

304/D-68



# Special Resource Study

Corinth, Mississippi

National Park Service  
U.S. Department of the Interior

Shiloh National Military Park



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# Special Resource Study

CORINTH UNIT  
Shiloh National Military Park  
Mississippi-Tennessee



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ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON

by Kate Brownlee Sherwood

(1841-1914)

I hear again the tread of war go thundering  
through the land,  
And Puritan and Cavalier are clinching neck  
and hand,  
Round Shiloh church the furious foes have met  
to thrust and slay,  
Where erst the peaceful sons of Christ were  
wont to kneel and pray.

The wrestling of the ages shakes the hills of  
Tennessee,  
With all their echoing mounts a-throb with  
war's wild minstrelsy;  
A galaxy of stars new-born round the shield of  
Mars,  
And set against the Stars and Stripes the flash-  
ing Stars and Bars.

'Twas Albert Sidney Johnston led the columns  
of the Gray,  
Like Hector on the plains of Troy his presence  
fired the fray;  
And dashing horse and gleaming sword spake  
out his royal will  
As on the slopes of Shiloh field the blasts of  
war blew shrill.

"Down with the base invaders," the Gray shout  
forth the cry,  
"Death to presumptuous rebels," the Blue ring  
out reply;  
All day the conflict rages and yet again all day,

Though Grant is on the Union side he cannot  
stem nor stay.

They are a royal race of men, these brothers  
face to face,  
Their fury speaking through their guns, their  
frenzy in their pace;  
The sweeping onset of the Gray bears down  
the sturdy Blue,  
Though Sherman and his legions are heroes  
through and through.

Though Prentiss and his gallant men are forc-  
ing scaur and crag,  
They fall like sheaves before the scythes of  
Hardee and of Bragg;  
Ah, who shall tell the victor's tale when all the  
strife is past,  
When, man and man, in one great mould the  
men who strive are cast.

As when the Trojan hero came from that fair  
city's gates,  
With tossing mane and flaming crest to scorn  
the scowling fates,  
His legions gather round him and madly charge  
and cheer,  
And fill the besieging armies with wild  
disheveled fear;

Then bares his breast unto the dart the daring  
spearsman sends,  
And dying hears his cheering foes, the wailing  
of his friends,  
So Albert Sidney Johnston, the chief of belt and  
scar,

Lay down to die at Shiloh and turned the scales  
of war.

Now five and twenty years are gone, and lo, to-  
day they come,  
The Blue and Gray in proud array with throb-  
bing fife and drum;  
But not as rivals, not as foes, as brothers recon-  
ciled,  
To twine love's fragrant roses where the thorns  
of hate grew wild.

They tell the hero of three wars, the lion-heart-  
ed man,  
Who wore his valor like a star—uncrowned  
American;  
Above his heart serene and still the folded Stars  
and Bars,  
Above his head, like mother-wings, the shelter-  
ing Stripes and Stars.

Aye, five and twenty years, and lo, the man-  
hood of the South  
Has held its valor stanch and strong, as at the  
cannon's mouth,  
With patient heart and silent tongue has kept  
its true parole,  
And in the conquests born of peace has  
crowned its battle roll.

But ever while we sing of war, of courage tried  
and true,  
Of heroes wed to gallant deeds, or be it Gray or  
Blue,  
Then Albert Sidney Johnston's name shall flash  
before our sight

Like some resplendent meteor across the som-  
bre night.

America, thy sons are knit with sinews wrought  
of steel,  
They will not bend, they will not break,  
beneath the tyrant's heel;  
But in the white-hot flame of love, to silken  
cobwebs spun,  
They whirl the engines of the world, all keep-  
ing time as one.

To-day they stand abreast and strong, who  
stood as foes of yore,  
The world leaps up to bless their feet, heaven  
scatters blessings o'er;  
Their robes are wrought of gleaming gold, their  
wings are freedom's own,  
The trampling of their conquering hosts shakes  
pinnacle and throne.

Oh, veterans of the Blue and Gray, who fought  
on Shiloh field,  
The purposes of God are true, His judgment  
stands revealed;  
The pangs of war have rent the veil, and lo, His  
high decree:  
One heart, one hope, one destiny, one flag  
from sea to sea.

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## INTRODUCTION

### PURPOSE OF THE CORINTH UNIT OF SHILOH NATIONAL MILITARY PARK

On September 22, 2000, President William J. Clinton approved S. 1117 to establish the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park in the vicinity of the city of Corinth, Mississippi, and in the state of Tennessee. The purpose of the unit, as outlined in Public Law 106-271, was to facilitate the protection and interpretation of resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth and other Civil War actions in the area in and around the city of Corinth. The unit was also to enhance public understanding of the significance of the Corinth campaign and the Civil War relative to the Western Theater of Operations in cooperation with state and local governmental entities, private organizations, and private individuals. The Corinth battlefield was ranked as a priority 1 battlefield, having critical need for coordinated nationwide protection by the year 2000 by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission in its *Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields* (1993).

### DIRECTION IN LEGISLATION TO STUDY POTENTIAL BOUNDARY CHANGES

Section 4 of this act expanded Shiloh National Military Park by directing that a 20-acre tract at Battery Robinett in Corinth be included in the Corinth unit where a National Park Service interpretive center had been authorized in 1996. The act also directed the secretary of the interior to manage, protect, and interpret the resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth that occurred in and around the city of Corinth in cooperation with the states of Mississippi and Tennessee, the city of Corinth, other public entities, and the private sector. The act authorized a special resource study (boundary adjustment study) to identify other Civil War sites in and around Corinth that are consistent with the themes of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, meet the criteria for designation as a unit of the national park system, and are considered appropriate for inclusion in the unit.

To comply with this congressional direction, the National Park Service has prepared a *Boundary Study/ Environmental Assessment* for the Corinth Unit to identify and evaluate potential boundary adjustments according to criteria listed in the NPS *Management Policies 2001* (Chapter 3.5, Boundary Adjustments). These criteria provide that boundary adjustments may be recommended to

protect significant resources and values, or to enhance opportunities for public enjoyment related to park purposes


address operational and management issues, such as the need for access or the need for boundaries to correspond to logical boundary delineations such as topographic or other natural features or roads

protect park resources that are critical to fulfilling park purposes

In addition the NPS *Management Policies* specify that all recommendations for boundary changes must meet the following two criteria:

1. The added lands will be feasible to administer, considering their size, configuration, ownership, hazardous substances, costs, the views of and impacts on local communities and surrounding jurisdictions, and other factors such as the presence of exotic species.
2. Other alternatives for management and resource protection are inadequate.





## HISTORIC THEMES, EVENTS, AND RESOURCES DETERMINED ELIGIBLE FOR INCLUSION

The Union victories in the Siege (April 29-May 30, 1862) and Battle (October 3-4, 1862) of Corinth, Mississippi, one of the Confederacy's most strategically located railroad junction towns, figured prominently in the ebb and flow of Confederate military fortunes during 1862. The Union victory in the siege consolidated Federal control of northern Mississippi, while the Union victory in the battle (one of the key events in favor of the North) followed a summer during which a string of Confederate victories appeared to presage recognition by Great Britain. After the renewed Union successes in the early fall, including the Battle of Corinth that would eventually result in the Confederate loss of the Mississippi Valley, this prospect slipped out of the Confederacy's hands.

### THEMES

The Siege and Battle of Corinth in 1862 are associated with four principal historic Civil War themes. These include the (1) relationship of the Siege and Battle to other operations in the Western Theater of the War that occurred in the vicinity of Corinth and the state of Tennessee, (2) railroads, (3) contraband camp, and (4) earthwork fortifications.

#### Relationship of Corinth to Campaigns in Western Theater

Although more than 10,000 armed conflicts, ranging from battles to minor skirmishes, occurred during the Civil War, the *Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields* (1993) identified 384 conflicts as the principal battles and classified them according to their historic significance. Class A and B battlefields represented the principal strategic operations of the war, while Class C and D battlefields generally represented operations with limited tactical objectives of enforcement and occupation. Furthermore, the report identified five significant theaters of operations in the Civil War (Main Eastern, Lower Seaboard and Gulf Approach, Main Western

Theater Minus Gulf Approach, Trans-Mississippi, and Pacific Coast) and listed significant campaigns as subsets of the theaters along with their corresponding principal battles.

According to the report, the significance of Corinth is based on its association with two principal campaigns in the Main Western Theater Minus Gulf Approach during the Civil War. The two campaigns were: "Battle of Corinth and Pursuit from Corinth (1862)" and "Shiloh Campaign (1862)."

**Battle of Corinth and Pursuit from Corinth Campaign (1862).** The report identified two battlefields — Battle of Corinth and Battle of Hatchie's [Davis] Bridge — as the key components of the Battle of Corinth and Pursuit from Corinth (1862) campaign in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. The commission classified the Battle of Corinth as having Class A military importance, because it was a general engagement involving field armies in which a commander achieved a vital strategic objective and had a direct, observable impact on the direction, duration, conduct, and outcome of the war. The commission classified the Battle of Hatchie's [Davis] Bridge as having Class C military importance. This was based on two elements: it was an engagement involving divisions or detachments of the field armies in which a commander accomplished a limited campaign objective of reconnaissance, disruption, defense, or occupation, and it had an observable influence on the direction, duration, or conduct of the campaign.

**Shiloh Campaign (1862).** The commission also identified the Siege of Corinth as a key component of the Shiloh Campaign in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. The Siege of Corinth was classified as a Class B battlefield site, because it was a major engagement of magnitude involving field armies or divisions of the armies in which a commander achieved an important strategic objective within the context of an ongoing campaign. Major battles had a direct, observable impact on the direction, duration, conduct, or outcome of the campaign.





## Railroads

The Civil War was the first great railroad war. The railroads brought an immense new mobility to both the Union and Confederate armies. Food, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and soldiers — the immense resources necessary to prosecute war on a large scale — required rapid movement that only railroads could provide over long distances.

Two of the most important trunk railroads in the South — the “Vertebrae of the Confederacy” — intersected at Corinth, often referred to as the “Crossroads of the Confederacy.” The Memphis & Charleston Railroad was the only through railroad in the South that provided east-west service from the Mississippi River at Memphis, by way of Chattanooga, to Richmond and Atlanta and beyond. The north-south Mobile & Ohio Railroad connected Mobile, Alabama, on the Gulf of Mexico with Columbus, Kentucky, on the Mississippi River just below its confluence with the Ohio River.

As massive armies maneuvered toward decisive conflict in the Western Theater of the Civil War, Corinth became the most important transportation hub in the Lower Mississippi Valley and the western Confederacy. The railroad crossover gave to Corinth a strategic significance that made it the most important transportation hub in the western Confederacy during March-May 1862.

Both the North and the South recognized the strategic significance of Corinth. In a telegram to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in May 1862, Union Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck recognized the strategic importance of the north Mississippi crossroads at Corinth and considered its capture more important than the destruction of the Confederate armies. He noted that “Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical [sic] points of war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards.” During the same period the importance of Corinth compelled Confederate Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard to make his aforementioned claim that if the Confederacy was “defeated here we lose the whole Mississippi Valley and probably our cause.”

## Contraband Camp

Following the Battle of Corinth, the Union garrison anchored Grant’s left flank as he began the Northern advance toward Vicksburg in November 1862. Earlier on October 26, the Union army established the military District of Corinth, one of four divisions of the District of West Tennessee extending across northeast Mississippi and portions of Tennessee and Alabama, with headquarters in Corinth.

The security offered by Union army forces occupying the District of Corinth offered a haven for a large number of refugees, most of whom were slaves seeking safety within the Union lines. On September 22, 1862, shortly before the Battle of Corinth, President Abraham Lincoln issued his Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The Federal army established a camp at Corinth to house the freedmen, who were officially termed “contraband of war,” and on December 17, 1862, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, overall Union commander in the area, designated John Eaton “General Superintendent of Contrabands.”

One of the most benevolent and efficiently operated camps of its type during the Civil War, the contraband camp at Corinth was considered to be a model. Beginning as a tent “city” in the fall of 1862, the camp blossomed under the supervision of Chaplain James M. Alexander of the 66th Illinois Volunteer Infantry. By mid-1863, it was organized as a cooperative farm that contained a church, commissary, hospital, frame and log houses, gardens, small cotton fields, and a street grid with named streets and numbered houses. By mid-1863, 300 acres of cotton and a 100-acre vegetable field were generating a monthly profit of \$4,000 to \$5,000 for the freedmen. An American Missionary Association school operated nearby for students of all ages. Northern white men and women from abolitionist and benevolent organizations went to Corinth to spread the word of God, teach, and care for the freedmen.

Although the camp’s population fluctuated, it housed more than 3,600 former African-American slaves from Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama by March 1863. The camp’s population increased to

more than 6,500 by September 1863. At its demise in January 1864 the camp housed some 2,500 people.

Nearly 2,000 African-American soldiers were recruited into the Union army from Corinth, including the First Alabama Infantry Regiment of African Descent, which later became the 55th United States Colored Infantry, and the Second Alabama Infantry Regiment of African Descent, which was later redesignated the 110th U.S. Colored Troops.

The Union garrison abandoned Corinth on January 24, 1864, having determined that the area no longer held strategic military significance. Along with Northern whites from various abolitionist and benevolent organizations and the freedmen, the Federals retired to the permanent Union enclave at Memphis.

### Earthwork Fortifications

The American Civil War is considered to be the first modern war by many military historians, and the Siege and Battle of Corinth involved the first large-scale use of hasty or rapid "entrenchments" by both Union and Confederate armies as an offensive tactic of modern warfare. The Siege and Battle of Corinth occurred at a time of revolutionary change in field military tactics. New weapons of technology, including the new rifle-muskets that killed at several hundred yards, had rendered previous battle tactics obsolete. The fortifications at Corinth, designed to protect troops against increased firepower from the new weapons, foreshadowed massive trench warfare systems that appeared in later wars, especially on the World War I battlefields in France and Belgium.


The Siege and Battle of Corinth occurred during the early stages of the Civil War, and the surviving earthworks are rare examples of early war field fortifications and represent part of a developing technology later applied extensively at Vicksburg (1863), Northern Virginia, Richmond, and Petersburg (1864), and North Georgia and Atlanta (1864). The earthworks were studied by foreign military leaders during the half-century prior to

World War I. These studies helped to advance the evolution of the trench warfare system that became a significant component of battlefield tactics during World War I.

The earthworks at Corinth are considered to be among the largest and best-preserved groups of field fortifications in the United States dating to the early Civil War period of 1862. During 1995 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project mapped Civil War features in the Corinth area to provide comprehensive documentation of the area's resources. The project was a public-private partnership involving the National Park Service's Cultural Resources Geographic Information Services (CRGIS), the Siege and Battle of Corinth Commission, the Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Alcorn County, city of Corinth, Tennessee Division of Archeology, Shiloh National Military Park, and American Battlefield Protection Program. The project's surveyors mapped 7.5 miles of surviving field fortifications and associated features. Of this total, 69% (5.2 miles) of the Civil War trenches were in Alcorn County, Mississippi, 16% (1.2 miles) in McNairy County, Tennessee, and 15% (1.1 miles) within the city limits of Corinth. These resources are fragmented in more than 50 locations in the area.

To determine how many miles of field fortifications were originally dug by the armies during the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the CRGIS digitized a military map dating from 1862, collected Global Positioning System positions, and then layered the depicted resources over a modern map. Through this process, CRGIS determined that the original entrenchments extended 40.9 miles. Of those shown on the military map, fewer than 18% (7.5 miles) remain extant. Only 16% (1.2 miles) of the extant resources were rated in good condition, while 39% (2.925 miles) were considered poor and 45% (3.375 miles) were rated fair.





CONTRABANDS ENLISTING.

## **HISTORIC OVERVIEW**

### **THE CIVIL WAR IN CORINTH**


Between 1861 and 1865 Corinth, Mississippi, served as one of the most significant focal points of the Civil War. The small town hosted more than 300,000 soldiers, as well as over 200 generals, from both Union and Confederate armies. More than 100 battles, skirmishes, and raids were conducted in or near Corinth, and the town supplied four colonels to the Confederate States Army: Mark Perrin Lowrey, Eugene Whitfield, Arthur E. Reynolds, and William M. Inge. Over 250 individual events associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth have been identified.

### **CORINTH: THE VITAL CROSSROADS RAVAGED BY WAR**

When the state of Mississippi adopted an ordinance of secession on January 9, 1861, Corinth was a frontier boomtown in the northeast portion of

the state, built on what had been Chickasaw Indian land only a quarter-century earlier. As early as 1854, the survey lines for two railroads, the Memphis & Charleston (completed in 1857) and the Mobile & Ohio (completed in 1861), had crossed in a remote corner of old Tishomingo County, spurring the development of a new trade center for the farms of southwestern Tennessee and northeastern Mississippi. Linking Columbus, Kentucky, in the Ohio Valley with Mobile, Alabama, on the Gulf Coast, the 469-mile-long north-south Mobile & Ohio Railroad was the longest trunk railroad in the South under the control of a single company. The Mobile & Ohio crossed the east-west axis of the 271-mile-long Memphis & Charleston Railroad at Corinth. Recently tied together with three other railroads, the Memphis & Charleston formed part of one of the longest trunk railroad systems in the South — a continuous line of railroad track running east from Memphis, Tennessee, on the Mississippi River, through Chattanooga, to the Atlantic Coast — and constituted the most important prewar railroad development in the South.





Originally named Cross City, a half-section of land surrounding the planned rail junction was surveyed by Eli and Houston Mitchell and Hamilton Mask, who laid out a plan of blocks, lots, and streets for the new community in 1855. Incorporated as "Corinth" in March 1856, by 1858 the new town boasted a population of some 1,500 people and numerous brick business houses, five churches, three hotels, several substantial residences, and Corona College, a school for young women. Speculation and the community's rapid population growth resulted in the addition of six new property plats to the original survey between 1855 and 1860. Today a residential district northeast of the business district, this area contains the majority of Corinth's extant antebellum structures.


With the opening of hostilities, the railroad junction became an important military depot and transportation hub for the South. Although the majority of the Corinth population had opposed secession, two local militia companies, known as the Corinth Rifles and Tishomingo Rangers, were mustered into state service at Corinth on February 20, 1861. The Tishomingo Rangers were soon organized into the 12th Mississippi Cavalry Battalion, and the Corinth Rifles were designated Company A, 9th Mississippi Infantry, after being transported down the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to Pensacola, Florida.


From February 1861 to the spring of 1862, Corinth served as an important organization depot for Mississippi volunteer regiments, as tens of thousands of soldiers mustered from throughout the western Confederacy were shuttled by rail through the community, bound for distant points like Mobile, Pensacola, Bowling Green, and Richmond. After President Jefferson Davis issued a general call for troops in April 1861, Mississippi responded by

forwarding several regiments to the Confederate States Army and continuing the organization of volunteers until 80 companies were formed and ordered into instruction camps at Iuka, Enterprise, Grenada, and Corinth. During the first week of May the 2nd and 11th Mississippi Infantry regiments were organized at an instruction camp at Corinth and sent by rail to Lynchburg, Virginia, on May 9. The 12th and 13th Mississippi Infantry regiments were mustered into service at Camp Clark near Corinth during May 13-16; both regiments were sent to Union City, Tennessee, and then rushed to Virginia in July. On May 21, Governor John J. Pettus ordered 50 of the state volunteer companies into Camp Clark at Corinth; from these companies the 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th infantry regiments were organized and trained before being sent to Kentucky and Virginia. During July-September, the 1st, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, and 26th Mississippi Infantry regiments were assembled and organized at an instruction camp at Iuka; the 1st and 23rd were sent to Kentucky in mid-September, the 20th was ordered to Virginia in August, the 22nd was sent to Memphis on September 10, and the 26th moved to Union City, Tennessee, in early December. The 7th Mississippi Infantry Regiment was organized at Corinth on September 25 and sent to Bay St. Louis in December.

During October-December 1861, 60-day troops, dubbed the Confederate Army of Ten Thousand, rendezvoused at Corinth under Brig. Gen. Reuben Davis. A 200-man infantry brigade of two regiments (4th and 5th) and one battalion (Beckett's) were organized and sent to Bowling Green, Kentucky. Upon the expiration of service of these troops, Col. Mark P. Lowrey used his former command (4th Regiment) as a nucleus to organize the 32nd Mississippi at Iuka in March-April 1862.









Meanwhile, Tennessee adopted an ordinance of secession on June 8, 1861. Hardin County, across the state line northeast of Corinth, was one of five counties in West Tennessee to vote (two to one) against the ordinance and against representation in the Confederate States of America. Nevertheless, West Tennessee began to supply troops to the Confederate army. On August 7, Capt. Marshall T. Polk's Tennessee Light Artillery Company, which had been organized at Bolivar in McNairy County on May 25, was mustered into Confederate service at Camp Brown in Union City. On October 15, Capt. J. Wesley Eldridge's Light Artillery Battery and Capt. J.W. Phillips' Tennessee Light Artillery were organized in Hardin County and forwarded to Bowling Green, Kentucky.

By late March 1862, the railroad junction at Corinth threatened to become a military liability to the Confederacy, as Federal forces targeted the strategic crossover for destruction or capture. For the next seven months, combative Union and Confederate armies wreaked havoc on the town and its citizens as they wrestled for control of the strategic rail crossroads.

## CORINTH: SPRINGBOARD TO SHILOH, MARCH-APRIL 1862

Early in 1862 the Union undertook campaigns aimed at dividing the Confederacy and recovering control of the Mississippi River from Cairo, Illinois, to its mouth at the Gulf of Mexico. Such undertakings would have extensive military and political repercussions.

Flag Officer David G. Farragut's oceangoing fleet moved against New Orleans. Early on April 24, while mortar-schooners hammered Forts Jackson and St. Philip, just above the Mississippi River's mouth 70 miles below the city, Farragut's ships passed the forts, destroyed the Confederate fleets, and forced the surrender of New Orleans. Thus, the South lost its largest city and most important port.

Ten weeks earlier, an amphibious Union force commanded by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, had advanced against strongholds guarding the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, was bombarded and captured by Union ironclads and timberclads on February 6, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, with its 13,000-man garrison, was unconditionally surrendered to Grant on the 16th.

These victories had immediate and far-reaching consequences. The Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi at Columbus, Kentucky was outflanked and had to be evacuated. Confederate forces in the area retired to Island No. 10 and western Tennessee. With Union gunboats ascending the Tennessee River as far south as Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and direct railroad connections between Memphis and Central Kentucky severed, the Confederate commander in the west — Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston — pulled Southern forces out of Bowling Green. The Confederates hurriedly abandoned Nashville and Middle Tennessee.

Johnston directed these troops to Corinth, because of the town's strategic location at the junction of the Memphis & Charleston and the Mobile & Ohio railroads.

According to former Confederate Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker, "these roads constituted the vertebrae of the Confederacy." Food, weapons, ammunition, equipment, and soldiers — the immense resources necessary to prosecute war on a large scale — required rapid movement that only railroads such as these could provide over long distances. Ably counseled by his second-in-command, Gen. Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, Johnston realized that if he was to hold the important Mississippi Valley and recover lost ground, he must concentrate his scattered forces, defend the vital railroads, and strike back at the Federal invaders. Thus, for the next several months this northeast Mississippi town became second only to Richmond as the most important point in the Confederacy. Thousands of soldiers from the Gulf Coast and Columbus, Kentucky used these railroads to join Johnston's forces.

In wake of the rapidly shifting seat of war, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Union forces in the West, unleashed simultaneous offensives to wrestle control of the Mississippi Valley. Armies under Maj. Gens. Ulysses S. Grant and Don Carlos Buell entered the Tennessee Valley to sever Confederate railroad communications. Halleck also sent armies into northern Arkansas and against Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi River at New Madrid, Missouri, and Island No. 10. Grant's army on the Tennessee ascended the river by steamboats and disembarked to establish a base of operations at Pittsburg Landing, 22 miles northeast of Corinth. The Federal front rested 2 miles inland on the rolling plateau, near a log church called Shiloh Meeting House. Grant's orders from Halleck were to wait for the arrival of Buell's Army of the Ohio that had started from Nashville during the third week of March. When Buell arrived, the combined Federal armies were to advance on Corinth. Aware of the impending threat, Johnston planned to smash Grant before Buell arrived. Initially, Johnston hoped to delay his attack until after the arrival of Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's Confederate Army of the West en route to Corinth from western Arkansas. However, the distance proved too great, and, with Buell's column rapidly approaching the Tennessee, Johnston was compelled to strike before Van Dorn arrived.

Shortly after daybreak on April 6, Johnston's army, having assembled for battle from Corinth and other outposts in the area, stormed out of the woods and assailed Grant's divisions in their camps near Shiloh Church. In spite of being caught by surprise, the Federals quickly rallied and a desperate battle followed. During the morning the Confederates gained ground in savage fighting at Spain field and Shiloh Church, but they were almost as disorganized by their successes as the Federals were by their disasters. At noon, the Southern offensive temporarily stalled in brutal uncoordinated assaults at Water Oaks Pond, the Hornet's Nest, and the Peach Orchard. At mid-afternoon, while directing a brigade forward, a bullet struck Johnston. Mortally wounded, he bled to death on the field. Beauregard assumed command of the Southern army. In the late afternoon, Grant's hard-pressed troops retired to a strong position west of Pittsburg Landing. Massed artillery covered the line, deep hollows their front, and the Tennessee River and Owl Creek their flanks. Near sundown, advance units of Buell's Army of the Ohio crossed the Tennessee and reported to Grant at Pittsburg Landing. A final Confederate charge failed to dislodge the Federal army from this strong position. Darkness ended further fighting for the day, and the exhausted armies bivouacked on the field.

