka Sound after Cook.

people to take up arms in defense of his right to monopolize access to the ships.[22] Ten years later, Wickaninnish deployed a number of canoes to capture men from a neighboring village who had visited Meares's *Felice* without the chief's consent. Wickaninnish's warriors dragged one of the "intruders" into the woods where he was executed.[23]

Rival leaders in the *ča·di·* borderland contested these efforts at control. For example, when Meares sailed from Friendly Cove to Wickaninnish's village at Clayoquot, the chief's brothers, Hanna and Detootche, paddled out to the *Felice* and attempted to entice the captain to anchor at their villages instead.[24] Although boundaries separated the sovereign spaces of particular leaders – and indigenous peoples understood these demarcations – in reality, these were fuzzy zones where one person's authority overlapped with another's. These micro-borderlands were sites of shared and contested

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[22] James Cook, J. C. Beaglehole, and R. A. Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 1999), 299. Anthropologist Richard Inglis and archaeologist James Haggarty point out that maritime fur traders only assumed that it was Nootka Sound where Cook anchored and Maquinna and Mowachahts whom he met. Scholars have subsequently followed their lead. Inglis and Haggarty argue that since Cook did not record any specific names, it is impossible to conclusively prove that he was at Nootka Sound in 1778. Richard I. Inglis and James C. Haggarty, "Cook to Jewitt: Three Decades of Change in Nootka Sound," in *Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fur Trade Conference, 1985*, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, et al. ([Montreal]: Lake St. Louis Historical Society, 1985), 214-215. It is also unclear whether the chief Cook met was Maquinna or his father since Tahumasses Indians from another part of Nootka Sound killed the Mowachaht chief's father in 1778. Camille de Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World between the Years 1816-1819, and Trading for Sea Otter Fur on the Northwest Coast of America* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1981), 123. While this is an interesting argument and an important caveat, for the purpose of the current analysis about the *ča·di·* borderland and its peoples, it does not matter whether or not the people Cook encountered were Mowachahts and Maquinna. Throughout this indigenous marine borderland, titleholders such as Maquinna possessed specific rights at controlling access to the fur trade vessels.

[23] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 142.

[24] Ibid., 136. During the first few years of encounters with non-Native traders, Maquinna controlled Nimpkish trader access to Europeans and Anglo Americans. The Nimpkish are a Kwakwaka'wakw group living on the northeast end of Vancouver Island; they traveled to Nootka Sound via overland "grease trails" to trade eulachon oil with Mowachahts. However, by 1790, Nimpkish traders were in direct contact with the Spanish. Daniel W. Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 126.

opportunities, as Native authorities attempted to transform these areas into clearer sovereign spaces. Non-Native vessels sailing through and across these zones heightened indigenous competition in the *ča·di·* borderland.

Tatoosh's confrontation with Meares provides one of the strongest expressions of Northwest Coast sovereignty in the late-eighteenth century. When the Makah chief boarded the *Felice*, he made it clear to the captain – despite the vagaries of translating from *q*^{w}*i·q*^{w}*i·diččaq* (Makah) into English – that they were now in his waters, which differed from Wickaninnish's waters, and that his authority extended a considerable way down the coast. Tatoosh also exercised his authority over his sovereign waters by not allowing his people to trade with Meares's party. Additionally, Tatoosh deployed his sea power of 400 warriors from a number of Cape Flattery villages, to intimidate the British into leaving his marine space. Tatoosh had the strength to curtail imperial efforts at transforming this space into a transportation corridor and trade zone controlled by non-Natives. These actions by Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh reveal some of the dimensions of indigenous Northwest Coast sovereignty at this time and illustrate that these societies thought of themselves as distinct peoples.

Diplomacy in the *ča·di·* Borderland

By the late-eighteenth century, the inhabitants of this borderland had developed some standard protocols for interaction, forms of ceremony and etiquette observed by indigenous diplomats and peoples when engaging in some activity in the spaces of others. For example, borderlanders employed one protocol when entering titleholders' sovereign spaces. Although he provided few details, British trader James Colnett observed the

protocol at work when indigenous outsiders entered Muchalaht waters in Nootka Sound, where he had anchored for several days in July 1787. A non-Muchalaht chief in a large canoe approached the village, stopping "almost out of hearing, & sight of the usual Song & gestures, which are perform'd on their passage when going a visiting."[25] Colnett's comment implies that outsiders performed a standard type of song and set of gestures when coming into the space of another group. Animated speeches were apparently an important component of this protocol. In 1817, the French trader Camille de Roquefeuil observed a "violent speech" Maquinna delivered when a Clayoquot canoe entered Nootka Sound to investigate the arrival of the *Bordelais*.[26] Once the outsiders received permission from the owners of the area, they could approach. If they did not receive permission – indicated by either verbal denial or a violent reaction –they had to beat a hasty retreat.

This protocol was central to the production and maintenance of indigenous space in this region. Through it, indigenous visitors recognized the sovereign authority of the local titleholder. From the perspective of chiefs, they engaged in the protocol to affirm the production of their space, to exercise chiefly responsibilities, and to confront outsiders. When non-Natives entered indigenous spaces in the *ča·di·* borderland, Native leaders used this protocol to frustrate the extension of imperial visions of space.

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[25] Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 105.

[26] Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World between the Years 1816-1819*, 42. Unfortunately, this speech was not translated to the French, so we do not know precisely what Maquinna said. However, the Clayoquots did not trade with the *Bordelais* – during either the 1817 or 1818 season – when it was in Nootka Sound. Instead, they continually offered to pilot the ship to Clayoquot Sound where they would exchange sea otter furs for trade goods. The lateness of the trading season and fear of Wickaninnish kept them from going to Clayoquot. This was only six to seven years after Clayoquots attacked the *Tonquin*. For French fears of Wickaninnish, see p. 119.

Although the historical record has failed to capture the full details of this protocol, oral and archival sources have memorialized adapted versions that indigenous peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland used in several first encounters with Europeans. Sometime in the late eighteenth century, Nanaimis and Tsaxawasip – who history now remembers as Chief Maquinna – spotted an approaching object in the distant ocean off Nootka Sound. They wondered whether it might be an island rising from the ocean. As it grew larger, they saw that it was some kind of watercraft that moved quickly and made great waves. Some thought that its power came from *hah hake to ak*, the lightning snake cast by Thunderbird, and that the supernatural snake must be working underwater to propel the vessel forward with such speed. Because others guessed that it might be an enchanted salmon transformed by magic, one of the canoes that went out to greet it carried Hahatsaik, a woman doctor who had power over all kinds of salmon. Donning a red cedar bark cap and apron, she sang to the unknown watercraft while shaking whalebone rattles with each hand. Tsaxawasip and Nanaimis also approached in their own canoes. They brought with them several fine sea otter skins and discovered that the vessel contained men, not enchanted salmon people. Wearing a fine, gold-braided hat, one of the strangers offered blankets and his hat to the two chiefs, who, in return, gave him the skins they had brought as a gift. Then the people welcomed the newcomers to their village by performing the wolf dance on the beach.[27]

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[27] Ethelbert Olaf Stuart Scholefield and Frederic William Howay, *British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present* (Vancouver: S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1914), 81-82. Recording this oral history told by Nanaimis and Tsaxawasip's descendant Chief George, Scholefield noted that this referred to the coming of Captain Cook. I believe that this account summarizes several Nuu-chah-nulth encounters with Spanish and British vessels. Because the people of Nootka Sound had already encountered the Spanish at least twice before the arrival of Captain Cook, I find it unlikely that they initially mistook the *Resolution* and *Discovery* for transformed salmon. Also, this account only mentions a single vessel. It is not uncommon for indigenous oral histories to collapse periods of time into an event that a non-Native scholar interprets as a single, temporal "moment." Additionally, Scholefield's volume on British Columbia celebrates the

Other versions of first encounters between peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland and Europeans include additional details. In some stories, Mowachaht warriors first approached the ship. They received pilot bread from the captain, a ritual that gave them the impression that these strangers were friendly. The warriors in the canoe kept repeating the Nootkan word *nu·tka·ʔičim* ("noo-tka-eecheem"), telling them to go around the harbor – the strangers misunderstood this to be the name for the place, which was how it became known as Nootka Sound.[28] Another oral account of this first encounter relates that the vessel became stuck when entering the sound. Mowachahts sent a whaling canoe out to direct them around the point. Mistaking the blocks on the masts for skulls, Hesquiats of Vancouver Island believed that the dead crewed these vessels. But they quickly discovered that these strangers were just humans.[29]

Europeans also tell their own stories of first encounters in the *ča·di·* borderland. Off the entrance to Nootka Sound in 1774, several canoes came out to investigate Captain Juan Pérez and his Spanish crew in the *Santiago*. Fray Tomás de la Peña noted that the canoes remained "a musket-shot from the ship," their occupants sometimes crying out in a "mournful tone of voice." The other priest, Fray Juan Crespi, wrote that they seemed to

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perspective of Captain Cook's encounter with the Indians of Nootka Sound as the first significant encounter. So his pro-Anglo perspective could have contributed to the framing of this particular oral history as the Nuu-chah-nulth's encounter with Cook. For more on indigenous oral histories and indigenous temporal perspectives, see Winona Stevenson, "Indigenous Voices, Indigenous Histories, Part I: The Othering of Indigenous History," *Saskatchewan History* 50, no. 2 (1998); Angela Cavender Wilson, "Power of the Spoken Word: Native Oral Traditions in American Indian History," in *Rethinking American Indian History*, ed. Donald Lee Fixico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); Julie Cruikshank, *The Social Life of Stories: Narrative and Knowledge in the Yukon Territory* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Peter Nabokov, *A Forest of Time: American Indian Ways of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[28] Winifred David, a Clayoquot whose grandmother was from Nootka Sound, shared this account. Barbara S. Efrat and W. J. Langlois, "The Contact Period as Recorded by Indian Oral Traditions," *Sound Heritage* 7, no. 1 (1978): 54-55.

be making gestures for the Spaniards to go away. In the morning, the Spaniards found themselves surrounded by fifteen canoes carrying one hundred men and women, and the paddlers appeared to give them advice on good anchorage. Pérez ordered the longboat into the water so it could go ashore in order to take possession of the land. But high winds and rough seas prevented them from entering the sound. In the meantime, the crew aboard the *Santiago* conducted a brisk trade, exchanging clothes, Monterrey shells, and knives for sea otter furs, herring, and clothing made from woven cedar bark. When the weather became too rough and pushed the ship toward a nearby rocky point, Pérez ordered the anchor cut free, and the vessel sailed south away from Nootka Sound.[30]

Captain Cook and his crew left a much more complete and extensive record on their first encounter in the *ča·di·* borderland. When the *Discovery* and *Resolution* entered Nootka Sound on March 29, 1778, more than thirty canoes surrounded them.[31] The first to pull alongside the *Discovery* held an orator who "stood up and held forth a long while." He pointed farther into the inlet, indicating that he wanted them to approach the village and anchor in front of it. Midshipman Edward Riou described the speech as a "harangue," while surgeon David Samwell emphasized the orator's "strange Motions." Afterward, the occupants of the canoes "all sung in a wild Manner, which some of our sailors compared to that of a Brother Tar on board who it seems in his time had cryed Potatoes about London." Then the orator presented his cedar-bark hat and other objects as

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[29] Peter Webster shared this piece of information and expressed his displeasure that all the people of the west coast of Vancouver Island are known by the inaccurate name Nootka. Ibid.: 55 & 59.

[30] For several versions on this encounter, see H. K. Beals, *Juan Pérez on the Northwest Coast: Six Documents of His Expedition in 1774* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1989), 88-90 & 113; George Butler Griffin, Adolph Sutro, and Donald C. Cutter, *The California Coast: a Bilingual Edition of Documents from the Sutro Collection* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 177-83 & 255-61. Peña's quotation of the "mournful tone" is on p. 179.

a gift; in return, he received a large axe, which appeared to make him content. After completing this initial exchange, other Mowachahts then exchanged various articles for iron goods.[32] When non-Mowachahts came to trade with the British during Cook's month-long sojourn in Friendly Cove, the "strangers" repeated similar versions of these performances.

Prior to the arrival of Europeans in the 1770s, these borderlanders did have experience with people from beyond their village communities. They would have understood outsiders as belonging to one of three groups.[33] Local outsiders came from villages within the *ča·di·* borderland, and they knew each other very well through previous networks of trade, kinship, and violence. "Distant outsiders" came from beyond this indigenous marine borderland, yet they too were known – but not as well as fellow borderlanders – from previous interactions. In the late-eighteenth century, some distant outsiders, such as Haidas from the Queen Charlotte Islands of northern British Columbia, had reputations as slave raiders. Paddling their large war canoes down the Inside Passage separating Vancouver Island from the mainland, they struck villages in Puget Sound and the *ča·di·* borderland to capture slaves. Nanaimos kept a watchman on duty to guard

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[31] Cook's vessels made a less-than-impressive entrance into Nootka Sound. As they approached the entrance to the sound, the ships became becalmed; they had to lower all the boats to tow the ship in.

[32] This initial encounter is summarized from Cook's official account, Riou's log, and Samwell's journal. All three are in Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*. Cook's account is on pp. 295-296, with an excerpt from Riou's log in footnote 5 on the same pages; Samwell's version is on p. 1088.

[33] I have organized these conceptual categories for outsiders. The terms *local outsiders* and *distant outsiders* are mine. I simply wanted a way to organize varying degrees of outsiders. These categories also help to explain how Mowachahts' culturally specific perceptions of others shaped their understandings of these encounters. For more on the general encounter process between American Indians and Europeans, see Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., *Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-9. For a more specific look at Cook's encounters in the Pacific, see Anne Salmond, *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: Captain Cook in the South Seas* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

against the raiders. When the lookout spied Haidas paddling south, he alerted his people by beating an old, thin canoe upturned for this purpose.[34] If the raiders headed west into the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Ditidahts lit a signal fire that alerted villages farther west of the approaching danger. Another beacon on Tatoosh Island could warn villages along the west coast of Vancouver Island.[35] Other distant outsiders of this time would have included the Nimpkish Kwakwaka'wakw with whom the Mowachahts traded eulachon oil via overland trails.[36] A third category of outsiders encompassed potentially powerful non-human peoples, denizens of the supernatural world with which Northwest Coast peoples interacted regularly.

When Mowachahts first encountered Pérez and Cook, they knew that they were dealing with outsiders, but they were unsure what kind. Were they distant outsiders from somewhere far away, or were they transformed non-human people? When the first canoes went out, Mowachahts appeared to hedge their bets by sending out a woman with power over salmon people and an orator who could greet them with the proper protocols for human outsiders. Just minutes into these encounters, Mowachahts concluded that the newcomers were not supernatural beings – they were strangers from someplace far from the *ča·di·* borderland. These strangers became a fourth category of outsider, *mamaʔni*,

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[34] Efrat and Langlois, "The Contact Period as Recorded by Indian Oral Traditions," 58.

[35] Pascua Interview 1. Ditidaht oral histories also mention the regional use of signal fires. See Arima, *Between Ports Alberni and Renfrew*, 306. There also appeared to be another beacon at New Dungeness in S'Klallam territory. See Berthold Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald During the Years 1845-1851: Under the Command of Captain Henry Kellett Being a Circumnavigation of the Globe, and Three Cruizes to the Arctic Regions in Search of Sir John Franklin*, 2 vols. (London: Reeve and Co., 1853), 110.

[36] Archibald Menzies and C. F. Newcombe, *Menzies' Journal of Vancouver's Voyage, April to October, 1792* (Victoria: Archives of British Columbia, 1923), 86-88; George Vancouver, *Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), 346.

which means "those living on the water and floating around, like they have no land."[37] Late-eighteenth-century inhabitants of this indigenous marine borderland knew that outsiders – local, distant, *mamaʔni*, and supernatural – fell somewhere along a spectrum of exchange ranging from contestation to sharing. Protocol helped them determine where on the spectrum to situate an unfolding encounter.

By 1787, when Meares's *Felice* sailed into the *ča·di·* borderland, Natives had codified the protocol for greeting *mamaʔni* when Europeans entered indigenous spaces.[38] Maquinna and Callicum, the ranking chiefs of Yuquot, employed this protocol when welcoming the *Felice* to Friendly Cove. The vessel had already been there for three days before the chiefs, who were visiting Wickaninnish when Meares sailed into their waters, made their appearance. They approached the vessel in twelve canoes, each holding eighteen men. The canoes paraded around the ship while the occupants sang "a song of a pleasing though sonorous melody," gestured toward the north and south, and cried out *wacush*, *wacush*, which meant "friends."[39] The two chiefs then came aboard, and one of them likely made a speech. Knowing the rudiments of Northwest Coast protocol, Meares gave the chiefs presents of copper, iron, and several other items. They reciprocated by

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[37] Efrat and Langlois, "The Contact Period as Recorded by Indian Oral Traditions," 60. Indigenous peoples quickly abandoned the idea that these were supernatural or transformed beings for several reasons. First, when they got close enough to the vessels, and once they had been onboard, they saw that the blocks on the masts were not skulls. Second, the brisk trade that arose between Natives and non-Natives indicated that these newcomers were just humans.

[38] Meares would have known what to expect because he had spoken with people who had visited the Northwest Coast previously. He also brought with him one of Barkley's charts and contrived to get the log book of the voyage of the *Imperial Eagle*, which had been in the *ča·di·* borderland the previous year. W. Kaye Lamb, "The Mystery of Mrs. Barkley's Diary: Notes on the Voyage of the 'Imperial Eagle,' 1786-87," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (1942): 31. He also had access to at least one of the journals of James Hanna, the first trader on the Northwest Coast after Cook. W. Kaye Lamb and Tomás Bartroli, "James Hanna and John Henry Cox: The First Maritime Fur Trader and His Sponsor," *British Columbia Studies* 84 (1989-90): 14.

[39] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 112-13.

throwing off their sea-otter garments and presenting them to the British captain. Once they had completed the formal gift exchange, Maquinna allowed Meares to anchor the *Felice* in Mowachaht waters.

Maquinna employed a separate protocol to open formal trade relations with the captain and crew of the *Felice*. Once the vessel anchored off Yuquot, he invited Meares to his longhouse, where he and Callicum initiated an exchange of presents. In front of a "great number of spectators," the two chiefs ceremonially gave the captain some sea otter skins amidst "great shouting and gestures of exultation." The audience quieted when Meares presented the chiefs with his reciprocal gifts. Despite Meares's efforts to conduct a "common barter" between his crew and lower-ranked Mowachahts – and one based on the values of articles exchanged – Maquinna managed the exchanges at Yuquot as one of "reciprocal presents."[40] During the *Felice's* sojourn in Nootka Sound, exchanges were often conducted in the ceremonial manner described above.[41]

When Meares arrived in Clayoquot Sound the following month, he relied upon Wickaninnish's local knowledge of the waters to navigate a safe anchorage. Accompanied by a fleet of canoes, the chief greeted the *Felice* and then boarded the vessel to pilot her into the harbor. As Meares noted, "Wicananish proved an excellent pilot, and was not only indefatigable in his own exertions, but equally attentive to the conduct of his canoes, in their attendance upon us" by helping the larger vessel avoid

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[40] Ibid., 119-20.

[41] Meares and other traders found the notion of reciprocity familiar because it had been a guiding principle in the land fur trade in northeastern North America for more than a century. See Jay Gitlin, "Empires of Trade, Hinterlands of Settlement," in *The Oxford History of the American West*, ed. Clyde A. Milner, Carol A. O'Connor, and Martha A. Sandweiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 104. For a larger view on the political consequences of reciprocity and gifts in fur trade exchanges, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republicans in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

dangerous reefs and submerged rocks.[42] When the *Felice* anchored in front of Clayoquot village, Wickaninnish remained on board while Meares "entertained" him – probably presenting him with small gifts, feeding him, and showing him around the vessel – for most of the day. Meanwhile, many Clayoquots came out to the ship to trade fish, wild onions, and berries for small bits of iron and other items.

The following day, the chief invited them to his longhouse, a structure whose enormous size "astonished" the British guests.[43] Arranged to display his power and authority, Wickaninnish sat at the upper end of the house, surrounded by other high-ranking individuals and chests overhung with bladders of oil and large slices of whale flesh and blubber. Most notably, "Festoons of human skulls, arranged with some attention to uniformity, were disposed in almost every part where they could be placed, and were considered as a very splendid decoration of the royal apartment." The estimated 800 guests were in the midst of "the most luxurious feast we had ever beheld."[44] Wickaninish's brother escorted the British guests to seats near the leader. When the feast ended, Meares presented gifts of blankets and two copper teakettles to the chief, who reciprocated with fifty jet-black sea otter skins. These he gave to Meares with an accompanying speech. After this grand spectacle, Wickaninnish managed the trade of sea otter skins with Meares, whereas he allowed his people to continue exchanging fish, berries, and greens with the crew.

These separate but related protocols conformed to indigenous practices and engaged several distinct audiences for a variety of purposes. In the first protocol on the

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[42] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 137.

[43] Ibid.

water, Maquinna and Wickaninnish demonstrated to Meares that he had entered their sovereign spaces, the waters in front of Yuquot and Clayoquot villages. The fleets of canoes that accompanied these titleholders when they first approached the vessel exhibited the sea power each chief could put on the water, a signal that Meares, a veteran of the Royal Navy, understood. Wickaninnish affirmed that the *Felice* was in his sovereign waters by literally bringing the vessel into his marine space. Piloting the ship also illustrates how, at these crucial moments of contact, indigenous local knowledge trumped the imperial conceit of simply navigating wherever captains ordered their vessels. More importantly, indigenous assistance in navigating unknown waters facilitated imperial processes such as exploration and trade.[45] Through the giving of gifts aboard the ship, Meares thought he had guaranteed Clayoquot compliance with his terms; however, to Northwest Coast chiefs, he seemed to acknowledge their sovereignty, paying for the privilege to anchor in their waters. When Maquinna and Callicum reciprocated by giving the captain their garments – which had a much greater value in both cultures than the gifts the captain had presented – they demonstrated their hospitality, influence, wealth, and chiefly authority. Just like the logic that underlay the Northwest Coast potlatch tradition, titleholders displayed their power by giving away their wealth.

Similar dynamics shaped the second protocol in the longhouse. Unlike the shipboard performances, these occurred in spaces that belonged to Maquinna and

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[44] Ibid., 139.

[45] Others have written about this with respect to the South Pacific. For example, Captain Cook relied upon Tupaia's (Tahitian) knowledge of the South Pacific to navigate through the region. See Ben Finney, "James Cook and the European Discovery of Polynesia," in *From Maps to Metaphors: The Pacific World of George Vancouver*, ed. Robin Fisher and Hugh Johnston (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), 19-34. See also David Turnbull, "Cook and Tupaia, a Tale of Cartographic *Méconnaissance*?," in *Science and Exploration in the Pacific: European Voyages to the Southern Oceans in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Margarette Lincoln (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1998), 117-131.

Wickaninnish. The Clayoquot chief demonstrated his influence and ownership of this space through the prominent display of whale products he had hunted and skulls of warriors he had vanquished. The latter also served to warn visitors about what could happen if they crossed the powerful chief. At Yuquot, the Mowachaht chiefs presented their gifts first, demonstrating to Meares that by the power of their wealth, they held authority in this space. Meares acceded to their authority by reciprocating with gifts of appropriate value. Although the order was reversed in the performance in Wickaninnish's longhouse, the effect was the same. The Clayoquot chief's gift of fifty prime sea otter skins outstripped the blankets and teakettles Meares offered first, thereby demonstrating Wickaninnish's superiority over the British captain, according to the socio-cultural standards of the Northwest Coast. But these performances also targeted an indigenous audience, the lower-ranked Mowachahts, Clayoquots, and any Native borderlanders present. Through these protocol performances, Maquinna and Wickaninnish affirmed their authority over their marine waters, villages, and exchanges with the *mamaʔni*. Most importantly, the chiefs demonstrated to Natives and non-Natives alike their power to control space on their terms.

As described in the beginning of this chapter, Meares's encounter with the Makah chief Tatoosh differed greatly from his interactions with other ranking chiefs in the *ča·di·* borderland. Like Maquinna and Wickaninnish, Tatoosh approached the vessel with his large fleet of canoes and warriors. Unlike the previous two encounters, however, Tatoosh presented a more formidable and antagonistic appearance – his warriors brandished threatening-looking weapons, and the chief himself had blackened his face in a "surly and forbidding" manner. The initial dynamics of this encounter differed, which accounted for

the changed reception that the British trader received. When Meares sailed into Nootka Sound, he had brought with him Comekala, one of Maquinna's brothers who had spent more than a year exploring the Pacific, visiting the Sandwich Islands and China.[46] The inhabitants of Yuquot welcomed Comekala home with an extravagant feast of whale blubber and oil.[47] Meares sailed into Clayoquot Sound on Wickaninnish's express invitation. Conversely, the British trader brought the *Felice* into Tatoosh's sovereign waters with no invitation or beloved relative; instead, Meares arrived after having spent weeks engaged in gift and commercial exchanges with Tatoosh's rivals. Wickaninnish had even warned Meares that Tatoosh and his people were a "subtle and barbarous nation," perhaps attempting to control trade within the *ča·di·* borderland.[48]

When Tatoosh boarded the *Felice*, Meares unknowingly insulted the powerful Makah chief twice. First, he only offered a "small present." Although Tatoosh had not been present at Yuquot or Clayoquot when Meares exchanged gifts with Maquinna and Wickaninnish, Tatoosh had heard about the gifts they had received. Because he ranked as high as Maquinna and Wickaninnish in the *ča·di·* borderland, the trifling present failed to show him the respect he was due. Second, Meares sent his longboat into Tatoosh's waters without having paid for this right as he had done at Friendly Cove and Clayoquot. The British were fortunate that the chief's warriors only harassed them with thefts rather than with a full-fledged attack. The following day, Meares compounded his earlier insults. When Tatoosh and the Makah warriors returned to the *Felice* the next day, they initiated

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[46] Another British vessel, James Hanna's *Sea Otter*, took Comekala across the Pacific in 1786. See Robert Galois, "The Voyages of James Hanna to the Northwest Coast: Two Documents," *British Columbia Studies*, no. 103 (1994): 84-87.

[47] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 109-11.

[48] Ibid., 154.

the basic greeting protocol by singing the welcoming song with which the British were familiar – they had heard the same song at Yuquot and Clayoquot. However, instead of inviting the chief aboard and offering appropriate gifts, the crew unfurled the sails and left. As we will see in the next chapter, this had serious consequences for the crew of the *Felice*.

Trade Networks in the *ča·di·* Borderland

The variable distribution of resources fueled an extensive trade network, one of the defining qualities of the *ča·di·* borderland. This network pre-dated the arrival of non-Natives.[49] Stretching from southeast Alaska to northern California and east to the western foothills of the Rocky Mountains, the core of this trade network centered on three, smaller overlapping regions of exchange.[50] Analyzing the indigenous exchange of slaves, an important trade item during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anthropologist Leland Donald identifies the three trade regions: a northern network, stretching from Vancouver Island northward; a southern nexus focused around the mouth of the Columbia River, dipping south along the Oregon coast and extending north to Cape Flattery; and a third series of connections among the Coastal Salish peoples of Puget

[49] This is consistent with the conclusions of other historians of American Indians. For example, Salisbury argues that "exchanges that linked peoples across geographic, cultural, and linguistic boundaries" were "fundamental to the social and economic patterns" of Indians prior to the arrival of Europeans. Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," 444. For another example of indigenous exchange networks prior to European arrival, see Jack D. Forbes, *Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 1-28. Although Forbes does not explicitly state these connections, the interactions between various indigenous peoples in the Southwest when Spaniards arrive in the region reveal established exchange connections. Historian James Brooks also explores the continental captive exchange complex stretching from the Southwest to the Great Lakes and beyond prior to the advent of Europeans. See Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 14-15.

Sound.[51] These networks of exchange bound indigenous borderlanders together but also provided opportunities for some to control weaker or less-advantaged peoples.

Due to their location midway between the northern and southern networks and at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca that opens to the east into Puget Sound, Makah traders connected these three networks. As Makah historian Greig Arnold describes it, every person or good had to pass Cape Flattery if going up or down the coast or into or out of Puget Sound.[52] Access to larger quantities and a broader range of unique, desirable trade goods enabled Makahs rather than neighboring peoples to dominate these networks. By controlling the nexus of these three trade networks, Makahs controlled space on their own terms prior to the arrival of Europeans.[53] Once they began trading with non-Natives, Makahs leveraged their control over these exchanges to extend Makah marine space at the cost of weaker neighbors.

From the early encounter era through the maritime fur trade (1774-1840s), non-Native captains witnessed a number of exchanges between Makahs and inhabitants of Vancouver Island. Although Cook never recorded the names of any of the "strangers" who came to Friendly Cove to trade with him and his crew, Makahs probably did come to Nootka Sound during the weeks he was there. After having anchored there for two weeks,

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[50] James R. Gibson, "The Maritime Trade of the North Pacific Coast," in *History of Indian-White Relations*, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn, *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), 375-76.

[51] Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 139-64. For a more in-depth examination of the Columbia River slave trade network and how it differed from northern slavery, see Yvonne P. Hajda, "Slavery in the Great Lower Columbia Region," *Ethnohistory* 52, no. 3 (2005).

[52] Greig Arnold, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 14 October 2008, MCRC.

[53] Lefebvre reminds us that the process of producing space through commodities is an uneven one because some spaces possess more advantages than others. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 265. This was true for Makahs – they leveraged their superior location and marine resources to control those who lacked these advantages.

a group of Indians residing to the southeast and outside Nootka Sound arrived to trade. They differed from other Northwest Coast peoples by a scar made across the bridge of the nose, a little below the eyes.[54] Over sixty years later, during the United States Exploring Expedition that visited the Northwest Coast in 1841, Naval Lieutenant Charles Wilkes met George, the ranking Makah chief at Tatoosh Island, who had a similar scar on the bridge of his nose. Wilkes noted that it was a Makah custom to cut the nose when they had caught a whale.[55] So perhaps these scarred "strangers" who came to trade with Cook during his sojourn at Yuquot were Makahs who had heard of the newcomers.

Makah traders were a crucial link connecting the northern and southern trade networks. After Meares had spent nearly a month among the Mowachahts at Friendly Cove, a Makah canoe – yet another "strange canoe" – arrived to trade. These people stood out from the other outsiders who had come to trade because the British crew noticed that one of the Indians had ornamented himself with a metal seal that had once belonged to Mr. Millar, an *Imperial Eagle* crewmember "murdered" by Quilleutes at the mouth of the Hoh River about a year earlier. Although the sailors assumed that these were the perpetrators and believed they must be punished, Maquinna convinced Meares to stay their vengeful hands by explaining that the visitors were traders living north of the Quilleutes and had received the item in exchange from them.[56]

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[54] Cook did not note the scar; however, he did detail that "their old friends" accompanied these newcomers. Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 301. Clerke, the commander of the *Discovery*, and King, the second lieutenant on the *Resolution*, both noted the facial scars. Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 1327 & 400.

[55] Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842*, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845), 486.

[56] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 124.

Overlapping networks of communication brought news of non-Native vessels and the trade opportunities they represented to distant chiefs. Indigenous borderlanders used the same network of signal fires that alerted neighboring communities to the presence of Haida raiders to broadcast news of vessels in the region.[57] Meares's account of his time on the Northwest Coast highlights several incidents that demonstrate the spreading news of trade opportunities. For example, from his village at Clayoquot Sound, Wickaninnish had heard about the British vessel's presence at Yuquot – this was why he came to Yuquot in early June to invite Meares to bring the *Felice* to his village.[58] During his sojourn at Clayoquot, news of their presence brought many visitors from the south – Makahs and other Nuu-chah-nulth groups – who came to trade; however, Wickaninnish would not allow it.

Even as an increasing number of vessels shuttled back and forth between villages, a thriving indigenous exchange between Cape Flattery and Vancouver Island continued throughout the maritime fur trade. For example, the Clayoquot chief Tootiscoosettle visited the crew of the Boston vessel *Columbia Rediviva* in the Strait of Juan de Fuca en route to Tatoosh Island to trade with Makahs in 1791.[59] A year later, Maquinna told the Spanish naturalist José Mariano Moziño that he traded with peoples to the south but never went any farther than Cape Flattery and Neah Bay.[60] That same year, Don Cayetano Valdés, the commander of the *Mexicana*, noted that Chief Tatoosh knew the

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[57] Pascua Interview 1.

[58] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 125.

[59] Frederic William Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 2nd ed. (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), 197.

names of all the English and Spanish captains who had visited the coast, Clayoquot, and Yuquot; additionally, he knew about the other vessels present in the strait even though they had not yet stopped at Cape Flattery.[61] In the early nineteenth century, Makahs were still among the most important traders in the region, providing many slaves, the finest sea otter skins, great quantities of oil, whale sinew, salal cakes, highly ornamented canoes, dentalium shells, red ochre, elk skins, and mica to neighboring peoples.[62]

Networks of exchange also connected Makahs to indigenous peoples in Puget Sound and to those living south along the coast. In 1792, Tatoosh impressed Valdés with his detailed navigation knowledge throughout the entire Strait of Juan de Fuca. The Makah chief also described the entry to Puget Sound and shared with the Spanish accurate information regarding its extent.[63] He had gained this knowledge through trading voyages that he and other Makahs made deep into Puget Sound.[64] Makahs also traveled to the mouth of the Columbia River about two hundred miles away to trade whale

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[60] José Mariano Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka: An Account of Nootka Sound in 1792*, trans. Iris Higbie Wilson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), 64-65.

[61] Josef Espinosa y Tello, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America. Being the Narrative of the Voyage Made in the Year 1792 by the Schooners Sutil and Mexicana to Explore the Strait of Fuca* (London: Argonaut Press, 1930), 34.

[62] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 101-08. Salal is an evergreen perennial native to the Pacific Northwest. Its bland berries were eaten fresh and dried into cakes, an important indigenous trade good in the region.

[63] Espinosa y Tello, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America*, 32-34. Almost four years earlier, Tatoosh had told Charles Duncan, captain of the *Princess Royal*, that *A'aas toopulse* (the Great Sea) extended east, where it branched north and south, running inland a considerable distance. Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 404.

[64] Peter Eggers, an Anglo American who lived at Neah Bay at the end of the nineteenth century, noted that Makahs paddled in their "big canoes" to trade dried halibut for clams and spring salmon with the Puyallups near Tacoma. He also detailed Makah trips to Squaxin Island, located at the farthest extent of Puget Sound's inland extension, to trade for clams that the Squaxins specifically dried for trade with them. The impression from this source is that these were regular trade excursions that had occurred for generations. Eggers to Roger Chute, 27 July 1936, MCRC photocopy from original in Ms 15/58, Box 4, Roger Chute Collection, Washington State Historical Society Archives (WSHSA), Tacoma, WA.

products and canoes with Chehalis and Chinook Indians.[65] In addition to making canoes, Makahs purchased many from Nuu-chah-nulth villages on Vancouver Island. They kept the new ones and sold the used ones to people farther south after chiseling off old wood to make them look better.[66] As today's Makah recall, "the ocean was a big highway" used by their ancestors to connect regional trade networks.[67]

Access to valued trade goods such as whale products and halibut from customary waters allowed Makahs to dominate the exchange of other important goods, such as slaves. Makahs connected several smaller indigenous slave-trade networks into one larger regional one.[68] John Jewitt, the famous captive enslaved by Maquinna when the Mowachaht chief annihilated the crew of the *Boston* in 1803, noticed that Makah traders were the top suppliers of slaves to many Nuu-chah-nulth communities on Vancouver Island.[69] In 1825, Dr. John Scouler met Makahs who told him that they took many northern slaves to Indian peoples in the south.[70] Their success as middlemen positioned them to become a critical component in expanding commercial markets in the Pacific from the late-eighteenth century on.

Already in place when non-Native maritime fur traders came to the region, an efficient and wide-ranging indigenous trade network fueled those traders' hopes of quick

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[65] Pascua interview 1.

[66] James Swan, "The Coast Tribes of Washington Territory," *Puget Sound Herald* (Steilacoom, W.T.) 10 February 1860, Folder 205: Swan, James G. "Historical and Miscellaneous Articles Contributed by James G. Swan Esq." Clippings of articles published in Port Townsend […]/1859-63, Stenzel Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Beinecke), Yale University, New Haven, CT.

[67] Arnold Interview.

[68] Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America*, 141. For more on the importance of slaves to Northwest Coast societies, see the rest of Donald's book.

[69] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 107. Maquinna's seizure of the *Boston* and Jewitt's period as the Mowachaht's "white slave" is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

and easy profits. Russian *promyshlenniki*, entrepreneurs who combined hunting and trapping with trading, had worked the far northern portion of the Northwest Coast since 1743, but the global exchange in furs did not penetrate into the *ča·di·* borderland until the 1770s.[71] The Spanish expeditions of 1774 and 1775 collected some sea otter skins, but their primary purpose was to extend their imperial claims farther along the North American coast to prevent Russian intrusions from the north.[72] Historians traditionally credit Captain Cook's third voyage in the Pacific as establishing the true commercial potential of the maritime fur trade, citing the oft-quoted example of a broken metal belt buckle that a midshipmen traded for a sea otter skin that he sold for $300 in China.[73] During the weeks that Cook's *Resolution* and *Discovery* spent at Friendly Cove, the indigenous trade network brought canoes of "strangers" from outside Nootka Sound to exchange sea otter skins for European trade goods. The enormous bounty of "soft gold," which Indians brought to non-Indians, gave the impression that all traders needed to do was to anchor in front of a village to receive such valuable goods for mere trifles.[74]

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[70] John Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America (1824-25-26)," *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* 6 (1905): 195-96.

[71] For more on *promyshlenniki* activities in North America, see A. V. Grinev, *The Tlingit Indians in Russian America, 1741-1867* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 91-106, Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 446-454; James R. Gibson, "A Notable Absence: The Lateness and Lameness of Russian Discovery and Exploration in the North Pacific, 1693-1803," in *From Maps to Metaphors*, 85-103.

[72] Beals, *Juan Pérez on the Northwest Coast*; Bruno de Hezeta and H. K. Beals, *For Honor & Country: The Diary of Bruno De Hezeta*, North Pacific Studies (Portland: Western Imprints, 1985).

[73] Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 302-03.

[74] Geographer Daniel Clayton accurately characterizes the maritime fur trade as a "geography of capital." He writes, "[T]raders' accounts of commercial interaction were bound up with the way they imaged and produced space commercially. The economy of the maritime fur trade… was… an *imaginative space* stocked with commercial desire and cultural derision, where actions, meanings, and imputations tarried uneasily in different places and at a number of geographical scales." Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 76-77.

Bostonians came to dominate the trade by the turn of the century, despite the fifty-year lead Russians had at the time. The Russian method of setting exchange prices in distant St. Petersburg meant that they could not respond quickly enough or competitively to British and U.S. captains who could adjust prices on the spot. The resolution of the Nootka Sound Controversy in the 1790s removed Spain as an imperial competitor in the region. British traders faced their own economic impediments. They had to work within the confines of two monopolies, purchasing privileges from the South Sea Company to gain permission to get furs in the Pacific and paying the East India Company for the ability to sell furs in Canton. Additionally, the former would not allow maritime fur traders to export Chinese goods to England, thereby cutting them out of another profitable leg of the England-Northwest Coast-China global trade circuit. This arrangement gave a significant commercial advantage to U.S. maritime traders, who were drawn into the Pacific by John Ledyard's reports of the lucrative commerce found along this coast. As a corporal of marines on the *Resolution*, Ledyard had accompanied Cook and had tried to persuade New England shipowners and merchants to invest in this commercial enterprise since 1783.[75]

When Robert Gray and John Kendrick, commanders of the Boston vessels *Columbia Rediviva* and *Lady Washington*, arrived on the Northwest Coast midsummer 1788 shortly after Meares, they found a trade into which they could insert themselves.

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[75] For more on John Ledyard, see Edward G. Gray, *The Making of John Ledyard: Empire and Ambition in the Life of an Early American Traveler* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). For a more complete narrative on the maritime fur trade, see Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 1-23; James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1758-1841* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992); Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 67-161. For a visual and material record of maritime fur trade exchanges, see Thomas Vaughan and Bill Holm, *Soft Gold: The Fur Trade & Cultural Exchange on the Northwest Coast of America*, 2nd ed. (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990).

Experienced Indian traders were eager to exchange furs for their goods. More importantly, Kendrick and Gray encountered an efficient indigenous trade network that funneled skins to a handful of key chiefs, who, in turn, managed the exchanges with non-Native traders. For example, while trading with Wickaninnish, they discovered that he had already collected skins from more remote villages inland and elsewhere on the coast. Similarly, in their first exchange with Tatoosh the following spring, they found that he had bought all the skins from neighboring peoples.[76] But perhaps the Northwest Coast indigenous trade network was too efficient. When Gray brought his furs to Canton after stopping at the Sandwich Islands, he received a lower price than expected because British traders, fresh from the Northwest Coast, had already flooded the market with furs.

The efficiency of the trade network also facilitated the near extinction of sea otters as skilled indigenous hunters exacted a lethal toll. Some places rapidly became destitute of these sea mammals. For example, Spaniards noted that by 1792, sea otters were "scarce" in Nootka Sound.[77] From 1788 to 1826, American ships made at least 127 voyages from the U.S. to China via the Northwest Coast as part of the maritime fur trade.[78] Filling the cargo holds of so many vessels with the skins of *Enhydra lutris* year after year nearly drove the species extinct.

From the beginning of the maritime fur trade, non-Native articles were desired goods for exchange among Northwest Coast societies. In 1774, when several canoes of

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[76] Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 45 & 72.

[77] Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka. English*, 48.

[78] Kenneth Scott Latourette, *Voyages of American Ships to China, 1784-1844* (New Haven: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1927), 255-61. Latourette noted that one source identified another eight vessels that came to the Northwest Coast from 1819 to 1825, but it is not known whether they continued on to Canton, which was likely. In the introduction to his lists, he also noted that these are "avowedly incomplete" due to imperfect archival records from the period.

inhabitants from Nootka Sound paddled into the ocean to trade with the Spanish explorer Juan Pérez, the first European to venture into the *ča·di·* borderland, they exchanged sea otter skins, herring, and garments made from woven cedar bark for knives, clothing, and abalone shells from Monterrey.[79] Four years later, when Cook spent a month anchored off Yuquot, Maquinna's village at Friendly Cove in Nootka Sound, Indians rejected beads and cloth offered by the British, instead trading a wealth of sea otter skins for metal items, including knives, chisels, buttons, nails, and pieces of iron and tin. Northwest Coast peoples desired metal tools because they could be used to carve cedar canoes, make planks for longhouses, and craft artwork. They desired smaller pieces of metal to use as decorative items, wearing some as jewelry and incorporating others into clothing and art. As Cook noted, "before we left the place, hardly a bit of brass was left in the Ship, except what was in the necessary instruments."[80] Already consummate traders rich in material goods, indigenous borderlanders desired new exchange items. However, they had specific wants, which changed over time and from one village to the next.

In 1788, Meares traded a wide range of items with numerous inhabitants of this indigenous marine borderland. In addition to the usual metal goods, he traded blankets, which would become a mainstay in Pacific Northwest exchanges for more than a century afterward. Meares also purchased indigenous labor, which he paid for daily with iron beads. These laborers supplemented the work of his Chinese carpenters who built a fortified post at Yuquot and the *North West America*, the first non-Native vessel constructed in the Pacific Northwest. As Meares departed Nootka Sound for China,

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[79] Beals, *Juan Pérez on the Northwest Coast.*

[80] Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 302.

Callicum, a Mowachaht leader second only to Maquinna, asked him to bring shoes, stockings, hats, and other European clothing when he next visited.[81]

But the most desired goods that Meares made available to Maquinna and Wickaninnish were weapons, including swords, firearms, and ammunition. These chiefs employed the new weapons in their campaigns against neighboring peoples. For example, in August 1788, Maquinna and Callicum filled twenty of their larger canoes with warriors armed with muskets – on loan from Meares – and set out to strike a village about twenty leagues up the coast. More than two weeks later, they returned victorious with a "great booty of sea-otter skins" and baskets full of the heads of thirty of their enemies.[82] Wickaninnish often withheld furs unless traders offered muskets for exchange.[83] His strategy worked: in 1792, the American trader John Kendrick exchanged 200 muskets, powder, and shot to the Clayoquot chief for his supply of furs.[84]

Those muskets probably brought Wickaninnish some victories. Muzzle-loaded muskets were notoriously inaccurate and commonly misfired, but their lethal force worked best when employed in large volleys. Shortly after gaining the firearms from Kendrick, the Clayoquot chief used them to drive away the British vessel *Butterworth* after its crew had stolen some furs.[85] But when these weapons were not used in a coordinated volley, they were no more effective than indigenous arrows, harpoons, and

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[81] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 217.

[82] Ibid., 196-209. Maquinna traded some of these skins for more firearms from Meares.

[83] Robert Haswell, second mate on Robert Gray's *Lady Washington*, complained that in January of 1789, they were only able to trade a few skins with Wickaninnish because he demanded muskets instead of the iron chisels that they offered. Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 56.

[84] Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka. English*, 71. Kendrick also provided Maquinna with a swivel gun.

clubs. This became evident when Meares's first officer, Robert Duffin, ordered the crew of the longboat to defend themselves from the attacking Makah and Pacheedaht warriors. In this incident, the attackers were not intimidated because the firearms failed to harm a significant number of Indians.[86]

What eighteenth-century firearms lacked in lethality, they made up for in cultural significance among indigenous peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland. Northwest Coast peoples believed that the supernatural being Thunderbird caused thunder and lightning, and that he employed them when whaling. They likely believed that firearms harnessed the supernatural powers of this being and bestowed them upon one carrying these weapons. This explains why Wickaninnish, a whaling chief, desired his own brace of pistols; perhaps this was also an unstated desire of Tatoosh, a rival whaling chief, which helps to explain why Meares's trifling present had angered him – it was not a pair of pistols. Moreover, possession of firearms signified to a chief's enemies that he had direct access to European goods. This heightened the influence of a leader and displayed to his rivals that his trade connections made him a more powerful leader than others in the *ča·di·* borderland.

Northwest Coast chiefs also desired other status items that could be employed to a military advantage. For example, Wickaninnish endeavored to purchase a non-Native vessel. In 1793, he struck a deal with Josiah Roberts, commander of a two-ship expedition to the Northwest Coast, to purchase the smaller of his two vessels, the ninety-

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[85] Frederic William Howay, "The Voyage of the Hope, 1790-1792," *Washington Historical Quarterly* XI, no. 1 (1920): 26.

[86] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 177. Due to the chaos of the attack and limited number of men Duffin had, it appears that they only had the opportunity to discharge their firearms singly rather than in a coordinated volley.

ton *Resolution*, for fifty prime sea otter skins.[87] Three years later, when the American Charles Bishop declined Wickaninnish's offer to exchange his *Ruby* for an entire cargo of furs, the chief gave Bishop a significant amount of furs to purchase in advance a ship fifty-four feet long with six carriage guns and a schooner rigged with a gig whaleboat.[88] Like the possession of firearms, owning a vessel would have indicated to Wickaninnish's rivals his stronger ties with and better access to European traders.

After the confrontation with Meares, Tatoosh courted other traders who came into Makah marine space. A month after Tatoosh had intimidated Meares into fleeing Makah marine space, the chief spent three days exchanging all the skins he had with Charles Duncan, the British captain of the *Princess Royal*. Already positioning himself as the preeminent trader of the strait, the chief told Duncan that the Makah were the only people in the area who had anything worth trading.[89] Tatoosh had previously secured most of the sea otter skins from weaker neighbors, such as S'Klallams, Quilleutes, and Pacheedahts.

Although Duncan had easy success with Tatoosh, subsequent traders left Makah waters in frustration because he would not simply exchange all his furs for whatever they offered. In April 1789, Robert Haswell, second mate on the American vessel *Lady Washington*, complained about only getting thirty furs from Tatoosh because they lacked enough iron chisels, the sole item the Makah chief wanted at that time. After the *Lady Washington* had exhausted its supply of chisels, Makahs paddled off, taking their other seventy furs with them to save for trading with another vessel. Compounding the Anglo

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[87] However, Roberts reneged on the deal. Instead of turning the schooner over to Wickaninnish, he sent her south to trade at the Columbia River. Frederic William Howay, "A Yankee Trader on the Northwest Coast, 1791-1795," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (1930): 87.

[88] Valerie L. Mathes, "Wickaninnish, a Vancouver Island Chieftain: His Life as Told by Foreign Visitors"" (University of New Mexico, 1965), 76-79.

[89] Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 404.

traders' disappointment was the fact that no other furs could be found in the strait since Tatoosh had already collected them from neighboring peoples.[90] Similarly, when traders failed to offer competitive prices, Tatoosh would only allow his people to trade a handful of furs, knowing that he could get a better price from another vessel.[91] With so many traders frequenting the coast, Tatoosh and other indigenous leaders could afford to wait.

Once they received non-Native goods in exchange for furs, Northwest Coast leaders circulated them both within their communities and to neighboring peoples. Meares saw Wickaninnish turn over to his brothers Hanna and Detootche two prized copper teakettles he had given the Clayoquot chief two weeks earlier. Wickaninnish did this in exchange for their furs, which he then traded to Meares for more goods, including firearms, powder, and shot.[92] During his brief encounter with Tatoosh off Cape Flattery, Meares and his crew saw a Makah in "possession of a complete set of coat buttons, which was very familiar to the memory of us all."[93] This individual could have only received them in exchange from someone on Vancouver Island.

In addition to trading these new goods within the *ča·di·* borderland, Northwest Coast peoples used them as important gifts. Meares noted that "[Wickaninnish] had lately given a splendid feast to a large number of his principal subjects; and from the great quantity of those articles he had received from us... there was every reason to suppose that he had added to the splendour of his banquet, by dividing his treasures among those

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[90] Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 72 & 81.

[91] This was the experience of the *Columbia Rediviva* in 1791. Ibid., 197.

[92] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 146-47.

[93] Ibid., 155.

who had the honour of being invited to it."[94] Donald is probably correct when he concludes that by the early nineteenth century, every chief needed to include non-Native goods among the gifts given away at a potlatch.[95] In 1803, Maquinna held a potlatch to commemorate a new name, Sat-sat-sok-sis, for his favorite son. The chief gave away a significant amount of the plunder he had taken from the *Boston*, including 100 muskets, 100 mirrors, 400 yards of cloth, and 20 casks of powder.[96] By the nineteenth century, chiefs also began incorporating European goods into indigenous funerals. For example, after the death of his nephew, Maquinna burned ten fathoms of cloth and buried him with a combination of Native and non-Native goods.[97]

Although manufactured items became important within Northwest Coast cultures, they did not replace indigenous trade goods.[98] Some maritime fur traders became important transporters of indigenous trade goods within and beyond the *ča·di·* borderland. For example, when the Boston trader Josiah Roberts wintered his vessel, the *Jefferson*, in Barkley Sound in 1793-94, he collected 160 fathoms of dentalium (used as currency throughout the Northwest Coast) and 210 moose skins from various indigenous peoples.[99] He knew that Indians along the Columbia River would trade sea otter skins for dentalium, while Haidas in the Queen Charlottes wanted moose skins to use as armor. Well into the

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[94] Ibid., 175.

[95] Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America*, 232.

[96] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 48. One could perhaps argue that this also motivated Maquinna's attack on the *Boston*. By the turn of the century, European and Anglo American traders could only find a few furs in Nootka Sound. This likely resulted in a decline in goods that Maquinna could get through trade. So perhaps he attacked the *Boston* to secure enough non-Native goods to throw an extravagant potlatch for his son.

[97] Ibid., 147.

[98] This is an example of what Salisbury recognized, that American Indians "interacted with [Europeans] and their materials in ways that were consistent with their own customs and beliefs." Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," 453.

twentieth century, whale oil, varieties of dried seafood, cedar logs and products, and other customary items continued to circulate throughout the region.

In the *ča·di·* borderland of the late-eighteenth century, a handful of indigenous leaders – Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh – used their control over local trade networks to produce space on their own terms. All three were titleholders in areas that possessed unique advantages over other places. This enabled them to exercise their power over larger spatial areas than others. In Tatoosh's case, he held sovereignty over the strategically located Cape Flattery and Tatoosh Island and owned a wealth of valuable marine resources. These advantages enabled him to gather furs from neighboring peoples with fewer resources. Once he had their furs, he limited their access to non-Native vessels and trade goods. But he also limited non-Native access to other peoples in the *ča·di·* borderland. Because he had a bulk of the furs in the region, there was little reason for them to engage or trade with other peoples. Additionally, by holding such a large volume of furs, he could manipulate the terms of trade, holding out for better prices and desired items. After exchanging furs for non-Native goods, he possessed a wealth of trade articles that he could spread throughout the *ča·di·* borderland in order to gather even more furs. In this way, Tatoosh quickly came to monopolize the fur trade in an extensive portion of this indigenous marine borderland. He controlled it to strengthen his authority and influence in the region and to extend Makah marine space deeper into the Strait of Juan de Fuca and south along the coast.[100]

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[99] Howay, "A Yankee Trader on the Northwest Coast, 1791-1795," 88.

[100] Lefebvre argues that "paths are more important than the traffic they bear" because of the values that people ascribe to these paths. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 118. On the one hand, Lefebvre is correct – Tatoosh used trade networks to extend his authority and influence. Yet he was able to do this only because Natives and non-Natives desired these goods.

Kinship Networks of the *ča·di·* Borderland

While trade networks created a web connecting borderland peoples and communities of the late-eighteenth century Northwest Coast, a network of kinship knitted them together in more intimate ways. Influential leaders such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh drew upon kin networks to frustrate and resist the imperial efforts of newcomers. Non-Natives noticed kinship ties most readily among the upper ranks of the indigenous peoples they encountered. Members of families at the top of the social hierarchy married similarly ranked individuals from neighboring villages and even from other ethnolinguistic areas. Thus, when he traded along the west coast of Vancouver Island in 1787, the British trader Charles Barkley found that most of the chiefs were related.[101]

The Clayoquot chief Wickaninnish exemplified these connections. One of his sisters was married to a Makah. When her husband died, Tootoocheeticus, one of Wickaninnish's brothers, adopted her Makah son and brought him to Clayoquot.[102] Similarly, after the chief's twelve-year-old son took his adult name and earned the right to head his own whaling canoe, Wickaninnish betrothed him to Maquinna's daughter, the Mowachaht leader's oldest child. Although this betrothal nearly resulted in violence a year later, when Maquinna stalled on surrendering his daughter to the Clayoquot chief,

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[101] The London merchant Richard Cadman Etches shared Barkley's impressions of his voyage along the Northwest Coast with Sir Joseph Banks in a letter dated July 20, 1788. Frederic William Howay, "Four Letters from Richard Cadman Etches to Sir Joseph Banks, 1788-92," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (1942): 135.

[102] Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 266-67.

tensions appear to have abated afterward.[103] During his time as one of Maquinna's slaves, Jewitt noted that his master's favorite wife was a "Wickininnish princess."[104]

Common peoples also married across boundaries in the *ča·di·* borderland. The extant, sparse observations about Northwest Coast family networks in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries only provide a glimpse of families at the top of the social hierarchy.[105] While traditional archival materials fail to note family networks among commoners, Makah and Nuu-chah-nulth oral histories recall a long history of marriage ties connecting the villages of Cape Flattery to communities on the Olympic Peninsula, south to the mouth of the Columbia River, and north across the strait.[106] As historian Alexandra Harmon argues, a broad web of family ties within communities and across the region meant that individuals' group affiliations were multifaceted, a borderland characteristic that explorers, traders, and later colonial officials – British and U.S. – had difficulty understanding.[107] With the great number of distinct peoples and their associated customs and languages in the Northwest Coast, those who married into other

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[103] For information on the naming ceremony of Wickaninnish's son, see Ibid., 262. Vancouver provided details on the conflict between Wickaninnish and Maquinna over the betrothal of their children. George Vancouver, *A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World, 1791-1795: With an Introduction and Appendices*, Vol. 2 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1984), 254.

[104] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 81. Historian Valerie Mathes concludes that this was one of Maquinna's sisters. See Mathes, "Wickaninnish", 17. Perhaps this was the same sister who had been widowed when her Makah husband died in the 1780s. It was not uncommon for women to remarry after a husband died or after leaving a spouse.

[105] Europeans observed Natives and their cultures, but to give themselves an advantage with commercial dealings rather than to record complete, ethnographic snapshots of Northwest Coast cultures. Ethnographic observations of Northwest Coast peoples began appearing later in the nineteenth century. See Barry Alan Joyce, *The Shaping of American Ethnography: The Wilkes Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).

[106] Ed Claplanhoo, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 13 October 2008, MCRC; Pascua Interview 1. There is an account of one individual, T a:y'o:ch, who was part Makah and part Ditidaht. See the oral history as recorded in Arima, *Between Ports Alberni and Renfrew*, 303-04.

[107] Alexandra Harmon, *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 8.

communities played central roles as intermediaries in the indigenous borderland.[108] These individuals often spoke several languages and traveled regularly between their new homes and natal villages.

In an effort to strengthen their influence in the region, titleholders occasionally extended kinship ties to non-Native traders. Some chiefs attempted to tie European traders to them in more intimate ways by exchanging names. For example, during one of James Hanna's two voyages to the Northwest Coast in the 1780s, the Clayoquot chief Cleaskinah – one of Wickaninnish's brothers – exchanged names with the British trader, and the chief promised to save all his furs for him.[109] Cleaskinah shows up in the accounts of subsequent traders as Chief Hanna, a familiar identity that he presented to encourage trade.

Meares also experienced an event that was probably a name exchange ceremony. Before leaving Friendly Cove, Maquinna honored him with a special ceremony witnessed by many of his people:

> Maquilla [Maquinna] thought proper... to do obedience to us as his lords and sovereigns. He took off his tiara of feathers, and placed it on my head; he then dressed me in his robe of otter skins; and, thus arrayed, he made me sit down on one of his chests filled with human bones, and then placed himself on the ground. His example was followed by all the natives present, when they sung one of those plaintive songs, which we have already mentioned as producing such a solemn and pleasing effect upon our minds. — Such were the forms by which he intended to acknowledge, in the preference of his people, our superiority over him.[110]

Meares interpreted the Mowachaht chief's action as an acknowledgement of Meares's sovereignty over them, but it appears to have been an adapted ceremony that extended

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[108] Although he focuses on captives, historian James Brooks makes a similar case for the southwest colonial borderland. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins.*

[109] Galois, "The Voyages of James Hanna to the Northwest Coast." See also Lamb and Bartroli, "James Hanna and John Henry Cox: The First Maritime Fur Trader and His Sponsor," 12-13. Lamb and Bartroli refer to Cleaskinah and Cheaskinah.

some of Maquinna's titleholder privileges to the British trader. Maquinna dressed Meares in robes only worn by ranking chiefs and sat the captain on a chest that held the skulls of prominent Mowachaht whalers.[111] By doing this in front of other Mowachahts, Maquinna demonstrated that he had tied Meares to him through kinship.[112] A similar desire to create familial connections lay behind Wickaninnish's request for Meares to take the chief's nineteen-year-old son with him when he left the Northwest Coast.[113]

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the few non-Natives who lived among indigenous peoples in the *ča·di·* borderland benefited from attempts to anchor them to specific families through kinship. However, the quality of their experience derived from their ability to meet the expectations of indigenous leaders. At the end of the summer trading season in 1786, British trader James Strange departed the Northwest Coast, leaving behind the ship's surgeon, John Mackay. Strange intended to return the following spring, and Mackay volunteered to stay behind in order to gain a more intimate knowledge of Mowachahts. The trader ordered the Irish surgeon to commit "to Paper every Occurrence, however trivial, which might serve to throw light on our

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[110] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 216-17.

[111] Meares inaccurately believed that these skulls and bones were those of individuals who had fallen prey to Maquinna's cannibal appetite. Instead, these were talismans of power that strengthened Maquinna's whaling prowess. Bones of prominent whalers figured in ritual preparations made by Northwest Coast whalers. See Vincent Aloysius Koppert, "Contributions to Clayoquot Ethnology" (Thesis (Ph.D.), The Catholic University of America, 1930), 56.

[112] Meares would have had substantial reasons to argue that Maquinna acknowledged British sovereignty over him and his tribe. In general terms, this would have fit with Meares's worldview, which characterized indigenous peoples as inferiors. More specifically, though, Maquinna's expression of submission had important geopolitical ramifications in the subsequent Nootka Sound Controversy. If Maquinna had submitted to Meares and King George, then Britain's claim to Nootka Sound would be stronger than that of the Spanish empire.

[113] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 205. Meares declined the offer, despite the youth's "amiable and docile disposition" and his appearance to be "very quick and sagacious." The captain felt that his presence would give the crew anxiety, an effect

hitherto confined knowledge of the Manners, Customs, Religion, & Government of these people."[114] He felt that Mackay's knowledge would give him an edge on other traders the next year.

Maquinna offered to take the surgeon into his family, even promising him a wife.[115] The chief vowed to feed him so well that Mackay would become "as fat as a Whale."[116] Mackay had already gained the Mowachaht chief's respect when he had cured one of his children of scabby hands and legs, a complaint common among children of Nootka Sound.[117] Captain Strange supplied Mackay with presents so he could continue to exert influence over his indigenous hosts by giving gifts. The surgeon also received seeds for a garden and a pair of goats. As the Mowachahts watched, the Irishman sowed the seeds. The captain hoped Mackay's cultivation of the soil and livestock would bolster Strange's claim to Yuquot.[118] More importantly, Strange honored Maquinna's request of arming the surgeon with a musket, pistol, and 200 rounds of ammunition. Maquinna

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they felt even with Tianna, a respected Sandwich Islands prince who had accompanied them on the entire voyage.

[114] James Strange, *James Strange's Journal and Narrative of the Commercial Expedition from Bombay to the Northwest Coast of America* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1982), 79.

[115] Alexander Walker, Robin Fisher, and J. M. Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1982), 69.

[116] Strange, *James Strange's Journal and Narrative of the Commercial Expedition from Bombay to the Northwest Coast of America*, 78.

[117] This affliction was probably impetigo, a bacterial infection encountered in children. This was probably a common complaint because impetigo could have been easily transmitted in the close quarters of the longhouses in which Northwest Coast peoples lived. For more on impetigo, see Charles Bryon, "Infections of the Skin and Its Appendages, Muscles, Bones, and Joints," in *Microbiology and Immunology On-Line*, ed. Richard Hunt (Columbia: Board of Trustees of the University of South Carolina, 2007) available online at http://pathmicro.med.sc.edu/ Infectious%20Disease/Skin%20Bone.htm [accessed July 2009].

[118] Walker, Fisher, and Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786*, 70. As Patricia Seed has argued, Englishmen established their claim to land in North America by planting gardens. Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession: Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 16-40. However, Mowachahts would have interpreted Mackay's actions very differently. They probably saw his labor as the actions of a slave, so perhaps this was ironically the beginning of his loss of status.

expected the Irishman, like any other member of his family, to fight his enemies.[119] To complete Mackay's "Warlike appearance," Maquinna requested that he be given a red coat to wear, explaining that this color would intimidate enemies.[120] When the chief offered to incorporate the surgeon into his family, he had expected to gain someone who would strengthen his influence over rivals on his borders.

But Mackay apparently spent a rather unsuccessful fourteen months as a member of Maquinna's family because he failed to meet the leader's expectations.[121] Just days after Strange's departure, Maquinna held a potlatch in Mackay's honor. Several hundred guests from neighboring tribes attended the feast, and the Mowachaht chief displayed his newest relative. Probably dressed in his red coat, Mackay displayed – and likely gave away, at the chief's urging – the rich presents he possessed. Maquinna also cajoled the surgeon into demonstrating his musket, which failed to impress when he missed his target. To impress his guests, Maquinna urged the surgeon to disassemble the musket to reveal its power. Unfortunately for the young Irishman, he allowed the musket's springs and screws to be passed around, and these were never recovered. He effectively disarmed himself and nullified his most significant advantage as a member of Maquinna's family.[122]

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[119] Walker, Fisher, and Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786*, 71.