Re-enforced by Buell's arrival and Lew Wallace's division of his own army, Grant launched a massive counterattack at dawn on April 7. The unexpected Union offensive caught the Confederates by surprise. Heavily outnumbered, Beauregard rallied his disorganized command, but several desperate countercharges failed to reverse the unequal contest. Beauregard skillfully disengaged his defeated army and retired to Corinth. The Federals, terribly mauled, did not press the pursuit, and Shiloh, the first momentous killing field of the war, claimed 23,746 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing in action (Union — 13,065; Confederate — 10,699) — a number greater than the Patriot forces suffered in all the engagements of the Revolutionary War. On April 8 Grant dispatched Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman on a reconnaissance to investigate Confederate intentions. Six miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing Sherman encountered a large Confederate field hospital protected by a small force of mounted Southern cavalry under Lt. Col.



*"The whole of Corinth with its enormous fortifications, burst upon our view. The United States flag was floating over the forts and in town. We were met by a perfect storm of grape, canister, cannon balls, and minie balls. Oh God! I have never seen the like! The men fell like grass. I saw men, running at full speed, stop suddenly and fall upon their faces, with their brains scattered all around; others, with legs and arms cut off, shrieking with agony."*

—Lt. Charles Labruzan  
of the 42nd Alabama Infantry

Nathan Bedford Forrest. In an area called "Fallen Timbers," Sherman was attacked by the Confederate force, losing about 90 men, until Forrest, who was severely wounded in the engagement, withdrew from the field. After the Confederate troopers retired, Sherman advanced, capturing the field hospital with its surgeons and about 250 Southern wounded. Among them were about 50 wounded Union soldiers who had fallen into Confederate hands at Shiloh. Sherman advanced his cavalry westward another mile, where they encountered Confederate Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge's rear guard about a mile east of the Michie family farmhouse. All signs pointed to a general Confederate retreat toward Corinth; thus, pursuant to Grant's instructions, Sherman returned to the Shiloh battlefield.

For the next few weeks, Corinth was nearly overwhelmed with sick and wounded Southern soldiers. The town responded as best it could, providing limited hospital space in public buildings and many of its homes. Local men and women, aided by volunteers from as far afield as New Orleans and Mobile, nursed the sick and tended the wounded and dying as the Union invasion closed in around them. Faced with an impending Federal offensive of massive proportions, Beauregard warned his superiors in Richmond, "If defeated here we lose the Mississippi Valley and probably our cause."

#### THE CORINTH SIEGE, APRIL 28-MAY 30, 1862

The siege of Corinth involved the confrontation of two huge armies headed by commanders intent on avoiding bloodshed. Union Maj. Gen. Halleck and Confederate Gen. Beauregard were so sobered by the carnage sustained at the Battle of Shiloh that they pressed for strategic advantage rather than for another large battle.

With control of the Mississippi Valley, the ultimate prize, Halleck, commanding United States forces in the West, was so troubled by Grant's initial lapses and awful casualties at Shiloh that he assumed field command and put Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in command of Grant's army. He made Grant second-in-command overall, a vague position with no real

authority. Halleck concentrated a massive army group at Pittsburg and Hamburg landings in southwestern Tennessee: the Army of the Tennessee under Thomas (right wing), the Army of the Ohio commanded by Buell (center), and Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi (left wing). In his first and only performance as a field commander, Halleck, an expert in military theory and history, meant to capture Corinth by carefully husbanding his army's numerical superiority.

#### Halleck's "Army Group" Moves Out

Island No. 10 in the Mississippi River and its 6,900-man garrison was surrendered to a Union amphibious force led by Pope on April 7, 1862. As Halleck began organizing for an advance on Corinth, reconnaissances on the Corinth and Purdy roads south and west of Shiloh by a battalion of Illinois cavalry under Maj. Christian Thielemann on April 13 revealed that only Confederate cavalry outposts were stationed within a 12-mile radius of Pittsburg Landing. During the third week of April, Pope, with most of his army, was shifted by water to Hamburg Landing, a short distance upstream (south) from Pittsburg Landing. There his forces joined the 123,000-man "army group" that Halleck was organizing for an advance on Corinth.

By April 28, when Halleck put his troops in motion from Pittsburg and Hamburg landings, Van Dorn's Army of the West had reinforced Beauregard. However, the combined Confederate armies were still outnumbered about two to one. After the Battle of Shiloh, Beauregard had turned his troops to fortifying the northern and eastern approaches to Corinth. These defenses extended in an arc about 15 miles out from the railroad crossover and anchored to the northwest and east on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. This 7-mile line consisted of trenches and rifle pits with artillery emplacements at key points.

The Federal columns advanced on Corinth along a broad front. Marching by way of Monterey, Tennessee, a large reconnaissance, supported by artillery under Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley, attacked mounted Confederate pickets north of the village on April 29. The Confederates were driven back by Union cavalry, deserting their camp and retiring

south of the village where the Federal pursuit was checked by fire from the Washington Louisiana Artillery commanded by Confederate Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson deployed near Adkins' House.

Thomas' lead division — William T. Sherman's — closed to within 8 miles of Corinth by May 4, and entrenched astride the State Line road, 1 mile west of its intersection with the Corinth road. On May 7, Sherman advanced west on the State Line road  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile to an important country road junction in the small hamlet of Locust Grove. Sherman had his men hastily entrench another strong position. The left faced south, while the bulk of the division prepared fieldworks that fronted west, parallel to the north-south Ridge road behind the front. As before, the extreme right (now the northernmost) flank of Sherman's second entrenched line was again refused. This succession of fortified positions on Sherman's front more effectively anchored, or secured, the "army group's" right flank against a potential Confederate counterattack from the west. Buell's columns marched via the State Line road. The vanguard crossed Lick Creek on the 2nd, and by nightfall lay bivouacked at Mount Olivet Church, 12 miles northeast of Corinth. By May 6, Buell's troops, pushing ahead slowly on three parallel roads, closed on the Mississippi state line along a 3-mile front just north of Chambers Creek, a west-to-east-flowing tributary of the Tennessee River.

#### **Maj. Gen. Pope Goads the Confederates: The May 3 and 9, 1862 Farmington Fighting**

Pope's soldiers, during their advance southwest from Hamburg Landing, traveled the old Hamburg road, crossed into Mississippi, and by dark on May 2nd occupied the high ground overlooking Sevenmile Creek, 6 miles east of Corinth. The next morning Brig. Gen. Eleazer A. Paine's division forded the creek, pushed forward, and approached Farmington, 4 miles east of Corinth. Here they attacked a strong force of some 4,500 Confederates positioned in front of the village. In a short, sharp engagement, Paine's soldiers, spearheaded by Col. James D. Morgan's brigade, drove the Confederates from their camp, compelling them to leave their tents, baggage, and 40 dead on the field. On May 4, the remainder of Pope's army crossed Sevenmile

Creek and camped within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Farmington, where Paine's troops had entrenched. Pope's Army of the Mississippi returned to its camps north of the creek on May 5, reestablishing its connection with Buell's army. This retrograde was dictated by the failure of Buell's Army of the Ohio, on Pope's right, to keep pace with Pope's men, who, by their rapid advance to Farmington, had exposed themselves to Confederate counterattack. Buell's slow march resulted from road troubles brought about by periods of heavy rain, and his innate caution, exacerbated by the near-disaster suffered by Grant at Shiloh.

Furthermore, Buell's columns were forced to negotiate a succession of feeder tributaries associated with Lick, Wardlow, and Chambers Creeks. His troops were delayed by the need to corduroy and improve miles of low-lying, dirt roadbeds and build bridges sufficient for the passage of troops, heavy wagons, and artillery. The necessity to halt and engineer the means necessary to traverse these topographical features did not encumber Pope's column tramping southward on the less-interrupted route via the Hamburg-Farmington road.

On May 4 and 5 torrential rains pelted the Corinth area, turning the roads into ribbons of mud and the streams into raging torrents and sweeping away a number of bridges. Confederate outposts clashed with Federal skirmishers as Union columns moved cautiously ahead. As the Federals moved toward Corinth, Union detachments raided the Memphis & Charleston Railroad between Burnsville and Glendale, Mississippi, on May 3 and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad near Bethel and Purdy, Tennessee, on May 4. Skirmishes between Federal and Confederate detachments occurred near Farmington, Mississippi, on May 4 and Purdy, Tennessee, on May 7.

The countryside north and east of the Corinth earthworks was rural, featuring small farms and fields bounded by thick woods. A prominent ridge ran about 2 miles east of the Confederate earthworks. This geological formation, officially named the Tennessee Divide, is the topographical divide separating the valley of the Tennessee from the Mississippi River drainage system. East of this watershed, Chambers and Sevenmile Creeks and

their tributaries discharge northeastward into the Tennessee River. West of the divide lay Corinth and the Mississippi Valley. Bridge and Phillips Creeks, lying between the divide and the Confederate rifle pits, flow southward and beyond their confluence southeast of Corinth, turn west to meet the Tuscumbia River.

To defend this gateway to the Mississippi Valley, Beauregard planned to take advantage of the terrain and blunders on the part of the Union generals to hurl a powerful force against any brigade or division that found itself isolated. On May 8 Buell's pioneers began bridging Chambers Creek, and, with the Army of the Ohio again inching southward, the aggressive Pope undertook a forced reconnaissance to determine if the Confederates were evacuating Corinth as reported by deserters. Once again, he crossed Sevenmile Creek, reoccupied Farmington, and pushed forward two divisions to within cannon shot of Confederate fortifications commanding the Phillips and Bridge creek bottoms. During the advance beyond Farmington, Paine's division was on the right and Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley's on the left. After a series of skirmishes on the 8th, Pope was warned that Buell's Army of the Ohio was not yet ready to advance beyond Chambers Creek. Thus, he recalled his troops and most of them returned to their camps north of Sevenmile Creek. Col. John M. Loomis' brigade of Stanley's division was detached and remained behind to hold Farmington, where Pope established a telegraph station.

The occupation of Farmington by Pope's troops posed a threat to a prolonged defense of Corinth by Beauregard's "army group" that could not be ignored. At Farmington, the Federals were within 2 miles of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad and 4 miles from the Mobile & Ohio. The latter railroad had to be kept open and operating or a prolonged defense of Corinth was doomed. In addition to two roads leading west from Farmington and passing through the Confederate fortifications commanding the Phillips Creek bottom, three roads converged on the village from the southwest and south. The most important of these — the Danville road — followed the ridge east of Bridge Creek and struck the Mobile & Ohio Railroad 3 miles south of the trestle carrying the tracks over the creek. The

other two roads led to Jacinto, then the county seat of Tishomingo County.

To cope with this threat, Beauregard, on May 7, redeployed his troops to strengthen his right, preparatory to attacking Pope's army at Farmington in an attempt to isolate and destroy it. Earl Van Dorn's three-division Army of the West was called from its camps south of Corinth, some from as far off as Rienzi. The army took position on the right flank of Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee's corps in rifle pits being thrown up astride the Danville road on the ridge south of Bridge Creek. Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge's four-brigade division, formerly posted in the earthworks south of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad fronting on the Phillips and Bridge creek bottoms now became Beauregard's ready reserve.

During the evening of May 8, Van Dorn took post beyond the works, forming his army into line of battle. His left flank (Brig. Gen. James H. Trapier's division) was anchored on the high ground south of Bridge Creek; his center (Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles' division) was on the Danville road, a mile northeast of where the road crossed the Memphis & Charleston Railroad; and Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's division massed in reserve and *en echelon* on Ruggles' right. Time was lost getting into position, and night closed in before all the troops were up. The attack was postponed, the soldiers sleeping on their arms.

Soon after daybreak on May 9, Van Dorn shifted his army farther east to extend across the three roads approaching Farmington from the south, from west to east — the Danville, old Jacinto, and Jacinto roads — and attacked. Confederate battle lines debouched from the woods south of Farmington to see Loomis' Union brigade bivouacked on a ridge north of Farmington and covering a bridge over Sevenmile Creek. A battalion of the 8th Wisconsin Infantry, deployed as skirmishers, occupied the village. In accord with Pope's orders, Brig. Gen. John M. Palmer's brigade of Brig. Gen. Eleazer Paine's division was crossing Sevenmile Creek preparatory to relieving Loomis' troops. Loomis' and Palmer's Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin infantry regiments and their supporting artillery batteries engaged the onrushing

Confederates and a bitter firefight ensued. The 2nd Iowa Cavalry was ordered across the Sevenmile Creek bridge and causeway to reinforce the hard-pressed Union infantry. Although the countryside was broken by ravines and ridges, Col. Edward Hatch, when called upon by Paine, charged three Confederate batteries. Hatch's 1st Battalion was repulsed by the left battery, but the 2nd and 3rd battalions compelled the center and left batteries to cease fire and limber up their pieces.

Pope was satisfied that his two brigades were outnumbered at least seven to one and that he could not reinforce them without crossing to the south side of Sevenmile Creek with his army. To do so was contrary to Halleck's instructions and would bring on a major battle before Buell's Army of the Ohio had closed on Pope's right. The Federal brigades, after five hours of combat, broke contact with the foe and retreated north across Sevenmile Creek and burned the bridge. Van Dorn, alerted that Buell had sent a division to reinforce Pope, did not attempt to force his way across the stream, but led his troops back to their camps. Union casualties in the fight numbered 16 killed, 148 wounded, and 14 missing. Confederate losses were probably equal to if not greater, considering they had been on the offensive; however, incomplete returns filed by only one division listed 8 killed, 89 wounded, and 2 missing. The Federals did not reoccupy Farmington until May 17.

### **Buell Moves Slowly, May 3-17, 1862**

On May 10, Buell moved to erase the 3-mile gap between his army and Pope's that the Confederates had failed to exploit during the Farmington fight. Brig. Gen. William Nelson's division took position at the Nichols Ford crossing of Sevenmile Creek; Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood's division closed on Nelson's; and, on May 12, Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden advanced his division to a new post on Nelson's left. The next four days — May 13-16 — found Buell's men opening roads across Sevenmile Creek and, on the evening of the 17th, his entire army crossed the creek on a 1½-mile front, driving back Confederate pickets. Upon halting, the troops entrenched. The left flank of the Army of the Ohio was anchored by Crittenden's division, his

left resting astride the Farmington-Corinth road. The center was held by Nelson's division, with Wood on the right at Andrew Driver's house on the Monterey-Corinth road. The center was held by Nelson's division, with Crittenden on the left, the latter's flank resting across the Farmington-Corinth road. Pope's army, its left flank refused, was on Buell's left, and Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman's division of Thomas' Army of the Tennessee was on his right. The works thrown up by the Army of the Ohio were within 2 miles of the Confederate defenses and separated from them by "diversified country."

### **Thomas' Army of the Tennessee Squeezes the Confederate Left, May 11-16, 1862**

The Union "army group's" right wing — Thomas' Army of the Tennessee — clawed its way ahead, its goal being to reach the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and invest the Confederate defenses north of Corinth. On May 11, while Buell advanced to Sevenmile Creek, Thomas' divisions moved forward a mile south of Locust Grove and entrenched 2 miles north of the Mississippi border. Sherman's division on the right faced west astride the Purdy (or Ridge) road at Locust Grove; Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut, in the center, fronted south and held the Purdy-Farmington road; and Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies, on the left, guarded the Monterey-Corinth road 2 miles south of Monterey. Within 48 hours, the three divisions gained another 2 miles and dug in on high ground overlooking the headwaters of Phillips Creek. Sherman's division on the right still faced west and commanded the Purdy road; Hurlbut faced southwest; and Davies, on the left, fronted south astride the state line. Skirmishers screening this movement clashed repeatedly with Confederate pickets. On May 17 "Task Force Sherman" (including troops from three brigades [Denver's, Morgan L. Smith's, and one of Hurlbut's]) crossed Phillips Creek.

In a savage fight, they compelled Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers' Mississippians to abandon a strong point at the Russell house near the junction of the state line, Purdy, and Ridge roads. Sherman's troops occupied the Russell house and the adjoining heights west of the upper Phillips Creek watershed. This position possessed great natural strength, and

*"One night eighteen of our company were put on out-post...George Thomas and I were stationed inside a fence row. We were told not to fire, and we were to be relieved before daybreak. We were not relieved however, and when day came we found ourselves only a short distance from the Yankee breastworks. We could have kept concealed by grass and bushes, but George, who knew not the meaning of fear, stood in his corner of the fence row. As he watched the Yankees walking their beats on the breastworks he thought it a good opportunity, and before he knew it, he had shot his man. Oh, then three cannon and two-thousand infantry turned loose on us! The fence was knocked to smithereens. The rails, filled with bullets, crashed over us. Limbs falling from trees, covered us, and we were buried beneath the debris like ground hogs. We could not get out until darkness fell again."*

*—Pvt. William E. Bevins of the 1st Arkansas Infantry*

Sherman's men immediately fortified it. Union losses in the fight were 10 killed and 31 wounded while Chalmers left 12 dead on the field. Over the course of the next two days, Thomas' center and left wing divisions, from right to left, the commands of Thomas Davies, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McKean, and T. W. Sherman, seized and entrenched new positions (May 19) south of the Tennessee state line. These adjustments in his front tied Thomas' left flank (T. W. Sherman) into Buell's right, anchored by Wood at the Driver house.

Now more than ever, Halleck practiced the "little-loss-as-possible method of warfare." Meticulous planning, careful advances, extensive offensive entrenchment, and no thought of attacking the entrenched enemy characterized his ponderous partial investment of Corinth. On May 18, with rifle pits being hastily built within 2 miles of Beauregard's fortifications, Halleck informed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that "Richmond and Corinth are now the great strategical [sic] points of the war, and our success at these points should be insured at all hazards." With the church spires surrounding the strategic railroad crossover now clearly visible on the western horizon, Halleck prepared for his next maneuvers. They would be executed with extreme caution. The objective was not to draw the Confederate army out for battle, but rather to force it to withdraw from Corinth.

#### **Federal Troops Gain the Phillips Creek Watershed**

By nightfall on May 21 other units of the Army of the Tennessee had abandoned the rifle pits they had occupied since the 13th and 19th and slid forward another ½ to 1 mile. As they advanced, they took position from right to left as follows: Hurlbut's division, its right anchored on Sherman's left at the state line, and then Davies'.

These two divisions, fronting west, dug in along the watershed known as Serratt's (Surratt) hill overlooking Phillips Creek. On Davies' left an artillery emplacement embrasured to mount six cannon was thrown up. At that point, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McKean's division took position at right angles to Davies, its front extending east across the Bridge

Creek bottom to link up with the center of T.W. Sherman's division, which had made little advance. No serious opposition to this advance was undertaken by the Confederates, except on Davies' front. His skirmishers encountered Confederates posted on the west side of Phillips Creek, but several rounds from one of his batteries sent the Southerners scampering.

#### **Confederates Muff Their Opportunity on May 22**

On May 17, the day of the Russell house fight, Pope's Army of the Mississippi — the Federal "army group's" left wing — crossed Sevenmile Creek and occupied Farmington for the third time. The troops — Paine's division on the right, its flank linked into Crittenden's Army of the Ohio division; Stanley's in the center; and Brig. Gen. Schuyler Hamilton's on the left — encamped in "double lines" and threw up earthworks that followed the military crest of the ridges and consisted of a single ditch and parapet. Paine's and Stanley's divisions fronted west — the latter's flank refused and anchored on a densely wooded branch of Clear Creek — and Hamilton's faced south to hold the Old Alabama road. The next day fatigue parties from Paine's division constructed two lunettes — the first in front of the division's center and the other on the right commanding the Corinth road — in which artillery was emplaced.

On May 22 a "red alert" was initiated when Pope's cavalry reported Confederates advancing in strong force. Although Hamilton's pickets were driven in, no attack came, and there were those who believed this to be a scare on the cavalry's part. Subsequently, Pope and his officers learned that a formidable Confederate force led by Van Dorn had moved out of the Corinth defenses, their mission to assail and overwhelm Hamilton's division and drive the Army of the Mississippi into the Sevenmile Creek swamps.

This attempt to attack Pope's army developed as a result of Beauregard's growing concern about the slow, but constant, approach of the Union forces. In response he determined to counterattack before the Federals could fortify and consolidate their

gains. Orders went out late on May 21 alerting his generals to have their divisions formed and ready to take the offensive at daybreak. Van Dorn's Army of the West, supported by Hardee's corps, would deploy southeast of Bridge Creek and advance northeast astride the Clear Creek watershed toward Farmington; Bragg's two-division corps would cross Phillips Creek and advance on Farmington from the west. Bragg was to govern his movements by the sound of Van Dorn's guns. Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk and Breckinridge pulled their respective corps out of the works west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and masked them between the railroad and the Purdy road. Breckinridge's corps formed along the tracks facing east, guarding Polk's left flank and rear from an attack in the direction of Purdy. Polk's mission was to assail and dislodge Thomas' Army of the Tennessee before they entrenched.

Beauregard's bold gamble came to naught. Van Dorn, whose three divisions were to trigger the attack, was unable to get his men into position by daybreak. Confronted by unexpected difficulties, mounting delays, and unable to bring order out of chaos, Van Dorn called off the attack and returned to his entrenchments. Because their actions were dependent on Van Dorn's, Hardee's, Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckinridge's corps were ordered back to their camps after a sharp skirmish.

### **Halleck Tightens His Grip, May 27-29, 1862**

**William T. Sherman's Troops Close to 1,300 Yards.** By the evening of May 27, Halleck's "army group" was ready to squeeze the Confederates again. Sherman's troops, on the right near the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, were confronted by a large salient earthwork complex on commanding ground several hundred yards east of the railroad. Nearly 1,200 yards north of this salient, sharpshooters harassed Sherman's pickets from a loop-holed, double-log house. Responding to orders from Halleck, Sherman, at 8:00 A.M. on the 28th, led a reinforced division quietly and unseen through the timber. Two 20-pounder Parrotts rifled guns were silently advanced to a masked position. When all was ready, the cannon were unlimbered, loaded, and manhandled to the crest. Opening fire, the can-

noneers Silfversparre's Battery H, 1st Illinois Light Artillery, wrecked the house and dislodged the defenders. Sherman's infantry, at the first cannon shot, dashed forward, crossed the field, and drove the Southerners across the ridge and field beyond into another dense forest. The attack, watched by Grant and Thomas, gave Sherman possession of a ridge within 1,300 yards of the salient Confederate fortification complex that guarded the ground where the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and the Purdy road entered the rebel works.

By 10:00 A.M., Sherman brought up artillery and threw out a host of skirmishers. The Confederates had reinforced their picket line, and their artillery mounted in the salient east of the railroad hammered the Federals. At 3:00 P.M. Sherman's skirmishers were attacked by a strong force of Confederates and compelled to give ground. Reinforcements were called up, Union resistance stiffened, and the Confederates withdrew.

Under cover of darkness, the engineers having examined the terrain, Sherman's reinforced division entrenched what was the sixth fortified line his men had constructed since they turned their first dirt of the advance on May 4th. This sixth position lay within 1,300 yards of the Confederates' main line of resistance. Sherman's right was anchored near the railroad at the Bowie Hill Cut, and his left on the Purdy road at the crest of a ridge, where he connected with Hurlbut's division. By 4:00 P.M. on May 29, artillery had been brought forward and emplaced in the works completed by Sherman's troops during the previous night.

**Buell's Army of the Ohio Presses the Confederate Center.** All was quiet along the 2-mile front held by the Army of the Ohio from May 18 until May 27 with one exception. On the 21st, Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick's brigade of Nelson's division, having assembled at the Driver house, made a forced reconnaissance in front of Wood's division. The Federal probe advanced 1 mile, crossed a high open ridge, and gained a position in front of Widow Surratt's house within a mile of the Confederate fortifications. Here his skirmishers encountered Confederates in large numbers. Sedgewick reinforced his skirmish line and called up and unlimbered his artillery. The Confederates

increased their commitment, and for some 45 minutes a desperate small unit action ensued before the Confederates pulled back. At dark, in response to orders from Buell, Sedgewick and his soldiers returned to their camp. The day-long activity cost Sedgewick 3 men killed and 23 wounded. The Confederates made no report of the action or casualties, although 35 newly dug Confederate graves were discovered at the site after the Southerners abandoned the area.

On the 26th, the day before Sherman's fight for, and occupation of, the double-log house, Buell called up his reserve division — Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook's — and deployed it in front of Thomas Sherman's and Wood's rifle pits. In this position McCook's men bivouacked. Early the next morning, they pressed ahead and, after a spate of small arms fire, compelled the Confederate pickets to withdraw across Bridge Creek. Cannoneers of Battery H, 5th U.S. Artillery, took advantage of McCook's thrust to establish a gun battery on high ground to the right, from where they enfiladed the Bridge Creek bottom and the road to Widow Surratt's house.

The next day, May 28, Buell exploited these gains by advancing three of his four divisions. On the right, McCook's men drove the enemy from and occupied Surratt's Hill, giving them a commanding position within 1,000 yards of the Confederate earthworks overlooking Phillips Creek. Nelson's division, spearheaded by Sedgewick's brigade, crossed Bridge Creek on the Farmington-Corinth road, and took position 1,300 yards east of the Confederate defenses overlooking Phillips Creek. Crittenden gained 1,200 yards and occupied ground to Nelson's left and rear with his left flank refused. These forward movements were resisted by Confederate skirmishers, but Union losses were light.

The Confederates employed artillery and Col. Joseph Wheeler counter-attacked three times in futile efforts to recover the Farmington road bridge seized by Sedgewick's soldiers. However, Buell's men had come to stay. Entrenching tools were brought up and, by daybreak on the 29th, the three Union divisions had thrown up earthworks.

**Pope's Army of the Mississippi Pounds the Confederates.** During the five days following the May 22 alert, General Pope's division commanders rotated responsibility for sending out combat teams to drive in Confederate pickets and reconnoiter the ground west of Farmington. On May 24, Stanley, concerned about the punishment meted out by enemy sharpshooters to his pickets, called out his most aggressive regimental commander, Col. Joseph Mower. With a battalion each from the 11th Missouri and 39th Ohio and the 10-pounder Parrotts of Dees' Battery C, 1st Michigan, Mower charged westward into the woods and sent the Confederates fleeing. He then brought up two of the rifled Parrotts, and the Michiganders fired a dozen shells into Corinth. On the 26th, Hamilton sent Col. Nicholas Perczel of the 5th Iowa, reinforced, and two sections of artillery on a reconnaissance south along the Danville road. Confederates were encountered in superior numbers and, after a brisk skirmish, Perczel recalled his men and returned to camp.

Meanwhile, Pope's army had been strengthened. The division led by Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, recently detached from Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis' Army of the Southwest, had marched from West Plains, Missouri, to Cape Girardeau. After boarding steamboats on May 22, the division ascended the Tennessee River and debarked at Hamburg Landing on the 25th and 26th. Davis's troops marched inland the next day and by nightfall on the 27th they encamped along the Hamburg road, 2 miles east of Farmington.

On May 28, in cooperation with the forward movement of Buell's Army of the Ohio, Pope's divisions pushed forward on a broad front. Paine's troops gained a mile and, after occupying the Danville-Farmington road ridge, entrenched. Stanley's advance carried his division into line on Paine's right. Reaching the White house overlooking Bridge Creek, his men halted in double lines and threw up rifle pits. His right flank rested within 1,800 yards of the nearest Confederate works, and his center faced the formidable Confederate artillery emplacements  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile to the south on Railroad Hill, some 100 yards below the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. At noon Union and Confederate artillery opened fire: two of Stanley's

batteries — Dee's Battery C, 1st Michigan, and Maurice's Battery F, 2nd U.S. Artillery — engaged four guns in the Railroad Hill emplacements. A large Confederate force, approaching in three columns, took advantage of this diversion to cross Bridge Creek and assailed the right of Stanley's division at the White house. After a brief fight, the Southerners recoiled, leaving more than 50 dead for the Union troops to bury.

Hamilton's and Davis' divisions also advanced. Hamilton's troops pushed south on the Jacinto road and, on coming into line on Paine's left, halted and entrenched. A six-gun battery was established with its cannon sighted to the southeast to guard against a flank attack. Davis' division, each soldier carrying two days' rations and 100 rounds of ammunition, filed into and occupied the Farmington earthworks erected by Paine's and Stanley's troops following their May 17 reoccupation of the village.

For ease of handling, Pope organized his Army of the Mississippi into right and left wings. Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, a newcomer to the region, assumed command of the right wing, consisting of Paine's and Stanley's divisions, and Hamilton, as senior officer, led the two left wing divisions — his and Davis' divisions.

During the morning of May 29 Confederate guns in the Railroad Hill battery exchanged volleys with the two 20-pounder Parrotts manned by Maurice's Battery F, 2nd U.S., emplaced on White house ridge. The Federals soon ceased fire in response to orders from Pope. Later, Capt. George Williams, commanding the heavy siege artillery, fired on Pope's orders. Still later, Williams fired, by Pope's order, and three 30-pounder Parrott shells were sent screaming into Corinth. One of these burst near the railroad crossover, killing a locomotive engineer and wounding four trainmen. This shelling alarmed the Confederate generals, because they feared the Federals might indiscriminately bombard the town.

The same day, Hamilton advanced a two-regiment combat patrol under Col. Samuel A. Holmes. The Federals reconnoitered south on the Jacinto road and encountered aggressive Confederates. After shots were exchanged, Holmes returned to camp.

### Booneville Raid of May 27-30

Meanwhile, on May 27, Col. Washington Elliott with two Federal cavalry regiments — the 2nd Iowa and 2nd Michigan — departed camps northeast of Farmington. Elliott was to penetrate the country south of Corinth and strike, if possible, the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. On the road at 1:00 A.M., the horse soldiers rode east through rugged countryside. They crossed successively Yellow Creek and the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and bivouacked at 2:00 A.M., on the 28th, at Thompson's, 6 miles south of Iuka.

At daybreak, Elliott had his men in the saddle. They traveled southwest via poor roads through the Tombigbee swamps. The raiders entered Booneville, on the Mobile & Ohio, some 25 miles south of Corinth at daybreak on May 29. The town was crowded with some 2,000 to 3,000 sick and convalescent Confederate soldiers. An infantry regiment was reportedly camped on the railroad south of town, and a battalion of cavalry was said to be encamped north along the railroad guarding the bridge and trestle spanning Kings Creek. A disabled locomotive and 26 cars stood near the railroad depot.

The telegraph line was cut, and the tracks north and south of town were torn up, rails bent, and ties burned. While Col. Philip H. Sheridan's 2nd Michigan troopers wreaked havoc on the railroad south of Booneville, they were interrupted by a detachment of Tennessee horse soldiers led by Col. W.R. Bradfute. Sheridan had little trouble in rallying his Michiganders and driving off the smaller Confederate force. The railroad cars, five of which were loaded with artillery ammunition, and the depot, were torched. Before doing so, the Federals saw that most of the hospitalized Confederates were removed beyond the blast zone when the powder and shells exploded.

After paroling some 500 to 700 convalescent Confederate infantry and taking about 40 mounted Southerners as prisoners, Col. Elliott recalled his horse soldiers "playing smash with the railroad," and at 9:00 A.M. evacuated Booneville and headed northeast. As they rode along for the first few hours, they heard explosions as fires they had set



reached and exploded ammunition. The brigade returned to its Farmington camp at 8:00 p.m. on May 31, having ridden 180 miles during its four-day raid. They now learned that Halleck's "army group" had been in possession of Corinth for more than 36 hours.

### Confederates Evacuate Corinth

The 48 hours following Van Dorn's May 22 failure to get his Army of the West in position to trigger an all-out attack on Halleck's "army group," before it could entrench the occupied ground on May 21, caused Confederate leaders to reevaluate their situation. Beauregard and his generals now concluded that Corinth was untenable. The water was insufficient and bad, being charged with magnesia and rotten limestone. Obstinate strains of typhoid and dysentery had felled thousands and sent hundreds, including Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Hogg, to early graves. An attempt to bore artesian wells had failed. In April and May nearly as many Confederates died of disease in Corinth as had been killed at Shiloh, and many thousands more were too ill to fight. Thus, few sound men were left. Northern troops also suffered much from disease, which daily increased with an accelerated ratio, significantly reducing effective troop strength since late April, and at least half the Federal generals — including Halleck — were afflicted with chronic dysentery.

Desertion further thinned the Confederate ranks, as several thousand soldiers, having grown despondent with the progress of the war, hit the bush and returned home. Also, most of the initial one-year enlistments for Southern volunteers faced termination in late April and May. Had the Confederate government not conscripted, on April 16, for three years' service all white males between 18 and 35 years of age, large numbers of war weary soldiers throughout the Confederacy would have most assuredly departed the ranks. Although Beauregard's effective strength had risen slightly during May, his "army group" was still vastly inferior in numbers to the United States forces.

Strategically, Beauregard's ability to realistically defend Corinth and repel the Union investment had grown increasingly doubtful. Thomas' Army of

the Tennessee had a stranglehold on the Mobile & Ohio north of town, while Union cavalry from Pope's Army of the Mississippi had, on May 3, and again on the 22nd, struck the Memphis & Charleston between Glendale and Iuka, cutting the telegraph and wreaking havoc on the right-of-way by torching trestles, bending rails, and destroying switches. In fact, Beauregard's direct east-west communications had remained severed since April 11th, when a 10,000-man Federal force under Brig. Gen. Ormsby M. Mitchell, elements of Buell's command left to occupy Middle Tennessee, had seized and occupied Huntsville, Alabama. Two days later, a Union combat team led by William T. Sherman had disembarked from steamboats at Chickasaw Landing, Alabama, and, before returning to Pittsburg Landing, had destroyed the 220-foot bridge carrying the Memphis & Ohio across Bear Creek. These Federal operations within, and occupation of, the northern tier of counties in Alabama effectively severed the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and forced Beauregard to utilize a more circuitous route of communication and supply to adequately link the Mississippi Valley with the eastern Confederacy.

On May 27, Beauregard issued detailed instructions to govern the evacuation of Corinth and its defenses and a withdrawal down the Mobile & Ohio toward Baldwyn. The evacuation was skillfully carried out. To avoid an attack, Beauregard had to keep the movement secret. Throughout the night of May 29-30 Beauregard orchestrated a perfect deception by running a succession of empty trains into the town while whistles blew and troops cheered as if massive reinforcements were arriving. Instead, Beauregard used the ruse to send off by railroad his sick and wounded men, his heavy artillery, and tons of valuable supplies. Meanwhile, his effective troops quietly retired from their camps and forward positions in the entrenchments to march south out of town. By morning the Confederates had abandoned Corinth, with Halleck suspecting nothing but continued resistance. At dawn, smoke and explosions from burning supplies and ordnance alerted the Federals to the deception. Federal patrols pushed forward to the Confederate rifle pits and found the trenches vacant. Beauregard had stolen a march on Halleck. The Confederates continued southward and

reached relative safety at Tupelo on June 9. The Union pursuit was ineffective.

In retrospect, Beauregard had saved his 53,000 effectives, and another nearly 22,000 sick and wounded men to fight again, in spite of the overwhelming numbers that Halleck had deployed against him. Combat losses were not high, because, after Shiloh, neither army appeared eager for another savage battle. The generals evaluated their tactics in a futile effort to adjust to the technological revolution in weaponry underscored by the infantry now being armed with rifle muskets, with a killing range of 600 yards, instead of smoothbore muskets, with a 60-yard effective range. Halleck, a cautious commander, was not about to be surprised as Grant had been at Shiloh. As his men had daily inched forward, they hastily entrenched. To buy time, Beauregard had employed large numbers of skirmishers to slow the Union advance and keep the Federals from seizing ground from which their artillery could command the Confederate fortifications and roads and railroads linking Corinth with Memphis to the west and Tupelo to the south. To defeat the enemy, the Confederates sought to take advantage of errors on the part of Halleck and his generals "to draw the enemy out of his entrenched positions and separate his closed masses for a battle." But, in this, they had failed, once on May 9 and again on the 22nd.

Beauregard reported that the Confederate retreat from Corinth "was conducted with great order and precision" and "must be looked upon, in every respect, by the country as equivalent to a brilliant victory." Northern newspaper reporters, as well as Federal authorities, agreed with him and saw a lost opportunity to crush the enemy army. However, Beauregard's many critics, including President Jefferson Davis, saw greater prophetic truth in his earlier assertion that losing Corinth would result in loss of the Mississippi Valley.

## THE LONG, HOT SUMMER OF 1862

### Federals Capitalize on the Capture of Corinth

The loss of Corinth and its strategic railroad crossover had immediate consequences for the

Confederacy. On the Mississippi River, 120 miles to the northwest, the Confederates, who since April 17 had checkmated the ironclads and rams of the Mississippi squadron, were outflanked. Under cover of darkness on June 4, the Southerners pulled out of Fort Pillow, which was occupied by Union forces the next day. The Federal naval squadron started downstream, and on June 6, while thousands of citizens watched from the Memphis bluffs, the Union vessels smashed the Confederate River Defense Fleet. Memphis was surrendered, and the Federals rapidly secured the Memphis & Charleston Railroad to beyond Corinth. While the gunboats prepared to steam downriver against the Confederate bastion of Vicksburg, Union raids and expeditions carried the war into southwestern Tennessee and the northern tier of Mississippi counties, resulting in numerous skirmishes throughout the late spring and summer. After the occupation of Corinth, the Federals began to rebuild the area's railroads. They felt their way toward Tupelo but did not force the Confederates to retreat farther south. There were important changes in the Union command: Pope went to Virginia to lead the newly constituted Army of Virginia, and Halleck was called to Washington in mid-July to become general-in-chief. Grant resumed command of the District of West Tennessee, and, under him, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans took charge of Pope's Army of the Mississippi, which assumed responsibility for defense of the Corinth area. Buell's Army of the Ohio headed eastward into the Tennessee Valley, rebuilding the Memphis & Charleston Railroad as it marched.

### Confederate Flood Tide

Beauregard went on sick leave in mid-June 1862, and President Jefferson Davis capitalized on this opportunity to replace the general, in whom he placed little faith, with Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, an aggressive fighter who commanded his confidence. Bragg started off with a flurry of activity. He employed railroads to shuttle his infantry south to Mobile, then northeast via southern Alabama and Georgia to Chattanooga, where he arrived ahead of Buell. On his departure from Tupelo, Bragg left the Army of the West, now led by Maj. Gen. Sterling

Price, to guard northeast Mississippi. From Chattanooga, Bragg put the Army of the Mississippi in motion for Kentucky with Buell following. Both armies marched hard and quickly with the Confederates at first enjoying the advantage. This was lost, however, when Bragg turned his columns eastward into the Bluegrass counties to rendezvous with the army Maj. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith had led into eastern Kentucky in late August. Buell was permitted to reach Louisville, where he regrouped and reorganized his army preparatory to taking the offensive.

During the race for Kentucky, Bragg, having received reports the Federals were pulling troops out of northeast Mississippi to reinforce Buell, called on Price to cross the Tennessee River and threaten Nashville. Price was also being pressured by his immediate superior — Van Dorn — to join forces at Holly Springs, Mississippi. With the Union navy having retired from its failed effort to seize Vicksburg, Van Dorn desired to mount an offensive into West Tennessee and required the addition of Price's force to attempt the difficult operation. Confronted by these contradictory orders, Price hesitated for several days. He then marched as Bragg directed and advanced his force northeast from Baldwyn and Guntown. Price's column entered Iuka, Mississippi, on September 13, where he again hesitated.

#### **Battle of Iuka, September 19, 1862**

Grant took advantage of Price's pause at Iuka. Reinforcements were rushed to Corinth and a converging attack on Price was planned. Grant, with three divisions, advanced from Corinth along the Memphis & Charleston Railroad by way of Burnsville and approached Iuka from the west; Rosecrans, with two divisions of his Army of the Mississippi, marched from Jacinto southwest of Iuka. The Federals planned to attack at daybreak on September 19.

Rosecrans' column was delayed, and Grant, having advanced two columns beyond Yellow Creek, deployed his troops 4 miles west of Iuka and waited. Price formed his two divisions north and west of town to confront Grant and watched the Jacinto

road with cavalry. About 2:30 P.M. Price learned of Rosecrans' approach and rushed an infantry brigade from Brig. Gen. Henry Little's division to defend the Jacinto road. Another brigade from Little's command followed and savage combat raged in the rugged and wooded countryside on the eastern slopes of Woodall Mountain. Price's veterans, although outnumbered two to one, more than held their own.

Throughout the late afternoon, as Rosecrans' troops gave ground, Grant's divisions faced a decreasing Confederate battle line northwest of Iuka. A strong northwest wind was present, and no noise of battle reached Grant or any element of his immediate command. As the sound of Rosecrans' guns was to signal the advance, Grant's troops continued to hold their ground. At dusk, the savage carnage southwest of Iuka sputtered out and both combatants rested. Price at first hoped to resume the fight on September 20, but, confronted by superior numbers on both flanks, he listened to the counsel of subordinates. The Confederates took advantage of the darkness to disengage their troops, steal a march on the Federals, and returned to Baldwyn where Price received instructions from Van Dorn. Rosecrans' losses in the engagement were 144 killed, 598 wounded, and 40 missing. Price reported 86 killed and 496 wounded. Among the Confederate dead was Brig. Gen. Little, a particularly valuable veteran officer.

#### **Grant Divides His Command, September 24, 1862**

On September 24 Grant issued General Orders No. 83 dividing his command, the District of West Tennessee, into four divisions. The First Division would be headquartered at Memphis; the Second Division at Jackson or Bolivar, Tennessee; the Third Division at Corinth; and the Fourth Division at Columbus, Kentucky. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans was assigned command (assumed on September 26) at Corinth. This division embraced all the territory occupied by the Army of the Mississippi and by the forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward O.C. Ord. It would be the duty of this division to guard the railroad south from Bethel to Chewalla in Tennessee so far as the country was occupied by Union forces.

## Battle of Corinth, October 3-4, 1862

There would be no rest for Price's Army of the West. From Baldwyn it marched to Ripley, where on September 28, Price rendezvoused with Van Dorn's column. As senior officer, Van Dorn took command. He marched northward with 22,000 men and 64 cannon and, on October 1, occupied Pocahontas on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, 18 miles northwest of Corinth. Van Dorn was faced with the options of continuing north to attack Bolivar, move west to threaten Memphis, or turn southeast against Corinth. He decided the priority was to defeat the Union garrison at Corinth, the linchpin to control of northeast Mississippi, and establish a railroad supplied base of operations from which he could mount the projected invasion of West Tennessee. Thus, Van Dorn turned his columns southeast toward Corinth, crossed the Hatchie River at Davis Bridge, and bivouacked at Chewalla. The advance was resumed at daybreak on October 3.

Before Halleck left Corinth for Washington in mid-July, he had ordered that a defensive line be constructed to protect Corinth against a Confederate force approaching from the west or south. Rosecrans deemed these fortifications too extensive to be manned by the forces available and questioned Grant, his immediate superior, about them. Grant agreed to a modification of the Corinth defenses — a modified system of artillery redoubts erected to only protect the vital supply magazines in and around the railroad crossover. The northernmost artillery redoubts of the Halleck line, among them Battery F, lay between the original Confederate entrenchments and Corinth. Thus, when Rosecrans learned of the Confederate occupation of Pocahontas, his modified defensive positions, although still incomplete, were much shorter and more easily defended than Beauregard's Confederate lines had been the previous spring.

This interior line of defensive redoubts consisted of Batteries Robinett, Williams, Phillips, Tannrath, and Lothrop, in the College Hill area. Rosecrans gave orders to connect the redoubts by breastworks and to strengthen them, where possible, by abatis — logs sharpened and pointed outward in front of the earthworks for greater defense. The inner line was

also extended to cover the northern approaches of the town. Battery Powell, although unfinished when the fighting began, was laid out for this purpose.

On October 2, Rosecrans learned Van Dorn's Confederates were closing on Corinth from the northwest. This put Van Dorn between Rosecrans and any reinforcements he might receive from Grant at Jackson and Bolivar, Tennessee.

Arriving 3 miles northwest of Corinth at 10:00 A.M., on October 3, Van Dorn deployed his three divisions and pressed toward the line of works erected by the Confederates six months before. Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell's division was on the right and Price's Army of the West, with divisions commanded by Brig. Gen. Dabney H. Maury and Brig. Gen. Louis Hébert, on the left. Rosecrans had called in his outpost detachments and massed four divisions, 23,000 strong, to defend Corinth. Before daybreak on October 3, three of his divisions — Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McKean's on the left, Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies' in the center, and Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton's on the right — moved out from their camps and took position midway between the Federal redoubts thrown up in and around Corinth and the old Beauregard trenches, north and northwest of town. Several regiments advanced and took cover in the rifle pits. The fourth division — Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley's — was held in reserve south of Corinth.

On the Confederate right, Lovell's brigades drove the Union skirmishers across Cane Creek and engaged three regiments of McKean's division deployed on the ridge where the Memphis & Charleston Railroad and the Chewalla road passed through the Beauregard line. Brig. Gen. John McArthur, commanding McKean's 1st Brigade, deemed it vital to hold this ridge and advanced five regiments to reinforce the three already posted there. Davies also secured permission from Rosecrans to move his division forward to the Beauregard defenses. McArthur's and Davies' advances were eccentric, and a large gap opened between the former's right and Davies' left. A bitter fight ensued for possession of the heights bordering the deep railroad cut, between McArthur's eight regiments and Lovell's three brigades. East of

*"When they encountered the abatis - an obstruction of felled trees, with sharpened and interwoven branches - the formation was necessarily somewhat broken, just as the enemy's artillery began to blast and wither the moving mass of men; but each man, though but an atom of the fiery storm, moved with a separate though strangely cooperative intelligence, advancing with remarkable rapidity toward the common objective, Fort Robinett."*

*—Thomas Duncan of  
the 2nd Texas Infantry*

Turner Creek and west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, Davies' dispersed division grimly held Beauregard's old breastworks against a slashing attack by Price's corps.

At mid-day, under heavy fire from the Federals posted to the left and right, the tough veterans from Dabney's division struggled up the steep slopes through a tangle of dense abatis. Within 15 minutes, Price's men were standing within the trenches, having penetrated the unmanned gap in the Union line. From this lodgment between the two Federal divisions, the Confederates had the leverage they needed to exploit the initiative. To prevent a disastrous breakthrough, McArthur's and Davies' troops pulled back 1 mile, closed the gap, and reformed some 900 yards in front of the Rosecrans redoubts. Davies refused his right flank and McArthur his left, anchoring the flank on Battery F. There McArthur and Brig. Gen. Marcellus M. Crocker's Hawkeye Brigade of McKean's division faced north to engage part of Maury's division driving southward across the Memphis & Charleston Railroad to attack Battery F from the north. Lovell's Confederates, extending farther to the south, outflanked McKean's troops posted in Batteries D and E, and approached the College Hill redoubts from the west. This forced McArthur and Crocker to retreat into these redoubts.

At the same time, the bulk of Price's Army of the West assailed Davies' division, hurling it back upon Battery Robinett, where it rallied. Col. Joseph H. Mower's brigade of Stanley's division was rushed to Davies' assistance during the retreat. Stanley had alerted his other two brigades to march, when, at 6:00 p.m., Van Dorn realized his troops were exhausted. Certain that he could win a complete and overwhelming victory in the morning, Van Dorn called a halt to the day's fighting. Rosecrans had been driven back nearly 2 miles, and three of his four divisions had taken refuge in the redoubts. Confederate pickets spent the night within several hundred yards of the Federal strongholds.

Rosecrans' troops, notwithstanding Van Dorn's successes, were not disheartened. The Union commander hastily redeployed his forces during the night. The Federal divisions were massed on the arc of a circle, less than 2 miles in length, with prepared

redoubts supporting key points. McKean's division was posted on the left in the neighborhood of Corona College and Battery Phillips, west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and south of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Stanley's division anchored its left at Battery Williams south of the Memphis & Charleston, and its right in and around Battery Robinett, 200 yards north of the railroad. Both redoubts lay less than 700 yards west of the railroad junction. Stanley relieved Davies' mauled division, which retired to Battery Powell, north of Corinth. With their right flank anchored on the uncompleted earthwork, Davies' men formed facing northwest. Hamilton's division constituted the army's extreme right beyond Davies' men and faced north.

In arranging his divisions for a dawn attack, Van Dorn kept his divisions in the same alignment they had held the previous day. Lovell on the right, south of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, deployed on high ground west of Battery Phillips; Maury's division in the center in front (north) of Battery Robinett; and Hébert's on the left, reinforced with a brigade from Maury, massed along the Mobile & Ohio Railroad north of the town. Hébert was to open the fight at daybreak and, pivoting on his right, advance down the Purdy road ridge to assault Battery Powell; Maury was to open with his artillery on Battery Robinett and then send his infantry into town; and Lovell, as soon as the divisions to the left were engaged, was to attack vigorously from the southwest.

Van Dorn's plan miscarried when Hébert became sick. It was 9:00 A.M. on October 4 before his replacement, Brig. Gen. Martin E. Green, took charge and sent the troops forward. When Green's formation finally advanced, it was with four brigades deployed *en echelon*, the left thrown forward. As the division pivoted on its right, the troops advanced and stormed Battery Powell.

Meanwhile, in front of Battery Robinett, Maury's three brigades, engaged in an intense firefight with Federal sharpshooters, had already taken up the attack. Out in front, Brig. Gen. Charles W. Phifer's brigade spearheaded the attack. Four regimental columns, 100 yards apart, moved against Battery Robinett. As Phifer's men surged forward, they were pounded by Union artillery, first with shell

and then canister. The left column — the 9th Texas Cavalry (dismounted) — sought to make its way down into the low ground to the right of the redoubt, but was checkmated by the right flank regiments belonging to Col. John W. Fuller's Ohio Brigade. The two right assault columns — the 3<sup>rd</sup> Arkansas Cavalry (dismounted) and Stirman's Sharpshooters — came on rapidly, because they advanced along the point of a ridge where there were only a few felled trees. A murderous storm of musketry from Fuller's men and artillery fire from the Federal redoubts, however, quickly brought Phifer's advance to a halt. Sometime during the engagement, Rosecrans rode to the point of danger and instructed the 27th Ohio and 11th Missouri to kneel to the right and rear of Robinett to get out of the enemy's line of fire, and — the moment the Confederates came to a stand — to charge with bayonets.

The initial assault wave stalled, Brig. Gen. John Moore's brigade now came forward, passed over and through Phifer's Texans and Arkansans, and fought its way toward Battery Robinett. Gallantly conspicuous on horseback, Col. William P. Rogers, a Mexican War comrade of President Jefferson Davis, advanced at the head of his veteran regiment — the 2nd Texas Infantry — leading successive charges against the Union bastion.

Capt. George A. Williams of the 1<sup>st</sup> U.S. Infantry, whose regulars converted into artillerists manned the three 20-pounder Parrotts emplaced in Battery Robinett, reported the Confederates initially:

gained the ditch, but were repulsed. During this charge 8 of the enemy, having placed a handkerchief on a bayonet and calling to the men in the battery not to shoot them, surrendered, and were allowed to come into the fort. They then reformed, and restorming carried the ditch and the outside of the work, the supports having fallen a short distance to the rear in slight disorder.

The men of the First U.S. Infantry, after having been driven from their guns [in Robinett], resorted to their muskets and were firing from the inside of the embrasures at the enemy on the outside, a distance of about 10 feet intervening; but the rebels, having gained the top of the work, our men fell back into the angle of the fort, as they had been directed to do in such an emergency. Two shells were thrown from Battery Williams into Battery Robinett, one bursting on top of it and the other near the right edge.

The ranks of Moore's brigade, like Phifer's before, were cut to pieces by the deadly musketry delivered at point blank range by the determined Ohio Brigade. In response to orders, the 11th Missouri and 27th Ohio sprang to their feet, and along with the survivors of the 63rd Ohio, charged into the Confederates struggling to sustain the attack in front of Robinett. Volleys of musketry decimated the Confederate ranks and sent the survivors reeling northward. The victorious Federals pursued the shattered Confederate regiments back into the woods from which less than 30 minutes before they had confidently emerged. Among the Confederates cut down below the bastion of Battery Robinett was Col. Rogers of the 2nd Texas.