[120] Strange, *James Strange's Journal and Narrative of the Commercial Expedition from Bombay to the Northwest Coast of America*, 80-81. Many societies in this indigenous borderland rubbed themselves with a red ochre when they went to war.

[121] Except where noted, these details on Mackay's sojourn among the Mowachaht is summarized from Alexander Walker's debriefing of the surgeon in Bombay in 1788, after Barkley had taken him away from Yuquot. Walker, Fisher, and Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786*, 177-85.

[122] As surmised by Alexander Walker, a military commander employed by the East India Company who had debriefed Mackay upon his return to Bombay, "[Mackay], by an Act of the greatest indiscretion, in this manner disarmed himself. Deprived of this powerful Weapon of respect and defence, he became less

Despite this setback, Mackay refused to leave Yuquot when James Hanna visited Nootka Sound a month after Strange's departure and offered to take the surgeon back across the Pacific.[123] When Hanna threatened to take Mackay away by force because he resented the advantage the Irishman would give to Strange, Maquinna and his Mowachaht warriors warned the British trader that they would resist.[124] At this point, they still valued Mackay's presence and believed that it would come to some advantage in the future.

However, the Irishman's situation worsened. After the botched musket demonstration, Maquinna refused to give Mackay a wife. The goats starved to death that winter. Even worse, Mackay lost Maquinna's friendship, and the chief expelled him from his longhouse.[125] As an outcast, the Irishman suffered at the hands of other Mowachahts. Although he attempted to keep the journal that Strange had requested, Callicum destroyed his writing materials. Northwest Coast peoples believed that written materials possessed supernatural powers and could cause sickness and even death.[126] Mackay traded his remaining clothes for food and stayed alive only through handouts.

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formidable, and less secure. He was no longer able to assist the Savages as they expected, against their Enemies, and in their projects for revenge, which it was too evident they had in view by his stay amongst them." Ibid., 180.

[123] Galois, "The Voyages of James Hanna to the Northwest Coast," 87. He allegedly told the British trader that "he began to relish dried fish and whale oil, was satisfied with his way of life, and perfectly contented to stay 'till next year." William Beresford, *A Voyage Round the World; but More Particularly to the North-West Coast of America: Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788, in the King George and Queen Charlotte, Captains Portlock and Dixon*, Second edition ed. (London: n.p., 1789), 232. Perhaps he still hoped to accomplish the directives with which Strange had left him.

[124] Walker, Fisher, and Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786*, 201.

[125] Mackay stepped over Maquinna's favorite infant, an action that Mowachahts believed presaged misfortune. When the infant died less than a fortnight after the incident, the chief's warriors beat the surgeon, and Maquinna threw him out.

[126] This was still evident in the mid-nineteenth century. Samuel Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast: Containing an Account of Travels and Adventures Among the Indians, Their Manners*

When Barkley's *Imperial Eagle* sailed into Friendly Cove the following summer, Mackay must have been relieved. It surprised Barkley's young bride when a "dirty" Indian "clothed in a greasy sea-otter skin" boarded their vessel and spoke to them in fluent English, offering his services in securing furs.[127] Although some derided Mackay's limited command of Nootkan, he had learned enough of their language to be of invaluable service to Barkley – his assistance was instrumental as the trader filled his vessel's hold with 800 furs, which he sold for $30,000.[128] When Barkley sailed west across the Pacific after a successful trading season, he took Mackay with him.[129]

While Mackay had disappointed Maquinna and his plans for using him in borderland political struggles, the Mowachaht chief later found two other non-Natives to be of greater value. In 1803, when he seized the *Boston* and had most of her crew executed, Maquinna saved two of her more useful crewmembers, the blacksmith John Jewitt and the sail maker John Thompson. These two captives he incorporated into his family as prized slaves. As in 1786, when he ceremonially displayed Mackay to

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and Customs, Their Treatment of Prisoners, and also a Description of the Country (1860), unpublished typed manuscript version in the Samuel Hancock Papers, UWSC, 91-92.

[127] Lamb, "The Mystery of Mrs. Barkley's Diary: Notes on the Voyage of the 'Imperial Eagle,' 1786-87," 41.

[128] Richard Cadman Etches, London merchant and supercargo on Dixon and Portlock's 1787 voyage to the Northwest Coast, believed that Mackay was no master of the Nootkan language as he had made himself out to be. However, even he concluded that Barkley had "found [Mackay] extremely useful in managing the traffic with the natives." Beresford, *Voyage Round the World*, 233. Other traders at Nootka Sound that season noted Mackay's usefulness to Barkley. For example, see footnote 121 in Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 341.

[129] Some scholars believe that Barkley forcibly removed Mackay from Nootka Sound in order to prevent Strange from benefitting from his assistance. See A. V. Venkatarama Ayyar, "Introduction: An Adventurous Madras Citizen: James Strange, 1753-1840," in *James Strange's Journal and Narrative of the Commercial Expedition from Bombay to the Northwest Coast of America* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1982), 11.

neighboring chiefs, Maquinna hosted a large potlatch to exhibit Jewitt and Thompson along with the rest of the booty he had seized from the *Boston*.[130]

Unlike Mackay, Jewitt and Thompson – especially the former – became useful members in his household. Both men "laboured severely" for the chief and his family, doing menial work such as making canoes, building and repairing longhouses, and fishing.[131] Putting his professional skills to use, Jewitt made bracelets, copper ornaments, fishhooks, and daggers for the chief to trade with other borderland peoples. After a difficult whaling season, Maquinna had Jewitt make him steel harpoon head, which the whaler and other Mowachahts saw as a powerful item after experiencing immediate success with it.[132] The way that Maquinna benefited from Jewitt's enslavement illustrates the advantages that could be gained from resisting imperial incursions. By attacking the *Boston*, seizing two men with useful skills, and putting them to use for his own gain, the Mowachaht chief increased his influence in the *ča·di·* borderland.

Additionally, Jewitt and Thompson helped Maquinna in his battles against others. When Maquinna prepared to go to war with the Haachahts, a neighboring people to the south in Barkley Sound, he ordered Jewitt to produce daggers for his warriors. Both men also participated in the fighting, and Thompson slew seven Haachahts. Jewitt captured four Haachahts, whom Maquinna allowed his slave to keep so that they could do his more

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[130] News of Maquinna's attack on the *Boston* had spread all over this indigenous borderland, bringing canoes of Indians from over twenty different tribes from as far north as Nawitti at the far tip of Vancouver Island and south into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 44-48.

[131] Ibid., 99.

[132] Ibid., 151.

menial tasks.[133] Afterward, Maquinna bestowed the name Tooteyoohannis upon Jewitt and married him to a neighboring chief's daughter.[134]

Jewitt became the object of jealousy among other Northwest Coast leaders the *ča·di·* borderland. Wickaninnish made repeated attempts to purchase Maquinna's white slave. At one point, he offered a wealth of goods, including four young male slaves, two highly ornamented canoes, a number of sea otter skins, and many fathoms of cloth and dentalium shells.[135] Perhaps realizing that Maquinna would never sell his valued property, Machee Ulatilla, a Makah chief who frequented Yuquot, helped to free Jewitt. Ulatilla conveyed a letter Jewitt wrote to Samuel Hill, captain of the brig *Lydia*. This prompted the Bostonian to go to Jewitt's aid.[136]

Several years after finagling Jewitt's and Thompson's release from Maquinna, Ulatilla himself kept four white slaves. In 1808, the Russian schooner *Sv. Nikolai* wrecked along Quilleute shores just south of Cape Flattery. Four of the Russian survivors, including Timofei Tarakanov, became the property of Ulatilla. By 1809, Ulatilla had brought his Russian slaves up to Cape Flattery, a fact remembered by Lakh-kanam, father of a neighboring S'Klallam chief in the later nineteenth century.[137] Ulatilla treated Tarakanov and his peers well: the Russian felt that he was "treated… as a friend,

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[133] Ibid., 168-72.

[134] Ibid., 173, 77-81.

[135] Ibid., 173.

[136] Ibid., 217-18. For more on Hill recovering Jewitt and Thompson, see Frederic William Howay, "An Early Account of the Loss of the Boston in 1803," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1926): 282-83.

[137] George Gibbs, "Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon," *Contributions to North American Ethnology* 1, no. 2 (1877): 240.

not as a prisoner."[138] In 1810, Ulatilla brokered a sale of his Russian slaves, an Englishman, and four Aleuts that Makahs held in captivity to T. Brown, then captain of the *Lydia*. Although they could be members of ranking indigenous Northwest Coast households, non-Native slaves were also valuable status items and important commodities. Chiefs like Ulatilla appeared to profit by selling their white slaves to Anglo captains eager to redeem "civilized" men from "savages."

Indigenous leaders such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh used kinship networks to produce space they could control. Marrying into another family often resulted in gaining access to that family's usufruct and proprietary rights. Through marriage, an individual could earn the right to an important name, song, profession, or fishing place. Similarly, marriage and other kinship practices such as adoption allowed titleholders to extend these rights to others. In societies where leaders earned and maintained authority through influence, this was an important benefit of building extensive kinship ties – chiefs could expand the space over which they held authority by developing familial relationships in other villages, even those separated by ethnolinguistic boundaries.

When chiefs tried to extend more intimate connections to non-Natives also illustrated the way they used kinship networks to produce space and control people.

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[138] This quotation comes from Tarakanov's narrative. Kenneth N. Owens and Alton S. Donnelly, eds., *The Wreck of the Sv. Nikolai: Two Narratives of the First Russian Expedition to the Oregon Country, 1808-1810* (Portland: Western Imprints, The Press of the Oregon Historical Society, 1985), 62. Owens and Donnelly hypothesize that Mackay, the Irishman left in Nootka Sound in 1786, might have fathered Ulatilla. However, this could not be the case. Jewitt described Ulatilla as being thirty years old in 1804, thirteen years older than he would have been if he had been fathered by Mackay. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 174. Also, as Mackay himself told Walker in 1788, Maquinna had not given him a wife. While it is probable that Mackay could have fathered a child through a less formal liaison, this offspring would not have risen to become a chief within Makah society due to Mackay's low status in this indigenous borderland of the eighteenth century. If Ulatilla did have non-Native heritage, then he would have been the progeny of someone from Cook's voyage of 1778.

Perhaps they had hoped that exchanging names would discourage specific captains from trading with rival chiefs – at the very least, this would strengthen a leader's authority by demonstrating to his rivals that he had a direct connection to these newcomers. When Maquinna welcomed Mackay into his family and offered him protection, he also hoped to exploit him by using him to vanquish his enemies and take over their spaces of authority. The Mowachaht chief benefitted more from his white slaves Jewitt and Thompson – they actually did fight for him against others, thereby allowing Maquinna to expand his space of authority. Additionally, Jewitt manufactured trade items that the chief used to gain influence over other peoples. These examples illustrate how overlapping trade and kinship networks – contested and shared – defined the *ča·di·* borderland.

Conclusion

By exploiting networks of trade and kinship, titleholders such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh produced space on their own terms and interrupted imperial processes. Their ability to do so reveals how the broader process of encounter, resistance, and conquest reshaped the Native world and indigenous spaces. Chiefs allowed vessels into their waters because it gave them the opportunity to fill their holds with whale oil, fish, and sea otter furs. They found that they could exchange customary indigenous goods for valuable objects that allowed them to maintain their authority. In the *ča·di·* borderland of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, Northwest Coast chiefs – not non-Native navigators, traders, and distant imperial officials – were the primary historical actors. Their understanding of local networks gave them enough power to control

customary marine and terrestrial spaces during initial imperial struggles over the Pacific Northwest.

When Europeans and Anglo Americans began sailing into these waters, they did not find empty marine and terrestrial spaces upon which they could simply inscribe their cartographic and geopolitical fantasies of empire.[139] In the waters stretching from the west coast of Vancouver Island down to the Columbia River and into Puget Sound through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, non-Native explorers and traders found a borderland space shared and contested by distinct peoples. Like all borderlands, diplomatic protocols and overlapping networks of trade and kinship drew together its various societies in complex and intricate ways. The arrival of Meares and his contemporaries did not create these borderland networks – they found them in place when they arrived.

Non-Natives in the *ča·di·* borderland witnessed and participated in the protocols and networks through which distinct peoples of the Northwest Coast shared and contested this marine space. Networks of trade united borderland communities by distributing the products of variable marine and coastal environments within the region. But the process itself could at times become competitive as indigenous chiefs wrestled over the best trade terms and controlled exchanges and distribution to benefit themselves and their people. Similarly, kinship networks intertwined borderland families at all levels of society in intimate ways. However, kinship could also become a point of conflict as titleholders competed for kin in both their village communities and across ethnolinguistic boundaries.

Borderland strategists such as Tatoosh, Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Machee Ulatilla extended these protocols and networks to non-Natives during the fourth quarter


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[139] For more on this imperial process in the Pacific Northwest, see Clayton, *Islands of Truth*.

of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth century.[140] Europeans and Anglo Americans became valued trade partners. Chiefs controlled access to traders and their vessels and competed – even fought – over trading privileges. In a few cases, chiefs incorporated non-Natives into their households. Individuals such as Mackay, Jewitt, Thompson, and Tarakanov seemed to be included in high-ranking families only as slaves or in a similar position. Occasionally, captains and the rare captive received honored names from chiefs, which was a way titleholders attempted to tie them to their families and communities.

Yet the adaptation of indigenous protocols to encounters with non-Natives illustrates that the *ča·di·* borderland remained a region where strong chiefs continued to control space on their own terms and to meet their own priorities and agendas throughout this period. Loosely codified into a recognizable form by 1788, when Meares sailed throughout the borderland waters, these protocols demonstrated continued indigenous sovereignty and chiefly authority to both Native and non-Native audiences. As we will see in the next chapter, those who ignored these protocols did so at their own peril.

[140] Historian Beth LaDow characterizes Sitting Bull as a "borderlands strategist." Beth LaDow, *The Medicine Line: Life and Death on a North American Borderland* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 60. I believe this term also applies to these Northwest Coast leaders of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.


Map 1: Locations of Maquinna,
Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh, circa 1788
British Columbia
Vancouver Island
Nootka Sound
(Maquinna)
Clayoquot Sound
(Wickaninnish)
Cape Flattery
(Tatoosh)
Pacific Ocean
Washington

Chapter Two

Inveterate Wars and Petty Pilferings

Less than two weeks after Captain Meares fled Makah waters in 1788, the *Felice* returned to the *ča·di·* borderland but avoided Tatoosh's space around Cape Flattery. Instead, Meares anchored in Barkley Sound, located north across the Strait of Juan de Fuca from Tatoosh Island. Although the ship lay miles away from either Tatoosh or Wickaninnish, indigenous visitors brought news of the *Felice's* return to the two chiefs. The British stayed for ten days, trading with Makahs, Clayoquots, and other Natives who brought a variety of fish, berries, and the occasional sea otter fur. While anchored in Barkley Sound, Meares sent out the longboat under the command of First Officer Robert Duffin to explore the Strait of Juan de Fuca to determine whether this was the Northwest Passage. While waiting for the return of Duffin's expedition, the situation of the longboat, which carried their "hopes of success, or the fears of calamity," weighed on the minds of the crew.[1]

Once again, Tatoosh thwarted British ambitions. Four days after setting out, Duffin brought the longboat into a small cove in San Juan Harbor on Vancouver Island. The Pacheedaht inhabitants claimed Tatoosh as their leader, and Duffin found them a "bold, daring set of fellows."[2] The following morning, several canoes carrying forty to fifty warriors attacked. As warriors prepared to board and seize the craft, a Pacheedaht chief readied his harpoon to impale the coxswain. Instead, one of the crew fired first and

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[1] John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, Bibliotheca Australiana (Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1967), 175.

[2] Duffin's account of the longboat's brief expedition is included as Appendix IV at the end of Ibid.

dropped the chief with a single shot to the head. Warriors lining both sides of the shore rained arrows and stones onto the vessel. One barbed missile struck Duffin in the head – only his thick hat prevented mortal injury. Arrows wounded an Italian in the leg, a Chinese sailor in the side, and another crewmember in the chest. The longboat "was pierced in a thousand places by arrows," and the survivors felt that the conflict had been "close" as they "fought for their lives."[3]

Duffin ordered the crew to the oars, and they pulled the little vessel out of the cove. After fleeing the coalition of Makah and Pacheedaht warriors, Duffin named the location Hostility Bay because he believed the attack had been an unprovoked. While limping back to the *Felice*, a small canoe paddled by two of Wickaninnish's people approached. They sold the bruised and battered crew some fish and offered two freshly severed heads "still streaming with blood."[4] They told Duffin that these were two of Tatoosh's warriors whom they had killed because the Makah chief had declared war on Wickaninnish. Duffin declined the grisly offering, and the crew continued creeping along the coast. Upon their reunion with the *Felice*, Meares concluded, "We were now obliged to give up all hope of obtaining any further satisfaction concerning the extent of the strait," which he still believed was the Northwest Passage.[5] Instead, they left the strait and returned to Nootka Sound. Their arrival relieved the shore crew of English and Chinese laborers who had stayed behind at Yuquot in order to build a vessel. By then, indigenous messengers had already brought news of the attack on the longboat. Some reports exaggerated, telling how the entire crew of the *Felice* – not just the longboat –

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[3] Ibid., 176-77.

[4] Ibid., 179.

[5] Ibid.

had been "cut to pieces" and the principal officers had perished. Other details were accurate and described specific wounds.[6] The ambush by Tatoosh's people and allied Pacheedaht warriors delayed British exploration of the strait until George Vancouver's expedition four years later.

Meares's interpretation of the attack on the longboat exemplifies the perspective of many non-Native traders who experienced threats or violence in the borderland. He believed in the inherent savageness of the antagonists; even Wickaninnish had warned him about Tatoosh and the Makah. In the voyage's official account, Meares wrote, "Though we had never had any intercourse or communication with the inhabitants of the straits, we had... hope[d] that our friendly conduct toward their neighbours, might, by some means have reached the district of their habitation and given them favourable impressions of us: but their conduct marked the most savage and bloody hostility."[7] Like Meares, many – but not all – traders characterized violence as unprovoked attacks by hostile savages.

Meares believed that Tatoosh and the Makah lacked the civilized qualities he found present among other peoples of this borderland. First, the Makah chief refused to trade, unlike non-Makah chiefs. Second, Maquinna and Callicum, who both shared information about the coast, helped Meares's Chinese and British carpenters build a smaller vessel at Yuquot to explore the region. By contrast, Tatoosh's warriors had foiled Meares's attempts to map empire onto Makah waters. Traders and navigators found these obstructions baffling and frightening, but some understood the reasons behind indigenous

[6] Ibid., 184.

[7] Ibid., 177.

attacks on their vessels. They criticized the competition, accusing rivals – often from other nations – of being provocateurs of violence.

Previous scholarly assessments of maritime fur trade violence have overlooked several important components.[8] Oral histories and documents report many incidents of theft, intimidation, and violence, which have prompted some to characterize this industry as a "looting of the coast."[9] Greedy traders resorted to pawning off poor-quality goods, theft, hostage-taking, and violence when competition increased and sea otter furs became scarce. Native health deteriorated with the introduction of alcohol, non-traditional foods, venereal diseases, and smallpox. Additionally, the proliferation of firearms made Indian warfare deadlier and fueled an increase in Northwest Coast slavery. The commodification of sea otters disrupted the ecology of the coast, thereby reducing fish numbers and increasing Native dependence on non-Native foods.[10] Assuming the inevitability of racial conflict, this assessment of fur trade violence casts indigenous peoples as victims whose simple natures precipitated trouble with rapacious Anglo traders. A more recent reassessment counters the assumption of indigenous victimization by explaining that traders became entangled in Native agendas and rivalries because the maritime fur trade

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[8] A few scholars downplay the violence, arguing that traders capitulated to Native chiefs who "vigorously asserted their demands." Both sides had goods wanted by the other, thereby fueling peace and accommodation. Violence only emerged after the fur trade era when settlers failed to accommodate Native demands and came to the frontier to transform it to meet their needs. When Indians and settlers clashed over indigenous land, their conflicts inevitably became violent. See Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 4.

[9] Frederic William Howay, *An Outline Sketch of the Maritime Fur Trade* (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, 1932), 12.

[10] For a more refined approach to Howay's argument, see James R. Gibson, *Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1758-1841* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992). He hypothesizes that this first period of cross-cultural interaction conditioned future Euroamerican-Indian relations along antagonistic lines.

"inflamed old grievances and encouraged new conflicts."[11] However, this study misses the larger and more important dynamics characteristic to the *ča·di·* borderland because it ignores the region's transnational characteristics and confines its subject to Canadian boundaries, which did not exist at the time.

Transcending simple racial antagonisms between Natives and non-Natives, complex local dynamics often resulted in violence between indigenous peoples and imperial actors.[12] In the *ča·di·* borderland, most first contact encounters and maritime fur trade exchanges included violence because of the competitive nature of producing space in this region. Natives and non-Natives harassed, intimidated, stole from, punished, attacked, and murdered each other. Moreover, violence in this borderland had a multidimensional quality because distinct indigenous peoples also committed these acts against one another. If we examine the violence of this era from the indigenous perspective, a different picture emerges. Violence marked early encounters because in the *ča·di·* borderland, rival chiefs competed to produce space and control people. When imperial actors entered the borderland, they exacerbated older lines of tensions, added new opportunities for conflict, and applied their own tools of violence. In this indigenous borderland where distinct peoples shared and contested spaces and resources, violence was not an anomaly or a result of miscommunications: threats and violence were central

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[11] Daniel W. Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 121.

[12] For two excellent examples exploring the complexities of regional, indigenous dynamics, see Ned Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); and James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). Historian Richard White has also explored these themes. See White, "The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of American History* 65, no. 2 (1978): 319-343; White, *Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); and White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republicans in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

to both the borderland and imperial processes of this period. More importantly, indigenous leaders such as Tatoosh utilized violence to foil imperial designs for domination of tribal marine space. These dynamics created a geography of fear that came to characterize the region long after the maritime fur trade ended.

Pre-Encounter Violence in the *ča·di·* Borderland

Prior to the arrival of Europeans along this stretch of the Pacific shore, indigenous leaders such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh employed violence to extend their authority and shape outcomes. Thus, violent incidents had a productive quality; they were not simply aberrations resulting from misunderstandings or breakdowns in normal relations. Nor were these incidents part of a cycle of revenge, reflecting a "warlike" Indian mentality. Natives used violence strategically, attacking their rivals to seize slaves, resources, land, and sea space. Violence could also be a stabilizing factor utilized by one or more titleholders to keep a rival from becoming too powerful. Finally, chiefs deployed violence and threats to control areas over which they held authority. In Northwest Coast societies, however, violence as a tool of control was a double-edged sword because too much against one's own people weakened influence and authority.[13]

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[13] I have adapted a portion of David Nirenberg's analytical framework for violence. In his examination of the persecution of minorities in the European Middle Ages, he identifies five categories of violence: cataclysmic, quotidian, strategic, controlled, and stabilizing. David Nirenberg, *Communities of Violence: Persecution of Minorities in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). For my analysis of violence in the *ča·di·* borderland of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, cataclysmic violence is not a useful category yet. From the perspective of Northwest Coast peoples, this type of violence would have only applied to large-scale violence related to the supernatural world. Once they concluded that Europeans were not from the supernatural world – a determination they quickly made during the initial first encounter period – violent relations with Europeans better fit the other analytical categories. Indigenous quotidian violence in this region would have related to violence committed against slaves and ceremonial violence related to the wolf ritual, raising house posts, or welcoming the first whale of the season. For more on ceremonial violence, see Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 165-81; and Alice Henson Ernst, *Wolf Ritual of the Northwest Coast* (Eugene: University of Oregon Press, 2001), 6-45.

For generations prior to the arrival of non-Natives, indigenous leaders and peoples competed over marine resources and access to them, and their struggles often became violent. As some of the best locations to harvest the sea's riches, the villages of Cape Flattery and Tatoosh Island were the focal point of repeated, violent contests. Some Makah oral histories relate that the *q*^{w}*idičča*ʔ*a·tx̌*, "the People of the Cape," have always been at this location.[14] However, other indigenous peoples have contested their tenure.

In a late-nineteenth century oral history, a Quilleute elder told that their warriors had once pushed Makahs north across the strait, claiming Cape Flattery, Tatoosh Island, and the surrounding waters.[15] During the early sixteenth century, the exiled Makahs – then living with Ditidaht kin on Vancouver Island – began encroaching upon the halibut banks stolen by Quilleutes.[16] Fearing that Makahs were preparing to reclaim ancestral villages and marine waters, Quilleute warriors paddled in one hundred war canoes across

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[14] Maria Pascua and Greig Arnold, interviews by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 13 & 14 October 2008, Makah Cultural and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA. Arnold also shared how prior to the beginning of time, Makahs and other peoples came from the stars, their ancestors. Within the tribe, there are alternate histories of how Makahs came to the Cape Flattery region. According to one elder, Makahs crossed from Vancouver Island about 3,500 years ago when a mudslide wiped out an ancestral village. See Ed Claplanhoo, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 13 October 2008, MCRC. Archaeological evidence at Ozette, a Makah village just south of Cape Flattery, places them in the region from 2,000 years ago. Stephan R. Samuels, *Ozette Archaeological Project Research Reports*, Vol. 1 (Pullman: Dept. of Anthropology, Washington State University, 1991), 11. Linguistic evidence reveals that the Makah dialect separated from the Nitinat dialect just over 1,000 years ago. See William H. Jacobsen, Jr., "Wakashan Comparative Studies," in *Languages of Native America: Historical and Comparative Assessment*, ed. Lyle Campbell and Marianne Mithun (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 776.

[15] This account is taken from a newspaper clipping dating from around 1890. Written by an Anglo teacher on the Quilleute reservation, the account reflects this tribe's point of view. Albert B. Reagan "Pioneer Makahs Massacred by Quileute Navy," Folder 9: Other Papers, Miscellaneous/1883-1891, Allison W. Smith Papers (WA MSS S-1591), Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Beinecke), Yale University, New Haven, CT.

[16] Oral histories can be difficult to date. I have provided an approximate date for this one by cross-referencing it with information from Swan's diary. In 1864, Kal-chote (Colchote in Swan's diaries), a Makah chief, related his genealogy to Swan, detailing that Neah Bay was named after an ancestor, Deeah, who had lived twelve generations earlier. Deeah had expelled Ditidahts from Neah Bay shortly after a combined Makah-Ditidaht force fought back against the Quilleutes. The conflict between the Makahs and Ditidahts is related next. James G. Swan, 13 January 1864, Diary 6, James G. Swan Papers, University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle, WA (hereafter cited as Swan Papers).

the strait and raided a Ditidaht-Makah village while the men were absent. The Anglo who recounted this incident, wrote, "With whale bone and stones and clubs, clam shell knives, and yew wood daggers [the Quilleutes] dealt death on every side." The victors took women and children captive, cut off the heads of the old men, and returned home.

As Quilleutes reveled in their victory, Makahs and Ditidahts retaliated against the Cape Flattery villages still held by their enemies. Arriving at Neah Bay, they turned it into a smoldering ruin. Then they moved around the cape, slaughtering all Quilleutes they could find. A Makah whaling chief slew one of the most powerful Quilleute "medicine men" by harpooning him through the head. The victors dragged the bodies of their enemies to the low tide mark so the sea would carry them away because "all Indians whose bodies are claimed by the sea turn into owls, the worst thing that could happen to anyone."[17] Makahs finished with a "terrible battle" at the premier whaling village of the coast, Ozette. They pushed Quilleutes south and thereafter excluded them from the waters and marine resources around Cape Flattery and Tatoosh Island.

In this borderland, allies one day could become competitors or enemies the next. Recorded in the early twentieth century, a second oral history relates that Makahs fought Ditidahts for ownership of Neah Bay, Tatoosh Island, and the adjacent marine space.[18] After wresting their ancestral lands and waters back from Quilleutes, Makahs and Ditidahts shared the spoils for a time. The former held Wayatch, Tsoo-yess, and Ozette

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[17] During the mid-nineteenth century, Swan twice noted the Makah belief that Indians who died on the water turned into owls. 19 July 1862, Diary 6, and 19 January 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers. The first account dealt with five Makah whalers who drowned, while the second one described how Quilleutes murdered eight Makahs who had swum to shore after a whaling accident.

[18] Albert Irvine and Luke Markistun, *How the Makah Obtained Possession of Cape Flattery*, Indian Notes and Monographs (New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation, 1921). Like the previous oral history, Luke Markishtum – the Makah who related this history – did not tell Irvine when this incident happened. However, it seems to make sense that this happened after the Quilleute-Makah conflict.

villages, while the latter claimed Tatoosh Island and Neah Bay. Tensions between the former allies intensified when a Ditidaht strongman pulled the head off a Makah in a strength contest and when Ditidahts enslaved five Makah girls after a storm had pushed their canoe to Tatoosh Island. Makahs attacked Tatoosh Island, and after a "great slaughter on both sides," Ditidahts retreated to Neah Bay. In a war council, the Makahs agreed to continue fighting until they had pushed out the Ditidahts who had overstayed their welcome. Through deception and a second battle, Makahs slew the two highest-ranking Ditidaht chiefs. With both chiefs dead, the surviving Ditidahts packed their belongings and left the Cape Flattery region, returning north across the strait. This left the ancestral Makah lands and waters in their hands once again.[19]

At this time, chiefly rivalries centered on controlling lucrative marine resources and the best sites for harvesting them. For example, when Quilleutes expelled Makahs from Cape Flattery, Tatoosh Island, and the nearby waters, they temporarily transformed this area into Quilleute space. This meant that Quilleutes and those with kinship ties to them resided in the Cape Flattery villages, fished the nearby halibut banks, harvested shellfish along the foreshore, and hunted sea mammals off the northern corner of the Olympic Peninsula. Moreover, Quilleute chiefs held authority over this space and benefitted from the resources, which gave them trade goods and potlatch gifts they spent strengthening their influence in the borderland. Makahs retaliated to reverse this situation and turned this area back into Makah space. When Ditidahts attempted to keep the spoils, Makahs responded with strategic violence, protecting their portion of the borderland. Key to controlling space is the ability to keep outsiders from making it theirs.

[19] For more oral histories on conflicts between the Ditidahts and Makahs, see Eugene Y. Arima, *Between Ports Alberni and Renfrew: Notes on West Coast Peoples* (Hull: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1991), 300-09. Makahs repeatedly raided Ditidaht villages in order to take salmon runs.

The lingering effects of more recent spatial struggles affected non-Natives when they arrived in the 1770s and 1780s. For example, Wickaninnish was an expansionist leader who had moved his people from the interior to the coast in the decade prior to the appearance of Europeans. With superior numbers, he conquered the villages around Clayoquot Sound to gain access to marine resources, especially salmon, halibut, and whales.[20] His success brought this portion of the *ča·di·* borderland under his control and gave him access to whale oil, an important commodity in the regional trade network. The new wealth allowed him to host lavish potlatches, which secured his influence among the conquered people in the sound and within the larger borderland. By the time Meares came to Clayoquot to trade, Wickaninnish had expanded his influence over eleven villages, which represented an estimated 13,000 people.[21]

These episodes of violence over ocean waters, their resources, and the best sites to access them illustrate that the *ča·di·* borderland was a region spatially contested long before the arrival of Europeans and Anglo Americans. When Meares sailed into Makah marine space in 1788, he entered an indigenous borderland crisscrossed by historic and contemporary lines of conflict and violence. Non-Natives did not create these episodes of borderland violence. Instead they exacerbated pre-existing lines of tension and added new

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[20] Oral histories collected in the early twentieth century explain that the population of Wickaninnish's inland village grew so large that they had outstripped their local food resources. The chief and his people declared war on the Kelsamites, living on the coast, in order to obtain their waters. They drove the Kelsamites out of Opitsit, and Wickaninnish used this village as a base to expand his influence throughout the sound. See Vincent Aloysius Koppert, "Contributions to Clayoquot Ethnology" (Thesis (Ph.D.), The Catholic University of America, 1930), 1.

[21] Summarized from Philip Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951). Population estimate is from Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 230.

possibilities for conflict, especially when Northwest Coast chiefs incorporated Europeans and Anglo Americans into already established trade and kinship networks.[22]

Violence & Early Encounters in the *ča·di·* Borderland

As described in Chapter One, amicable exchange characterized the first encounter between indigenous inhabitants of the *ča·di·* borderland and Europeans. In 1774, when Pérez and his Spanish crew exchanged clothing, shells, and knives for sea otter furs, fish, and cedar-bark clothing, bad weather – not threatening or violent Natives – drove the *Santiago* away. Historian John Lutz argues that first contact encounters in the region had peaceful outcomes because both sides "performed their spirituality."[23] For example, when Pérez met Nuu-chah-nulths, "both peoples sought to minimize danger and maximize opportunities."[24] While Lutz emphasizes the spiritual dimension of these early first contact encounters, the dynamics of the *ča·di·* borderland better explain why this particular meeting was peaceful. First, Pérez arrived unannounced off the entrance to Nootka Sound. Similarly, this was Pérez's only stop in the borderland, and he stayed for less than two days, which did not leave much time for rivals chiefs to appear. Unlike subsequent encounters, Pérez's encounter off Nootka Sound only involved a single group of people. After leaving Nootka Sound, the *Santiago* sailed south along the Washington

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[22] This is where I diverge from the preponderance of traditional borderlands scholarship, which argues that borderlands did not arise until two or more European polities began to contest and share a geographic region.

[23] John Lutz, "First Contact as Spiritual Performance: Encounters on the North American West Coast," in *Myth and Memory: Stories of Indigenous-European Contact*, ed. Lutz (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 31.

[24] Ibid., 30. Although Lutz applies this quotation to Pérez's meeting with the Haida just before his encounter with indigenous people off Nootka Sound, this analysis applies to the later encounter with Nuu-chah-nulths as well.

coast. Although they saw the "smokes of many great fires, so that we know this coast to be inhabited," they did not linger to meet any other indigenous borderlanders.[25]

Subsequent first contact encounters, however, did include intimidation, theft, and conflict as borderland violence shaped cross-cultural interactions. This became evident during the 1775 Spanish expedition along the western edge of North America.[26] Captaining the frigate *Santiago*, Bruno de Hezeta y Dudagoita commanded the expedition. A second vessel, the schooner *Sonora*, captained by Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, also accompanied them. On their way north, the vessels became separated somewhere along the Washington coast. Early the following morning, July 14, nine Indians in a canoe approached the *Santiago* and offered sea otter skins and fish to trade.[27] Afterward, Hezeta and a heavily armed party went ashore and performed a quick possession ceremony because they feared that the deteriorating weather would beach the *Santiago*.[28] Naming the landing site Rada de Bucareli (Bucareli's Roadstead), Hezeta described it as being "choked with brush and branches so that any object at a distance of four *varas* can not be seen by anyone outside," a condition that heightened his anxiety and hastened their return to the *Santiago*.[29]

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[25] See "Document No. 19: Journal of Fray Juan Crespi kept during the [*Santiago*] voyage – dated 5th October 1774," in George Butler Griffin, Adolph Sutro, and Donald C. Cutter, *The California Coast: A Bilingual Edition of Documents from the Sutro Collection* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969), 263.

[26] For a brief summary of this expedition, see Mary Gormly, "Early Culture Contact on the Northwest Coast, 1774-1795: Analysis of Spanish Source Material" (Originally written as a Master's thesis in 1959, University of Idaho, 1977), 9-11.

[27] Miguel de la Campa and John Galvin, *A Journal of Explorations: Northward along the Coast from Monterey in the Year 1775* (San Francisco: John Howell, 1964), 41.

[28] For more on Spanish possession ceremonies, see Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession: Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 69-99.

[29] Bruno de Hezeta and H. K. Beals, *For Honor & Country: The Diary of Bruno De Hezeta*, (Portland: Western Imprints, 1985), 76. Today, this site is known as Point Grenville, Washington. *Vara* is approximately the equivalent of a rod; so Hezeta could only see about 60 feet or so into the woods. He

Upon sailing farther north along the coast, his crew spotted the *Sonora* near the mouth of a river and heard the firing of shots. They later learned that a host of Indian warriors had killed several Spanish crewmembers. The bloodshed resulted from a chain of events that had begun the evening before. A canoe of Indians had approached the *Sonora*, and Bodega y Quadra invited them aboard and gave presents. The Indians reciprocated with fish and whale flesh and invited the crew to come to their village to feast and dance. The following morning, Bodega y Quadra sent seven crewmembers ashore to collect water and to cut a topmast. According to the Spanish witnesses, when they arrived at the mouth of the river, two to three hundred Indians ambushed them. They "cut to pieces" five of the crew as another two "escap[ed] from their hideous cruelty by throwing themselves into the sea."[30] However, these survivors tired, and halfway back to the *Sonora*, they turned to shore but then presumably drowned before they could reach the beach. The attacking Indians stripped the launch of its iron, salvaged what boards they could, and set the remainder afire.

As the launch smoldered on the shore, the attackers retreated into the woods, appearing to take the dismembered Spanish bodies with them, an action that convinced those aboard the schooner that the attackers were cannibals. At the same time, nine canoes of Indians who had visited them previously returned. A sailor on the *Sonora*

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named this site after the current Viceroy of New Spain, Antonio Maria Bucareli e Ursua, who had arranged the expedition.

[30] Benito de la Sierra, *Fray Benito De La Sierra's Account of the Hezeta Expedition to the Northwest Coast in 1775* (San Francisco: 1930), 30. The Spaniards possibly exaggerated the number of Indian attackers. As James Belich, a New Zealand historian, has noted, Victorian British officers and colonial officials in the mid-nineteenth century had a tendency to inflate numbers of indigenous warriors in order to account for Native victories. See James Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: The Maori, the British, and the New Zealand Wars* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). However, at this time, Quinaults had hundreds of warriors they could send against enemies; perhaps the Spaniards had not exaggerated.

alerted the the crew that the newcomers had armed themselves. Drawing nearer, however, the Indians also made signs of friendship. The Spanish offered glass beads, encouraging them to advance. When a canoe came close enough to the schooner, the Spaniards fired their muskets and swivel gun – these were the shots the *Santiago* crew heard. The fusillade "killed seven of the nine [Indians in the lead canoe], thus making them pay for life for the seven Spaniards they had slain," and the canoes beat a hasty retreat.[31]

When the Spanish ships reunited, Bodega y Quadra urged Hezeta to land a party on shore so they could punish the "treacherous" Indians. The commander, however, decided against vengeance. As he noted in his official record, not only did he have instructions to limit violence to cases of self defense, but they were also outnumbered and would be fighting in overgrown terrain that the enemy knew well. Additionally, he recognized that if he lost any more men, he would need to turn back. Instead, he ordered the vessels to leave the coast and to push north.[32]

During the return voyage south several days later, they again encountered Indians while sailing near the waters where they had lost some crewmembers. A canoe carrying ten Indians came out to the *Santiago*, offering pelts and dried smelt for trade. One of the sailors told Hezeta that he recognized two as part of the group that had come onboard the *Sonora* the evening before being attacked. The commander plotted to lure the canoe close enough so that he could take hostages. However, the Indians evaded his efforts and skillfully kept the canoe positioned into the wind, making it impossible for the Spanish to

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[31] Sierra, *Fray Benito De La Sierra's Account of the Hezeta Expedition to the Northwest Coast in 1775*, 31. In addition to Fray Sierra's account, this attack is detailed in Hezeta and Beals, *For Honor & Country*, 77-78. See also Campa and Galvin, *A Journal of Explorations*, 42-45.

[32] Hezeta and Beals, *For Honor & Country*, 78-79.

overtake them. Hezeta lost sight of them at sundown, and the following day, he sailed south away from the Northwest Coast.[33]

Unlike the earlier Pérez voyage, Hezeta's 1775 expedition illustrates that competition between distinct peoples of this borderland could lead to violence. While exploring the Washington coast, the vessels had sailed into the waters of two competing tribes, the Quilleute and Quinault, both just south of the Makah. Although the Spanish were unable – or unwilling – to distinguish one group from another, the concurrent incidents of trade and violence indicate that they had encountered two different peoples. The peaceful interactions were likely with Quilleutes, while the violent ones were with Quinaults.[34] Those who visited the *Sonora* on the evening of July 13 had exchanged whale flesh and fish for "trifles" offered by the Spanish – these were Quilleutes because they had better access to whale meat, something that Quinaults would have been unlikely to have because they only harvested the occasional drift whale.[35] When seven of the *Sonora's* crew went ashore, they landed at the mouth of the Quinault River, within

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[33] Ibid., 84-85; Sierra, *Fray Benito De La Sierra's Account of the Hezeta Expedition to the Northwest Coast in 1775*, 36; and Campa and Galvin, *A Journal of Explorations*, 53-54. This incident also seems to indicate that these Indians understood the limits of vessels equipped with sails. This knowledge hints that Northwest Coast peoples used sails prior to the appearance of Europeans.

[34] Most historical accounts assume that the Spaniards only encountered Quilleutes and that this tribe was responsible for the violence. For example, see James V. Powell, "Quileute," in *Northwest Coast*, ed. Wayne Suttles, *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1990), 435.

[35] Whaling done by other non-Makah Washington Indians is still a debated point. Including the Makah, many claim that only the People of the Cape pursued whales from canoes. However, on July 31, 1861, the Quilleutes had whale oil to trade with the crew of the *Sarah Newton*. See James G. Swan, Folder 191: Bound autograph manuscript journal and memorandum book, 1861-71, Box 10, Stenzel Collection (WA MSS S-2368), Beinecke (hereafter cited as Manuscript Journal). While teaching Quilleute children at a day school at La Push, Washington, in the late 1880s and 1890s, A.W. Smith collected several drawings students made of Quilleute whalers. See Folder 5: Student Papers, Other student work, Drawings/n.d., Smith Papers, Beinecke. The Quinault, who only harvested drift whales, would have been unlikely to have whale flesh because this spoils quickly and can only be harvested from a freshly killed whale. David R. Huelsbeck, "Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast," *Arctic Anthropology* 25, no. 1 (1988): 7.

Quinault territory and near one of their villages.[36] When the Quilleute canoes returned after the Quinault ambush, they had armed themselves to fight the Quinault, not to attack the Spanish aboard the *Sonora*. With their emotions running high after witnessing the death of seven crewmembers, the Spaniards fired on the Quilleutes, assuming that they had been the attackers.

This incident also reveals clashing efforts among Quilleutes, Quinaults, and Spaniards to produce and control space in the southern corner of the *ča·di·* borderland. The position of the Spanish vessels suggests that the Quilleutes traders had trespassed in Quinault waters. By trading in Quinault waters, Quilleutes challenged the former's control over this marine space. They probably armed themselves in an attempt to ally with the Spanish against their rivals. On a voyage of exploration, the Spanish engaged in producing space for empire. They took "possession" of the land, which some Quinaults possibly witnessed.[37] However, the Quinault attack on their shore party demonstrated the fiction of this space being Spanish. Additionally, complex indigenous dynamics fueled the Quinaults' violent reaction. They attacked the Spaniards onshore to punish them for trading with the rival Quilleutes in Quinault waters. Spanish attempts at taking timber and fresh water also would have concerned Quinaults. This attack exemplified Quinault efforts to control interactions within tribal space. More importantly, the incident

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[36] The village was *k iay* (Taholah) located at the mouth of the Quinault River. See the map in Yvonne P. Hajda, "Southwestern Coast Salish," in *Northwest Coast*, 504. In his edited volume of Hezeta's diary, Beals locates this incident at the Quinault River. See Hezeta and Beals, *For Honor & Country: The Diary of Bruno De Hezeta*, 78. Quinault oral histories also point to the involvement of their ancestors. See Jacqueline M. Storm and Pauline K. Capoeman, *Land of the Quinault*, 2nd ed. (Taholah: Quinault Indian Nation, 1991), 84.

[37] Fray Benito de la Sierra used "possession" to describe their actions on July 14. Sierra, *Fray Benito De La Sierra's Account of the Hezeta Expedition to the Northwest Coast in 1775*, 29.

illustrates that from the beginning of imperial efforts at producing space in the Northwest Coast, indigenous peoples interrupted this process.

Scholars often emphasize the peaceful quality of the next European-indigenous encounter in this region, Captain Cook's month-long sojourn at Friendly Cove in April 1778. [38] However, tensions of violence particular to the *ča·di·* borderland marked that episode, too. After just one day among the Mowachahts of Nootka Sound, Cook concluded that "they were as light fingered as any people we had before met."[39] Indians pilfered many small items, including nails, chisels, and other pieces of metal. Some of these petty thefts went unnoticed by the British at the time, but others seemed threatening to voyagers so far from home. For example, someone stole a thirty-pound iron hook used to pull up the main anchor. Cook also complained about the Natives' sharp trading practices. Some cheated his crew by mixing water in with the whale oil they sold.[40] Other traders complained of Mowachaht chiefs who blackened sea otter pelts with charcoal to make them appear of a higher value.[41]

We should understand these thefts and apparently unscrupulous trading practices within the context of Northwest Coast culture and of specific borderland dynamics. Accounts of non-Native explorers and traders rarely recorded thefts among the inhabitants of one village or within a confederation of communities. For example, in

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[38] Recent scholarship has begun to reassess the role of violence during Cook's third voyage. For example, geographer Daniel Clayton argues that although violence was rare, "tension was never far from the surface." Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 32. New Zealand scholar Anne Salmond also reassesses Cook's voyages and the more prominent role violence played than most scholars have assumed. Anne Salmond, *The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: Captain Cook in the South Seas* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

[39] James Cook, J. C. Beaglehole, and R. A. Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 1999), 297.

[40] Ibid., 302.

[41] Alexander Walker, Robin Fisher, and J. M. Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1982), 62.

1787, the British trader James Colnett believed that the inhabitants of any one village in Nootka Sound were "strictly honest among themselves."[42] Theft would have been unusual within a village where everyone shared real or fictive kinship. On the other hand, many accounts noted incidents of "theft" between distinct peoples. John Rickman, a lieutenant on the *Resolution*, described an incident where Mowachahts "took everything" from a non-Mowachaht "stately youth" who had visited the ship and traded.[43] To British eyes, it appeared that the inhabitants of Friendly Cove had stolen these goods. However, from the perspective of the indigenous inhabitants of the *ča·di·* borderland, the young chief had committed the theft by trading without Maquinna's permission. Mowachahts simply confiscated the goods he had received illicitly.

Anthropologist Philip Drucker argues that Nuu-chah-nulths saw Europeans as outside the normal kinship and trade networks of the region. Therefore, they would have seen non-Native property as up for grabs.[44] Anthropologist Turrell Moore expands this notion, suggesting that inhabitants of Nootka Sound saw non-kin Europeans as potential enemies and therefore fair targets for theft.[45] As discussed in the previous chapter, inhabitants of the *ča·di·* borderland saw Europeans and Anglo Americans as distant outsiders from beyond this region, so perhaps they did see non-Native property as available for taking when the opportunity arose. Moreover, chiefs might have found the

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[42] James Colnett and Robert Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America: The Journals of James Colnett, 1786-89* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 107.

[43] John Rickman, *Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1967), 239.

[44] Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes*, 313.

[45] Turrell Adcock Moore, "The Emergence of Ethnic Roles and the Beginning of Nootkan Native-Overseas European Relations, 1774-1789" (University of Oregon, 1977), 77 & 354-355. Enemies and non-kin were sometimes synonymous categories.

property threatening if it fell into the hands of a rival. This anxiety possibly encouraged leaders to overlook thefts of non-Native property.

Social status also shaped these incidents. In the *ča·di·* borderland, trade often happened between high-ranking equals who ritualized exchanges through formal diplomatic protocols. However, trade across status ranks was more of a free-for-all. Chiefs often had the right to seize what they wanted from the lower ranks when commoners operated in leaders' owned spaces. For example, Colnett noted that Oughomeize, a Muchalaht chief along the eastern shores of Nootka Sound, intercepted canoes returning from his fishing grounds, and he took a percentage of the catch.[46] The same dynamics shaped incidents of supposed "theft." Natives probably classified many sailors and laborers aboard vessels as slaves because they did the work ascribed to the lowest-ranking members of society.[47] Many of the accounts of theft occurred when an Indian stole something from a non-Native who was not an identifiable officer.[48]

To Natives, these incidents inscribed class and status. From the British perspective, however, they exemplified theft. Although crew comments written in hindsight described indigenous hosts who "offered the least violence" while Cook's vessels were at Friendly Cove, the British found theft and underhanded trading practices somewhat threatening and believed that they portended violence.[49] When their hosts

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[46] Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 111.

[47] In European and Anglo-American cultures of the eighteenth century, some compared a sailor's lot to that of black slaves. Paul A. Gilje, *Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 83.

[48] For example, Cook noted an early incident where a pair of Indians worked together to steal from one of his sailors; one individual "amused" the Anglo while another stole from him. Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 298.

[49] Rickman, *Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean*, 236.

armed themselves against potential antagonists about to enter Friendly Cove, some crewmembers feared they might be preparing to attack.[50]

Non-Native captains found these thefts especially galling. According to historian Marcus Rediker, eighteenth-century captains possessed "near-dictatorial powers [that] made the ship one of the earliest totalitarian work environments."[51] All captains relied on physical force to keep the sailors – men in a lower social class than the captain and his officers – in line. This included beatings, curses, and threats to kill, especially if any sailor raised a hand in self-defense. Kanakas (Native Hawai'ians) and non-Anglo sailors usually received more disciplinary actions than Anglo crewmembers.[52] Captains meted out punishments such as keel-hauling, running the gauntlet, and flogging with the cat-o'-nine-tails in front of the crew in order to intimidate the rest into following his orders.[53] Recognizing the point beyond which one should not push the crew, shrewd captains combined rewards, promises, and kind words with brute strength, curses, and threats to maintain authority and prevent mutiny.

This discipline model influenced how captains and crew dealt with Natives whom they believed had done them wrong. As Rediker argues, "The establishment of authority

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[50] See the comment by the expedition's surgeon, David Samwell. Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, Vol. 3, 1093. Although Samwell did not begin his journal until sometime after the voyage's departure from New Zealand, it appears that he wrote his entries for their time at Nootka Sound while there. Therefore, his observations more accurately present what he and others felt at the time. For more on Samwell's journal as a document, see Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, Vol. 3, cxcii-cxcv.

[51] Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750*, Canto ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 212.

[52] Gilje, *Liberty on the Waterfront*, 83.

[53] When a sailor was keel-hauled, he was dragged underneath the ship, from one side to the other or from fore to aft. Sailors punished by running the gauntlet had to pass through a double file of men facing each other. Armed with clubs and other weapons, the men struck at individuals the captain ran between them. A normal sentence for running the gauntlet was eight to ten passes through the corridor of armed men. Details on these punishments are from Dorothy Denneen Volo and James M. Volo, *Daily Life in the Age of Sail* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 131-32. See also Ruth Pike, *Penal Servitude in Early Modern Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 132.

and discipline was also crucial to the stabilization of the merchant shipping industry and even the empire itself in the first half of the eighteenth century."[54] With this experience in mind, maritime fur trade captains believed that they needed to establish discipline over indigenous peoples in the Northwest Coast. They deployed violence to create imperial spaces in the *ča·di·* borderland. As on their ships, captains believed that punishments were most effective when conducted in front of an audience of potential offenders. Some captains struck chiefs in front of their people, fired on canoes with other warriors watching, and destroyed villages while Natives hid in nearby woods. However, shrewd traders understood that a combination of enticements and violence best intimidated potentially dangerous trade partners.

Additionally, British crewmembers and officers expressed their anxieties by employing violence to punish thieves. Cook noted that an Indian thief "generally relinquished his prize with reluctancy [*sic*] and sometimes not without force."[55] One midshipman also wrote about a fellow sailor who threw a piece of wood at one thief with such force that it cracked a canoe it hit instead to the waterline. Those in the canoe became angry and drew their bows to fire at the sailor, but another crewmember intervened, firing an arrow from a bow he had just purchased from an Indian.[56] Even Cook himself attempted to punish indigenous thieves. After having been at Friendly Cove for nearly a month and suffering from the depredations of indigenous theft, the exasperated Cook fired a musket loaded with small shot at a canoe carrying someone who had stolen a small piece of iron. He injured four men in their backs and "made the whole

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[54] Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea*, 207.

[55] Cook, Beaglehole, and Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery*, 298.

[56] See footnote 1 in the edited volume of Cook's journal. James Trevethen recorded this incident as marginalia in a published volume of Cook's account. Ibid.

party leave us rather apparantly [*sic*] in an ill Humour with us."[57] The crew and officers exerted their authority to extend British space in this corner of the *ča·di·* borderland. However, continued thefts indicated their failure.

Much as Hezeta's expedition had triggered conflict off the Washington coast, at Nootka Sound, Cook's presence also exacerbated tensions among distinct peoples with a history of mutual hostility. Charles Clerke, commander of the *Discovery*, reported that the local Indians had a number of disputes with neighboring peoples.[58] At one point, three to four hundred Mowachahts paddled across Nootka Sound to attack enemies on the opposite shore. Upon their return, they exchanged with the British some sea otter pelts they had seized from their rivals.[59] These conflicts demonstrate that this was a region contested long before the arrival of Europeans. With the influx of new goods, Maquinna employed violence to maintain his authority and to expand his control. His indigenous methods of warfare and politics complicated imperial designs to transform this into European zones of safety, order, and free trade.

Maritime Fur Trade Violence in the *ča·di·* Borderland, 1786-1803

Similar dynamics of theft, intimidation, and conflict pervaded the maritime fur trade throughout the *ča·di·* borderland. When a growing number of non-Native traders came to the area during the late eighteenth century, relations of violence expanded along preexisting lines of tension in the region, drawing in a greater variety of peoples. Additionally, increased contacts between Natives and non-Natives provided numerous

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[57] Although this incident is missing from Cook's official account, the expedition's astronomer, William Bayly, recorded it in his journal. See footnote 2 in Ibid., 307.

[58] Ibid., 1326.

[59] Rickman, *Journal of Captain Cook's Last Voyage to the Pacific Ocean*, 236.

opportunities for misunderstandings, insults, and new violence. However, some incidents of violence had a productive quality, because borderland dynamics allowed rivals to benefit from discord elsewhere. Some chiefs, such as Tatoosh, used conflict to their advantage to expand their influence in this indigenous marine borderland.

Earlier incidents of violence shaped subsequent interactions between indigenous peoples and non-Natives. In 1787, twelve years after Hezeta's voyage of violence along the Washington coast, Captain Charles Barkley brought the 400-ton, 20-gun, *Imperial Eagle* to the region seeking sea otter skins.[60] Barkley and his crew spent more than a month at Nootka Sound trading for furs. After other licensed trading vessels arrived, Barkley completed his transactions at Yuquot and sailed south along the Vancouver Island coast, stopping at Clayoquot Sound and Barkley Sound to collect furs from Wickaninnish and related peoples. Later, he headed south across the strait, identifying and naming this the "long lost strait of Juan de Fuca."

Sailing south along the coast of the Olympic Peninsula, Barkley ran into serious trouble near where Indians had attacked Hezeta's Spanish crew. The British captain anchored off the mainland and sent thirteen men in two boats to travel up the Hoh River to trade with Indians. Because the river was too shallow for the longboat, the smaller craft with six men took a sheet of copper for trade and rowed upstream, never to be seen again. When Barkley sent an armed party ashore the next day, they discovered clothes and linen, "mangled and bloody," but they found neither bodies nor boat. Concluding that

[60] Because East India Company employees had surreptitiously financed the voyage, the twenty-six-year-old Barkley renamed the *Louden* the *Imperial Eagle* and flew the Austrian flag as a subterfuge to avoid the expensive licensing fees. An account of Barkley's voyage no longer exists. Information from this voyage comes from contemporary traders who included bits and pieces about his trading expedition. The best assemblage of these scattered fragments is in W. Kaye Lamb, "The Mystery of Mrs. Barkley's Diary: Notes on the Voyage of the 'Imperial Eagle,' 1786-87," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (1942). Barkley's bride, Frances, was the first Anglo woman to visit the Northwest Coast. Unless otherwise noted, the quotations here are from this article, which excerpts her diary.

Natives had eaten the sailors, they set a nearby Hoh Indian village afire in retribution.[61] Afterward, Barkley sailed back to China, where he sold his 800 furs for $30,000, which fueled dreams of wealth despite news of hostile Natives.

Barkley had brought the *Imperial Eagle* into waters already bloodied by an earlier cross-cultural encounter. Other Native peoples subsequently told Anglo captains that Quilleutes had attacked Barkley's crew.[62] Quilleutes would have had at least two good reasons to do so. First, they recalled the encounter from twelve years earlier when Spaniards fired on them without cause, slaughtering a canoe-load of their people who had offered support against the attacking Quinault warriors. Second, Quilleute chiefs desired to keep non-Natives away from the Hoh village which Barkley approached. With the competitive dynamics of this indigenous borderland, Quilleute chiefs would have been reluctant to let a rival Hoh chief gain access to valued trade goods. From the Quilleute perspective, they had seen the *Imperial Eagle* sail past their village. Rather than stopping to offer trade – and to make up for the murderous actions of the earlier non-Native visitors – the vessel anchored in the waters of their closest competitors. Their attack on the crew of the *Imperial Eagle* exemplified strategic violence, which Quilleutes used to discourage the British from trading with rivals.

Especially when these incidents resulted in dead Europeans, indigenous power created a geography of fear for non-Native visitors to the Northwest Coast. The Spanish and British deaths along the Olympic Peninsula illustrate this process. After Quinaults killed members of his crew, Bodega y Quadra mapped this violent incident into the

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[61] The account of Barkely's burning of the Hoh village appears in a 1788 letter the London merchant Richard Cadman Etches wrote to Sir Joseph Banks. See Howay, "Four Letters from Richard Cadman Etches to Sir Joseph Banks, 1788-92," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (1942): 135.

[62] For example, Maquinna told Meares this a year later in Friendly Cove. Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 124.

imaginations of Spaniards and other Europeans by naming the location of the "massacre" Punta de los Mártires (Martyrs Point). He also named a nearby island Isla de Dolores (Isle of Sorrows).[63] The names Bodega y Quadra bestowed on these features appeared on late-eighteenth century maps of the Pacific Northwest. Similarly, Barclay named the waterway where he lost thirteen men Destruction River and renamed Bodega y Quadra's Isla de Dolores with an English name, Destruction Island, a name it still carries today.[64] As scholar Paul Carter argues, through the act of naming, "space is transformed symbolically into a place... a space with history."[65] For both of these Spanish and British captains, violence would forever mark the histories of these places.

Captured on maps, the geography of fear made non-Natives anxious and fearful when on the Northwest Coast. This can be seen throughout Meares's time in the region. The "massacre" of the sailors of the *Imperial Eagle* weighed heavily on the minds of Meares and his British crewmembers, and it shaped many of their actions and interactions with various indigenous peoples. Erecting a trading base and crude shipyard at Yuquot,

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[63] Scholars have noted previously that the Spanish captain named this island after the liturgical feast of Our Lady of Sorrows (Nuestra Señora de Dolores) because he sailed past it on September 18, close to the date of this Catholic event; however, the Isla de Dolores would have also memorialized the loss of seven crewmembers. See Map 63 in Derek Hayes, *Historical Atlas of the Pacific Northwest: Maps of Exploration and Discovery: British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Yukon* (Seattle: Sasquatch Books, 1999), 40.

[64] There is some confusion over who named this feature Destruction Island. Some scholars attribute the name to George Vancouver, claiming that he transferred Barkley's name for Destruction River to the island. See William S. Hanable, "Destruction Island Light Shines for the First Time on January 1, 1892," (available online at http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=5697) *HistoryLink.Org Online Encyclopedia of Washington State History* [accessed April 2009]. However, Vancouver referred to it as Destruction Island, implying that he adopted Barkley's name for this place – his journals do not mention transferring the name over. See his entry for 16 October 1792, in George Vancouver, *Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean and Round the World*, Vol. 1 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968), 416. In her diary, Barkley's wife appears to have noted that her husband named it Destruction Island. See Lamb, "The Mystery of Mrs. Barkley's Diary," 44. A nineteenth-century history of the Pacific Northwest also noted that Barkley had named the island. See E. W. Wright, *Lewis & Dryden's Marine History of the Pacific Northwest* (Portland: The Lewis & Dryden Printing Company, 1895), 4.

[65] Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987), xxiv.

Meares enclosed them within a strong breastwork and defended it with a cannon. Revealing his anxiety, he explained that they "wished to operate on [Indian] fears as well as their gratitude."[66] Meares also overlooked most thefts, even of important items such as the ship's pinnace, which someone in Friendly Cove had stolen and broken apart for its iron and nails. Although both Maquinna and Callicum professed to know nothing about its theft, Meares chose not to confront them about this very serious loss. He feared that a confrontation might jeopardize their trading activities or lead to a more serious conflict in this remote corner of the Pacific.[67]

Thefts encouraged Meares to take precautions, which often insulted indigenous leaders. For example, when they first anchored off Wickaninnish's village in Clayoquot Sound, Meares feared the chief's power to do "mischief" against the vessel and her crew. The captain always kept armed crewmembers on deck and curtailed the number of Indians on the *Felice* at any one time. However, this constant vigilance angered the Clayoquot chief, who left the ship and refused to allow his people to trade. Meares assuaged the chief's feelings by giving him a sword, large copper dish, and a pistol, an item Wickaninnish had desired for some time.[68]

Meares's anxieties heightened when he crossed into Makah marine space. Wickaninnish had already warned the captain that Tatoosh and his people were "subtle

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[66] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 115.

[67] Ibid., 127-28.

[68] Ibid., 145. Andrew Taylor, third (later second) mate on the British vessel *Prince of Wales* (Colnett), noted that Indians in Nootka Sound became angry when they hoisted the boarding netting to prevent unwanted visitors to their ships: "when we hoisted the Nettings, it gave general offence, many of them left us indicating by their menaces that we need not expect Skins unless we suffered them on board." Quote from Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 104.

and barbarous."[69] Coming from the chief of a bold people who appeared less civilized than those he had met at Friendly Cove, Wickaninnish's warning must have commanded the captain's attention. After Tatoosh's confrontation with Meares aboard the *Felice*, the British dispatched the longboat to look for secure anchorage. Fear kept the longboat crew from retaliating when a "great crowd of canoes" surrounded the small boat and when intimidating Makahs leapt aboard and stole various articles.[70] Just before departing Makah waters, Meares wrote of their isolation "on a wild and unfrequented coast, in a distant corner of the globe, far removed from all those friends, connections, and circumstance which form the charm and comfort of life, and taking our course, as it were through a solitary ocean."[71] Fear hurried them out of Makah waters, despite Tatoosh's efforts at making amends for his earlier confrontational behavior.

The crew's anxieties intensified when they entered the waters where Barkley's *Imperial Eagle* had lost six of her crew. Coming within sight of Destruction Island, the weather became "thick and gloomy" and then turned to rain.[72] The wind died, forcing Meares to anchor off a Quilleute village, which "distress[ed]" the crew who feared becoming a meal for "cannibals."[73] As the captain wrote, "The wretched fate of the people belonging to the *Imperial Eagle*, evidently predominated in the minds of our crew; and being on the very coast where such an act of barbarity was committed, the infectious apprehension of a similar destruction spread amongst them. It was the common subject of

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[69] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 154.

[70] Ibid., 155.

[71] Ibid., 155-56.

[72] Ibid., 159.

[73] Ibid., 160.

their discourse, and had such an influence on their spirits, as to endanger the loss of the ship."[74] Fortunately for the crew, a wind kicked up, and the *Felice* tacked out of the frightening waters by nightfall. Meares's impressions illustrate the geography of fear through which he took his crew.

For their part, indigenous borderlanders possessed ambivalent feelings about the newcomers. On the one hand, chiefs desired the trade goods that vessels brought to their shores. They used these goods to maintain and even expand their spatial influence. On the other hand, violence against their people and neighbors made them wary. And non-Natives committed plenty of violence to make indigenous peoples cautious.