The volley that killed him probably came from the 63rd Ohio, which in the fury of the countercharge received shouted orders from their commander, Col. John W. Sprague, to shoot the man on horseback. The Ohioans responded, and when the volley ripped the air the horse and rider collapsed near the stump of a tree, only a few yards from the northernmost embrasure of Battery Robinett. Later, while removing the Confederate dead from the battlefield, Union survivors found that Rogers had been hit by at least seven minie balls fired from close range, rendering the body armor he wore all but useless.

A number of Maury's troops, advancing southward down the Elam Creek bottom to the east of Battery Robinett and west of Battery Powell, fought their

*"We are at the Tishomingo Hotel, which, like every other large building, has been taken for a hospital. The yellow flag is flying from the top of each. Mrs. Ogden tried to prepare me for the scenes which I should witness upon entering the wards. But alas! Nothing that I had ever heard or read has given me the faintest idea of the horrors witnessed here. I do not think that words are in our vocabulary expressive enough to present to the mind the realities of that sad scene. Certainly, none of the glories of the war were presented here."*

*—Kate Cumming, hospital volunteer from Mobile, Alabama*

way into Corinth. There they joined perhaps 2,000 soldiers from Green's command, which had overrun Battery Powell and hurled Davies' badly mauled division southward through town. A Confederate staff officer, Capt. Edward H. Cummins, reported that upon entering Corinth, General "Maury's troops obtained the ground from the Tishomingo Hotel, northward towards Bragg's (old) headquarters [the Veranda House]." Green's men, on the left, held the (Federal) works north of the town and occupied the square and mingled with Maury's troops near the depot. Caught in a counterattack converging on the railroad crossover from the east, south, and west, the Confederates in town were soon driven back in disorder. Battery Powell was recovered by the Federals, and by 1 P.M., with Lovell's division deployed as rear guard, Van Dorn's shattered army limped northwest in full retreat. Strangely, Lovell's division did not participate in the morning attack but spent the morning lightly demonstrating in front of the formidable College Hill defenses while Lovell reconnoitered the Union defenses. His failure to act and advance his brigades to attack generated considerable debate and great controversy in the years to come. After reconnoitering the field, Rosecrans decided not to start a pursuit until the next day.

Van Dorn was criticized for his conduct of the campaign, and serious charges were brought against him by one of his subordinates. A court of inquiry convened at Abbeville, however, exonerated Van Dorn. But at Corinth, as at Pea Ridge in March, Van Dorn had demonstrated he was incapable of leading an army to victory. Soon he would be transferred to the cavalry, where, in the few months left to him, he would score his only spectacular successes — the Holly Springs' Raid and the Battle of Thompson's Station.

#### **BATTLE OF DAVIS BRIDGE, OCTOBER 5, 1862**

The battered Confederate divisions under Van Dorn spent the night of the 4th at Chewalla, Tennessee. Upon learning Van Dorn's force had moved to attack Corinth, Grant rushed Maj. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut, commanding a detachment of 8,000 men of the Army of West Tennessee, south-

east from Bolivar to Davis Bridge on the Hatchie River. If Hurlbut discovered the enemy retreating, he was to destroy the bridge and contest their crossing of the river. In addition, Grant had directed his chief engineer, Brig. Gen. James McPherson, to march a brigade from Bethel Station, Tennessee "with all speed" to reinforce Corinth. Meanwhile, at Corinth, Rosecrans was to take up pursuit the next day and overtake Van Dorn's retreating column and destroy it.

After covering 23 miles on October 4, Hurlbut's column bivouacked on the State Line road along Big Muddy Creek, 3 miles west of Davis Bridge. Meanwhile, his cavalry had driven the pickets of Col. Wirt Adams' Mississippi Cavalry eastward to Metamora, a hamlet situated on a high ridge surrounding the junction of the State Line, Ripley, and Pocahontas roads, overlooking the Davis farm and wooded banks of the Hatchie River to the east. A late afternoon counterattack forced the Federal troopers back toward the Big Muddy, where darkness ended further action. At 8:00 A.M. the next morning, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord overtook the column and assumed command of the Union forces. Ord pressed the advance and in less than an hour seized the high ridge at Metamora, unlimbered artillery and opened a vigorous bombardment on Davis Bridge and an advancing column of Confederates engaged in crossing the river.

Maury's shattered Confederate division of Price's Corps departed Chewalla early and reached the bridge before Ord could effectively block a crossing. Part of John C. Moore's brigade managed to join Lt. Col. E. R. Hawkin's 1st Texas Legion and Capt. Dawson's Missouri Battery west of the river. Moore established a line of battle on Burr's branch, 1,000 yards east of Metamora, to defend the bridge. Under cover of an artillery bombardment, Ord advanced Brig. Gen. James C. Veatch's infantry brigade, which quickly overran the Confederate line. Moore's defenders fell back, reeling across the bridge. Several hundred Confederates, along with four of Dawson's cannon, were cut off and captured. Others, unable to reach the crossing, threw down their weapons and swam the muddy water to escape.

Veatch's soldiers, led by Ord, seized the rickety bridge and charged across the river. In a thicket east of the crossing, the Union troops encountered a murderous fire of canister, shot and shell, and musketry from the Confederates posted on the wooded heights east of the river. Price reinforced Moore with Maury's entire division, and the Confederates pounded the congested river bend at point blank range. The Union attack stalled and casualties mounted. Troops from Brig. Gen. Jacob Lauman's brigade, sent to Veatch's support, were likewise driven to the ground. Ord himself toppled onto the bridge, shot in the leg.

Familiar with the terrain, Hurlbut assumed Union command and advanced batteries across the bridge to support a fresh assault. While the rest of Lauman's men crossed the river, Veatch extended the Federal line northward. By mid-afternoon, with artillery and two brigades east of the river, Hurlbut increased the pressure on the Confederates. The Federal troops seized the crown of the hill at 5:00 P.M.

Three miles east, at Young's Bridge on the Tuscumbia River, the Confederate rear guard, under Brig. Gen. John S. Bowen, repulsed Rosecrans' ponderously slow moving pursuit column led by McPherson, torched the bridge, and retired west of the river. For a while at least, the Confederate rear was secure.

Alerted at mid-morning about the Federal column approaching Davis Bridge from Bolivar, Van Dorn realized his badly mauled army faced imminent danger of being trapped between converging Union columns. Thus, he had looked to Maury to hold off Ord's advance while scouts secured another crossing of the Hatchie at Crum's Mill 6 miles further south. While Price's corps held Hurlbut at bay, the artillery and 500 wagons in the supply train, followed by the rest of the Confederate army, tramped south on the Bone Yard road to Crum's. By 1:00 A.M., October 6th, Van Dorn's forces were safely across the river. Despite the disorder in his ranks, he had been able to stay one step ahead of the Federals.

The savage fight at Davis Bridge, honored with the battle designation "Hell on the Hatchie" on many

Union regimental flags, resulted in some 570 Union casualties and roughly 400 (mostly captured) Confederate casualties. The Confederates retreated southwestward, followed as far as Ripley by Rosecrans' command, where Grant ordered his subordinate general to abandon the movement and return to Corinth. Van Dorn's weary column reached Holly Springs on October 13. Grant's decision to halt the pursuit meant the Confederates retained a viable force to oppose future Union operations in northern Mississippi.

Van Dorn's bold offensive had failed. Although he prevented Grant from detaching additional troops to oppose Bragg in Kentucky, he failed to defeat Rosecrans and recapture the important Corinth rail center. More significantly, Van Dorn's failed attempt to capture Corinth, the last Confederate offensive in Mississippi, seriously weakened the only mobile Confederate army in the state. For the numbers of combatants engaged, the battle fought at Corinth on October 3-4, 1862, ranks as one of the Civil War's most bitter episodes of applied violence. Union losses in the two-day struggle were 355 killed, 1,841 wounded, and 324 missing for a total of 2,359 out of 23,000 soldiers engaged. The Confederate losses were staggering, listed at 505 killed, 2,150 wounded, and 2,183 missing, for a total of 4,838 out of 22,000 men engaged. Van Dorn's army suffered, in percentage of numbers engaged, casualties equal to those recorded by Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia the previous month (September 17) at Antietam near Sharpsburg, Maryland.

The Confederate forces stationed in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, placed under the command of Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton on October 14th, relinquished the initiative to the more aggressive Ulysses S. Grant. One month after the Battle of Corinth, Grant launched a major offensive into Mississippi, beginning a relentless nine-month campaign of conquest to seize fortress Vicksburg, the "Confederate Gibraltar" on the Mississippi River.

*"Gray-haired men - men in the pride of manhood - beardless boys - Federals and all, mutilated in every imaginable way, lying on the floor, just as they were taken from the battle-field; so close together that it was almost impossible to walk without stepping on them. I could not command my feelings enough to speak, but thoughts crowded upon me. O, if the authors of this cruel and unnatural war could but see what I saw there, they would try and put a stop to it! To think, that it is man who is working all this woe upon his fellowman."*

*—Kate Cumming, hospital volunteer from Mobile, Alabama*

*"I sat up all night, bathing the men's wounds, and giving them water. Every one attending to them is completely worn out. Some of the doctors told me that they had scarcely slept since the battle. As far as I have seen, the surgeons are very kind to the wounded, and nurse as well as doctor them. The men are lying all over the [hotel], on their blankets, just as they were brought from the battle-field. They are in the hall, on the gallery, and crowded into very small rooms. The foul air from this mass of human beings at first made me giddy and sick, but I soon got over it. We have to walk, and when we give the men any thing kneel, in blood and water; but we think nothing of it at all."*

—Kate Cumming, hospital  
volunteer from Mobile,  
Alabama

## UNION OCCUPATION OF CORINTH: OCTOBER 1862-JANUARY 1864

Following the Battle of Corinth, on October 26, 1862, Grant issued General Orders No. 2 creating the Districts of Memphis, Jackson, Corinth, and Columbus under his Department of the Tennessee, which extended across northeast Mississippi and portions of Tennessee, Alabama, and Kentucky. Thus, the geographical divisions designated in General Orders No. 83 on September 24 hereafter became known as districts. While occupied by United States forces, Corinth became a fortified bastion and a bustling army depot. The District of Corinth included five fortified posts/camps: Corinth (headquarters), Glendale, and Danville, Mississippi; Bethel, Tennessee; and Tuscumbia, Alabama. The district was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Charles S. Hamilton, having replaced the reassigned Rosecrans. Hamilton was replaced by Brig. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge on October 30 at which time the District of Corinth was redesignated the 3d Division of the Army of the Tennessee (later designated Right Wing, 16th Army Corps, Army of the Tennessee).

An average occupation force of 25,000 Federal troops, mostly volunteers from the Midwestern states, garrisoned the District of Corinth during its 15-month tenure. These soldiers maintained existing fortifications, erected fortified stockade camps, maintained railroad tracks, bridges, and trestles, and performed garrison duties. They conducted periodic raids of the countryside to destroy Confederate facilities and supplies and liberated enslaved African-Americans, bringing them back to Corinth. Occasionally, the garrisoned forces participated in important field operations, such as support of Grant's Central Mississippi Railroad offensive, pursuit of both Van Dorn's and Forrest's strategic raids in December 1862, and support of the opening movements of Streight's April 1863

raid in northwest Alabama. In addition, Corinth district forces fought a number of minor actions and skirmishes with marauding Confederate forces, which actively harassed and probed the district. To better monitor and effectively defend the district, Federal troops erected outpost stockade camps, including Camps Robinett, Montgomery, Davies, Glendale, Clear Creek, Sheldon, and MacIntosh. Established by Company D of the 66th Illinois Infantry and the 5th Ohio Cavalry on November 26, 1862, Camp Davies remains one of the best documented of the stockade outpost camps. It was on a 25-acre plot of ground, 5 miles south of Corinth, in the Tuscumbia Hills overlooking Clear Creek (east) and the Tuscumbia River (south), a short distance west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. The stockade enclosed approximately 10 acres with 13-foot-high log walls, had an exterior ditch excavated to a depth of 6 feet, and consisted of 10 log barracks, Masonic Hall, commissary, and a large hospital. In 1863 a telegraph line was constructed from the camp, easterly to the railroad where lines already existed.

## Contraband Camp

The security offered by United States Army forces occupying Corinth attracted African-Americans who fled Southern plantations and farms seeking freedom. The migration of African-American refugees into occupied Corinth increased dramatically following issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation by President Abraham Lincoln, on September 22, 1862 (11 days before the Battle of Corinth), which authorized, as of January 1, 1863, freedom for all slaves in areas still in rebellion against the United States. By December 1862, Grant reported a sizable population of 20,000 refugee African-Americans being housed, fed, and protected within his department.

The African-Americans who fled into Union lines at Corinth and elsewhere in the Mississippi Valley precipitated a change in Union military policy that would profoundly change their lives and in the end help turn the tide of the war in favor of the North.

General Dodge understood what affect the defection of thousands of African Americans would have on the Confederate war effort. He began to enlist the escaped slaves who came into his lines as teamsters, cooks, and laborers. Dodge also anticipated the change of mood in Washington concerning the potential use of African American men in the army. He actively recruited adult male refugees, armed them, and placed them in charge of security at the newly organized contraband camp for the refugees on the northeast side of Corinth.

Dodge's refugee administrative efforts led to the formation of the 1st Alabama Infantry Regiment of African Descent, consisting of approximately 1,000 men, organized at Corinth on May 21, 1863. The regiment provided a ready reserve of manpower for the garrison, participating in the daily work assignments on railroads and fortifications, foraging patrols, and raids conducted by the Union occupation forces in northern Mississippi and western Tennessee. Eventually, Dodge instructed his raiding parties to liberate more slaves and bring them back to Corinth. These tactics added much needed manpower to the Federal forces and consequently removed their labor services from the Confederacy.

The men of the 1st Alabama Infantry (African Descent) eventually experienced combat in northern Mississippi, at Brice's Crossroads on June 10, 1864, and at Waterford on August 16-17, 1864. After Corinth was abandoned in January 1864, the regiment moved to Memphis where it formed part of the 1st Colored Brigade, District of Memphis, 5th Division, 16th Corps, Army of the Tennessee. The regiment was re-designated the 55th U.S. Colored Troops on March 11, 1864.

Three companies of another regiment (perhaps as many as 319 men), the 2nd Alabama Infantry of African Descent, were also recruited at Corinth during April and May 1863. This regiment was officially organized at Pulaski, Tennessee, between November 20, 1863, and January 14, 1864, and

redesignated the 110th United States Colored Troops. These soldiers would fight at Athens, Alabama, on September 23-24, 1864. By the end of the war at least 1,800 African-American men were recruited for the Union army at Corinth.

The Corinth contraband camp (also referred to as the "contraband retreat" and "contraband corral" in contemporary accounts) was the home of the families of the African American men who marched off to war. It began as a tent city in the fall of 1862 on the Phillips farm owned from 1842 to 1867 by Mary Phillips, the widow of Joseph Phillips, but under the supervision of Chaplain James M. Alexander of the 66th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, the Corinth camp blossomed, and by mid-1863, resembled a small town complete with a church, commissary, hospital, both frame and log houses, and a street grid with named streets and numbered houses. An American Missionary Association school operated nearby where eager students of all ages sought knowledge day and night. The freedmen were well treated in Corinth, which was considered to be a model camp. Northern white men and women from abolitionist and benevolent organizations came to Corinth to spread the word of God, teach, and care for the freedmen. Several makeshift satellite contraband camps were also scattered throughout the Corinth area.

With the service-aged male freedmen enlisted for military service, the remaining contraband camp residents, soldiers' families and the elderly, cooperatively farmed 400 acres of land, 300 in cotton and 100 in vegetables. They sold their cotton to purchasing agents, and produce on the open market to area citizens and other soldiers stationed in and around Corinth, and, unlike residents in other contraband camps, the freedmen who worked directly for the government at Corinth were paid for their efforts. In the summer of 1863, Col. John Eaton, Grant's superintendent of freedmen, estimated the Corinth camp was making a monthly profit of \$4,000 to \$5,000. At the time of its demise the camp at Corinth was home to some 2,500 people, although as many as 6,000 people were reported to have resided in the camp at its peak.

### **Federal Abandonment of Corinth, April 24, 1864**

By late 1863, Union military authorities determined that the Corinth district no longer held strategic military significance. There was a critical need to reduce occupation forces and commitments and supply soldiers for the upcoming spring and summer campaigns and supply Federal forces in the West via transportation facilities at Chattanooga and Nashville. Thus, they burned government buildings and barracks and partially destroyed railroad, supply warehouses, and depot facilities. Once the demolition was complete, the United States garrison abandoned the post on January 24, 1864, and along with Northern whites from various abolitionist and benevolent organizations and the freedmen, retired to the permanent Federal enclave at Memphis.

### **Confederate Reoccupation of Corinth: 1864-1865**

After Federal abandonment of Corinth, the Confederates reoccupied the town and vicinity. President Jefferson Davis foresaw the end of the Confederacy unless drastic action could be taken. Union armies under Grant hammered Confederate forces in front of Richmond, while Sherman advanced his western "army group" towards Atlanta. To facilitate the shipment of valuable military food stores from the region, local Confederate authorities realized the northern Mississippi railroads must be repaired at once, and labor crews began to work on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. By April 1864, handcars, pulled by mules, were able to reach Corinth. However, the lack of customary rolling stock, especially boxcars, hampered Confederate efforts. Throughout the early summer, rail communications slowly improved, and in July a Federal expedition from Memphis destroyed vital rail facilities around Tupelo.

In the fall, the pressing need to repair the Memphis & Charleston Railroad east to Tuscumbia, Alabama, arose out of necessity to assist Gen. John B. Hood, who commanded the principal western Confederate army (Army of Tennessee) opposing Sherman in Georgia. Only a fragment of rail line ran eastward from Corinth 36 miles to Cherokee,

Alabama. However, even this stretch was overgrown with briars and brambles. Hood decided to take a bold gamble. He would rapidly shift his army to northwest Alabama and invade Tennessee, smash the Union forces there, and sweep on through Kentucky to Ohio. This threat to Sherman's own supply line would hopefully draw Sherman from Georgia.

The immediate problem was how to supply Hood's invading army from behind Federal lines. The earlier Federal evacuation of Corinth provided the solution. The railroad from Mobile via Corinth to Tuscumbia was hastily repaired using impressed slaves loaned by Confederate Engineer detachments at Mobile and Demopolis, Alabama. By mid-November, with the existing Alabama sector of the Memphis & Charleston in "tolerably safe" condition 6 miles beyond Cherokee to Barton, Corinth became a vital supply depot for Hood's army, which represented the Confederacy's last chance for success in the West. With Hood's forces pushing north out of the Tennessee Valley towards Nashville, the flow of supplies along the rickety route still remained exasperatingly slow.

Worse trouble was to come. The Memphis Federals were quick to realize the significance of the Mobile & Ohio to Hood's operation, and from late November onward took pains to pepper the railroad with raids. The ragtag Mississippi militia rushed up and down the threatened road, always two to three days behind the Federal horse soldiers. Even when concentrated, the Southern forces were no match for Union attempts to play smash with the railroad, such as a blow that came in the final week of December 1864. Though brief in duration, the raid of veteran Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Grierson was the final straw that broke the camel's back. Grierson's command did not advance in a solid line, but rather in scattered parties, which hit and ran over the whole of northern Mississippi. Their movements threw the Confederates into turmoil. When Grierson departed, he left behind destroyed bridges and trestles of an aggregate length of 4 miles, 14 smashed locomotives, 95 gutted boxcars, and 10 miles of ruined track. Although part of the damage had been borne by the Mississippi Central Railroad, the worst destruction had been dealt the important Mobile & Ohio between Tupelo and Okolona.

Even before Grierson's raid, the wreck of Hood's army, which had not lured Sherman from Georgia, began a miserable retreat from the battlefields of Franklin (November 30) and Nashville (December 15-16) where the Confederates had been smashed by numerically superior Union forces under Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. Pursued by Thomas, Hood's battered command limped across the Tennessee River to discover its rail communications gone. The army staggered on past Tusculum, Iuka, and Corinth, then south to Tupelo. It would have been much worse had not impressed gangs of slaves managed to make repairs to the Mobile & Ohio while its bridges smoldered. Within a week, the few locomotives and cars that remained carried much needed supplies up the war-torn road to Corinth.

By December 1864 the momentous decision against the Confederate States of America appeared already to have been rendered. The forces of the Union army were not only pounding rebel armies to pieces, but they were also tearing the Southern infrastructure apart from within. From January 18-21, 1865, a Federal division under Col. Jonathan B. Moore marched from Eastport, Mississippi, which had been reoccupied on January 7th by Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith, commanding a detachment of the Army of the Tennessee. Moore was to reconnoiter towards Corinth, where reports warned the town was occupied by a brigade of Confederate cavalry. The Union column entered Corinth on January 19, driving out a few stragglers from Brig. Gen. Lawrence S. Ross' brigade, who retreated after some slight skirmishing. In their hasty retreat, the Southerners set fire to the Tishomingo Hotel, which contained commissary stores. The large three-story structure near the depot was still burning when the Federals arrived. Moore's men spent about an hour tearing down and burning other storehouse buildings and confiscating the scant remaining edible supplies. The expedition returned to Eastport, its objectives accomplished.

Although the Civil War continued to consume a mortally wounded Confederacy for another five months, for Corinth — devastated by four years of occupation by Confederate and Union military forces — the violence of war was over. From his camp at Eastport, Private Elisha Stockwell, Jr. took

time to write his mother about the pursuit of Hood from Nashville and his latest adventures in Mississippi. Stockwell stated his regiment had marched to Corinth, finding the town "all burned down...the country as far as we went is completely destroyed, it don't look like the same place...it did 2 years ago." Later, on May 4, 1865, Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor surrendered the Confederate forces still operating in Mississippi to Maj. Gen. Edward S. Canby.

### Corinth National Cemetery

The Corinth National Cemetery was established by an Act of Congress in 1866 as a site for the burial of Union dead. The remains of Federal soldiers were gathered from some 15-20 battlefields and skirmish grounds, including Corinth, Iuka, Holly Springs, Guntown, and Farmington, Mississippi, and Parker's Crossroads, Middlebury, and Britton Lane, Tennessee, as well as scattered camps and hospitals in the two states. By 1870 when the interment program was virtually completed, Corinth National Cemetery ranked as the 16th largest national cemetery, having 5,688 interments, of which 1,793 were known and 3,895 were unknown. Interments included representatives of 273 regiments from 15 states. By February 1961 the cemetery's interments numbered 5,942 — 1,946 known and 3,996 unknown.





## THE RESOURCES

Within the 250 events identified for the Siege and Battle of Corinth, approximately 150 historic sites and properties covering three states were considered in the context of this boundary adjustment study. During the evaluation of these resources, some sites and properties were determined to merit consideration for addition to the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. These sites and properties are marked with an asterisk (\*). Furthermore the 150 sites have been the basis for determining which sites and properties would qualify for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park.

## MISSISSIPPI

### Alcorn County

\*Corinth – Siege and Battle (fortifications, antebellum homes, Confederate and Union headquarters, and National Cemetery)

\*Glendale – Confederate and Union outposts and skirmishes

Camp Clear Creek – Union garrison camp and outpost

Camp Big Spring – Union garrison and outpost

Camp Montgomery – Union garrison camp and outpost

\*Russell House – Skirmish (Also McNairy County, Tennessee)

Widow Surratt's House – Skirmish and fortifications

\*Driver House – Antebellum home, Union camps, and skirmishes

Sharp's Mill

\*Camp Davies – Union outpost and skirmish

Danville – Skirmishes

Smith's Bridge (Tuscumbia River) – Union outpost and skirmishes

\*Rienzi – Union and Confederate outposts and depot

\*Jacinto – Union and Confederate outposts and antebellum courthouse

Cypress Creek and Tuscumbia Bridges

Ramer's Crossing – Skirmish (Also McNairy County, Tennessee)

Kossuth – Union and Confederate outposts and skirmish

\*Alexander's Junction – Engagement

\*Camp Clark – Confederate camp

Bridge Creek – Confederate batteries east of creek along Danville Road

### Lee County

Guntown – Confederate depot, skirmishes, and engagement

Saltillo – Confederate depot

Tupelo – Confederate depot, skirmishes, and engagement

### Prentiss County

\*Booneville – Union and Confederate outposts, skirmishes, and depot

Osborn and Wolf's Creeks – Skirmishes

Blackland – Skirmishes

Baldwyn – Union and Confederate outposts and skirmishes

Bay Springs and Vincent's Crossroads –

Confederate outpost and skirmish

Carrollsville – Skirmish

Marietta – Skirmish

Jumpertown – Skirmish

### Tippah County

Ripley – Confederate camps, assembly area for Confederate forces prior to Battle of Corinth, raids, and skirmishes

Ruckersville – Skirmish

Box Ford (Hatchie River) – Skirmish

### Tishomingo County

\*Iuka – Battle, skirmishes, camps, fortifications,

Confederate burials, and antebellum homes

Taylor's Landing (Tennessee River at Yellow Creek)

Burnsville


\*Eastport – River landing (depot), fortifications, and camps

Barnett's Corners or Crossroads – Skirmish

Widow Moore's House – Skirmish

Peyton's Mill – Skirmish





## TENNESSEE

### Hardeman County

Pocahontas – Depot and skirmish  
Metamora – Davis Bridge Battlefield  
Wray's Bluff – Union railroad fortification  
Bolivar – Railroad depot, Union garrison, skirmishes, and antebellum homes  
Middleton – Skirmish

### Hardin County

Cerro Gordo – Naval engagements (1862-63)  
\*Savannah – Union and Confederate camps, Union army headquarters (William H. Cherry home), and hospitals  
\*Shiloh/Pittsburg Landing – National Military Park and National Cemetery  
Crump's Landing – Union depot and camps  
Stoney Lonesome – Union camp (also McNairy County, Tennessee)  
Confederate Bivouac, April 5, 1862 – Confederate headquarters of Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard and Confederate field hospitals (Also McNairy County, Tennessee)  
Widow Howell's House – Skirmish (Also McNairy County, Tennessee)  
Hamburg Landing – Union depot, camps, and hospital  
Buell's Upper Landing – Union depot  
Camp Stanton – Union John A. McClernand's fortified division camp (Also McNairy County, Tennessee)  
Buell's Headquarters No. II  
Atkins' Ford – Skirmish  
Greer's Ford  
Bolling's Ford  
Turner's Ford  
Lick Creek or Hamburg Road Ford

### McNairy County

Adamsville – Union camp and skirmish  
\*Fallen Timbers – Confederate field hospital and Union reconnaissance site  
Michie (now Pebble Hill) – Road junction for Confederate pre-Shiloh battle assembly site, Confederate rearguard action after Shiloh, fortifications, and Union and Confederate camps  
Squire Moore's House (now Needmore) – Confederate pre-Shiloh battle assembly road junction

Locust Grove – Road junction (Confederate approach to Shiloh and Union advance on Corinth)  
Monterey or Pea Ridge – Union and Confederate camps/outposts, skirmishes, and hospitals  
Purdy – Confederate outpost  
Bethel Station – Confederate camps and outpost  
William T. Sherman's Fortifications – May 4, 7, 11, 13, and 21  
Stephen Hurlbut's Fortifications – May 11, 13, and 21  
Thomas Davies Fortifications – May 10  
\*Chewalla – Union depot and Union and Confederate camps  
\*Camp Sheldon  
Young's Bridge (Tuscumbia River)  
Big Hill (Big Hill State Park) – Skirmish and Union railroad fortification  
Bone Yard – Earl Van Dorn's wagon trail park  
Buell's Headquarters Nos. III, IV, and V

## ALABAMA

### Colbert County

Chickasaw Bluff – Confederate fortifications and skirmishes  
Big Bear Creek – Memphis & Charleston Railroad bridge and skirmishes  
Little Bear Creek – Skirmish  
Tuscumbia – Union and Confederate depot, naval activities, and skirmishes


### Lauderdale County

Florence – Union and Confederate depot, naval activities, and skirmishes  
Waterloo – Skirmishes and Union activities  
Gravelly Springs – Union activities

## CORINTH UNIT SITES AND ROUTES

- 1 Battery F
- 2 Boxe House
- 3 Contraband Camp
- 4 Corona College
- 5 Fallen Timbers Battlefield
- 6 Farmington Battlefield
- 7 Federal Redan
- 8 Federal Lines (Nelson, May 17)
- 9 Federal Lines (Davies, May 19)
- 10 Federal Lines (Davies, May 21-28)
- 11 October Corinth Battlefield
- 12 Russell House Battlefield

0 1 2 3 4 mi  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 km



## EVALUATION CRITERIA

Properties considered for addition to existing units of the national park system must be evaluated against established criteria to determine if they meet eligibility requirements prior to recommendation to Congress for formal action. According to the criteria properties may be recommended for the following reasons:

To include significant resources or opportunities for public enjoyment related to the purposes of the park

To address such operational and management issues as access and boundary identification by topographic or other natural features and roads

To protect park resources critical to fulfilling the park's purpose

The criteria also demands that properties be evaluated for the following determinations:

It will be feasible to administer, considering size, configuration, ownership, costs, and other factors.

Other alternatives for management and resource protection are not adequate.

The study of the properties considered significant to the Siege and Battle of Corinth was conducted by National Park Service staff from Shiloh National Military Park, the Southeast Regional Office, and the Denver Service Center with the able assistance of the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth as well as the Siege and Battle of Corinth Commission.

As a result of the initial national historic landmark designation and the subsequent research efforts, the National Park Service has determined 24 resources should be considered as nationally significant and further analyzed to determine if they are worthy of inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park. To provide for ease of understanding the relationships of these resources to the siege and battle, analysis of these contributing resources has been categorized under

four topical/ chronological headings: **Siege Phase** (April 8, 1862 – June 10, 1862); **Battle Phase** (Iuka-September 19, 1862 Corinth – October 3-4, 1862; Davis Bridge – October 5, 1862); **Occupation Phase** (October 6, 1862 – January 24, 1864); and **Commemoration Phase** (Post-Civil War).

Analysis and findings of these significant properties are as follows:

### SIEGE PHASE (April 8, 1862-June 10, 1862)

#### Fallen Timbers Battlefield

On April 8, 1862, after two days of fierce fighting at Shiloh, Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant dispatched Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman on a reconnaissance to investigate Confederate intentions. Six miles southwest of Pittsburg Landing Sherman encountered a large Confederate field hospital protected by a force of mounted Southern cavalry and other military units under Lt. Col. Nathan Bedford Forrest in an area called "Fallen Timbers." Sherman advanced against the Confederate force, losing about 90 men during the engagement in which Forrest was severely wounded. After the Confederate cavalry retired, Sherman advanced and captured the field hospital with its surgeons and about 250 Southern wounded and about 50 wounded Union soldiers that had been previously captured by the Confederates. Sherman's cavalry advanced westward another mile, where they encountered the Confederate rear guard under Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge about a mile east of the Michie family farmhouse. With all signs pointing to a general Confederate retreat toward Corinth, Sherman returned to Shiloh Church. A cautious and methodical Union advance would now mark the beginning of the Siege of Corinth.

#### Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.

The Battle of Fallen Timbers, which occurred on April 8, 1862, as the Confederates began their retreat back to Corinth following the Battle of Shiloh, may be regarded as the beginning of the Siege of Corinth. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War.



The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. Thus, the battlefield area provides the opportunity to relate the story of the opening phase of the siege. During 1995-96, the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project documented the general dimensions and features of the Fallen Timbers Battlefield — a parcel consisting of some 300 acres of largely agricultural and forested land.

The pastoral setting of the battlefield retains a high degree of integrity, although the area has been impacted by several roads, cultivation, a post Civil War farmstead, and scattered houses along the roads. Although there are no extant remains of any Civil War structures, the largely pristine battlefield has high potential for archeological survey and research, and it provides excellent opportunities for interpretive/recreational trail possibilities, waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The site also provides the opportunity for the development of trails that would connect with Shiloh National Military Park and the city of Corinth, thus allowing for the interpretation of post-Shiloh and early Siege of Corinth military activities. The boundary of the battlefield's parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

**Operational and Management Issues.** County roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Fallen Timbers Battlefield. Access to the battlefield site is by the Joe Dillon and Harrison County Roads. Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral with some residences along the area's county roads. The battlefield area provides opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Fallen Timbers Battlefield is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource associated with a key Civil War military operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations (one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission) and would afford the opportunity to relate the Fallen

Timbers Battlefield to both the Battle of Shiloh and the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the pastoral vistas from the battlefield that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the battlefield. Although a post Civil War farmstead has been constructed on the battlefield and some modern homes have been built along the roads in the area, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the battlefield. However, construction of more homes and other structures in the area or subdivision of the battlefield property could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the battle.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The land on which the Fallen Timbers Battlefield sits could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the battlefield retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as formerly cultivated farm fields or as forested lands. The battlefield area is entirely in private ownership, although approximately 225 acres are owned by one family. The Friends of Shiloh Battlefield have indicated interest in acquiring portions of the battlefield lands for donation to the National Park Service. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration of the battlefield to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the battlefield would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development and construction of waysides and a small offroad parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although the Fallen Timbers Battlefield is entirely in private ownership, the Friends of Shiloh Battlefield have indicated interest in acquiring portions of the battlefield for donation to the National Park Service. The charter of the

Friends organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Fallen Timbers Battlefield would be in jeopardy if left in private ownership or to the Friends to manage. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the Fallen Timbers Battlefield.

### **Engagement at Farmington**

#### **Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The Engagement at Farmington is related to the Siege of Corinth. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. Thus, the battlefield area provides the opportunity to relate the story of a significant element of the month-long siege. During 1995-96, the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project documented the general dimensions and features of the Engagement at Farmington — a parcel consisting of 1,205 acres in the middle of which were the Federal Lines, Paine & Stanley (May 17, 1862) hereinafter evaluated under separate heading. The semirural community setting of the Engagement at Farmington retains a relatively high degree of integrity, although the area has been impacted by several roads, cultivation, scattered houses along the roads, and the semblance of a small town residential grid pattern at Farmington. Although the aforementioned earthworks are the only extant remains of Civil War era military resources in the vicinity, the engagement area provides excellent opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities, waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The boundary of the battlefield's parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

County roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Engagement at Farmington parcel. Access to the engagement site is by County Roads 106, 114, and 200. Adjacent land use is semirural, featuring pastoral landscapes and viewsheds, forested lands, scattered residences along the county roads, and a small community residential grid pattern at Farmington. Nevertheless, the engagement area provides opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The area encompassing the Engagement at Farmington is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource associated with a key Civil War military operation of the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations (one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission) and would afford the opportunity to relate the Engagement at Farmington to the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the pastoral and semirural vistas and landscapes of the engagement area that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the Engagement at Farmington. The engagement area has been somewhat compromised by the construction of modern homes and other structures along the roads and continuing expansion of the Farmington community. The construction of more homes or further subdivision of the engagement area properties could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the engagement.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The land on which the Engagement at Farmington sits could be easily managed. Despite the aforementioned intrusions on the engagement area, its immediate surroundings retain much of their historic character. The engagement area is entirely in private ownership. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration of the battlefield to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the engagement area would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development and construction of waysides and a small-scale offroad parking area.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The land on which the Engagement at Farmington occurred remains entirely in private ownership. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the properties associated with the Engagement at Farmington. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the area is in jeopardy.

#### **Russell House Battlefield**

From May 11-16, 1862, the right wing of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck's Union "army group" — Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas' Army of the Tennessee — clawed its way ahead. Thomas' objective was to reach the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and invest the Confederate defenses north of Corinth. On May 17, "Task Force Sherman", (including troops from three brigades [Brig. Gen. James W. Denver's and Col. Morgan L. Smith's from William T. Sherman's division, and one brigade from Brig. Gen. Stephen A. Hurlbut's division]) crossed Phillips Creek and, in a savage fight, compelled Confederate Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers' Mississippians to abandon a strong outpost at the Russell House on the state line, ½-mile east of the Purdy road. Union losses in the fight were 10 killed and 31 wounded while the Confederates left 12 dead on the field.

Because it occupied high ground along the headwaters of Phillips and Bridge creeks, the position possessed great natural strength and Sherman's men lost no time fortifying it. A parapet was constructed, and after dense trees and undergrowth were cleared away to provide a field of fire for his batteries, Sherman ordered his pickets to drive the enemy

farther south toward Corinth beyond a large open field to his front and right.

The northeast corner of this battlefield area contains the extant remains of field fortifications constructed by Hurlbut's division starting on May 13th. The first section of fieldworks consists of a 500-foot-long line of rifle pits, with earth breastworks of 2 to 3 feet in height. Forward of this line (about 275 yards), on a prominent watershed overlooking Phillips Creek, is an artillery redoubt and adjoining rifle pits covering an area of about 2 acres. The works have been affected by the placement of a utility natural gasline. However, there are parapet walls 3 or more feet high.

#### **Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The Russell House Battlefield is related to the Siege of Corinth. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. Thus, the battlefield area provides the opportunity to relate the story of a significant military action to the Siege of Corinth. During 1995-96, the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project documented the general dimensions and features of the Russell House Battlefield — a 702-acre parcel of largely agricultural and forested land. Two-thirds of the battlefield area is in Tennessee and one-third is in Mississippi.

The pastoral setting of the battlefield retains a high degree of integrity, although the area has been impacted by roads, cultivation, and scattered houses along the roads. The northeast corner of the battlefield area contains the extant remains of field fortifications, and the largely pristine battlefield area has high potential for archeological survey and research. The battlefield provides excellent opportunities for interpretive/recreational trail possibilities, waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The boundary of the battlefield's parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

**Operational and Management Issues.** State highways, county roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Russell House Battlefield. Access to the battlefield site is by Mississippi State Highway 145, Tennessee State Highway 5, Harper Road (Alcorn County Road 138), and Sticine Road (McNairy County Road). Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral (agricultural and forested) with some residences along the area's county roads. The battlefield area provides opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Russell House Battlefield is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource associated with a key Civil War operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations (one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission) and would afford the opportunity to relate the battlefield to the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the aforementioned extant field fortifications and the pastoral vistas and landscapes from the battlefield that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the battlefield. Although some modern homes and farmsteads have been constructed along the roads in the area, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the battlefield. However, construction of more homes and other structures in the area of the battlefield property could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the battle.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The land on which the Russell House Battlefield sits could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the battlefield site retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as cultivated farmfields or as forested lands. The entire battlefield area property is privately owned. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration of the battlefield to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the battlefield would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development and construction of waysides and a small-scale offroad parking area.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The land on which the Russell House Battlefield sits remains entirely in private ownership. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the Russell House Battlefield property. Thus, the property remains in jeopardy.

#### **Boxe House Battery**

On May 17, 1862, Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Union Army of the Ohio crossed Sevenmile Creek on a 1¼ mile front, driving Confederate pickets back toward Corinth. Upon halting, the troops entrenched, throwing up earthworks to protect their new position. On the right, Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood's division anchored the line at Driver's House on the Monterey-Corinth road. Brig. Gen. William Nelson's division held the center, while Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden formed on the left, the latter's left flank resting across the Farmington-Corinth road. The works thrown up by the Army of the Ohio were within 2 miles of the Confederate defenses northeast of Corinth.

On May 28 Buell advanced three of his four divisions. On the right, Surratt's Hill was occupied, and in the center Nelson's troops crossed Bridge Creek on the Farmington-Corinth road, taking a position 1,300 yards east of the Confederate defenses overlooking Phillips Creek. In a sharp fight along the south Farmington-Corinth road, an advance by Crittenden was ably supported by an artillery bombardment provided by the 10-gun battery erected at the Boxe House immediately south of the road. Crittenden gained 1,200 yards occupying ground to

Nelson's left and rear with his left flank refused. The advances encountered Confederate skirmishers, but Union losses were light. Entrenching tools were brought up and, by daybreak of the 29th, the three Federal divisions had thrown up a formidable line of earthworks. The Boxe House battery consists of an extant semicircular ditched parapet, with walls 3 to 6 feet high and 10 to 12 feet wide. The interior walls of the parapet have eroded. Embrasures for at least 8 cannon are evident. Although the battery site sits in a housing subdivision, the battery field of fire (or view) to the south-southwest remains an open viewshed.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The Boxe House Battery is related to the Siege of Corinth. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. Thus, the battery provides the opportunity to relate the story of a significant earthwork fortification and its role in an important military action to the Siege of Corinth. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project documented the general dimensions and features of the Boxe House Battery — a 4-acre parcel of forested land.

The wooded setting of the Boxe House battery retains a relatively high degree of integrity, however, the earthwork fortification has been impacted by erosion. Although the battery site is in a housing subdivision, the battery field of fire (or view) to the south-southwest remains an open viewshed. Thus, the battery site provides opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities, waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The boundary of the battery's parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

**Operational and Management Issues.** County roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Boxe House Battery. Access to the site is by Kendrick Road. Although the battery site is in a housing subdivi-

sion, it is largely covered with trees, and the battery's field of fire (or view) to the south-southwest remains an open viewshed. Thus, the site provides opportunities for short interpretive/ recreational trails, modest interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Boxe House Battery is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource associated with a key Civil War operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations (one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission) and would afford the opportunity to relate the battery site and associated military actions to the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the 4-acre battery site and remaining pastoral vistas and landscapes associated with the battery field of fire (or view) to the south-southwest. These resources provide the historic setting for interpreting the battery and important military actions that occurred at the site. Because the site has been subjected to erosion and is in a subdivision near a major county road, it is threatened by further development that could substantially reduce its integrity and negatively impact the extant elements of its historic setting.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Comprised of 4 acres and accessible via county roads, the Boxe House Battery could be easily managed. The battery site is privately owned. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration of the site to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the battery site would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development expenses for the site. Modest long-term development costs would result from trail development and construction of waysides and a small-scale offroad parking area.

### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The land on which the Boxe House Battery sits remains entirely in private ownership. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the site. Thus, the long-term preservation and interpretation of the site remains in jeopardy.

### **Federal Lines, Davies & McKean (May 19, 1862)**

These Union field fortifications constructed by soldiers assigned to Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies' division consist of two sections that have been impacted by mowing and cultivation. One section, approximately 2,000 feet north of Mississippi State Highway 2 and situated in a northwest-to-southeast line, is more than 1,300 feet long, 2 to 4 feet high, and approximately 10 feet wide. Two well-defined battery emplacements divide the line into thirds, and a "V"-shaped earthwork, measuring 25 feet at its open end, 20 feet on each side, and 15 feet behind the main line of earthworks, is 400 feet east of the west end of the earthworks. A post Civil War farmhouse site impacts the east end of this line of works.

A second section of earthworks, part of the same line of fieldworks, continues for 475 feet beginning at a gravel drive on the old farmhouse site, extends eastward, and ends at Mississippi State Highway 2 after being broken for 25 feet by a dirt road. These earthworks are 1 to 3 feet high and 2 to 3 feet wide. Another significant section of fieldworks is south of Mississippi State Route 2. This line, constructed and manned by the Union division commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas McKean on May 19, 1862, extends southeast for nearly 1,300 feet. The rifle pits are ditched and range 2 to 4 feet high, and 3 to 4 feet wide. A large five-gun artillery position is near the left center of the line and exhibits a high degree of definition. A municipal water tower is immediately forward of the battery. Other than this impact the field of view remains open in front of the battery and retains its pastoral character. A church is 300 yards to the east.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** A 105-acre segment of the Davies and McKean Union

earthworks (associated with the Siege of Corinth) were one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. In 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project further documented these earthworks, which resulted in a more accurate and comprehensive delineation of the dimensions and features of the earthworks.

The extant Davies and McKean earthworks provide the opportunity to relate artillery emplacements, rifle pits, and other elements of earthworks fortifications of the siege story. The earthworks retain a high degree of integrity, although portions have been impacted by field roads, a state highway, cultivation, a post Civil War farmhouse, and a municipal water tower facility. The earthworks provide excellent opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The earthworks, which are covered by underbrush and a canopy of trees, are in a large pastoral setting of cultivated fields. The boundary of the earthworks' parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

**Operational and Management Issues.** Farm roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Davies and McKean earthworks. Access to the earthworks is from State Highway 2. Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral with some residences along the area's county roads and State Highway 2 as well as a municipal water tower and church near the site. The earthworks provide opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The extant Davies and McKean Union earthworks are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that (1) contributes to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic

Landmark; (2) is associated with a key Civil War military operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations that is one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission; and (3) affords the opportunity to relate artillery emplacements, rifle pits, and other elements of earthwork fortifications associated with the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the pastoral vistas from the earthworks that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the earthworks. Although some modern homes, a church, and a municipal water tower have been constructed along the roads in the vicinity of the earthworks, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the fortifications. However, construction of more homes and other structures in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the earthworks.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands on which the Davies and McKean Union earthworks sit could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the earthworks retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields or forested lands. The land on which the earthworks sit north of State Highway 2 is available for donation; the lands on the south side of the highway are owned by several private landowners. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the earthworks would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, new and improved waysides, and improvement of the extant small-scale offroad parking area.

### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although the property that includes the portion of the Davies Union earthworks north of Mississippi State Highway 2 has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Davies and McKean Union earthworks on the north and south sides (earthworks on south side remain in private ownership) of Mississippi State Highway 2 are in jeopardy. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the Davies and McKean Union earthworks.

### **Federal Lines, Davies (May 21 & 28, 1862)**

The first section of Union earthworks, also known as the Harper Road Union earthworks, are approximately 1,000 feet south of the intersection of Harper Road and Mississippi State Highway 2. Thrown up by Brig. Gen. Thomas A. Davies' division, Army of the Tennessee, on May 21st, after advancing from its previous line prepared on May 19, the division dug in on this watershed overlooking Phillips Creek. The extant rifle pits, along with evidence of possibly two artillery embrasures, extend in a north-to-south line parallel to Harper Road for approximately 1,200 feet. The earth parapets are 3 to 4 feet high and about 10 to 12 feet wide.

The second section of works is roughly  $\frac{3}{4}$  mile to the west on a watershed overlooking the west side of Phillips Creek. In the advance conducted by elements of all three Union armies on May 28, 1862, Davies' division advanced from the Harper road line, occupied this ground, and constructed its final fieldworks of the siege. The line meanders along the crest of a ridge for nearly 1,600 feet, starting at the Mississippi State Route 2 right-of-way, from northwest to southeast. It is broken at four points by farm lanes (now pasture). The ditched rifle pits are from 2 to 4 feet high and from 4 to 6 feet wide.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** A 3-acre segment (the aforementioned first section) of the Harper Road Union earthworks (associated with the Siege of Corinth) were one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project further documented the Harper Road Union earthworks, thus resulting in addition of the aforementioned second section.

The extant earthworks, which are currently interpreted off Purdy Road, provide the opportunity to relate "successional" fortifications of the siege story. The earthworks retain a high degree of integrity, and their immediate surroundings have high archaeological potential because of the likelihood that they contain remnants of encampments that were occupied for several weeks during the siege. The earthworks provide excellent opportunities for interpretive/recreational trail possibilities along with a small-scale parking area with an offroad pullout. The earthworks, which are covered by underbrush and hardwood and pine trees, are in a largely pastoral setting of cultivated fields with some residences along the roads. The boundary of the earthworks parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The boundary of the Harper Road Union earthworks is defined by roads and highways – US Business 45, State Highway 2, and Harper Road – and land-use patterns. Access to the earthworks is from US Business 45. Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral with some residences along the roads. The earthworks provide opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The extant Harper Road Union earthworks are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that (1) contributes to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark; (2) is associated with a key Civil War military operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations that is one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission; and (3) affords the opportunity to relate successional fortifications associated with the Siege of Corinth. Construction of the Harper Road Union earthworks was the final determinant that forced Confederate Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard to evacuate Corinth on May 30, and they are the only extant earthworks that relate to that story.

Critical resources include the pastoral vistas from the earthworks that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the earthworks. Although a few modern homes have been constructed along the roads in the vicinity of the earthworks, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the fortifications. However, construction of more homes in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the earthworks.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands on which the Harper Road Union earthworks sit could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the earthworks retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farm fields or as forested lands. One-third of the land on which the earthworks sit are available for donation, while the remainder of the lands are owned by three or four private landowners. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the earthworks would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from

acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, new and improved waysides, and improvement of the existing small-scale parking area.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although several properties that include a portion (approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$ ) of the Harper Road Union earthworks have been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth (approximately  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the earthworks remain privately owned), the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Harper Road Union earthworks are in jeopardy if left to the Friends to manage. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the Harper Road Union earthworks.

#### **Federal Lines, Nelson (May 17, 1862)**

These Union fieldworks constructed by Brig. Gen. William Nelson's division, Army of the Ohio, extend south from a point about 350 yards south of Henderson Road. From there, a line of rifle pits meanders along the crest of a low rise for approximately 2,000 feet. Impacted by field roads and cultivation, the northern two-thirds of the line is approximately 1 to 2 feet high, with some ditching evident, and 2 to 3 feet wide. The southern third of the line, which is refused to the east-southeast, retains better definition, retains most of its ditch, and is approximately 3 to 3  $\frac{1}{2}$  feet high. An artillery emplacement and bombproof are along the southern end of the earthworks. Five hundred feet southeast of these features are what appear to be another emplacement and bombproof in the same configuration as the previous set. These outlying earthworks have been significantly affected by logging activity.

Located 250 yards west of the center of the above line of fieldworks is a classic V-shaped artillery

redoubt. The walls of the redoubt are ditched, roughly 60 feet long, from 5 to 6 feet high, and from 6 to 8 feet wide. The forward projecting angle of the redan, open to the rear, is well defined with the exterior walls of the parapet retaining good definition. An unobstructed field of view exists for nearly  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile in front of this artillery emplacement.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** A 36.5-acre segment of the Nelson Union earthworks (associated with the Siege of Corinth) was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project further documented these earthworks, thus resulting in a more accurate and comprehensive delineation of the dimensions and features of the earthworks.

The extant Nelson Union earthworks provide the opportunity to relate artillery emplacements, bombproofs, a classic V-shaped artillery redoubt, and other elements of earthwork fortifications of the siege story. The earthworks retain a high degree of integrity, although portions have been impacted by field roads, cultivation, erosion, logging, and bulldozing for a farm equipment parking area. The earthworks provide excellent opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The earthworks, which are covered by underbrush and trees, are in a largely pastoral setting of cultivated fields. The boundary of the earthworks' parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

Farm roads, land-use patterns, and topographical features define the boundary of the Nelson Union earthworks. Access to the earthworks is from Henderson Road. Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral with some residences along the area's county roads. The earthworks provide opportuni-



ties for interpretive/ recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The extant Nelson Union earthworks are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that (1) contributes to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark; (2) is associated with a key Civil War military operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations (one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission); and (3) affords the opportunity to relate artillery emplacements, bomb-proofs, and a classic V-shaped artillery redoubt associated with the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the pastoral vistas from the earthworks that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the earthworks. Although some modern homes have been constructed along the roads in the vicinity of the earthworks, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the fortifications. However, construction of more homes in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the earthworks.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands on which the Nelson Union earthworks sit could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the earthworks retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields or as forested lands. Portions of the land on which the earthworks sit are available for donation, while the remaining lands are privately owned. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the earthworks would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from

acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, new and improved waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although several properties that include a portion of the Nelson Union earthworks have been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Nelson Union earthworks are in jeopardy if left to the Friends to manage. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the Nelson Union earthworks.