The first to bring a vessel into these waters after Captain Cook, the British trader James Hanna "had a very serious Engagement with the Natives."[75] In September 1785, Hanna sailed the *Sea Otter* into Nootka Sound. After a few days of "friendly and commercial intercourse" with the Mowachahts, a trade dispute arose. Hanna fired on a canoe carrying an Indian accused of stealing a chisel. This fusillade killed twenty including some chiefs. On the schooner at the time, Maquinna escaped by leaping into the water from the quarterdeck.[76] After an absence of several days, several canoes approached the *Sea Otter*, and a herald stood in one and "solemnly declared" the "reasons for war," informing Hanna that they would attack the following day. The next day, a fleet of canoes surrounded the schooner and fired a "shower of arrows and darts," but "Captain

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[74] Ibid., 161.

[75] Walker, Fisher, and Bumsted, *An Account of a Voyage to the North West Coast of North America in 1785 & 1786*, 199.

[76] Maquinna shared these details with Jewitt nearly twenty years later. John R. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt, Only Survivor of the Ship Boston, During a Captivity of Nearly Three Years among the Savages of Nootka Sound; with an Account of the Manners, Mode of Living, and Religious Opinions of the Natives* (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1824), 128.

Hannay's musquetry [*sic*] and small guns did great execution among them, and they drew off."[77] Afterward, a Mowachaht came forward and begged for peace. Trade commenced once again and continued until the British trader sailed for China.

Also during this voyage, one of Hanna's sailors played a practical joke on Maquinna, a stunt with long-lasting consequences. The Mowachaht chief was so upset by this that he told Esteban Jose Martínez about the insult four years later. Eager to highlight the poor behavior of a British captain, Martínez recorded the incident in his journal:

> [O]ne day, when Macuina, the principal chief of the village in this port where we are lying, went on board [Hanna's] ship to visit him, and when they had seated him near the binnacle, they sprinkled a little powder under his chair, giving him to understand that this was an honor which they showed to chiefs. He supposed that the powder was dark colored sand, but he soon felt its effect, when one of the Englishmen set off the charge. Poor Macuina was raised from the deck by the explosion and had his buttocks scorched; he showed me the scars.[78]

Unlike violence apparently directed at lower-ranking Indians, this insult struck at the chief. This insult and Hanna's killing of twenty Indians for a petty theft prompted Maquinna to limit the flow of furs. While violence did not shut down trade at this time, it did limit it – Hanna complained that Maquinna only traded half the furs his people had. More importantly, this incident demonstrated that chiefs controlled the rules of exchange and could frustrate Anglo commercial desires.

Rival chiefs could turn violence against another group of indigenous people in the borderland to their advantage. Cleaskinah, an Ahousaht chief and lesser rival to Maquinna, exchanged names with Hanna probably during his 1785 voyage to the

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[77] Except where noted, these quotations come from a letter "from a gentleman in China" published in London's *Daily Universal Register* (precursor to the *London Times*) on August 21, 1787. This letter deals with Hanna's first voyage. Galois, "The Voyages of James Hanna to the Northwest Coast: Two Documents," *British Columbia Studies*, no. 103 (1994).

[78] This quotation from Martínez's journal appears in W. Kaye Lamb and Tomás Bartroli, "James Hanna and John Henry Cox: The First Maritime Fur Trader and His Sponsor," *British Columbia Studies* 84 (1989-90): 15. As we will see later, Martínez did not have the best relationship with the indigenous inhabitants of Nootka Sound.

Northwest Coast.[79] Hearing of the conflict between Hanna and Maquinna, Cleaskinah recognized the opportunity to gain trade goods from the British vessel rather than mediated through the more powerful Mowachaht chief. Hanna welcomed the Ahousaht chief's offer because Maquinna had limited trade.

The non-Native scramble for furs encouraged some chiefs to raid other indigenous peoples possessing "soft gold." Late in the summer of 1788, Meares witnessed Maquinna, Callicum, and Comekala lead a Mowachaht navy north to wage war on a distant people. Although Maquinna told Meares that they were retaliating against those who had attacked a village under the leadership of his grandmother, the battle resulted in a "great booty of sea-otter skins."[80] Some chiefs tried to gain non-Natives allies in their conflicts against others. For example, when Bodega y Quadra's cabin boy turned up dead in 1792, Maquinna attempted to convince the Spaniards that a rival on the other side of Nootka Sound had ordered the murder. Maquinna offered to have his brother Comekala take a Spanish launch, armed with several swivel guns, to punish the murderer. Maquinna wanted this to be a joint Spanish-Mowachaht expedition so that his enemies would know that "Maquinna is the same as Quadra, and Quadra is the same as Maquinna."[81] More than two decades later, Maquinna confided to a French trader that he missed the Spanish post at Yuquot because its presence had frightened his enemies.[82] As

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[79] This making of fictive kin was first discussed in Chapter One. See Galois, "The Voyages of James Hanna to the Northwest Coast"; and Lamb and Bartroli, "James Hanna and John Henry Cox."

[80] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 209.

[81] José Mariano Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka: An Account of Nootka Sound in 1792*, trans. Iris Higbie Wilson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), 57. For more on the importance of exchanging names to create fictive kinship ties, see Chapter One.

[82] Camille de Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World between the Years 1816-1819, and Trading for Sea Otter Fur on the Northwest Coast of America* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1981), 115. Maquinna tried to convince the French to establish a permanent trading post at Nootka Sound for the same reason.

historian Ned Blackhawk argues, imperialism often resulted in displaced violence, where one group of indigenous peoples committed violent acts against others for reasons related to colonial processes such as trade.[83] In the *ča·di·* borderland, displaced violence happened along indigenous lines of tension. Maquinna took this opportunity to strike at long-time enemies. For these influential chiefs, the ability to wage war and plunder others indicated their power to control space in areas distant from home villages.

Sometimes, a chief manipulated the borderland's dynamics of rivalry and conflict to expand his influence. Tatoosh did so in the late eighteenth century. When Meares agreed to the exclusive trading arrangement with Wickaninnish in 1788, this action exacerbated preexisting tensions within the borderland, and Tatoosh maneuvered himself into a position to extend his influence deeper into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. After Meares demonstrated that he would not offer the Makah chief a similar trading arrangement, Tatoosh became worried that Wickaninnish's exclusive agreement with the British trader would give him an inordinate amount of regional influence. Therefore, when the *Felice* returned to the area and sent its longboat deeper into the strait, Tatoosh seized the opportunity to strike at the Meares-Wickaninnish alliance. Leveraging his kinship ties with the Pacheedaht on Vancouver Island, Tatoosh convinced them to join his warriors in attacking the British longboat just as the Makah chief declared war on Wickaninnish. Pacheedahts preferred an alliance with the powerful chief from Cape Flattery to falling prey to Wickaninnish's expansion. Neighbors of the Clayoquot chief, the Pacheedahts worried that they might be next, especially now that he had strong ties to a non-Native trader who provided him with firearms and metal weapons.

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[83] Blackhawk, *Violence over the Land*.

However, the alliance with Tatoosh came at a cost. Instead of conquest at the hands of the Clayoquots, Pacheedahts needed to provide furs to the Makah chief. When the *Lady Washington* sailed into the Strait of Juan de Fuca a year later, the American crew complained that Pacheedahts and others along the strait had no furs because "Tatooth of Clahaset" had already procured them.[84] It also appears that Tatoosh used this foothold on Vancouver Island to expand his authority even farther into the borderland. Probably through a combination of trade opportunities, kinship ties, and intimidation and violence, Tatoosh held sway over a village on the southwest corner of the island by 1792.[85] Similarly, in 1793, after Tatoosh had finished trading furs with the Boston vessel *Jefferson* at Barkley Sound, he "took the opportunity to plunder the [local] natives."[86] What *Jefferson*'s captain mistook as plundering was Tatoosh exerting his titleholder's privilege to collect furs and other goods from people over whom he held authority.[87]

However, Tatoosh's influence over non-Makah villages and peoples did not go uncontested. By 1825, Makahs were engaged in an "inveterate war" with the Clayoquots and Ditidahts, enslaving many to sell to indigenous communities as far south as the

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[84] Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 2nd ed. (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), 72.

[85] Tatoosh piloted Valdés's *Mexicana* to one of his villages near present day Victoria, B.C. The Spanish noted that the Makah chief "was one of the most feared of all the chiefs who live on these shores, and that he had won the greatest respect and authority among [the inhabitants of this village], on account of his bravery, ability and character." Josef Espinosa y Tello, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America. Being the Narrative of the Voyage Made in the Year 1792 by the Schooners Sutil and Mexicana to Explore the Strait of Fuca* (London: Argonaut Press, 1930), 36.

[86] Howay, "A Yankee Trader on the Northwest Coast, 1791-1795," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (1930): 87.

[87] Non-Natives often mistook titleholders exercising their chiefly privileges as "looting," "plundering," or "stealing." For example, Colnett complained that they could not purchase as many fresh salmon as they wanted because chief Oughomeize (Muchalaht) kept intercepting canoes and taking fish when the Muchalaht fishermen returned to his waters. Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 111.

Columbia River.[88] Similarly, neighboring peoples rankled at Makah influence in the *ča·di·* borderland. S'Klallams along the northern edge of the Olympic Peninsula and Quilleutes to the south maintained antagonistic relations with Makahs through the mid-nineteenth century.[89]

Some non-Natives also stole from Indians, who then retaliated. For example, in 1787, Captain Barkley angered the Nootka Sound chiefs when he ignored indigenous trading protocols by intercepting canoes and seizing sea otter skins, only offering Indians what he thought proper.[90] In 1803, Maquinna complained to his "white slave" John Jewitt that Captain Tawnington – a man his people had treated well when he wintered at Nootka Sound – entered Maquinna's longhouse when the chief was gone and stole forty of his best furs at musketpoint.[91] Some captains kidnapped Indians to labor on their vessels. For example, a Makah told John Scouler in 1825 about being kidnapped by Captain Ayres in 1811, along with a dozen others from the Columbia River.[92] Additionally, non-Natives committed actions that indigenous peoples would have perceived as theft. Northwest Coast societies believed that everything had an owner. So when Europeans and Anglo Americans entered sovereign spaces of titleholders and helped themselves to water, driftwood, timber, fish, sea mammals, game, and wild plants, Indians saw this as stealing. These thefts encouraged reciprocal takings by indigenous peoples.

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[88] John Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America (1824-25-26)," *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* 6 (1905): 195-96.

[89] Ann M. Renker and Erna Gunther, "Makah," in *Northwest Coast*, 423.

[90] Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 106.

[91] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 127. Howay thinks this might have been Capt. Ewen of the British schooner *Prince William Henry*. He wintered at Friendly Cove in 1792-93. See Howay, *A List of Trading Vessels in Maritime Fur Trade, 1785-1825* (Ottawa: Royal Society of Canada, 1930), 117. During the 1803 attack on the *Boston*, Maquinna took Jewitt and another survivor as slaves. This incident is discussed in detail later in the chapter.

[92] Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America," 205.

Some Europeans struck indiscriminately at chiefs and commoners alike. In 1789, Esteban Jose Martínez established a settlement and fort at Nootka Sound to strengthen Spanish sovereignty in the face of Russian, English, and U.S. encroachments along the west coast of North America. Martínez was an unpopular commander – the expedition's naturalist, José Mariano Moziño, described him as a "ferocious pirate whose avarice did not respect a single thing" – and especially brutal violence marked his sojourn at Nootka Sound.[93] For example, when Callicum, the second highest-ranked chief in Nootka Sound, called Martínez a "wicked man," the captain had him killed. Callicum had boarded the *Princessa* to offer the captain some fish; however, before the chief could present the gift, Martínez snatched it from his hands. This caused Callicum to depart immediately, calling out *peshae, peshae* (bad, bad) as he got into his canoe with his wife and child.[94] When Martínez misfired while shooting at the retreating chief, another Spaniard shot Callicum dead. His body tumbled into the sea and sank. When the chief's father begged Martínez for permission to "creep for the body beneath the water," the captain refused the request until presented with a sufficient quantity of sea otter pelts.[95] Moziño noted that Callicum's "blood with which the sea was tinted, saddened the natives beyond measure" and prompted Maquinna to flee Nootka Sound to seek safety among Wickaninnish.[96]

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[93] Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka*, 75.

[94] Chinook jargon dictionaries note that *peshak* means "bad." George Gibbs, *Dictionary of the Chinook Jargon, or Indian Trade Language, Now in General Use on the Northwest Coast, Adapted for General Business* (Olympia: T. G. Lowe, 1873).

[95] Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789 from China to the North-West Coast of America*, 118.

[96] Moziño, *Noticias De Nutka*, 76. The Indian inhabitants of Nootka Sound were not the only ones to have trouble with Martínez. He seized several English trading vessels and sent their crews to San Blas (Mexico). His confrontational actions precipitated the Nootka Sound Controversy, which resulted in the loss of Spanish claims to the Northwest Coast. See Gormly, "Early Culture Contact on the Northwest Coast, " 17-22. See also David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 285-289.

Nuu-chah-nulth oral histories reveal a darker side to the Spanish time at Nootka Sound.[97] Martínez's Yuquot fort included a blacksmith shop to manufacture small metal trade items and to supply the garrison with arms. Nuu-chah-nulth histories remember that some Spaniards mistreated young Indian girls, pulling them into the blacksmith's shop "without any romance." The blacksmith always had a red-hot iron ready for those who refused. According to an oral account, the smith would poke the hot iron into a girl's vagina if she refused his unwanted advances; some died from their injuries.[98]

Some Spaniards attempted to produce imperial space by controlling Natives through violence and intimidation. Martínez killed Callicum because the chief had disrespected him in front of his men on his own vessel. Already unpopular among his crew, perhaps he feared that allowing this level of disrespect would encourage his crew to do the same or even mutiny. Similarly, he demonstrated his spatial control over the very waters of Friendly Cove by prohibiting Callicum's father from recovering his son's body. In this violent environment shaped by the "ferocious" Martínez, his men felt that they had the power to deploy sexual violence against Native women.[99] From their perspective, Mowachahts needed to learn the value of hierarchy in Spanish spaces such as the blacksmith's shop and the *Princessa*. Far from disapproving official eyes, some Spaniards deployed such violence to demonstrate their control over Yuquot.

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[97] The following is summarized from an account in Barbara S. Efrat and W. J. Langlois, "The Contact Period as Recorded by Indian Oral Traditions," *Sound Heritage* 7, no. 1 (1978): 60.

[98] As Peter Webster, the Nuu-chah-nulth who told this history, noted, Spaniards have never admitted to this horrifying abuse.

[99] Cherokee scholar Andrea Smith makes the connection between the colonial production of space and sexual violence, arguing that "colonial sexual violence establishes the ideology that Native bodies are inherently violable – and by extension, that Native lands are also inherently violable." Smith, *Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005), 12.

Spanish abuse of Mowachahts affected cross-cultural interactions because news spread in the borderland. A year after Martínez abandoned the Yuquot outpost, Makahs resisted similar Spanish efforts to produce imperial space at Cape Flattery. In late July 1790, Manuel Quimper sailed the *Princesa Real* into Neah Bay, took possession for the Spanish empire, and named it Nuñez Gaona. Although noting the excellent shelter the bay offered and that the surrounding country appeared fertile with several level spots for settlement, he did not stay long:

> [A]fter having learned that the inhabitants of this bay are warlike, daring and thieves, and had acquired the information that in the present year five foreign vessels had been there to trade for furs. The natives pride themselves on having killed the captain of one of these, an infamy which embraced also one of our soldiers, but who miraculously escaped from their hands. He had become separated from the other soldiers and the sailors who went to wash their clothes, and was treated by the Indians with some wild fruit. Pointing out to him where they had obtained it he allowed them to take him along, but as soon as they had him at a distance where he could not be helped by our men they fell on him with blows from limbs of trees, with arrows, and with the very cutlass which he carried for his defense. Leaving him apparently mortally wounded they went away, but he had the good fortune to be cured of his wounds during the voyage.[100]

As some Spaniards accrued a nasty reputation, Makah resistance earned them a reputation for fierce independence that endured for the next century.

Despite the Makah's warlike reputation, the viceroy of New Spain – gazing at a map while sitting over a thousand miles away from Cape Flattery – concluded that Nuñez Gaona was a suitable spot for a new Spanish garrison. In 1792, he ordered Salvador Fidalgo to fortify the port by establishing a permanent Spanish presence there. Fidalgo's *Princessa* anchored at Nunñez Gaona in late May. After taking possession of the site with the customary formalities – erection of a cross and reading of the *Requirimiento*, which ordered Indians to accept Spanish rule and Christian conversion – Fidalgo's crew began

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[100] Manuel Quimper to Viceroy Conde de Revilla Gigedo, 13 November 1790, in Henry Raup Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan De Fuca* (Santa Ana: Fine Arts Press, 1933), 80.

building the outpost, which consisted of a shed, bakery, provisional barracks, blacksmith's shop, corral for cattle, and garden.

Relations among the Spanish and the People of the Cape remained tense. Recalling the earlier Makah assault on a sailor from Quimper's expedition and the fate of Hezeta's crew that put ashore just south of Cape Flattery, Fidalgo took precautions. He kept a longboat close to shore to evacuate the garrison if the Makah attacked. The Spaniards fortified the outpost and protected it with six small cannons. He only allowed chiefs on board to trade, and he refused to provide them with arms or even knives. At sunset, Fidalgo's crew fired a cannon to warn Makahs to stay away from the *Princessa* and the outpost until dawn. These actions indicated that Fidalgo understood the tenuous hold Spain had over Makah space.

At the beginning of July, Antonio Serantes, the *Princessa's* pilot, disappeared while hunting in the woods behind the outpost. The following morning, twenty men and several dogs searched the woods in vain. Meanwhile, a Makah told Fidalgo that Chief Tatoosh had killed the Spanish pilot.[101] In a fit of rage, Fidalgo fired on two canoes of Makahs, killing all within except a boy of fifteen and a girl of six.[102] Several days later, Serantes's body was found in the woods. When interviewed by Bodega y Quadra not long after this incident, Tatoosh related that others had murdered and robbed Serantes before fleeing the area. Although the commander did not believe Tatoosh, he realized the precarious nature of the tiny Spanish settlement and decided to befriend the powerful chief by giving gifts for sharing this information.

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[101] Although the Spanish sources do not note what would have caused Tatoosh to kill Serantes, in 1863, Captain John (Makah) shared with Swan an oral history of this incident, relating that Makahs had killed Serantes for committing several rapes. Swan, Manuscript Journal, 136.

[102] This action earned him reprimands from Bodega y Quadra (Fidalgo's superior at Nootka Sound), the viceroy at San Blas, and even the Spanish king.

While Makahs continued trading with the Spanish, tensions remained high. Canoes of warriors intimidated passing vessels, and chiefs exchanged sea otter pelts with British and American vessels, something that likely frustrated Fidalgo because these competitors took valuable furs away from him. Makahs told any non-Spanish captain who would listen that they disliked the intruders. Constant Makah threats, coupled with the inability of Bodega y Quadra and George Vancouver – empowered by the British Crown to resolve the Nootka Sound Controversy – to settle the Pacific boundary claims between their respective empires, encouraged the viceroy to abandon Neah Bay.[103] Less than four months after Fidalgo sailed the *Princessa* into Nuñez Gaona, Bodega y Quadra ordered him to abandon the fledgling outpost and remove his garrison to Nootka Sound. Once the Spanish retreated from Neah Bay, Makahs dismantled the outpost as if to eradicate its former presence. They burned what they could not use, threw the bricks in a nearby creek, and transformed the site into a refuse heap.[104] Makahs had stymied Spanish efforts at producing imperial space in their customary territory.

Legacies of Violence in the *ča·di·* Borderland

Borderland conditions occasionally resulted in dramatic incidents, which have become infamous examples of "savage" violence in non-Native histories. For example, in 1803, Maquinna and his warriors attacked the *Boston* after Captain Salter had offended

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[103] This section on the brief Spanish outpost at Neah Bay is assembled from Wagner, *Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan De Fuca*, 59-69; Gormly, "Early Culture Contact on the Northwest Coast," 31-32; Espinosa y Tello, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America*, 26-28; Howay, "The Voyage of the Hope, 1790-1792," *Washington Historical Quarterly* XI, no. 1 (1920): 28; and Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast*, 409-416.

[104] Swan, "The Coast Tribes of Washington Territory," *Puget Sound Herald*, 10 February 1860. When Swan first went out to Neah Bay in March 1859, he could find no trace of the old Spanish fort. Swan, 18 March 1859, Diary 1, Swan Papers.

the Mowachaht chief. Maquinna enslaved the two survivors, John Jewitt and John Thompson, the ship's blacksmith and sail maker. While the Anglo-American captain's rudeness over a broken fowling piece sparked the actual violence, Maquinna later confided to Jewitt that earlier incidents, such as the Spanish killing of Callicum and other transgressions, had "excited in the breast of Maquinna an ardent desire for revenge, the strongest passion of the savage heart, and though many years had elapsed their commission, still they were not forgotten."[105] Nuu-chah-nulth oral histories from Nootka Sound blame Spanish violence for angering Mowachahts to the point of attacking any non-Native vessel when the opportunity presented itself.[106]

But more than the chief's "ardent desire for revenge" caused Maquinna's attack on the *Boston*. By 1803, Friendly Cove had already become peripheral to maritime fur traders.[107] Few furs could be found here; the small amount that Maquinna had came from distant villages. These numbers had dwindled since the late-1790s when traders began collecting furs from the supplier villages, thereby cutting out Maquinna as the middleman.[108] Fewer furs meant that the Mowachaht chief secured a smaller quantity of trade goods, which resulted in the waning of his chiefly influence in the *ča·di·* borderland. Fewer vessels stopped at Friendly Cove during this time, and they sought supplies: fresh and dried fish, whale oil, freshwater, and timber to repair ships. These provisions brought

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[105] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 128.

[106] Efrat and Langlois, "The Contact Period as Recorded by Indian Oral Traditions," 60.

[107] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 23; Howay, *A List of Trading Vessels in Maritime Fur Trade*. By the late 1790s, the Queen Charlotte Islands had become the favored location to purchase furs.

[108] For example, the Nimpkish Kwakwaka'wakw, who once sent their furs to Maquinna via the overland "grease trails," began exchanging the valuable pelts directly with non-Native traders by the 1790s. By the turn of the century, the Nimpkish encountered non-Native traders frequently enough that they no longer sent furs to Maquinna. Helen Codere, "Kwakiutl: Traditional Culture," in *Northwest Coast*, 363; and Clayton, *Islands of Truth*, 126.

fewer valued goods than what had once come to Maquinna and his people. Therefore, his desire to re-establish his influence by seizing a wealth of trade goods likely contributed toward the decision to attack the *Boston*.

Maquinna quickly capitalized on his victory. Representing twenty tribes to the north and south, a great number of canoes arrived at Yuquot a few days after taking the *Boston*. Maquinna arranged to awe his visitors with his chiefly power. The Mowachaht chief assembled his warriors on the beach, each carrying at least one loaded musket and wearing clothes pillaged from the vessel. Jewitt noted:

> Nothing could be more ludicrous than the appearance of this motley group of savages collected on the shore, dressed, as they were, with their ill-gotten finery, in the most fantastic manner, some in women's smocks, taken from our cargo, others in *Kotsacks*, (or cloaks,) of blue, red, or yellow broad-cloth, with stockings drawn over their heads, and their necks hung round with numbers of powder-horns, shot-bags, and cartouch-boxes, some of them having no less than ten muskets a piece on their shoulders, and five or six daggers in their girdles.[109]

One of Maquinna's new "white slaves," Thompson the sail maker, readied a cannon that the chief had mounted in front of his longhouse. When the visitors approached, Maquinna leaped to the roof of his longhouse, began violently drumming on the boards, and then ordered the muskets and cannon fired. Afterward, he invited his guests into his longhouse, where he feasted them for days on whale blubber, smoked herring spawn, dried fish, and whale oil. In a grand potlatch, Maquinna gifted the seized loot to his guests, all in the name of his son, Sat-sat-sok-sis. These crafted displays illustrated to all that Maquinna still held enough power to control space on his own terms. Additionally, this opportunity strengthened not only his name, but also that of his son.

Similarly, in 1811, when the Anglo-American captain Jonathan Thorn, who already had earned a reputation for anger and poor judgment, insulted a Clayoquot chief,

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[109] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 45.

warriors attacked the *Tonquin*.[110] The dispute began when Thorn and a chief disagreed over the price of some goods; in anger, the captain struck the leader in the face.[111] Later that day, several canoes approached, offering furs to trade. Thorn allowed all the Indians onboard, despite warnings from a Makah interpreter he had picked up along the Washington coast. The crew became anxious due to the overwhelming number of Indians on the deck and the fact that the few women present stayed in the canoes. However, Thorn scorned their anxieties, believing that they had enough firearms to repel any attack. But moments later, Thorn himself became afraid when Clayoquots surrounded him and cut him off from the crew. At this point, he ordered the Indians to get off his ship and sent his crew scurrying to ready the ship to sail away. Instead of departing, the Clayoquots pulled weapons from the furs and attacked. Striking crewmembers unconscious, they threw them into the sea, where women in canoes dispatched them with their paddles. Clayoquots clubbed to death the captain. Leaping overboard, the Makah interpreter surrendered himself to the women. He remained a slave for two years until his family redeemed him.[112]

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[110] During the eight-month voyage from New York to the mouth of the Columbia, Thorn had earned a reputation for irascibility and stubbornness. His poor judgment cost the lives of eight crewmembers when he sent them into treacherous waters at the mouth of the Columbia to seek a channel for the *Tonquin*. For a concise overview of the voyage of the *Tonquin* prior to her demise, see Carlos A. Schwantes, *The Pacific Northwest: An Interpretive History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 56-57.

[111] Unless otherwise noted, details regarding the attack on the *Tonquin* are from Gabriel Franchère and J. V. Huntington, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of America in the Years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814; or, the First American Settlement of the Pacific* (New York: Redfield, 1854), 179-86. See also Ross Cox, *The Columbia River; or, Scenes and Adventures During a Residence of Six Years on the Western Side of the Rocky Mountains among Various Tribes of Indians Hitherto Unknown; Together with a Journey across the American Continent*, Vol. 1, 2d ed. (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1832), 88-96. It is unclear who Thorn struck. Due to the large number of warriors involved in the attack, the chief was probably Wickaninnish. However, other sources note that the attack on the *Tonquin* was done without Wickaninnish's knowledge. For example, see Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America," 194.

[112] Controversy also surrounds the identity of the interpreter. Howay, "The Loss of the *Tonquin*," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1922): 83-84. Some sources point to him being picked up in the southern part of the *ča·di·* borderland near Gray's Harbor, while others mention that Thorn picked him up

Rather than allowing the Clayoquots to take the vessel, four survivors set the ship's magazine – nine thousand pounds of gunpowder – on fire, and the resultant explosion destroyed the *Tonquin*. As one eyewitness recalled decades later, "the noise of the explosion made the earth tremble, and... fragments of the ship were flying through the air everywhere: after the explosion what remained of the ship on the water was soon consumed by fire, thereby killing all of the Indians who had assembled on board that morning."[113] The explosion and ensuing fire killed 100 to 200 Clayoquots.[114]

Unlike Maquinna's seizure of the *Boston*, the attack on the *Tonquin* did not result in a wealth of looted goods. However, similar motivations appear to have resulted in this violent incident. In both cases, captains had disrespected a ranking titleholder. Similar to other indigenous peoples in the region, Clayoquots had suffered earlier insults from non-Natives captains and crew. The Boston trader Josiah Roberts had upset Wickaninnish in 1793 when he failed to turn over a vessel the Clayoquot chief had paid for with a down payment of fifty prime sea otter skins.[115] Fresh on the Clayoquot chief's mind in 1811 was a more recent incident. Captain Ayres from Boston – the same individual who also kidnapped Indians and forced them to labor on his ship – had hired a dozen Clayoquots as

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on Vancouver Island near Nootka Sound. In 1853, an old Makah chief claiming to be the interpreter aboard the *Tonquin* told Samuel Hancock, the first Anglo-American trader at Neah Bay, about the 1811 attack and stated that Thorn had picked him up at Neah Bay. See Samuel Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast: Containing an Account of Travels and Adventures Among the Indians, Their Manners and Customs, Their Treatment of Prisoners, and also a Description of the Country* (1860), unpublished typed manuscript version in the Samuel Hancock Papers, UWSC, 145-153. I believe that he was probably a prominent Makah; only titleholders had the chance of being redeemed from slavery, and Makahs would have had the political and kinship connections to initiate redeeming this individual.

[113] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 149.

[114] For the low number, see the *Missouri Gazette*, 15 May 1813. The higher number comes from Cox's and Franchère's accounts.

[115] Perhaps seeking to counter the influence of Europeans with a vessel of his own, Wickaninnish desired his own schooner. Instead of surrendering the vessel to Wickaninnish, Roberts sent the ship to the Columbia River to trade. Howay, "A Yankee Trader on the Northwest Coast," 87 & 89.

seal hunters for his vessel in March of that year. After promising to return them to their homes, he instead abandoned them on "some desert islands" in San Francisco Bay. This angered Wickaninnish, who vowed to "avenge themselves on the first white men who appeared among them" – the *Tonquin* turned out to be that first ship.[116] Although the declining number of available sea otter pelts was less severe than the situation in Nootka Sound – Wickaninnish still had plentiful suppliers from distant villages on Vancouver Island – Clayoquot Sound suffered from smaller numbers of furs. This meant that Clayoquot chiefs would have also worried over their waning influence in the borderland. Most importantly, however, these incidents illustrated that local chiefs such as Maquinna and Wickaninnish still had the ability to control space by their own standards. Despite decades of maritime fur trade encounters, non-Native traders had failed to turn these into Spanish, British, or U.S. spaces.

The 1803 and 1811 attacks on these two American vessels cast a long shadow in the *ča·di·* borderland and changed the local contours of the maritime fur trade. After Maquinna's seizure of the *Boston*, few vessels put in at Nootka Sound, fearing that they too would suffer the same fate. With fewer ships visiting Yuquot, Maquinna utilized indigenous trade networks to send the few sea otter pelts that he did procure to other trading ports, such as Nawitti at the extreme northwest point of Vancouver Island and Fort George at the mouth of the Columbia River.[117] This represented a critical reversal of the earlier pattern where Maquinna received furs from others and benefited from monopolizing the exchanges with traders.

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[116] Franchère and Huntington, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of America*, 187. More information about this incident is on pp. 126-127.

[117] Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World*, 48; and Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America," 195.

When vessels did visit Friendly Cove once again, Maquinna kept a low profile. For example, when the French *Bordelais* sailed into Nootka Sound in 1817, Maquinna approached in a small canoe. Unlike his conduct during previous visits by non-Native ships, Maquinna did not announce his presence through a parade of canoes. Captain Camille de Roquefeuil noted, "[T]here was no ceremony that announced the presence of their chief, but the natives having pointed him out to me, I invited him to come on board."[118] Once aboard, the captain gave the Mowachaht chief a small meal, a present, and a seven-gun salute. Maquinna reciprocated with three small sea otter furs, but he demanded immediate payment for them. Worried that Maquinna might mount an attack on the *Bordelais*, the captain deployed the boarding nets and kept the ship a fair distance away from Yuquot. Eight years later, a Hudson Bay Company ship, the *William and Ann*, sailed into Nootka Sound. This time, a small flotilla of canoes greeted them, but Maquinna was absent; he did not board the vessel until it anchored off Yuquot. Unlike previous encounters with traders, the Mowachaht chief had no sea otter pelts to offer.[119] As with the *Bordelais*, the HBC ship took extra precautions to prevent an attack.

Diplomatic protocols also changed in high encounter areas outside Nootka Sound because chiefs questioned their safety aboard vessels. For example, when the *William and Ann* entered Makah waters after their visit to Nootka Sound, no diplomatic protocol took place. Makah canoes carrying fish greeted the vessel, but Chief Tatoosh was not among the passengers. Instead, he sent a lower-ranking chief, one of his brothers, to facilitate the exchange of fish for trade goods.[120] Similarly, when the *Bordelais* made a second visit to

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[118] Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World*, 45.

[119] Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America," 192.

[120] Ibid. 195.

Nootka Sound in 1818, a delegation from Clayoquot – minus Wickaninnish – tried to lure the French vessel away from Maquinna's space.[121] However, the French did not trust the Clayoquot offer. With the attack of the *Tonquin* still fresh on their minds, they sailed south for California instead of visiting Wickaninnish. Apparently, the highest-ranking chiefs, Maquinna, Tatoosh, and Wickaninnish, no longer felt safe leading delegations to trading vessels. They feared that captains might take them hostage to extort furs from them or to punish them for attacks on non-Native vessels. The diplomatic protocol that once provided structure for encounters between Natives and non-Natives appears to have become a casualty of both violence and overhunted sea otters. More importantly, abandoning the diplomatic protocol eroded the authority and influence that chiefs accrued through monopolizing the maritime fur trade exchanges.

The dramatic attacks on the *Boston* and *Tonquin* reconfigured dynamics in the borderland. By the turn of the century, trade patterns had already changed as sea otter pelts dwindled in this region and non-Native traders increasingly looked to the Queen Charlotte Islands north of Vancouver Island for furs. However, the dearth of sea otter pelts was not uniform throughout the borderland. Tatoosh and Wickaninnish had access to sea otter pelts well into the nineteenth century, a situation that must have rankled their rival, Maquinna.[122] But places such as Friendly Cove and Clayoquot remained vital ports for resupplying vessels until the attacks on the *Boston* and the *Tonquin*. Then vessels avoided these ports long afterward.

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[121] Roquefeuil, *Voyage around the World*, 118.

[122] Jewitt noted that Makahs and Wickaninnish's people provided the best quality and greatest quantity of sea otter furs. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 74, 103, & 107. When the U.S. Exploring Expedition (the Wilkes Expedition) stopped at Neah Bay in 1841, Makahs had many sea otter furs to trade, but they offered such "exorbitantly high prices" that the Anglo Americans refused to buy any. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842*, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845), 297 & 486.

Maquinna – and probably Wickaninnish and other borderland chiefs – had their critics. The attacks on the *Boston* and *Tonquin* angered some because they had driven away the valuable trade vessels. Someone warned Maquinna that northern neighbors intended to destroy the Mowachahts for attacking the *Boston*. Although this never happened, the rumor indicated that Maquinna's action had displeased others. Fearing the retribution his critics might take, the Mowachaht chief even had his "white slaves" Jewitt and Thompson stand guard over him at night.[123] Some Nuu-chah-nulth of the late-twentieth century remembered Maquinna as "the first white man" among their people.[124] Oral histories characterize him as arrogant, aggressive, and high-handed; they criticize him for acting on his own decisions rather than consulting his people.

Reflecting the failure of non-Native traders to turn the indigenous borderland into imperial spaces, the attacks on the *Boston* and *Tonquin* affected this region. Along with the dwindling supply of sea otter pelts, these violent incidents contributed to a geographic shift in the maritime fur trade. Fearing retribution from non-Native captains, chiefs kept a lower profile. The diplomatic protocol that had structured cross-cultural exchanges fell out of use, which eroded the influence of chiefs who had once monopolized the trade. Overall, ships began avoiding the Vancouver Island villages because these attacks confirmed the geography of fear many non-Native captains imagined for this region. This augmented the rising influence of Makah chiefs and of Neah Bay as a safe port of call. As

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[123] Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 145-146 & 165-166.

[124] Susan Mary Kenyon, *The Kyuquot Way: A Study of a West Coast (Nootkan) Community* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1980), 124. Interestingly, his reputation did not sully the title of "Maquinna." It is still an important name owned by specific Nuu-chah-nulth families, and only respected individuals can earn the right to call themselves "Maquinna." Chief Michael Maquinna is one of the current members of the Mowachaht/Muchalaht Council of Chiefs. Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nation, "Contacts," (available at http://www.yuquot.ca/contacts.html) [accessed January 2009].

we shall see in the next chapter, this situation shaped the dynamics of the land-fur trade, which came to eclipse the maritime fur trade in the Pacific Northwest.

Conclusion

Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh dominated much of the maritime fur trade in the *čaʕdiʕ* borderland. The manners of their deaths in the 1820s illustrate the consequences of their responses to the changing dynamics of the indigenous marine borderland in the early nineteenth century. Of the three, we only have specific information about the death of Maquinna. The last archival reference to Maquinna comes from an HBC trader in 1825 – he described the infamous Mowachaht chief as an "ageing man."[125] Oral histories report that in the late-1820s, Maquinna planned to raid his uncle's Muchalaht village to take their salmon stream.[126] Muchalaht women living at Yuquot warned their people after overhearing the chief's plan. When Maquinna and his warriors paddled upriver toward the target village, his uncle led an ambush and personally killed Maquinna by holding his head underwater until he drowned.

At the hands of his uncle and during a war expedition against his relatives, Maquinna's death reveals that this maritime fur trade chief had become desperate. When Scouler visited Nootka Sound in 1825, he noted the scarcity of European goods among the Mowachaht.[127] By this time, the maritime fur trade had shifted away from Friendly Cove and the Mowachaht chief's control. In order to reestablish his influence, Maquinna felt that he needed to do something dramatic on the scale of what he had accomplished

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[125] John Rodgers Jewitt and Hilary Stewart, *The Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt: Captive of Maquinna* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 184.

[126] This was an oral history told by Andy Callicum. See Ibid.

[127] Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America," 193.

over two decades earlier with his attack on the *Boston* – the aged leader decided to seize a valuable indigenous resource, a nearby productive salmon stream owned by his uncle. With the paucity of non-Native vessels stopping at Nootka Sound and the Mowachahts' limited supply of sea otter pelts, Maquinna turned to a common strategy in the borderland – seizing a lucrative resource site from a rival in order to augment one's influence.

Apparently, the deaths of Tatoosh and Wickaninnish were neither dramatic nor violent. No oral histories tell of these leaders dying at the hands of rivals while making desperate gambles to maintain or reestablish influence. This suggests that these chiefs died of old age. When Scouler sailed into Makah waters in 1825, he met an elderly brother to the still-living Tatoosh. This is the last archival reference to the Makah chief. By 1841, when Wilkes's U.S. Exploring Expedition lingered at Neah Bay, they encountered Chief George, then the ranking titleholder.[128] Wickaninnish also seems to have died of old age sometime after 1820.[129]

In contrast to the violent death of Maquinna, the quiet passing of Tatoosh and Wickaninnish illuminates the changing borderland conditions that privileged Makahs and Clayoquots. First, the villages of Cape Flattery and Clayoquot Sound were better positioned to benefit from valuable indigenous trade goods harvested from whales and other sea mammals.[130] This meant that Tatoosh and Wickaninnish could maintain their influence in the borderland more easily than Maquinna once the maritime fur trade

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[128] Wilkes, *United States Exploring Expedition*, 486.

[129] Valerie L. Mathes, "Wickaninnish, a Vancouver Island Chieftain: His Life as Told by Foreign Visitors"" (University of New Mexico, 1965), 90.

[130] Jewitt noted that Kla-i-zarts (Makahs) and Wickaninnish's people provided great quantities of whale oil and other sea mammals products. During the same period, he described Maquinna's concern over his lack of whaling success. Jewitt, *Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt*, 107 & 151-152. Several fur trade accounts also characterized Clayoquots and Makahs as being more successful whalers than the inhabitants of Nootka Sound. For example, see Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast*, 70. See also Colnett and Galois, *A Voyage to the North West Side of America*, 404.

shifted to the Queen Charlotte Islands. Second, unlike the inhabitants of Nootka Sound, Makahs and Clayoquots still had access to sea otter pelts, albeit in smaller quantities than before. This meant that non-Native vessels traded greater quantities and higher-quality goods with Makahs and Clayoquots for the valued furs. Again, this gave Tatoosh and Wickaninnish an advantage over their rival Maquinna. Finally, because the dramatic attacks on vessels at Nootka and Clayoquot had encouraged vessels to anchor at Neah Bay instead, this also benefitted Tatoosh over his Nuu-chah-nulth rivals. Together, these advantages meant that Wickaninnish and especially Tatoosh did not need to resort to desperate and dangerous violence to maintain or reestablish their authority in the borderland. Violence – or the lack thereof – continued to play a pivotal role in the political dynamics of the *ča·di·* borderland well into the nineteenth century.

Maritime fur trade accounts and log books confirm that theft, intimidation, and violent conflict characterized this industry. Many – but not all – traders believed that Indian attacks on them were unprovoked and due to the inherently "savage" nature of Natives. Obviously, this was not the case. Borderland dynamics and previous incidents established the context of subsequent encounters and made violence multidimensional as Natives clashed with other indigenous peoples and non-Native traders. Colonialism and imperial processes did not create this violence. Instead, they exacerbated preexisting, indigenous lines of tension and conflict, characteristics of the *ča·di·* borderland where distinct peoples contested and shared spaces and resources as they had for generations prior to the arrival of Europeans.

Violence also had productive qualities. Certain chiefs and their people benefitted from conflict and tension in other parts of the borderland. Direct violence against weaker

rivals resulted in the expansion of tribal spaces and resources. Some chiefs manipulated the dynamics of conflict to expand their influence, such as when Tatoosh allied with Pacheedahts to stop both Meares's exploration and the growth of Wickaninnish's influence. This extended Makah space deeper into the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Dramatic incidents of violence, such as Nuu-chah-nulth attacks on the *Boston* and *Tonquin*, indirectly benefited Makahs as this indigenous marine borderland transitioned into the colonial borderland emerging during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

Indigenous chiefs such as Maquinna, Tatoosh, and Wickaninnish used violence to produce and control space on their own terms. They deployed violence strategically to gain or protect resources and spaces. Chiefs also utilized violence as a stabilizing factor to confront rivals who became too powerful. Additionally, they employed violence to control people within the spaces over which they held authority. Most importantly, indigenous leaders applied violence to interrupt Europeans and Anglo Americans from making imperial spaces in the region. Some individuals and peoples – especially Makahs and their various chiefs – disrupted imperial efforts at least through the 1840s. However, as we will see in the next chapter, several important events and the establishment of a colonial borderland began to change this in the decades following the maritime fur trade.

Chapter Three

A Tale of Two Chiefs

On December 24, 1851, the Hudson's Bay Company's brig *Una* wrecked at Neah Bay. With both anchors down, strong winds blew her into Waadah Island at the opening of the bay. Bound for Fort Victoria on the southern end of Vancouver Island, the *Una* carried a load of furs and £300-worth of gold the crew had collected from the Queen Charlotte Islands. Makahs salvaged stores, rigging, and other flotsam from the wreck of the 187-ton vessel. From their perspective, the chiefs of the People of the Cape (Makahs) owned whatever washed ashore at Neah Bay.[1] Then they set fire to what they could not salvage, demonstrating that the foreshore and sea around Cape Flattery was still Makah space.[2]

The dramatic way Makahs expressed their control shocked officials of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) and the nearby Colony of Vancouver Island. Writing to Henry Grey, the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, James Douglas – then Chief Factor of the HBC and governor of the fledgling Colony of Vancouver Island – explained that "the Natives... gathered about the wreck in vast numbers, and behaved with great barbarity towards such of the 'Una's' crew as were landed from the wreck. They broke open and rifled the Seamens' chests, stript [*sic*] them of their clothes, and

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[1] As explained earlier, Makahs call themselves *q*^{w}*idiččaʔa·tx̌*, which means "the People of the Cape."

[2] For a settler-colonial view on the *Una* incident and for more information on her activities in the Queen Charlottes, see Ethelbert Olaf Stuart Scholefield and Frederic William Howay, *British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present*, Vol. 2 (Vancouver: S.J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1914), 2. See also G. P. V. Akrigg and Helen B. Akrigg, *British Columbia Chronicle, 1847-1871: Gold & Colonists* (Vancouver: Discovery Press, 1977), 44-46. For a comprehensive list of HBC vessels, where they were built, and their tonnage, see Alexander Spoehr, "Nineteenth-Century Chapter in Hawai'i's Maritime History: Hudson's Bay Company Merchant Shipping, 1829-1859," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 22 (1988): 99.

maltreated those who attempted, unarmed as they were to defend their property."[3] Only the "timely arrival" of the American schooner *Susan Sturgis* prevented "greater atrocities" from happening. More importantly, at least from Douglas's perspective, the master of the *Susan Sturgis* had kept the valuable furs and gold out of Makah hands.[4]

Douglas believed that the Makah's actions had made it his duty to bring them "to a serious account for their barbarous conduct on that occasion, in order to repress the mischievous consequences likely to arise from their evil example, and deter other Savage Nations from committing wanton outrages on the persons and property of Her Majesty's subjects."[5] Although Chief Kleh-sitt, the highest-ranking Makah titleholder, had already sent messengers to Fort Victoria to apologize for his people's conduct and to offer to pay for lost property, the governor sent the HBC schooner *Cadboro* to Neah Bay with a "well appointed force to demand restitution and compensation from the Cape Flattery Chiefs."[6] Douglas appeared eager to control the outcome of this incident.

Instead, Makah leaders countered the British threat. When the *Cadboro* arrived at Neah Bay, Chief Kleh-sitt told Charles Dodd, the commander of the expedition, that he had already executed ten of the plunderers and burned alive the one accused of setting the vessel on fire. In reality, Kleh-sitt had probably done nothing of the kind. Anyone the Makah chief executed or immolated would had to have been a slave, a fact that Dodd, an

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[3] James Douglas, Gov. Vancouver's Island, to Earl Grey, 29 January 1852, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O. [Colonial Office], Vol. 726, 1852-1856*, pp. 5-10 [microfilm copy in "Correspondence with Hudson's Bay Company relating to conveyance, settlement, and reconveyence of Vancouver Island," Vol. 2 (GR-0332), British Columbia Archives (BCA), Victoria, copied from originals in the Public Records Office, London (PRO series C.O. 134)].

[4] Douglas to Archibald Barclay [HBC Secretary], 3 January 1852, *Douglas Letters, 1841-1858* [photostat copies of originals from the Fort Nisqually Collection at the Huntington Library in San Marino, CA], Puget Sound Agricultural Company Records (PSAC), University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle, WA.

[5] Douglas to Grey, 29 January 1852.

[6] Ibid.

experienced HBC employee, might have known.[7] Within the Northwest Coast culture, high-status individuals occasionally used slaves as proxies to pay for murders, property damage, and theft.[8] The *Cadboro*'s commander quietly accepted the chief's assurances that the perpetrators had been punished since Kleh-sitt never offered up any physical evidence. The Makah chief then restored to the King George men (British) every article of value from the *Una* that his people still possessed. Additionally, he offered an annual payment of whale oil as restitution.[9] Chief Kleh-sitt correctly guessed that these expiations would result in the *Cadboro*'s departure from Makah waters.

Kleh-sitt's actions reflect indigenous protocols of Northwest Coast justice rather than bow to British intimidation. A Native leader – not British officials – had "executed" the guilty Indians, and Kleh-sitt had paid the aggrieved party for the loss of property, as if making peace with another indigenous chief rather than an imperial agent. Moreover, both Dodd and Douglas accepted Kleh-sitt's explanation, thereby acknowledging the chief's authority to punish his people for "crimes" against British citizens and property. However, when reporting back to his superiors in both the colonial and Company offices, Governor Douglas ignored the fact that the Makah chief had handled the threat of British violence in his own manner. The governor condemned the chief's "barbarous actions" of

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[7] Dodd had been stationed in the Columbia District since 1836 as first mate on several HBC vessels, including the *Beaver* and *Cadboro*, both of which engaged regularly with Makahs and other Northwest Coast peoples. See "Charles Dodd Biographical Sheet (1808-1860) (fl. 1833-1860)," June 1999 (updated July 2005), Hudson's Bay Company Archives (HBCA), Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada (available online at http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/archives/hbca/biographical/d/dodd_charles.pdf [accessed April 2009]).

[8] Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 103.

[9] Details on the *Cadboro* expedition appear in James Douglas, Gov. Vancouver's Island, to Earl Grey, 11 February 1852, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vol. 726, 1852-1856*, pp. 12-13 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 2]. See also Douglass [*sic*] to Edmund A. Starling, [Indian Agent for Puget Sound District] 11 February 1852, copy in *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (*ARCIA*) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1852), 175-176.

summary executions and immolation while reassuring his superiors that deploying the *Cadboro* had achieved a suitable result. He believed that this expedition "produced the desired effect of alarming the Natives" and "has made a deep impression in the minds of the Natives, who were intently watching our proceedings."[10] The governor appeared too embarrassed to admit that Cape Flattery was still Makah space under the sovereign power of influential chiefs.

However, this incident highlights the changing balance of power in the mid-nineteenth century *ča·di·* borderland. By 1851, a variety of new actors in the borderland also had the ability – or desired to have the power – to produce and control space. Present in the borderland for more than two decades, the HBC had grown influential. Moreover, during the 1840s, U.S. and British settlers began establishing sawmills, fishing operations, farms, and small settlements in the region. Eager to protect these newcomers, the colonial governments of the United Kingdom and United States grappled with policies for managing the large populations of Indians who still outnumbered whites. Douglas's decision to deploy the *Cadboro* arose from his conviction that the Company should protect white lives and property from the "wanton outrages" of Indians. He believed that only clear example of retributive violence could "awe" the Natives properly.[11]

As settler-colonial power grew, indigenous leaders became divided over how best to manage the changing socio-political dynamics in the borderland. By 1851, two schools of thought appeared among the *q*^{w}*idiččaʔa·tx̌* (the People of the Cape) on dealing with the

[10] Douglas to Grey, 11 February 1852.

[11] For more on vengeance throughout the North American fur trade, see John Phillip Reid, *Patterns of Vengeance: Crosscultural Homicide in the North American Fur Trade* ([Pasadena]: Ninth Judicial Circuit Historical Society, 1999).

expanding settler-colonial world. Known to Anglos as "the White Chief," Kleh-sitt embodied a strategy of accommodation and peace with the King George men and Bostons (Americans). Born sometime between 1807 and 1812, he came of age as a whaler just as U.S. and British coastal traders began purchasing large quantities of whale oil from Makahs. After the death of the previous ranking chief in 1846, Kleh-sitt used the wealth garnered from whale oil to secure his position as the highest chief among the People of the Cape. Chief Kleh-sitt welcomed stronger ties with non-Natives, especially when it gave him an opportunity to exploit them for political gain in his community.[12]

By the early 1850s, Chief Ellacoom represented the other division in the tribe, the side which sought to keep non-Natives at a distance. Born in 1818 or 1819 to a prominent Makah trader, Ellacoom worked as a kitchen scullion at the HBC's Fort Langley located about thirty miles up the Fraser River, which empties into the eastern waters of the borderland. There he lived among King George men who gave him a new name – Flattery Jack – and likely treated him poorly due to his age, race, and position in the kitchens. After someone murdered his father, the teenage Ellacoom took over the family trading activities, traveling through the borderland and beyond to exchange animal skins. Largely through trading pelts rather than whaling, Ellacoom rose to power among his people.

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[12] Information on Kleh-sitt is from George Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States: Reported to the Superintendent of the U. S Coast Survey* ([Washington, DC?]: s.n., 1862), 112. See also "Autobiography of James Lawson," 1879, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Central Library, Silver Spring, MD (available online at http://www.history.noaa.gov/stories_tales/jlawson.html [accessed March 2009]). During the 1852 U.S. Pacific Coast Survey, Lawson was topographical aid to the expedition's commander, Lieutenant George Davidson. Lawson thought that Kleh-sitt was known as the "White Chief" because he had a lighter complexion than other Makahs. Information on the murder of George, the previous chief, in 1846 is from Berthold Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald During the Years 1845-1851: Under the Command of Captain Henry Kellett Being a Circumnavigation of the Globe, and Three Cruizes to the Arctic Regions in Search of Sir John Franklin*, 2 vols. (London: Reeve and Co., 1853), 106-07. This incident is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.

By the 1850s, however, he had earned a reputation for antagonizing Anglos. Being treated poorly as a young scullion and disrespected by HBC traders as a teen stoked the fires of his anger. Moreover, Ellacoom's access to indigenous commodities desired by Anglos dwindled as sea otters and beavers became difficult to find. By the end of the 1840s, he lost most reasons to interact peacefully with non-Natives.[13] Chief Ellacoom found a sympathetic audience among similarly aggrieved Makahs. He likely had led the aggressive salvaging of the *Una*. Chief Ellacoom embodied those indigenous people who worried about the regional expansion of Anglo numbers and power.

The *Una* incident illustrates the complex, interconnected relationships among numerous peoples – both Native and non-Native – of the Northwest Coast.[14] Influential Makah chiefs engaged trade and colonization to maintain their ability to control space, and their actions helped to make colonialism possible in this region. A number of Natives such as Kleh-sitt valued the trading relationship they had with non-Natives, and they feared that the aggressive actions of some like Chief Ellacoom jeopardized engaging the settler-colonial world. Similarly, HBC employees, settlers, and colonial officials found themselves balancing retributive violence with reliance upon local Indians, who provided

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[13] Information on Ellacoom is from "Autobiography of James S. Lawson"; William Fraser Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie, Physician and Fur Trader* (Vancouver: Mitchell Press, 1963), 224 & 242-43; George Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually: Commencing May 30, 1833; Ending September 27, 1859* (Tacoma: Fort Nisqually Association, 1993), Section One, 40-46. Archival sources do not indicate how his father was killed or who murdered him in 1831. Due to the nature of intertribal relationships in the borderland, however, an indigenous person or group of people from another tribe probably murdered him.

[14] Historian Coll Thrush argues that by the 1870s and 1880s "Seattle was an imbricated place" where Indians and settlers were "imbricated into the urban fabric." Coll-Peter Thrush, *Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-over Place* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 66-79, quotations on pp. 69 & 75. I believe that this process had been occurring in the larger Northwest Coast during earlier decades. For example, Anglos engaged in the land-based fur trade in the Columbia River watershed depended on local Chinooks and Kalapuyans for their success in the early nineteenth century. As one historian argues, indigenous contributions "from day one" allowed for non-Native survival in this industry. See Mathais D. Bergmann, "'We Should Lose Much by Their Absence': The Centrality of Chinookans and Kalapuyans to Life in Frontier Oregon," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 109, no. 1 (2008): 37.

the furs, supplies, and food that made colonialism possible in the Northwest Coast during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Some colonial and Company officials worried that too heavy-handed an approach would interrupt their supply of furs and food. Worse, it could amplify interracial violence and endanger settlers. Moreover, new colonial boundaries further complicated the way indigenous borderlanders interacted with newcomers. After the War of 1812, the U.K. and U.S. agreed to jointly occupy the Oregon Country because they could not settle on a boundary demarcating their respective colonial spaces. Although the 1846 Oregon Treaty resolved this issue by creating a boundary along the forty-ninth parallel, people – and especially Indians – living along this line strayed from one side to the other for their own reasons and on their own terms.

Finally, the *Una* incident reveals the racialized nature of settler-colonial power in this colonial border zone. In an act of Anglo solidarity, an American vessel saved British survivors and property from Makah warriors. As a colonial official, Douglas knew that he was ordering the *Cadboro* into U.S. waters to confront American, rather than British, Indians, so he specifically ordered Dodd to avoid hostile measures unless in self defense.[15] Douglas informed Edmund A. Starling, the federal Indian Agent for the Puget Sound district in Oregon Territory, of British actions against the Makah.[16] Like their Anglo counterparts across the border, U.S. officials knew that Northwest Coast Indians outnumbered them, a situation that encouraged whites to unite along racial lines rather than to split along national divisions when it came to fighting or punishing Indians. However, during the mid-nineteenth century, Native deaths from epidemics combined

[15] Douglas to Earl Grey, 29 January 1852, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vol. 726, 1852-1856*, pp. 5-10 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 2].

[16] Douglass [*sic*] to Starling, 11 February 1852.

with increasing numbers of non-Natives emigrants changed the demographics of the region and undercut the ability of Indian peoples to define and control space on indigenous terms.

The Land-Based Fur Trade and Rise of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1811-1848

The rising presence of Anglos altered the *ča·di·* borderland into which Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom emerged as Makah leaders. Beginning in the 1810s, Makahs and other indigenous peoples of the borderland encountered more people from outside the Northwest Coast, including Bostons, King George men. Provided to non-Natives by various indigenous peoples, a wealth of natural resources – furs, fish, whale oil, timber, and coal – drew newcomers to the region during the first half of the nineteenth century. Both Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom developed ties to the most powerful newcomer, the Hudson's Bay Company, as the People of the Cape became one of the key indigenous peoples central to the Company's regional success. When HBC forts appeared in the Northwest Coast, the young Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom experienced the Company's efforts to produce and control space in and around the outposts. During this period, HBC officials at the forts developed a policy of employing retributive violence against Indians for "depredations" on whites and their property. This established a precedent for the racialized nature of settle-colonial power that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. However, as incidents discussed in this chapter reveal, Makah chiefs such as Kleh-sitt and Ellecoom still retained enough power to interrupt imperial processes at least until the early 1850s.

The land-based fur trade shaped the lives of Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom much as the maritime fur trade had done so for their parents. Due to the collapse of sea otter populations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and in the many bays, inlets, and coves – along with the dramatic violence related to the *Boston* and the *Tonquin* – the maritime fur trade in the *ča·di·* borderland had declined. By the start of the century, the smaller, independently financed traders shifted their focus north, collecting furs from Haidas in the Queen Charlotte Islands and other indigenous peoples. The land-based industry resembled its maritime antecedent because both depended on safe, ordered spaces for profitable exchanges. But the divergent strategies for creating safety and order marked the greatest difference between the two trades, influenced the lives of local indigenous peoples, and altered the dynamics of power in the region. As the land-based fur trade grew, Natives and non-Natives became more closely interconnected in Oregon Country.

Unlike the maritime fur trade, the land-based fur trade established long-term, terrestrial toeholds for non-Natives in the Pacific Northwest. Although established during the maritime fur trade, Fort Astoria became the first land-based fur trade outpost at the edge of the *ča·di·* borderland. A German immigrant who had made his fortune in the Northeastern fur trade, John Jacob Astor financed the Pacific Fur Company (PFC), which erected Fort Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River in 1811.[17] As the marine prong of Astor's strategy to build a fort in the Pacific Northwest, Captain Jonathan Thorn's *Tonquin* carried construction supplies and a workforce – including a dozen Kanakas – to

[17] In addition to the PFC employees aboard the *Tonquin*, Astor financed an expedition to cross North America en route to the mouth of the Columbia River. This expedition encountered significant difficulties, and in 1812 they ended up straggling into the partially built fort being constructed by the crew of the *Tonquin*. For more on the experience of the overland expedition, see Alexander Ross and Milo Milton Quaife, *Adventures of the First Settlers on the Oregon or Columbia River* (New York: Citadel Press, 1969), 183-98.

the Northwest to help build the fort.[18] Shortly after the PFC began collecting furs from local Indians, the British warship *Racoon* seized the fort during the War of 1812, and the North West Company of Montreal purchased the establishment. With no other land-based operations to contend with at this point, the newly renamed Fort George became an important hub during the waning years of the maritime fur trade. Regional Indians such as Makahs visited the fort and used indigenous trade networks to send furs there to exchange with Nor'westers, employees of the North West Company.[19]

With the support of the British government, the Hudson's Bay Company absorbed the rival North West Company in 1821 and acquired Fort George. The HBC then began an aggressive expansion in the Pacific Cordillera stretching from the Columbia River to northern British Columbia, establishing fourteen posts between 1821 and 1846.[20] Reflecting the changing focus of trade, in 1825 the HBC replaced the coastal Fort George with Fort Vancouver ninety miles upriver along the northern bank of the Columbia River to better access inland fur trade networks and the beaver skins they provided. The new fort became the HBC's administrative headquarters and supply depot west of the Rocky

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[18] Gabriel Franchère and J. V. Huntington, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Northwest Coast of America in the Years 1811, 1812, 1813, and 1814; or, the First American Settlement of the Pacific* (New York: Redfield, 1854), 53. The Pacific Fur Company's *Beaver* brought another sixteen Kanakas. In addition to helping to construct and maintain the fort, these men played a critical role in sustaining the Astorians who lived there. When the North West Company took over Fort Astoria, most of the Kanakas stayed on to work for the British. For more on the Native Hawai'ian experience at Fort Astoria, see Jean Barman and Bruce McIntyre Watson, *Leaving Paradise: Indigenous Hawaiians in the Pacific Northwest, 1787-1898* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 34-56.

[19] John Scouler, "Dr. John Scouler's Journal of a Voyage to Northwest America (1824-25-26)," *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* 6 (1905): 195.

[20] Cole Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 37. For an overview of the expansion of the HBC, see John S. Galbraith, *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 78-155. A newer work examines the emerging Pacific economy of the nineteenth century and details the role of British fur traders in the Pacific Northwest. See Richard Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793-1843* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).

Mountains. Like its predecessor, Fort Vancouver lay at the southern extent of the *ča·di·* borderland and continued to receive furs from coastal peoples.

Although the HBC set out to monopolize the industry in the Northwest Coast, U.S. competition provided indigenous peoples with trade options. Based from Boston, small American "coasters" frequented the southern side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, and the Pacific shores to the mouth of the Columbia River. The brig *Owhyhee* entered the Columbia River in 1827, even sailing up to Fort Vancouver in an attempt to intercept furs bound for the HBC headquarters.[21] Fearing potential losses from American coasters, Chief Factor John McLoughlin sent a crew to the mouth of the Fraser River at the eastern end of the *ča·di·* borderland to establish a new post, Fort Langley, in the fall of 1827.[22] The HBC began collecting beaver skins from local Coastal Salish peoples, Vancouver Island communities, and S'Klallams on the southeastern edge of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Fort Langley also drew a number of Native laborers to the Fraser River area. They worked at clearing land, providing large quantities of fish, cutting timber and firewood, and other tasks important for the fort's survival.[23] Shortly after the establishment of Fort Langley, a Makah came to the outpost and gained permission for his ten-year old son, Ellacoom, to work in the kitchens.[24] A prominent trader, the father probably wanted his son to learn English and to gain a better understanding of non-Native

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[21] Frederic William Howay, "Brig Owhyhee in the Columbia, 1827," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* XXXIV, no. 4 (1933).

[22] Reflecting a pattern typical of HBC workforces, this construction crew included one Abenaki, two Native Hawai'ians, one "York Factory Indian," two Iroquois, and one "Canadian Half breed." Morag Maclachlan and Wayne Suttles, *The Fort Langley Journals, 1827-30* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998), 23.

[23] For a more complete overview of Fort Langley's interactions with local indigenous peoples, see Ibid.

[24] While assigned to Fort Nisqually as the surgeon in 1833, William Fraser Tolmie met Ellacoom. He noted that the "young Flattery Jack" had been a kitchen scullion at Fort Langley, but that now he was a man of some importance to his people at Cape Flattery. Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 224.

culture in order to benefit his people's commercial dealings with the newcomers. Likely unpleasant, Ellacoom's experiences as a young scullion shaped his attitude on Anglos he encountered the rest of his life.

Other goods Native peoples brought to Fort Langley quickly outpaced the value of furs collected there. In 1832, Archibald McDonald, chief trader at Fort Langley, reported, "Our Salmon, for all the Contempt entertained for any thing out of the routaine [*sic*] of Beaver at York Factory, is close upon 300 Barrels, & I have descended to Oil & Blubber too.... I am much satisfied with its proceeds myself."[25] At the urging of George Simpson, the Company's administrator in the Columbia Department, the HBC diversified its economic activities, expanding into provisioning the growing Pacific markets of Alaska, California, and the Sandwich Islands.[26] When Honolulu became the base of the North Pacific whaling fleet during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the Company was well positioned to supply specialized naval stores and hardware to vessels that visited the Oahu agency. This agency became the primary outlet for produce, cured salmon, and spars collected from Northwest Coast peoples.[27] In return for indigenous goods, HBC traders in the 1830s and 1840s provided standard trade items such as tea,

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[25] McDonald to John McLeod, 15 January 1832, McLeod Papers, National Archives Canada, Ottawa, as quoted in Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 218.

[26] Americans first pursued a strategy of diversification in the Pacific market. Maritime fur traders from Boston exported sandalwood to Canton, where Chinese craftsmen used it to make incense, medicines, and carvings. For more on this trade, see Charles H. Hammatt and Sandra Wagner-Wright, *Ships, Furs, and Sandalwood: A Yankee Trader in Hawai'i, 1823-1825* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999). During the 1820s, American coasters carried spars on their decks to Oahu (Sandwich Islands) and supplied Russian outposts in Alaska and Spanish missions in California with provisions. Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 55. Their success likely sparked Simpson's desire to expand into the provisioning trade in the Pacific market. For an overview of the expansion of trade in the Pacific during the early nineteenth century, see David Igler, "Diseased Goods: Global Exchanges in the Eastern Pacific Basin, 1770-1850," *American Historical Review* 109, no. 3 (2004).

[27] Specialized naval stores included sheet copper, sheathing nails, anchors, anchor chains, rolls of canvas, tar, black and white paint, pitch, varnish, paint brushes, iron hoops, copper bolts, salted pork, arrowroot, charts, and nautical almanacs. Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 166-208.

rice, American tobacco, molasses, sugar, and salt. More exotic goods requested by Northwest Coast chiefs included coral and Chinese-made sandalwood and camphor boxes, which became popular potlatch gifts.[28]

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the regional economy depended upon the interwoven exchanges among indigenous villages and newcomer settlements. For example, Makahs occupied an important role in the HBC's expansion into the provisioning and fur trades of the Pacific. In the late-1820s, Cape Flattery was "the critical spot" in Fort Langley's trading area.[29] Located between Nuu-cha-nulth peoples to the north and Coast Salish peoples to the east and south, the People of the Cape attracted indigenous trade from Vancouver Island, western parts of the Gulf of Georgia, Puget Sound, the Olympic Peninsula, and the coast south to the Columbia River. Although Makah traders only occasionally visited the fort, HBC vessels going to and from the post regularly stopped at Neah Bay.[30] Compared to other parts of the southern Northwest Coast, valuable sea otters could still be found off Cape Flattery where Makahs such as Ellacoom and his father hunted them from canoes in the open sea and from behind blinds on coastal beaches.[31] In addition to sea otter pelts and beaver skins from other parts of the borderland, Makahs provided whale oil, fresh fish, slaves, and *haiqua* (dentalia shells

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[28] Ibid., 165.

[29] Ibid., 231.

[30] The Fort Langley accounts do not mention any Makahs coming to the fort, although Ellacoom's father must have visited the fort sometime between 1827 and 1831. The chief traders there kept detailed accounts naming Indians who visited the post. See Maclachlan and Suttles, *The Fort Langley Journals.* Cowichans, the most powerful indigenous people at the eastern edge of the *ča·di·* borderland, controlled Native access to the fort and likely kept most Makahs from trading there. However, Cowichans could not prevent HBC vessels from stopping at Neah Bay. Captain James Scarborough so frequently visited Neah Bay that some HBC records called this body of water Scarborough Bay. Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 234.

[31] For an account of Makah sea otter hunting in the 1830s, see John Dunn, *History of the Oregon Territory and British North-American Fur Trade: With an Account of the Habits and Customs of the Principal Native Tribes on the Northern Continent*, 1st ed. (London: Edwards and Hughes, 1844), 231.

used as currency). Called "Cape Flattery oil" in the Fort Langley records, HBC ships often purchased more than one hundred gallons at a time.[32] The Company shipped the oil to London where it was distilled into benzene to light homes and businesses. The trade in Cape Flattery oil increased over the next two decades. By 1852, Makahs traded over 30,000 gallons of whale oil to passing vessels – many of them belonging to the HBC – and they kept a similar amount for personal consumption and trade with neighboring Indians.[33] Based on whaling returns provided by a Makah chief in the late-1850s, 60,000 gallons of oil represented approximately twenty-six whales killed annually.[34] One of the best whalers of the period, Kleh-sitt oversaw his people's interactions with HBC employees when they exchanged whale oil for trade goods.

Despite the rising presence and power of the HBC, the wealth of goods provided by Northwest Coast peoples continued to draw American coasters to the region through the 1830s. Many of these coasters stopped at Neah Bay to purchase furs, fish, and whale oil that normally went to Fort Langley.[35] The steps the HBC took to shut out the Yankee rivals provided further opportunities for Makahs and other peoples to engage the expanding Anglo world. In 1836, the Company brought the steamship *Beaver* to the Northwest Coast and based it at Fort Langley. Operating as a mobile fort, the steamer

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[32] Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 233.

[33] George Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1972), 35. That year, whale oil sold for just over 68¼ cents per gallon, so 30,000 gallons represents $20,475 of whale oil. Alexander Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery, from Its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876* (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian, 1964), Vol. I, 660.

[34] This statistic is calculated from whaling returns provided by Wha-laltl-as sá buy (also known as Swell) to Swan. See 29 October to 1 November 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers, UWSC.

[35] Howay, "Brig Owhyhee in the Columbia, 1827," 325-26; Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 238. Due to Captain Dominis's underhanded technique of using Indian fears of smallpox to extort furs, Makahs continued to tell stories of Dominis's 1833 visit to Cape Flattery twenty years later. William Hills, "Journal on Board H.M.S. *Portland* and H.M.S. *Virago*," 1852-1853, University of British Columbia Library (UBCL), Vancouver.

regularly visited borderland villages.[36] William Fraser Tolmie, a former chief factor in the Pacific Northwest, recalled nearly forty years later that the *Beaver* "made it unprofitable for traders in sailing vessels to visit the coast" because steam power enabled vessels to navigate the variable winds and tides of the region better.[37] Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom witnessed the regular voyages of the *Beaver* that brought it into their waters, and they managed the exchange of indigenous products with the chief trader aboard the vessel.

Makah relations with the HBC grew after the establishment of Fort Victoria in 1843. Earlier forts had appeared at the *ča·di·* borderland's edges; however, Fort Victoria was located squarely within the borderland, "in the midst of the Natives' world."[38] By 1843, the Company had grown concerned about the boundary issue. They worried that the U.S and U.K. would place the border north of Fort Vancouver, which would leave their primary Pacific depot in American territory. Additionally, they wanted a depot situated farther north in order to supply more easily the majority of their outposts in the northern Pacific Cordillera. Moreover, during the 1820s and 1830s, several ships wrecked at the dangerous mouth of the Columbia River, resulting in the loss of years' worth of trade goods, thereby undercutting the Company's ability to compete with American

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[36] The *Beaver* was such a common sight that someone memorialized it in a petroglyph at Clo-oose, a Ditidaht village on the north side of the strait. For a photo of this petroglyph, see Ruth Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast: The Makah, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Southern Kwakiutl and Nuxalk* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 214. As a local historian noted in 1894, "Where there were no forts erected, the *Beaver* would steam up to the Indian villages and lay at anchor, while the natives would paddle out with canoe-loads of valuable furs to exchange for such notions as suited their peculiar fancy." Charles W. McCain, *History of the SS "Beaver": Being a Graphic and Vivid Sketch of This Noted Pioneer Steamer and Her Romantic Cruise for over Half a Century on the Placid Island-Dotted Waters of the North Pacific; Also Containing a Description of the Hudson's Bay Company from Its Formation in 1670, Down to the Present Time* (Vancouver: Evans & Hastings printers, 1894), 26. Probably based on descriptions such as these, Harris described the *Beaver* as a "mobile fort." Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia*, 39.

[37] Tolmie to James Swan, 30 December 1878, James G. Swan Papers, University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Vancouver.

[38] Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 278.

coasters.[39] These reasons encouraged the HBC to erect a new outpost at the southern end of Vancouver Island. In addition to its advantages over Fort Vancouver, Fort Victoria lay close to the important fisheries in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, and the Fraser River. The new outpost also had easy access to plenty of lumber for construction, to good-quality land for expansion, and to a large Indian population. The Company assumed that local Indians could be hired to construct the fort, would sell food to HBC employees, would supply goods for export, and would provide a market for British imports.[40] These assumptions highlighted the HBC's continued dependence on local Indian peoples.

The establishment of Fort Victoria and its early operations reveal the way indigenous peoples were the keystone to HBC growth in the region. When charged with the task of constructing the fort in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Chief Factor James Douglas chose Camosun, a sheltered harbor on the southern tip of Vancouver Island, where Indians could beach their canoes easily. After disembarking at Camosun, Douglas told the chiefs of the Songhee, a Coastal Salish people who owned the site, that he desired to build a trading post on their land. Upon considering that Fort Langley had benefitted neighboring indigenous peoples along the Fraser River, the chiefs gave Douglas permission to build the HBC fort and provided labor to help in its construction.[41] Later that summer, the Company brought wild Spanish cattle and work horses from Fort Nisqually in Puget Sound. Songhees helped to care for this livestock, even taking them

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[39] Nearly every vessel entering the Columbia River's mouth found it difficult at best and fatal at worst. Local Chinooks provided valued navigation skills, and captains hired them to help navigate the treacherous sandbars and currents of the river. Bergmann, "'We Should Lose Much by Their Absence.'"

[40] Margaret A. Ormsby, "Introduction," in *Fort Victoria Letters, 1846-1851*, ed. Hartwell Bowsfield (Winnipeg: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1979), xvi.

[41] For an overview of the construction and early years of Fort Victoria, see W. Kaye Lamb, "The Founding of Fort Victoria," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* VII, no. 2 (1943). See also Ormsby, "Introduction."

into their longhouses during severe winters.[42] In the beginning, non-Natives often called Fort Victoria by its "Indian" name Camosun, reversing the tendency of Europeans to replace indigenous place names immediately. [43] Referring to this new commercial hub by its Native name highlighted that early colonial places often occupied spaces where indigenous peoples continued to exercise power.[44] The new fort thrived due to the labor and support provided by various indigenous peoples.

Even more than they had with Fort Langley, the People of the Cape played a key role in Fort Victoria's survival and early success. Shortly after construction began at Camosun, Makahs became regular visitors at the new HBC outpost, just a short canoe paddle across the strait from Cape Flattery. During Fort Victoria's first summer and fall, Makahs and Nuu-chah-nulth peoples provided salmon and potatoes that fed King George men and the Kanaka and Songhee laborers constructing the outpost.[45] Equally important to the fort's success, though, were the commercial products brought there by Makahs and other indigenous peoples. Ellacoom and Kleh-sitt visited the fort with their people to sell

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[42] Douglas to Archibald Barclay, HBC Secretary, 3 September 1849, in Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters*, 45.

[43] Lamb, "The Founding of Fort Victoria," 83.

[44] Recently, historical geographers have begun to explore the relationship between power, maps, and place names. For a sampling of this literature, see Paul Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987); J. Brian Harley, "Maps, Knowledge, and Power," in *The Iconography of Landscape*, ed. Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Barbara Belyea, "Amerindian Maps: The Explorer as Translator," *Journal of Historical Geography* 18, no. 3 (1992); Barbara Belyea, "Inland Journeys, Native Maps," *Cartographica* 33, no. 2 (1992); David Turnbull, *Mason, Tricksters and Cartographers: Comparative Studies in the Sociology of Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000); and Daniel W. Clayton, *Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000).

[45] Douglas to Simpson, 16 November 1843, D.5/9, HBCA, as quoted in Lamb, "The Founding of Fort Victoria," 89-90. Douglas employed Songhees and Kanakas to fill the HBC's labor shortage. See Ormsby, "Introduction," xxi. For a general overview of the role of Native Hawai'ian labor in HBC operations in the Pacific Northwest, see Barman and Watson, *Leaving Paradise*, 57-83.

fish, furs, and whale oil.[46] Other borderlanders also brought goods to the fort, including enormous quantities of salmon, shingles by the thousands, and canoe-loads of blueberries.[47] The HBC earned a substantial margin of profit from these indigenous commodities by funneling them into the Pacific market which provisioned miners in California and the growing urban center of San Francisco.[48] Acknowledging the advantageous location of Fort Victoria and its rising importance in the provisioning trade, the HBC made it the Pacific depot and headquarters in 1849. The commodities that Kleh-sitt, Ellacoom, and others exchanged at Fort Victoria helped to transform this outpost into a prosperous commercial hub and provisioned colonial activities throughout the Pacific.

The presence and actions of the HBC in the *ča·di·* borderland exacerbated preexisting borderland tensions among the indigenous peoples drawn to the forts. Although they lacked the power to control intertribal conflicts for most of the first half of the nineteenth century, at times Company officials desired to do so in order to create a safe and ordered environment for profitable exchanges. For example, from the perspective of the chief trader at Fort Langley in 1828, violence among Indians was not the problem; instead, it was that violence hampered Indian abilities to collect furs. He wrote, "The poor tribes of this quarter Cannot attend to any thing like hunting [for furs] while their Powerful Neighbours from Van. Island are allowed to Murder and Pillage

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[46] For example, members of a British survey crew observed a Makah chief who came to Fort Victoria to exchange a sea otter pelt for eight HBC blankets. Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald*, 106. Cape Flattery oil continued to be a common item carried by merchant ships making the seven-month voyage from Fort Victoria to London. For example, see Douglas & John Work [Chief Trader] to the Governor & Committee, 7 December 1846, in Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters*, 8.

[47] Douglas to the [HBC] Governor and Committee, 27 October 1849, Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters*, 63. See also C. A. Bayley, "Early Life on Vancouver Island," 1878 [microfilm P-C 3], Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA; and Ormsby, "Introduction," xxx.

[48] In 1847, only eight merchant ships stopped at Fort Vancouver; two years later thirty-four visited the fort. However, by early 1850s, U.S. merchants began supplying San Francisco more regularly, and California's reliance on HBC imports ended. Ormsby, "Introduction," xc.

them at pleasure."[49] Order and safety were necessary for the physical and commercial existence of the fort.

But when intertribal violence did not inhibit trade, Company officials neglected to interfere. At least one official, Roderick Finlayson, even promoted conflict among tribes, noting years later, "The policy of the Company was honesty – and also to keep the several tribes divided and at enmity among themselves. This plan followed for purposes of protection to ourselves – in short to keep up a jealous feeling between the respective tribes."[50] In charge of Fort Victoria from 1844 to 1849, Finlayson ignored the murder of the highest-ranking Makah chief just outside Fort Victoria in 1846. Visiting from the Columbia River, several Chinooks murdered Chief George after watching him exchange a sea otter skin for trade goods from Finlayson.[51] At other times, however, intertribal conflict made him anxious. In 1848, Captain George Courtenay soothed Finlayson's anxiety by bringing the fifty-gun *H.M.S. Constance* into Victoria Harbor to defuse a Makah-S'Klallam conflict unfolding just outside the fort.[52] His actions reflected the limitations of the HBC at controlling indigenous peoples in the spaces beyond the walls of forts.

However, the HBC did use its limited power to attempt to establish an *ad hoc* policy of retributive violence against Indians for perceived depredations on non-Natives

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[49] Maclachlan and Suttles, *The Fort Langley Journals,* 67.

[50] Roderick Finlayson, *History of Vancouver Island and the Northwest Coast* ([n.p.]: 1879), 68.

[51] While robbery might have been part of the motivation, the reason for attacking Chief George was probably more complex. One British observer noted, "[George] had doubtless in his time played many tricks of the same kind as that to which he now fell a victim; they usually act and react one upon the other." Although this comment is steeped in Anglo assumptions of vengeful Natives, it speaks to the underlying reality that complex indigenous reasons usually provided the motivations for violence. See Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald*, 106. George's murder promoted Kleh-sitt to highest Makah chief.

[52] F. V. Longstaff and W. Kaye Lamb, "The Royal Navy on the Northwest Coast, 1813-1850, Part II," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (1945): 123-24.

and their property. In January 1828, S'Klallams killed HBC employee Alexander McKenzie and his companions along Hood Canal. Like many interracial acts of violence in this borderland, the S'Klallams had numerous reasons for attacking the HBC party. An experienced fur trader, McKenzie had married the "Princess of Wales," the daughter of Concomly, a powerful Chinook chief who kept slaves, including several S'Klallams. His wife accompanied the party, and S'Klallams took her hostage, perhaps as a bargaining piece to free their people from Concomly. S'Klallams were also upset that the Company traded with their long-time borderland enemies, the Cowichans of Vancouver Island. S'Klallam chiefs had made several efforts to dissuade McKenzie and others from trading with Cowichans. Adding insult to injury, the Company had established Fort Langley north of S'Klallam space. This benefited indigenous rivals and prevented S'Klallam chiefs from serving as intermediaries. Finally, indigenous oral accounts point to earlier injustices traders had committed against these people; McKenzie's party could have been killed in retaliation.[53]

Chief Factor John McLoughlin decided that the Company needed to employ a policy of retributive violence against Indians who murdered HBC employees. Writing to his superiors in London, McLoughlin argued:

> To pass over such an outrage would lower us in the opinion of the Indians, induce them to act in the same way, and when an opportunity afforded kill any of our people, and when it is considered the Natives are at least an hundred Men to one of us it will be conceived how absolutely necessary it is for our personal security that we should be respected by them, & nothing could make us more contemptible in their eyes than allowing such a cold-blooded assassination of our People to pass unpunished & every one acquainted with the character of the Indians of the North West Coast will allow they can

[53] For more on the S'Klallam attack on McKenzie's party, see Maclachlan and Suttles, *The Fort Langley Journals,* 213; and Mary Ann Lambert Vincent, *Dungeness Massacre and Other Regional Tales* (Mary Ann Lambert, 1961), 9-12. This McKenzie was not the same individual as Alexander Mackenzie, credited as the first white man to cross North America.

> only be restrained from committing acts of atrocity & violence by the dread of retaliation.[54]

He believed that conditions unique to the Northwest Coast – Indians outnumbered whites, these Natives only respected vengeance – necessitated a violent response.

Although the punitive expedition targeted ethnic S'Klallams rather than all Indians in general, this action established a precedent for the racialized nature of colonial power that Anglos used to control Indians. Led by Chief Trader Alexander McLeod, a force of about sixty men left Fort Vancouver in June, entered Puget Sound from the south, and set out in canoes for S'Klallam villages. McLoughlin instructed McLeod to find the "murderous tribe, and if possible, to make a salutary example of them, that the honour of the whites was at stake."[55] On the way to rendezvous with the HBC schooner *Cadboro*, McLeod's party encountered two S'Klallam lodges. They fired upon those sleeping inside, killing at least two families. After meeting up with the *Cadboro*, the expedition set out for the distant S'Klallam village at New Dungeness on the south side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Under cover of fire from the schooner, the expedition's forces landed. After recovering the Princess of Wales and some articles from McKenzie's party, they looted what provisions and whale oil they could carry. Then they burned the village and destroyed the rest of the S'Klallams' property, including nearly thirty canoes, as the inhabitants watched from the forest's safety. Although critical of the McLeod's leadership, Frank Ermatinger, an HBC clerk accompanying the expedition, reported that

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[54] McLoughlin to the [HBC] Governor and Committee in London, 10 July 1828, B.223/b/4, HBCA (as quoted in Jonathan R. Deans, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Its Use of Force, 1828-1829," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 98, no. 3 (1997): 293 [footnote 14]).

[55] Recorded by HBC clerk Frank Ermatinger. See Eva Emery Dye, "Earliest Expedition against the Puget Sound Indians," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 1, no. 2 (1907): 17.

the extensive destruction of property would "be seriously felt for some time to come."[56] More importantly, he believed that news of this retribution would travel among regional Indians. Makah chiefs heard of this incident, and this story of HBC vengeance likely made the rounds among Indians such as young Ellacoom who then worked at Fort Langley.

During the 1830s and 1840s, Makahs and others challenged HBC efforts at controlling Indians. From the late 1820s to the late 1840s, continual labor shortages prevented the HBC from enacting a coherent policy dealing with Indian depredations in the way that Company officials desired. For example, McLoughlin had to wait until July to dispatch the 1828 expedition to punish the S'Klallams because this was the first opportunity when the employees at Fort Vancouver had no other duties.[57] However, when resources allowed, the HBC intervened on behalf of non-Natives who found themselves at the mercy of local Indians. But Company intervention almost always happened on indigenous rather than British terms.

The HBC expended their limited resources combating the enslavement of non-Natives by Makahs. During the winter of 1833, a storm drove a "junk" laden with rice and fourteen sailors out of sight of the Japanese coast. They drifted east across the Pacific for three months, eventually coming within sight of Cape Flattery. Makahs paddled out to the vessel and found a man and two teenage boys who had survived on rice and freshwater collected from rain. After enslaving the Japanese survivors, Makahs seized the vessel and its goods and broke it apart to salvage the useful materials. Chinook Indians

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[56] Ibid.: 28; and Maclachlan and Suttles, *The Fort Langley Journals,* 214.

[57] Deans, "The Hudson's Bay Company and Its Use of Force, 1828-1829," 270. See this article for a more complete explanation of McLoughlin's failure to develop a consistent policy to deal with Indian attacks on whites in the Oregon Country.

brought the news of the unusual slaves to McLoughlin at Fort Vancouver; however, he could not address the issue until later that year, although he wanted to free the captives as soon as possible. Captain William McNeill, master of the HBC brig *Llama*, redeemed the captives by purchasing them from the Chief George, Kleh-sitt's predecesor.[58] In the mid-1840s, the HBC also redeemed an Anglo-American sailor whom Chief George had enslaved.[59] Stories of powerful Makah chiefs who kept non-Native slaves continued to color Anglo opinions of the People of the Cape throughout the mid-nineteenth century.[60] More importantly, these incidents demonstrated that Makahs had the ability to control space on their terms. King George men could not enter Makah villages and demand the release of non-Native slaves – they had to accede to indigenous protocols and purchase them from the owner.

Even in spaces closer to the forts, the HBC had only slightly more ability to punish Indians for depredations. Established in 1833, Fort Nisqually maintained amicable relations with local Puget Sound peoples who came to the outpost to trade furs and work

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[58] There is a little confusion over dating this incident. Probably the clearest dating comes from the entry for 9 June 1834 in the Fort Nisqually Journal of Occurrences. See Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*, Section One, 28. After spending several months at Fort Vancouver waiting for a ship, the Japanese survivors caught one headed to London; from there the survivors attempted to return to Japan. Diplomatic tensions between the U.K. and Japan prevented them from returning home, in addition to the Japanese attitude that regarded anyone who left Japan – even accidentally – as contaminated. For more on this incident, see William Fraser Tolmie, "Manuscript Copy of Memo in Reference to Japanese Junk Wrecked at Cape Flattery, W.T. in Winter of 1834-35," [n.d.] (WA MSS 478), Beinecke; Alexander Caufield Anderson, "Notes on Indian Tribes of British North America and the North West Coast," *The Historical Magazine*, March 1863, 80; Washington Irving and Benjamin Louis Eulalie de Bonneville, *The Rocky Mountains; or, Scenes, Incidents, and Adventures in the Far West* (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea, & Blanchard, 1837), 246; Edward Belcher, *Narrative of a Voyage Round the World: Performed in Her Majesty's Ship Sulphur During the Years 1836-1842: Including Details of the Naval Operations in China from Dec. 1840 to Nov. 1841* (London: H. Colburn, 1843), 303-04; and Finlayson, *History of Vancouver Island and the Northwest Coast*, 82. See also Cassandra Tate, "Japanese Castaways of 1834: the Three Kichis," (available online at http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=9065) *HistoryLink.Org Online Encyclopedia of Washington State History* [accessed July 2009].

[59] Much to the consternation of other Anglos, this sailor voluntarily returned to Chief George after he had been freed. Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald*, 106-07.

[60] For example, see Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States*, 113.

seasonally. But as the fort's fur returns dwindled, the Company sought new avenues for profit. In 1840, the HBC formed a subsidiary, the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, and began farming and raising livestock on lands near the forts.[61] These agricultural efforts set the stage for conflict, and by the mid-1840s, tensions developed between the HBC and local Indians over livestock. In March 1846, five Nisqually Indians captured an ox and were butchering it when an HBC employee caught them. With the help of another group of Indians, fort employees apprehended two of the five culprits and brought them back to the outpost, where they were flogged and imprisoned until a chief purchased their freedom with a rifle and pistol.[62] Thefts of livestock continued, and fort officials attempted to punish the perpetrators in the same manner. Douglas advised Tolmie, then in charge of Fort Nisqually, to use "judgement [*sic*] and discretion" in punishing Indians for these thefts, warning that failure "would prove disastrous, and expose us to Contempt" among Indians.[63] Lacking the ability to project actual power into spaces around the forts, HBC officials needed to use violence selectively and only when they believed they could succeed.

At Fort Victoria, some Makahs ran afoul of the Company's efforts to control Natives and protect HBC property. In 1847, an HBC employee whipped a Makah caught breaking into one of the outpost's warehouses.[64] The theft of Company livestock vexed Douglas more. In 1848, he complained of this "mischievious practice which must be

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[61] Finlayson, *History of Vancouver Island and the Northwest Coast*, 76-77; Galbraith, *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor*, 192-217; and Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains*, 235-40.

[62] The journal simply notes that the fort official received help from "Beach Indians." 16-21 March 1846, in Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*, Section Five, 6.

[63] Douglas and Ogden (Fort Vancouver) to Tolmie, 9 July 1846, in *Douglas Letters*, PSAC, UWSC.

[64] James Douglas & John Work [Chief Trader] to the Governor & Committee, 6 November 1847, in Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters*, 13. Douglas noted that Songhee warriors even "[took] up arms against a body of Cape Flattery Indians, who threatened to attack the Post in retaliation."

checked by the punishment of the Offender, an object in which we have partly succeeded."[65] By 1850, "wandering Tribes" became such a problem that he appointed four guards to stand permanent watch over Company livestock.[66] Although he did not name the "wandering Tribes," Makahs frequented the lands around fort. In 1861, during the first census Anglo Americans made of the Cape Flattery villages, Makahs complained about being punished for shooting cattle owned by whites, even when the animals wandered onto Native-owned property.[67] The People of the Cape had learned this lesson from the HBC on Vancouver Island. When Anglos punished Indians for shooting livestock that wandered onto Native-owned land, colonial authorities erased indigenous property rights.

These experiences shaped Kleh-sitt's and Ellacoom's strategies for interacting with the growing Anglo presence in the borderland. For Chief Kleh-sitt, these incidents encouraged him to seek a strategy of peaceful interactions in order to minimize conflict. For Chief Ellacoom, conflicts over livestock were just one more grievance against the presence of Anglos. When non-Native settlers intruded into indigenous spaces – and as the newcomers' power to control the region grew – the policies of these two chiefs hardened.

Settlers and Indigenous Peoples, 1845-1855

Indigenous borderlanders also had to deal with new settlers. The arrival of British and U.S. settlers during the 1840s resulted in growing non-Native efforts to produce and

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[65] Douglas & Work to the Governor & Committee, 5 December 1848, Ibid., 27.

[66] Douglas to Archibald Barclay [HBC Secretary], 1 September 1850, Ibid., 116.

[67] Manuscript Journal, 53.

control space. The newcomers no longer simply needed small islands of security and order – forts – within an indigenous world; by the mid-nineteenth century, they required increasing amounts of safe and ordered spaces for pioneer enterprises, such as lumbering, farming, mining, and settling. This brought non-Natives into conflict with indigenous peoples, especially those living in places where outsiders wanted to build saw mills, open mines, and establish farms and towns. In order to ensure the newcomers' safety, settler-colonial officials increased their attempts at controlling Indians. As the colonial predecessor in the region, the HBC influenced the strategies of Indian control that emerged in both U.K. and U.S. portions of Oregon Country.[68] The Company's earlier efforts at crafting a coherent policy to punish Northwest Coast Indians for depredations against non-Natives and their property gave rise to the racialized nature of settler-colonial power that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century.

But the arrival of settlers provided more opportunities for indigenous peoples to engage the expanding settler-colonial world while threatening to fragment Native communities. Early settler-colonial processes depended upon the participation and support of indigenous peoples. Without the labor provided by Indians who cut down trees, cleared land, tended livestock, and dug up coal, many early pioneer ventures would have failed. More importantly, Northwest Coast peoples provided fish, potatoes, berries, and oil to nascent settlements, critical commodities that sustained many of the first settlers who arrived in the mid-nineteenth century. But interactions with settlers and non-Native colonial officials heightened tensions in many indigenous communities, such as when Makahs became divided over how to deal with the newcomers.

[68] Legal scholar John Phillip Reid argues that the HBC is one of Canada's colonial predecessors. This conclusion can be expanded to argue that the HBC was also a colonial predecessor for what became the U.S. portion of Oregon Country. See Reid, *Patterns of Vengeance*, 121.

Coming along the Oregon Trail, increasing numbers of Americans settled south of the Columbia River. Supported by politicians with dreams of a continental nation, these newcomers agitated for U.S. control over the entire Oregon Country. During the 1844 presidential contest, the Democratic Party embraced expansionist ideology and made "Fifty-Four Forty or Fight!" a key issue, which resulted in the election of James K. Polk (Democrat). Compromising on the forty-ninth parallel, Polk's administration settled the boundary issue in 1846 through the Oregon Treaty, ending nearly three decades of joint occupation in the Pacific Northwest. In 1848, Congress created the Oregon Territory, which consisted of the current states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. A year later, the U.K. created the Colony of Vancouver Island. In 1853, Congress separated Washington Territory from Oregon Territory.[69]

Although the Treaty of Oregon had defined the border between colonial claims, government officials quickly discovered what Makahs and other borderlanders already knew – that the marine boundary was inherently permeable.[70] According to the terms of the treaty, the HBC still owned property and ran agricultural and trading operations on the U.S. side of the border.[71] Throughout most of the 1850s, the HBC remained the

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[69] Americans were a very expansionist people at this time. For a concise overview of U.S. expansion into the North American West, see Clyde A. Milner, "National Initiatives," in *Oxford History of the American West*, ed. Clyde A. Milner, Carol A. O'Connor, and Martha A. Sandweiss (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). For the making of British Columbia, see Patricia Roy and John Herd Thompson, *British Columbia: Land of Promises* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005). For U.S. expansion into the Pacific Northwest, see Carlos A. Schwantes, *The Pacific Northwest: An Interpretive History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 78-111.

[70] Although it failed to change their daily lives, Makahs probably learned of the new boundary fairly quickly. If crewmembers of the *H.M.S. Herald* neglected to tell them when they visited Cape Flattery in 1846, then HBC officials at Fort Victoria would have told Makah chiefs about the new boundary. The *Herald* spent the summer of 1846 surveying the coast along the forty-ninth parallel in preparation for the new boundary. Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald.*

[71] Until a final adjustment could be made, the HBC still held rights to lands they occupied, such as those of the Puget Sound Agricultural Company, in the U.S. portion of Oregon Country. The U.S. finally settled this issue in 1869, paying the HBC $200,000 for the PSAC. Galbraith, *The Hudson's Bay Company as an*

Makah's top trading partner, with Company vessels stopping at Neah Bay and Makahs traveling to Victoria.[72] Indiscriminate trade between Makahs and the HBC concerned U.S. officials, and in 1858 an Indian agent surveying the region complained that "all the money paid out by [our] government and citizens [to the Makah] goes immediately over to Victoria to be invested in blankets, muskets, etc."[73] Both U.S. and British officials complained of citizens from the other side crossing the border to sell liquor to Indians, "an evil which endangers the peace of the frontiers."[74] Like those living in other borderlands in North America, local residents –both Native and non-Native – exploited the boundary for their own economic advantage.[75]

At this time, mobile Indians who ignored the border were part of a larger colonial concern of local borderlanders who disrespected boundaries. For much of the mid-nineteenth century, the British worried about American squatters. By the late 1840s, HBC officials at Fort Nisqually began complaining about Americans who squatted on the lands of the Puget Sound Agricultural Company (PSAC).[76] After 1846, the potential for American squatters north of the borderline concerned colonial and Company officials even more. In response to this concern – and to support their economic diversification

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Imperial Factor, 251-82; and Cecelia Svinth Carpenter, *Fort Nisqually: A Documented History of Indian and British Interaction* (Tacoma: Tahoma Research Service, 1986), 128.

[72] Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory*, 35.

[73] J. H. Jenkins, "No. 82, Report of J. H. Jenkins, special agent at Neah Bay, May 27, 1858," *ARCIA*, 1858, 237.

[74] J. H. Pelly [HBC Governor] to Earl Grey, 19 March 1850, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vols. 721-725, 1822-1852*, pp. 230-233 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 1].

[75] Examples of this are evident in the Alberta-Montana and Southwest borderlands. See Sheila McManus, *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005); and Andrés Reséndez, *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[76] Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*. See from Section Five on.

efforts – the HBC decided to encourage British emigration to Vancouver Island.[77] Based on information provided by Douglas, the Company believed that the island would be an ideal place for a colony because it offered cultivable lands in the south, good harbors for a naval depot, and abundant timber and coal. Sir John Pelly, HBC Governor, secured permission from the Crown to allow the Company to establish a colony on Vancouver Island in 1849. The first settlers arrived by the barque *Harpooner* on May 31, 1849, and included coalminers, workmen, carpenters, bakers, a shipwright, and their families.[78] These would have been the first settlers to interact with the People of the Cape.

The experience of Walter Colquhoun Grant, the first non-Native to settle independently of the HBC on Vancouver Island, illustrates that early emigrants needed assistance from local Indians and Company employees. A Scottish native, Grant arrived on Vancouver Island in the fall of 1849. He planned to prepare prefabricated house frames to sell in California for $250 each. From the beginning, his venture was fraught with difficulties. Concerned about Grant's "destitute means" – he came with no money – the HBC paid for his passage from California to Fort Vancouver, gave him Company credit, and provided him with livestock. The men Grant hired for this venture arrived at Fort Victoria two months before him, and Douglas had trouble preventing them from leaving for more lucrative work on American vessels or for the California gold fields. When Grant finally arrived, Douglas took him along the coast to point out potential sites for his sawmill and to introduce him to local Indians. Against Douglas's recommendation, Grant chose a location twenty-five miles away from Fort Victoria

[77] Ormsby, "Introduction," xlix.

[78] Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, *Canada and Its Provinces: A History of the Canadian People and Their Institutions*, Vol. 21 (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook and Company, 1914), 89. See also Ormsby, "Introduction," xliv-xlvii. Additionally, see "List of Passengers from England per Barque 'Harpooner' 1849," Philip and Helen Akrigg Research Collection, UBCA.

because it offered an abundant supply of timber and a good stream for his sawmill. Douglas "endeavoured strongly to impress on the minds of Captain Grant and his followers, the invaluable importance, both as regards the future well being of the Colony, and their own individual interests, of cultivating the friendship of these Children of the forest."[79] The experienced fur trader worried that settlers would antagonize local Indians.

But Indians and settlers had many motivations for interacting in productive ways. For example, Grant relied upon indigenous labor and information. While at Neah Bay, he asked Chief Ellacoom for advice on where to settle and set up his sawmill. Already exhibiting a proclivity to direct Anglos away from Makah space, Ellacoom told him about large tracts of arable land and timber resources across the strait on Vancouver Island.[80] Local Indians from nearby Nuu-chah-nulth villages helped in felling trees and building Grant's sawmill, which he had located on indigenous land. Like settlers living close to Fort Victoria, Grant and his men received salmon and potatoes from his indigenous neighbors.[81] Many Native borderlanders welcomed the new market in commodities and labor that settlers provided. However, others worried about newcomers taking land and resources, and resistant Indians stole from and threatened the outsiders. Like other settlers, Grant complained of Indian "depredations," claiming that they caused everything to go "to ruin" during his absences.[82] As interracial tensions mounted, colonial officials became concerned.

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[79] James Douglas to Archibald Barclay, 3 September 1849, enclosure in Pelly to Earl Grey, 28 February 1851, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vols. 721-725, 1822-1852*, pp. 259-265 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 1].

[80] Walter Colquhoun Grant, "Report on Vancouvers Island," 25 October 1849 (A/B/20/G76), BCA.

[81] Douglas to Barclay, 3 September 1849.

[82] Grant to Douglas, 10 September 1850, "Vancouver Island – Colonial Surveyor: Correspondence Outward, Original and Transcript," (C/AA/30.71J); and "Miscellaneous Information Relating to Walter Colquhoun Grant," (M/G76), BCA. See also Richard Blanshard, Gov. of Vancouver's Island, to Earl Grey,

Officials governing the Colony of Vancouver Island worried that the presence of British settlers heightened the importance of controlling Indians. After founding the colony, the HBC extended the policy of inflicting devastating retribution for violence against whites and their property.[83] Unlike previous attempts to develop a coherent policy, this time it worked because official colonization provided them with the backing of the Crown. On the Northwest Coast, this power manifested itself in the gunboats of the Royal Navy, which local officials deployed against Indians. As one historian describes this, "in many cases, the smouldering ruins of a village and a scattered village tribe were the telling testaments of the process of keeping Northwest Coast Indians 'in awe of British power.'"[84] These destructive expeditions illustrated the growing Anglo ability to project power into indigenous spaces.

Although the People of the Cape did not directly encounter the gunboats, they kept a wary eye on the Royal Navy vessels as they sailed – then steamed – through local waters to shell other villages. During 1850 and 1851, the fledgling colonial government at Victoria found itself needing to respond in kind to the murder of three deserters from the Company ship *Norman Morison*. Believing that Newitties near Fort Rupert on the northeastern edge of Vancouver Island had murdered the deserters, colonial officials

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18 September 1850, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vols. 721-725, 1822-1852*, pp. 257-258 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 1]. Eventually Grant left Vancouver Island to fight in the Crimean War (1853-1856), and in 1862 he died in India after falling ill.

[83] Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 22. Other scholars have written about Douglas's approval of gunboat diplomacy; he believed that gunboats were effective for terrorizing Natives into doing what he felt they should do. See also Barry M. Gough, *Gunboat Frontier: British Maritime Authority and Northwest Coast Indians, 1846-1890*, ed. UBC Press, Pacific Maritime Studies Series (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984). For an alternate view on Douglas's interactions with Indians during the early colonial years, see Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 49-72.

[84] Gough, *Gunboat Frontier*, 14.

called upon the Royal Navy's corvette *Daedalus* to punish the offenders. They believed that "if we make no demonstration the Indians will lose all respect for us and may make an attack on [Fort Rupert]."[85] As in the earlier incident against the S'Klallam, the British burned longhouses and canoes, working on the premise that if the tribe would not surrender the murderers, then the whole group deserved punishment. Eventually, the Newitty sued for peace on their own terms by bringing three mangled Indian bodies to Fort Rupert, telling the British that these were the offenders.[86] Colonial officials felt that they had accomplished their goals. Douglas reported to William Tolmie at Fort Nisqually, "the Indians [are] all quiet and civil, being greatly awed by the example made of the Neweetees."[87] However, Douglas ignored the way in which the Newitty chiefs confronted British retributive violence. Newitty actions demonstrated that Native leaders still had enough power to control some aspects of conflicts within indigenous spaces. Native chiefs, not British officials or soldiers, executed Indian offenders.[88]

However, the balance of power began to shift. During the winter of 1852-1853, Douglas pursued a similar policy against Cowichans and Nanaimos for the murder of a Company shepherd stationed just five miles from Victoria. Again with Royal Navy assistance, the governor took over 150 men into Cowichan territory to capture the two accused murderers. After Douglas gave the tribe an ultimatum, they turned over a man

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[85] John Sebastion Helmcken [HBC doctor and magistrate at Fort Rupert] to Richard Blanshard, 17 July 1850, CAA 40.3 R2, BCA (as quoted in Ibid., 42).

[86] For a detailed examination of this incident, see Ibid., 32-49.

[87] James Douglas [Chief Factor at Fort Victoria] to Tolmie, 6 August 1851, "Correspondence – Letters to Tolmie from Various Parties, 'D,'" William F. Tolmie Papers (4577-001), UWSC (hereafter cited as Tolmie Papers).

[88] Similar to the incident at the beginning of this chapter, it is also possible that the Newitty chiefs did not execute any of their people. Perhaps they simply showed to HBC authorities the bodies of three men killed during the shelling.

the governor believed to be the suspect; actually, he was a slave offered instead as compensation. In this encounter, Cowichans handled British intimidation on indigenous terms by paying for a murder with a slave.[89] But this incident did not conclude on Cowichan terms. Colonial forces caught the second suspect, the son of a Cowichan chief, after Douglas took the father hostage. The governor had both suspects tried in the colony's first trial by jury. Naval officers found the two Indians guilty and hanged them in front of their people. In personal correspondence with Tolmie, Douglas cast his success in almost Biblical terms, writing, "We had a good deal of trouble in effecting our object, and had to carry their villages sword in hand, but the Almighty disposer of events favoured the just cause, and the land is now cleansed from the polution [*sic*] of innocent blood."[90] In his mind, God sided with innocent Anglos over violent Indians. Douglas reported to his superiors that the scene "appear[ed] to make a deep impression" upon the assembled Cowichans.[91]

These incidents also made an impression upon the mid-nineteenth century peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland. Through indigenous networks, Chief Kleh-sitt would have heard of gunboats shelling the Newitty village. This must have been fresh on his mind in December 1851, when Ellacoom and other Makahs pillaged the *Una*, the incident described at the beginning of the chapter. Fearing gunboats shelling Neah Bay, Kleh-sitt sent the diplomatic delegation to Victoria apologizing to Douglas and offering to pay for

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[89] Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America*, 103.

[90] Douglas to Tolmie, 26 January 1853, Tolmie Papers.

[91] Douglas to A. Barclay, 20 January 1853, in W. Kaye Lamb, "Four Letters Relating to the Cruise of the *Thetis*, 1852-1853," *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 6 (1942): 205. For a more detailed account of this incident, see Gough, *Gunboat Frontier*, 50-56; and Chris Arnett, *The Terror of the Coast: Land Alienation and Colonial War on Vancouver Island and the Gulf Islands, 1849-1863* (Burnaby: Talonbooks, 1999), 40-45.

damages. Like the Newitty chiefs, Kleh-sitt satisfied HBC demands for justice with claims that he had executed the perpetrators. On the other hand, the now coherent British policy of retributive violence encouraged Ellacoom and his supporters to harden their stance against Anglos.

Throughout the late 1840s, both chiefs noticed the growing number of Bostons arriving in the region. The first Americans to claim lands north of the Columbia River, the Bush family and their friend Michael Simmons, settled near Tumwater in 1845 after emigrating along the Oregon Trail.[92] During the second half of the 1840s, an increasing number of lumbermen came to the Puget Sound region to establish more than a dozen sawmills. They harvested the "almost inexhaustible forests of... rich timber," which they shipped aboard the "large number of ships that are now constantly arriving and departing, heavily laden."[93] Many of these vessels would have stopped at Neah Bay to trade with Makahs for salmon and whale oil used to grease the skids of their logging operations. By 1849, C. T. W. Russell settled in Shoalwater Bay, north of the mouth of the Columbia River, where he started an oyster business. He proudly reported to Isaac Stevens, the territorial governor, that he had induced others – "the right kind of settlers, not hunters and trappers, but good old farmers with their families" – to take up residence in the

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[92] These emigrants chose lands along the southern shores of Puget Sound over the more popular Willamette Valley because the provisional U.S. government of Oregon Territory had passed discriminatory laws prohibiting African Americans from settling south of the Columbia. George Washington Bush, the patriarch of the family and key leader of this group, was the wealthy son of a black sailor and Irish American servant. He had also been an HBC employee and had been to the Pacific Coast in the 1820s. See "George Washington Bush and Other Negro Pioneers," [Oversize Scapbook], Box 14, Ruby El Hult Papers (accession no. 0376-005), UWSC; Clinton A. Snowden et al., *History of Washington; the Rise and Progress of an American State*, Vols. 2 & 3 (New York: The Century History Company, 1909), 421-34 (Vol. 2), & 37-40, 242-42 (Vol. 3). See also John Edwin Ayer, "George Bush, Voyageur," *Washington Historical Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1916); Paul F. Thomas, "George Bush" (Thesis (MA), University of Washington, 1965), 2-45, & 103-04; and Ruby El Hult, "The Saga of George W. Bush," *Negro Digest* (1962).

[93] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 50.

area.[94] While reports from early settlers such as Russell, Bush, and Simmons encouraged more Americans to come to the region, the Donation Land Act (1850) served its purpose of promoting settlement in Oregon Territory. In November 1851, the Denny Party made their now-famous landing at Alki in Puget Sound; by 1852, they had relocated to an indigenous Duwamish site, Little Crossing-Over Place, and founded Seattle.[95]

Before the 1850s, few non-Natives came to Neah Bay to settle. In 1838, HBC traders at Fort Nisqually heard from visiting S'Klallams that a vessel had visited the Clasits (Makahs) and that some passengers purchased land for a settlement.[96] However, these settlers – British or American – did not stay long, if they ever existed at all; they do not appear in any other archival sources nor do oral histories mention them. As during the maritime fur trade, Makahs discouraged non-Native efforts to encroach upon their spaces. In 1849, when Grant spoke to Ellacoom about good sites for settling and cutting timber, the chief directed him away from Makah land. Several years later, the Scottish settler complained that "Flattery Jack (chief of the Macaws)... seemed to have delighted in telling the most atrocious falsehoods," specifically lying about the "beautiful prairie-land" at Barkley Sound."[97] Considering the number of complaints explorers and settlers have made regarding similar Indian "lies," this appears to have been a common strategy used by Natives to get rid of unwanted non-Natives.[98]

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[94] Russell to Gov. Stevens, 6 February 1856, Isaac I. Stevens Papers, Washington State Archives, Olympia.

[95] For more on the founding of Seattle, see Thrush, *Native Seattle*, 17-65.

[96] 11 February 1838 in Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*, Section Four, 11.

[97] Grant, "Report on Vancouvers Island," 11; and Grant, "Description of Vancouver Island," 1857, 295-286. Ellacoom was not the only Native individual to direct Grant away from his or her lands. Grant criticized many Indians for misdirecting him to other parts of Vancouver Island.

[98] For example, Pueblo Indians in the Southwest told the Spanish conquistador Coronado of Quivira, a land east of New Mexico that was rich in gold, silver, and silks. This misdirection led the Spanish away from the pueblos and into the plains of Kansas. For a concise account of this, see Ramón A. Gutiérrez, *When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500-1846*

Makahs discouraged settlement around Cape Flattery while taking advantage of opportunities presented by the increasing number of non-Natives. Since the maritime fur trade, Neah Bay had been an important anchorage for many vessels, a condition that continued throughout the nineteenth century. When the H.M.S. *America* visited the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1845, Captain Gordon described Neah Bay as "a secure place for small ships" and a common anchorage for American whalers.[99] The People of the Cape regularly encountered ships sailing through their marine waters. When the *Herald* entered the strait in 1846, Makahs visited the vessel in canoes launched from Tatoosh Island. They offered fish and skins for trade and boarded the *Herald* "without the least fear," indicating that this was a normal occurrence.[100] By the early 1850s, Makahs were raising over one hundred tons of potatoes annually from seed they obtained from the HBC. They consumed some of this harvest but traded the bulk to nearby Company posts and passing vessels.[101]

Although many Makahs benefited from trade with non-Natives, they resisted initial attempts to establish permanent trading posts at Cape Flattery. In 1849, the Anglo-American Samuel Hancock failed to establish one at Neah Bay. Keenly aware of his "isolated situation," Hancock worried that Makahs would steal his trade goods.[102] He wrote that they "seemed dissatisfied with my presence" and described numerous Makah

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(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 44-45; and David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 46-49.

[99] S. Gordon to Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 October 1845, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O., Vols. 721-725, 1822-1852*, pp. 66-75 ["Correspondence with HBC...," Vol. 1].

[100] Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald*, 95.

[101] George Gibbs, "Notebook: Indian Tribes, 1853-1854," George Gibbs Notebooks of Scientific Observations of the Pacific Northwest (WA MSS S-1810), Beinecke, 50; Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 140; and Ormsby, "Introduction," l.

[102] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 89.

threats and entreaties for him to leave.[103] Probably led by Chief Ellacoom, a "large deputation" of 200 Makahs surrounded his post, broke his canoe into pieces, and forced him to leave within three days. Between the growing number of vessels anchoring at Neah Bay and the burgeoning port of Victoria, Chief Kleh-sitt likely felt that he had plenty of trade options and did not need an Anglo trader in a Makah village. Perhaps he also worried that this outsider might compete with him by ignoring the chief's authority to manage trade. Regardless, Kleh-sitt neglected to intercede on Hancock's behalf at this time.

Shortly afterward, however, Chief Kleh-sitt appeared to invite Hancock back to Neah Bay in 1851 to protect his chiefly influence and the well-being of his people.[104] When Fort Victoria and Puget Sound towns siphoned off trade from local Indians, the Makah's position as middlemen in regional exchange networks had waned. Hancock's second venture began well and benefited both him and Kleh-sitt. This time, the trader came better prepared. He chartered a vessel from Olympia to carry him, two hired men, and an adequate quantity of trade goods to Neah Bay. With Kleh-sitt's support, Hancock received a better reception from the People of the Cape. By October, he and his men had built a small compound; they also hired a Makah cook. He traded for furs, oil, and salmon with Makahs and others to the north and south. Hancock noted, "The news of my location as trader spread like wild fire among the Indians, and I was soon visited by representations from the far south, and the tribes who lived north of the Strait of Juan of

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[103] Ibid., 90.

[104] In his memoir written less than a decade later, Hancock did not name any particular Makah chief. He did note, however, that the tribe welcomed him as a trader, which would have only happened if one of the ranking chiefs such as Kleh-sitt approved of the outsider's presence. In his memoir, Hancock noted that he went to Neah Bay on business earlier that year; perhaps Kleh-sitt invited the American to return then. See Ibid., 135.

Fuca on the coast of Vancouver's Island."[105] Kleh-sitt's gamble for inviting a trader to Cape Flattery returned Neah Bay to prominence and shored up his authority, as he mediated trade between non-Makahs and Hancock.[106]

Hancock's presence and other intrusive Anglos displeased some Makahs, however. Shortly after the trader's arrival, several – perhaps with the encouragement of Chief Ellacoom – stole some of his goods. Hancock also worried that tensions between Makahs and ships carrying goods from San Francisco to Puget Sound could make him a target for Indian anger. Many stopped at Neah Bay to trade liquor and other goods for fish, furs, and whale oil.[107] While the People of the Cape welcomed the trade brought by these vessels, they resisted those who disrespected them. For example, during the winter of 1851-52 –the same season as the wreck of the *Una* –Makahs threatened Captain Pinkham's schooner *Franklin*. Somehow the captain had angered a faction of Makahs, and when several canoes of warriors painted for battle approached his vessel, he fired his cannons at them. Fearing that Makahs might retaliate against him after suffering violence and insults from Anglos, Hancock built a ten-foot high palisade and breastwork around his post in early 1852.

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[105] Ibid., 137. For example, in one exchange, forty canoes arrived from Vancouver Island, and these visitors spent two days trading oil with Hancock. See pp. 153-154.

[106] In 1852, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey noted that Makahs "maintain trade with the Indians on the west of Vancouver [Island], forcing them to dispose of their oil and skins to themselves directly, and not the traders. By this means they make a large profit as intermediate traders." Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States*, 115.

[107] Believing that his life was in danger, Hancock blamed Makah threats on "the indiscreet conduct of persons on board vessels coming into the Strait, who at different times gave whiskey to Indians visiting the ships." Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 140. Although Hancock railed against the evils of selling liquor to Indians, he also appeared to be prepared to engage in this illicit trade – at least one set of trade goods he brought north from San Francisco included more than 200 gallons of whiskey. See p. 134.

More importantly, Makahs resisted when non-Natives encroached on their sovereign spaces. This became evident when the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey expedition established a base camp at Neah Bay while Hancock still traded there. Having heard that Makahs antagonized whites, the expedition's leader, Lieutenant George Davidson, convened a council with Chief Kleh-sitt. With Hancock translating, Davidson explained to the large group assembled in the chief's longhouse that the survey crew was not there to "take away their lands, or interfere with their rights in any way; that our mission was for the benefit of shipping, and that in this they would share by having a trade with the whites." But he also warned them that "if any attack was made upon us, or injury inflicted, a retribution was sure to follow."[108] Like HBC officials, Davidson indicated his willingness to deploy retributive violence against aggressive Indians. However, the fact that Davidson felt the need to secure Kleh-sitt's permission for being on Makah land revealed that some indigenous leaders still possessed power that Anglos respected.

The presence of the survey crew at Cape Flattery highlighted the mounting tensions among the People of the Cape. Although the highest-ranking titleholder allowed Hancock and the Pacific Coast Survey crew to occupy his people's land temporarily, other chiefs were less welcoming. At the council, Chief Ellacoom warned Davidson that his people were "equally willing to come to blows" if need be. Davidson's crew worried about Ellacoom, having heard that he was "a most incorrigible scoundrel, who by force of mental power and rascality had made himself of some importance to the tribe."[109] After setting up their camp, the steamer *Active* which had brought them to Neah Bay left to

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[108] "Autobiography of James Lawson." Lawson was topographical aid to Davidson during the Pacific Coast Survey.

[109] Ibid.

survey the eastern part of the strait. Nine of the expedition's crew remained behind, and they knew that the local Indian population greatly outnumbered them. James Lawson, topographical aid to Davidson, wrote, "All told in camp there were but nine of us, and when it is considered that in 24 hours about 500 Indians could be mustered against us, this might be considered a small force. But while we feared no danger we deemed it well to be prepared. We had in camp sufficient arms, rifles, revolvers, cavalry pistols and shotguns, to fire over sixty shots without stopping to reload."[110] Lawson's assessment that superior firepower and military training could overcome overwhelming Native numbers exemplified Victorian-Era assumptions about racial violence.[111]

Leveraging his influence within the borderland, Chief Ellacoom demonstrated to both expedition officials and Kleh-sitt his willingness and ability to strike at outsiders. After the survey crew established their tent camp, "a large fleet of canoes" carrying around 200 Nuu-chah-nulths from Vancouver Island came to Cape Flattery to exchange oil with Hancock.[112] The trader overheard a conversation among the Indians regarding a plan to attack the survey crew. Darting over to the camp, Hancock informed Lawson and Davidson of the impending attack. The crew erected a breach work of logs, prepared their firearms for action, and posted guards at both the camp and Hancock's post. The northern Indians did not camp on the beach that evening, staying in their canoes positioned in a kelp field. Throughout the night, two Indians periodically sauntered by the camp to reconnoiter the Anglo defenses. In the morning, the fleet departed for home back across

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[110] Ibid.

[111] New Zealand historian James Belich explores this topic in the context of Maori-*pakeha* (white) conflicts of the mid-nineteenth century. James Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: The Maori, the British, and the New Zealand Wars* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).

[112] "Autobiography of James S. Lawson"; and Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 153-154.

the strait. In hindsight, Lawson wrote in his autobiography that "The Mak-Kahs, on account of threats of punishment, were afraid to commit the deed, but the Vancouver [Island] Indians were to do so, and after sharing the spoils the latter would return home."[113] A keen borderland strategist, Ellacoom probably manipulated his kin on Vancouver Island to be his proxy. If these "northern Indians" attacked, then if questioned by Anglo authorities, Makahs could accuse the northerners instead of taking the blame themselves.

Much to Lawson's frustration, Makahs resisted the U.S. government's effort to map indigenous spaces. They stole survey markers and ran off, with a pistol-wielding Lawson in pursuit. Eventually Lawson took out his frustration by shooting a village dog and by threatening to kill any man or whip any women and children who interfered with the survey. Davidson drilled the small crew with weekly target practices, scheduled for when large numbers of Makahs watched. He hoped to create in the Makah a "wholesome dread" of Anglo weapons. Instead, Makah chiefs just wanted the weapons even more, offering "fabulous price[s]" for the guns. On October 1, the *Active* returned to collect the survey crew at Neah Bay, and the U.S. intruders left.

These interactions between Makahs and Anglos – the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey expedition, Hancock, visiting traders, and the HBC – shaped subsequent impressions of the People of the Cape and their chiefs as formidable and aggressive.[114] Makah chiefs still had substantial power and influence within the borderland. Working with allied kin from across the strait, Makahs could intimidate non-Native intruders, forcing them to leave or accommodate to some Native protocols. Chiefs Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom possibly

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[113] "Autobiography of James S. Lawson."

[114] For example, see Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory*, 35.

hoped that these displays of power would impress both rival titleholders in the borderland and the newcomers. During the early 1850s, indigenous leaders still possessed enough power to interrupt imperial processes.

Anglo intrusions did exacerbate tensions between chiefs. Lawson's and Hancock's accounts presented Kleh-sitt as a leader willing to accommodate the expanding settler-colonial world. As the highest-ranking chief among his people, the forty-five year old Kleh-sitt profited handsomely from trade with Anglos.[115] However, he also believed in accommodating the newcomers to preserve a place for the People of the Cape in these changing times. After Kleh-sitt witnessed one of the survey crew's rounds of target practice, Lawson noted:

> [Kleh-sitt] walked to the target, and placing his thumb and forefinger at an average distance of the shots from the bull's eye, he measured off how many times it required to pass across his breast; then dropping his hand, and shaking his head as though to say, 'Poor chance for an Indian there' he walked slowly and sedately back, and without a word, seated himself. It was one of the most expressive movements I ever saw.[116]

Kleh-sitt staged this performance for both the white audience and his people to convince the latter of the futility of violence against Anglos.

On the other hand, by the early 1850s, Ellacoom appeared to have hardened his stance against non-Natives. About ten years younger than Kleh-sitt, Ellacoom had extensive experience with Anglos. Rather than drawing him closer to the Anglo world, these encounters made him wary. He became tired of the patronizing manners of HBC traders who lectured him on being "impudent" and found him and his people "ugly

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[115] Davidson estimated Kleh-sitt's age at forty to forty-five years. Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States*, 112.

[116] "Autobiography of James S. Lawson."

customers."[117] Ellacoom probably chased Hancock away in 1849 during his first venture at Neah Bay, led the plundering of the *Una* in 1851, and antagonized the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey crew in 1852. These incidents illustrate that neither chief spoke for the entire tribe. However, before the growing division and rivalry between Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom could develop into an intratribal conflict, a new crisis hit.

Confronting Disease at Neah Bay, 1853

Increased engagement with the non-Native world brought Old World pathogens to the Cape Flattery villages. By the mid-nineteenth century, disease effects had worsened because multiple afflictions hit the People of the Cape, compounding mortality as epidemics struck a people already weakened by earlier maladies. As Makahs suffered the severest effects of disease, the number of non-Natives grew. These conditions worked together to reverse the demographics of the borderland, resulting in non-Natives outnumbering indigenous peoples. The smallpox epidemic of 1853 was particularly catastrophic because it killed the highest-ranking chiefs, including Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom. Not only was this a severe emotional blow to Makahs, but it also meant that inexperienced leaders became the ones to confront the expanding power of non-Natives and settler-colonial governments to control Indians. [118] The high mortality and loss of experienced chiefs threatened to undermine Makah ability to control space.

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[117] The first quote is from 9 December 1834, in Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*, Section 1, 46. The second quote is from a year earlier in Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 243.

[118] For more on the cumulative impact of Old World diseases on indigenous peoples and the loss of leaders who died from diseases, see Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), 35-63. Crosby explores these topics within the context of ecological imperialism in *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Makahs had suffered from Old World diseases prior to the mid-nineteenth century. At some point between 1775 and 1782, smallpox struck the People of the Cape and others in the borderland, killing many.[119] Although no maritime fur traders noted evidence of Makahs having suffered from this epidemic, members of the American *Columbia* observed smallpox scars among Ditidahts in 1791.[120] The Natives blamed the Spanish for introducing the disease. Because networks of kinship, trade, and warfare crossed the strait and connected Nuu-chah-nulths such as the Ditidahts to Makahs, if one group contracted smallpox, others did as well. By 1830, the indigenous borderland population had risen substantially, but failed to recover to the pre-smallpox level.[121] When Natives confronted settler-colonial power during the mid-nineteenth century, they did so with fewer people than when they had encountered maritime fur traders.

Some non-Natives took advantage of the "heritage of confusion and fear" the late-eighteenth century epidemic left behind.[122] Duncan McDougall, head of the Pacific Fur Company's Fort Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River, told local Chinooks

> 'The white men among you are few in number, it is true, but they are mighty in medicine. See here,' continued [McDougall], drawing forth a small bottle and holding it before their eyes, 'in this bottle I hold the small-pox, safely corked up; I have but to draw the cork,

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[119] It is difficult to date the earliest smallpox epidemics. Anthropologist Robert Boyd argues that there might have been several localized smallpox epidemics introduced to Northwest Coast peoples in the late-eighteenth century: from Kamchatka and the Russians in 1769, from the Spanish in 1775, and from the Plains peoples around 1782. See Robert T. Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence: Introduced Infectious Diseases and Population Decline among Northwest Coast Indians, 1774-1874* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 38.

[120] Frederic William Howay, ed., *Voyages of the Columbia to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-1793*, 2nd ed. (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press in cooperation with the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1990), 196 & 371.

[121] Geographer Cole Harris comes to this conclusion. See Harris, *The Resettlement of British Columbia*, 23. Boyd estimates the pre-contact Makah population to be 5,400. Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence*, 264. By 1841, when Wilkes's U.S. Exploring Expedition visited Cape Flattery, they estimated that there were 1,000 Makah warriors, or approximately 4,000 Makahs. Charles Wilkes, *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842*, vol. 4 (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1845), 487.

[122] Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence*, 45.

> and let loose the pestilence, to sweep man, woman, and child from the face of the earth.' The chiefs were struck with horror and alarm.[123]

Known as "the Great Small-pox Chief" after this 1811 speech, McDougall exploited indigenous fears of this Old World disease after hearing of the demise of the *Tonquin* in Clayoquot Sound. He employed fear of smallpox in an attempt to control local Indians. Natives and Anglo traders spread the theory of bottled diseases that angry whites could uncork at will. For example, in 1830, Captain John Dominis of the Boston brig *Owyhee* threatened to uncork a bottle full of disease, unleashing it among the Makah if they refused to trade beaver skins.[124] This explanation for disease made an impression on some Makahs and remained a common understanding in the 1850s.

During the 1830s and 1840s, Northwest Coast peoples became part of a broader disease pool.[125] Dominis's *Owyhee* brought the "fever and ague" (malaria) to Makahs and other indigenous borderlanders in 1830.[126] However, Makahs avoided other maladies that struck the region, including the influenza and smallpox outbreaks of 1836-1838 and dysentery in 1844. Perhaps Makahs limited their contact with sick locations and affected peoples. The Fort Nisqually records indicate that from 1833 to 1836 Ellacoom led Makah trading delegations there, arriving in the late fall and staying until January.[127] However, after January 1836, he no longer came to the fort. That fall, Makahs avoided Puget Sound

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[123] Washington Irving and Edgeley W. (ed.) Todd, *Astoria; or, Anecdotes of an Enterprise Beyond the Rocky Mountains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 117.

[124] A Coastal Salish chief told Tolmie this story in 1833. Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 238. Over twenty years later, Makahs told British missionary William H. Hills of Dominis's threat. Hills, "Journal on Board H.M.S. *Portland* and H.M.S. *Virago*." Dominis regularly visited Cape Flattery and probably repeated this threat to Makahs. Howay, "Brig Owhyhee in the Columbia, 1827."

[125] Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence*, 116-44.

[126] Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 238.

[127] See Sections One and Two in Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*. See also Tolmie, *The Journals of William Fraser Tolmie*, 224-43.

to trade probably because they had heard about the influenza outbreak in March and April of 1836 that struck Indians living near Fort Nisqually. However, the increasingly interconnected nature of the Northwest Coast meant that the People of the Cape could not avoid all Old World diseases. In the spring of 1848, measles arrived at Fort Victoria, where Makahs contracted it. That summer, Anglo passengers carried influenza to the fort, and Makahs, already weakened by measles, caught this too.[128] By the mid-nineteenth century, the People of the Cape suffered from scrofula, a form of tuberculosis affecting the lymph nodes.[129]

During the summer or fall of 1853, the year following the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey's sojourn at Neah Bay, smallpox ravaged the indigenous communities of the borderland. Mortality from this epidemic was higher than previous epidemics because Makahs had spent the months before the outbreak fighting off a bevy of other ailments, including malaria. During his time at Neah Bay with the survey expedition, Lawson suffered from "chills and fever" and took quinine. Malaria then spread to the People of the Cape. For instance, Lawson noted incidents of "serious illness" among the tribe and even complained of their "avidity" for applying for and taking "Boston drugs" – Chief Kleh-sitt made the most frequent requests.[130] Having spent the last five years suffering from measles, influenza, and now malaria, Kleh-sitt sought cures to these afflictions.

But the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey did not bring smallpox to Neah Bay. Instead, passengers and clothing on Captain Fowler's brig *Cynosure* carried the disease north

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[128] Boyd, *The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence*, 145-60.