#### **Federal Lines, Paine & Stanley (May 17, 1862)**

These Union fieldworks were constructed by elements of Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of the Mississippi (Brig. Gen. E.A. Paine's division and Brig. Gen. David S. Stanley's division), when Pope re-occupied Farmington on May 17th. These fortifications are on the watershed lying south of Sevenmile Creek and on a part of the battlefield involved with the May 9th engagement at Farmington. The fieldworks on Stanley's front consist of two lines of eroded rifle pits along the ridge-line, facing west-southwest. The line lower on the ridge is 168 feet long, 1 to 2 feet high, and approximately 2 feet wide. The second earthwork is about 50 feet above the lower line and is 200 feet long, 1 to 2 feet high, and approximately 2 feet wide. Immediately south of these works, beyond ground disturbed by the Farmington municipal water tower, are two small artillery demi-lunes (single-gun redoubts). Each gun emplacement is roughly 16 feet from end to end and has ditched, semicircular parapet walls roughly 2 to 3 feet high averaging 4 feet wide. Road right-of-way work and other human activities have impacted these resources. North of these artillery emplacements (about 50

yards), across a county road, are two additional demi-lunes. These crescent-shaped, one-gun artillery emplacements are in excellent condition and are roughly 16 to 18 feet long, with 4- to 5-foot ditched parapet walls from 3 to 5 feet wide. The military engineering features retain good definition.

Roughly  $\frac{1}{2}$  mile north of Stanley's sector are the remains of General Eleazer Paine's division. These fieldworks are along a ridge about 75 yards west of the Five Points road junction. The initial feature, about 175 feet long is a 4-gun artillery emplacement, fronting west. The parapet walls are 3 to 4 feet high and 2 to 3 feet wide. At the south end of the artillery emplacement the line refuses and proceeds east in the form of rifle pits for 150 feet. The line is from 1 to 2 feet high and roughly 2 feet wide. The entire area has been impacted by recent logging activity.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** A 6-acre segment of the Paine and Stanley Union earthworks (associated with the Siege of Corinth) was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Siege of Corinth as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project further documented these earthworks, thus resulting in a more accurate and comprehensive delineation of the dimensions and features of the earthworks.

The extant Paine and Stanley earthworks provide the opportunity to relate the battlefield involved with the May 9th engagement at Farmington and subsequent rifle pits, small artillery demi-lunes, artillery emplacements, and other elements of earthwork fortifications of the siege story. The earthworks retain a high degree of integrity, although portions have been impacted by erosion, road right-of-way work, logging and other human

activity, and construction of the Farmington municipal water tower. The earthworks provide excellent opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The earthworks, which are covered by grass and some hardwood trees, are generally along the Farmington Church Road at the northern end of the small community of Farmington. The boundary of the earthworks' parcel will be adjusted to avoid land use conflicts.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The boundary of the Paine and Stanley Union earthworks is defined by county roads, land use patterns, and topographical features such as ridge lines. Access to the earthworks is from the Farmington Church Road as well as other county roads. Adjacent land use is primarily semirural, although some residences and the Farmington municipal water tower facility have been constructed along the area's county roads. The earthworks provide opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale offroad parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The extant Paine and Stanley Union earthworks are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that (1) contributes to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark; (2) is associated with a key Civil War military operation in the Shiloh Campaign in the Western Theater of Operations that is one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission; and (3) affords the opportunity to relate the battlefield involved with the May 9th engagement at Farmington and subsequent rifle pits, small artillery demi-lunes, artillery emplacements, and other elements of earthwork fortifications associated with the Siege of Corinth.

Critical resources include the semirural pastoral vistas from the earthworks that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the earthworks. Although some modern homes and the Farmington municipal water tower have been constructed along the roads in the vicinity of the earthworks, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the fortifications.

However, construction of more homes or further commercial development in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the earthworks.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Privately owned lands on which the Paine and Stanley Union earthworks sit could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the earthworks retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields, forested lands, or semirural landscapes. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the earthworks would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, new and improved waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** The Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth have not purchased any of the lands on which the Paine and Stanley Union earthworks are situated, and no other organizational or governmental entity has indicated interest in preserving and interpreting these earthworks. There is no recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection, interpretation, and visitor use of the Paine and Stanley Union earthworks. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the earthworks is in jeopardy.

**BATTLE PHASE (Iuka- September 19, 1862; Corinth - October 3-4, 1862; Davis Bridge - October 5, 1862)**

#### **Iuka Battlefield**

During the late summer of 1862, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, acting on orders to prevent Federal troops at Corinth from reinforcing middle Tennessee, led 14,000 men northeastward toward the Tennessee River from Tupelo. At Iuka, on September 13, Price drove back a small Union garrison, occupied the town, and awaited developments. Grant, planning to trap Price before Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn could reinforce him, led 8,000 men under Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord eastward from Corinth to halt Price's further movement north. In the meantime, he ordered Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans to move 9,000 troops through Jacinto to Iuka and block Price's retreat south. After a fierce engagement on September 19, between Little's division of Price's corps, and part of Rosecrans' force, Price realized further advance northward was impossible.

Outnumbered by the converging Union columns, Price disengaged and retreated south during the night. Grant's forces occupied Iuka, while Rosecrans' mounted a pursuit. A strong Confederate rearguard and rugged terrain permitted Price to slip away to Baldwyn.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission recognized the significance of Iuka Battlefield and listed it as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated Iuka as having Class C military importance, because it had an observable influence on the outcome of the Heartland Confederate Offensive of 1862 in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. While not identified in the original national historic landmark nomination, Iuka should be considered as a contributing resource in any future revision to the national historic landmark.

There is community interest in developing Iuka's Civil War resources to attract tourism. In addition to managing the battlefield and interpreting the event with wayside signs and trails, the Brinkley

Home could be adaptively used as a combination visitor center and bed-and-breakfast to serve as the centerpiece for the Iuka Civil War experience. Historically, Iuka was known for its mineral springs and has long attracted visitors; thus, incorporating a Civil War experience would add to the critical mass of activities in the area.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The core of the Iuka Battlefield is divided by Highway 72 into two discontinuous parcels and is further compromised by the recent construction of a motel onsite. Land use surrounding the battlefield is predominantly modest residential along with forestlands and agriculture. Nevertheless, the opportunity for a Civil War experience remains at Iuka and could be linked to the larger Shiloh/Corinth visitor experience. The National Park Service would assist by providing technical support to develop interpretive packages for Iuka and seek every opportunity to connect the site with future patterns of use at Corinth.

**Protection of Park Resources.** As stated previously, the Iuka Battlefield has been recognized as significant by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission. Protection of the battlefield and its remaining resources are thus considered important, but the property remains privately owned. The Iuka Battlefield Commission has begun efforts at protection of the resources and no immediate threat of further loss of the resource is recognized at this time.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The Iuka Battlefield is sufficiently removed from Corinth that management would probably require an onsite presence to ensure adequate resource protection. Little exists to assist visitors in understanding the Battle of Iuka at this time and some level of development would be necessary to implement a desired visitor experience. Designing that visitor experience would require wayside interpretive displays, literature describing the battlefield and its events, modest-scale parking, directional signs, and some additional visitor services. Once the development package is in place, administration of the site would require only routine maintenance and periodic patrols.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Due to the compromised integrity of the Iuka Battlefield, this resource is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park. Nevertheless, the Iuka Battlefield Commission owns a portion of the battle site. The 45-acre site contains historic resources of interest beyond the events of the battle, including a pre-Civil War family cemetery. Within the community additional resources are owned by the Iuka Battlefield Commission and available for interpretation, including antebellum homes and the Shady Grove cemetery where approximately 260 Confederate soldiers are interred in a mass grave. The National Park Service would provide support and assistance to the commission to ensure resource protection and interpretation of those resources.

#### **October Battlefield, Phase I (October 3 Action)**

The Battle of Corinth, fought on October 3-4, 1862, occurred on this ground, much of which retains its historic pastoral character (particularly the northern half of the battlefield). On the morning of October 3 Confederate Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn hurled his three-division Army of the West (22,000 men) against Corinth's outer defenses held by three Union divisions under Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans' 23,000-man garrison. The Confederates attacked astride the Chewalla Road (present-day Wenasoga Road) and the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad (present-day Southern Railroad). The principal fighting began during mid-morning of October 3, when the three Confederate divisions of Lovell, Maury, and Hebert charged the Federals defending the old Confederate breastworks that dated from the earlier siege activities. The scene of battle (Phase I) extended from the heights overlooking (both south and north) the Memphis & Charleston Railroad at the point where the Chewalla Road crossed the railroad and proceeded eastward approximately 2 miles to Elam Creek, west of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad (present-day Illinois Central Railroad).

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The October Battlefield, Phase I, is one of the 16



historic properties identified as contributing to the significance of the 1991 Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark designation. In 1993 the Battle of Corinth was cited by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission as one of the 384 principal Civil War battlefields because it had a decisive influence on a campaign and a direct impact on the course of the war. The National Trust for Historic Preservation has also identified the battlefield as one of the 10 most threatened national historic landmarks.

The property associated with the October Battlefield, Phase I, retains much of its historic pastoral character. Thus, a large expanse of land area is available for visitor use and interpretation. Access to the battlefield is convenient from local city and county roads.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The boundary of the October Battlefield, Phase I, is largely defined by the existing city and county road network as well as the remaining earthworks and fighting field of October 3.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The October Battlefield, Phase I, features the fighting field of October 3, extant earthwork fortifications, and associated viewsheds that retain much of their historic pastoral character. The viewsheds between the various resources, as well as those between the resources and the city of Corinth and the railroad (the latter being one of the central features of the interpretive story at Corinth), are significant in that they provide the historic setting within which to interpret the Battle of Corinth. All of these resources are considered to be critical components for inclusion in the Corinth Unit.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The resources and viewsheds associated with the October Battlefield, Phase I, cover more than 1,400 acres. Aside from the existing road network and residential dwellings along the roads, the area retains much its historic pastoral character, remaining either as farm fields or as forested lands, and could be easily managed. More than 140 acres of the October Battlefield, Phase I, are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and are available for donation. Private residential properties adjacent to

the road network would not be acquired unless specific resource protection or visitor use needs were identified. Management would provide periodic mowing and routine law enforcement patrols. The concept for visitor use would require some additional trails, access points, interpretive media, and small-scale parking areas.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although some of the land within the October Battlefield, Phase I, has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties it owns or may acquire in the future. The organization's challenge is primarily property acquisition for donation to the National Park Service. No other management entity is recognized as being capable of providing for adequate management and resource protection or accommodating anticipated visitor use levels.

#### **October Battlefield, Phase II (October 4 Action)**

Battery Robinett, which played a significant role in the military activities at Corinth on October 4, 1862, was one of six artillery redoubts (along with Batteries Tannrath, Lothrop, Phillips, Williams, and Powell) that were erected and armed by Union soldiers during the summer of 1862 for the defense of Corinth. The redoubts were 2 miles from the crossover of the Memphis & Charleston and Mobile & Ohio Railroads. The placement of the six redoubts enabled the Federals to afford better guard against the Confederate forces approaching Corinth from the west, south, and north. Today the October Battlefield, Phase II, includes ground on which Confederate forces swept forward and attacked the Federals who were massed on the arc of a circle, less than 2 miles in length, with the aforementioned six redoubts at key points.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** Portions of the October Battlefield, Phase II, constitute elements of one of the 16 historic properties identified as contributing to the significance of the 1991 Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark designation. As aforementioned, in 1993 the Battle of Corinth was cited by the Civil War

Sites Advisory Commission as one of the 384 principal Civil War battlefields. The National Trust for Historic Preservation has also identified the battlefield as one of the 10 most threatened national historic landmarks.

The property retains much of its historic pastoral character. Thus, a large expanse of land area is available for visitor use and interpretation. Access to the battlefield is convenient from local city and county roads.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The boundary of the October Battlefield, Phase II, is largely defined by the existing city and county road network as well as the remaining earthworks and fighting field of October 4.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The October Battlefield, Phase II, features the fighting field of October 4, extant earthwork fortifications, and associated viewsheds that retain much of their historic pastoral character. The viewsheds between the various resources, as well as those between the resources and the city of Corinth and the railroad (the latter being one of the central features of the interpretive story at Corinth), are significant in that they provide the historic setting within which to interpret the Battle of Corinth. All of these resources are considered to be critical components for inclusion in the Corinth Unit.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The resources and viewsheds associated with the October Battlefield, Phase II, cover nearly 500 acres. Aside from the existing road network and residential dwellings along the roads, the area retains much of its historical pastoral character, remaining either as farm fields or as forested lands, and could be easily managed. Some 7 acres of the October Battlefield, Phase II, are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and are available for donation. Private residential properties adjacent to the road network would not be acquired unless specific resource protection or visitor use needs were identified. Management would provide periodic mowing and routine law enforcement patrols. The concept for visitor use would require some additional trails, access points, interpretive media, and small-scale parking areas.


#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although some of the land within the October Battlefield, Phase II, has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties it owns or may acquire in the future. The organization's challenge is primarily property acquisition for donation to the National Park Service. No other management entity is recognized as being capable of providing for adequate management and resource protection or accommodating anticipated visitor use levels.

#### **Battery Robinett**

As discussed above, Battery Robinett was the focal point of the fighting associated with the October 4 battle at Corinth. The immediate Battery Robinett site comprises a 17.33-acre park-like setting that is dominated by the Corinth Interpretive Center (to be completed and opened to the public in spring 2004), an obelisk erected in memory of Col. William P. Rogers, a memorial of Confederate Brig. Gen. Joseph L. Hogg, six Confederate memorial headstones, and various historical markers. The Battery Robinett area also includes the land on which significant military activities associated with the October 4, 1862, battle for Corinth raged, including ground where Union Col. John W. Fuller's reinforced Ohio brigade repulsed repeated desperate human wave attacks by the Confederate brigades of Maj. Gen. Dabney H. Maury's division, thus ensuring the success of a Federal counterattack and ultimate victory.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** Battery Robinett is listed as one of the 16 historic properties that contributes to the significance of the 1991 Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark designation. Access to the property is convenient from local city roads. The focal point of the visitor experience afforded by the Corinth Unit will be the interpretive center which is currently under construction at the Battery Robinett site.



**Operational and Management Issues.** The Battery Robinett area is largely defined by the boundaries of the previous city park and adjacent city road network.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The immediate Battery Robinett site includes the focal point of the fighting associated with the October 4 battle of Corinth, while the surrounding Battery Robinett area includes the ground upon which reinforced Union forces repulsed repeated desperate Confederate human wave attacks, thus ensuring the success of a Federal counterattack and ultimate victory. The area includes the viewshed between the battery and the railroad, the latter being one of the central features of the Corinth Unit. The immediate site also includes the Corinth Interpretive Center that is currently under construction and various memorials, historical markers, and memorial headstones all of which are considered to be critical components for inclusion in the Corinth Unit.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The resources and viewsheds associated with Battery Robinett cover more than 360 acres. Aside from the existing road network and surrounding city development and infrastructure, the area retains much of its historical pastoral character, remaining either as formerly cleared farm fields or as forested lands, and could be easily managed. Some 108 acres of the Battery Robinett area are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and are available for donation. The 17.33-acre site on which the Corinth Interpretive Center is being constructed is already owned by the U.S. Government and administered by the National Park Service. Private residential properties would not be acquired unless specific resource protection or visitor use needs were identified. Management would provide periodic mowing and routine law enforcement patrols. The concept for visitor use would require some additional trails, access points, interpretive media, and small-scale parking areas.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** The 17.33-acre site within the Battery Robinett area on which the Corinth Interpretive Center is being constructed is owned by the U.S. Government and administered by the National Park Service. Although some of the

remaining land within the Battery Robinett area has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties it owns or may acquire in the future. The organization's challenge is primarily property acquisition for donation to the National Park Service. No other management entity is recognized as being capable of providing for adequate management and resource protection or accommodating anticipated visitor use levels.

### **Confederate Siegeworks**

The Confederate Siegeworks were earthwork fortifications developed between the Mobile & Ohio Railroad and present-day Purdy Road. They represent the northern extent of the 7-mile network of Confederate fortifications (known as the Beauregard Line) constructed in and around Corinth between late March and the Confederate evacuation of Corinth on May 29, 1862. Initially constructed by impressed African American slaves from area farms and plantations and manned and improved by Confederate soldiers, the well-preserved earthworks, with a few exceptions, form a continuous line extending approximately 8,500 feet. They range between 6 inches and 15 feet, averaging 3 to 5 feet high along most of the line. Their average width is 10 to 12 feet. This complex site of fortifications contains three 5-gun artillery redoubts, two of which (located on either side of the base of the salient) are in good condition and exhibit outstanding military engineering definition. The third redoubt at the extreme northern end of the salient has been impacted by agricultural activities.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The Confederate Siegeworks are listed as one of the 16 historic properties that contribute to the significance of the 1991 Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark designation. Much of the property in the vicinity of the siegeworks retains its historic pastoral character. Access to the siegeworks, portions of which are currently interpreted with waysides and associated modest parking areas, is convenient from local city and county roads. High quality remnant earthworks are readily

visible throughout this property and provide good opportunities for expanded visitor use and interpretation.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The entire extent of the extant Confederate Siegeworks are within the October Battlefield, Phase I and II, sites and are thus defined largely by the local city and county road networks.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Confederate Siegeworks comprise significant extant earth fortifications associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth as well as associated viewsheds that retain much of their historic pastoral character. The viewsheds between the siegeworks and the railroad, the latter being a central feature of the interpretive story at Corinth, are significant in that they provide the historic setting within which to interpret military activities related to both the siege and the battle. The siegeworks are considered to be critical components for inclusion in the Corinth Unit.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The resources and viewsheds associated with the Confederate Siegeworks cover more than 800 acres. Aside from the existing road network and residential dwellings along the roads, the area retains much of its historic pastoral character, remaining either as farm fields or as forested lands, and could be easily managed. More than 250 acres of the Confederate Siegeworks are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and are available for donation. Private residential properties adjacent to the road network would not be acquired unless specific resource protection or visitor use needs were identified. Management would provide periodic mowing and routine law enforcement patrols. The concept for visitor use would require some additional trails, access points, interpretive media, and small-scale parking areas.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although some of the land within the Confederate Siegeworks has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties it owns or may acquire in the future. The organization's challenge is primarily property acquisition for donation to the

National Park Service. No other management entity is recognized as being capable of providing for adequate management and resource protection or accommodating anticipated visitor use levels.

## Battery F

Battery F, situated on the point of a ridge approximately 2,200 feet south of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, is a well-preserved Union earthwork constructed during the summer of 1862 to protect the railroad. The site, about 1½ miles northwest of the railroad crossover, was the scene of heavy fighting during the Battle of Corinth. On the afternoon of October 3, 1862, two Union infantry brigades and supporting field batteries were driven from the position by direct attack from Confederate brigades advancing from the north and a flanking movement by Confederate forces to the south. Approximately 150 feet long, the parapet is between 3 and 6 feet high with a ditch in front. The battery was the northernmost of the detached batteries protecting approaches to Corinth along roads and railroads.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** Battery F was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The earthworks retain a high degree of integrity, having been protected by forest cover.

Visitor use is accommodated via a short trail from the adjacent county road and by several waysides that interpret the Battery. Parking is modest but apparently sufficient to accommodate visitor traffic. Battery F is approximately 2 miles from Battery Robinett and easily accessed along county roads.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The 9-acre property is bounded on two sides by county roads and private properties on the remaining two sides with the earthworks at the farthest northeast edge of the site adjacent to the residential properties. Thus the boundary appears clearly defined by the roads and the battery itself.

**Protection of Park Resources.** Battery F is an important resource for the Corinth unit since it represents the only remaining battery in pristine condition. The landscape in front of the battery remains undeveloped, thus allowing for protection of both the battery and its viewshed.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Comprised of 9 acres and accessible via county roads, Battery F could be simply managed by periodic mowing of the landscape surrounding the battery with routine law enforcement patrols for protection. Wayside interpretation is onsite, and few visitor use needs are apparent. The existing modest parking lot may need to be formalized.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** The Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth have acquired the 9-acre property for donation to the National Park Service. Again that organization does not expect to manage the property for the long term. No other management entity is recognized capable of providing the necessary levels of resource protection and visitor use.

### **Davis Bridge Battlefield**

On October 5, 1862, 8,000 Union troops under Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord, sent by U.S. Grant from Bolivar, Tennessee, to intercept Van Dorn, slammed into the vanguard of the retreating Confederate column at Davis Bridge on the Hatchie River 2 miles south of Pocahontas, Tennessee. Ord drove the head of the Confederate column back across the river, seized the bridge, and charged his troops into the thicket east of the river. Confederates defending the heights overlooking the crossing to the east inflicted heavy casualties on the Federals and checked their further advance. His route west blocked by Ord, and with Rosecrans' pursuit columns in his wake, Van Dorn successfully managed to extricate his army from between the two converging enemy columns and crossed the Hatchie at Crum's Mill 6 miles upstream (south), retreating to Holly Springs, Mississippi. The engagement at Davis Bridge ended Van Dorn's Corinth offensive. A complete failure, the autumn campaign was the last Confederate offensive in Mississippi. The bridge across the Hatchie River

has long since washed away and the banks of the river have undergone erosion, but the battlefield site retains a high degree of integrity.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** A 5-acre plot at the Davis Bridge Site was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. In 1993 the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the Davis Bridge battle as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the battle as having Class C military importance, because it had observable influence on the outcome of the Battle of Corinth and Pursuit from Corinth campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. During 1995-96 the Corinth Civil War Mapping and Documentation Project documented 40 extant defining features in the battlefield area that are critical to an understanding of the battle. In 1998 the Davis Bridge Battlefield, a 598-acre historic property, was listed in the National Register of Historic Places. The national register designation incorporated the core battlefield area on the east and west sides of the Hatchie River as well as the 5-acre Davis Bridge Site.

Much of the core battlefield area remains in agricultural cultivation or woodlands; thus, the battlefield retains a high degree of its historic pastoral and woodlands character and provides a large expanse of land area available for visitor use and interpretation. Metamora Ridge, easily accessible by state highways and county roads, offers scenic vistas of the historic core battlefield area. Furthermore, the largely pristine battlefield has high potential for archeological survey and research.

Because the battlefield retains a high degree of integrity, it provides a wide array of opportunities for visitor use and interpretation, such as trails, waysides, and related exhibits. Existing land use would allow for easily accessible public use. The battlefield is near the small railroad community of Pocahontas, Tennessee, and the Hatchie River and remnants of historic roads bisect the battlefield. Access is convenient from local county roads and State Highway 57.



The current focal point of the visitor experience is the forested 5-acre plot near the historic bridge site where the heaviest fighting occurred. An unimproved road on a historic road trace accesses this site. There are several stone monuments commemorating the battle and those who fell there. However, the 598-acre core battlefield offers ample opportunity to interpret all key elements of the entire battle within the parameters of their relatively pristine historic surroundings.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The 598-acre boundary of the Davis Bridge Battlefield is largely defined by landownership patterns and topographical features. The property lines and the battle lines are essentially compatible. Adjacent land use consists primarily of agricultural cultivation and woodlands. The area west of the river is largely pastoral in character, providing opportunities for interpretive trails, waysides, and vistas, while the heavily wooded area east of the river provides opportunities for management as a backcountry trails area.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Davis Bridge Battlefield is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect: (1) a historic property listed in the National Register of Historic Places; (2) a resource contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark; (3) a key Civil War battle in the Battle of Corinth and Pursuit from Corinth campaign in the Western Theater of Operations; and (4) one of the 384 principal battlefields of the Civil War as identified by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission. Critical resources include the vistas of the river valley and core battlefield area from Metamora Ridge that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the battlefield. Although a few modern homes have been constructed on or near the core battlefield area, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the battlefield. However, construction of more homes in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the importance of the battlefield, and the possibility of timbering would affect the site because it would contribute to soil erosion.

**Feasibility of Administration.** As defined by its National Register of Historic Places nomination form, the core area of the Davis Bridge Battlefield encompasses 598 acres. These lands, which could be easily managed, retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields or as forested lands. There are 115 acres of the core battlefield area available for donation – 110 acres owned by the state of Tennessee and 5 acres owned by the Davis Bridge Memorial Foundation. The remaining lands of the core battlefield area are owned by nine private landowners, the largest being the Miller Lumber Company, which owns 345 forested acres that were last timbered in 1995-96. Private residential properties would not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs were identified. Management would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols (primarily on a seasonal basis), and partnerships with state and local governments and private organizations to obtain services for a seasonal education/interpretive program and personal visitor services.

Visitor use of the battlefield would require some additional trails, improvement of existing trails, new and improved waysides, and construction of a small-scale parking area and modest scale shelter/orientation structure to serve as a visitor contact facility. In addition, consideration would be given to construction of a representative period bridge over the Hatchie River at the historic Davis Bridge Site.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although 115 acres of the core Davis Bridge battlefield area have been acquired by the state of Tennessee and the Davis Bridge Memorial Foundation, neither the state nor the foundation envisions long-term management of the properties they own. Although Big Hill Pond State Park once had site management responsibility for the Davis Bridge Site, the state's severe budget problems have left it financially strapped, forcing it to abandon such activity. The foundation is small and has limited resources, and it is the stated intention of that organization to have the battlefield incorporated into the national park system. No other recognized management entity is capable of

providing for resource protection and visitor use of the battlefield.

### **Confederate Rifle Pit**

Known locally as the rifle pit, this feature is probably a prepared artillery redoubt. It is crescent-shaped, and faces northeast, and consists of a low earthwork behind which was a shallow trench. Devoid of sod and subject to erosion, the earthwork is approximately 3 feet high, 10 to 12 feet wide, and 50 feet long.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** While identified in the initial national historic landmark nomination as one of the 16 contributing resources to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the site has been severely compromised by the community's water tower constructed directly on the resource. Thus little integrity remains and the site is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. A wayside onsite describes the rifle pit and visitor use is currently allowed.

### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The rifle pit/redoubt is in a residential neighborhood with easily identified property lines resulting from adjacent residential lots and city streets. Access for visitor use is accommodated via the network of community streets.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The existing erosion problem would continue without apparent solution due to the lack of protective vegetation. In the long run the modest physical remains of the rifle pit/redoubt would likely be lost.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The site is modest in size — less than 1 acre — and consequently could be easily managed as a part of the larger Corinth Unit, with periodic mowing and other routine maintenance.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** The rifle pit/artillery redoubt is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park largely due to the compromised integrity of the site. However, it

would remain a component of the larger visitor experience with interpretation provided through the continued use of waysides at the site. Continued ownership by the city of Corinth is considered appropriate.