[129] During his time at Neah Bay in the early 1860s, Swan spent significant portions of his time dispensing medicine to treat scrofula and strumous afflictions among the Makah. For example, see 30 January 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers.

[130] "Autobiography of James S. Lawson."

from San Francisco, infecting Natives along the Columbia River, at Shoalwater Bay, and at Cape Flattery.[131] When the *Cynosure* arrived at Neah Bay, two sick Makahs disembarked and infected their people. One of the returning Makahs died, but the other survived. Many Makah families fled into the borderland, crossing the strait to live among relatives at Ditidaht and other Vancouver Island villages.[132] Their fear-fueled diaspora spread the disease to Nuu-chah-nulth kin.[133]

Still at his trading post at Neah Bay, Hancock witnessed Makah efforts to combat the epidemic. In the beginning, when someone became sick in a longhouse, all the occupants fled to live in other houses after leaving behind some dried fish and water for the afflicted person. As the epidemic spread, sick people pulled themselves out to the beach to die. Many begged Hancock for help, promising to become his slaves for life if they survived. Beyond providing food and water, however, he believed he could do little. Many Makahs died in front of the trader's post. Hancock had survivors dig large holes to deposit fifteen to twenty bodies at a time. When he tired of bodies filling his yard, he dragged them down to the beach at low tide, hoping they would drift away. In a matter of six weeks, the disease burned its course, and close to 2,000 Makahs died, more than

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[131] Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory*, 34. For more on the 1853 epidemic along the Columbia River, see Abigail Malick to children, 28 September 1853, Malick Family Papers (WA MSS S-1298), Beinecke. Swan provides a brief account of the epidemic at Shoalwater Bay. See James Gilchrist Swan, *The Northwest Coast; or, Three Years' Residence in Washington Territory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 54-59. By November, the epidemic had reached deep into Puget Sound and was "raging" at the Puget Sound Agricultural Company's farm at Tlithlow. See 8 November 1853, in Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually*, Section Nine, 43. Captain Fowler and his vessel were common enough visitors to Neah Bay that HBC officials called him the Indian trader from Cape Flattery; he often came to Fort Nisqually to purchase hundreds of dollars of blankets, a valued trade good. See 12 July 1852 in Ibid., Section Eight, 32.

[132] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 155.

[133] British Indian Agent William Bamfield reported that smallpox had "nearly annihilated" the Pacheedahts in the early 1850s. They likely contracted the disease from fleeing Makahs or neighboring Ditidahts, who had taken in smallpox refugees from the Cape Flattery villages. Eugene Y. Arima, *Between Ports Alberni and Renfrew: Notes on West Coast Peoples* (Hull: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1991), 295.

three-quarters of the People of the Cape.[134] Hancock reported that "the beach for the distance of eighteen miles was literally strewn with the dead bodies of these people, presenting a most disgusting spectacle."[135] What disgusted Hancock devastated Makah society.

Survivors hypothesized about who to blame for the 1853 smallpox epidemic. Believing that whites kept diseases in bottles, some blamed the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey because they had left behind bottles to mark a coastal astronomical station. Fearing future outbreaks, some Makahs dug up and destroyed these bottles.[136] Others blamed the survivor who had returned to Neah Bay aboard the *Cynosure*. Hancock observed:

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[134] Estimating disease mortalities among indigenous peoples is difficult. Right before the epidemic struck, members of the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey estimated that 300-500 Makah warriors lived at Cape Flattery. For the low number, see Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States*, 115. For the high number, see "Autobiography of James S. Lawson." It seems reasonable to extrapolate from this statistic that there were about 1,200-2,000 Makahs alive in 1852. This is close to the Cape Flattery population that HBC traders approximated in the mid-1840s. See Joseph Schafer, "Documents Related to Warre and Vavasour's Military Reconnaissance in Oregon, 1845-46," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (1909): 61. However, the estimates from both HBC traders and the Pacific Coast Survey appear to have left out those living at Ozette, about twenty miles south of Cape Flattery. 500 people living at Ozette right before the epidemic would be a conservative estimate. This would give us an estimated total of at least 1,700-2,500 Makahs. Gibbs noted that 150 Makahs lived at Cape Flattery after the epidemic. Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory*, 35. When the tribe signed the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay with U.S. representatives, the treaty commission believed that there were approximately 600 Makahs. See "Ratified Treaty No. 286: Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Makah Indians;" Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-69, (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publication T494, roll 5), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), RG 75, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., 4 (hereafter cited as Treaty Negotiation Notes). The tribe certainly did not rebound from 150 to 600 individuals in just over a year. Instead, Gibbs's estimate of 150 probably left out those living at Ozette, whereas the treaty included those living there. Additionally, Makah survivors on Vancouver Island probably returned to Neah Bay after Gibbs's initial estimate, and they most likely brought other kin with them. Working with these numbers gives us a mortality of around 76%. This percentage is similar to mortality estimates of that time. At the end of 1853, Washington Territorial Indian Agent E.A. Starling reported that the recent smallpox epidemic "has been most fatal among the Macaws, more than half of the Tribe being carried off by it." Starling to Stevens, 4 December 1853, Records of the Washington Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1853-1874, (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publications No. 5, roll 9), BIA, NARA. The leader of the Pacific Coast Survey had heard that more than two-thirds had fallen victim to the disease. Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States*, 116.

[135] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 156.

[136] Lawson complained of the Makah and their "superstitious ideas" that led them to believe this. "Autobiography of James S. Lawson."

> [B]eing determined to have satisfaction from some quarter for the loss of so many of their people, [they] apprehended the Indian who contracted the disease on the schooner, but recovered: as a punishment he was taken out in the middle of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and placed in a small canoe barely large enough to hold him and set adrift, without a paddle or anything else. They thought he would drift out to sea and perish, but the night was calm and favorable, and paddling with his hands he succeeded in reaching by morning, Nerah Island [Waadah Island in Neah Bay], where he was discovered by the natives who went after him and shot him with their muskets.[137]

Many in the tribe also blamed Hancock, and he taxed his limited communication skills to convince them otherwise.

Despite his reassurances, however, Hancock never regained the Makah's goodwill. Prior to the 1853 epidemic, the presence of the U.S. Pacific Coast Survey had exacerbated tensions among Makah chiefs and with Hancock. He had lost his patron, Chief Kleh-sitt, to the disease, and some continued to blame him for the catastrophe. Additionally, the Anglo-American trader's actions during the epidemic would have upset many. Not only had he failed to help those in need, he had dragged the dead to the waterline. From the Makah perspective, this would have been a terrible insult because this was a common way to dispose of dead slaves.[138] The tribe made their feeling for Hancock known. He later recalled that hostile Makahs who "threatened at various times to kill me if I did not leave the place."[139] After the epidemic, he concluded that he was no longer safe. By the end of 1853, he abandoned his trading post, exchanging the remainder of his goods with neighboring S'Klallams for passage to Whidbey Island in northern Puget Sound, where he lived "the quiet life of the farmer."[140]

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[137] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 157.

[138] Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America*, 180. When the People of the Cape fought off Ditidahts from Tatoosh Island, Makahs executed one of the Ditidaht chiefs at the shoreline because this would have been a way of insulting one's enemies.

[139] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 183.

[140] Ibid, 185. By January 14, 1854, he had settled into his new life on Whidbey Island, where he was appointed to the Grand Jury. George Albert Kellogg, *A History of Whidbey's Island (Whidbey Island) State of Washington* (Oak Harbor: G.B. Astel, 1934), 33.

The high mortality from the 1853 diseases dealt a severe blow to the People of the Cape. Hancock reported, "[I]t was really distressing to look at those who had survived this sad occasion, some of whom had lost all their near and dearest friends, and whose countenances showed their distress more plainly than words could have told; all seemed to realize their forlorn situation, and be ignorant what to do with themselves."[141] A year later, Territorial Governor Stevens and his treaty commission visited Neah Bay. Klah-pe at hoo (Capt. John Claplanhoo), younger brother of Chief Halicks – the titleholder ranked right under Ellacoom – told Stevens that "Since his brother died, he had been sick at heart."[142] Coming on the heels of previous afflictions, the combined onslaught of malaria and smallpox resulted in a social catastrophe unmatched by previous epidemics.

The loss of the highest-ranking chiefs compounded their sadness. Among the casualties buried in pits around Hancock's post, abandoned on the beach, or dragged to the waterline at low tide were the three highest chiefs: Kleh-sitt, Ellacoom, and Halicks. Smallpox struck them down at the peak of their lives. A year earlier, Lawson remarked on Kleh-sitt's physical health after witnessing the whaler at work: "Perfectly naked he stood in the bow of the canoe, one foot on each gunwale, a perfect specimen of an athlete, and never failed to strike his mark."[143] In his mid-thirties, Ellacoom was a renowned war chief in the borderland. Having these accomplished and healthy whalers and warriors – literal paragons of their people – waste away in a matter of weeks must have devastated the People of the Cape even further. The loss of the highest chiefs necessitated a reshuffling of leadership among the Makah. Self-described "small chiefs" such as Kal-

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[141] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 156.

[142] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2.

[143] "Autobiography of James S. Lawson."

chote of Neah Bay became the ranking titleholders. These inexperienced leaders confronted the U.S. treaty representatives in 1855. At this point, only about a quarter of the Makah remained – all demoralized survivors – to resist the outsiders.

Conclusion

1853 was a crucial moment for the People of the Cape. They began that year from a position of relative power in the borderland. Chief Kleh-sitt had reversed his people's waning trade influence in the borderland by bringing a non-Native trader to Cape Flattery. Selling tens of thousands of gallons of whale oil to this trader and the HBC had made Kleh-sitt and others wealthy. Ellacoom's "pillaging" of the *Una* and Kleh-sitt's "barbarous" punishment of those Makahs who preyed upon helpless whites encouraged newcomers to the region to respect – even fear – them. While these two chiefs disagreed over how to deal with the expanding settler-colonial world, they embodied the power of indigenous leaders to both interrupt and enable colonial processes such as trade, surveying, and settlement. The Northwest Coast of the early 1850s was a complex region where indigenous power, people, and commodities simultaneously worked with and against the governments, settlers, and markets of two of the most powerful empires of the time, the United Kingdom and the United States. At the beginning of 1853, Makah chiefs such as Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom still possessed the ability to control space.

As the year progressed, however, catastrophic challenges threatened the People of the Cape. A deadly smallpox epidemic hammered a population already weakened from an earlier affliction of malaria, reducing the Makah from around 2,000 individuals to several hundred. In addition to losing around three-quarters of their people to disease,

others temporarily fled the Cape Flattery villages, deepening the desolation of the Makah. Moreover, the epidemic had taken the lives of their two most powerful chiefs, Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom. A second event – the creation of Washington Territory – took another two years to present a challenge to the Makah. On February 8, 1853, Congress organized this new territory, which intensified Anglo-American emigration to the Northwest Coast and established the settler-colonial government that would come to Neah Bay to sign a treaty with Makah chiefs in 1855. How the People of the Cape recovered from one challenge to confront the next would determine their fate for the rest of the nineteenth century.

Chapter Four

The Sea Is My Country

One winter morning in 1855, the Makahs of Neah Bay village awoke to find a vessel anchored in the shelter of the bay. They recognized the schooner *Potter* and knew her captain, E. M. Fowler. During the last several years, he had visited Neah Bay to trade, and, ominously, Fowler's *Cynosure* had brought smallpox to the Makah in 1853. As the *Potter* did on her last visit, she brought some Bostons (Americans) on government business.[1] That previous evening, Washington's Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens and members of his treaty commission had slipped into Neah Bay aboard the *Potter*. Other commissioners accompanying Stevens included Michael Simmons (Indian Agent), Benjamin F. Shaw (interpreter), and George Gibbs (surveyor/secretary).[2] They had come to this remote corner of the nation to treat with the Indians living at Cape Flattery.

After warily observing the governor and surveyor map out reservation boundaries, six leaders from Neah Bay and other nearby Makah villages boarded the *Potter* to learn about the proposed treaty and to state their concerns. With the help of Captain Jack – a neighboring S'Klallam sub-chief who translated from Makah into Chinook Jargon, a

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[1] Colonel Simmons, the territorial Indian agent, had stopped at Neah Bay earlier and tried to impress upon them the importance of signing a treaty with the U.S. "Ratified Treaty No. 286: Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Makah Indians," Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-69 (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publication T494, roll 5), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), RG 75, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C., 4 (hereafter cited as Treaty Negotiation Notes).

[2] Stevens believed that he had tapped the best talent in the territory for his commission. Simmons and Shaw were "old frontiersmen" and some of the earliest settlers to the region – the former has been described by his admirers as the "Daniel Boone of Washington Territory," while the latter was a noted translator of Chinook jargon. A "[man] of education," Gibbs had lived in the area for a period of time. Other treaty commissioners not present a Neah Bay included High A. Goldsmith and James Doty, the son of a former Wisconsin governor and an individual with experience among the Blackfeet. See Hazard Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 452-53.

language spoken by Captain Fowler and Shaw – the Makah chiefs listened as Stevens explained how the Great Father had sent him to watch over them. To open the negotiations, Governor Stevens explained his perspective on the proposed treaty. Like the treaties he had signed with Puget Sound tribes, this one would transfer Makah land to the United States. In return, the federal government would provide a reservation, school, farms, and a physician, among other items.[3]

The chiefs cared little for what Stevens offered. Instead, every one of them spoke about the importance of retaining their marine tenure. Five of them spoke about the need to reserve their fishing and whaling rights. For example, Kal-chote, one of the two chiefs representing Neah Bay, stated, "I ought to have the right to fish, and take whales and get food when I like. I am afraid that if I cannot take halibut where I want, I will become poor." Governor Stevens acknowledged their position by answering that he wanted them to continue fishing and whaling; he only wanted whites to do so, too. Kal-chote conceded that he "would live as a friend to the Whites and they should fish together." Except for the 1853 smallpox epidemic, the last several decades of interaction with British and Anglo Americans had gone well because Makahs had profited by selling oil, sealskins, and fish to traders and vessels.

But Makah statements also articulated a connection to marine space that was broader than fishing and whaling rights. Individuals spoke of specific marine locations they owned. Ke-bach-sat from Tsoo-yess, a coastal village at the mouth of the Sooes River, spoke of an estuary as his property. Keh-tchook of Tatoosh Island explained that

[3] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2. All quotations of what was said during the treaty negotiations are from this document and reflect how George Gibbs, Gov. Stevens's secretary, understood what various speakers said. While Gibbs knew enough Chinook Jargon to publish a dictionary in 1873, he relied upon the linguistic skills of Capt. Jack to translate from Makah into Chinook Jargon.

his holdings encompassed the island and extended through marine waters to the Hoko River's mouth. More importantly, these Makah leaders clearly described the ocean as their homeland. In describing his holdings, Keh-tchook told the Anglo-Americans that "he did not want to leave the saltwater." Another chief, It-an-da-ha, echoed his words, repeating that he too did not wish to leave the salt water. Tse-kaw-wootl of Ozette stated it clearest: "I want the sea. That is my country." Wanting to impress upon the governor the importance of this statement, Tse-kaw-wootl refused to even consider the terms of the treaty until Stevens joined him in a canoe on the saltwater. While the two leaders paddled around, the Ozette chief explained that the sea was his country.[4]

Representing their people, forty-two Makahs signed the treaty by marking an "X" next to the approximations of their names that Gibbs noted. As their people had done for generations, Makah chiefs protected their marine tenure; however, this time they used a non-Makah tool of diplomacy – a treaty – instead of indigenous protocols. From the perspective of the People of the Cape, Governor Stevens appeared to understand and acknowledge their tenure claims to customary marine space. They likely would not have signed the treaty otherwise.

The historical context of local power dynamics in the mid-nineteenth century *ča·di·* borderland shaped the treaty negotiations between Bostons and the People of the Cape. At this time, the Makah held a better negotiating position than other Indians west of the Cascade Mountains in Washington Territory. Not only were Makahs an important part of the settler-colonial economy, but Anglos also feared and respected them.

[4] Today's Makahs remember this important canoe excursion upon which Tse-kaw-wootl insisted. While it is tempting to imagine this exchange as literally one where the two men were alone in a small canoe on the water, Capt. Jack and Fowler probably accompanied them to help Stevens understand Tse-kaw-wootl's position.

Governor Stevens recognized that this tribe retained enough power to complicate the new territory's development. More importantly, Makah chiefs used the treaty to protect what was important to their people: the sea. Their ability to force Stevens to negotiate was significant because the governor appeared unwilling to do so with other tribes, even when it resulted in failed negotiations.[5]

The Makahs' connection to the ocean and its resources shaped the concerns the chiefs expressed during the treaty negotiations. By describing the sea as his country, Tse-kaw-wootl articulated cultural values central to his people's relationship to customary marine space. First, his words reveal that the People of the Cape owned specific marine waters and resources. This contradicts the assumption underlying most narratives about settler-colonial expansion into indigenous spaces, namely the idea that property-oriented societies claimed lands and resources that Natives held in common and did not fully use. Second, the Ozette chief's words and those of his peers also invoked the ways that Makahs made the sea their country through customary practices, such as whaling, sealing, and fishing. Moreover, these practices enabled Makahs to exploit marine resources, which provided them with the wealth and power that better positioned them when they needed to negotiate with non-Natives.

Captured by calling the sea their country, the Makahs' worldview additionally highlights how they conceptualized marine space differently from Anglos. Shaped by a common European tradition that divided water from land, British and American officials in 1846 had used the Strait of Juan de Fuca that separates Vancouver Island from the

[5] For example, Stevens's negotiations south of Cape Flattery with the Quinaults, Queets, Satsops, Chehalis, Chinooks, and Cowlitz unraveled when he refused to grant them all their own separate reservations. James Gilchrist Swan, *The Northwest Coast; or, Three Years' Residence in Washington Territory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 327-51; Jacqueline M. Storm and Pauline K. Capoeman, *Land of the Quinault*, 2nd ed. (Taholah: Quinault Indian Nation, 1991), 102-03.

Olympic Peninsula to make a convenient and natural boundary between United Kingdom and U.S. claims in the Oregon Country.[6] Similarly, when Governor Stevens and his treaty commission drew up the boundaries of the Makah reservation, they assumed that the coastline made a natural boundary to the north and west, like some invisible fence that would keep Makahs inside and other Indians and Anglo settlers outside. However, Indians on either side of the international border frustrated both British and U.S. colonial officials who desired to keep Natives in their respective places, politically, socially, and economically.

Unlike Anglos who saw marine water as a boundary separating one colonial space from another, Makahs and other indigenous borderlanders continued to see these waters as a space of connections. Indigenous networks of trade, kinship, and violence endured. More importantly, the continuation of these networks confounded the efforts of officials on both sides of the border to create a more traditional colonial boundary line. By engaging in regional indigenous networks, peoples such as the Makahs and neighboring Nuu-chah-nulths illustrate that characteristics and processes of the *ča·di·* borderland endured throughout the nineteenth century. The indigenous borderland persisted not only into the period when a separate but related colonial borderland emerged, but also after 1846, when the U.K. and the U.S. established what they considered a definitive boundary between their respective claims. The continuation of indigenous borderland dynamics shaped the development of Washington Territory and the British colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia to the north.[7]

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[6] For more on the European tradition of separating spaces into distinct fragments, see Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1974).

[7] This point aligns with more recent histories exploring the role of indigenous peoples in the making of colonial spaces. For example, see Coll-Peter Thrush, *Native Seattle: Histories from the Crossing-over*

Local Power and Negotiating the Treaty of Neah Bay (1855)

Their ability to exploit lucrative marine resources left the People of the Cape in a better position than other American Indians when negotiating with the United States. Because the U.S. treaty negotiators valued Makah contributions to the nascent settler-colonial economy, Governor Stevens was willing to negotiate a few key points in the Treaty of Neah Bay. Additionally, the Makah were the most feared tribe west of the Cascades, and territorial officials worried that this group could cause them trouble. Legal scholar Stuart Banner argues that in North America "every land transfer of any form included elements of *law* and elements of *power*."[8] When examining treaty making, land sales, and theft of indigenous spaces, most scholars have limited their scope to explaining that settler-colonial societies possessed more power than indigenous peoples. Looking back in time with a wide-angle lens, we can see that Anglo-American treaty negotiators in Washington Territory acted from a "position of assured dominance," believing that they possessed more power than Indian tribes in the mid-nineteenth century: the population of the U.S. outnumbered Indian peoples in the territory; an entire legal framework of treaties, laws, and courts supported the taking of Indian land and control of Natives; and the nation could deploy its military might against Indians.[9] Without denying this fact, however, we should consider local dynamics of indigenous power that shaped

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Place (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007); and Hazel Petrie, *Chiefs of Industry: Maori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007).

[8] Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 4.

[9] Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 129. Prucha argues that nineteenth-century American Indian tribes depended upon the U.S. both politically and economically when they signed treaties. On the international stage, Indian tribes were not seen as independent nations, especially after the War of 1812, and Indians depended upon whites for trade goods. See pp. 5-9.

specific negotiations, such as the Treaty of Neah Bay. Even within the framework of a process predisposed to work against indigenous peoples, Makah chiefs in 1855 had enough power to alter the treaty to protect what was most important to their people – continued rights to the sea.

At the time of negotiating the treaty, Anglos respected the contributions the People of the Cape made to the settler-colonial economy. Makahs provided whale oil, fish, furs, information, and labor to the British colonies in the region and Washington Territory, a fact the treaty commission appreciated. Having lived in Puget Sound for nine years before Stevens appointed him Indian Agent in 1854 and to the treaty commission, Michael Simmons wrote in a local paper, "[The Makah] are altogether the most enterprising within the Territory. In industry, thrift, and enjoyment of the comforts of life they are not approached by any neighboring tribe southward. They take the whale with harpoon, spears, etc., of their own invention and venture in their whale excursions in their light canoes an almost incredible distance from land."[10] Other observers informed the governor that the Makah technique with indigenous equipment was "vastly superior" to American whaling methods, which lost many whales each voyage.[11] George Gibbs, surveyor for the commission, understood the scale of contribution Makah whalers made to the settler-colonial economy – in the 1850s, he had reported that Makahs annually traded tens of thousands of gallons of oil.[12]

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[10] 3 February 1855, quotation from the *Pioneer and Democrat* territorial paper, in Charles Miles, *Michael T. Simmons* ([Seattle]: V. E. Bower, 1980), 204. Simmons became the first Indian Agent in the territory.

[11] Charles J. Russell to Isaac I. Stevens, 6 February 1856, Isaac Ingalls Stevens Papers (WA MSS 442), Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Beinecke), Yale University, New Haven, CT.

[12] George Gibbs, *Indian Tribes of Washington Territory* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1972), 35.

As they had done since the maritime fur trade, Makahs participated in making colonialism possible in the Northwest Coast. A product harvested and processed into a vital trade good for both indigenous peoples and newcomers, whale oil was a key ingredient Anglos used to produce colonial spaces in the region. Makah oil heated and lit homes and businesses in nearby towns such as Victoria and Port Townsend. For centuries, Anglos have prided themselves in bringing light – a central component to civilizing projects across North America – to an otherwise dark continent. But local non-Natives overlooked the fact that indigenous oil fueled these lamps. Similarly, large quantities of Makah oil greased the skids of local logging operations. By removing trees, newcomers tamed an otherwise threatening wilderness by clearing the land for towns and farms. Proud of transforming wilderness spaces into civilized places, non-Natives ignored the fact that indigenous oil expedited this process. Although the irony seemed lost on Stevens, Gibbs, and Simmons, these individuals knew and appreciated the indigenous products provided by Makahs. The U.S. treaty negotiators probably expected to hear Makah statements that insisted on their continued rights to whale and fish in customary waters. Stevens himself told the Makah chiefs, "I know what great whalers you are," and he promised that "[The Great Father] will send you barrels in which to put your oil, kettles to try it out, lines and implements to fish with."[13] The federal government never kept these promises after local officials gained enough power to ignore Makah demands.

Anglo acknowledgement of the ways local Indians supported settlers provided a problematic tension in the treaty process advocated by the federal government and territorial officials. Within the context of Seattle's development during the third quarter

[13] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 4.

of the nineteenth century, historian Coll Thrush argues that whites possessed a "deep ambivalence about the place of Indians in urban life."[14] But settlers living outside urban spaces also felt this ambivalence. On the one hand, non-Natives wanted to continue benefitting from indigenous products, trade, and labor. Local Indians, and even those from as far north as Alaska, provided a wealth of goods that fed early settlers and fueled commercial enterprises. Indians cleared forests and broke ground; harvested crops; delivered mail, cargo, and people in their canoes; piloted non-Native vessels through unknown and dangerous waters; and provided companionship to white men far from home. On the other hand, many newcomers desired to separate Indians from white society.

The actions of territorial officials such as Governor Stevens and the treaty commission often reflected this ambivalence. Stevens believed that Washington Territory urgently needed Indian treaties, and he set out to put Natives in their place. By 1855, American settlers had already filed thousands of land claims under the Donation Land Act and the Preemption Act, which Congress had extended to Washington Territory the previous year. Often located on indigenous lands, these claims brought newcomers into conflict with local Indians. For example, in the winter of 1846, Indians shot and butchered a bull owned by an American settler who had taken up a claim near Fort Nisqually, and conflicts such as these became common as more outsiders arrived.[15] Just before Congress created Washington Territory from the northern half of Oregon Territory, the number of whites killed by Indians had increased from thirteen in 1850 to

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[14] Thrush, *Native Seattle*, 47.

[15] See 12 December 1846, in George Dickey, *The Journal of Occurrences at Fort Nisqually: Commencing May 30, 1833; Ending September 27, 1859* (Tacoma: Fort Nisqually Association, 1993), Section Five, 30.

fifty-eight in 1852, including thirty-nine emigrants.[16] Although many of these deaths occurred in areas south of the Columbia River, which separated Washington and Oregon territories, the statistics pointed to a disturbing regional trend. Similarly, Indians complained of violent whites who failed to pay for work or services.[17] These incidents weighed on the mind of the new governor, portending an increase in interracial conflict in the territory.

A Jacksonian Democrat, West Point graduate, veteran of the Mexican American War, and ardent expansionist, Stevens initially believed that he had the power and personal ability to impose the government's reservation policy upon Indians. Characterized as a "young man in a hurry," Stevens felt pressured to negotiate treaties quickly to open the land for settlers, economic development, and roads. In his address to the first session of the territorial legislature, the governor promised to take the "promptest action" at terminating Indian title to lands.[18] However, he also hoped that peaceful settlement with Washington Indians would enable the territory to continue benefiting from the indigenous labor and goods critical to settler-colonial processes.[19]

One strain of Stevens's ambivalence emerged from the federal government's entwined reservation and treaty policies. George W. Manypenny, Commissioner of

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[16] Charles S. Drew, *An Account of the Origin and Early Prosecution of the Indian War in Oregon* (Fairfield: Ye Galleon Press, 1973), 3-7.

[17] Kent Richards, "Federal Indian Policy, Isaac I. Stevens, and the Western Washington Treaties, 1854-1855," 1991, in folder "Treaties – Stevens; Boldt – Kent Richards' Papers, 1991," Box 2, Sue Lean Donation, Washington State Archives (WSA), Olympia, 29-30.

[18] He delivered this address on February 28, 1854. Isaac I. Stevens, "Governor Isaac I. Stevens to the First Annual Session of the Legislative Assembly, February 28, 1854," in *Messages of the Governors of the Territory of Washington to the Legislative Assembly, 1854-1889*, ed. Charles M. Gates (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1940), 4.

[19] Stevens to [George W.] Manypenny, [Commissioner of Indian Affairs,] 30 December 1854; and Stevens to J. W. Denver, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 10 January 1859, Records of the Washington Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1853-1874, (Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publications No. 5, roll 1), BIA, NARA.

Indian Affairs, had committed his agency to a strategy of using treaties to assign tribes to small reservations where federal agents would work to civilize Indians, training them to develop "such habits of industry and thrift as will enable them to sustain themselves."[20] Prior to beginning the territory's treaty negotiations, Stevens met with Manypenny and the commissioner's second-in-command, Charles Mix, in the nation's capital. These officials directed Stevens to concentrate Washington's Indians onto as few reservations as possible. Mix advised Stevens to minimize the number of treaties in the territory, encouraging him to unite bands into tribes and to concentrate multiple tribes onto each reservation. Manypenny and Mix were concerned about creating many small reservations because this strategy had caused the Senate to fail to ratify the nineteen earlier treaties Anson Dart (first Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon) had negotiated with Indians in Oregon Territory in 1851. Agreeing with their recommendations, Stevens left Washington D.C. hoping to consolidate all the territory's Indians onto one of two reservations, one west of the Cascades, and another east of the mountains. He did not plan on making the same mistake Dart had made in giving each tribe its own reservation. Moreover, Stevens assumed that this strategy would reduce administrative costs and curb "mischievous" Indian dispositions.[21]

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[20] Manypenny, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," 25 November 1854, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (*ARCIA*) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1854), 222. Manypenny believed that this strategy was a viable alternative to extermination. For more on this, see Robert A. Trennert, *Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the Beginnings of the Reservation System, 1846-51* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1975).

[21] Richards, "Federal Indian Policy, Isaac I. Stevens, and the Western Washington Treaties, 1854-1855," 33-40; and Carole Seeman, "The Treaty and Non-Treaty Coastal Indians," in *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils: Northwestern Indian Policy, 1850-1855*, ed. Clifford E. Trafzer (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), 41-43. For more on the federal policy of treaties and reservations in the mid-nineteenth century, see Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, Abridged ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 108-35; Prucha, *American Indian Treaties*, 208-60.

To facilitate the treaty-making process, Stevens adopted a template that reflected the philosophy of the federal government and the treaty policy advocated by the Office of Indian Affairs.[22] In December 1854, prior to treating with any of the Washington tribes, Stevens asked Gibbs to develop a uniform treaty template that reflected local conditions and could be used with all groups.[23] This template included a key provision protecting indigenous fishing at "usual and accustomed places" both on and off the reservations. The treaty commissioners believed that if they allowed tribes to continue normal subsistence practices, Indians could support themselves, which would save the government money. More importantly, however, the fishing clause embodied the other strain of Stevens's ambivalence over the place of Indians in the social and economic life of the territory. By protecting the right of Indians to fish at "usual and accustomed places," the treaties – documents designed to remove indigenous peoples from white society – encouraged Indians to leave the reservation in order to pursue customary practices which kept them engaged with Anglo Americans.[24]

Despite this ambivalence, the treaty commission attempted to follow a reservation policy designed to draw lines around Indians, removing them from territorial society to prepare them for eventual assimilation.[25] Ardent supporters of this policy, Stevens and

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[22] Stevens used several earlier treaties to craft his template for those negotiated with Washington Tribes. Treaties he referenced included those that Joel Palmer, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon, negotiated at Table Rock and Cow Creek in southern Oregon and ones Commissioner Manypenny negotiated with the Omahas and Missouri Indians. Kent Richards, "The Stevens Treaties of 1854-1855, an Introduction," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 106, no. 3 (2005): 7-10.

[23] Clifford E. Trafzer, *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils*, 1-6. See also Richards, "Federal Indian Policy, Isaac I. Stevens, and the Western Washington Treaties, 1854-1855," 54-55.

[24] Some scholars point to this ambivalence for causing the failure of the reservation policy in Washington. See Brad Asher, *Beyond the Reservation: Indians, Settlers, and the Law in Washington Territory, 1853-1889* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 34-59.

[25] Historian John Findlay argues that the architects of reservations designed these spaces "so that they resembled variations of the mid-nineteenth-century American asylum." See John M. Findlay, "An Elusive

the commissioners assumed that physical reservation borders would contain Indians. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Charles Mix, explained the goal of the reservation policy to the Secretary of the Interior. In an annual report, Mix wrote, "Great care should be taken in the selection of the reservations, so as to isolate the Indians for a time from contact and interference from the whites." Additionally, "No white persons should be suffered to go upon the reservations." Furthermore, "[T]here should be sufficient military force in the vicinity of the reservations to prevent the intrusion of improper persons upon them... and to aid in controlling the Indians and keeping them within the limits assigned to them."[26] Specific to the reservation the commissioners marked out at Cape Flattery, they believed that borderlines drawn across the land and along the coast would keep the Makah in and non-Makahs – both Natives and non-Natives – out.

Territorial officials reinforced the physical reservation border with additional boundaries designed to keep Makahs and other Washington Indians in their place.[27] Controlling Indians lay at the heart of these efforts.[28] Some officials, such as Governor Stevens, advocated military control over the territory's indigenous peoples. A long-time supporter of using the military to monitor Indians in the frontier, Stevens tried and failed

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Institution: The Birth of Indian Reservations in Gold Rush California," in *State and Reservation: New Perspectives on Federal Indian Policy*, ed. George Pierre Castile and Robert L. Bee (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1992), 18.

[26] Charles Mix, "Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs," *ARCIA*, 1858, 10. See also Asher, *Beyond the Reservation*, 9, and 36-37.

[27] For an examination of how boundaries of race, gender, and national identity were used to define the border in the Albert-Montana borderlands, see Sheila McManus, *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).

[28] Historian Frederick Hoxie has characterized reservations as "oppressive and unsuccessful instruments of imperial control." See Frederick E. Hoxie, "Crow Leadership Amidst Reservation Oppression," in *State and Reservation*, 38.

to get support for a strong territorial militia.[29] Without this type of military power at his disposal, Stevens then turned to the treaties to encode some method of control. Along with other territorial officials, Stevens wanted to control Indian trade, redirecting it to benefit U.S. rather than British interests. Although the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) went unnamed, Article Thirteen of the Treaty of Neah Bay dealt implicitly with the Company by prohibiting Makahs from trading "at Vancouver's Island or elsewhere out of the dominions of the United States."[30] This provision reflected Stevens's desire to break the HBC's power over the territory's Indians. In his instructions to the officers in charge of a survey of the territory, Stevens wrote, "The Indians must look to us for protection and counsel… I am determined, in my intercourse with the Indians, to break up the ascendency of the Hudson Bay Company and permit no authority or sanction to come between the Indians and the officers of this government."[31] Additionally, the treaty provision prohibiting Indians from trading outside the U.S. echoed concerns expressed by Edmund Starling, an earlier Indian agent, who complained about tribes crossing the border to trade for blankets and other goods.[32] As the colonial entities of Vancouver Island and Washington Territory took shape in the mid-nineteenth century, each set of officials worked to make Indian trade benefit their colony instead. Ironically, this treaty provision redirecting Indian trade toward Americans provided another way for the territory's indigenous peoples to remain engaged with white society.

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[29] Before becoming governor of Washington Territory, Stevens attempted to gather support for the creation of military colonies in the "Indian country" of the American West. See Stevens to [Colonel W. J. Hardee, 1850 or 1851], in Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, Vol. I, 262.

[30] Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties, 1778-1883* (New York: Interland Publishing Inc., 1972), 684.

[31] Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, Vol. 1, 297.

[32] Edmund A. Starling, [Indian Agent for Puget Sound District], "No. 71, Report of E. A. Starling," 1 September 1852, *ARCIA*, 1852, 173.

The treaty commissioners sought to control a more concerning issue, interracial relations. Article Twelve in the Treaty of Neah Bay ordered the tribe to free all slaves and not acquire any more. On the surface, this provision reflected national concerns over the expansion of slavery in the American West, and Congress had established Washington as an antislavery territory.[33] More specifically, Anglo Americans – especially those such as Stevens who had strong abolition backgrounds – saw Northwest Coast Indian slavery as a backward institution to prohibit in the progressive territory.[34] But Anglo fears over Natives enslaving non-Natives underscored the importance of prohibiting this institution. As discussed in the previous chapter, HBC officials had employed their limited power to control Indians to free non-Native slaves. In the decades before signing the Treaty of Neah Bay, Makahs drew the attention of Anglo officials intent on combating slavery because these powerful chiefs had purchased or captured Japanese, Russians, and white Americans, in addition to indigenous peoples from other tribes allied with fur traders. During the mid-nineteenth century, Neah Bay continued to be the center of the indigenous slave trade, and Anglos still feared becoming enslaved to Indian masters.[35] Therefore, when the U.S. treaty commission came to Neah Bay, prohibiting slavery – especially across racial lines – was a top priority. In the decades after signing the treaty,

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[33] Richard White, *"It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 157-70.

[34] Leland Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 214-24. Anglos commonly blamed Indian "indolence" on their practice of keeping slaves. For example, see Starling, "No. 71, Report of E. A. Starling," 172. For a brief mention of Stevens's abolitionist stances, see [Isaac I. Stevens] to Father [Isaac Stevens, Sr.], 17 November 1838, in Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, 55. See also Kent D. Richards, *Isaac I. Stevens: Young Man in a Hurry* (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1979), 10 & 39.

[35] Gilbert Malcolm Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1868), 67. For white fears of being enslaved, see Samuel Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast: Containing an Account of Travels and Adventures Among the Indians, Their Manners and Customs, Their Treatment of Prisoners, and also a Description of the Country* (1860), unpublished typed manuscript version in the Samuel Hancock Papers, University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle, 164.

federal agents at Neah Bay made few efforts at ending Makah slavery of Natives, thereby indicating that officials at the time only desired to prevent Indians from enslaving whites and other "civilized" peoples.[36]

Additionally, the territorial legislature used laws to erect legal boundaries controlling interracial relations. In 1854 and 1855, the legislature passed and amended a law voiding all solemnized marriages – unions officiated by clergymen and government officials – between whites and Indians and making it illegal for anyone to solemnize such unions.[37] During the land-based fur trade, interracial unions had been common.[38] When settlers and colonial officials came to the region in the 1840s, they expressed their distaste of these relationships, especially when they resulted in mixed-race children. For example, Berthold Seemann, botanist aboard the British survey vessel the *Herald*, described his "disgust" at the "half-castes" he saw at Fort Victoria in 1846, surmising that

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[36] For example, just before the Makah chief Kal-chote died, James Swan (then the reservation teacher) facilitated the transfer of the chief's slaves to a relative by making sure that Kal-chote's property, including his slaves, was disposed of according to the will the dying titleholder dictated to Swan. See 14 January 1863, Diary 6. Agency officials also hired Makah slaves to do various labor and chores. See 29 June 1863, Diary 6. Officials such as Swan and agents assigned to Neah Bay neglected to free slaves, even when a slave requested it. See 8 February 1865, Diary 9; 13 July 1866, Diary 10; and 7 January 1879, Diary 24, James G. Swan Papers, UWSC (hereafter cited as Swan Papers).

[37] The first version of this act only voided marriages already solemnized. An amendment to this earlier act prohibited future marriages between whites and those with more than "one-half Indian blood" or individuals with one-fourth or more of "negro blood." See "An Act to Amend an Act, Entitled 'An Act to Regulate Marriage,' Passed April 20th, 1854," in Frank Pierce, *Laws of Washington; a Publication of the Session Laws of Washington Territory, Including the General Laws and Resolutions of the Years 1854 to 1888 Inclusive; the Federal and Colonial Orders, Treaties, Acts and Ordinances Affecting Land Titles in Washington* (Seattle: Tribune Printing Company, 1895), Vol. I, 651-52. While this action ignored interracial common-law marriages, the Marriage Act of 1866 closed this loophole and made these marriages illegal. Ibid., 354-57.

[38] For a general overview of this topic throughout the North American fur trade, see Sylvia Van Kirk, *"Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society, 1670-1870* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). For these dynamics specific to the Pacific Northwest, see Richard Mackie, *Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793-1843* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 305-08.

they "appear to inherit the vices of both races."[39] Five years later, the first schoolteacher the Colony of Vancouver Island hired complained of HBC officers living with Native women.[40] Through these laws and others (such as barring Indians from testifying in civil and criminal proceedings), U.S. territorial officials sought to separate Indians from white society.

Of all the Indians west of the Cascade Mountains, Governor Stevens worried most about the Makah at Cape Flattery. He knew of the tribe's reputation for violence and intransigence. In his report on Indians in the American West, Stevens predicted, "The superior courage of the Makahs, as well as their treachery, will make them more difficult of management than most other tribes of this region. No whites are at present settled in their country; but as the occupation of the territory progresses, some pretty stringent measures will be probably required respecting them."[41] Characterizing them as "the most formidable to navigators of any in the American territories on the Pacific," Stevens worried that the People of the Cape could interfere with his dream of transforming the territory into a strategic trade link to the Orient.[42] At the very least, situated at the entrance to Puget Sound, angry Makahs could disrupt maritime traffic. But Stevens also knew that he had a timely opportunity to negotiate with the Makah because smallpox had killed the leading chiefs and had left despondent survivors.[43] If he was ever going to

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[39] Berthold Seemann, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Herald During the Years 1845-1851: Under the Command of Captain Henry Kellett Being a Circumnavigation of the Globe, and Three Cruizes to the Arctic Regions in Search of Sir John Franklin*, 2 Vols. (London: Reeve and Co., 1853), Vol. 1, 104-05.

[40] C. A. Bayley, "Early Life on Vancouver Island," 1878 [microfilm P-C 3], Bancroft, 5.

[41] Stevens to Manypenny, 16 September 1854, in *ARCIA*, 1854, 450.

[42] Ibid., 449. Stevens wanted to have a role in opening the Pacific to American trade. See Richard D. Scheuerman, "Territorial Indian Policy and Tribal Relations, 1850-1856," in *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils*, 10.

[43] Another scholar has argued that Stevens was eager to take advantage of the disruptive effects of diseases. See Seeman, "The Treaty and Non-Treaty Coastal Indians," 45-49.

badger such a formidable people onto a reservation with other coastal Indians, he felt that now was the time to do so.

But Makahs and other Puget Sound Indians were neither as cooperative nor despondent as Stevens hoped. Even before the *Potter* arrived at Neah Bay, the commissioners had abandoned the goal of placing all Indians west of the Cascades onto one reservation. Stevens began his treaty negotiations with the Puget Sound peoples, who forced him to concede to several reservations rather than one. Like the tribes Dart negotiated with previously, the Puget Sound chiefs refused to give up ancestral lands, convincing Stevens that doing so would lead to war.[44] Makahs had already refused to join the S'Klallams for the negotiations with Stevens; they insisted on having their own treaty with the U.S.[45] Fearing further complications, Stevens tried to frighten the Makah chiefs, warning them that "many whites were coming into the country, and that he... did not want the Indians to be crowded out."[46] His threat failed to intimidate the chiefs into leaving Cape Flattery, and the leaders informed him that they would not sell or abandon ancestral lands and waters. Eager to leave Neah Bay with some kind of settlement and fearing the repercussion of angering the People of the Cape, Stevens conceded to Makah demands.

In 1855, Makah chiefs held enough power to force Stevens to alter a critical clause in the Treaty of Neah Bay. At their insistence, he changed Article Four, which detailed the tribe's fishing rights, to include whaling and sealing rights (the addition has

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[44] The most dramatic example of this was when Chief Leschi (Nisqually) told Stevens that if he could not get his home, then he would fight. One eyewitness to the incident reported "Leschi then took the paper out of his pocket that the Governor had given him to be sub-chief, and tore it up before the Governor's eyes, stamped on the pieces, and left the treaty ground, and never came back." Eventually, Simmons forged the chief's mark on the treaty. See Ezra Meeker, *Pioneer Reminiscences of Puget Sound: The Tragedy of Leschi* (Seattle: Lowman & Hanford Stationary and Print. Co., 1905), 242.

[45] Richards, *Isaac I. Stevens*, 207.

[46] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2.

been underlined): "The right of taking fish and of whaling or sealing at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the United States."[47] This small but important alteration made this the only treaty to protect indigenous whaling rights in the continental U.S. Additionally, all the Stevens Treaties – except the Treaty of Neah Bay – contained the same exact language detailing tribal fishing rights.[48] The fact that Stevens made this change is important because Makahs forced him to alter his treaty template. The Treaty of Neah Bay was the only Stevens Treaty to have this – or any – tribally specific condition beyond particular reservation boundaries.

The smallpox deaths did encourage Makah chiefs to negotiate with Stevens, but not in the way that the governor had hoped. The recent disease mortalities still affected Makahs. Klah-pe-at-hoo, a Neah Bay chief, told Stevens that "he had been sick at heart" since his brother's death.[49] Others also explained that the deaths of the ranking chiefs had resulted in their promotion to leading titleholders. But instead of undercutting Makah power, the recent disease experience encouraged the chiefs to approach the treaty negotiations as an opportunity to protect what was important to the People of the Cape. They knew that the dynamics of the *ča·di·* borderland had changed and would continue to do so. The recent smallpox epidemic had reduced Makah numbers, leaving them weaker

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[47] Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties, 1778-1883*, 682-85.

[48] The Stevens Treaties in western Washington included the Treaty of Medicine Creek (1854), Treaty of Point Elliott (1855), Treaty of Point No Point (1855), and the Treaty of Neah Bay (1855). For more on the Stevens Treaties, see Richards, *Isaac I. Stevens*, 181-210; Trafzer, *Indians, Superintendents, and Councils*; Cesare Marino, "History of Western Washington since 1846," in *Northwest Coast*, ed. Wayne Suttles, *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute, 1990), 169-72; Richards, "The Stevens Treaties of 1854-1855, an Introduction"; Alexandra Harmon, *The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest* (Seattle: Center for the Study of the Pacific Northwest in association with University of Washington Press, 2008), 3-31.

[49] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2.

than ever, with respect to neighboring indigenous peoples. Perhaps they believed that U.S. acknowledgment of Makah marine tenure in a treaty would protect customary marine space from not just white settlers but other indigenous rivals.

Additionally, Makah chiefs appeared to know what to expect from a treaty negotiation. Although this was their first treaty with a non-Native colonial authority, indigenous networks of trade and kinship had brought news of other such negotiations. Between 1850 and 1854, James Douglas, as Governor of the Colony of Vancouver Island, negotiated fourteen treaties with Natives north of the Strait of Juan de Fuca.[50] On the surface, these were little more than land purchases. For example, Douglas paid the "Swengwhung" (a band of Songhees) of Victoria Peninsula seventy-five pounds sterling for their land in April 1850. However, this purchase and the others Douglas made set aside a small reserve for the Indian group and included treaty-like conditions, such as hunting and fishing rights in customary areas.[51] Makahs would have also known of the 1851 Dart Treaties, especially the Tansey Point Treaty signed with Quinaults and others to the south.[52] These British and U.S. treaties gave Makah chiefs certain expectations for their own treaty: money for lands they conceded, protection of some ancestral lands, and guaranteed fishing and hunting rights. More importantly, these earlier negotiations

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[50] For a concise overview of the Douglas Treaties, see Robin Fisher, *Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992), 66-68; Cole Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 17-44.

[51] "Sample Text of Douglas Treaty: Swengwhung Tribe – Victoria Peninsula, South of Colquitz" (available at http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/treaty/landmark/douglas/sample.html), Province of British Columbia Website [accessed May 2009]. Although calculated in pounds sterling, Douglas paid in HBC blankets. Harris, *Making Native Space: Colonialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia*, 19.

[52] Richards argues that Puget Sound Indians knew of the Dart Treaties and the fact that Congress had failed to ratify them, which made chiefs wary that whites would not compensate them for land or protect them from settlers. Richards, "Federal Indian Policy, Isaac I. Stevens, and the Western Washington Treaties, 1854-1855," 33.

provided Makahs with the notion that treaties could benefit their people.[53] This conclusion aligns with oral histories kept by other tribes who were parties to Stevens Treaties. For example, Ted Strong (Yakama) speaks of his people's belief that their chiefs saw the 1855 treaty as "an instrument to preserve life for out tribal nation.... [O]ur treaty was looked upon by our leaders as a way of preserving what tribal members were left after decimation by war, by diseases and a reduction in the quality of life because of the encroachment of a new order of people and society that was coming to the Northwest."[54] Makahs still speak of the treaty as a document in which they "kept the sea" for themselves.[55]

Makah Marine Tenure in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

In 1855, Makah chiefs believed that keeping the sea for the People of the Cape was of paramount importance. By calling the sea his country during the treaty negotiations, Tse-kaw-wootl expressed Makah tenure over customary marine waters and resources. The existence of tribal marine tenure counters the tendency of traditional scholarship on indigenous peoples to limit Native tenure concepts to terrestrial spaces. For example, many studies on American Indians examine the relationship of a particular tribe to its land and related resources.[56] These studies explore how land is the foundation

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[53] Makahs remember the treaty negotiations as a time when ancestors fought for their way of life. See Mary Ann Claplanhoo-Martin, Charles "Pug" Claplanhoo, and John McCarty, interviews by Josh Reid, digital audio recordings, 19 May 2009, Makah Cultural and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA.

[54] Clark Hansen, "Indian Views of the Stevens-Palmer Treaties Today," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 106, no. 3 (2005): 11.

[55] Karen Samantha Barton, "'Red Waters': Contesting Marine Space as Indian Place in the U.S. Pacific Northwest" (Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2000), 247.

[56] For a representation of the extant scholarship on American Indian land tenure, see Imre Sutton, *Indian Land Tenure: Bibliographical Essays and a Guide to the Literature* (New York: Clearwater Pub. Co., 1975); Richard White, *Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the*

of tribal identity. They usually detail some aspect of the expansion of settler-colonists across North America and the resultant conflict over Indian land. Through a combination of colonial processes, institutional mechanisms, and shifting balances of power, Anglo-Americans dispossessed the former occupants of the land. This terrestrial perspective overlooks those indigenous peoples, such as Makahs, who vested marine rather than terrestrial spaces and resources with their most valued tenure rights.

During the mid-nineteenth century, *tenure* meant ownership of land, according to the doctrine of property that predominated in the U.S. and the U.K.[57] Anglos understood that ownership was exclusive and gave the owner the right to buy and sell her or his property and to manage the land as s/he saw fit. But ownership was not absolute, especially within the context of modern nations. Through legal institutions and political bodies, societies have exercised constraints over both the use and allocation of property, including taxation and regulatory powers, such as policing and zoning.

Settler-colonial empires and nations have used tenure concepts to their advantage in order to dispossess indigenous peoples of land and terrestrial resources.[58] For example, during the North American colonial period, expanding empires acknowledged varying degrees of indigenous tenure rights to enable them to purchase Indian land or to seize vast tracts through "just wars." During the treaty era, the U.S. recognized Indian tenure in

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Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Florence Connolly Shipek, *Pushed into the Rocks: Southern California Indian Land Tenure, 1769-1986* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987); James Hart Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989); Donald Lee Fixico, *The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: American Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources* (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1998); Elliot West, *The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land.*

[57] For a concise overview of how tenure concepts differed among American Indian and "Western" societies, see Sutton, *Indian Land Tenure*, 4-6.

[58] For a useful overview of this process in the U.S., see Banner, *How the Indians Lost Their Land*.

order to negotiate for land cessions, just as Governor Stevens did during the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay with the Makah.[59] Congressional legislation, such as the Dawes Severalty Act (1887), granted ownership rights to individuals to fragment tribal holdings and to transfer more land out of American Indian hands. Like other Western concepts applied to indigenous peoples, tenure has a long history of being used to the advantage of the colonizer.[60] Therefore, when discussing *indigenous tenure*, we must differentiate it from the version of tenure that predominated in the U.S.

In North America, indigenous tenure concepts and protocols varied from one culture to the next and over time. Like their Nuu-chah-nulth relatives, Makahs observed a complex system of ownership rights encompassing nearly every cultural and material item.[61] When Europeans and Anglo Americans encountered Northwest Coast peoples during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, many complained that everything – driftwood, fish, shellfish, game, sea mammals, timber, wild plants, and freshwater – appeared to have an owner. As non-Natives became more familiar with indigenous cultures of this corner of the Pacific, they learned that ownership rights extended to cultural property, such as names, songs, dances, games, stories, rituals, and privileges to practice a particular occupation, like whaling. Ownership rights were also tied to the social hierarchy. Chiefs held the most important resources and hunting,

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[59] However, under the leadership of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court limited "aboriginal title" by defining it as only a "mere right of usufruct and habitation." *Johnson v. M'Intosh* 21 U.S. 543 (1823).

[60] Some indigenous political scholars argue a similar case for the Western concept of *sovereignty*. See Taiaiake Alfred, "Sovereignty," in *A Companion to American Indian History*, ed. Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002).

[61] Philip Drucker, *The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1951), 247-73; Ruth Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast: The Makah, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Southern Kwakiutl and Nuxalk* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), 43-56; Alan D. McMillan, *Since the Time of the Transformers: The Ancient Heritage of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Ditidaht, and Makah* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 16-17.

fishing, and gathering areas, including cranberry bogs, locations for fishing weirs, and offshore fishing grounds. They facilitated and monitored use of these resources and extended usufruct rights to family members and others, even to non-Makahs on an occasional, case-by-case basis.[62] In 1941, Makah elders explained to an attorney connected to the federal Indian Office that their ancestors never fished an area that did not belong to them unless the owner invited them to do so.[63] While Makahs of the mid-nineteenth century owned many terrestrial resources and lands, the ocean around Cape Flattery was their most valuable property. As they had done for generations, they rooted their marine tenure rights within the very fabric of what made them Makah – cultural practices and performances related to the marine environment.

As detailed in the Introduction, a combination of natural forces makes the waters off Cape Flattery, the historical and current Makah homeland, a complex marine environment. Fluctuating winds, nearby mountains and watersheds, submarine geological features, circulating water masses, and a rich marine ecosystem interact to create the oceanography of Makah marine space.[64] Located just off Cape Flattery, the Juan de Fuca

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[62] Makah oral histories differ on this point. Some recall hearing elders mention that they allowed non-Makah Indians with kinship ties to a Makah family to fish propertied grounds on an occasional basis. For example, see Maria Pasqua and Dale Johnson, interviews by Josh Reid, digital audio recordings, 18 May 2009, MCRC. Other Makahs state that non-Makahs never fished tribal grounds. See Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo interview. Regardless, when Makahs occasionally allowed non-Makah Natives to fish in customary waters, they did not transfer ownership rights to these people; nor did it make these sites part of the collection of "usual and accustomed grounds" non-Makahs could claim under a treaty. For some examples of specific cultural property items, see Charlotte June Coté, "'It's Who We Are': Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002), 49-50; Linda Goodman and Helma Swan, *Singing the Songs of My Ancestors: The Life and Music of Helma Swan, Makah Elder* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), 112; Susan Mary Kenyon, *The Kyuquot Way: A Study of a West Coast (Nootkan) Community* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1980), xi.

[63] [Edward Swindell], "Transcript of the Meeting, Oct. 15, 1941 – evening meeting," Box 1: Old Fishing Locations, Edward Swindell, Jr., Papers (M005), MCRC. Swan noted ownership of cranberry land; see Swan, 24 August 1862, Diary 6, Swan Papers.

[64] F. Favorite and Northwest Fisheries Center, *The Ocean Environment* (Seattle: Northwest Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1975); F. Favorite, Taivo Laevastu, and Richard Robert Straty, *Oceanography of the Northeastern Pacific Ocean and*

Eddy draws rich nutrients from the cold ocean depths to the surface. This upwelling fuels a food web that includes a wide variety of fish, sea birds, and marine mammals – especially whales – which are culturally significant to Makahs. While scholars typically characterize the entire Northwest Coast region as a rich marine environment, substantial variations occur from one place to the next and over time. Due to the proximity of the Juan de Fuca Eddy, customary Makah waters are some of the most consistently plentiful marine environments in the region.

Makahs expressed tenure over these bountiful waters through indigenous knowledge of local space. For example, during the treaty negotiations, Kal-chote, the first Makah leader to speak on behalf of his people, connected knowledge to tenure rights. When introducing himself to Governor Stevens, Kal-chote stated, "I know the country all around and therefore I have a right to speak" about Makah ownership of the sea and their fishing rights.[65] As one of the highest-ranking chiefs, he owned important marine resources, such as particular halibut fishing banks just off the coast, and his family had fished them for generations. The "country" he and other Makahs described was the ocean around the Cape Flattery villages, which provided access to lucrative fishing, whaling, and sealing grounds. Their familiarity with the area transformed a watery void into Makah home waters to which they held title.[66]

Eastern Bering Sea, and Relations to Various Living Marine Resources, Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center Processed Report (Seattle: National Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest and Alaska Fisheries Center, 1977); David F. Purdy, *A Summary of the Physical Oceanography of the Pacific Northwest Coast*, OCS Information Report ([Washington, DC]: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Pacific OCS Region, 1990); Amy MacFadyen, Barbara Hickey, and William Cochlan, "Influences of the Juan De Fuca Eddy on Circulation, Nutrients, and Phytoplankton Production in the Northern California Current System," *Journal of Geophysical Research* 113 (2008).

[65] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2.

[66] Spaces are composed of more than places people simply use. As French sociologist Henri Lefebvre argues, spaces are best understood as social realities with sets of forms and relations. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 116. Similarly, geographer Yi-Fu Tuan emphasizes the culturally specific processes

Like other cultures, Makahs articulated their ownership and knowledge through placenaming. Using examples from Western Apaches, anthropologist Keith Basso explains how the process of placenaming invests spaces with social meaning by invoking stories that teach culturally specific values.[67] Place names also encode cultural knowledge that reflects subsistence patterns and a people's understanding of geography and natural forces. Writing about indigenous Torres Strait Islanders between the Australian continent and New Guinea, geographer Bernard Nietschmann argues that, "Names acknowledge familiarity with places... place names provide traditional title to land and sea territory. History and tenure are confirmed by places named."[68] The examples below illustrate that Makahs employed place names in ways similar to Apaches and Torres Strait Islanders to transform the sea into their home.

Archival records before, during, and after the nineteenth century illustrate the importance of marine placenaming to Makahs. For example, during the 1792 Galiano and Valdés expedition to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Spaniards noted several Makah names for

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societies undergo to transform "amorphous space into articulated geography." Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*, 25th Anniversary Edition ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 83. Geographer Bernard Nietschmann argues that "Sea territories are not just bounded sea space but areas named, known, used, claimed and sometimes defended. A social group's familiarity with an area creates a territory. A territory, whether terrestrial or marine, is more than simply spatially delimited and defended resources for the exclusive use of a particular group. A territory is social and cultural space as much as it is resource or subsistence space. Sea space becomes an entity because a social group establishes and recognizes the location, pattern and interaction of marine things and processes." Bernard Nietschmann, "Traditional Sea Territories, Resources and Rights in Torres Strait," in *A Sea of Small Boats*, ed. John Cordell (Cambridge: Cultural Survival, Inc., 1989), 60. For more on how people use their ecological and environmental understandings to configure inshore waters into specific regimes of local sea tenure, see John Cordell, *A Sea of Small Boats*, 1-32.

[67] Keith H. Basso, *Wisdom Sits in Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).

[68] Nietschmann, "Traditional Sea Territories, Resources and Rights in Torres Strait," 83.

harbors, river mouths, islands, passages, and other marine features.[69] The wide geographic breadth of these names demonstrates that Makah mariners intimately knew the entire Strait of Juan de Fuca and northern Puget Sound. While residing at Neah Bay in the decades after the Treaty of Neah Bay, James Swan, the first Anglo-American teacher on the reservation, noted many Makah place names for marine locations. Some identified fishing grounds over which specific families and villages held particular usufruct rights. They called the important halibut banks located twelve miles off Cape Flattery *Klushooa*, meaning "place where the water is shallow" or "shoalwater." Makah fishermen named a certain oceanic salmon fishing spot *Slthu-slthu-both* – "fish moving around on top."[70] These names illustrate an understanding of this marine space in terms of its depth, locations for specific resources, and the behavior of certain fish. High densities of place names demonstrate long-term occupation and intimate knowledge of places.[71] In his unpublished manuscript on Makah geography of the early twentieth century, anthropologist T. T. Waterman recorded 144 marine place names (64%) out of a total 224 from the Cape Flattery region. Examples ranged from named sea stacks to submerged rocks to particular spots on beaches.[72]

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[69] Josef Espinosa y Tello, *A Spanish Voyage to Vancouver and the North-West Coast of America. Being the Narrative of the Voyage Made in the Year 1792 by the Schooners Sutil and Mexicana to Explore the Strait of Fuca* (London: Argonaut Press, 1930), 32-37.

[70] Swan, 7 October 1880, Diaries 28 & 29, Swan Papers. Swan noted the names as *Klo shie* and *Kloshieas*, while elders in the twentieth century wrote it as *Klushooa* and noted that whites call it Swiftsure. See "Exhibit HH: Written Testimony of Nora Barker, Makah Elder & Teacher of Makah History, [August 23, 1977]," Legal Case C85-1606M, Makah v. U.S., Makah Tribal Council Collection (M010), MCRC. Barker also acknowledged that whites today call *Slthu-slthu-both* Forty-Mile Bank after its distance from shore.

[71] Nietschmann makes a similar argument. See "Traditional Sea Territories, Resources and Rights in Torres Strait," 83.

[72] T. T. Waterman, "Geography of the Makah," [n.d.], in Erna Gunther Papers, 1887-1977, UWSC. Unfortunately, this incomplete manuscript rarely noted the history or stories behind specific place names. Others have criticized it for its focus on terrestrial places. Barbara Lane, "Makah Economy circa 1855 and the Makah Treaty – A Cultural Analysis," [1972], Makah Tribal Council Collection (M010), MCRC, 11.

The naming of Tatoosh Island exemplifies how Makahs used names to articulate indigenous knowledge, history, and values. The island actually has several names. *Op-pa-chaket*, ("land on water") was one of the original Makah names for the island.[73] But from the eighteenth century, the People of the Cape have referred to it more frequently as *Tatoosh Island*, its current name. The Ditidaht, a group of Vancouver Island Nuu-chah-nulth and close relatives of the Makah, named the island *Too-too-tche*, the Nootkan word for Thunderbird, a powerful, supernatural being. According to John Claplanhoo, a mid-nineteenth century Makah chief:

> [Thunderbird] is in all aspects like an Indian and feeds on whales. When he is hungry he clothes himself with wings and feathers, as he would put on a blanket and soars away like a vast cloud over the ocean. When he sees a whale he throws down the Ha hake to ak – an animal like the sea horse – who with his red tongue causes the lightning by thrusting it out like a snake. This stuns or kills the whale when the Thunderbird seizes it with his talons and carries it home for food. The rustling of its wings causes the thunder.[74]

Accounts such as this illustrate that Thunderbird taught Makahs and Nuu-chah-nulths how to whale.[75] Therefore, when the Ditidaht named Tatoosh Island, they were recognizing this as one of the premier whaling sites in the borderland. Makahs accepted this name, despite the fact that it also reminded them that Ditidahts once claimed the

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[73] For this name, see Elliot Anderson [Makah] to Roger Chute, 19 June 1937, MCRC photocopy from original in Ms 15/23, Box 6, Roger Chute Collection, Washington State Historical Society Archives (WSHSA), Tacoma. While at Neah Bay for three months in 1852, members of the U.S. Coast Survey noted this name as *opichuk't*. George Davidson, *Directory for the Pacific Coast of the United States: Reported to the Superintendent of the U. S Coast Survey* ([Washington, DC?]: s.n., 1862), 111. The other original Makah name is *ča·di·*. For this name, see Maria Pasqua, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recordings, 13 October 2008, MCRC.

[74] Swan, 24 November 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers.

[75] To mid-nineteenth century Makahs, Thunderbird was not a mythological relic of the past – he was still physically present. Gibbs spoke with one Makah whaler who encountered Thunderbird while chasing a whale. Thunderbird appeared and plucked the whale out of the water, "causing a great commotion in the water and nearly capsizing the canoe." See "Notebook: No. II – Journal and Notes NWBS, 1855-1858," George Gibbs Notebooks of Scientific Observations of the Pacific Northwest (WA MSS S-1810), Beinecke.

island.[76] Additionally, they adopted *Tatoosh* as an honored name that prominent whaling chiefs earned the right to hold as any other ceremonial property.

More than just expressing ownership, indigenous knowledge of this named marine country allowed Makahs to navigate it safely and to exploit its resources. When on the water, they used both landmarks and seamarks to pinpoint their location. For example, fishermen located fishing spots by referencing features along Vancouver Island and the Olympic Peninsula.[77] Sealers noted the difference between shallower inshore waters and the deeper "blue sea" above the submerged continental shelf.[78] They also knew the locations of regular kelp beds and used them as overnight anchorages when away from their villages.[79] Whaling crews occasionally lost sight of land and stayed out at sea for days. On clear evenings, they steered by the Pole star. Combinations of regular swell patterns and winds enabled them to fix their approximate location, even in the regular fogs that conceal the coast.[80] Experienced Makah mariners also used the water's appearance and the set of tide rips to approximate their location when out of sight of land.[81]

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[76] This incident was detailed in Chapter Two. See also Albert Irvine and Luke Markistun, *How the Makah Obtained Possession of Cape Flattery*, Indian Notes and Monographs (New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation, 1921); Waterman, "Geography of the Makah," 13.

[77] "Exhibit HH: Written Testimony of Nora Barker." Elders recall some of the earliest fishing cruises with their fathers and grandfathers who could locate specific grounds at sea in this manner. See Johnson Interview and McCarty Interview.

[78] "Memorandum – Information Obtained from Robert Lee as to Sealing," 22 December 1938, Seals and Sealskins – Reports, etc. (Original Neah Bay Agency), Decimal File 927.0, Taholah Indian Agency, Taholah, WA, BIA, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, WA (hereafter cited as Robert Lee Info).

[79] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 154.

[80] For an explanation of how Makahs used – and continue to use – the swell patterns to orient themselves with respect to the shore, see Johnson interview.

[81] T. T. Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," *University of Washington Publications in Anthropology* I, no. 1 (1920): 47.

Spending so much time on the water, the People of the Cape also needed to understand and be able to predict local weather. Individuals with the most developed weather-prediction skills were "broadcasters" who advised fishermen, sealers, and whalers when to go out.[82] Makahs embedded some of this indigenous knowledge in cultural terms. For example, they had two months that they named after the changing weather conditions. *Klo klo chis to puthl*, their equivalent of February, marked the beginning of good weather, indicating that women could safely canoe alone. *Cha kaush puthl* began in late November, and its name means "month of winds and screaming birds."[83] They also differentiated between certain weather phenomena on land and at sea. For example, *Kloot ka bethld*, means "thunder on the ocean."[84] For Makahs, this term not only recognized that thunder sounds different on the ocean, but it also signified the whaling power of Thunderbird, who causes thunder on the ocean when he whales.

Makah ability to predict the weather impressed non-Indians. In an article for the *Washington Standard* in 1863, Swan reported that Makahs recognized that the clamor of birds and a particular type of swell preceded storms. The swell caused "strange noises" to emanate from the rocky caverns on Cape Flattery. When fishermen and sealers on the water heard these noises, they had just enough time to round the cape and seek safety in Neah Bay before the storm hit.[85] In a separate account, he also recorded the ability of

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[82] Again, oral histories detail many of these skills. See Dave Sones, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, MCRC.

[83] James G. Swan, Folder 191: Bound autograph manuscript journal and memorandum book, 1861-71, Box 10, Stenzel Collection, Beinecke (hereafter cited as Manuscript Journal).

[84] Swan, 21 December 1878, Diary 23, Swan Papers.

[85] James Swan, "Cape Flattery," *Washington Standard* [(Olympia, W.T.)], 20 June 1863. According to Swan, Makahs believed that these sounds were made by "Indians who have been drowned about the Cape, whose office it now is to warn other Indians of impending danger."

Makahs and neighboring peoples to predict upcoming seasons of especially unpleasant weather. Toward the end of September 1865, he wrote in his diary:

> "Capt. John [Claplanhoo] tells me that the Indians predict a very cold winter. There will be according to his statement, very high tides, violent gales, great rains, much cold and snow. The Arhosetts [on Vancouver Island] predict rain from an unusual number of frogs in a particular stream at their place. The Oquiets [on Vancouver Island] predict cold from the fact that great numbers of mice were seen leaving an island in Barclay Sound and swimming to the mainland."[86]

His entries that winter noted the conditions his "informants" had predicted. This level of familiarity with their home indicated that the sea was their country.

Makah knowledge of their marine environment also extended to the biological resources within it. This allowed them to adapt gear and techniques to harvest a range of oceanic foods and materials. Like indigenous, local knowledge, the work they did in these waters also expressed tenure. Statements made by Makah chiefs during the treaty negotiations illuminate that they understood the connection between labor and ownership. In the same breath as they spoke of their ownership of the sea, they detailed the importance of maritime work, such as catching halibut and hunting whales.[87] By mixing their labor with the ocean through customary marine practices, Makahs transformed the sea into their country.[88]

As it had for many generations, halibut fishing formed the foundation of Makah subsistence and provided an important commercial good they traded to other indigenous communities and passing non-Native vessels. During summers, Makah fishermen worked customary halibut banks in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Pacific. Their knowledge of

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[86] Swan, 25 September 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers.

[87] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2-3.

[88] Anthropologist Faith Harrington makes a similar argument for seventeenth-century New England, arguing that English development of cod fisheries in the northeast Atlantic was an expression of their national territoriality. Faith Harrington, "Sea Tenure in Seventeenth Century New England: Native Americans and Englishmen in the Sphere of Marine Resources, 1600-1630" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985).

the habits of halibut and other species enabled them to exploit this resource heavily. For example, they designed specially curved hooks so that dogfish infesting the halibut banks would not stay on the hook when they struck.[89] Additionally, they baited the hooks with octopus, knowing that *shoo-yoult* (halibut) prefer it while *yáh-chah* (dogfish) avoid it.[90] By working named and owned halibut banks such as *Klushooa*, Makah fishermen expressed their tenure over the sea.

Makah sealers also relied upon indigenous knowledge to hunt two species of seals, *kaíth-la-doose* (fur seals) and *kars-chówe* (hair seals). Like halibut fishing, the customary practice of sealing also expressed Makah tenure of their marine country. Sealers embarked from winter villages at 2 A.M. to take advantage of the east wind that swept their canoes, rigged with sails woven from cedar bark, out to the ocean. They went ten to forty miles into the Pacific, reaching the hunting grounds at daylight in order to catch herds of sleeping seals. From January to May, the Davidson Current, which carries warmer, equatorial-type water along the Washington coast, brings migrating seals close to shore. In good weather, sealers stayed on the water for more than twenty-four hours, lighting fires in their canoes to stay warm.[91]

Sealers used specially designed silent canoes to approach the sleeping herd, getting close enough to hear individual seals snore.[92] Twenty-four feet long, these canoes

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[89] Peter Eggers, Oral Testimony Collected by Roger Chute, 29 May 1936, MCRC photocopy from original in Ms 15/58, Box 4, Chute Collection.

[90] Swan, Manuscript Journal, 76; Eggers, Oral Testimony; James Gilchrist Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery, at the Entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca, Washington Territory," in *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge*, ed. Smithsonian Institution (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1870), 93-106.

[91] Robert Lee Info; E. M. Gibson, "No. 64, Annual Report of Neah Bay Agency," *ARCIA*, 1873, 308; Swan, 16 November 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers; Rev. Charles A. Huntington, *Memoir, 1899*, Beinecke, 133.

[92] Like many Northwest Coast peoples, Makahs had specialized canoes for specific purposes. See T. T. Waterman and Geraldine Coffin, *Types of Canoes on Puget Sound* (New York: Museum of the American

held a three-man crew – a harpooner and two paddlers – and about fifteen carcasses. Canoe makers constructed these vessels to ride high in the water so that the harpooner could more easily see his prey, and they scorched the bottoms of these canoes to burn off splinters that might make noisy ripples and wake sleeping seals.[93] Paddlers approached from the leeward side of the herd so that the seals could not smell them coming. When the canoe got to within twenty feet of the prey, the hunter hurled a fifteen-foot harpoon shaft mounted with two, barbed spearheads. The best harpooners sometimes struck with one throw two seals sleeping next to each other.[94] Attached to lines sixty-feet long and buoys made from inflated sealskins, the harpoon heads detached from the shaft when they struck. Then the hunters hauled the seal toward the canoe and clubbed it dead. When they were done sealing, they took advantage of the afternoon west wind to carry them home.[95]

Pelagic sealing entailed a certain amount of manageable danger. Like other wild animals, injured seals bite. When dragged close enough to club, seals lashed out, biting limbs and sometimes even gouging canoes.[96] A combination of thrashing seals and

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Indian, Heye Foundation, 1920); Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 11-26. Early visitors to this region commented on the great variety of canoes, especially noting the larger ones that could hold dozens of warriors. See John Meares, *Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the N. W. Coast of America*, Vol. 1 (London: J. Walter, 1791), 246-51.

[93] Robert Lee Info; "Pelagic Seal Hunting by Makah & Quilleute Indians," [1930s?] Seals and Sealskins – Reports, etc. (Original Neah Bay Agency), Decimal File 927.0, Taholah Indian Agency, Taholah, WA, BIA, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, WA (NARA-Seattle); McCarty Interview.

[94] Circus Jim, a noted Makah sealer, spoke about getting two seals with one throw. See Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, *Fur Seal Arbitration. Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Paris, under the Treaty between the United States ... And Great Britain, Concluded at Washington, February 29, 1892, for the Determination of Questions between the Two Governments Concerning the Jurisdictional Rights of the United States in the Waters of Bering Sea* (Washington: Govt. print. off., 1895), 380.

[95] This information about pre-schooner sealing is from a variety of sources. See Capt. Clarke, "Pelagic Sealing," [no other publication info], pp. 4-9, Vol. 40, older 6: Subject files, Series B: Miscellaneous – Pelagic Sealing [Reel A01765], Newcombe Family Papers, 1870-1955, British Columbia Archives (BCA), Victoria, Canada; Swan, "Fur Seal Industry of Cape Flattery and the Vicinity," [1883?], Stenzel Collection; "Pelagic Seal Hunting by Makah & Quilleute Indians."

[96] "Pelagic Seal Hunting by Makah & Quilleute Indians."

turbulent waters occasionally overturned canoes. One Makah sealer recounted a time when his canoe overturned and dumped him, his brother, their little white dog, and bleeding seal carcasses into the ocean off Tatoosh Island. This attracted nearby sharks that circled and made "savage runs" at them and the dead seals.[97] Storms could also sweep in, blowing sealers far out to sea. For example, in 1874, a ship bound for Asia picked up a canoe of Makahs whom a storm had forced far offshore.[98] Indigenous knowledge allowed Makah sealers to minimize these dangers and to hunt this marine resource with some predictability and safety.

Of all their customary practices, whaling best demonstrates that the People of the Cape combined indigenous knowledge with labor to express marine tenure. Makah whalers have relied upon their knowledge of the marine environment to hunt leviathans for the last 2,000 years. Through the mid-nineteenth century, most whalers caught one or two annually and five in good years.[99] Primarily hunting *se-whow* (California gray whales) and humpbacks, whalers also occasionally harvested *koats-kay* (sperm whales), *shys-what* (right whales), fin whales, and even blue whales. They also took *tsáilth-ko* (porpoises), *sah-bass* (sharks), and *kowid* (orcas).[100] Successful whalers possessed

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[97] Taholah Indian Agency, "Elliott Anderson: The Last Surviving Member of the Ozette Tribe and Ozette Reservation," MCRC photocopy from original in Ms 15/21, Box 2, Chute Collection.

[98] The sealers switched to another vessel bound for San Francisco and returned home two months later. Huntington, "Annual Report of Makah Agency," 25 August 1875, *ARCIA*, 1875, 362-64.

[99] Barton, "'Red Waters,'" 86. See also Swan, Diaries 1-6, Swan Papers. The Claplanhoo family remembers a harpoon that had been passed from father to son since the mid-eighteenth century. In 1907, this device had 142 notches on it for the whales Claplanhoo whalers had killed with it. See Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

[100] Swan, end of Diary 5, Swan Papers. Archaeological evidence has also confirmed these harvests. David R. Huelsbeck, "Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast," *Arctic Anthropology* 25, no. 1 (1988). While Huelsbeck hypothesizes that Makahs harvested sperm whales and orcas only as drift whales, Swan's diaries referenced several specific killings of orcas. His informants also told him that they sometimes harvested sperm whales, and his diaries never noted a sperm whale hunt. See Swan, Manuscript Journal, 73. Oral histories also imply that Makahs hunted a wide range of whales. See Sones Interview. Information about whales Makahs hunted can also be found in letters Swan wrote to Professor

knowledge specific to particular species of whales, information guarded and passed from father to son, just as whaling gear was.[101] A crew of eight sometimes remained on the ocean for days at a time, fifty to one hundred miles away from shore, pursuing *chet-a-pook* (whales).[102] A whaler harpooned his prey several times, bleeding it to death with a lance amidst "great fountains of crimson spray."[103] In extreme cases, whalers leapt onto harpooned whales who took too long to die. They held onto the lines connecting the whale to the canoe while stabbing the leviathan to dispatch it. Whalers even practiced holding their breath underwater in case they needed to hold onto submerging whales in these situations.[104] Once dead, a diver sewed shut the whale's mouth to prevent it from sinking. Then the crew towed the whale back to the coast, sometimes taking three days to get it ashore.[105] Staying out for this length of time and paddling across such great distances required Makah whalers to rely upon their knowledge of the ocean environment and their navigational and weather-prediction skills within a large marine area.

Laboring in a sea that was their country, mid-nineteenth century Makah fishermen, sealers, and whalers harvested enormous quantities of marine products. The wealth they earned from these products allowed them to wield significant authority and power in the *ča·di·* borderland. Abetted by indigenous knowledge, access to unique trade

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Spencer Baird of the Smithsonian, 6 November and 12 December 1882, Letterbook, Vol. 6, pp. 309-311 & 339-340, Swan Papers, University of British Columbia (microform, University of Washington library).

[101] Sones Interview.

[102] Samuel Morse, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 20 August 1897, *ARCIA*, 1897 291-92.

[103] Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 44.

[104] Ibid. Makahs continue to tell these stories today.

[105] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 139; Swan, "Indian Method of Killing Whales"; Anderson to Chute, 19 June 1937, MCRC photocopy from original in Ms 15/23, Box 6, Chute Collection; Lucien M. Lewis, "The Whale Hunters of Neah Bay: How on Occasion the Makah Indians Paddle out to Sea in Their Dugout Canoes and Kill 'Chit-up-Puk'," *Field and Stream*, April 1906; Ruth Kirk and Richard D. Daugherty, *Hunters of the Whale: An Adventure in Northwest Coast Archaeology* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1974), 44-50.

goods harvested from halibut, seals, and whales enabled the Makah to establish their middleman position in regional trade networks prior to the appearance of Europeans. As described in previous chapters, the People of the Cape maintained their influence by exchanging customary marine products with non-Native traders during the post-contact decades. In the early encounter years, non-Natives desired sea otter pelts. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, fish, sealskins, and whale oil increased in importance. For example, Swan estimated that the Makah, a tribe of 654 individuals in 1861, annually took more than one-and-a-half million pounds of fresh halibut.[106] Women dried much of this catch, which fed Makahs during the winter and was exchanged with neighboring tribes and non-Natives.

Seals provided Makahs with a number of valuable subsistence and commercial products. They ate the flesh, rendered the blubber into oil, used the skin for bedding, and employed the bladder to store sea mammal oil.[107] From entire sealskins that they inflated, whalers made floats used when hunting. They often employed thirty to forty of these buoys to slow down and tire out harpooned whales, and these prevented the heavy carcass from sinking.[108] During the second half of the nineteenth century, sealskins

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[106] Swan, 16 March 1880, Diary 10, Swan Papers; Swan to Miles C. Moore [Governor, Washington Territory], 30 August 1889, "Fishing," Box 1P-1-2, Miles C. Moore Papers, WSA; Swan, Manuscript Journal, 39-52.

[107] Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, *Fur Seal Arbitration*, 381. See also Robert Lee Info; James Cook, J. C. Beaglehole, and R. A. Skelton, *The Journals of Captain James Cook on His Voyages of Discovery* (Rochester: Boydell Press, 1999), 302. See also Swan, "Indian Method of Killing Whales"; Swan 6 July 1879, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

[108] Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery," 21; Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 34-36.

became an important commodity that Makahs traded with Anglos on both sides of the strait.[109]

However, mid-nineteenth century Makahs profited most from the trade of whale products.[110] Indigenous peoples of the borderland prized whales for their flesh, sinew, blubber, oil, and bones. Like halibut and seal meat, women smoked whale flesh stripped from carcasses.[111] Makahs ate blubber fresh and hung the remainder in smoke to cure it like bacon.[112] They used the bones as tools – spindle whorls, bark shredders, bark beaters, mat creasers, clubs, wedges, and tool handles – and structurally in water diversion efforts and as retaining walls to help stabilize small mudslides.[113] But whale oil was the most important subsistence and commercial product harvested. After stripping the blubber from a carcass, women boiled it and used clamshells to skim off the oil as it rose to the surface. Makahs stored processed oil in bladders and consumed it like butter, dipping dried fish, potatoes, and berries in it.[114]

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[109] This is detailed in Chapter Five. See also Charles Willoughby, "Report of the Makah Agent," 17 August 1880, *ARCIA*, 1880, 155-156; John C. Keenan, "Report of Neah Bay Agent," 1 August 1896; *ARCIA*, 1896, 313.

[110] Some scholars still emphasize the subsistence aspect of hunting, fishing, and gathering, while minimizing or ignoring the commercial elements of these customary practices. However, Huelsbeck's analysis of whale remains at Ozette demonstrate that Makah whalers took far more whales than they could simply "consume," thereby concluding that pre-contact whaling had to be a commercial activity also. See Huelsbeck, "Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast," 9-10.

[111] Whale flesh spoils more quickly than blubber; sometimes the meat had spoiled from drift whales or from those caught far out to sea before it could be stripped from the carcass and smoked. Ibid.: 7.

[112] Anglos who tried dried blubber thought it tasted like sweet pork. Swan, 25 December 1864, Diary 8, Swan Papers; Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery," 22. See also *Resources and Development of Washington Territory: Message and Report of Watson C. Squire, Governor of Washington Territory to the Legislative Assembly, Session 1885-6* (Seattle: Lowman and Hanford Stationary and Printing Company, 1886), 37.

[113] The archaeological dig at Ozette uncovered over 1,000 tools (25%) made of whalebone. Huelsbeck, "Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast," 7.

[114] Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery," 22. In his diaries, Swan often noted the common mid-nineteenth century Makah meal of dried halibut, whale oil, and potatoes. For example, see Swan, 29 October 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers.

While Makahs valued the material goods procured from customary practices such as fishing, sealing, and whaling, their marine country and the resources within it had an importance more complex than straightforward economic terms conveyed. Unlike forms of tenure that predominated in the U.S. during the first half of the nineteenth century, Makah tenure had sentimental – even spiritual – components. By mixing their labor with the sea, they communicated a "bond of belonging."[115] In writing about Hispano loggers' belief that they owned the forests of northern New Mexico, anthropologist Jake Kosek reminds us that "Sentimental arguments over nature are often considered the antithesis of rational discourse about property rights."[116] Applied to American Indians, scholars mistakenly dismiss these sentiments as stereotypes of the Ecological Indian.[117] For Makahs, however, their bond with the sea has been and continues to be far more complex. When Tse-kaw-wootl described the sea as his country, he invoked the Makahs' spiritual bond with the waters around Cape Flattery. Additionally, his words referenced the ways they owned marine space, used customary practices to express tenure rights, and exploited the ocean's bounty to gain wealth and power.

During the nineteenth century, Makahs recognized that tenure often entailed both rights and responsibilities.[118] These rights included usufruct rights, and high-ranking leaders had the authority to decide who else could share the property in question and on

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[115] Raymond Williams, "Ideas and Nature," in *Problems in Materialism and Culture*, ed. Williams (London: Verso, 1980), 83. I have adapted his statement where he writes, "we have mixed our labor with the earth, our forces with its forces too deeply to be able to separate each other out." Cordell calls this "a special fraternity with the sea." Cordell, *A Sea of Small Boats*, 2.

[116] Jake Kosek, *Understories: The Political Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 119.

[117] Shepard Krech, *The Ecological Indian: Myth and History*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999).

[118] This perspective still shapes Makahs' understanding of marine tenure. See Sones interview.

what terms.[119] More importantly, because Makahs embedded tenure concepts within a larger worldview that recognized "numinous forces" in their environment and that the spiritual and physical realms are one, they understood that ownership also entailed responsibility.[120] For example, the People of the Cape believed they were responsible for maintaining a balanced relationship with a community that included the very animals and fish that they harvested. [121] This should not be misconstrued as Makahs acting like proto-ecologists. Harvesting over a million pounds of halibut, hunting thousands of seals, and harpooning dozens of whales on an annual basis illustrate that Makahs cannot be stereotyped as Ecological Indians. More than anything else, their belief that marine tenure entailed responsibility differentiates the Makahs' understanding of ownership from similar concepts that predominated in the nineteenth-century United States.

To understand how responsibility related to the spirituality of the People of the Cape, we must briefly examine the worldview of the nineteenth-century Makah. From their perspective, most animals, plants, and prominent landmarks were non-human people.[122] Billy Balch, one of Swan's indigenous "informants," told him that Makahs believed that everything – including trees, animals, birds, and fish – were "formerly Indians who for their bad conduct were transformed into the shapes that now appear."[123]

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[119] Donald, *Aboriginal Slavery on the Northwest Coast of North America*, 272-308.

[120] Coll Thrush and Ruth Ludwin, "Finding Fault: Indigenous Seismology, Colonial Science, and the Rediscovery of Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Cascadia," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 31, no. 4 (2007): 6. For the unity of the spiritual and physical realms, see Eugene Richard Atleo, *Tsawalk: A Nuu-Chah-Nulth Worldview* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).

[121] American Indian historian Donald Fixico argues that for most indigenous cultures, the "community extends beyond human relationships." Donald Lee Fixico, *The American Indian Mind in a Linear World: American Indian Studies and Traditional Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 7.

[122] Religious studies scholar Howard Harrod defines this perspective a "sacred ecology." Howard L. Harrod, *The Animals Came Dancing: Native American Sacred Ecology and Animal Kinship* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000), xiv.

[123] Swan, 4 December 1863, Manuscript Journal.

Balch told Swan that Seal was once a thief, so the brothers Sun and Moon shortened his arms and tied his legs. They then cast him into the sea and told him to eat only fish. Sharing a common origin and designation as people, everything deserved respect, which Makahs demonstrated through protocols, laws governing the relationships between human and non-human beings.[124] Through stories elders told, Makahs learned that protocols kept relationships balanced and that violating these laws had consequences. Additionally, Makahs embedded their worldview in the marine-oriented, spatial context of the geography around Cape Flattery. For example, *Se kar jecta* was an "evil genius" – probably a powerful shaman – who had transformed into a large rock off the coast south of the cape. On two separate canoe trips, Swan observed Makahs throwing offerings of bread, dried halibut, and whale blubber at *Se kar jecta* in order to ensure safe passage.[125]

Like other Northwest Coast peoples, Makahs believed that the non-human members of their community possessed power and punished those who failed to observe protocols correctly. Cedakanim, a Clayoquot chief in the mid-nineteenth century, told Swan about a time when sea otters had vengefully drowned the son of a great chief, who was a successful hunter of the species. The chief exacted his revenge by killing a great number of sea otters and feeding their dried hearts to his dogs. This severe violation of indigenous protocols insulted the otters, and they left the coast.[126] Although Nuu-chah-nulth and Makah peoples had hunted sea otters to near extinction in the borderland during

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[124] For more on the Northwest Coast belief that animals are people and on the importance of protocols governing relationships, see Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 59-64. As Northwest Coast peoples continue to believe, "The land, the plants, the animals and the people all have spirit – they all must be shown respect. That is the basis of our law." Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw, *The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1987-1990* (Gabriola: Reflections, 1992), 7.

[125] Swan, 24 September 1861, Diary 5, Swan Papers; Swan, Manuscript Journal, 63.

[126] Penned in October 1878, this notation appears on p. 172 in Swan's annotated volume of Meares's account of his voyages. Available at UWSC.

the maritime fur trade, some blamed a high-ranking chief's behavior for the dearth of otters. His disrespectful behavior to non-human people resulted in both personal (a drowned son) and society-wide (sea otters abandoned the coast) consequences. For commoners, it appears that the consequences for disrespectful behavior were personal, while the actions of chiefs had both personal and societal consequences.

The spiritual dimensions of the whaling practice best exemplify how Makahs honored and propitiated the non-human members of the marine community. To become a "skookum whaleman" (strong whaler), a harpooner – who was also the captain of a whaling crew – needed supernatural powers.[127] Because a harpooner's success at whaling relied upon his ability to interact with a non-human spirit possessing greater spiritual strength, he needed additional powers. Makahs believed that humans possessed limited natural power and ability, especially in comparison to a powerful being such as a whale. Additionally, whaling included both physical and spiritual hazards. To meet these challenges, whalers sought spiritual assistance through ceremonial practices. Prayers could help someone attain a power, while dreams also granted a power or revealed how to earn it. To secure these supernatural powers, a person performed specific actions, such as ritual bathing, or by scouring the woods and beaches for signs of power. Whalers also sought guardian spirits whose supernatural strength would protect the crew.[128]

Makahs believed that acquiring "whale medicine" ensured one's success at sea. For example, a spar that waves had thrown to the top of a nearby sea stack, enticed many

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[127] *Skookum* meant "strength," especially supernatural strength. See George Gibbs, *Dictionary of the Chinook Jargon, or Indian Trade Language, Now in General Use on the Northwest Coast, Adapted for General Business* (Olympia: T. G. Lowe, 1873).

[128] Elizabeth Colson, *The Makah Indians: A Study of an Indian Tribe in Modern American Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), 242. See also Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 48. For more on the importance of acquiring spiritual powers to become a successful whaler, see Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 72-74.

whalers for years. They devised methods to retrieve the inaccessible spar because they believed that they could craft it into a harpoon shaft that would bring its owner immense whaling luck.[129] John Claplanhoo told Swan several stories of whale medicine he or his family members had received. One time, "raven lit on a stone a few feet off and ruffling up his feathers as they do when angry, first uttered a hissing sound and then a croak, and opening his beak wide twice to vomit up something," a bone, three inches long. Claplanhoo believed that this was a bone of the *ha hake to ake*, the lightening snake that Thunderbird uses to hunt whales.[130] About a week before Swan left the reservation – he had resigned from his teaching position at Neah Bay – Claplanhoo showed him his best whale medicine: the bone of *ha hake to ake*; a goose-egg-sized rock that had come from a dead whale and that he had bought from a Ditidaht whaler; and the dried blowhole of a whale that his father had found in the mountains, thought to have been carried there by Thunderbird.[131] Whalers guarded these relics and passed them on to their sons.

The People of the Cape knew that humans rarely received supernatural powers, so these individuals became important leaders within the community. Moreover, spiritual power enabled the acquisition of resources for the wellbeing of their people. This explains why chiefs – those who acquired numerous spiritual powers – owned these resources, held the rights to hunt whales, and passed them from one generation to the next. Similarly, chiefs were most responsible for maintaining respectful relationships with non-human members of the community.[132] For example, Makahs blamed the poor

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[129] Waterman, "Geography of the Makah," 30.

[130] Swan, 22 January 1865, Manuscript Journal.

[131] Swan, 23 September 1866, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

[132] This was – and continues to be – a common belief among Northwest Coast peoples. For example, see Wa and Uukw, *The Spirit in the Land*, 7.

salmon and sealing seasons in 1879 on a chief who had allowed his pregnant wife to eat of the first salmon of the season. This resulted in the deaths of her and their unborn twins and caused salmon to leave the rivers and seals to flee.[133]

In addition to accumulating supernatural powers, whalers exercised ownership and tenure responsibilities through ritual preparations for a hunt. Sometimes lasting for eight months, pre-hunt rituals were the most important aspect of preparation.[134] The rites included fasting, swimming, and purification through ritual bathing conducted at secret bathing ponds. Like other forms of ceremonial property, families owned specific rituals; many consisted of ceremonially washing the body and scrubbing oneself with twigs, leaves, and hemlock branches. While bathing, some harpooners imitated the whale, making slow movements so that it would act this way when hunted. Members of the whaling crew abstained from normal food and sex. If someone had not gone through these ritual preparations, he was not allowed in the canoe. Before embarking on a hunt, the whaling captain sang to the whale, asking it to give itself to his people. When a whale damaged or capsized a canoe, it indicated that the whaler or his crew had failed to observe the necessary protocols.[135]

Rituals practices continued during the hunt and after the whale's death. Once the harpooner struck the whale, he sang to his prey in order to encourage it to come to shore easily. Descendents of whalers recall hearing elders discuss that a whale "accepted the harpoon" if the harpooner had followed the correct protocols affirming the relationship

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[133] Swan, 10 March 1879, Diary 25, Swan Papers.

[134] Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 17.

[135] Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 47. See also Peter S. Webster and Campbell River Museum and Archives Society, *As Far as I Know: Reminiscences of an Ahousat Elder* (Campbell River: Campbell River Museum and Archives, 1983); Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 38-40; Kirk, *Tradition and Change on the Northwest Coast*, 138.

between hunter and prey.[136] Harpooner's wives also played an important role while the crew was at sea because her behavior affected the whale her husband hunted. She had to remain still in the dark and fast for the duration of the hunt. They also believed that her spiritual power helped to draw the whale safely to the village.[137] As they brought the whale ashore, the village welcomed it into their community. The harpooner acknowledged the whale's special status within the community by placing eagle down and feathers on its hump and blowhole. Then he demonstrated his whaling power through a special performance. The whaler's wife danced, while his father and an uncle sang songs thanking the whale for giving itself to their people.[138]

Through his whaling success, a harpooner proved that he had received these powers, gained the protection of guardian spirits, and followed the protocols.[139] Whalers marked their success by taking important names they had earned through their whaling accomplishments. For example, the prominent whaler John Claplanhoo took the name *Kloot ka bethld* (thunder on the ocean) later in life.[140] Makahs believed that the most successful whaling chiefs had accumulated so much power that they could call whales to shore without even hunting them.[141] For this reason, drift whale landings validated a

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[136] Atleo, *Tsawalk*, x. Other indigenous cultures also believe that animals agree to become food because of the shared bond of kinship between humans and non-human people. See Harrod, *The Animals Came Dancing*, xii. See also Piers Vitebsky, *The Reindeer People: Living with Animals and Spirits in Siberia* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 259-84.

[137] Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 39-40. See also Erna Gunther, "Reminiscences of a Whaler's Wife," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 33 (1942); Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 58.

[138] Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 46. See also Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 113.

[139] Colson, *The Makah Indians*, 250; Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 48.

[140] Swan, 21 December 1878, Diary 23, Swan Papers.

[141] For example, *Hiskoop-shah-nulth-shi* (He Makes the Whale Blow on the Beach) is a propertied name owned by a prominent whaling family. The ancestral Hiskoop-shah-nulth-shi had so much spiritual power, he could get whales to beach themselves at his village. Micah McCarty, email to author, 13 October 2004.

chief's power. Chiefs guarded their rights to drift whales, even going to war with neighboring villages over these beached carcasses.[142]

As owners of the proprietary right to harvest this rich resource, whaling chiefs also had to satisfy responsibilities within the human community. After welcoming a whale to the village, they butchered it, a process that took an entire day and unsettled the weaker stomachs of some non-Native observers.[143] Butchers observed specific rules when dividing the meat and blubber. Richest in oil, the hump went to the harpooner. The whaling crew received large strips of blubber and divided the tongue, an organ that contained a large amount of oil. Through feasts during which they distributed blubber and whale meat, whalers fulfilled their spiritual and material responsibilities of ownership.[144] The "sumptuous feasts reflect[ed] well upon the host chief's ability to provide for the wellbeing of his community," while "overflowing feast tables [were] an indication that [he had] been favoured with spiritual power."[145] When chiefs shared whales through feasts, they reaffirmed their authority, validated their spiritual prowess, and demonstrated ownership over specific resources.[146]

The material and spiritual importance of whaling also influenced customs that took place off the water. For example, when a whaler wanted to marry, he had to

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[142] Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 51. See also McMillan, *Since the Time of the Transformers*, 132. These conflicts were detailed in an earlier chapter.

[143] Swan noted that butchering one whale began in the morning and continued until 10 P.M. 25 April 1861, Diary 4. He also once judged the butchering process to be a "most filthy sight." 9 March 1862, Diary 5, Swan Papers. See also Swan, "Indian Method of Killing Whales."

[144] Waterman, "The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians," 45-46. See also Swan, "Visit to Tatooche Island," *Washington Standard*, 20 July 1861, in William A. Katz, ed., *Almost out of the World: Scenes from Washington Territory* (Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1971), 120; Swan, "The Indians of Cape Flattery," 22-23.

[145] Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 103.

[146] Atleo characterizes these feasts as signifying "a confirmation and affirmation of the claims of the host chief," namely his claims to power and authority. See Ibid., 113. See also [Testimony of Joe Sly,] 15 October 1941, "Old Fishing Locations, October 1941," Edward Swindell, Jr. Papers (M005), MCRC.

demonstrate his prowess to his potential bride and her father, who was usually another whaler. This included a mock whale hunt in front of the longhouse where the desired bride lived with her family. Swan witnessed one such engagement in December 1863:

> A canoe was hoisted on the shoulders of some 8 or 10 Indians and in it were two men and two boys. In front crawling on all fours was an Indian dressed to resemble a whale although the resemblance was very small. Every now and then he would raise his head to blow like a whale. This he did very exact. The Indians in the canoe kept their paddles going as if she was in the water and went through all the performances of killing a whale except darting the harpoon at the fellow ahead.[147]

Instead of harpooning the Makah impersonating a whale, the whaler hurled his harpoon at the door of the longhouse, "splitting the door in two." More than a decade earlier, Samuel Hancock, the first Anglo-American trader to reside for a brief period at Neah Bay, also observed this performance, noting that the groom hurled the mussel-shell tipped harpoon with such force that it went clear through a three-inch thick cedar board.[148] During the mock hunt, the groom's family heaped blankets in front of the longhouse. A successful performance – indicated by breaking down the door and piling up enough blankets – demonstrated the whaler's spiritual, physical, and financial ability to his potential bride and her family.[149]

Tse-kaw-wootl's position as a prominent whaling chief framed his perspective on the words he spoke during the treaty negotiations. When describing the sea as his country, he stated Makah ownership of customary marine space. His words expressed tenure rights expressed through indigenous knowledge of local spaces. Through their ability to navigate the ocean and predict its conditions, Makah familiarity with the sea transformed local waters into their home and country. They embedded knowledge,

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[147] Swan, 1 January 1864, Dairy 6, Swan Papers.

[148] Hancock, *Thirteen Years Residence on the North-West Coast*, 143.

[149] For more on the importance of such demonstrations during betrothal, see Atleo, *Tsawalk*, 50-57.

history, and values in their culture via placenaming, and the density of marine place names reflected ownership over this space.

Makahs also mixed their labor with the ocean. Through customary practices such as fishing for halibut and hunting seals and whales, Makahs made the sea their country, reaped a wealth of subsistence and commercial goods, and expressed a sentimental bond of belonging. Shaped by a common Northwest Coast worldview, Makah tenure over marine space also had a spiritual component. Rituals and protocols connected to marine practices best exemplified this, specifically the responsibility to maintain balanced relationships with the non-human people of the region. Although the treaty commissioners did not understand the Makahs' perspective on marine space, this was what the whaling chief meant when he called the sea his country.

Differing Concepts of Marine Space in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

When Makahs characterized the sea as their country, they highlighted a perspective on marine space that differed from the mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-American view of the ocean. The white treaty negotiators thought of the sea as a commons for Indians and non-Native citizens of the territory to share. Additionally, they believed that the coastline made an ideal natural boundary for political entities such as nations and reservations. On the other hand, the People of the Cape saw local waters as sovereign Makah space and larger marine waters as a medium of connections. During the decade after signing the treaty, Makah actions in local marine waters revealed that their connection to the sea remained strong. Moreover, the Makah perspective on marine space remained dominant for much of the nineteenth century.

While at Neah Bay, one of Stevens's primary purposes was to create boundaries around the Makah if they refused to leave their ancestral home. The most important boundary would be the physical border demarcating the tribe's reservation. On his first morning there, Stevens and the commission's surveyor, George Gibbs, hastily surveyed Cape Flattery for the reservation's boundaries. At this point, they had not yet met with the Makah chiefs, and Stevens still hoped that this location would become the reservation for all the territory's coastal Indians if none of the tribes agreed to leave the coast for reservations in Puget Sound.[150] From his perspective, the coastline surrounding Cape Flattery made a convenient boundary around part of the reservation.

Stevens and the other treaty commissioners held a belief common to Anglo Americans of that time – coasts and bodies of water make for convenient, natural boundaries.[151] The 1846 drawing of the border between U.K. and U.S. colonial spaces in Oregon Country reinforced this concept of water as a national boundary. The U.S. rejected Britain's proposal to make the Columbia River the boundary between the two nations' claims in the Pacific Northwest. Instead, the two countries agreed to make the Strait of Juan de Fuca the boundary line. According to the 1846 agreement, the border extended along the forty-ninth parallel from the crest of the Rocky Mountains to the Strait of Georgia in northern Puget Sound. From there, it dipped southward along the channel separating Vancouver Island from the mainland and progressed west to the

[150] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 1.

[151] This concept emerged from a common, "Western" notion that terrestrial and marine spaces are separate. S.E. Jackson, "The Water Is Not Empty: Cross-Cultural Issues in Conceptualising Sea Space," *Australian Geographer* 26, no. 1 (1995): 87. For a critique of the separation of spaces, see Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*.

Pacific through the strait, making Cape Flattery, the homeland of the People of the Cape, the most northwestern corner of the continental United States.[152]

Prior to becoming governor of Washington Territory, Stevens's experiences underlined the importance of coastlines as boundaries. After he graduated from West Point, the Army assigned him to the Corps of Engineers, where he oversaw the rebuilding and fortification of coastal forts in New England from 1839 to 1846.[153] Increased tensions with Mexico and the Maine-New Brunswick boundary dispute between the U.S. and U.K. heightened national concerns over coastal defenses. After returning from the Mexican-American War, Stevens accepted a position in Washington, D.C., as assistant to the director of the U.S. Coast Survey from 1849 to 1852. With the recent acquisition of Alta California through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that ended the Mexican-American War, this department focused on surveying the Pacific coast. Stevens oversaw the production, publication, and distribution of new, detailed maps of the coastline from California to the Pacific Northwest.[154] A decade of experience in the Army Corps of Engineers and in the Coast Survey office meant that when Stevens strolled along the beach at Neah Bay that January morning in 1855, the governor believed that he was walking the reservation's boundary.

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[152] Although the Strait of Juan de Fuca was never contested after 1846, the U.K. and U.S. disputed over the eastern edge of this marine borderline in Puget Sound. Disagreement over which channel separated Vancouver Island from the mainland nearly escalated into war and did result in the diplomatic spat known as the "Pig War." This boundary dispute was resolved in 1872. For more on the Pig War, see Scott Kaufman, *The Pig War: The United States, Britain, and the Balance of Power in the Pacific Northwest, 1846-72* (Lanham: Lexington, 2004); Scott Kaufman and John A. Soares, "'Sagacious Beyond Praise?' Winfield Scott and Anglo-American-Canadian Border Diplomacy, 1837-1860," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 1 (2006).

[153] See Richards, *Isaac I. Stevens*, 27-47; Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, Vol. I, 60-95.

[154] For Stevens's time with the Coast Survey, see Richards, *Isaac I. Stevens*, 69-91; Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, Vol. I, 241-79.

Stevens expected Makahs to continue relying on customary marine waters to make a living. This was the reason why Article Four, which guaranteed Indian fishing rights, was in the Treaty of Neah Bay and the other Stevens Treaties. However, the governor's perception of marine space shaped his understanding of the fishing rights the People of the Cape would have. Specifically, Stevens thought of the waters around Cape Flattery as a marine commons for Indians and the territory's citizens. [155] Like other Anglos of this time, Stevens reduced the sea to a "homogenized commons" for all to share.[156] With a background in coastal issues and previous aspirations for a career in law, the governor had some familiarity with the U.S. legal perspective on water rights as articulated by Joseph Angell in *A Treatise on the Common Law, in Relation to Water Courses*. In this treatise, Angell argued that "[A]ll persons have a common and general right of fishing in the sea and in all branches, bays, coves, and arms and in all other navigable or tide waters" and that the legislature has the power to regulate this right.[157] By using the treaties' Article Four to impose common-property status on indigenous fisheries, the governor did what officials in other settler-colonial societies were doing at the time – attempting to extinguish indigenous tenure on land and sea.[158]

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[155] In the 1840s, "Western" nation-states began constructing coastal waters as territorial seas that belonged to specific countries. Phil Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 137.

[156] Jackson, "The Water Is Not Empty," 89. For concise overviews of the general "Western" concept of the sea as commons, see Harrington, "Sea Tenure in Seventeenth Century New England," 36-41; Steinberg, *The Social Construction of the Ocean*, 90-98; Cordell, *A Sea of Small Boats*, 12-13.

[157] Joseph Kinnicut Angell, *A Treatise on the Common Law, in Relation to Water Courses: Intended More Particularly as an Illustration of the Rights and Duties of the Owners and Occupants of Water Privileges: To Which Is Added an Appendix, Containing the Principal Adjudged Cases* (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1824). Richards points out that Stevens purchased this copy for the library. See Richards, "Federal Indian Policy, Isaac I. Stevens, and the Western Washington Treaties, 1854-1855," 6-7. Angell's quotation from Ibid., 7. Richards notes that this quotation came from pages 71-72 of the 1877 version of the treatise.

[158] Cordell argues that, "Legislating common status for underexploited inshore fisheries was a convenient maneuver by colonialists seeking to displace or nullify tenure claims of indigenous peoples." Cordell, *A Sea of Small Boats*, 13.

However, Makahs did not believe that the treaty had extinguished their marine tenure. Like Stevens, their cultural perception of marine space shaped their understanding of the treaty. Indigenous negotiators such as Kal-chote and Tse-kaw-wootl believed that the same waters which the governor saw as a marine commons instead belonged to the People of the Cape as sovereign space. From the Makahs' perspective, "commons" fisheries did not exist as Anglo treaty commissioners assumed.[159] The large halibut fishing banks – then situated on the British side of the new border separating colonial claims – were not a commons. Many Makahs and even non-Makahs fished these banks; however, people only had the right to do so once the rightful Makah owner (a chief) gave them permission to fish there. Granting someone the occasional right to fish these banks did not extend ownership privileges to these fishermen. Instead, non-owners gained permission on a case-by-case basis to fish in any given location due to kinship connections they might share with the actual owner. Moreover, individuals and families who fished at someone else's spot paid in some manner for the privilege.

By extending fishing rights to whites of Washington Territory during the treaty negotiations, Makah chiefs did not believe that they had surrendered ownership over their "usual and accustomed" fishing sites or had turned these into a property-less commons. When Kal-chote stated during the treaty negotiations that he "would live as a friend to the Whites and they should fish together," he assumed that Makah owners would grant specific, case-by-case fishing rights to whites just as they had done in the past to other

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[159] Writing about indigenous marine peoples of Australia, Cordell explains that "Indigenous fishing and maritime communities were thought [by settler-colonial whites] to be analogous to hunters-gatherers. It was widely assumed such economies precluded the formation of property rights." John Cordell, "Indigenous Peoples' Coastal Marine Domains: Some Matters of Cultural Documentation," in *Turning the Tide: Indigenous Peoples and Sea Rights* (Northern Territory University, Darwin: 1993), 2. As quoted in Jackson, "The Water Is Not Empty," 93.

non-Makahs.[160] Newcomers fishing in customary Makah waters would need to gain permission from the rightful owner and pay for the privilege of fishing there. Kal-chote and the other chiefs did not believe that granting whites the right to fish Makah-owned grounds cancelled out indigenous ownership.

During the first post-treaty decade, Makah chiefs enforced their understanding of Article Four over Anglos who fished customary indigenous waters. In 1863, a low-ranking Makah chief from Tsoo-yess punished Captain Stratton, master of the schooner *Brant*, for fishing without the titleholder's permission.[161] Tsa-tsat-wha set the captain's skiff adrift because he was "angry with Stratton over some fish." Later that year, Stratton returned to Neah Bay to fish, but this time he went out with several Makahs, whom he paid by giving them half his catch. When they returned to the beach, several elders took fish from the seine Stratton had used. Swan noted in his diary that those taking the fish "inquired what right we had to catch their fish. I told them the fish belonged to whoever caught them and if they wanted to fish to go and catch them. I soon restored them to good humor by giving each one a present of a fish and they promised that hereafter they would keep out of the net and not crowd round so much."[162] These elders were probably low-ranking chiefs who shared ownership of oceanic fishing banks with those Makahs who had fished with Stratton. The elders believed that they were entitled to some of the catch. Although Swan lectured them on the Anglo-American concept of individual property

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[160] Treaty Negotiation Notes, 2.

[161] Although not identified as a high-ranking chief, Tsa-tsat-wha must have been someone of rank within Makah society. In 1862, Swan convinced S'Klallams that they needed to pay $60 to Tsa-tsat-wha for the killing of one of his slaves. See entry for 28 May 1862, Diary 5. The chief also traded at Victoria but got in trouble with the Makah agent, Henry Webster, for drunkenness and trafficking liquor. See entries for 23 September 1863, Diary 6; 31 March 1864, Diary 8; and 21 May 1866, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

[162] Swan, 6 April and 7-9 September 1863, Diary 6, Swan Papers.

harvested from a commons, the elders would have seen his eventual gift of fish as payment for fishing Makah grounds. Until at least the mid-1860s, Makahs always accompanied Anglos fishing customary waters. Each time, the non-Native fishermen shared their catch with the People of the Cape, an action that Makahs continued to see as payment for allowing others to fish propertied marine spaces.[163] Ironically, both Makahs and non-Natives alike probably believed that these actions confirmed their divergent understandings of marine space.

Despite the treaty provisions designed to confine Makahs to the reservation, the People of the Cape continued to leave at will. These trips into and across the marine borderland demonstrated that they still believed that the sea was a medium of connections. As Map 2 [end of chapter] reveals, by the 1860s, these interactions had grown to incorporate vessels from a variety of nations and to include nearby Anglo towns such as Victoria and Port Townsend (on the U.S. side of the boundary) and distant Pacific ports. The coastline bounding the northern and western edges of the reservation did not keep Makahs in and non-Makahs out. Instead, it was a permeable zone in which canoes landed or departed and across which clandestine goods and valued commodities crossed. The coast continued to be a site of cultural interaction among diverse Native and non-Native peoples.[164]

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[163] For examples of Makahs fishing with non-Natives, see entries for 15 and 20 June and 12 July 1865, Diary 9; and 20 and 25 August 1866, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

[164] Although I do not believe that the metaphorical spatial boundaries he differentiates among Pacific islands and beaches fit the Makah, Greg Dening explores similar themes in his fascinating work. See Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land, Marquesas, 1774-1880* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 3-34; Dening, *Performances* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 64-78; Dening, "Deep Times, Deep Spaces," in *Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean*, ed. Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun (New York: Routledge, 2004).

In the marine waters of the borderland, the actions and travels of Makahs, other indigenous peoples, and non-Natives mapped the physical contours of engagement in the years following the Treaty of Neah Bay. While the People of the Cape did not make or need any maps in this period, it is possible to approximate what such a map might have looked like if we turn to the diaries of James Swan. Born in Medford, Massachusetts, in 1818, Swan began living along the southern shores of the Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1859 after having spent a brief period in San Francisco and then several years in Shoalwater Bay north of the mouth of the Columbia River.[165] He first encountered Makahs at Neah Bay that March, and over the next few years, he made many trips to the Cape Flattery villages. He wrote a number of articles about the tribe for local and regional newspapers and did various jobs for local Indian agents.[166] For example, in 1861, George Paige, Indian agent for northern Puget Sound, asked Swan to take the first federal census of the Makah.[167] The following year, the Office of Indian Affairs appointed him teacher at the Neah Bay agency, a position he held until 1866. From 1859 until 1866, he kept a daily diary of his time at Neah Bay.[168] Many of his entries include information about Makahs leaving the reservation in canoes or aboard Anglo vessels and about non-Makahs – Natives and non-Natives alike – visiting the Cape Flattery villages. While Swan certainly failed to note every time someone came to or left the reservation, his observations of

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[165] For more information about Swan, see Swan, *The Northwest Coast*; Lucile McDonald, *Swan among the Indians: Life of James G. Swan, 1818-1900* (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1972); Ivan Doig, *Winter Brothers: A Season at the Edge of America* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980); George A. Miles, *James Swan, Cha-Tic of the Northwest Coast: Drawings and Watercolors from the Franz & Kathryn Stenzel Collection of Western American Art* (New Haven: Yale University, 2003).

[166] Some of these articles are collected in Katz, ed., *Almost out of the World.*

[167] Detailed notes about taking this census are in Swan's Manuscript Journal, 39-66.

[168] The bulk of these diaries compose the Swan Papers, UWSC. Other Swan notebooks from this time are part of the Stenzel Collection, Beinecke.

almost 900 such events in a seven-year period reveal some basic patterns charted on Map 2. Mapping these travels and interactions underscores the conclusion that the People of the Cape continued to perceive the ocean as a space of connections.[169]

The high frequency of visits to or from Anglo towns and cities demonstrates that the Makah reservation boundaries remained permeable during the decade following the signing of the treaty. Just under half (46%) of these interactions involved Makahs traveling to or whites coming to Neah Bay from San Francisco or the nearby Anglo towns of Port Townsend, Port Angeles, and Victoria. With ties to all four places, Swan noted most of these interactions, especially when non-Natives visited the reservation. As it had been since the maritime fur trade, Neah Bay was a common anchorage for vessels passing by Cape Flattery. Ships often stopped there to ride out a storm or to wait for more favorable winds that would bring them into or out of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. They also anchored there to resupply with freshwater and fish; to deliver or pick up mail; and to get the news, either from reservation employees or from old newspapers. For a number of these voyages, Neah Bay was the destination, as Anglos came to trade for whale oil, to deliver cargo or people, or to engage in reservation or territorial business. A few, such as Captain Stratton, came to Neah Bay to fish.

In canoes and non-Native vessels, Makahs also traveled to Anglo places for their own reasons. The primary purpose of many trips was to exchange indigenous products for non-Native goods. To the consternation of Indian agents, Makahs often crossed the

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[169] I adapted this method from Michel de Certeau, "Walking in the City," in *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). In this piece, the French scholar mapped “pedestrian speech acts” to analyze the real systems and networks that spatialize a city. For a similar method applied to South Pacific Islanders and how their voyages reveal ways they “encompassed” the sea, see Dening, "Deep Times, Deep Spaces," 27; Dening, "The Geographical Knowledge of the Polynesians and the Nature of Inter-Island Contact," in *Polynesian Navigation*, ed. Jack Golson (Wellington: Polynesian Society, 1972).

border to trade at the British port Victoria, where they purchased blankets, muskets, and liquor, sometimes with money the U.S. government had paid the People of the Cape for ceded lands.[170] British traders offered lower-priced, superior-quality goods that Makahs and other American Indians preferred to purchase. Henry Webster, the first Indian agent assigned to Neah Bay, reported, "The contrast between the 'King George' and the 'Boston' blanket, when good, is sadly against us, but when 'cultus' [poor quality] we are *humiliated* before the Indian."[171] Additionally, Makahs visited towns for specialized services only found there, such as when Willub took his brother, Captain Balch, to Victoria to see a surgeon.[172] Makahs sometimes visited Pacific ports in the employ of non-Natives. Following a tradition practiced by HBC officials, reservation employees hired Makahs to deliver mail, cargo, and people throughout the region. Makahs also labored aboard non-Native vessels. For example, when Swan conducted his census in 1861, he met Jackson, a Makah who told stories about his travels to the Sandwich Islands, San Francisco, and the Columbia River. Jackson was proud that he had worked as a cook and knew how to prepare hash and fries.[173] Making use of intimate knowledge of local marine waters and currents, Makahs also gained occasional employment piloting vessels entering or leaving Puget Sound.[174]

More importantly, Map 2 reveals that Makahs continued interacting with other indigenous peoples in the *ča·di·* borderland during the immediate post-treaty years.

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[170] One agent complained that "[A]ll the money paid out by government and citizens goes immediately over to Victoria to be invested in blankets, muskets, etc." See "No. 82, Report of J. H. Jenkins, special agent at Neah Bay, May 27, 1858," *ARCIA*, 1858, 237.

[171] "Report of Henry A. Webster, United States agent, 1862," *ARCIA*, 1862, 410.

[172] Swan, 5, 6, and 22 April; and 4 May 1864, Diary 8, Swan Papers.

[173] Manuscript Journal, 56.

[174] For example, Wha-laltl as sá buy – or Swell, as Swan called him – had worked aboard the steamer *Enterprise* as a pilot. Swan, 18 September 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers.

Twenty-one percent of Swan's observations show that the People of the Cape regularly visited or received visitors from eight indigenous villages and peoples beyond the reservation boundaries. Three of these – Clayoquot, Ditidaht, and Pacheedaht – were villages on Vancouver Island, and another five – Clallam Bay, Elwha, Ozette, Quilleute, and Quinault – were on the Olympic Peninsula.[175] Unlike those with Anglo places and people, Swan did not record every Makah interaction with other indigenous peoples. First, these incidents did not interest him as much as encounters with whites. Moreover, Swan was not everywhere on the reservation at all times. There were interactions between Makahs and non-Makah Indians that either he did not observe or did not seem important enough to note down. Therefore, the number of times Makahs traveled to or received visitors from these villages was substantially higher.[176]

Interactions among distinct indigenous peoples reveal that Natives sustained the borderland networks which existed prior to the arrival of Europeans, even when new networks tied to settler-colonial places emerged and became important. Exchange of indigenous and non-Native products continued to bring together Native borderlanders, and Neah Bay maintained its position as the hub of regional trade. Whale oil, a variety of fresh and dried seafood, animal skins, slaves, liquor, and finished products such as canoes and carved items continued to circulate along indigenous exchange networks throughout

[175] At this time, Ozette was not part of a reservation, so I have included it as an off-reservation, indigenous village. Ozette gained reservation status in 1893, and Makahs and American officials considered it to be part of the Makah reservation.

[176] I am only analyzing the major points of interaction revealed on this map. The other 33% of encounters included people from many indigenous communities throughout the Northwest Coast and with individuals and vessels from a handful of other early settlements in Puget Sound and global ports, such as Valparaiso (Chile), London, and Honolulu.

the region. Makah individuals also funneled Native products valued by Anglo traders into non-Native markets.[177]

Kinship and violence – sometimes interconnected – continued to tie together various communities throughout the borderland. For example, Cedakanim, a prominent Clayoquot chief and grandson of Wickaninnish, often visited the Cape Flattery villages because his son Frank was married to Totatelum, daughter of Kal-chote.[178] Ties such as these were important during the 1860s because they conferred socio-political advantages. In March 1863, Frank informed Swan of a potential incident of borderland violence against the Makah that Cedakanim had diffused. In retribution for a chief a Makah had murdered earlier, Arhosetts, a Nuu-chah-nulth people, had asked Clayoquots to assist in an attack on the People of the Cape. Arhosetts promised Cedakanim that he and his people would receive one hundred blankets and twenty Makah slaves after the attack. After much debate, "old Cedakanim told them he would not fight the Makahs nor did he want any pay from the Arhosetts as he was much richer than they and to prove this he ordered 100 pieces of blubber to be given them, each of which was worth a blanket. This... made the Arhosetts so ashamed that the sweat ran off of their faces so they took the blubber and left without saying anything more."[179] As they had done for generations

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[177] For example, at Ohiat on Vancouver Island, Peter (a Makah whaler) purchased sixty gallons of oil to resell to Anglo traders. Swan, 9 May 1862, Diary 5, Swan Papers. Peter often made trips to Vancouver Island villages to purchase oil.

[178] Frank and Totatelum had an infant daughter who died. Swan noted that if the child had been a boy and had lived, he would have been a very powerful chief in the region because this would have been the grandson of two of the highest ranking families among both Clayoquots and Makahs. Swan, 7 October 1863. However, women sometimes received chiefly titles, even in the 1860s. On his deathbed, Kal-chote asked Swan to transfer to Totatelum his paper from Governor Stevens that recognized Kal-chote's position as a Makah chief. When he died, Totatelum received the majority of Kal-chote's property, including his slaves. Swan, 13 and 14 January 1863, Diary 6. Swan noted the Cedakanim family genealogy that connected them to Wickaninnish in the entry for 8 September 1880, Diary 29, Swan Papers.

[179] Swan, 6 March 1863, Diary 6.

prior to the arrival of Europeans, the indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast engaged each other for a variety of reasons and on their own terms. Rather than acting as a confining boundary for the People of the Cape, the coastal edges of the reservation facilitated Makah and non-Makah interactions as they had always done.

Conclusion

Despite the rising presence of settler-colonial governments based out of Victoria and Olympia (Washington Territory's capital), indigenous chiefs – not just colonial officials – still possessed enough power to shape the outcomes of events in the borderland during the mid-nineteenth century. Both within and beyond the boundaries of the reservation, the interactions of Makahs and non-Natives illustrated the ambivalent relationship between Indians and whites in the immediate post-treaty years. Powerful tribes, such as the Makah, continued to engage Anglo society on both sides of the border, and whites were becoming an increasing part of the social lives of the People of the Cape. Although settler-colonial officials crafted reservation boundaries designed to separate indigenous and Anglos societies, all groups sought out each other for many reasons. Moreover, marine waters did not make for effective coastal boundaries separating different peoples. Instead, the sea continued to be a medium of connections facilitating a variety of interactions and opportunities. These connections followed pre-encounter borderland networks tying together indigenous communities and newer settler-colonial networks encompassing non-Natives and their settlements.

In the 1860s, a series of incidents involving several indigenous peoples, King George men, and Bostons demonstrated the complexity of this region during the

immediate post-treaty years. Metsonak, an Elwha living to the east of Cape Flattery, killed Wha-laltl as sá buy (Swell), a Makah chief in 1861. After stealing away a Makah woman whom Metsonak beat, Wha-laltl had earned the enmity of the Elwha individual. When Wha-laltl traveled to Port Townsend in his canoe to pick up some goods for an American trader at Neah Bay, Metsonak shot the Makah in the back.[180] Simmons, the Indian agent for Washington Territory, asked the People of the Cape to allow him to punish the murderer. However, the agent did not act quickly enough for the Makah chiefs, who decided to punish the Elwhas according to standards of Northwest Coast indigenous justice. That September, a war party of twelve canoes carrying eighty warriors armed with guns struck the Elwha. They returned three days later with the heads of two they had killed. Cobetsi, the leading Makah war chief, explained to Swan why they had attacked:

> We think Mr. Simmons has made fools of us and the Indians on Vancouver's Island, the Nittinats and the Clyoquots laugh at us, and call us old women. It is for this that we have gone up and killed these two men. Swell went up to Port Townsend for the Bostons, and he was killed; and the Bostons promised to hang his murderers, but they have not done so, and now we will look out for ourselves.[181]

Additionally, Cobetsi told Swan that:

> Before Mr. Simmons came, the Mackahs [*sic*] had strong hearts and were brave. If any Indians killed their people, they at once resented it, but Mr. Simmons gave them papers and told them not to fight. They promised him and they kept their word. When the Clallams found that Mr. Simmons did not do as he agreed they laughed at the Mackahs and recently killed two of their slaves. It was for this additional insult of the Clallams that they had gone.[182]

As a testament to the persistence of Makah power, Cobetsi displayed the heads in front of his longhouse at Tsoo-yess for months afterward. His intended audience – Natives and

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[180] See Swan Diary 4, Swan Papers, for information on Wha-laltl's murder. Swan also detailed this incident in "Murder of Wha-lathl, or 'Swell,'" to readers of the *Washington Standard* on 30 March 1861. See Katz, ed., *Almost out of the World*, 100-04.

[181] Ibid., 107.

[182] Manuscript Journal, 37.

non-Natives who visited the cape – could not miss Cobetsi's message. With empty eye sockets staring out to sea, the desiccated heads cast a morbid fascination upon Anglo visitors to Tsoo-yess. Elwhas asked Swan to recover the heads, offering ten blankets for each head. However, the Makah chief declined to surrender them, stating that "this could not be done till he had added [Metsonak's] head to the number and then he would be ready to talk about peace." [183] At one point, Makah chiefs appeared willing to try Boston-style justice. However, when they experienced the impotence of territorial officials at keeping the peace and were ridiculed by neighboring peoples, they did not hesitate to settle conflicts by indigenous rules.

But the conflict between Elwhas and Makahs continued. The following March, an Elwha chief, Kachin, secured a tentative peace with Makahs after agreeing to execute Metsonak; however, Kachin neglected to follow through on his promise, which angered many Makahs. In July 1863, one of Wha-laltl's cousins stabbed Metsonak's brother in vengeance, which prompted the Elwha to declare that they would retaliate by killing Peter, Wha-laltl's brother. The intertribal conflict continued to simmer, and anytime Elwhas visited Neah Bay, tensions threatened to escalate. Even Metsonak's death from consumption in February 1864 did not end the tension. Two years later, while trading at Victoria, Peter killed an Elwha, which prompted the aggrieved tribe to threaten Makahs and whites passing their village at the mouth of the Elwha River. This time, the territorial government intervened by coming to Neah Bay and arresting Peter. However, after Webster, the Indian agent at Neah Bay, placed Peter on the schooner *Westin* to transport him to Fort Steilacoom for imprisonment, a group of Makahs staged a daring rescue.

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[183] Swan, 6 October 1861, Diary 5, Swan Papers; Manuscript Journal, 55.

Following the schooner in a canoe, they boarded the vessel and freed Peter. During the rescue, another set of Makah warriors, led by John Claplanhoo, one of Swan's closest Makah friends, held Swan hostage in case something happened to Peter in the interim. After the rescue party returned to Neah Bay, Claplanhoo released Swan, and the People of the Cape began debating whether they should kill all the whites on the reservation. A few days later, thirty-three U.S. soldiers aboard a steamer arrived at Neah Bay to quell the potential uprising and to apprehend Peter and thirteen other Makahs.[184] The belligerent Makahs did not remain in prison at Fort Steilacoom for very long. By the fall of 1867, Peter was back at Neah Bay, ironically employed as a reservation policeman by the same agent who had arrested him a year earlier.[185]

This series of incidents highlights the continued ability of Makahs to subvert settler-colonial efforts at establishing control over the region, especially over indigenous peoples. As a typical borderland conflict in which kinship intermingled with violence, these events illustrate that regional rivalries still had meaning to indigenous peoples. For example, Makah chiefs worried that letting Wha-laltl's murderer go unpunished jeopardized their standing among other peoples in the region, thereby provoking them into action. Although the settler-colonial governments had established bordered spaces in

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[184] Details about these events are from Swan's diaries. See the following entries: 7 March 1862, Diary 5; 1 August 1863, and 4 February 1864, Diary 6; 20 February and 6 April 1866, Diary 9, Swan Papers. The detachment of thirty-three soldiers probably represented the entire garrison at Fort Steilacoom. By the 1860s, it had become difficult to recruit soldiers for outposts so distant from the battlefields of the Civil War. For example, in 1862, only twenty-seven volunteers were stationed at Steilacoom. See Clinton A. Snowden et al., *History of Washington; the Rise and Progress of an American State* (New York: The Century History Company, 1909), Vol. 4, 108.


[185] By the fall of 1866, Swan had left Neah Bay and relocated to Port Townsend after resigning as reservation teacher, so it is difficult to date exactly when territorial authorities released Peter and the rest. However, Swan noted that Agent Webster sent Peter to apprehend two Makah women who had run off with some white coalminers to Victoria. Swan, 3 October 1867, Diary 11, Swan Papers. Peter held this position throughout the tenure of several Indian agents and was still working as an agency policeman in 1879. See Swan, 18 November 1879, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

1846, indigenous borderland networks continued to cross imperial boundaries. These Native networks were more than subtle connections running parallel to and separate from non-Native networks. The incidents reveal that indigenous borderland dynamics sometimes took place in Anglo places and involved – even threatened the lives of – non-Natives. Moreover, individuals such as Peter attempted to take advantage of the boundary separating imperial domains. Perhaps he killed the Elwha on the north side of the borderline because he believed that U.S. officials might overlook this action if it happened on British soil.