### **Railroad Crossover**

The crossover of the east-west Memphis & Charleston Railroad and north-south Mobile & Ohio Railroad was the catalyst for the creation and development of Corinth and was the reason for the town's strategic military significance. The crossover is represented today by the Illinois Central Gulf and Southern Railroads. The nearby depot, constructed in 1917, is the third such structure to stand at this site.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The railroad crossover was one of the original sites identified in the national historic landmark as a contributing resource. Its importance to the Corinth story cannot be understated, nevertheless it remains the junction of two active rail lines. Thus, the site is considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit with some qualifications. Interpretation would occur adjacent to the crossover, and the National Park Service would seek some level of management responsibility but there would be no intention to acquire lands owned by the managing railroad authority. Agreements with the city of Corinth would be sought to allow visitor use of Trailhead Park and the city parking lot to facilitate the visitor experience provided at this site.

Interpretation relating the story of the crossover in the Civil War is provided onsite. Parking is provided nearby along with several wayside interpretive displays. Once the Northeast Mississippi Museum opens in the depot building adjacent to the crossover, additional interpretation of the railroad story at Corinth could be provided.

### **Operational and Management Issues.**

Less than 1 mile from Battery Robinett, the railroad crossover could be easily managed, requiring only modest services such as routine trash collection.





The active rail line traffic would continue to present obvious visitor safety problems to management.

**Protection of Park Resources.** Resource protection of the Railroad Crossover would be secure as long as the two railroads continued to operate. The resource is also afforded the protection as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Although convenient to Battery Robinett and not a large site in terms of acreage, the railroad crossover would be expected to accommodate visitors. Safety of the visiting public would be the primary concern of National Park Service management due to the continuing operation of the two railroad lines. Frequent rail traffic occurs over the lines on a daily basis.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Due to the significance of the railroad crossover, the resource is considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park. But due to its continued use as a functioning transportation hub certain limitations are also appropriate. As suggested earlier, National Park Service management would be limited to adjacent properties developed in conjunction with the city of Corinth at Trailhead Park as an ongoing partnership.

### Corona College

Opened as a school for young Southern women in 1858, Corona College was located on what came to be known as the College Hill area about five miles southwest of the railroad crossover. During the summer of 1862, when Union forces constructed an inner line of earthwork fortifications, Batteries Phillips, Tannrath, and Lothrop were erected in the College Hill area to protect Corinth against a Confederate force approaching from the west or south. After heavy fighting on October 3, the Federal forces retired into their interior line of redoubts, and on the morning of October 4, Confederate Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell skirmished but did not assault the Union lines on College Hill. Without his support, the temporary Confederate penetration into the heart of Corinth was doomed. The college, which is no longer

extant, was used as a hospital by both sides during the Civil War.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The Corona College site would provide the opportunity to broaden the visitor experience at Corinth to include interpretive themes underrepresented at other Civil War parks. The principal historic themes that could be developed in association with this resource would include medical care during the Civil War and the impact of the conflict on civilian populations.

**Operational and Management Issues.** The Corona College site is defined as a single property owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth. Access to the site is from Highway 72, one of the principal traffic arteries in Corinth. The property is currently pastoral in character and fronted by commercial development along Highway 72.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The resources of the Corona College site are largely archeological. Acquisition of the property would ensure the long-term protection of those resources. The property would otherwise be subject to commercial development because it is near the intersection of Highways 72 and 45, a growing commercial area in Corinth.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Corona College covers 2 acres adjacent to Highway 72. The site would be easily administered as a component of the Corinth Unit with only periodic law enforcement patrols required. Protection of archeological resources would be most critical because there are no extant aboveground physical resources. The Corona College story would ultimately be one of the more meaningful human interest stories of the Corinth Unit. This parcel would provide opportunities for relating the impact of the Civil War on civilian populations as well as stories concerning medical care for battle casualties and field hospitals. In order to adequately design a visitor experience, a development concept plan for Corona College should be undertaken immediately if the site is included as a component of the Corinth Unit. At a minimum the site would need modest parking,

wayside interpretive panels, and perhaps some artifact displays.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** Although the Corona College site has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Corona College site is in jeopardy. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the site.

#### **Duncan House**

The Duncan House served as the headquarters of Confederate Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge during April and May 1862. The house was moved from around the corner on Bunch Street during the early 20th century and has undergone many modifications.

#### **Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The Duncan House, a privately owned home at 810 Polk Street (northeast corner of Bunch and Polk Streets) in Corinth, was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The Duncan House was associated with the Siege of Corinth, and, in 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the siege as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. In 1993 the Duncan House was listed in the National Register of Historic Places as contributing to the significance of the Midtown Corinth Historic District.

The Duncan House provides the opportunity to tell the story of how a private home in Corinth was used as headquarters by a Confederate general

(Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge) during the siege. A wayside in front of the house describes its significance and relationship to the Siege of Corinth. Constructed during the late 1850s, the Duncan House retains little integrity, because it has gone through many changes. During the early 20th century, the structure was moved to its present site from around the corner on Bunch Street and covered with weatherboard siding. During the early 1920s, a partial-width, hip-roofed porch supported by boxed columns was added to the front façade, along with a six-panel door with transom and sidelights. In addition, the rear façade of the structure has been altered, many interior features, including partitions, trim, and fireplace surrounds, have been removed, and the interior floor plan has been remodeled.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

As a single structure in the context of a city block, the Duncan House could be easily managed as a discreet parcel by simply acknowledging the property lines. Nevertheless, the house has been moved from its original location to its present site and has been modified over time. The most desirable solution for both historic preservation and visitor experience purposes would be to return the property to its 1862 location and context.

**Protection of Park Resources.** As a privately owned structure, the property would appear adequately protected. The resource is also afforded protection as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Because this historic structure has been modified since the Civil War, an accurate restoration of the house to its period of significance would be an expensive undertaking. Annual maintenance costs would be substantial. The Duncan House, having been modernized and moved from its original location, would also complicate management and interpretation because it has lost much of its integrity.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The Duncan House is a well-maintained, privately owned residence. Thus, it is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. However, because the house is an integral ele-





ment of the siege story as well as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark and a national register-listed historic district, the National Park Service will seek to work with the private owner to ensure that the structure's documented historical and architectural values are protected, preserved, and interpreted to NHL standards.

### **Oak Home**

Constructed in 1857, the Oak Home served as the headquarters of Confederate Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk from late March to May 29, 1862. Rehabilitated ca. 1930, the house was enlarged and remodeled, the grounds were formally landscaped, and garden structures were added in the then popular Williamsburg interpretation of the "colonial style."

#### **Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The Oak Home, a privately owned residence at 808 North Fillmore Street (northeast corner of Bunch and Fillmore streets) in Corinth, was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The Oak Home was associated with the Siege of Corinth, and, in 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the siege as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. In 1993 the Oak Home was also listed in the National Register of Historic Places as contributing to the significance of the Midtown Corinth Historic District.

The Oak Home provides the opportunity to tell the story of how a private home in Corinth was used as headquarters by a Confederate general (Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk) during the siege. A wayside in front of the home describes its significance and relationship to the Siege of Corinth.

The Oak Home, reflecting Greek Revival influence, is a one-story, five-bay, post and timber center hall plan residence that was constructed in 1857. The simply detailed mid-19th century home was

enlarged with a side, two-bay addition, and the interior was remodeled and enhanced in the "Williamsburg" interpretation of the "colonial style" during 1930-35. Other improvements constructed in the "colonial style" included formal landscaping of the grounds and construction of a garden pavilion and a garage with living quarters on the second level connected to the front façade by a breezeway.

Despite the aforementioned alterations, the Oak Home has retained its original strong projecting front portico with paired square columns supporting a deep entablature, and the central block appears much as it did in a ca. 1860 sketch of the structure. The 1930s-era alterations to the residence were of high quality and blend with the original building fabric.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

As a single-family home on a distinct property within the community, the Oak Home is easily identifiable simply through the use of the existing property lines. Consequently the property could be easily managed for purposes of visitor use and resource protection. If considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, the Oak Home would constitute another detached property.

**Protection of Park Resources.** As a privately owned structure, the property would appear to be adequately protected. The home is also afforded protection as a contributing resource to the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Because it is a historic structure that has been modified since the Civil War an accurate restoration of the Oak Home to its period of significance would be an expensive undertaking. Annual maintenance costs would be substantial.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** The Oak Home is a well-maintained, privately owned residence. Thus, it is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. However, because the home is an integral element of the siege story as well as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark and a national register-listed historic district, the National

Park Service will seek to work with the private owner to ensure that the structure's documented historical and architectural values are protected, preserved, and interpreted to NHL standards.

### Fish Pond House

Constructed in 1856, the Fish Pond House served as the headquarters of Confederate Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard from late March until May 29, 1862. The house has undergone many changes since its initial construction, the most prominent being the removal of the projecting cupola on the roof that housed a cistern which purportedly gave the house its name.

#### Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.

The Fish Pond House, a privately owned home at 708 Kilpatrick Street in Corinth, was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The Fish Pond House was associated with the Siege of Corinth, and, in 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the siege as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach.

In 1993, the Fish Pond House was listed in the National Register of Historic Places as contributing to the significance of the Midtown Corinth Historic District. The Fish Pond House provides the opportunity to tell the story of how a private home in Corinth was used as headquarters by a Confederate general (Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard) during the Siege of Corinth. A wayside in front of the house describes its significance and relationship to the Siege of Corinth.

The Fish Pond House was constructed in 1856 as a one-story, five-bay, post-and-timber frame center hall cottage with Greek Revival influence. The house has undergone many exterior and interior alterations and remodeling efforts since its initial construction, the most prominent being removal of

the projecting cupola on the roof that housed a cistern which purportedly gave the house its name. Despite these changes, the central block appears much as it did during the Civil War era.

**Operational and Management Issues.** As a single-family home on a distinct property within the community, the Fish Pond House is easily identifiable simply through the use of the existing property lines. Consequently, the property could be easily managed for purposes of visitor use and resource protection. If considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, the Fish Pond House would constitute another detached property in the overall mix of the Corinth Unit resources.

**Protection of Park Resources.** As a privately owned structure, the property would appear to be adequately protected. The resource is also afforded protection because it is a contributing resource to the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Because this historic structure has been modified since the Civil War an accurate restoration of the Fish Pond House to its period of significance would be an expensive undertaking. Annual maintenance costs would be substantial.

#### Alternatives to National Park Service

**Management.** The Fish Pond House is a well-maintained, privately owned residence. Thus, it is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. However, because the house is an integral element of the siege story as well as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark and a national register-listed historic district, the National Park Service will seek to work with the private owner to ensure that the structure's documented historical and architectural values are protected, preserved, and interpreted to NHL standards.

### Veranda House

A significant example of Greek Revival architecture modified and adapted to a domestic scale, the Veranda House served as the headquarters of Confederate Maj. Gens. Braxton Bragg and Earl



Van Dorn in April and May 1862 and of Union Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck from May 30 to mid-July 1862.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The Veranda House, a privately owned residence at 705 Jackson Street (northwest corner of Jackson and Childs streets) in Corinth, was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The Veranda House was associated with the Siege of Corinth, and, in 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the siege as one of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War. The commission designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862) in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. In 1975, the Veranda House was individually listed in the National Register of Historic Places, and in 1993, it was listed as contributing to the significance of the Midtown Corinth Historic District.

The Veranda House provides the opportunity to tell the story of how a private home in Corinth was used as headquarters by two Confederate generals (Maj. Gens. Braxton Bragg and Earl Van Dorn) during the siege and by a Union general (Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck) during the period immediately following the siege from May 30 to mid-July 1862. A wayside in front of the house describes its significance and relationship to the siege (and immediate post-siege period) of Corinth.

Owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth the structure is open for tours. Located behind the Veranda House, a one-story Greek Revival structure that is believed to have served as its detached kitchen, has been converted for use by the Friends as the Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center. The center provides visitor orientation and is the starting point for driving and walking tours that interpret the Siege and Battle of Corinth.

Previously known as the Curlee House, the Veranda House was a one-story, three-bay, post-and-timber frame center hall residence constructed in 1857. The house is a significant example of

Greek Revival architecture modified and adapted to a domestic scale. Although the structure retains a high degree of integrity, alterations to its exterior include the replacement of two pairs of octagonal chimneys with lower, more conventional stacks, roof alterations and replacement, removal of simple, sawn antefixes from the parapet wall, and construction of a frame addition to the rear elevation during the early 1930s.

**Operational and Management Issues.** As a single-family home on a distinct property within the community, the Veranda House is easily identifiable simply through the use of the existing property lines. Consequently the property could be easily managed for purposes of visitor use and resource protection. If considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, the Veranda House would constitute another detached property in the overall mix of Corinth Unit resources.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Veranda House is owned and operated by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth. As such, it functions as the city's interim interpretive center pending construction of the permanent interpretive center at Battery Robinett. Protection of the Veranda House would remain important in the future because it would continue to be an integral component of the Civil War experience in Corinth. The National Park Service would assist in any resource protection needs that are identified by the Friends group. The resource is also afforded protection as a contributing resource to the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark.

**Feasibility of Administration.** Because this historic structure has been modified since the Civil War, an accurate restoration of the Veranda House to its period of significance would be an expensive undertaking. Annual maintenance costs would be substantial.

**Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The Veranda House, as well as its associated Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center, are well maintained by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth. The house is considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. However, because the house would continue to be maintained and

managed by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the National Park Service does not propose the structure for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. The house and the interim interpretive center would remain as integral elements of the siege story as well as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark and a national register-listed historic district, the National Park Service will seek to work with the Friends organization to ensure that the structure's documented historical and architectural values are protected, preserved, and interpreted to NHL standards.

#### **OCCUPATION PHASE (May 30, 1862- January 24, 1864)**

##### **Contraband Camp**

Established in late 1862 after the Battle of Corinth, the contraband camp housed between 2,500 and 6,000 freed African Americans until the Union army abandoned Corinth in January 1864. African American men in the camp were recruited for service in the Federal army, and Northern white men and women from abolitionist and benevolent organizations came to Corinth to provide the freedmen with religious, academic, and vocational instruction.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** Sections 6 and 7 of Public Law 106-271 identify the story of the Corinth contraband camp as one of the significant themes to be interpreted in the Corinth Unit. The site of the Corinth contraband camp provides the opportunity to interpret the largely untold experiences of African-Americans within the context of the Siege and Battle of Corinth as well as the broader Western Theater of Operations during the Civil War.

Although the contraband camp was destroyed by the Union army before abandoning Corinth in January 1864, the camp and its immediate surroundings have high archeological potential because of the likelihood of subsurface artifacts related to the operation of the camp. Although the contraband camp is in a semiurban environment and modern residences have been constructed

along the roads that skirt the area, the site is covered with underbrush and hardwood and pine trees. Nevertheless, the site provides excellent opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities, a small-scale parking area with offroad pullout, and waysides/exhibits. The boundary of the contraband camp parcel will be adjusted to avoid land-use conflicts.

##### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The general boundary of the Corinth contraband camp is defined by land-use patterns and by city/county roads on the north and west, a railroad on the south, and Bridge Creek on the east. Adjacent land use is characterized by some residences on acreage plots along the roads as well as urban development to the north and west. Nevertheless, the contraband camp provides opportunities for interpretive/ recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and non-personal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Corinth contraband camp is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource that (1) Public Law 106-271 identifies as being a significant theme associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth and the Western Theater of Operations during the Civil War; and (2) affords the opportunity to interpret the largely untold experiences of African-Americans within the context of the Siege and Battle of Corinth as well as the overall context of the Civil War.

Critical resources include the pastoral and woodland character of the contraband camp that provide the historic setting for interpreting the importance and key elements of the camp. Although some modern homes have been constructed along the roads in the vicinity of the campsite, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the site. However, construction of more homes and urban commercial development in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the campsite.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands on which the Corinth contraband camp sit could be easily managed. Although located within a semiurban environment, the immediate surroundings of the

site retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character. Twenty acres of the camp are available for donation, while the remainder of the lands are privately owned. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private residential properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified. Management of the contraband camp would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain services for development of a seasonal education/ interpretive program and personal visitor services. Development costs would result from trail development, new and improved waysides and exhibits, and construction of a small-scale parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although 20 acres of the Corinth contraband camp have been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Corinth contraband camp is in jeopardy. There is no other recognized entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the site.

### **Camp Davies**

Camp Davies was a stockade camp established by Federal troops on November 26, 1862, to serve as a fortified outpost for the garrison at Corinth. The camp is 5 miles south of Corinth on high ground between the Tuscumbia River (south) and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad (east). The stockade and camp facilities were constructed by soldiers from Company D, 66th Illinois Infantry, with assistance from the troopers of the 5th Ohio Cavalry. Fortified earthworks surrounded the 10-acre log stockade enclosure that featured officers' tents, 10 log barracks (approximately 20 ft. x 60 ft.) with fireplaces, three artesian wells, commissary, Masonic Hall and a large hospital. Pine trees 10-15 feet tall were

transplanted around the log structures, and in front of the officers' tents a double row of trees were planted with a sidewalk between them.

On November 22, 1863, Camp Davies was the scene of a skirmish between Federal and Confederate troops. The camp was burned as the Union Army abandoned the area on January 24, 1864. The site is rural and has been impacted by a county road and establishment of an African-American cemetery known as the Stockade Cemetery. The earthworks comprising the western portion of the facility retain a high degree of definition with an extensive ditch and walls from 6 to 8 feet high. The earthworks lose definition east of the county road.

### **Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.**

The extant Camp Davies remains provide the opportunity to preserve important resources that relate the African-American role in the post battle occupation of Corinth by Federal forces and, along with the contraband camp, the larger story of African-American participation in the Civil War. The remains of the camp retain a degree of integrity, although a county road, cultivation, and erosion have impacted the site. Camp Davies provides an excellent opportunity for interpretive/ recreational trail possibilities and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area. The boundary of the parcel will be adjusted to avoid land use conflicts.

### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The boundary of the Camp Davies site is defined by the area occupied by the outpost's soldiers as well as topographical features such as ridgelines. Access to the site is from County Road 427. Adjacent land use is primarily rural. The site provides opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale offroad parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The resources at Camp Davies are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that affords the opportunity to relate the role of African-Americans in the post battle occupation of the Corinth area by Federal forces.

Although a few modern intrusions are apparent in the vicinity of the camp, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the remaining resources. However, more development in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of Camp Davies.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands that comprise Camp Davies could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the encampment area and earthworks retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields, forested lands, or semirural landscapes. A portion of the site is currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and is available for donation. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the site would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain other services. Aside from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, interpretive waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although a portion of Camp Davies site have been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties they own or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Camp Davies site are in jeopardy. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection and interpretation and visitor use of the site.

## **Federal Redan**

The Federal Redan was constructed by Federal troops after the Battle of Corinth to protect the Union garrison against enemy attack from the southwest. The earthwork fortification consists of two walls, each approximately 35 feet long. The redan, which faces an open field, is between 3½ and 4 feet high with a shallow ditch in front. Evidence of a historic roadbed on site is believed to be the historic trace of the Kossuth Road that extended from Corinth to Kossuth, approximately 6 miles to the southwest.


**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The 30-acre Federal Redan site provides the opportunity to preserve important resources that relate to the post battle occupation of Corinth by Federal forces. The extant redan remains retain a high degree of integrity, although a county road skirts the north end of the property and the site has been impacted by erosion. The redan faces an open field currently protected by forest cover; thus, the immediate surroundings retain much of their historic and woodland character. The redan provides an excellent opportunity for interpretive/recreational trail possibilities and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

## **Operational and Management Issues.**

The 30-acre property is on the south side of Bell School Road approximately ¼ mile west of State Highway 45 and ½ mile south of State Highway 72. Access to the site, which is surrounded by private property, is from State Highway 45 and Bell School Road. Thus, the boundary appears clearly defined by the roads and redan itself. Adjacent land use is primarily pastoral with some residences along the area's county roads and urban development along State Highways 45 and 72. The redan provides opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The Federal Redan is critical to the Corinth Unit, because it would protect a resource that affords the opportunity to relate significant elements of the post battle occupation of the Corinth area by Federal forces. Critical

# Corinth Miss.



Corona College, Corinth, Miss.  
Houston, the play

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resources include the pastoral and woodland character of the site that provides the historic setting for interpreting the principal elements of the redan. Although some modern homes have been constructed along the county roads in the vicinity of the redan site, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the remaining resource. However, construction of more homes and urban development in the area could substantially change the historic setting that is essential for interpreting the significance of the redan.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands on which the Federal Redan are located could be easily managed. Although located close to major state highways and an urban environment, the immediate surroundings of the site retain much of historic pastoral and woodland character. The entire 30-acre redan site is owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and is available for donation. Landownership issues will drive the final configuration to avoid conflicts. Private properties will not be acquired unless specific critical resource protection or visitor use needs are identified.

Management of the site would entail periodic mowing, routine enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain other services. There are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, interpretive waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

**Alternatives to National Park Service Management.** Although the entire 30-acre Federal Redan site has been acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the charter of that organization does not envision long-term management of the properties it owns or may acquire in the future. The purpose of that organization is primarily property acquisition on an opportunity basis for donation to the National Park Service. Thus, the long-term preservation and visitor use of the Federal Redan site is in jeopardy if left to the Friends to manage. There is no other recognized management entity capable of providing for resource protection, interpretation, and visitor use of the site.

## Camp Glendale

Following the Battle of Corinth, on October 26, 1862, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant established the military District of Corinth, one of four divisions of Grant's District of West Tennessee that extended across northeast Mississippi and portions of Tennessee and Alabama with headquarters in Corinth. An average occupation force of 25,000 Federal troops garrisoned the district, which included five fortified posts/ camps: Corinth, Glendale (7 miles southeast of Corinth), and Danville, Mississippi; Bethel, Tennessee; and Tuscumbia, Alabama.

The district was under the command of Maj. Gen. Isaac F. Quinby until November 11, 1862, and from that date until January 24, 1864, it was administered by Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge. Camp Glendale consists of the remains of a stockade bastion, 200 feet by 100 feet, with a ditch and walls nearly 5 feet high. The bastion was 1/4 mile north of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Archeological evidence illustrates that the area was equal in size and complexity to Camp Davies south of town. Loyal Unionists from North Alabama, organized into the 1st Alabama (U.S.) Cavalry, were stationed here from late October through June 1863. In addition, other regiments of the district garrison force served at the Glendale post.

When it was determined that the Corinth district no longer had strategic importance, the Union Army abandoned the area on January 24, 1864, burning its posts and camps and retiring military and civilian (i.e., freedmen) personnel to the Federal enclave at Memphis.

## Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.

The extant earthworks retain a relatively high degree of integrity. Their immediate surroundings have high archeological potential because of the likelihood that they contain remnants of encampments that were occupied for more than one year following the Battle of Corinth. The earthworks provide excellent opportunities for interpretive/recreational trail possibilities, and a small-scale parking area with offroad pullout already exists. Camp Glendale would afford the opportunity to



relate the story of Southerners serving as Union troops as well as the aftermath of the Siege and Battle of Corinth.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The boundary of the Camp Glendale site is defined by the area of influence of the camp as well as topographical features such as ridgelines. Access to the site is near Highway 72 and from County Road 248. Adjacent land use is primarily rural. The site provides opportunities for interpretive/recreational trails, interpretive media, small-scale offroad parking, and nonpersonal services.

**Protection of Park Resources.** The resources at Camp Glendale are critical to the Corinth Unit, because they would protect a resource that affords the opportunity to relate the role of Southerners serving as Union troops as well as the aftermath of the Siege and Battle of Corinth.

Although a few modern intrusions are apparent in the vicinity of the historic camp area, there are no significant immediate identifiable threats to the site's resources. Long-term protection of the resource, however, is not ensured.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The lands that comprise Camp Glendale could be easily managed. The immediate surroundings of the site retain much of their historic pastoral and woodland character, remaining either as farmfields, forested lands, or semirural landscapes. At this time the resource is in private ownership. Inclusion of this site in the Corinth Unit would require acquisition of the property.

Management of the site would entail periodic mowing, routine law enforcement patrols, and perhaps partnerships with local governments and/or private organizations to obtain other services. Aside

from acquisition costs, there are no perceived short-term development costs. Long-term development costs would result from trail development, interpretive waysides, and construction of a small-scale offroad parking area.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** No friends group interested in the preservation and interpretation of the Camp Glendale site exists. Therefore the National Park Service would need to acquire the property through appropriate means to ensure long-term protection, interpretation, and visitor use of the resource.

### **COMMEMORATION PHASE (Post Civil War)**

#### **Corinth National Cemetery**

Established in 1866 the 16-acre Corinth National Cemetery is part of the National Cemetery System administered by the Department of Veteran Affairs. Interment of the remains of Civil War soldiers, which were gathered from approximately 20 battlefields in the area, began at this cemetery in September 1866. The cemetery is currently open for additional interment of United States service men and women.

**Significant Resources or Opportunities for Public Enjoyment Related to the Corinth Unit.** The Corinth National Cemetery was one of the 16 properties listed as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark. The cemetery was associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth, and, in 1993, the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission listed the siege and battle as two of the 384 principal battles of the Civil War.

The commission classified both the siege and the battle as being significant components in the Main Western Theater Minus the Gulf Approach. It designated the siege as having Class B military importance, because it had a direct and decisive influence on the outcome of the Shiloh Campaign (1862), and the battle as having Class A military importance because it had a decisive influence on a campaign and a direct impact on the course of the war.

The Corinth National Cemetery, which remains open for additional interment of U.S. service men and women, provides the opportunity not only to commemorate the Siege and Battle of Corinth but also to memorialize the soldiers who died during those events. Waysides at the cemetery describe its significance and relationship to the siege and battle.

Although still open for additional burials, the cemetery retains a high degree of integrity as the final resting place for the bodies of Civil War soldiers gathered from approximately 20 Civil War battlefields in the area. There are two noncontributing buildings within the 16-acre cemetery boundary that were constructed in 1934: the two-story, Tudor style superintendent's house and the utilitarian T-shaped maintenance building.