Additionally, these incidents illustrate another degree of complexity in the Northwest Coast, specifically the nature of violence and justice in a region where indigenous peoples still had the power to interrupt imperial designs. Settler-colonial officials were eager to enforce peace and impose Anglo legal systems; however, this remained difficult in an indigenous region where Native chiefs could still enact their own systems of justice and power. Even when the territorial government apprehended belligerent Indians who had broken out of reservation boundaries and subverted Anglo attempts at punishment, justice seemed elusive. On one hand, it appears ironical that Peter becomes the reservation policeman shortly after his imprisonment for committing a murder, flaunting Anglo authority, and threatening white lives. However, this result reveals that Indian agents at Neah Bay had to rely on Makah chiefs. Peter came from a high-ranking family that had enough influence with white officials that he not only spent little time in prison, but he also secured a position as a person with power recognized by non-Native bureaucrats. During the 1860s, Anglo-American authority on the Makah reservation still relied upon indigenous power.

Finally, these incidents demonstrate the resounding failure of the reservation policy of confinement.[186] The ambivalent relationship between Indians and whites undermined the policy itself. More importantly, powerful Native peoples such as the People of the Cape refused to abide by Anglo efforts at confining them to reservations. Additionally, coastal and marine borders that settler-colonial officials perceived as firm boundaries were instead permeable zones of interaction. The Makahs' view of the sea as a medium of connections prevailed during the second half of the nineteenth century. As the next chapter demonstrates, the Makahs' perception of the sea as their country enabled their success in the face of the expanding settler-colonial world. More importantly, this connection allowed them to continue subverting federal attempts at control. By employing successful, customary marine practices, Makahs convinced some colonial agents entrenched in the philosophy of assimilation that indigenous methods worked.

[186] Asher, *Beyond the Reservation*, 34-59.


Marine Connections to
Cape Flattery (1859-1866)
1-10
11-30
31-60
Port Angeles (103)
Victoria (124)
Port Townsend (140)
Colony of Vancouver Island
Colony of British Columbia
Clayoquot
Ditidaht
Pacheedaht
Makah Res.
Elwha
Quilleute
Olympia
Washington Territory
Pacific Ocean
San Francisco

Chapter Five

An Anomaly in the Indian Service

In June 1865, Henry Webster, U.S. Indian agent at Neah Bay, composed his annual report for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, characterizing his Makah charges as "an anomaly in the Indian service."[1] From his vantage at the most northwestern point of the United States, the people living in a collection of cedar longhouses hugging the rugged shore of Cape Flattery must have appeared this way. Violent storms swept across heavily forested, mountainous terrain and regularly dumped over 100 inches of rainfall each year. The nearest Anglo settlement lay several days away by Indian canoe. Neah Bay felt isolated from the world. After one of his earliest visits to Cape Flattery, James Swan described Webster as living an "almost Robinson Crusoe residence on this bleak, extreme northwest portion of the domain of the United States… the farthest west of any settlers on American soil."[2] In this seemingly isolated and unwelcoming environment of Cape Flattery, the Makah anomalously thrived.

This was no "bleak," remote edge of the world for the indigenous people that made this their home. As discussed in previous chapters, networks of trade, kinship, and conflict knit together village communities and growing Anglo towns along the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, and Vancouver Island. Makah whalers, sealers, and fishermen harvested a wealth of resources from customary waters. More importantly, as

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[1] Henry Webster, "No. 8, Report of H. A. Webster, Agent at Neah Bay Agency," 30 June 1865, United States, Office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1865* (*ARCIA*) (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1865), 91.

[2] James G. Swan, "Two Months with the Makahs," *San Francisco Evening Bulletin*, 22 October 1860, quoted in William A. Katz, ed., *Almost out of the World: Scenes from Washington Territory* (Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1971), 73-74.

Agent Webster reported, they not only "procure[d] a scanty and temporary supply, but [also] have abundance to dispose of in trade with the Indians and whites." He advised the commissioner that the federal government should encourage their fisheries so they could remain self-supporting and attain a "state of civilization." This also made them anomalous: rather than civilizing them by turning them into farmers and ranchers, Webster believed that the federal government should support customary Makah marine practices to help them progress.

Perhaps the People of the Cape appeared anomalous to Agent Webster in a third way, for he came from a culture that defined whites and Indians as opposites.[3] The former pictured themselves as modern, civilized, prosperous, masculine, and dynamic, believing that they were agents of the future who would usher in progress and develop the Northwest Coast wilderness. Conversely, Indians were supposed to be traditional, uncivilized, impoverished, feminine, childlike, and static. Nearly all Anglo Americans saw Indians as a part of nature, relics of the past, and impediments to the inevitable progress and economic development of the continent. Anglo Americans such as Webster regarded Makahs as anomalous because they did not fit the Indian stereotype.[4] During the second half of the nineteenth century, the People of the Cape bought and used expensive, modern vessels and prospered as dynamic actors in regional and international markets of exchange, all while adhering to characteristics that kept them culturally Makah.

Historical narratives that detail the rise of global capitalism and nation-states often cast indigenous peoples as either noble victims or ignorant dupes who could only

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[3] For a more complete introduction to this dichotomy, see Paige Raibmon, *Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 7.

[4] The classic work on this stereotype still remains to be Robert F. Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

accept or react to European and Anglo-American actions and changes. These narratives simplify the role of indigenous peoples in commercial exchanges. For example, Natives appear only at the fringes, as peripheral hunters or fishermen exploited by dynamic non-Natives. This characterization obscures the way indigenous people adapted to a market society on their own terms. Reports such as those written by Agent Webster perpetuated this false conclusion and framed successful Makahs as anomalous.

Makah whalers, sealers, and fishermen combined new opportunities and technologies with customary practices to maintain a unique identity. Rather than allowing expanding networks of capital to overwhelm and replace indigenous practices, these fishermen and sea mammal hunters engaged markets of exchange and attracted – even made – capital investments in North Pacific extractive industries. When examined from a Makah perspective, these actions reveal dynamic, indigenous actors who exploited new opportunities within their own cultural framework.[5] During the second half of the nineteenth century, the success of the People of the Cape stemmed from measures Makah chiefs had taken to protect access to customary marine space while negotiating the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay. Moreover, Makahs continued benefitting from the wealth harvested from the sea and from networks that crossed marine space to connect them with other Native and non-Native communities.

During this period, the Claplanhoo family exemplified Makah success. Prominent patriarchs such as Klot-ha-butl (John), K-a-h-ix (James), and Kosh-u-ka (Jongie) occupied the ranks of tribal leadership for nearly a century, from the early 1850s to the late 1950s. Although James engaged in the pelagic sealing industry and Jongie both

[5] For an excellent collection of essays discussing the overlapping categories of "modern" and "traditional," see Brian C. Hosmer and Colleen M. O'Neill, *Native Pathways: American Indian Culture and Economic Development in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2004).

sealed and fished commercially, all three Claplanhoo chiefs whaled.[6] Like other Northwest Coast whaling chiefs, these men married women from prominent Nuu-chah-nulth families across the strait, which enabled them to maintain close ties with influential in-laws. They also had kinship ties to other Makah nobility.[7]

Claplanhoos first appear in the Anglo historical record during the negotiations of the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay with Territorial Governor Isaac Stevens. Early in the treaty council, a Neah Bay chief named Klah-pe at hoo (John Claplanhoo) spoke about his continuing sadness at the death of his brother, Halicks – the third-highest chief – from smallpox.[8] After Halicks died, his chiefly position, titles, and other property passed on to his brother. But John also inherited his brother's responsibilities. This meant that despite his sadness, John focused on what his people needed: access to customary marine waters, whales, seals, and fish.

To varying degrees, all three Claplanhoo chiefs from this period engaged new opportunities – schools, local and global markets, influential Anglos, and non-Native

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[6] Mary Ann Claplanhoo-Martin and Charles "Pug" Claplanhoo, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, Makah Cultural and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA.

[7] In 1860, Captain John married She-as-te-do, a Ditidaht woman who was betrothed to Chief Kles-sitt, a casualty of the 1853 smallpox epidemic. James married Mary Ann, a Nuu-chah-nulth woman with chiefly lineage. Jongie married Lizzie, another high-ranking woman from across the strait, in 1897. James married his daughter Minnie to Chestoqua Peterson, the son of Peter Brown and nephew of Wha-laltl as sá buy, the Makah chief whose murder in 1861 perpetuated a long-running conflict with the neighboring Elwhas. These genealogical notes are from a variety of sources. See "Heirship Report for Chestoqua Peterson," 2 December 1926, [Probate No. 17954/21 and 56084/26], [Folder] 17954-21; and "Heirship Report for Quata Moore," 11 September 1930, [Probate No. 56334/30], [Folder] 56334-30, Neah Bay, 350, in Central Classified Files (CCF), 1907-1939, Neah Bay [Agency], Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Record Group 75, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (NARA – DC). See also Swan's diaries in James G. Swan Papers, University of Washington Special Collections (UWSC), Seattle (hereafter cited as Swan Papers); and Family Group Sheets, MCRC. Makah oral histories maintain excellent genealogical information. See Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview; and John McCarty, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, MCRC.

[8] Non-Natives have always had difficulty writing indigenous names. "Klah-pe at hoo" is an approximation of Claplanhoo. "Ratified Treaty No. 286: Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Makah Indians," Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-69 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T494, roll 5), BIA, NARA – DC, 2 (hereafter cited as Treaty Negotiation Notes).

technologies – presented by the integrated nature of settler-colonialism in the borderland. Yet, they also adhered to a Makah identity by participating in cultural practices ranging from lengthy potlatches to ritual preparations for customary hunting and fishing practices. Other Makahs also succeeded during this period. But the accomplishments of the Claplanhoos, tracked through archival and oral sources, most especially reveal that the People of the Cape combined customary practices with new opportunities to attain high standards of living. This strengthened the tribe's ability to resist the cultural assault of federal assimilation policies.

However, Makahs of the second half of the nineteenth century experienced enormous challenges that eventually undercut their success. The People of the Cape and other indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast were not the only ones who hunted whales and seals. The growing number of non-Native whalers and sealers in local waters and the larger Pacific Ocean devastated marine species that provided for Makah subsistence and commercial harvests. As a growing number of users overhunted Pacific resources, nation-states established conservation measures that privileged non-Natives over Natives and large over small operations. By the early twentieth century, Makah hunters of the sea found themselves excluded from once-lucrative fisheries then collapsing. Without the wealth and subsequent power Makahs accrued from customary marine harvests, the People of the Cape became poor and susceptible to assimilation.

Makah Whalers, 1850s to 1928

A customary practice for over two thousand years, whaling had always secured substantial wealth and power for the People of the Cape, but this situation began

changing during the second half of the nineteenth century. As non-Native commercial whalers depleted Pacific stocks, Makahs experienced greater difficulty finding whales in local waters. Subsequently, indigenous whalers petitioned the federal government for new technologies to expand their Pacific hunting range. However, Makahs received inconsistent levels of support for these requests, which resulted in the tribe's failure to secure access to modern technologies for whaling to the degree that they wanted. Troubled by the dearth of whales migrating past Cape Flattery, Makahs suspended the active practice of whaling in 1928 until stocks rebounded at some point in the future.

Whaling had always made the People of the Cape wealthy and powerful. They hunted many species of leviathans found in the Pacific. In 1852, they caught more than two dozen, which provided them with over 60,000 gallons of oil, an amount exceeding the average take of a whaling ship returning to its northeastern port after a two-year voyage.[9] Makahs exchanged this oil for a wide range of Native and non-Native goods, which made whalers wealthy individuals within the tribe. For example, one Makah elder recalls stories of his grandfather Hyushka (xicka), a Wayatch chief born in 1845 who had earned substantial wealth from whaling. When federal Indian agents in the late-nineteenth century forced him to give up two of his three wives, Hyushka gave them enough money

[9] For example, in 1852, a ship returning to New Bedford, MA, carried an average number of 1,343 barrels, which represented between 40,290 and 47,005 gallons, of oil harvested during a two-year period. This information is from a table copied from the "New Bedford Shipping List: Whaling in the North Pacific" as printed in Alexander Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery, from Its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876*, Vol. 1 (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian, 1964), 104. During the whaling industry, there was no standard number of gallons per barrel. Normally, each barrel of whale oil contained from thirty to thirty-five gallons. William Scoresby, *An Account of the Arctic Regions, with a History and Description of the Northern Whale-Fishery*, Vol. 2, A reprint of the 1st edition, 1820 ed. ([New York]: Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1969), 397-415 and 525-528.

to live in comfort for the rest of their lives.[10] But overhunting by non-Natives in the Pacific Ocean eventually changed the fortunes of Makah whalers.

Initially, the arrival of Anglo whalers to the Pacific brought further wealth to Makahs. In the late-eighteenth century, non-Native whalers seeking new hunting grounds entered the Pacific, and their number grew rapidly. In 1787, the English whaler *Amelia* took the first sperm whale in the Pacific, and by 1791, Yankee whalers from Nantucket and New Bedford hunted in the ocean too. Maritime historians sometimes aggrandize the role of white whalemen, characterizing them as "part of the advance guard of civilization" because they explored uncharted seas and brought unknown areas and peoples into global markets.[11] But this assessment becomes complicated when we consider the role of indigenous peoples in these pursuits. For example, the *Butterworth*, one of the earliest ships to return to England after trading along the Northwest Coast, brought back about 20,000 gallons of whale oil. Scholars identify this as the origin of whaling in the North Pacific.[12] However, the *Butterworth*'s crew did not procure this oil from whales they had hunted; instead, they had purchased it from indigenous whalers in the *ča·di·* borderland. By the early nineteenth century, a few whaling vessels from England and New England told port authorities that they were bound for the Northwest Coast to hunt leviathans.[13] After making the long trip around Cape Horn, these ships

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[10] McCarty Interview. Hyushka shows up in anthropologist Erna Gunther's genealogical notes on the Makah as xicka, or "John (Old Man) McCarty." See McCarty Genealogy Notes, Erna Gunther Papers, 1882-1981 (accession 0614-004), UWSC.

[11] Karl Brandt, *Whale Oil: An Economic Analysis* ([San Jose]: Stanford University Press, 1940), vii.

[12] Robert Lloyd Webb, *On the Northwest: Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest, 1790-1967* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 15.

[13] The exact origins of non-Native whaling in the North Pacific are unclear. Historians usually point to the voyage of Captain Folger's *Ganges* from Nantucket as the first whaler to hunt north of 49° N and east of 170° W. But there were probably earlier voyages, including the *Eleanora* from Providence, RI, (1802); the

needed fresh provisions, a situation that encouraged them to interact with indigenous peoples along the Northwest Coast.

After the War of 1812, the Pacific whaling industry grew as the fleet expanded and engaged new ports, along the northeastern seaboard of the U.S. Whalers targeted sperm whales because of the high quality of their oil, which was used for illumination. However, the "golden age" of whaling began in 1835 with the taking of the first right whale – called this because it became the "right" whale to hunt due to its high oil content and ease of capture – off the northwest coast of North America above 50°N latitude. This coincided with a booming demand for whale-oil lubricants used by textile factories filled with power looms. For example, in 1851 alone, one factory in Lowell, Massachusetts, used 6,772 gallons of whale oil, which represented the harvest of three sperm whales.[14] By 1846, over 700 barks, brigs, and schooners from U.S. ports whaled in the Pacific, with the majority cruising right-whaling grounds in the Gulf of Alaska and off Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands.[15]

Whaling vessels often came into the borderland waters, where they interacted with Makahs and other indigenous peoples. Whalers anchored at Neah Bay to procure

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Minerva (1805); Benjamin Worth, a Nantucket whaling master from Nantucket, who claimed to have whaled along the Northwest Coast as far north as 59°N before 1824; and at least one French whaler (*Gange*) in 1834. Ibid., 35-36.

[14] Committee on Rosin Oil, *A Report on Rosin Oil* (Lowell: S. J. Varney, 1852), 5, as excerpted in Webb, *On the Northwest*, 36.

[15] After the U.K. repealed bounties for Pacific whaling, Americans dominated whaling. The repeal caused a dramatic reduction in the British whaling fleet, from 322 ships in 1821 to 85 ships in 1841, very few of which made it to the Northwest Coast. See Webb, *On the Northwest*, 57. Except where otherwise noted, information about the early decades of Pacific whaling is from J. T. Jenkins, *A History of the Whale Fisheries, from the Basque Fisheries of the Tenth Century to the Hunting of the Finner Whale at the Present Date* (London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1921), 207-55; Charles Melville Scammon, *The Marine Mammals of the North-Western Coast of North America and the American Whale Fishery*, A facsim. ed. (Riverside: Manessier Pub. Co., 1969), 212-15; Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, Vol. 1, 90-98.

fresh provisions and whale oil from the People of the Cape.[16] But some feared the Makah and other Indians, probably due to violent encounters during the maritime fur trade. For example, in September 1843, the *Caroline* (American) and *Rèunion* (French) fled Cape Flattery after a brief and seemingly friendly encounter. After whaling together off Alaska's Kodiak Island, the two vessels approached the cape to seek provisions and new hunting grounds. Seven canoes of Makahs greeted them, offering fresh fish and whale oil for sale. An English-speaking chief – probably Chief Ellacoom – tried to persuade them to come into Neah Bay where they could sojourn for several weeks until whales migrating north came into the strait. However, Captain McKenzie of the *Caroline* "d[id] not like the appearance of things" and feared a trap. Over the strenuous objections of the French captain, whose crew needed provisions, he departed the area and sailed for San Francisco. Fearing to anchor alone at Neah Bay, the *Rèunion* followed the *Caroline* south.[17] Although anxiety marked this encounter, enough whaling ships evidently visited Neah Bay that Makahs knew what crews needed and wanted. Similar to those during the maritime fur trade, these exchanges brought a wealth of non-Native material goods to the People of the Cape.

Some vessels came into the Strait of Juan de Fuca looking for new whaling grounds or for locations to establish shore whaling operations. For example, in the fall of 1847, the *General Teste*, a French whaler from Le Havre, cruised into the strait to hunt in

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[16] S. Gordon (Capt. of *HMS America*) to Secretary of the Admiralty, 19 October 1845, *Record Office Transcripts, H.B.C. – C.O. [Colonial Office], Vols. 721-725, 1822-1852*, Vol. 723, pp. 5-10 [microfilm copy in "Correspondence with Hudson's Bay Company relating to conveyance, settlement, and reconveyence of Vancouver Island," Vol. 1 (GR-0332), British Columbia Archives (BCA), Victoria, copied from originals in the Public Records Office, London (PRO series C.O. 134)].

[17] George W. R. Bailey (green hand), keeper, "The Journal of the *Caroline* on the Northwest Coast, September 1843," [MS] 596, Kendall Whaling Museum, Sharon, MA, as excerpted in Webb, *On the Northwest*, 287-95.

the Gulf of Georgia and northern Puget Sound. But the *Teste* did not do well – the crew only killed one whale which they lost – and had left by early 1848.[18] Early non-Native shore whaling operations in this region also had a faltering start. From 1867 to 1871, just under a dozen companies – all operating from shore stations on the British side of the border – formed and collapsed, and none lasted longer than two seasons. They suffered from bad weather, lack of proper equipment, low oil prices, and vessel losses. These Anglo hunters often lost slain whales in the dense fogs characteristic to the area. The most successful venture only captured nineteen whales and produced about 33,000 gallons of oil in one season.[19]

As with similar expansions of the settler-colonial world into the region, indigenous peoples of the borderland engaged in the non-Native whaling industry. Along with other Pacific peoples, some Makahs, such as David Fisher (qi̓·tap), labored on non-Native whaling ships and explored the larger world. Shipping out of Neah Bay in the 1850s, Fisher joined cruises lasting years in length and even traveled as far abroad as Africa.[20] Some indigenous borderlanders also labored at local shore whaling stations, although Anglo operators ignored the whaling expertise of these people, limiting them to tasks such as towing carcasses to shore and stripping the flesh and blubber. Additionally, Native women lived with some non-Native men working at the shore stations and

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[18] James Douglas and John Work to [HBC] Governor and Committee, 6 November 1847, in Hartwell Bowsfield, ed., *Fort Victoria Letters, 1846-1851* (Winnipeg: Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1979), 13.

[19] For an overview of the early shore stations in B.C., see Webb, *On the Northwest*, 125-32.

[20] Karen Samantha Barton, "'Red Waters': Contesting Marine Space as Indian Place in the U.S. Pacific Northwest" (Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2000), 240. For more on qi̓·tap (David Fisher), see Maria Pascua and Greig Arnold, interviews by Josh Reid, digital audio recordings, 13 & 14 October 2008, MCRC.

probably contributed by rendering blubber into oil.[21] Moreover, indigenous whalers often picked up the prey struck but lost in the fog by their non-Native counterparts. Although whites complained in local papers that Indians "appropriated to their own use" carcasses belonging to shore whaling operations, Natives probably exchanged with traders large amounts of oil processed from these "losses."[22]

During the nineteenth century, the expansion of non-Native whaling throughout the Pacific devastated whale stocks. The eastern Pacific whale fisheries followed a similar pattern as non-Native whalers depleted a given stock within a decade. During the 1840s, whalers targeted right whales in the North Pacific; however, by the 1850s, returns had plummeted to a quarter of those from the previous decade. Moreover, non-Native whalers often lost many they harpooned. For example, in 1841, the *Superior* struck fifty-eight whales along the Northwest Coast but only recovered twenty-six, noting that another five sank before retrieval. Upon examining numerous logs from whaling's golden age, one historian concluded that the deaths of unrecovered whales was high because nearly every logbook made references to encountering the carcasses of right whales that had died from harpoon strikes.[23] After discovering bowhead grounds in the Bering Sea in 1849, whalers shifted to this baleen whale, and by 1865, they had reduced this species by more than a half.[24] Due to decreasing numbers of bowheads – and the actions of the *Shenandoah*, a Southern privateer steamship that burned thirty-four Yankee whaling

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[21] Webb, *On the Northwest*, 127.

[22] "Later from the West Coast – More about the Mysterious Wreck – The Whaling Expedition," *British Colonist* [Victoria], 31 March 1869, 3.

[23] Webb, *On the Northwest*, 70-72.

[24] Alan M. Springer et al., "Whales and Whaling in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea: Oceanographic Insights and Ecosystem Impacts," in *Whales, Whaling, and Ocean Ecosystems*, ed. James A. Estes, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 246.

vessels in the Bering Sea at the end of the Civil War – non-Native whalers shifted their focus to hunting gray whales in their calving grounds off Baja California.[25] Intense commercial whaling also caused this fishery to collapse, and the gray whale population went from a high of 24,000 at the beginning of the century to 2,000 by the 1880s.[26]

During the 1870s, the New England whaling industry withered and died. Decades of fluctuating prices for oil and baleen made it difficult for investors to sustain profits. Good years resulted in the growth of the fleet and new ports, which in subsequent years flooded markets with whale products and drove prices down. More significantly, whalers had overhunted numerous species to the point where voyages became too expensive for the meager returns. Once only lasting two years, cruises in the 1870s stretched from four to six years, and amounts of oil and baleen decreased. Longer voyages required a more substantial outfitting of vessels, an expense that grew out of proportion with profits. Moreover, only the Northern Pacific and Arctic fisheries – "where disasters were the rule and immunity from them the exception" – remained profitable.[27] For example, the whaling fleet in the Arctic suffered a catastrophe in 1871, when ice crushed thirty-four ships. The financial losses from this catastrophe numbered in the millions, and 1,200 survivors eventually made it to Honolulu, where they languished while looking for

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[25] Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, Vol. 1, 102-03.

[26] Springer et al., "Whales and Whaling in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea," 146. Springer estimates that "aboriginal whaling" in the Pacific had reduced the number of grays to 12,000 by 1846. However, Japanese shore whaling, which intensified from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, also caused this reduction. For an overview of historical Japanese whaling, see Arne Kalland and Brian Moeran, *Japanese Whaling: End of an Era?* (London: Curzon Press, 1992), 65-94; Hiroyuki Watanabe, *Japan's Whaling: The Politics of Culture in Historical Perspective*, trans. Hugh Clarke (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2009).

[27] Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, Vol. 1, 112.

employment in a dwindling industry.[28] As whaling profits plummeted, the output from the nation's oil wells increased, providing a plentiful, high-quality, and cheap alternative to whale oil for lighting and lubricants.[29]

For New England laborers and investors, other industries beckoned. By the 1870s, whaling captains, experienced sailors, and "green hands" were earning very little; crewmember income averaged between three and seven dollars a month. These laborers felt that "a strenuous and dangerous voyage of a year yielded not a penny besides the food." They found better wages in the booming manufacturing industry of the Northeast. Additionally, Pacific Rim gold discoveries encouraged desertions as whaling become less profitable. Sailors – and even captains and officers – joined whaling ships simply to get to the region. Profits also diminished for ship owners. After the 1871 catastrophe in the Arctic, insurance premiums shot up to "almost prohibitive heights." Additionally, the transition from sail-powered ships to more successful steam-powered vessels was too expensive for those who had already invested their capital in sailing ships.[30]

Although the end of the industry in the Northeast was not the end of U.S. whaling, the demise of Yankee whaling in the 1870s affected the People of the Cape. After the Civil War, San Francisco grew into the leading port for whalers, and competition from this new center of the industry contributed to the waning influence of Northeastern ports. By 1883, San Francisco had refineries for whale oil and sperm-candle works. Instead of

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[28] Marc L. Songini, *The Lost Fleet: A Yankee Whaler's Struggle against the Confederate Navy and Arctic Disaster* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), 287-342.

[29] Starbuck provides an overview of the 1870s decline of the Yankee whaling industry. Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, Vol. 1, 109-13. For more on the price of whale oil versus petroleum, see Brandt, *Whale Oil*, 50-54. In 1881, the federal government switched from whale oil to "coal oil" (petroleum) to fuel the nation's lighthouse lamps. Swan, 7 June 1881, Diary 29, Swan Papers.

[30] Brandt, *Whale Oil*, 54.

shipping oil and other whale products around Cape Horn – an arduous and long voyage, at best – merchants used new transcontinental railroads to transport commodities east. By 1893, thirty-three whaling ships were based out of the Pacific port, and twenty-two of these were steamers.[31] Instead of anchoring at Neah Bay to resupply, steamships put in at other ports, which had access to abundant coal. With no Yankee whalers stopping at Cape Flattery and the new steam-powered whaling fleet bypassing Makah villages, the People of the Cape lost an important market for whale oil. Moreover, the shift to expensive floating factory ships at the turn of the century moved whaling even farther from the coast and indigenous whalers. Modern whaling focused less on whale oil, a commodity easily provided by Makahs, and more on goods indigenous peoples could not provide, such as fertilizers, bone meal, animal fodder, glue, cosmetics, and other products requiring expensive industrial processes.[32]

Most importantly, the overall decline of whales in the Pacific affected Makah whalers such as John Claplanhoo during the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Known as Captain John by Anglos, this patriarch was a prominent whaling chief. However, he seemed to doubt his whaling ability when he measured his kills against those of his deceased brother, Halicks. To prove his whaling prowess and lineage, he made theatrical shows of his ancestral "whale medicine," pieces of dead whales and a bone of the *hah hake to ak*, a sea horse-like animal who stuns whales with lightning. According to Northwest Coast legends, Thunderbird uses the *hah hake to ak* when he comes down from his alpine nest to hunt whales. When John had trouble hunting in the mid-1860s, he underwent extra ritual preparations, including fasting, sleep deprivation,

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[31] Ibid., 51-52.

[32] For modern whaling, see Webb, *On the Northwest*, 221-87.

and bathing in saltwater with his whale medicine. Others also noticed the declining numbers of whales. In 1891, Lighthouse Jim joked to James Swan that they had a harder time catching the leviathans "as [we] now drink coffee at each breakfast before going out as the whales smell their breath."[33] However, John's whaling skills and Lighthouse Jim's coffee breath did not cause their troubles. Instead, their experiences reflected the changing ecology of the Pacific, namely the removal of vast numbers of leviathans by non-Native commercial whalers. Whales were simply harder to find off Cape Flattery.

Despite the increasing difficulty of securing whales throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, whaling still remained important to the People of the Cape. The continued prominence of whalers among tribal leadership indicates that these chiefs must have provided tangible benefits. John Claplanhoo maintained his position as a recognized leader of the tribe. Detailed census records of the 1860s show the Claplanhoo longhouse as one of the largest, indicating that profits from whaling continued to provide enough wealth to support a large family.[34] In 1878, he took the name Kloot ka bethld, which means "thunder on the ocean" – he only could have earned the right to this name if he had established himself as a prominent whaler. Similarly, in the first American-style election held on the reservation, the residents of Neah Bay chose John Claplanhoo as one of their four chiefs, who, in turn, elected him tribal chairman in 1879.[35] During the third quarter of the nineteenth century, whaling chiefs held onto their leadership positions

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[33] Swan, 24 November 1859, Diary 2; 6 April 1866, Diary 9; 2 September 1866, Diary 10; and 15 July 1891, Diary 55, Swan Papers.

[34] James G. Swan, Folder 191: Bound autograph manuscript journal and memorandum book, 1861-71, Box 10, Stenzel Collection (WA MSS S-2368), Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT (hereafter cited as Swan, Manuscript Journal).

[35] Swan, 21 December 1878, and 23 and 24 January 1879, Diary 23, Swan Papers.

because they still had access to valuable goods such as oil, blubber, whalebone, and whale meat, products that they also exchanged for non-Native goods with traders.

While whaling statistics from the second half of the nineteenth century are difficult to ascertain because no one kept complete returns for the entire tribe, available evidence indicates that Makahs regularly landed around a dozen whales each year. Based on statistics provided by the whaling chief Wha-laltl as sá buy, Swan reported that in 1859, Makah whalers harvested thirteen whales, which produced about 30,000 gallons of oil.[36] Because a whaler involved in this fishery had related this statistic, it is probably accurate. During his tenure at Neah Bay as the agency teacher, Swan noted occasions when Makahs hunted whales; however, these numbers are less accurate than the 1859 one provided by Wha-laltl because Swan could not be everywhere on the reservation at all times. He never heard of some hunts, and there were probably times when he did not report whaling about which he had heard. However, some of Swan's numbers are close to those reported by Wha-laltl. For example, in 1862 and 1863, Makahs took thirteen and eight whales, respectively.[37]

In their annual reports, Indian agents also occasionally noted the number of whales the tribe had taken that year. Again, these numbers are lower than they actually were because agents were not in a position to report every hunt. Additionally, agents wrote most of these reports in August and September, and Makahs hunted all year long whenever whales were present. According to the reports, during the late-nineteenth

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[36] Swan, 29 October and 1 November 1859, Diary 2, Swan Papers. Wha-laltl as sá buy (Swell) estimated that Makah whalers produced about 30,000 gallons of whale oil from thirteen whales. Therefore, Makahs harvested about 2,300 gallons of oil per whale, a number that I will use in estimating indigenous whaling returns of this period.

[37] These returns are gathered from Swan's diaries, numbers five through seven, covering the relevant years. Swan Papers.

century, the People of the Cape continued harvesting whales at a level comparable to returns from earlier decades. For example, in 1872, Makahs took nine whales. They harvested the same number in 1888, twelve in 1891, and ten in 1897.[38]

These whaling returns compared favorably to Anglo operations along the west coast of North America. In 1872, Makahs hunting in canoes produced at least 20,700 gallons of oil from the nine whales the agent reported. Two years earlier, San Francisco, a growing city with nearly 150,000 people, imported 4,013 barrels (or about 130,423 gallons) of whale oil from six vessels that identified the city as their home port. This oil resulted from four- to six-year cruises in the Bering Sea and Arctic Ocean, and 1870 had the highest oil returns recorded by the city's port officials until the advent of steam-powered whaling ships later that century. When we consider that this non-Native oil came from leviathans harvested during voyages lasting several years, this statistic represents an average of 27,590 gallons per year, an amount not much higher than what Makahs produced.[39]

As whale oil returns dwindled at Anglo operations, Makah harvests remained comparably high during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. In 1888, Makahs

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[38] E. M. Gibson, "No. 64, Annual Report of Neah Bay Agency, 1 September 1873," *ARCIA*, 1873, 308; W. L. Powell, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 11 August 1888, *ARCIA*, 1888, 225; John P. McGlinn, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 17 August 1891, *ARCIA*, 1891, 448; Samuel G. Morse, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 20 August 1897, *ARCIA*, 1897, 292.

[39] No returns were recorded from 1871 to 1874 due to the disaster of ships crushed by Arctic ice in 1871. San Francisco's oil imports dwindled to 1,200 barrels (or about 39,000 gallons) in 1875 and dipped even lower – 675 barrels (or about 21,938 gallons) – a year later. But in 1877, the city imported its highest amount yet, 4,520 barrels (or about 146,900 gallons) of oil; however, no oil imports were recorded from 1878 to 1883 with the collapse of the sail-powered Yankee whaling industry in the late-1870s. Beginning in the 1880s, steam-powered whaling ships began embarking from San Francisco to ply the North Pacific and Arctic. Working from more efficient steamships and armed with a new darting gun (combination of bomb lance and harpoon), Anglo whalers realized large returns, and oil imports in San Francisco peaked at 29,870 barrels (nearly one million gallons) in 1887. Starbuck, *History of the American Whale Fishery*, Vol. 2, 697. See also Walter Sheldon Tower, *A History of the American Whale Fishery* (Philadelphia: [University of Pennsylvania], 1907), 130.

again harvested at least nine whales, which produced approximately 20,700 gallons of oil. In comparison, a shore whaling station at San Simeon Bay, California, took seven gray and humpback whales in 1888, and the same amount in the following year. From these whales, this station produced 180 and 260 barrels (or 5,850 and 8,450 gallons) of oil, respectively. With twenty-one men and nine boats at the time, this operation was "one of the principal whaling stations on the Pacific Coast" and had operated since 1865.[40] Comparing the oil returns of Makah whalers to this similar whaling operation reveals two important conclusions. First, Makah women were more efficient when it came to processing oil, getting more than twice the amount of oil from a whale – either that or Makahs hunted larger specimens than their Anglo counterparts in California did. Second, during a period when whales were "disappearing from the Pacific Ocean," Makah whalers also harvest a greater number than whites engaged in a similar pursuit.[41]

However, the People of the Cape could do little about the impact of modern whaling upon sea mammal populations in the Pacific. Claplanhoo oral histories recall that 1909 marked the last whale hunt completed by a family member. Jongie, grandson to John Claplanhoo, killed the whale and added the one-hundred-forty-second notch to the harpoon that his forebears had used for four generations.[42] Makahs took the occasional

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[40] They processed more oil in 1889 because the whales they landed were larger than the ones from the previous year. A. B. Alexander, "Report of A. B. Alexander, Fishery Expert," enclosure in Z. L. Tanner, "Report upon the Investigations of the U.S. Fish Commission Steamer *Albatross* from July 1, 1889, to June 30, 1891," in United States Commission of Fisheries, *Report of the Commissioner for 1889 to 1891* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893), 278. For more on the history of the San Simeon Bay whaling station, see Robert C. Pavlik, "Shore Whaling at San Simeon Bay," *Sea Letters [a publication of the San Francisco Maritime National Park Association]* (Fall/Winter 1990), (available at http://www.historyinslocounty.org/Shore%20Whaling%20by%20Pavlik.htm), History in San Louis Obispo County Website [accessed June 2009].

[41] "Whalers in the Pacific, [30 August]," 7 September 1891, *New York Times*.

[42] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview. During the interview, Pug associated Jongie's last whale with the year of the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition. Jongie's grandfather, Che-ya-te-toh, probably made this harpoon and added the first notches to it.

whale during the second decade of the twentieth century, but by this time, they rarely saw whales in local waters. In 1928, nineteen years before non-Natives decided to suspend the hunt of gray whales, concern over the dearth of whales caused the tribe to suspend the active practice of whaling until populations had rebounded. To provide the youngest generation with the experience of welcoming a whale to Neah Bay, whalers held a final hunt, led by Charles White.[43] The tribe always intended to revive an active whaling practice at some point in the future.[44]

Before deciding to suspend whaling, Makahs looked to new technologies that would allow them to expand their hunting grounds deeper into the Pacific. In 1862, John Claplanhoo spoke with Swan about the possibility of purchasing a schooner from a local trader.[45] Already finding it more difficult to locate whales along the coast, John hoped to use the larger vessel to hunt far from the safety of the coast. In 1884, 100 Makahs met in council with an Indian Inspector and urged him to convince the government to provide them with a steamship so they could more easily haul in whales from the Pacific.[46] Some of whom had been present at the 1855 treaty negotiations, these individuals recalled that Governor Stevens had promised to support tribal marine industries. By making these

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[43] Cary C. Collins, "Subsistence and Survival: The Makah Indian Reservation, 1855-1933," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 87, no. 4 (1996): 183. Additionally, see the caption for photo MCRC-0014 at the MCRC.

[44] The International Whaling Commission granted protection for gray whales in 1947. However, in some parts of the west coast of North America, grays were protected from 1937 on. See Serge Dedina, *Saving the Gray Whale: People, Politics, and Conservation in Baja California* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000), 26 and 48-52. House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *Saving the Gray and Bowhead Whales: Report to Accompany H. Resolution 15445*, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, no. 94-1574.

[45] Swan, 27 March 1862, Diary 5, Swan Papers.

[46] William A. Newell, U.S. Indian Inspector, "Neah Bay Agency, W.T., Inspector's Report," 18 November 1884 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1070, roll 28), Reports of Inspection of the Field Jurisdiction of the Office of Indian Affairs, Neah Bay, 1881-1897, BIA, NARA – Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, WA (NARA – Seattle).

requests in the decades following the treaty, the People of the Cape attempted to hold the government responsible for its promises.

Some federal officials supported Makah requests for modern vessels, despite the philosophy that Indians should only pursue agriculture. In his annual reports for 1865 and 1867, Henry Webster, the Makah agent, forwarded the tribe's requests to his superiors, as did agents Elkanah M. Gibson (1873) and Charles A. Huntington (1876).[47] They questioned the department's wisdom in sending agricultural implements to coastal tribes such as the Makah, who also found the intended purpose of these tools pointless. Instead, Makahs fashioned them into fishhooks, blubber knives, and points for whaling lances.[48] During the 1860s and 1870s, the Indian Affairs Department ignored the requests for vessels. However, in the 1880s, the department agreed to finance the Makah request for a steamship due to a favorable review by an Indian Inspector. Unfortunately, finalizing the decision depended upon the advice of the current Makah agent, Oliver Wood, who considered it an unreasonable request because a steamer would cost $8,000, plus the cost of fuel and crew wages.[49] If they had acquired either of these vessels earlier, Makah whalers could have possibly met the challenge of a dwindling number of whales migrating past Cape Flattery by expanding their hunting range farther into the Pacific.[50] Instead, they spent more time seeking fewer whales that swam into coastal waters.

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[47] Webster, *ARCIA*, 1865, 90-93; Webster, "No. 4, Annual Report of H. A. Webster, Agent, Neah Bay Agency," 1 July 1867, *ARCIA*, 1867, 41-45; Gibson, *ARCIA*, 1873, 306-309; Huntington, "Annual Report of Makah Agency," 25 August 1875, *ARCIA*, 1875, 362-64.

[48] Swan, 24 February 1880, Diary 10, Swan Papers. See also Barton, "'Red Waters,'" 115.

[49] Commissioner [of Indian Affairs] to Wood, 11 December 1884, p. 273, Finance Division, Vol. 108, 8 November 1884 to 17 December 1884, Office of Indian Affairs Correspondence, BIA, NARA – DC. See also Wood to Commissioner of Indian Affairs (CIA), 14 January 1885, No. 2053, Letters Received, 1881-1907, BIA, NARA – DC (hereafter cited as Letters Received).

[50] In the first part of the twentieth century, white California fishermen followed a similar pattern, relying on technological advances of motorized vessels to open up deepwater fisheries. See Arthur F. McEvoy, *The*

Although customary whaling methods endured throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, Makahs sought more efficient ways to hunt whales. For example, in 1861, James Swan observed Peter Brown – an established whaling chief from a long line of whalers – use a rifle during a casual hunt. Eighteen years later, after seeing a mortar fired, older whalers expressed interest in acquiring one to use for whaling.[51] When the opportunity presented itself, whaling crews hired powered ships to haul harpooned whales into Neah Bay. For example, in 1905, two vessels, the *Wyadda* and the *Lorne*, witnessed a hunt and competed for the opportunity to bring in the carcass. The Makahs chose the former vessel, a tugboat that pulled ships into or out of the strait.[52] Because the federal government had failed to honor Makah requests for a modern vessel, the People of the Cape engaged local ships on their own terms.

Makah interest in selectively applying modern technologies and opportunities to whaling was part of the larger context of ways that the People of the Cape engaged the expanding settler-colonial economy. For example, John Claplanhoo raised James, his adopted son, to be prominent in the hybrid Anglo-indigenous culture of the mid-nineteenth century Pacific Northwest.[53] When John went to Victoria, the most important

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Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 123-55.

[51] Swan, 24 September 1861, Diary 5; and 27 May 1879, Diary 25, Swan Papers.

[52] "Exciting Whale Hunt," 15 June 1905, *Victoria Daily Colonist*, 8. Haggling with tugboat captains over towing whales back into Neah Bay appeared to be a common practice at the time. Others also observed this on separate occasions. See Lucien M. Lewis, "The Whale Hunters of Neah Bay: How on Occasion the Makah Indians Paddle out to Sea in Their Dugout Canoes and Kill 'Chit-up-Puk'," *Field and Stream*, April 1906.

[53] When Swan initially wrote of James, his first star pupil, he described him as John's nephew. Later diary entries described him as John's son. See 2 December 1863, Diary 6, and 6 November 1864, Diary 8, Swan Papers. A heirship report from 1930 clarified the Claplanhoo genealogy, showing that James was Halick's son and that John was his uncle. See Heirship Report for Quata Moore. For a complete examination of the hybrid Anglo-indigenous world of the Puget Sound, see Alexandra Harmon, *Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

Anglo outpost in the region, he often took James along so he could learn from an early age about the non-Native economy.[54] Additionally, John supported government efforts to teach his adopted son and other children to read and write in English. For example, he organized fifty men to help raise the schoolhouse and even lectured antsy students when they caused trouble for James Swan, the first Anglo schoolmaster at Neah Bay.[55] John's actions complicate the traditional narrative of indigenous resistance to non-Native education. He believed that an American education in the fledgling Neah Bay school could provide James with expanded opportunities.[56]

While John embraced many aspects of non-Native culture, he also continued to abide by Makah cultural expectations. He maintained his chiefly position with elaborate potlatches, some lasting nearly a month.[57] During these ceremonial feasts, the Claplanhoo family organized and performed ritual dances, fed hundreds of guests from villages on both sides of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and gave gifts of money, food, blankets, and other trade goods. Although he pursued opportunities to familiarize James with the settler-colonial world, at the same time he taught the boy Makah dances and saved his powerful whale medicine for him.[58] He even arranged to have more successful whalers teach James how to whale.[59] John knew that in order for James to be a successful leader of his people, he would need to bridge the Anglo and Makah cultures.

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[54] Swan, 30 August 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers.

[55] Swan, "History of the Commencement of the Makah Indian Agency at Neah Bay, W.T.," 5 April 1881, Folder 8, Box 9; and 26 September 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers.

[56] Scholarship is beginning to explore this theme. See Cary C. Collins, "A Future with a Past: Hazel Pete, Cultural Identity, and the Federal Indian Education System," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 92, no. 1 (2000/2001).

[57] Swan, December 1878, Diary 23, Swan Papers.

[58] Swan, 28 November 1864, Diary 8, Swan Papers; Swan, 22 January 1865, Manuscript Journal.

[59] Swan, 6 May 1865, Diary 9, Swan Papers.

Similar to indigenous peoples elsewhere, Makahs found ways to combine customary practices with modern opportunities and technology in a manner that allowed them to continue being Makah.[60] Using tugboats to tow whales ashore, employing rifles to hunt, and expressing interest in other modern gear did not dilute the customary practice of whaling. Nor did these modifications, local and global markets, or a white education dilute the Makah identity of Claplanhoos such as John and James at this time. By engaging non-Native tools and opportunities during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Makahs continued what they had been doing for generations – adapting to a changing world in ways that strengthened their identity, influence, and authority in the *ča·di·* borderland.

Makah Pelagic Sealing, 1871-1897

When Makahs such as the Claplanhoos combined customary practices with modern opportunities and technology in the case of pelagic (oceanic) sealing, they accumulated considerable wealth. This strategy enabled them to better resist assimilation and to control both their marine space and reservation lands. Not only did Makah hunters pursue fur seals in local waters and throughout the larger Pacific Ocean, but they became important investors in this extractive industry, purchasing expensive, modern schooners. Sealing from ships allowed this tribe to expand Makah marine space substantially and to hunt pinnipeds in a greater area as the species became overhunted by non-Natives. However, the environmental cost of this industry – in which Makahs were particularly successful hunters – prompted the United States to focus the nation's first international

[60] For a similar comparison, see Hazel Petrie, *Chiefs of Industry: Maori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2007).

conservation efforts on fur seals. At the end of the nineteenth century, Congress passed laws that ended commercial pelagic sealing while privileging well-capitalized and politically well-connected, non-Native corporations heavily involved in North Pacific extractive industries. More importantly, Makahs who had been entrepreneurial, modern investors, found themselves shackled to the timeless stereotype of the subsistence, Native hunter. The U.S. prohibition on pelagic sealing reversed the fortunes of the People of the Cape, transforming them from wealth to poverty as they entered the twentieth century.

Like his adopted father, James Claplanhoo took advantage of modern opportunities to secure and strengthen his leadership position in the borderland. Although James whaled, his financial success in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century came from sealing rather than whaling. By the 1870s, the skins of fur seals – a sea mammal long hunted by Makahs for their flesh, hide, and oil – had become a valuable commodity. Skins from the North Pacific ended up in London, where furriers turned them into stylish, ebony sealskin coats worn by the likes of Mark Twain.[61] By 1871, Makahs were trading sealskins for clothing, flour, and other items.[62] As local traders on both sides of the international border competed for sealskins, Makahs began demanding cash. In 1873, James and 150 Makah hunters together earned over $10,000 selling 1,500 skins from seals they had taken up to forty miles offshore during the first five months of the year.[63] A year later, they sold twice the amount of sealskins and made $15,000.[64]

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[61] An early twentieth-century reference for women called a sealskin coat a “precious possession” and carefully detailed how to pick out one, which usually cost around £200. Mrs. Fitzroy Stewart, "Practical Advice on the Choice of Furs No. 3 - Sealskins," in *Every Woman's Encyclopedia* (London: 23-29 Bouverie Street, 1910).

[62] Gibson, “No. 2, Annual Report of E.M. Gibson, Agent, Neah Bay Agency,” 1 September 1871, *ARCIA*, 1871, 280.

[63] Gibson, *ARCIA*, 1873, 308. I have estimated the number of sealers from the next annual report. Huntington, “Annual Report of the Makah Agency,” 5 September 1874, *ARCIA*, 1874, 330. Huntington

By the late-1870s, Makah sealers began accumulating substantial cash by joining crews of Anglo-owned schooners based out of Victoria, Port Townsend, Seattle, and San Francisco.[65] For one-third of the catch, these schooners took sealers and their canoes and gear out to sea for week-long voyages. Chiefs earned fees for brokering labor agreements with ship captains, traders, and Indian agents.[66] Occasionally, a sealer's wife joined the crew as cook and skinner. At sea, Makah women also processed seal blubber into oil, reserving the cleanest oil for consumption.[67] In 1880, the Makah-organized Neah Bay Fur Sealing Company chartered the *Lottie*, a Port Townsend schooner, and made over $20,000 during the four-month season.[68] Competition for sealskins enabled hunters to command the full value or higher for their catches.[69]

The People of the Cape understood the benefits of schooner ownership. James Claplanhoo was one of the first Native borderlanders to acquire a modern ship. After spending the previous year considering several, James purchased the thirty-one-ton *Lottie*

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counted 174 Makah males. Some of the oldest males did not hunt, while some of the older boys (counted as children) accompanied male relatives on seal hunts. For sealing done by older boys, see the Alanson Wesley Smith Papers (microfilm, roll 3), NARA – Seattle (hereafter cited as Smith Papers).

[64] Huntington, *ARCIA*, 1874, 332.

[65] Swan, 12 March 1879, Diary 24, Swan Papers. Indians on the West Coast of Vancouver Island had sealed from schooners for more than a decade before this. See Peter Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet: A Chronicle of the North Pacific Sealing Schooner Trade* (Victoria: Sono Nis Press, 1988), 17.

[66] Swan, 15 January 1879, Diary 23; and 4 April 1879, Diary 25, Swan Papers. Nuu-chah-nulth sealers also made similar arrangements. See Harry Guillod, Journal – September 1, 1881 – 1906, (MS-2822) [microfilm A01000(6)], and William Stone to Mr. Daykin, 12 June 1895, File 2254, Part 1, Canada, Department of Marine and Fisheries Central Registry Records (CRR), 1895-1914, (GR-2908) [Reel B-11112], BCA.

[67] A. W. Vowell, Indian Superintendent [of British Columbia], to Theo Davie, Attorney General [of B.C.], 3 August 1894 (1030/94); and Hammersly & Hamilton, barristers, to Arthur G. Smith, Deputy Attorney General [of B.C.], 11 September 1894 (1277/94), Box 3, File 2: Correspondence Inward, 1894, British Columbia, Attorney General (GR-0429) [microfilm B09318], BCA. Women processed 1,500 gallons of seal oil each season. Swan, "Fur Seal Industry of Cape Flattery and the Vicinity," [1883?], Stenzel Collection, Beinecke.

[68] Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 155. See also Charles Willoughby, "Report of the Makah Agent," 17 August 1880, *ARCIA*, 1880, 155-56.

[69] Willoughby, "Report of Neah Bay Agent," 26 August 1882, *ARCIA*, 1882, 155.

from a local trader at the beginning of 1886. He paid $1,200 cash, some of which he borrowed from Ditidaht relatives across the Strait of Juan de Fuca, with another $600 due at the end of the sealing season. Crewing his new ship with Makah sealers, James employed her in the spring hunt along the Washington state and Vancouver Island coasts.[70] The *Lottie* transported canoes to sealing grounds up to one hundred miles offshore. At night, the sealers ate and slept on the *Lottie*, which allowed them to stay out on cruises for a week or longer. After purchasing the schooner, James increased his profits from commercial pelagic sealing.

Other Makahs also invested in North Pacific industries at this time. A year before James bought the *Lottie*, Peter Brown, member of another prominent Makah family and one of the tribe's chiefs, purchased the *Letitia* for $1,000.[71] In 1886, the same year that James acquired his first schooner, Klahoowik and Haspooey bought the twenty-six-ton *Sierra* from three San Franciscans for $1,500. A month later, Lighthouse Jim paid over $1,000 for the *C. C. Perkins.* [72] These owners recruited Makahs and other Indians from neighboring villages on both sides of the strait to work their vessels, and occasionally they hired white captains and sailors.[73] By 1887, five Makah-owned schooners engaged in sealing out of Neah Bay, and that number doubled by 1893.[74]

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[70] For details related to purchasing the *Lottie*, see Swan, 16 April 1885, Diary 38; and 17 January, 3 February, and 8 February 1886, Diary 39, Swan Papers. Entries from February through July in Diary 39 include details about James's first season as owner of the *Lottie*.

[71] Wood, "Report of Makah Agent," 13 August 1885, *ARCIA*, 1885, 188. Wood tried to credit himself with convincing Brown (although he did not name him in his report) to purchase a schooner. While Wood probably did suggest this, other evidence in Swan's diaries indicates that Makahs had been interested in purchasing schooners for a while. Swan noted that Peter Brown owned the *Letitia.* See 17 October 1885, Diary 38, Swan Papers.

[72] Swan, 17 September and 18 October 1886, Diary 40, Swan Papers.

[73] "Deposition of Charlie, Nitnat Indian sealer," and "Deposition of Moses, Nitnat Indian sealer," 27 April 1892, Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, *Fur Seal Arbitration. Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Paris, under the Treaty between the United States ... And Great Britain, Concluded at*

By employing schooners as bases to hunt seals, Makahs not only earned larger profits, but they also expanded their hunting range and tribal marine space. Whereas canoes alone had once limited Makahs to hunting pinnipeds within thirty miles of Cape Flattery and in the strait, schooners allowed them to expand their spring coastal sealing from the mouth of the Columbia River to the northern tip of Vancouver Island. More importantly, Makah sealing expanded into the North Pacific. In the summer of 1887, James took the *Lottie* farther north, for cruises in the Bering Sea made the greatest profits.[75] Hunters could harvest many more seals, and the higher-quality skins fetched a better price.[76] The Bering Sea voyages were lucrative, netting James $3,600 in profits, for example, during the 1889 season in the Bering Sea.[77] In following years, the *Lottie's* profits from North Pacific pelagic sealing brought the Claplanhoos between $7,000 and $8,000 annually, which allowed James to expand his capital investments.[78] Like most successful investors, he diversified his assets in 1890 when he bought out the reservation trader for $3,000.[79] A year later, he deposited $5,000 in Port Townsend's Merchants

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Washington, February 29, 1892, for the Determination of Questions between the Two Governments Concerning the Jurisdictional Rights of the United States in the Waters of Bering Sea, Vol. 3 (Washington: Govt. print. off., 1895), 304 & 08. See also Powell to CIA, 21 August 1889, No. 24364, Letters Received; Max Lohbrunner, "Reminiscences of B.C. Sealing Industry," interview by Imbert Orchard, audiocassette, 1967, BCA; and Joseph William Collins, "Report on the Fisheries of the Pacific Coast of the United States," ed. U.S. Fish and Fisheries Commission (G.P.O., 1891), 254.

[74] Powell, "Report of Makah Agent," 15 August 1887; *ARCIA*, 1887, 210; and Swan, 9 December 1893, Diary 59, Swan Papers.

[75] Powell to CIA, 8 March 1886, No. 7920; C. S. Fairchild, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to Secretary of the Interior, 5 April 1886, No. 9425; Powell to CIA, 10 March 1887, No. 7376, Letters Received; and Swan, 7 September 1887, Diary 41, Swan Papers.

[76] Stewart, "Practical Advice on the Choice of Furs No. 3 - Sealskins."

[77] Swan, 9 March 1880, Diary 10; and 31 August and 1 September 1889, Diary 48, Swan Papers.

[78] Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 155.

[79] Charles Adie, ["Bill of Sale,"] 26 December 1891, enclosed in letter from McGlinn to CIA, 30 December 1891, No. 608, Letters Received.

Bank, where his money earned six percent interest.[80] The diversity and scale of these financial activities reveal that some indigenous people were important investors in North Pacific extractive industries.

Similar to any savvy capitalist, James expanded his investment and purchased a fleet of vessels. After the 1891 sealing season, he began shopping around for a second schooner, traveling to San Francisco aboard a steamer to inspect vessels. He eventually contracted with Fisher and McDonald of Seattle to build him the larger, forty-two-ton *Deeahks*, which he named after an ancestor and sailed back to Neah Bay in January 1893.[81] That year, he also purchased the *Emmett Felitz*, a thirty-ton vessel. Additionally, sometime between 1887 and 1893, he bought the fifteen-ton *Puritan*. His son Jongie commissioned a new schooner for $2,500 at the beginning of 1897.[82] James also maintained his vessels regularly. During the stormy winter months, he paid for sheltered moorage at Scow Bay near Port Townsend. He had them repaired by carpenters in Hadlock, another Puget Sound port, and bought new sails for his ships. Additionally, James and Jongie insured their vessels with wealthy local merchants.[83]

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[80] Swan, 7 September 1891, Diary 55, Swan Papers.

[81] Swan, 25 October 1891, Diary 55; 15 December 1892, Diary 58; and 22 January 1893, Diary 59, Swan Papers. "Neah Bay" is an Anglicized approximation of "Deeah Bay," the Makah name for this body of water. It is named after a powerful Makah chief, who owned the land around Neah Bay approximately thirteen generations before James. For genealogical information on Deeah, see Swan, 13 January 1863, Diary 6, Swan Papers. Deeah's brother might have been the war chief who wrestled the Cape Flattery area away from the Quilleutes. See Albert B. Reagan, "Pioneer Makahs Massacred by Quileute Navy," [newspaper clipping], "Other Papers, Miscellaneous/1883-1891," Allison W. Smith Papers, Beinecke.

[82] Swan, 30 March and 9 December 1893, Diary 59; and 3 January 1897, Diary 63, Swan Papers.

[83] Many entries in the Swan diaries note Makah owners maintaining and insuring their vessels. For example, see 21 November 1886, Diary 40; 22 February 1890, Diary 50; 11 July 1890, Diary 51; 14 May 1891, Diary 55; 7 June 1892, Diary 56; and 29 January and 3 February 1893, Diary 59, Swan Papers. At this time, Makahs insured their vessels with local businessmen, such as Frank Bartlett, owner of one of Puget Sound's largest mercantile establishments, and J. Katz, a German Jew who had become a successful mercantilist after immigrating to the area.

While sealers such as James embraced certain elements of Anglo technology and business acumen, they did not abandon Makah hunting methods. Instead, they combined the best aspects of both to increase their success in a customary practice.[84] Even in the dangerous and new waters of the Bering Sea, Makahs preferred using customary gear. As along the coast, they conducted the actual seal hunt from specially adapted canoes. Most uses a double-headed harpoon that they hurled with both hands instead of noisier rifles or shotguns.[85] They adapted the harpoon's design, incorporating iron or sheet copper tips instead of mussel shells. Ironically, the reservation's blacksmith, whom the Department of Indian Affairs had hired to support the tribe's agricultural pursuits, became busy in the weeks before the coastal sealing season, fashioning metal tips for spears, lances, and harpoons.[86] By employing traditional gear, Makahs rarely lost seals they struck, whereas Anglo hunters often lost as much as three-fifths. It is not surprising then that few non-Native hunters impressed experienced Makah sealers. For example, Osly, a Makah who had sealed in the Bering Sea three separate times on both Anglo-owned and Makah-owned schooners, stated, "The white hunters who used guns in the Bering Sea were banging away at the seals sometimes all day long, and they would lose a great many of those that they had shot. I do not think that they brought to the schooner one-half of those that they killed."[87] Some Makahs used guns to hunt seals, but only when they worked

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[84] Information for this description of nineteenth-century Makah sealing is taken from a collection of depositions made by Makah sealers and schooner owners on April 27, 1892, as evidence to be used in the Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration. Sealers making statements included Peter Brown, his son Chestoqua, James Claplanhoo, and eighteen others. See "Testimony Taken among the Makah Indians," *Fur Seal Arbitration,* Vol. 3, 376-99.

[85] In 1888, they complained to the Indian agent at Neah Bay that gun-wielding white sealers from San Francisco and Victoria scared seals away from local waters. Powell, *ARCIA*, 1888, 225.

[86] Swan, 24 February 1880, Diary 10, Swan Papers.

[87] "Deposition of Osly, Makah Indian sealer," 27 April 1892, in *Fur Seal Arbitration*, Vol. 3, 391.

from an Anglo-owned schooner in the Bering Sea. Most tellingly, prominent sealers continued using traditional gear during important ceremonies, thereby indicating their enduring cultural value.[88]

Revealing an entrepreneurial spirit, Makahs chartered their vessels for other purposes when they were not sealing. Their ships transported goods around Puget Sound, hauled lumber and dynamite, and salvaged shipwrecks. One even shipped cargo to the Sandwich Islands aboard his vessel. Additionally, Makah schooner owners made their vessels available for family and friends who traveled around the region, such as groups of hop pickers headed to Puyallup.[89] Some invested their profits in other ventures, such as a "full-blooded Indian" who owned a hotel and had saved $1,000 to erect "a more pretentious building for accommodation of his guests," as one surprised Makah agent reported.[90] These investments and ventures highlight the ways indigenous peoples engaged settler-colonialism in the Pacific Northwest.

Makahs bridged the indigenous Northwest Coast and Anglo cultures through capital investments in the extractive economy of the North Pacific. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, indigenous borderland networks continued to be valuable. James maintained kinship ties to communities on Vancouver Island in the customary Northwest Coast manner by attending events hosted by relatives north of the international border and by throwing potlatches. His wide network of kin bestowed clear financial benefits to James, who borrowed cash from family members to purchase his first

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[88] Swan, 31 December 1878, Diary 23, Swan Papers.

[89] There are numerous references to these other purposes in the Swan diaries. For example, see entries for 6 February, 13 July, and 21 August 1887, Diary 41; 23 June and 5 July 1890, Diary 51; 1 December 1890, Diary 53; and 25 January 1892, Diary 56, Swan Papers.

[90] McGlinn, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 19 August 1892; *ARCIA*, 1892, 495. He also noted a second store owned by a Makah.

schooner.[91] Similarly, he fostered ties among traders, Indian agents, and other key members of the Anglo community. One of his family's most important white contacts was James Swan. Although renowned as a "rascally old drunkard" and accused of "debauchery among Indian women," Swan served as teacher, notary, judge, secret agent for the North Pacific Railroad, deputy collector of customs, and Hawaiian consul, which made him a useful family friend.[92] For example, Swan helped James and others sort through the legal issues concerning the purchasing and licensing of Anglo vessels.

James's success as a sealing chief relied on his ability to bring benefits and gains to his people. He continued to host potlatches, spending an estimated $3,000 on one in 1890.[93] Claplanhoo oral histories recollect a much larger one he held in 1897 for his son Jongie's marriage to Lizzie, a Nuu-chah-nulth woman from a chiefly family. James hosted the wedding feast at Pachina, a village on the southern edge of Vancouver Island, and invited twenty-five different tribes from around the *ča·di·* borderland. The Claplanhoo family feasted the guests for more than a week and gave each individual twenty dollars in gold and a number of blankets he had purchased from the Hudson's Bay Company traders in Victoria. Altogether, James spent an estimated $20,000, money he had earned from sealing.[94] Fulfilling his chiefly obligations, he also spread his profits and influence in the Anglo world throughout the greater Makah community. Beyond hiring

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[91] For example, in 1879, James hosted thirty-five canoes of Ditidaht, Clayoquot, and Pacheedaht guests. Swan, 26 and 27 July and 23 August 1879, Diary 10. For borrowing cash, see 3 February 1886, Diary 39, Swan Papers.

[92] Roger Chute, Assistant Fish Economist, to Erna Gunther, Director of the Washington State Museum at University of Washington, 22 April 1937, MCRC, photocopy from original in Ms 15/106, Box 4, Roger Chute Collection, Washington State Historical Society Archives (WSHA), Tacoma; Huntington, *Memoir, 1899*, Beinecke, 127. For a hagiography of Swan "the pioneer," see Lucile McDonald, *Swan among the Indians: Life of James G. Swan, 1818-1900* (Portland: Binfords & Mort, 1972).

[93] McGlinn to CIA, 25 January 1892, No. 3889, Letters Received.

[94] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

Makah crews and captains, he also helped others purchase their own schooners, loaning money and expertise to close deals. For example, James brought in his son-in-law Chestoqua Peterson as part owner of the *Lottie*, and three years later, Chestoqua – probably with help from James – purchased the *Anna Beck*.[95] Although investing in the Anglo economy, James did not abandon his obligations as a chief.[96]

Like his adopted father did for him, James groomed his son Jongie for leadership in the late-nineteenth century Northwest Coast. Born in 1877, Jongie attended the reservation school to learn English and accompanied his father to the growing towns of Puget Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca.[97] When James bought out the reservation trader, he put the teenage Jongie in charge of the store, a move supported by the Indian agent on the grounds that the young Claplanhoo would gain a business education.[98] Most importantly, James also taught Jongie about his chiefly responsibilities. He took Jongie and his other children to potlatches and regional Northwest Coast gatherings.[99] Jongie learned to whale from his father, and he inherited the family's whaling gear that had been

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[95] Swan, 1 March 1889, Diary 46; and 26 and 27 March 1889, Diary 47. James hired another son-in-law, Luke Gilbert, as master of the *Emmett Felitz*. 4 April 1893, Diary 59, Swan Papers.

[96] At least one other historian has claimed that Makah schooner purchases meant that they left behind expensive indigenous practices such as potlatching. See Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 156. He comes to this conclusion based upon the 1893 words of Chief Peter Brown, who claimed that they had abandoned the potlatch so they could buy schooners. Perhaps Chief Brown told the inspector what he wanted to hear, instead. As father of James's son-in-law and business associate Chestoqua Peterson, Chief Brown would have been a familiar participant in these potlatches. Additionally, the McGlinn report that Murray cites has no mention of this interview with Chief Brown. See McGlinn, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 19 July 1893; *ARCIA*, 1893, 325-327. However, this is certainly what McGlinn wanted to believe. See McGlinn to CIA, 25 January 1892, No. 3889, Letters Received.

[97] Swan, 12 June 1885, Diary 38, Swan Papers.

[98] Adie, ["Bill of Sale"]; and McGlinn to CIA, 30 December 1891, No. 609, Letters Received.

[99] For example, see Swan, 11 July 1881, Diary 29, Swan Papers.

passed down for generations.[100] James wanted Makah culture to shape the perspective of his children; but he also wanted them to be conversant in engaging Anglos.

As with Pacific whaling, commercial hunting exacted a catastrophic toll on fur seal numbers during a short period of time. Native and non-Native hunters took pinnipeds from the Pribilof herd, a once-massive population that migrated along the Northwest Coast to their breeding grounds on the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea.[101] After the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, a number of fur companies flocked to the Pribilofs the following year, slaughtering over 300,000 seals on Saint Paul and Saint George islands. Concerned that a continued free-for-all would wipe out the herd, Congress designated the islands a government reserve and restricted hunting to a single lease holder. In 1870, the Alaska Commercial Company (ACC) agreed to pay the U.S. government half-a-million dollars each year for a twenty-year hunting lease, which allowed them to harvest 100,000 fur seals annually. This lucrative arrangement allowed the federal government to net ten million dollars during the lease period, while the ACC paid over twenty-two million dollars to company shareholders, many of whom were congressmen.[102] During the lease period, ACC hunters clubbed dead an average of 98,823 seals each year in their rookeries. In 1890, Congress awarded the second twenty-year lease to the North America Commercial Company (NACC). Demonstrating a commitment to conserving the Pribilof herd, the Department of Treasury limited the

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[100] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

[101] Robin W. Baird, "Status Report on the Northern Fur Seal, Callorhinus Ursinus, in Canada," (Ottawa: Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, 1996), 4-5; Scammon, *The Marine Mammals of the North-Western Coast of North America and the American Whale Fishery*, 141-63.

[102] Jozo Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources, with Special Reference to the North Pacific* (Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1943), 74; D. G. Paterson, "The North Pacific Seal Hunt, 1886-1910: Rights and Regulations," *Explorations in Economic History* 14, no. 2 (1977): 98; Kurkpatrick Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), 114.

annual quota of seals killed on land to 60,000. The NACC harvested well below this number, normally taking between 12,000 and 30,000 seals any given year. In 1892 and 1893, the government limited them to 7,500 seals annually in an effort to relieve hunting pressure on the herd.[103]

Convinced that seals belonged to no one until caught, pelagic sealers plied the North Pacific and Bering Sea, taking seals from the same Pribilof herd from which the ACC and NACC hunters harvested. Most of the pelagic sealers were Canadians who sailed from Victoria, but a small number of Americans from San Francisco, Neah Bay, Port Townsend, and Seattle also hunted the seas. During the ACC's lease from 1870 to 1889, pelagic sealers took less, totaling 269,276 fur seals for an average of just over 14,000 seals a year. However, this situation reversed in the mid-1880s. In 1883, the *San Diego* caught over 2,000 seals in the Bering Sea, which inspired a geographic expansion of the pelagic industry. Two years later, Anglo pelagic hunters employed firearms. By the time the NACC assumed the Pribilof lease, the catch at sea outnumbered the land harvest nearly three to one.[104] With non-Native hunters losing up to three-fifths of what they shot, pelagic sealers probably killed close to a million fur seals in the 1890s. Hunting pressure at sea and in the terrestrial breeding grounds triggered the collapse of the fur seal population.

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[103] Except for the first year of their lease, when they only took about 23,000 seals, in fifteen of the twenty years, ACC hunters exceeded the 100,000 quota by up to 10,000 seals. The 1870 number is from Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources*, 74. 1871-1895 data is from "United States No. 2 (1898): Joint Statement of Conclusions Signed by the British, Canadian, and United States' Delegates Respecting the Fur-Seal Herd Frequenting the Pribyloff Islands in Behring Sea," in Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, *Bering Sea Arbitration Papers*, Vol. 5 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1898), 4. 1896-97 data is from David Starr Jordan, *The Fur Seals and Fur-Seal Islands of the North Pacific Ocean*, Part 1 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1898), microform. These documents also tabulated the pelagic catch for the same years.

[104] From 1890 to 1897, pelagic sealers took 364,203 fur seals (an annual average of 45,525), while the NACC land hunters only caught 135,976 (an annual average of 16,997).

Among the first to notice reduced seal numbers in coastal waters, Makahs employed new technology – modern vessels – to expand their hunting range. Prior to schooner ownership, indigenous sealers ventured farther offshore as seal numbers dwindled; however, this brought them into the ocean where sudden storms could capsize canoes or push them out to sea. For example, seven Makahs died at sea in 1875, and in 1881, on his way from Port Townsend to Honolulu, Captain Calhoun picked up two exhausted Makahs and their canoe more than fifty miles west of Cape Flattery.[105] Schooner ownership enabled sealers to expand their customary activity safely from overhunted local waters to the greater North Pacific and into the Bering Sea.

Makah hunters, however, faced an even greater obstacle, seal conservation backed by the power of the state and the London fur industry. As pelagic sealers, Makah hunters and ship owners such as the Claplanhoos found themselves on the losing side of a diplomatic struggle over the Pribilof seal herd. When he began investing in schooners in 1886, James confronted Treasury Department officials keen on discouraging pelagic sealing in the Bering Sea. That year, he asked for permission to take the *Lottie* to Alaska to hunt sea otters and seals. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury replied that his department would not authorize any sealing permits for anyone other than the lease holder of the Pribilofs, the ACC.[106] That year, James did not take his schooner into the Bering Sea. Fearing that they were getting cut out of sealing in the Bering Sea, however, he and other Makahs repeated the request the following year.[107] When federal officials

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[105] Huntington, *ARCIA*, 1875, 362-64; and Rufus Calhoun, Master of the *Buena Vista*, to CIA, 23 March 1882, No. 10292, Letters Received.

[106] Fairchild to Secretary of the Interior, 5 April 1886, No. 9425, Letters Received.

[107] Powell to CIA, 10 March 1887, No. 7376, Letters Received.

neglected to reply, James took his schooner to the Bering Sea that summer, thereby expanding Makah marine space.[108]

The People of the Cape brought their vessels into the Bering Sea at the same time that the federal government attempted to make the North Pacific into a more "legible" space.[109] From the perspective of the U.S. government administering the District of Alaska, the most efficient way to profit from the seal catch was through the monopolistic leasing system on the Pribilof Islands. To curb the depredations upon the American herd by foreign sealers, U.S. Revenue cutters stopped twenty Canadian schooners from 1886 to 1890. They turned five foreign vessels out of the Bering Sea and confiscated the rest.[110] The U.S. Treasury Department auctioned some of the seized vessels, such as the *Anna Beck*, a Victoria schooner that Chestoqua Peterson, the son of Peter Brown and husband to James Claplanhoo's daughter, bought and renamed the *James G. Swan*.[111] American confiscations of Canadian vessels triggered a twenty-year-long diplomatic struggle between the U.S. and Canada – and eventually Japan and Russia, two other sealing nations – over the Pribilof herd.[112]

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[108] Swan, 7 September 1887, Diary 41, Swan Papers.

[109] I am using "legible" in the way that James Scott applies it: states attempt to arrange populations and resources in ways that simplify functions such as taxation, conscription, and order. See Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2.

[110] "Behring Sea Arbitration Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Constituted under Article 1 of the Treaty Concluded at Washington on the 19th February, 1892, between Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of America," (London: Harrison and Sons, August 1893), in West Coast Agency – Decision of Tribunal of Arbitration Concerning the Bering Sea Award, Indian Affairs (RG 10, Vol. 3873, file 89,849, Part 2), microfilm C-10154, Library and Archives Canada (LAC), Ottawa.

[111] Revenue cutters seized the *Anna Beck* in 1887, and Peterson bought her two years later when U.S. marshals auctioned her off with three other schooners seized in Alaska waters. Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 71. See also Swan, 26 March 1889, Diary 47, Swan Papers.

[112] For an overview of this, see Paterson, "The North Pacific Seal Hunt"; Briton C. Busch, *The War against the Seals: A History of the North American Seal Fishery* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's, 1985); Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*; and Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 105-64.

The Revenue cutters also targeted Makah vessels in the Bering Sea. Although Claplanhoo's *Lottie* narrowly escaped the cutters in early July 1889, she stayed in Alaskan waters for the summer and returned to Neah Bay at the end of August with 600 sealskins for a profit of $3,600.[113] Peterson's newly purchased *James G. Swan*, however, was not as lucky; the Revenue cutter *Rush* seized her with 190 sealskins at the end of July. Fearing that the loss of the schooner and the summer's work would be a great hardship, Peterson pled ignorance of the law, arguing that he believed that the Revenue cutters had been in the Bering Sea to protect American schooners.[114] In previous years, the few Anglo-American-owned vessels the Revenue cutters had seized had been either released or cleared of all charges by Treasury Department officials, a fact that infuriated Canadian sealers.[115] At the urging of W. L. Powell, the Indian agent at Neah Bay, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asked the Attorney General's office to provide legal protection to the schooner's owner and Makah crew. But the Office of the Attorney General refused to offer Indians legal protection.[116] Unlike Anglo-American owners of vessels, Makah schooner owners suffered prosecution from the federal government.

Peterson then hired James Swan as his attorney to help settle the case with the government. Swan petitioned the Secretary of the Treasury on Peterson's behalf, but the Department declined to intervene in the case.[117] When Judge Hanford of the U.S. District Court decided against Peterson and ordered him to pay a $350 fine and nearly $100 in

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[113] Swan, 31 July and 31 August 1889, Diary 48, Swan Papers.

[114] George H. Shields, Assistant Attorney General, to Secretary of Interior, 21 December 1889, enclosed in letter from Secretary of Interior to CIA, 21 December 1889, No. 36992, Letters Received.

[115] Good examples of these include the *San Diego* and the *Sierra*. See Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 62.

[116] Powell to CIA, 21 August 1889, No. 24364; Shields to Secretary of Interior, 21 December 1889, enclosed in letter from Secretary of Interior to CIA, 21 December 1889, No. 36992, Letters Received.

[117] Swan, 21 September 1889, Diary 48, Swan Papers.

court costs, Peterson paid to get the vessel released immediately, and Swan filed an objection. He argued that the Bering Sea was an open sea and that no law of Congress could make it a *mare clausum* (closed sea). He told the court that its ruling had made Peterson "suffer hardship and consequent loss," and while the schooner owner would like to appeal the ruling, he lacked the financial means to do so. More importantly, Swan wanted the District Court to forward Peterson's case as a claim for consideration by the Court of Arbitration in Paris, which would be adjudicating illegal seizures of Canadian schooners by U.S. Revenue cutters.[118] Agent Powell concurred, asking the Department of Indian Affairs to inform him on how Makahs could file for their share of the $470,000 award.[119] However, the Department ignored this request because the Tribunal Award only applied to seized British vessels.[120] As nations grappled with settling conservation issues on the international stage, diplomats not only shut out indigenous investors from a profitable industry, but they also denied them compensation opportunities.

At the same time, Makahs encountered local courts and judicial officials who were increasingly hostile to Native sealers and indigenous vessel owners. For example, in November 1893, Koatslanhoo (Makah) leased the *Mary Parker* to Captain Bangs of Seattle for coastal trading. Bangs insured the schooner and cargo in his name, scuttled it,

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[118] Swan, 19 April 1890, Diary 51. Swan noted in his diary that Judge Hanford adjudicated the case. See 4 April 1890, Diary 50, Swan Papers. For Swan's filed objection, see "Exceptions to the Ruling of the Court in *U.S. v. Schooner* James G. Swan," 7 April 1892, enclosed in letter from Powell to CIA, 13 November 1893, No. 43351, Letters Received. Ironically, Swan's logic on the inability of Congress to turn the Bering Sea into a *mare clausum* aligned with the decision handed down by the Paris Tribunal in 1894.

[119] Powell to CIA, 13 November 1893, No. 43351, Letters Received.

[120] During the Tribunal's hearings in Paris, arbitrators made it clear that they would not consider claims of British-licensed vessels owned by U.S. citizens. They would only determine claims to be valid if British citizens owned these vessels. See Charles H. Tupper to Foster, 26 May 1893, Enclosure 1 in No. 65, and John W. Foster to Tupper, 27 May 1893, Enclosure 2 in No. 65, "United States, No. 11 (1893): Papers Relating to the Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration," in *Bering Sea Arbitration Papers*, Vol. 5, (London: Harrison and Sons, 1893), 50-51.

and pocketed the insurance money. When Koatslanhoo sued Bangs, the court acquitted the latter because he employed "able counsel," and the former recovered nothing.[121] In 1895, Judge Hanford – the same official who had decided against Chestoqua Peterson several years earlier in the case of the *James G. Swan* – refused to hear the case of a white sealer, Henry Anderson, who had murdered a Makah, Philip Brown, as the two divided their catch of seals at Ozette. Hanford referred the case to the local court, which released the white murderer.[122] With growing numbers of Anglo Americans in the new state, officials were more interested in privileging whites over Indians.

But even in this settler-colonial regime that was growing increasingly hostile to Indians, not everything impinged on the People of the Cape. In 1894, the U.S. and U.K. governments agreed to follow a modified version of the recommendations of the Tribunal of Arbitration in Paris. The Paris Tribunal decided against the U.S. claims that the Bering Sea was a *mare clausum* (closed sea) and that seals swimming in the North Pacific were exclusive government property. The Tribunal, however, did make several recommendations to conserve the Pribilof herd. They proposed a closed season from May 1 to July 31 in the North Pacific and Bering Sea and prohibited firearms and other explosive devices in the hunting of seals.[123] These conservation measures had an ambivalent effect on Makahs.

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[121] Powell, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 9 August 1894; *ARCIA*, 1894, 316; and Swan, 9 December and 30 December 1893, Diary 59, Swan Papers.

[122] See William H. Brinker, U.S. Attorney, to John C. Keenan, 26 October 1895, and [Newspaper Clipping, 1895], enclosed in letter from Keenan, U.S. Indian Agent at Neah Bay Agency, to CIA, 1 November 1895, No. 45552, Letters Received.

[123] The closed season covered the Pacific north of 35°N latitude and east of 180° longitude. Other Tribunal recommendations included a sixty-mile no-sealing zone around St. Paul and St. George Island and a new requirement for the licensing of sealing vessels. See Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 122. See also Paterson, "The North Pacific Seal Hunt," 103.

The closed season caused some trouble for indigenous sealers. Although required to notify schooners of the beginning of the closed season, Revenue cutters passed the Makah fleet for weeks without telling them of the upcoming date. Instead, in June the Revenue cutter *Grant* seized two Makah schooners, the *Puritan* and the *C.C. Perkins*, weeks after they had reportedly sealed during the closed season. Citing the fact that the cutters ignored Anglo-American vessels in Puget Sound ports, even though everyone knew that they had sealed illegally in the Bering Sea, Agent Powell begged Captain Tozier of the *Grant* to release the schooners. It appeared that the cutters had unfairly targeted Makah schooners once again.[124] The cutters released the vessels only after Swan petitioned the Secretary of the Treasury on behalf of the Makah owners.[125] Makah sealers lobbied federal officials for a partial exemption to the closed season because it prohibited sealing during May, one of the best months for marine conditions off the Washington coast. Although their agent and the Acting Secretary of the Interior supported the position, the government failed to grant an exemption.[126]

The Paris Tribunal's 1894 prohibition on firearms, however, worked in favor of indigenous sealers because they alone were proficient in the use of spears. After learning about the 1894 regulations, a local newspaper noted jealously, "Ten schooners for sealing voyages are being fitted out by the Makat [*sic*] Indians of Neah Bay. The fleet will be worth over $20,000, and will be entirely owned, officered and manned by aborigines. As the regulations as laid down in the Paris tribunal forbid the use of firearms in sealing, the

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[124] Powell to Capt. D. F. Tozier of the [Revenue] Steamer Grant, 4 June 1894, enclosed in letter from Powell to CIA, 4 June 1894, No. 22501, Letters Received.

[125] James Claplanhoo owned a share of the *Puritan*. Swan, 9 December 1893, Diary 59, and 26 June and 15 July 1894, Diary 60, Swan Papers.

[126] Powell, *ARCIA*, 1894, 316; Acting Secretary of the Interior to CIA, 4 October 1894, No. 38575, Letters Received.

Indians will have a decided advantage in the industry, since at handling the spear they are experts."[127] Prefacing an attitude that would resurface in many U.S. treaty rights debates in the twentieth century, this Anglo commentator objected to the "special rights" the regulations appeared to confer upon Indians.

Under the new conservation regulations, Makah sealers did very well. During the first year of the firearms prohibition, Makahs caught over 2,500 seals off the coast of Washington.[128] In 1895, Jongie took the *Deeahks* to the Bering Sea and brought back nearly 600 skins after two months of hunting.[129] According to the Makah agent, this was one of the best years for Makah sealers, who earned over $44,000 during several months of work.[130] The following year, the Claplanhoos hired Henry Hudson, an experienced Makah sealer, to captain the schooner for a run to the Bering Sea, which netted them over 500 skins.[131] These returns compared well to those taken from the Bering Sea in the years prior to the Paris Tribunal's regulations. This success demonstrated to the federal government and the NACC, the new lessee of the Pribilof Islands, that the firearms prohibition was no disadvantage to experienced indigenous pelagic sealers. Further steps were necessary for conserving the herd.

The late-1890s was a critical turning point for Makah sealers such as the Claplanhoos. Backed by powerful Republican allies, the NACC pushed for legislation in late 1897, which prohibited all U.S. citizens from pelagic sealing in the North Pacific and

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[127] [Newspaper clipping, excerpt], *Daily Columbian* (New Westminster), 9 December 1893, West Coast Agency – Decision of Tribunal of Arbitration Concerning the Bering Sea Award.

[128] Powell, *ARCIA*, 1894, 316. Because Powell wrote this report about a week after the Bering Sea season had opened, these numbers must only reflect the coastal catch from the spring season.

[129] Swan, 7 October 1895, Diary 61, Swan Papers.

[130] Keenan, "Report of Neah Bay Agent," 1 August 1896; *ARCIA*, 1896, 313.

[131] Swan, 7 October 1896, Diary 62, Swan Papers.

Bering Sea.[132] Coastal Indians would be exempt, but they could only seal for subsistence purposes and from canoes with spears. From the perspective of the federal government and NACC, this legislation was necessary because the pelagic catch from 1890 to 1896 was nearly three times higher than the land catch, and pelagic hunters killed more than they caught. While the pelagic catch did begin to diminish from 1898 to 1909, it still remained high due to the increasing numbers of Japanese and Russian sealers in the Bering Sea.[133] Ironically, the new law defined Makahs as citizens, who could therefore be prohibited from sealing, while larger government policies and actions limited Indian citizenship rights and attempted to keep them as federal wards.[134]

In December 1897, the Claplanhoos led a petition effort for an exemption to the impending prohibition.[135] The formal, typed petition and the language expressed in this document illustrated the way Makahs had adapted certain Anglo characteristics within their own cultural framework. The petitioners began by connecting their contemporary

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[132] Paterson, "The North Pacific Seal Hunt," 101; Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources*, 88. The principal shareholder in the NACC, D. O. Mills, had strong ties to the Republican Party. His political connections helped to secure the twenty-year lease in 1890, and they probably served the NACC well when the Republicans took back the White House and won strong majorities in Congress in the 1896 election. Big businesses such as the NACC supported McKinley and contributed to his victory, so it should come as no surprise that in the first year of his presidency, McKinley backed and signed a law protecting the monopolistic NACC at the expense of small sealing operations such as the Claplanhoos. For more on McKinley-era Republican politics, see Robert W. Cherny, *American Politics in the Gilded Age, 1868-1900* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1997), 94-138. See also Eric Rauchway, *Murdering Mckinley: The Making of Theodore Roosevelt's America*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2003).

[133] From 1898 to 1909, the NACC reported 206,324 sealskins, for an average of 17,193 per year; the pelagic catch for this period was 257,786 sealskins, for an average of 21,482 per year. During this period, the number of Canadian vessels engaged in pelagic sealing plummeted from 31 to 4, while the number of Japanese vessels increased from 13 in 1897 to 25 in 1910.Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources*, 89-90; and Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 142.

[134] For more on the tension between citizenship and ward status specific to Washington Indians in the early twentieth century, see Harmon, *Indians in the Making*, 160-89. See also Francis Paul Prucha, *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*, Abridged ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 272-73; and Frederick E. Hoxie, *A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 211-38.

[135] James Claplanhoo, Capt. John Claplanhoo, et. al., Petition, [December] 1897, No. 53731, Letters Received.

commercial sealing activities to cultural traditions: seals had always furnished them with clothing and food. Then they invoked their specific 1855 treaty "right" to take seals forever and to never have this right limited by the government. Objecting to the meager exemption allowing Indians to seal from canoes, they were concerned that "Permission to hunt seal in open canoe, 50 miles from shore is but permission to go to certain death." Additionally, they drew upon assimilation rhetoric to demonstrate the progress they had made through sealing: all their "capital" was invested in schooners and appliances for sealing, and it was a "trade" they understood very well. Seeking the attention of fiscally conservative officials, the petitioners pointed out that they supported themselves without government aid through this industry. The petitioners also cast themselves as Christians, arguing that "God gave us the Seals for our sustenance." Finally, they attempted to appeal to a sense of fairness:

> We think we ask only what is justice and equity is due us. You call us your wards and the care of our interest is in your hands, to prohibit us from Sealing would take us our livlihood [*sic*], and destroy all our capital which is invested in boats and appliances for Sealing. The Misery and want which would come to us would be such as would come to your people if from them were taken at once lands and tools and stock and factories and mines and they were left to face ruin and starvation.

Pelagic sealing defined them not only as Makah but also as productive members of a modern, American society. In their minds, the Makah right to seal was no different from a miner's right to extract ores, a rancher's right to raise livestock, or a factory owner's right to manufacture goods.

Despite the concerted efforts of the Claplanhoos and others, the 1897 law that prohibited pelagic sealing by U.S. citizens ended this commercial industry for the People of the Cape. Shortly after the law's passage, Revenue cutters steamed into Neah Bay and confiscated the tribe's largest schooners, including three owned by James and Jongie. The cutters towed a dozen Makah ships to the nearby Life-Saving Service station at the

western edge of Neah Bay, beaching them there where they remained until storms and waves destroyed them.[136] Ironically, part of the station was located on Claplanhoo land that Swan had recommended that the Department of Interior use for this coastal outpost in 1877. It must have been especially galling for James and Jongie to see their vessels wasting away just yards from family property.[137]

Those owning smaller schooners fared slightly better. Some Makahs sold them, but with pelagic sealing outlawed, these ships sold under market value. Others ran afoul of U.S. and Canadian officials when they tried to seal surreptitiously.[138] As they did after whaling was no longer a viable industry, many turned to another customary subsistence and commercial practice, fishing. Within a year of the prohibition, former sealers such as the Claplanhoos outfitted the smallest schooners for the halibut business and shipped their catch to Seattle.[139]

Others turned to indigenous borderland networks to prolong their sealing careers by looking north for employment on Canadian ships. In his first report for the new century, the Makah agent complained of ten "educated, young" Makahs who went to Victoria and shipped out on British schooners to go sealing in the Bering Sea, despite his

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[136] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview. A precursor to the U.S. Coast Guard, the Life-Saving Service established the Neah Bay Station in 1877 on reservation land the Department of the Interior let the service use. See "Station Neah Bay, Washington," January 2001 (available at http://www.uscg.mil/history/stations/NEAHBAY.pdf), U.S. Coast Guard Website [accessed June 2009].

[137] John Claplanhoo had complained to Swan about this situation in 1889, and John purchased part of it back from the Life-Saving Service in 1891. See Swan, 4 April 1877, Diary 22; 18 May 1889, Diary 47; 15 June 1891, Diary 55, Swan Papers. Decades later, the grandchildren of Jongie played in the rotting hulks of abandoned Claplanhoo schooners. Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

[138] Morse, *ARCIA*, 1897, 291-92.

[139] Chestoqua Peterson to Swan, 5 May 1899, Series B.1.2.1, James Gilchrist Swan Papers [from the University of British Columbia Library Special Collections and University Archives] (UW Microfilm A8576, reel 4) (hereafter cited as UBC Swan Papers).

explicit prohibition on doing so.[140] From his perspective, the fact that they were "educated" meant that they knew they were breaking the law. Ironically, however, their education enabled them to read the shipping articles Canadian schooner-owners in Victoria required Indians to sign, thereby making them desired crewmembers.[141]

The continued decline of the Pribilof fur seal herd at the hands of foreign sealers – and the desire of the federal government and the London fur industry to protect their long-term profits via conservation – resulted in the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911, the first such international treaty to conserve marine mammals.[142] A year earlier, the federal government declined to renew the NACC's lease of the Pribilof Islands, thereby taking over the monopoly of hunting seals on land. Through an elaborate financial arrangement, Japan, Russia, and the U.S., countries that held seal rookeries, agreed to pay pelagic sealers a percentage of future annual returns. The majority of these payments went to Japanese and Canadian sealers. The U.S. Department of Treasury bought out the sealing fleets of these two nations for $200,000 each.

Funds for American and, most especially, Makah sealers were significantly smaller and more difficult to secure. By 1911, the American sealing fleet no longer existed, and compensating the Japanese and Canadian fleets commanded the attention of the negotiators of the Fur Seal Convention. Politicians made no plans to compensate Makah schooner owners because they assumed that they only hunted from canoes and for

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[140] Morse to CIA, 2 July 1900, No. 32541, Letters Received.

[141] For the use of shipping articles in Victoria, see documents in File 2254, Part 1: Sealing – efforts of US vessels to enlist Indian crews & protests of Victoria Sealing Company against same, 1895-99, Department of Marine and Fisheries, Documents Relating to B.C., 1895-1914 (GR-2908) [microfilm reel B-11112], BCA.

[142] For a complete examination of the diplomatic efforts to bring about this convention, see Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 105-64. See also Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources.*

subsistence. In the eyes of non-Native diplomats, Indians had lost nothing because the 1894, 18997, and 1911 regulations, laws, and conventions had enshrined subsistence hunting rights.[143] Informed by the stereotype of the Native hunter who only kills enough to feed himself and his family, non-Natives ignored Makah investments in the North Pacific sealing industry.

However, government officials in contact with Makahs appeared to have known better. After passage of the 1897 law prohibiting pelagic sealing, a "Navy man" had promised Jongie Claplanhoo and other schooner owners that the government would compensate them for their losses.[144] Jongie followed the diplomatic battle over pelagic sealing in the Bering Sea because he hoped to recover his family's financial losses. As a regular and literate visitor to Victoria, Jongie learned about the Anglo-Canadian position in local papers and from other ship owners. Canadians refused to consider any cessation of pelagic sealing unless the U.S. government would buy them out. In 1899, Jongie wrote to James Swan, seeking information on a government plan to buy out the Victoria sealing fleet at $150 per ton, arguing that "we have all the rights to sell our Schooner the same."[145] Officials repeated these promises years later. In 1919, Schuyler Colfax wrote to federal officials, reminding them of these government promises. He told them that "Government officials" in 1911 had promised that Makah sealers could continue to hunt seals commercially, taking up to 4,000 seals annually. Additionally, these same officials

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[143] Under the subsistence right to hunt, some coastal Indians did continue sealing into the twentieth century. In 1926, for example, the Taholah Superintendent authenticated 1,035 sealskins from Makah and Quilleute sealers hunting from canoes with "primitive" gear; however, in 1934, he authenticated only twelve skins. See Nicholson, Taholah Superintendent, to Western Weekly, Inc., 10 September 1934, File 927.0 Seals and Sealskins – Reports, etc. (Original Neah Bay Agency), Box 171: Decimal File 921.5-936, Taholah Indian Agency, Taholah, Washington, BIA, NARA – Seattle.

[144] Murray, *The Vagabond Fleet*, 160.

[145] Jangi James to Swan, 24 February 1899, Series B.1.2.3, UBC Swan Papers.

had told them that if they could not hunt commercially, the government would compensate the tribe at this amount. Because Makahs had never received any compensation, Colfax wanted permission to use his small, nine-ton *Elsie Allen* as a "tender" to support eight sealers who would hunt from canoes and with spears. In reply, the Department of Indian Affairs, informed by the Commissioner of Fisheries, stated that it could not grant Colfax the right to use his schooner to seal commercially.[146]

Although Makah schooner owners could sue for compensation, expensive lawsuits required years of patience and did not guarantee success. For example, thirty-one years after the passage of the 1897 law that ended all pelagic sealing, Chestoqua Peterson's widow received an estimated $20,000 settlement from the government on a sealing claim she filed. However, the lawsuit cost her thousands of dollars, which required her to borrow $1,500 from the local trader and over $500 from other individuals.[147] Despite decades of effort, Jongie never secured any compensation for the loss of his property, an unresolved complaint that still angers his descendents.[148] During the first half of the twentieth century, few Makahs had the money to pursue these claims. Any cash they had was invested in gas-powered fishing boats and other expensive, modern gear used for halibut and salmon fishing.

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[146] Schuyler Colfax to Frank K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior, 9 December 1919; Colfax to Cato Sells, CIA, 9 December 1919; E. B. Meritt, Assistant Commissioner [of Indian Affairs] to Colfax, 8 January 1920; and Smith, Commissioner of Fisheries, to CIA, 30 December 1919, "[Folder] 106911-1919, Neah Bay, 115," CCF.

[147] Raymond H. Bitney, Superintendent of Neah Bay Agency, to CIA, 20 January 1932, "[Folder] 69742-1931, Neah Bay, 155," CCF.

[148] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

As Makahs still recall, the U.S. prohibition on pelagic sealing was a turning point for the tribe and transformed them from a wealthy to an impoverished people. Samuel Morse, the Neah Bay agent in 1899, reported on the tribe's impoverished condition:

> There was a time once when they had plenty, when whale oil brought a good price and they were permitted to kill seal; then they had money and had everything they wanted that money could buy. At that time they owned several schooners and made regular trips to Alaska sealing, and were very successful. In their native canoes they went many miles out in the Pacific and killed whales of great size, and now the market for whale oil is gone. They are prohibited from sealing, their schooners were seized and sold.[149]

Commercial pelagic sealing continued for another fourteen years by Japanese and Russian vessels and the occasional Canadian schooner. Sealing also continued on land and controlled by the U.S. government. Conservation efforts indeed saved the fur seal species and allowed for continued systematic exploitation.[150] However, conservation diplomacy cut out the People of the Cape from these profits, even though sealing was a customary commercial activity protected by the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay. They could hunt seals, but now only for subsistence purposes and by using "Native" gear.

Conclusion: The Meaning of Makah Success and the Price of Poverty

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the People of the Cape combined new opportunities and technologies with customary practices, which allowed them to remain a successful and influential people in the borderland. Makahs continued to benefit from the wealth of the sea and from networks that crossed marine space to connect them to other Native and non-Native communities. Families such as the Claplanhoos engaged markets of exchange and made significant capital investments in

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[149] Morse, "Report of Agent for Neah Bay Agency," 21 July 1899; *ARCIA*, 1899, 356.

[150] By 1941, the Pribilof herd had rebounded, increasing in population by an order of ten. Tomasevich, *International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources*, 107. As environmental historian Kurkpatrick Dorsey concludes, "the end of pelagic sealing had given the fur seal a new life." Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy*, 162.

North Pacific extractive industries. Not only did this strategy make Claplanhoos and others wealthy, but it also enabled them to strengthen their identity as Makahs in the face of mounting pressure from U.S. assimilation policies.

The success of the Claplanhoos and others convinced a variety of government officials, including Indian agents on the frontline of assimilation, that Makah methods worked and should receive support. Initially, federal agents tried to civilize the People of the Cape by turning them into farmers, but both the landscape of the Neah Bay reservation and Makahs frustrated assimilation efforts. Nearly every Indian agent posted to this agency commented on the unsuitability of the reservation for agriculture. For example, Agent Willoughby described the reservation as, "Mountainous and densely wooded, with a climate proverbial for its moisture, its scarcity of game, limited tracts of land fit for cultivation, and poorness of its soil... a country scarcely desirable for cultivation." On the other hand, he did note that the wealth of the ocean made it "all that can be desired" for a "fishing people."[151] Environmental realities and successful Makahs appeared to create a difficult situation for agents such as Willoughby. On the one hand, agents championed assimilation goals, such as "civilizing" Indians through farming. Yet many reservations – especially the Makah reservation at Neah Bay – were unsuited for agriculture. Moreover, Makahs who accumulated substantial wealth through customary practices – yet in very modern ways – made the case for alternative approaches.

The active participation of Makahs in marine markets of exchange integrated them into Anglo society better than agriculture ever could. Their maritime profits convinced some agents, such as the Reverend Charles Huntington, to recommend to the

[151] Willoughby, *ARCIA*, 1882, 155.

Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the government should civilize the Makah by encouraging fisheries and teaching trades that would support customary marine practices.[152] Considering the cultural characteristics of the People of the Cape and their environment, Lieutenant Hays, another Indian agent, put it best when he wrote, "It would be worse than folly to attempt to change these expert fishermen into a tribe of farmers."[153]

Many Anglos believed that customary Makah marine pursuits were legitimate markers of civilization. In 1885, the agency teacher suspended school for two weeks so the older boys could go sealing.[154] One Indian agent lauded Makah mariners for the benefits their labors brought the nation:

> The products of the waters around Cape Flattery, which amount to many thousand dollars annually, would be lost to the country were it not for these Indians, as there are perhaps no other people who would or could take their places and obtain a support as they do, and beside produce annually what is worth thousands of dollars to the several interests of our country.[155]

When families such as the Claplanhoos combined this with capital investments in schooners and trading posts, agents saw what they wanted to see – they believed that the Makah were distancing themselves from their traditional, "savage" ways.[156] Additionally, Makah labor connected these North Pacific resources to regional and national economic centers, thereby bringing them safely within the umbrella of the U.S.[157]

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[152] Huntington, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 17 August 1876, *ARCIA*, 1876, 133-135.

[153] J. H. Hays, "No. 4, Annual Report of Lieutenant J. H. Hays, United States Army, Agent, Neah Bay Agency," 12 September 1870, *ARCIA*, 1870, 36.

[154] Daniel W. Quedessa, [Makah], to A. W. Smith, April 1885, Smith Papers (microfilm roll 3).

[155] Gibson, *ARCIA*, 1873, 308.

[156] McGlinn's letter to the Commissioner exemplifies this. See McGlinn to CIA, 25 January 1892, No. 3889, Letters Received.

[157] Historian Sheila McManus makes a similar argument, stating that the railroads in the Alberta-Montana borderland linked resources of the Medicine Line country with Eastern cities and ports, thereby bringing

A few Anglos even concluded that Makahs were more successful than most whites. At the close of the century, Hazard Stevens, son of Isaac Stevens, reflected back on the last four decades of Washington's history, declaring:

> In their remote, rocky stronghold, protected by the strong arm of the government extended over them by this treaty, but depending upon the sea and their own efforts for a livelihood, they have prospered greatly, putting up vast quantities of fish, furs, and oil for market; and there are few white communities that have so much wealth per capita, or wealth so evenly distributed, as these industrious and manly Indians.[158]

In this passage, Hazard emphasized his perspective on the legacy of his father's treaties, namely that they had protected the territory's Indians and allowed them to prosper. However, his assessment of Makah success reveals that many in the state recognized the important contributions made by the People of the Cape during the state's development.

Makah success also allowed them to confront allotment, the cornerstone of assimilation efforts, by adhering to their marine identity. In 1890, when asked about dividing the reservation into individual agricultural plots, they expressed no interest. Instead, two years later they pushed for – and received – ten-acre allotments, each with frontage on Neah Bay, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Pacific Ocean, or one of the rivers flowing into these saltwater bodies. Individuals wanted a "fair distribution of the most desirable location on the water front," according to the Indian agent.[159] Makahs rejected the "imaginative geography" that an abstract federal perspective attempted to create across all reservations.[160] Unfortunately, a subsequent agent voided these allotments after

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them into the respective national orbits. See McManus, *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 55.

[158] Hazard Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens*, Vol. 1 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), 477.

[159] For their initial lack of interest in allotment, see McGlinn, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 14 August 1890, *ARCIA*, 1890, 222-225. For Makah support of ten-acre, waterfront allotments, see McGlinn, *ARCIA*, 1892, 494.

[160] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Anniversary ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 54.

removing the previous agent for corruption charges. The 1907 agricultural allotments angered many Makahs who had been pleased with the earlier division of the reservation.[161] But in the 1890s, the People of the Cape repudiated farming as the only path to civilization and rejected the stipulation that reservation lands should be allotted for agricultural purposes. By asserting their identity as a marine people, Makahs articulated culturally-specific alternatives that combined customary practices, characteristics of their unique identity, and new opportunities presented by settler-colonialism. The success of the Claplanhoos and other Makah families convinced agents that this combination could work.

Makah success even convinced off-reservation bureaucrats that the sea best supported the tribe. One federal inspector who visited the reservation in 1890 concluded that "little can be done" to encourage farming, horticulture, and raising cattle at Cape Flattery.[162] Echoing three decades of complaints made by Indian agents assigned to Neah Bay, he argued that the constant mists and fogs, seasonal temperature swings, and high rainfall inhibited federal efforts at turning Makahs into farmers. Instead, he advised that these Indians must continue relying on marine resources because the profits provide them with a "great deal of money." Subsequent federal officials in the Interior Department came to the same conclusions, arguing that "There seems little hope of the Indians doing anything in the way of agriculture" and that they "[get] along very well" from sealing and

[161] Claude C. Covey, "Report of Neah Bay Agency," 26 August 1903, *ARCIA*, 1903, 333.

[162] Daniel Dorchester, Superintendent of Indian Schools, to CIA, 4 October 1890, No. 31461, Letters Received.

fishing.[163] Makah success through customary marine practices convinced numerous officials to support a non-agricultural strategy for this tribe during the assimilation era.

However, by the close of the nineteenth century, the situation for the People of the Cape had changed. Their newly impoverished condition strengthened the position of agents of assimilation bent on recasting "these expert fishermen into a tribe of farmers" during the twentieth century. As oral histories recall, the end of the nineteenth century was a turning point: Congress made it illegal for Makahs to engage in commercial pelagic sealing, Revenue cutters confiscated the best Makah vessels, and the people became poor. Former sealers and whalers even tried their hand at farming because customary marine practices that had made them wealthy were no longer tenable.[164] Restrictions on maritime pursuits discouraged Makahs from living at some ancestral villages on the coast. [165] Working in concert with federal policies requiring Makah children to attend school at Neah Bay village, these restrictions resulted in families relocating from distant villages to where agents could better control them. The days of suspending school to allow Makah boys to chase sea mammals were over. Instead, teachers at the Neah Bay school focused on a curriculum taught at Indian schools across the nation, teaching Makah children farming skills, making and repairing harnesses, blacksmithing, horse shoe making, wood cutting, silversmithing, sewing, keeping house, and staying clean. Increased missionary efforts and a rigid government education system altered customary social and spiritual

[163] Acting Secretary of the Interior Department to CIA, 4 October 1894, No. 38575, Letters Received.

[164] Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview.

[165] "Special Meeting of the Makah Tribe and Council," 23 January 1956, Folder 2, Box 2, Erna Gunther Papers, 1871-1962 (accession 0614-004), UWSC.

systems, especially those tied to the ocean.[166] By the 1920s, Makahs felt that "the power of Indian agent [*sic*] was law," and aggressive agents forbade the People of the Cape from speaking their language and engaging in customary songs, dances, and other cultural activities. When holding potlatches, Makahs went to distant villages or Tatoosh Island, posting sentries to warn of the arrival of the agent.[167]

At a glance, the example of Makah whalers and sealers might resemble a narrative of declension common to most histories of American Indians. However, their story complicates many usual assumptions. The example of the Claplanhoos overturns the stereotype that Indians are "traditional" and have no role in a "modern" world. Individuals such as John, James, Jongie, and others combined modern opportunities and technologies with customary marine practices to maintain a Makah identity. They purchased schooners, trading posts, and hotels and deposited money in local banks. With new equipment, they expanded their marine space into the Bering Sea. At the same time, they hosted extravagant potlatches, used their influence and money to help other Makahs, and passed on their cultural values to sons and daughters. During the first four decades after the 1855 Treaty of Neah Bay, many Makahs profited. They used their success to blunt the harshest edges of federal assimilation policies, even shaping some to fit their unique maritime needs.

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[166] Jim Terry (Stanford University), Ed Claplanhoo, Ione Bowechop, and Vivian Lawrence, "Analysis of Schools and Education on Our Makah People," [1973], Folder 21: Makah Indian Nation, 1975, Box 3, Erna Gunther Papers, 1887-1980 (accession 0614-002), UWSC. See also Charlotte June Coté, "'It's Who We Are': Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002), 93; and Elizabeth Colson, *The Makah Indians: A Study of an Indian Tribe in Modern American Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), 18-21.

[167] Terry, et. al., "Analysis of Schools and Education on Our Makah People." See also Claplanhoo-Martin and Claplanhoo Interview and McCarty Interview.

Makah whalers and sealers also confronted significant environmental and legal challenges during these four decades. As whale numbers decreased, they scaled back commercial whaling to a moderate level that they could sustain into the twentieth century. When seals became harder to find in local waters, they took to the high seas in larger vessels. They wrote letters, signed petitions, and hired lawyers to protect rights they had secured for themselves in the treaty. Once again, they pursued strategies that adapted modern opportunities and technologies within their own cultural framework.

But Makah sealers found themselves on the losing side of a battle over a valuable marine resource. The federal government and the London fur industry used conservation measures to cut smaller, independent pelagic sealers out of a profitable industry. The wasteful practices of gun-wielding, non-Native pelagic sealers made the entire industry an easy target on the international stage of conservation diplomacy. At the same time, regulations, laws, and conventions redefined the role of indigenous sealers by limiting them to the stereotype of the Native subsistence hunter. This codified the assumption that indigenous peoples could not be modern and resulted in denying most Makah sealers compensation rights that were extended to non-Native sealers.

Just how "anomalous" were the Makah of the second half of the nineteenth century? Other indigenous peoples also thrived in environments that non-Natives found hostile and challenging. The story of the Claplanhoos and other Makah whalers and sealers forces one to set aside the assumption that American Indians cannot be prosperous and dynamic on their own terms. Instead, they exemplify the larger narrative of indigenous peoples who engaged modernity within their own cultural framework and to

pursue their own ends.[168] Perhaps the only anomaly was the way in which some government officials perceived the Makah as so different from other American Indians.

[168] Recent scholarship is beginning to explore this new narrative. For a North American perspective, see Philip J. Deloria, *Indians in Unexpected Places* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); Raibmon, *Authentic Indians*; Morris W. Foster, *Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991); Hosmer and O'Neill, *Native Pathways*. Scholars outside the North American context have also developed this narrative. For example, see Petrie, *Chiefs of Industry*.

Conclusion

We Don't Want a Wonder Bread Culture

From the bow of the *Hummingbird*, Theron Parker looked over at the dead whale, the first hunted by the People of the Cape in the last seventy-one years. At that moment, he and his crew focused on securing the carcass and towing it around Cape Flattery to Neah Bay where the rest of the tribe waited expectantly. Over the next several weeks, Parker and others recognized the magnitude of what they had done. Reviving an active whaling practice had benefited the tribe in many ways. The 1999 hunt generated interest in other customary marine practices, revitalized Makah culture, and reconnected elders and youth by providing a desire to pass down – and to receive – teachings and tribal history. It demonstrated the continued cultural importance of tribally specific hunting practices and helped move Makah culture from the museum back onto the water. Even the racist backlash against Makah whaling had positive consequences because it encouraged some to take more notice of their heritage, something they had ignored before.[1]

A decade after the event, Makahs still credited the 1999 hunt for bringing together the community.[2] As tribal elder Dale Johnson stated, "Events happen when you get a

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[1] These benefits are summarized from a variety of sources, including Karen Samantha Barton, "'Red Waters': Contesting Marine Space as Indian Place in the U.S. Pacific Northwest" (Dissertation, University of Arizona, 2000); Jennifer Sepez, "Political and Social Ecology of Contemporary Makah Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Shellfish Collecting Practices" (Dissertation, University of Washington, 2001); Charlotte June Coté, "'It's Who We Are': Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling" (Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002); and Ann M. Renker, "Whale Hunting and the Makah Tribe: A Needs Statement," International Whaling Commission Report 59-ASW9, 2007). See also Dave Sones, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 19 May 2009, Makah Cultural and Research Center (MCRC), Neah Bay, WA.

[2] Dale Johnson and John McCarty, interviews by Josh Reid, digital audio recordings, 18 and 19 May 2009, MCRC.

whale."[3] Families performed songs and dances, and the tribe hosted a grand potlatch for guests from across the region and beyond. Most importantly, Makahs recognize that the revival of whaling expressed both tribal sovereignty and their identity as the People of the Cape. From the perspective that the sea is their country, the 1999 hunt was part of the tribe's continuing efforts to reclaim customary marine space.

On that May morning at the close of the twentieth century, Makah whalers did more than harpoon a whale – they dramatically anchored their nation's identity to the sea, just as generations of ancestors had done. Through spiritual beliefs and customary practices such as whaling, sealing, and fishing, Makahs transformed the sea into their sovereign space. They guarded this space from others, reinforcing the understanding that local waters belonged to the People of the Cape. For thousands of years, strategic exploitation of this marine borderland made Makahs a powerful, influential people. During the century after the arrival of non-Natives in this corner of the Pacific Ocean, the Makah relationship with the ocean and their customary marine resources enabled them to participate in global networks of exchange, to resist U.S. assimilation efforts, and to retain greater autonomy than many other land-based reservation communities.

However, by the close of the nineteenth century, overexploitation of marine resources undercut Makah success and power. Efficient Native hunters – Makahs included – nearly exterminated sea otters in local waters by the early nineteenth century, pushing non-Native traders to ply northern regions along the Northwest Coast when seeking valuable "soft gold." By the mid- to late-nineteenth century, European, Japanese, and Anglo-American hunters exacted a lethal toll on the Pacific's sea mammal species.

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[3] Johnson Interview.

Hunting any cetacean that provided oil, baleen, and other commodities, whalers brought one species after another to the brink of extinction. Wasteful non-Native overhunting of fur seals triggered national and international conservation efforts. Backed by the London fur industry, influential Anglo Americans harnessed the power of the state to cut out small-scale pelagic sealing operations, such as Makah hunters and schooner owners, while protecting profits earned by powerful non-Native shareholders. The loss of these customary practices caused the People of the Cape to enter the twentieth century weaker than ever and undermined their ability to continue resisting the assimilation efforts of U.S. Indian agents and government policies. Concern over the dearth of whales off Cape Flattery in the early twentieth century even prompted Makahs to suspend the active practice of whaling – a customary activity at the heart of their cultural identity – until whale populations rebounded at some point in the future.

Focusing on marine rather than terrestrial spaces uncovers several important findings. First, it reveals that Makah marine space was part of an indigenous borderland composed of specific networks and socio-political dynamics. Along with diplomatic protocols, trade, kinship, and violence intertwined the lives of the distinct peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland. Native borderland networks were in place long before the arrival of non-Natives to the Northwest Coast, and indigenous power and dynamics shaped the initial phase of cross-cultural interactions. When imperial actors entered the borderland, they provided new opportunities for conflict within the context of preexisting tensions between powerful Native chiefs, such as Maquinna, Wickaninnish, and Tatoosh. As the imperial rivalry between the United States and United Kingdom transformed this region into the transnational space known as the Oregon Country during the first half of the

nineteenth century, indigenous borderland dynamics persisted. Powerful Makah chiefs, such as Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom, traded whale oil and furs and exploited both indigenous and Anglo borderlands networks to maintain the influence of the People of the Cape. Their actions shaped non-Native perceptions of the Makah as a powerful and influential tribe to respect and even fear. In the later nineteenth century, Makahs such as the Claplanhoos leveraged existing indigenous borderland networks to raise the necessary capital and labor to succeed in both the Native and settler-colonial world of the Pacific Northwest through fur sealing. This narrative focus on the regional indigenous borderland demonstrates that these networks persisted long after the U.S. and U.K. (later Canada) imposed a borderline in 1846.

More importantly, borderlands strategists such as Tatoosh, Kleh-sitt, Ellacoom, and the Claplanhoos exploited marine products and social networks to interrupt imperial processes. For example, Tatoosh prevented the British trader John Meares from exploring the Strait of Juan de Fuca and sailing into Puget Sound. By monopolizing much of the maritime fur trade within the strait, the powerful Makah chief expanded his influence in the region and made the People of the Cape a force maritime fur traders respected and feared at times. Although chiefs Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom embraced divergent strategies for dealing with expanding settler-colonial power, their attitudes of accommodation and intimidation extended Tatoosh's legacy – Makahs were a powerful people colonial authorities needed to appease. Therefore, when U.S. representatives came to Neah Bay in 1855 to impose a treaty upon the tribe, Governor Stevens acceded to Makah demands that protected not just tribal lands, but also tribal waters and their access to marine resources that had made them an influential people for generations. By whaling, sealing, and

fishing – customary practices protected by the Treaty of Neah Bay – Makahs maintained their wealth and influence within both the *ča·di·* borderland and the settler-colonial world. Most importantly, Makah success allowed the tribe to blunt the worst effects of U.S. assimilation until the end of the nineteenth century.

Focusing on marine space reveals a more complete understanding of the ways that indigenous peoples such as the Makah engaged settler-colonialism. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, efficient Native hunters and chiefs exploited marine resources and indigenous borderland trade networks to fill the cargo holds of maritime fur trading vessels and provision crews. The first extractive industry on the Northwest Coast, the maritime fur trade began a process that brought non-Native empires to the region. When the commercial focus shifted to the land-based fur trade, Native peoples and networks continued to be central to the success of European companies, such as the Hudson's Bay Company. The People of the Cape were a key component – perhaps *the* key component – in these early industries. When U.S. and British settlers came to the region, indigenous commodities harvested from the ocean and land provided desperately needed food for the newcomers and made survival possible for underprepared settlers. Native labor and goods also established the foundation for such commercial ventures as logging, whaling, and provisioning. Ironically, Anglos often take pride in these entrepreneurial activities and credit them for taming the wilderness and making this region into the U.S. and Canadian Wests. Yet none of this could have happened without the involvement and support of the indigenous peoples of the Northwest Coast. By the 1880s, Natives such as the Makah did not just work as laborers or hunters for Anglos in

the settler-colonial economy; as important financial actors, Makahs invested in the extractive industries of the North Pacific, which contributed to national development.

Finally, examining the relationship of Makahs to marine space and the resources within it demonstrates that the People of the Cape combined customary practices with new opportunities and technologies to succeed on their own terms in the settler-colonial world. By hunting sea otters and trading the pelts and various indigenous commodities, Makahs and other Native peoples of the *ča·di·* borderland engaged new markets of exchange and brought a bevy of non-Native goods into their communities. These cross-cultural exchanges did not result in dependency, as some scholars conclude. Rather, chiefs funneled the goods into socio-cultural networks and employed them to maintain and expand their influence over weaker rivals in the borderland. By the mid-nineteenth century, Makahs looked to new technologies to expand the range of customary marine practices. By adapting non-Native technologies and markets of exchange to fit their specific cultural needs, the People of the Cape maintained their autonomy and controlled tribal spaces – both marine and terrestrial – until the end of the nineteenth century.

A Traditional Future

On the one hand, the story of Makahs and their relationship to customary marine space seems like a narrative of declension. Basically, Makahs had a good life until Anglo Americans ruined everything. While similar to other American Indian histories, the specific contours of this story are particular to the Makah experience. For example, non-Native diseases did not destroy the People of the Cape, leaving them susceptible to the nefarious agents of empire. Granted, many Makahs died from disease, including chiefs

such as Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom; however, new leaders emerged to confront the U.S. treaty negotiators who purposefully came hot on the heels of a catastrophic epidemic. Still reeling from the deaths of close family members, Makah negotiators protected what was most important to them and their people – the sea. Similarly, settler-colonial intrusions did not automatically ruin Makahs' good lives. Rather, for most of the nineteenth century, the People of the Cape succeeded because they engaged the settler-colonial world, but on their own terms and for their own reasons. This allowed them to maintain enough power to complicate imperial processes such as trade, settlement, treaties, and assimilation, activities that took away the cultures, powers, lands, and resources of so many indigenous peoples elsewhere. Makahs did not experience real trouble until non-Native industries wiped out the resource foundation for Northwest Coast culture and employed the regulatory power of the state to shut out indigenous peoples from customary practices and spaces that had once made them wealthy and powerful. In their newly impoverished condition, the People of the Cape became more susceptible to increased assimilation pressure exerted by Indian agents.

Narratives of declension problematically characterize American Indians as one-dimensional victims. Scholars who assume this perspective shackle indigenous peoples to a static and nostalgic past, while giving non-Natives too much power to shape outcomes. This approach ignores the contingent nature of settler-colonial expansion and overlooks how resilient American Indian individuals, communities, and nations adapted and responded to colonialism and its lethal results. The story of the Makah represents what historian Daniel Richter calls an "inclusive and empowering, rather than imperialistic and dominating" history, specifically rebutting the "cameo" approach to American Indian

history criticized by Vine Deloria, Jr.[4] Makahs interrupted and engaged settler-colonial processes for their own purposes, and they and other indigenous peoples on both sides of the border were central to the making of the U.S. and Canadian Wests.

Within the context of indigenous history, narratives of declension are especially problematic because they continue to frame debates over American Indian identity, sovereignty, and treaty rights in nations today. The debate over the 1999 whale hunt illustrated this. Critics failed to understand why Makahs continue to value whaling, openly wondering why the tribe cannot "get with the twentieth century." As one opponent stated, "with their supermarkets and cars, [Makahs] no longer need to kill a being as sentient as our mammoth whales." Even non-Native supporters of the Makah right to hunt see this as a tribal effort to "return to [a] whaling past."[5] Critics and some supporters alike believe that the Makah nation is trying to turn back the clock, to live in the past, by reviving whaling.

A better understanding of Makah history reveals that we should see the tribe's revival of whaling from a different perspective. By pursuing *chet-a-pook* (whales) off Cape Flattery, today's Makahs are articulating a traditional future instead of grasping at a long-lost, static past.[6] In addition to other marine initiatives pursued by the tribe, whaling

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[4] Daniel K. Richter, "Whose Indian History?" *William and Mary Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (1993): 389. Deloria criticized supposedly inclusive American histories for simply adding the stereotypical trappings of various minority groups – "a few feathers, woolly heads, and sombreros" – to the dominant white narrative of "manifest destiny." He called this the "cameo" approach to history. See Vine Deloria, *We Talk, You Listen: New Tribes, New Turf* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 39.

[5] Sarah Kershaw, "In Petition to Government, Tribe Hopes for Return to Whaling Past," *New York Times*, 19 September 2005.

[6] American Indian scholar Jace Weaver brought this concept to the attention of the field in "More Light Than Heat: The Current State of Native American Studies," *American Indian Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (2007): 249. He credits the following for developing the concept: Claire Smith, Heather Burke, and Graehme K. Ward, "Globalisation and Indigenous Peoples: Threat or Empowerment?," in *Indigenous Cultures in an Interconnected World*, ed. Claire Smith and Graehme K. Ward (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000); and Julie

illustrates that this American Indian nation lives in the present and looks toward the future while retaining what is best about their traditions.[7] Moreover, this marine practice defines them as a people distinct from mainstream society.

The 1999 whale hunt and continued whaling efforts are part of a longer Makah strategy to craft a traditional future. During the maritime fur trade, Chief Tatoosh exploited a customary resource – sea otters – and borderland networks to extend his authority over neighboring peoples. His successors, such as chiefs Kleh-sitt and Ellacoom, initially pursued a similar strategy by trading furs, whale oil, and fish with Hudson's Bay traders at nearby forts. Even when Chief Ellacoom took a divergent tactic, choosing to confront the expanding settler-colonial world more aggressively than Chief Kleh-sitt, he was looking to the future instead of the past. He knew that in order for the People of the Cape to maintain their influence in the nineteenth century, the newcomers would need to respect Makah power on indigenous terms. Similarly, during the treaty negotiations of 1855, Tse-kaw-wootl and the other Makah chiefs pushed for treaty provisions that protected the tribe's rights to customary marine practices and spaces because of their concern over the future. As Chief Kal-chote argued, if his people could not take whales, seals, and fish as they had always done, he feared they "would become poor."[8] Sadly, his words rang true less than fifty years later.

Gough, "History, Representation, Globalisation and Indigenous Cultures: A Tasmanian Perspective," in *Indigenous Cultures in an Interconnected World.*

[7] For example, the Makah have partnered with the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary to protect marine resources, such as whales, halibut, black cod, whiting, and seals. See Vincent Cooke (Makah) and George Galasso (Olympic National Marine Sanctuary), "Challenges and Opportunities for the Makah Tribe and Olympic National Marine Sanctuary," [2000?] (available online at http://nsgd.gso.uri.edu/riu/riuc04001/riuc04001_part4.pdf) National Sea Grant Library Website [accessed July 2009].

[8] "Ratified Treaty No. 286: Documents Relating to the Negotiation of the Treaty of January 31, 1855, with the Makah Indians," Documents Relating to the Negotiation of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Tribes of Indians, 1801-69 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T494, roll 5), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, National Archives, Washington, D.C., 2.

Most notably, Makah pelagic sealing during the late-nineteenth century exemplified both the benefits and challenges of striving for a traditional future. Combining a customary practice (hunting seals) with modern opportunities and technologies (global markets and schooners) allowed the People of the Cape to expand their marine space into the Bering Sea and accumulate substantial wealth. This, in turn, strengthened their ability to resist assimilation and shape a Makah future that remained distinct to their identity. However, conservation concerns over the Pribilof fur seal herd resulted in national legislation and international conventions that cut out Makah sealers and other small operators. Moreover, these conservation efforts codified the stereotype of the Native hunter who could only engage in this customary practice with pre-modern equipment and for subsistence purposes. This assumption locked indigenous peoples and their customs in the past and denied them a place in the modern world.

Current Makah efforts at reviving the active practice of whaling similarly demonstrate the tribe's perseverance at articulating a traditional future and the challenges of doing so. When Makahs decided to suspend the whaling practice in 1928, they intended to return to whaling at some point in the future. During the decades when they were not whaling, the People of the Cape maintained the tradition by including whaling implements in important social events and by performing songs and dances connected to the practice.[9] They continued harvesting whale oil, blubber, and meat from drift whales that washed ashore.[10] However, because harvesting whale products – even from carcasses that had washed ashore – was illegal, the federal government guarded, buried, and

[9] Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 10.

[10] See Maria Pascua, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 13 October 2008, MCRC; and Sepez, "Political and Social Ecology of Contemporary Makah Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Shellfish Collecting Practices," 109.

dynamited beached whales to prevent "scavenging."[11] Those living outside the reservation did not see Makah efforts at maintaining the whaling tradition, which caused non-Natives to believe that the tribe had abandoned the tradition and left it in the past. Therefore, critics mistakenly assumed that Makahs were grasping at a nostalgic past when they expressed the intent to revive whaling.

During the second half of the twentieth century, however, momentum built for a return to whaling. From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, the archaeological findings at Ozette, a Makah village just south of Cape Flattery, "sparked a cultural renaissance" in the tribe.[12] Several hundred years ago, prior to the arrival of non-Natives to this region, a massive mudslide entombed part of Ozette village, one of the principal sea mammal hunting sites along the Northwest Coast. Most of the 40,000 artifacts and extensive faunal remains dug out of the mud demonstrated to Western academics what Makahs already knew: they have always been a people of the sea. For example, 88% of the weight of faunal remains came from harvested whales and demonstrated that Makahs hunted sea mammals for both subsistence and commercial purposes.[13] Most importantly, the archaeological work at Ozette uncovered the central importance of whaling to Makah cultural, subsistence, and commercial activities, thereby strengthening the tribe's ties to their whaling tradition.

Soon after the findings at Ozette, the People of the Cape considered exercising their whaling rights once again. After the federal government removed gray whales from the list of endangered species in 1994, the Makah Tribal Council secured government

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Coté, "'It's Who We Are,'" 140.

[13] David R. Huelsbeck, "Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast," *Arctic Anthropology* 25, no. 1 (1988): 9.

support to petition the International Whaling Commission (IWC) for a whaling quota. In 1997, the IWC granted the Makah nation a quota of five whales annually, and a year later, the tribal council formed a whaling commission to oversee the hunt. Responding to animal rights activists concerned that the "traditional" method of hunting was cruel, the tribal whaling commission contracted with a veterinarian to adapt a large-caliber rifle to more humanely and safely kill a harpooned whale. After thousands of hours of physical and ritual preparation, Makah whalers harpooned and landed their first whale in seventy-one years.[14]

By placing the 1999 whale hunt within the larger context of a Makah narrative that focuses on their connection to marine space, we can see that the People of the Cape have a history of combining customary practices with modern opportunities and technologies. By deciding what constitutes "traditional culture" and how they will practice it, Makahs are exercising self-determination and expressing their unique identity in today's world.[15] Moreover, they are confronting the ongoing effects of colonialism and representing themselves as a modern indigenous community amidst national and international pressures. Indigenous traditions and customary practices are not static cultural components frozen in time. They change over time. For Makahs, these changes illustrate "the resilient, adaptive capacity of Indian groups to respond to colonialism in

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[14] For an overview of the 1999 hunt, the events leading up to it, and the aftermath, see Robert Sullivan, *A Whale Hunt: Two Years on the Olympic Peninsula with the Makah and Their Canoe* (New York: Scribner, 2000); Sepez, "Political and Social Ecology of Contemporary Makah Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Shellfish Collecting Practices," 112-97; Robert J. Miller, "Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe Goes Whaling," *American Indian Law Review* 25, no. 2 (2002); and Miller, "Tribal Cultural Self-Determination and the Makah Whaling Culture," in *Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination*, ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005). See also Greg Arnold, interview by Josh Reid, digital audio recording, 14 October 2008, MCRC.

[15] This is drawn from Miller's definition of "self-determination." See Miller, "Tribal Cultural Self-Determination and the Makah Whaling Culture," 123.

challenging and often deadly circumstances."[16] The People of the Cape are demonstrating that they live in the present and are moving into the future while retaining what they believe is best about their traditions. Or, as one Makah phrased it: "We are whalers. We don't want a Wonder Bread culture."[17]

[16] Ned Blackhawk, "Recasting the Narrative of America: The Rewards and Challenges of Teaching American Indian History," *Journal of American History* 93, no. 4 (2007): 1168.

[17] Barton, "'Red Waters,'" 190. Nuu-chah-nulth scholar Charlotte Coté characterizes the 1999 whale hunt as an indigenous action striking back at "culinary imperialism," a power dynamic that dictates what counts as acceptable food, especially with respect to what indigenous peoples are allowed to produce and eat. For more on this idea, see Coté, *Honoring the Spirits of Our Whaling Ancestors: The Revitalization of the Makah and Nuu-Chah-Nulth Whaling Tradition* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, Forthcoming). For a brief history on the "Western hegemonic control of food production and food consumption," see Russell Lawrence Barsh, "Food Security, Food Hegemony, and Charismatic Animals," in *Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime*, ed. Robert L. Friedheim (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). For a discussion of culinary imperialism applied to the Third World, see Uma Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third-World Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 161-88. Culinary imperialism is not limited to the Third World; the Japanese have complained specifically about U.S. culinary imperialism as applied to consuming whale products. See Calvin Sims, "Japan, Feasting on Whale, Sniffs at 'Culinary Imperialism' of U.S.," *New York Times*, 10 August 2000.

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