#### **Operational and Management Issues.**

The cemetery boundary is well-defined, occupying approximately an entire city block. Adjacent land use is principally residential with a strong delineation of separation from the neighborhood provided by the cemetery wall. Access is via the city streets of Corinth. The national cemetery is open daily for visitors.

**Protection of Park Resources.** Since the Corinth National Cemetery is a unit of the National Cemetery System, it is well protected and no immediate or future threats are recognized. Surrounding properties are expected to continue as residential


neighborhoods and thus remain compatible with the ambience of the cemetery.

**Feasibility of Administration.** The Corinth National Cemetery is a well-managed facility. Thus, most administrative issues are being addressed by the current management. Both operational and visitor use considerations are accommodated. Adding the national cemetery to the Corinth Unit would enlarge the maintenance operation of the unit substantially.

#### **Alternatives to National Park Service**

**Management.** The Corinth National Cemetery is a well maintained component of the National Cemetery System administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs. Thus, it is not considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. Because the cemetery is an integral element of the siege and battle story as well as a contributing resource to a national historic landmark (NHL), the National Park Service will seek to work with the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure that the cemetery's documented historical values are protected, preserved, and interpreted to NHL standards.









## MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

In addition to establishing resource significance and measuring sites against criteria for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park, this study has explored differing management frameworks for those resources passing the test of eligibility. Four alternatives are presented for consideration. All alternatives recognize the need to protect the nationally significant resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth and promote interpretation and visitor enjoyment of those resources. The differences in the alternatives are largely one of scale with each alternative protecting a progressively larger acreage.

### ALTERNATIVE A: THE CORINTH UNIT AS BATTERY ROBINETT

#### Concept

This alternative constitutes an existing conditions approach to the future of the Corinth Unit and the interpretation of the Siege and Battle of Corinth. A recommendation for the future management of the unit would not go beyond the enabling legislation of Public Law 106-271. Approximately 20 acres at Battery Robinett, including the interpretive center, would be managed as an extension of Shiloh National Military Park and officially designated the Corinth Unit.

#### Management Authority

The National Park Service would assume responsibility for management of the Battery Robinett site and operation of the interpretive center. A partnership with the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth, associated groups, city of Corinth, and other landowners would continue to ensure protection of resources and implementation of historic preservation practices. The bureau would enter into cooperative agreements as necessary to support other public and private entities in their management efforts.

#### Boundary Consideration

The National Park Service currently owns 20 acres at Battery Robinett Park. Minor adjustments could be made by adding adjacent properties acquired by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth. Properties not contiguous to the Battery Robinett Park site would not be included in the Corinth Unit.

#### Resource Protection and Visitor Use

The National Park Service would undertake protection of the resources associated with Battery Robinett. All other resources identified as contributing to the significance of the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark or listed in the National Register of Historic Places would be protected under the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended. The visitor experience accommodated by the National Park Service would rely primarily on interpretation at the interpretive center through exhibits, programs, and personal services. Arrangements would be sought to connect visitor use at the interpretive center with opportunities for an enhanced experience via the walking and driving tours of Corinth and vicinity. Other resources of the region — including the recreational resources of the hiking/biking trails and trailhead park, visitor services provided in Corinth such as food and lodging, and other historic qualities and historic districts of the community — would be important components of the menu of choices offered the visiting public. Interpretation currently available at the Veranda House would be an important complement to that provided at the interpretive center at Battery Robinett.

#### Budget Estimate

Under alternative A the National Park Service would staff and operate the interpretive center, maintain the Battery Robinett site, and engage the local community in a variety of partnership activities. Beyond the construction of the interpretive center, further development costs are not recog-





nized. Staff costs are estimated to be \$669,200 annually for administration, visitor protection, interpretation, and maintenance divisions. Startup costs include \$24,000 for a patrol vehicle and \$80,000 for office equipment.

## **ALTERNATIVE B: THE CORINTH UNIT AS BATTERY ROBINETT PLUS OTHER CORE RESOURCES**

### **Concept**

The basic direction suggested by this alternative is to ensure the adequate range of historic resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth are included in the boundary, adequate opportunities for interpretation of the many Corinth stories are available, and this is accomplished by recommending the minimum acreage deemed necessary for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. This alternative would add all the aforementioned sites to the Corinth Unit that were considered eligible for inclusion in the national park system but would only acquire those sites considered essential to the Corinth Unit. In addition to Battery Robinett, the unit would include the battlefield sites, siege lines, and earthworks in and around Corinth, as well as the Corona College site, and the Contraband Camp site. The 11 areas would constitute the Corinth Unit with boundaries defined for each area to include what is considered the minimum acreage necessary to adequately protect its core historic resource. The total acreage of this alternative is 930 acres, of which 532 acres are available for donation.

As in the previous alternative, it is assumed that the new Corinth Civil War Interpretive Center at Fort Robinett Park (Battery Robinett) has been constructed and is in operational phase.

### **Management Authority**

Under this alternative, the National Park Service would operate as a traditional land management agency with operational and maintenance responsibilities for all those properties acquired and included in the Corinth Unit. The other contributing elements of the national historic landmark, such as the

historic houses and the national cemetery, would remain in private ownership but would be included in the unit. The National Park Service would participate in marketing and interpreting those resources with private owners. Partnerships with property owners would be developed to ensure that cooperative management of all significant historic resources was continued. The National Park Service would assist those property owners in an appropriate manner, as directed by Congress, including providing technical assistance, assistance in soliciting grants, and developing integrated interpretive programs.

### **Boundary Consideration**


The legislative boundary of the Corinth Unit established by PL 106-271 would be enlarged beyond the Battery Robinett site by the addition of other resources/properties considered eligible for inclusion and necessary to develop the Corinth Unit with minimal acquisition of private property. Battery Robinett would be enlarged from the approximately 20 acres under alternative A to include approximately 154 acres. The Corinth Unit would incorporate approximately 930 acres. The unit would be developed from 11 distinct parcels and acquired only from willing sellers, of which 532 acres are currently available for donation. The Park Service would also seek protection of surviving resources through the use of scenic easements, agricultural easements, and other less-than-fee acquisition procedures.

### **Resource Protection and Visitor Use**

Protection of the sites and resources included in the Corinth Unit would be the responsibility of the National Park Service. The remaining nationally significant properties would continue to be afforded the protection provided by the NHPA of 1966, as amended.

Under this alternative, the visitor experience provided by the Corinth Unit would be more elaborate than the previous alternative, although the new interpretive center at Battery Robinett would remain as the primary attraction. Additionally, the Park Service would design a visitor experience for the Corinth battlefield and associated earthworks





to interpret those events. Details regarding additional NPS developments to enhance the visitor experience at other sites proposed for inclusion into the Corinth Unit are still in the preliminary planning phase. Such developments may include improving access to the sites; construction of parking areas for cars, buses, and recreational vehicles (RVs); developing trails around the sites, installing interpretive wayside markers; and providing informational pamphlets that describe the historic events. This second layer of interpretation would focus on the battlefield events and the physical elements associated with those events, including earthworks, batteries, and siege lines. Site-specific developments proposed for the properties/resources included into the Corinth Unit would be evaluated and analyzed for potential environmental and human health impacts in separate NEPA documentation. A third component of the enhanced visitor experience would be to relate those significant resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth that are not represented in the national park system, principally the Contraband Camp and Corona College sites. The walking and driving tours would continue and would feature private properties, such as the historic homes, to the extent reasonable. Again, the services and historic sites available in and around Corinth would remain important components of the overall visitor experience.

### Budget Estimate

Under alternative B the National Park Service would staff and operate the interpretive center, maintain Battery Robinett, manage the 11 additional parcels considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, and engage the local community in a variety of partnership activities. Beyond the construction of the interpretive center, further development costs are anticipated. For additional waysides, trails, and parking areas, approximately \$500,000 would be needed. Staff costs are estimated to be \$1,606,100 annually for the administration, visitor protection, interpretation, and maintenance divisions. Startup costs associated with the need for patrol vehicles is estimated at \$45,000, for office equipment at \$125,000 and for maintenance equipment at \$181,900. Of the 930 acres eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, 538 are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of

Corinth or other partners and are available for donation.


## ALTERNATIVE C: EXPAND PROTECTION OF THE CORINTH UNIT TO INCLUDE CORE RESOURCES AND ADDITIONAL LANDS THAT PROVIDE HISTORIC CONTEXT

### Concept

This alternative would go beyond alternative B by expanding the protection of the core resources to include important viewsheds and additional lands that provide historic context for the 18 sites considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit. But as in alternative B, the concentration would be on ensuring adequate acreage for preservation of the significant historic resources and interpretation of those same resources. Again, all sites considered eligible would be recommended for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park under this alternative. In addition, this alternative would attempt to link the Corinth Unit with Shiloh National Military Park by adding defined corridors that incorporate lands on which the Civil War troop movements between Shiloh and Corinth occurred.

In essence, this alternative would add road corridors. As in alternative B, 18 areas would constitute the Corinth Unit, but additional acreage would be added to several areas to protect important viewsheds and adjacent landscapes. As in alternative B, the other contributing elements to the national historic landmark, such as the historic homes and the national cemetery, would be included in the Corinth Unit but remain in private ownership. The National Park Service would engage private homeowners and other managing authorities in marketing and interpreting those resources as a part of the larger Corinth Unit. The total acreage of this alternative is 6162 acres, of which 1,038 acres are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth or other partners and are available for donation.

The road corridors would include lands on which the historic troop movements between Shiloh and Corinth occurred and provide a direct, tangible link between the two units, thus creating a cohesive





park. The primary goal of adding the corridors would be preservation of historic traces relating to the troop movements. In addition, the corridors would provide opportunities for visitor use in multiple ways by accommodating interpretive, transportation, and recreational functions. Through the use of mostly existing roads, hiking, bicycling, and automotive connections between the two units would be formalized. Along existing rights-of-way the opportunity to provide all-purpose trails adjacent to McNairy County (TN) and Alcorn County (MS) roads would be explored with the current managing authorities. The trail alignments would then connect with the internal road networks of both Shiloh National Military Park and the city of Corinth to complete the loop. Wherever possible historic resources within the corridors would be preserved and interpreted.

In an important sense Corinth would become a southern gateway to Shiloh National Military Park much as Savannah, Tennessee, is the northern gateway to the park. Since major transportation routes serve Corinth, it is easily visited by most travelers. The interpretive center at Battery Robinett would reinforce the links between the units. With the addition of the various road corridors linking Corinth and Shiloh the national military park could become a recreational destination as well as a historic resource dedicated to the preservation of Civil War resources. The hiking/bicycling opportunity would entail a round-trip loop of more than 50 miles.

#### Management Authority

This alternative is similar to alternative B in that the National Park Service would operate as a traditional land managing agency with operational and maintenance responsibilities for all those properties incorporated in the unit, including the road corridors. Since certain properties would not be included in the unit, primarily the historic houses, the national cemetery, and the railroad crossover, partnerships with property owners would be developed to ensure continued cooperative management and preservation of all significant resources. The National Park Service would assist those property owners in any manner deemed appropriate by Congress. In addition, the National Park Service

would cooperate with owners of the historic properties in the communities that are not related to the Civil War period as well as with management authorities responsible for other visitor attractions in the region for continued resource preservation and interpretation.

In general, the National Park Service envisions its primary roles in the unit as managing those lands acquired for direct federal ownership, working with the Corinth community to enhance visitor use, developing and leading a comprehensive interpretive program, promoting partnerships with owners of associated historic sites, providing technical assistance for historic preservation initiatives in the area, expanding recreational opportunities in the region, and seeking continued private and public sector support for the Corinth Unit.

Enlarging the Corinth Unit to the extent provided by this alternative would likely raise a number of concerns for the National Park Service, the community, and the region. Typically, designation of a new unit of the national park system generates interest and visitation predictably increases. The magnitude of that increase is difficult to estimate, but increased traffic and parking and the demand for other visitor services can be expected to materialize soon after enlargement of the unit. Given the commitment of the community to achieving a high-quality park, these concerns are not viewed as insurmountable, and cooperation between the National Park Service and local partners should provide amicable resolution.

#### Boundary Consideration

Under this alternative, as in alternative B, the legislative boundary established by Public Law 106-271 would be enlarged beyond Battery Robinett by the addition of the 17 sites considered eligible additions to the unit. Since several of the individual areas would be enlarged beyond the areas provided in alternative B, the Corinth Unit would incorporate approximately 6,162 acres, of which 1,038 acres are owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth or other partners and available for donation. The road corridors connecting Corinth and Shiloh would be added to the unit, but acquisition of property is not anticipated.





## Resource Protection and Visitor Use

Protection of the sites and resources included in the Corinth Unit would be the responsibility of the National Park Service. The other nationally significant properties would continue to be afforded protection under the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended.

The visitor experience defined for the unit would go beyond that of alternative B by integrating the historic experience offered by the Corinth Unit with opportunities to explore and recreate in the surrounding area. The interpretive center at Battery Robinett would provide the initial introduction to the unit with visitors encouraged to explore the other 17 parcels of the Corinth Unit and experiences available in the community. Additionally, the National Park Service would design a visitor experience at Davis Bridge, Fallen Timbers, and the Corinth Battlefields to interpret those events. The scope of the experience is difficult to predict, but at a minimum access would be improved, parking enhanced, interpretive waysides installed, and informational pamphlets prepared. This second layer of interpretation would focus on the battlefield events and the physical elements associated with those events, such as earthworks, batteries, and siege lines. A third component of the visitor experience would consist of interpretation of those significant resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth that are not currently represented in the national park system, principally the contraband camp and Corona College sites.

As suggested in alternative B, the National Park Service would work with owners of related historic properties to ensure that the broadest range of visitor experiences is achieved. The walking and driving tours in and around Corinth would continue and feature private properties to the extent reasonable. Also, the National Park Service would work with the city of Corinth to participate fully in special community events. The final component of the visitor experience offered at Corinth would be the expanded role of recreational opportunities provided by the proposed hiking/bicycling tours that follow the historic troop movements between Shiloh and Corinth.

Concurrent with this special resource study a firm has been retained by the city of Corinth to evaluate the transportation, parking, and other needs of the town and its business district. The National Park Service is participating in that study and would assist in implementation of future recommendations that enhance the visitor experience and protect historic resources.

Once the Corinth Unit is fully established, visitors can expect to gain a quality understanding and appreciation of the Siege and Battle of Corinth as the earlier technical analysis of associated sites demonstrates. It is anticipated that an extended experience would celebrate the many resources of the community and region. With the development of the Corinth Unit, the National Park Service has an opportunity to work with the community to integrate fully the visitor experiences of the Siege and Battle with the other attractions and services in Corinth. The challenge for the future will be to link the Civil War experience to an enhanced appreciation of the larger community and its attractions and to connect with the necessary visitor services provided by the business interests of Corinth.

While the focus of this special resource study has been on the sites associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the surrounding area boasts a wealth of resources and activities that would broaden and enhance the visitor experience. Walking and driving tours of the other national historic landmark Civil War sites are available. The walking tour showcases the historic homes, sites, and districts of Corinth. Weather permitting, one can easily explore the Veranda House, other historic homes near downtown, and the railroad crossover along a defined pedestrian corridor. The Civil War driving tour connects more distant sites and more fully interprets the role Corinth played in the Civil War by providing access to outlying historic features such as Davis Bridge, Battery F, and other related battle sites.

Those experiences in Corinth would be further enhanced after the hiking/biking trails are completed. The hiking/biking trails developed by the city of Corinth are in addition to the connecting corridors between Shiloh and Corinth discussed above.





Starting at Trailhead Park, the hiking/biking trail would lead travelers through the historic downtown area to nearby earthworks. Other sites connected via the hiking/ biking trail include the national cemetery and Battery Robinett. The trail would extend through approximately 20 miles of Alcorn County with 8 miles of paved trails. Thus, Corinth could emerge both as a recreational and a historic park destination. A connection to other important resources within the region would also be facilitated to further enhance the quality of the visitor experience. Important sites, such as the Jacinto Courthouse, are already preserved and interpreted and, with an appropriate link to Corinth, would become additional visitor destinations.

Beyond interpretation of the events associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth, the primary interpretive themes of the Corinth Unit would include underrepresented subjects in the national park system such as the Contraband Camp, Corona College, and the role of railroads in the Civil War. For the type of unit envisioned by this study, one of the first undertakings of the National Park Service would be to explore development concepts for the contraband camp and Corona College properties and implement visitor use concepts at those sites. While the railroad crossover would remain an operating transportation hub, the National Park Service might consider additional interpretation at the site in conjunction with the property owners and perhaps in collaboration with the Northeast Mississippi Museum. Establishing interpretive programs at these sites and relating these stories would further connect the park visitor with the community.

Battery Robinett and the interpretive center are expected to become the introductory destination for visitors to the Corinth Unit. Visitors would be invited into the downtown business district of Corinth. The heart of Corinth consists of several historic districts that are listed in the National Register of Historic Places. The districts include an architectural showcase of residential and commercial buildings that provide a strong sense of the community's character and history. Some of those buildings have been adapted for use as restaurants that provide quality food service. Others provide a

variety of retail services. Ideally the business community in Corinth would provide the services required by the visiting public. Historic structures in the community, such as the Coliseum Theatre, could offer plays, concerts, and lectures thematically related to the Civil War and presented as adjuncts to the visitor experience provided by the Corinth Unit.

### **Budget Estimate**

Under alternative C the National Park Service would staff and operate the interpretive center, maintain and manage Battery Robinett and the 17 parcels considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth Unit, and engage the local community in a variety of partnership activities. Beyond the construction of the interpretive center, further development costs would be needed; including additional wayside exhibits and accompanying pullouts and parking areas. One-time development costs are estimated at \$500,000. Staff costs are estimated to be \$1,696,300 annually for the administration, visitor protection, interpretation, and maintenance divisions. Start-up costs associated with the need for patrol vehicles are estimated at \$45,000, \$125,000 for office equipment, and \$181,900 for maintenance equipment. (See appendix B for a detailed list of staff and equipment requirements associated with this alternative.) Land acquisition costs are estimated at approximately \$45,000,000.

## **ALTERNATIVE D: EXPAND PROTECTION OF THE CORINTH UNIT TO INCLUDE CORE RESOURCES, ADDITIONAL LANDS PROVIDING HISTORIC CONTEXT, AND ACCOMMODATE OTHER APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS**

### **Concept**

In many respects this alternative is similar to alternative C in that the same range of historic resources would be recommended for inclusion in the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park. However, certain considerations beyond strict resource protection requirements and the needs for visitor use and enjoyment would drive the decisions regarding the ultimate acreage of the various areas.

The principal consideration under this alternative would be to identify recognizable boundaries wherever possible to simplify management and law enforcement functions. For some of the areas boundary lines would be extended to section lines, roads, rail lines, or other topographic features to achieve more easily manageable and enforceable boundaries.

As in alternatives B and C, 18 areas would constitute the Corinth Unit. Several of the individual areas would have additional acreage added beyond alternative C, primarily at Farmington and at the four components of the Corinth Battlefield (Phases I and II, Battery Robinett, and the Confederate Siegeworks). The total acreage of this alternative is 7,427 acres, of which 1,038 acres are currently owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and are available for donation.

Again the road corridors corresponding to the historic troop movements between Shiloh and Corinth would be added to the unit to create a cohesive park.

As in the previous alternative, Corinth would become a southern gateway to Shiloh National Military Park

#### **Management Authority**

As in alternative C, the National Park Service would operate as a traditional land-managing agency with operational and maintenance responsibilities for all those properties incorporated in the unit. The National Park Service would cooperate with owners of the historic properties that are not related to the Civil War period as well as with management authorities responsible for other visitor attractions in the region.

In general, the National Park Service envisions its primary roles in the unit as managing those lands acquired for direct federal ownership, working with the Corinth community to enhance visitor use, developing and leading a comprehensive interpretive program, promoting partnerships with owners of associated historic sites, providing technical assistance for historic preservation initiatives in the area, expanding recreational opportunities in the region, and seeking continued private and public sector support for the Corinth Unit.

#### **Boundary Consideration**

As in alternative B the legislative boundary established by Public Law 106-271 would be enlarged beyond Battery Robinett by the addition of the 17 other sites considered eligible additions to the unit. Since several of the individual areas would be enlarged from that provided for under alternative C, the Corinth Unit would incorporate approximately 7,427 acres, of which 1,038 acres are owned by the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and available for donation. The road corridors connecting Corinth and Shiloh would be added to the unit but acquisition of property for those purposes is not anticipated.

#### **Resource Protection and Visitor Use**

Protection of the sites and resources included in the Corinth Unit would be the responsibility of the National Park Service. The other nationally significant properties would continue to be afforded protection under the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended.

The visitor experience defined for the unit would be similar to the one described for alternative C and would seek to integrate the historic experience offered by the Corinth Unit with opportunities to explore and recreate in the surrounding area. The interpretive center at Battery Robinett would provide the introductory experience for visitors to the Corinth Unit. Additionally the National Park Service would design a visitor experience at Davis Bridge, Fallen Timbers, the Corinth Battlefields, and other resources to interpret those events.

As suggested in alternatives B and C, the National Park Service would work with owners of related historic properties to ensure that the broadest range of visitor experiences would be provided. The walking and driving tours of Corinth would continue and feature private properties to the extent reasonable. Also, the National Park Service would work with the city of Corinth to participate fully in special community events. The final component of the visitor experience offered at Corinth would be the expanded role of recreational opportunities provided by the proposed hiking/bicycling tours that follow the troop movement corridors between Shiloh and Corinth.

Once the Corinth Unit is fully established, visitors can expect to gain a quality understanding and appreciation of the resources associated with the Siege and Battle of Corinth as the earlier technical analysis of associated sites demonstrates. An extended experience is also anticipated that would celebrate the many historic and recreational resources of the community and region. With the development of the Corinth Unit, the National Park Service has an opportunity to work with the community to integrate fully the visitor experiences of the Siege and Battle with the diversity of attractions and services of Corinth.

### Budget Estimate

In most respects the costs associated with alternative C would be anticipated in this alternative as well. Under alternative D the National Park Service would staff and operate the interpretive center; maintain Battery Robinett; manage the 17 other parcels considered eligible for inclusion in the Corinth unit, and engage the local community in a

variety of partnership activities. Beyond the construction of the interpretive center, further development costs would be needed for additional way-side exhibits and accompanying pullouts and parking areas. One- time development costs are estimated at \$500,000. Staff costs are estimated to be \$1,696,300 annually for the administration, visitor protection, interpretation, and maintenance divisions. Startup costs associated with the need for patrol vehicles are estimated at \$45,000, \$125,000 for office equipment, and \$181,900 for maintenance equipment.

Since additional acreage is considered by this alternative land acquisition costs would be higher than previous alternatives. Land acquisition costs are estimated at approximately \$63 million. Additionally this alternative would entail restoration of certain properties to historic conditions with a large budget item required to remove contemporary houses from many of the properties. No estimate is available to accomplish the restoration of the lands acquired.

Corinth Unit Boundary Adjustment Acreage Summary

| AREA               | Alternative A | Alternative B | Alternative C | Alternative D |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| BATTERY F          |               | 5.29          | 5.29          | 5.29          |
| BOXE HOUSE         |               | 10.84         | 39.20         | 39.20         |
| CAMP DAVIES        |               | 180.69        | 255.16        | 255.16        |
| CAMP GLENDALE      |               | 56.70         | 56.70         | 56.70         |
| CONTRABAND CAMP    |               | 87.72         | 120.31        | 156.37        |
| CORONA COLLEGE     |               | 3.29          | 3.29          | 3.29          |
| DAVIS BRIDGE       |               | 960.83        | 960.83        | 960.83        |
| FALLEN TIMBERS     |               | 442.82        | 469.91        | 469.91        |
| FARMINGTON         |               | 375.77        | 434.54        | 698.15        |
| FEDERAL LINES 5/17 |               | 173.42        | 245.01        | 258.41        |
| FEDERAL LINES 5/19 |               | 332.63        | 454.85        | 485.17        |
| FEDERAL LINES 5/21 |               | 148.08        | 222.13        | 229.09        |
| FEDERAL REDAN      |               | 28.61         | 28.61         | 28.61         |
| OCTOBER PHASE I    |               | 1041.28       | 1192.96       | 1406.75       |
| OCTOBER PHASE II   |               | 7.33          | 225.4         | 499.37        |
| ROBINETT           | 17.33         | 181.84        | 275.46        | 362.97        |
| RUSSEL HOUSE       |               | 416.59        | 649.8         | 694.7         |
| SIEGEWORKS         |               | 371.72        | 523.4         | 817.31        |
| TOTALS             | 17.33         | 4,825.45      | 6,162.85      | 7,427.28      |

## **PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT STUDY**

This boundary adjustment study began in March 2001 with a scoping trip to Corinth, Mississippi, and Shiloh National Military Park. The purpose of the trip was to examine sites listed as contributing resources to the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark, collect data, determine the scope of the study, and meet with interested parties.

In June 2001 fieldwork continued in Corinth at which time the architectural/engineering firm (Mangi Environmental, Inc.) contracted to complete the compliance requirements of the project was taken to various sites in and around Corinth to better understand the project's scope. An initial meeting was held with the Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth to inform that organization the National Park Service was beginning the study. Approximately 45 people attended that initial meeting. Concerns expressed were largely focused on the nature of a boundary adjustment study. During the same week a meeting was held with the Rotary Club of Corinth. The focus of the meeting was largely on the intent of the legislation, the begin-

ning of the study, and implications of battlefield preservation for the Corinth area and increased tourism for the community.

In July 2001 the study team attended the monthly meeting of the Siege and Battle of Corinth Commission meeting to discuss the nature and progress of the boundary adjustment study. The status of the properties evaluated by the study team was presented. At that time both the commission and the community indicated agreement with the study's preliminary findings.

Finally, a scoping meeting for the accompanying environmental assessment (being prepared by Mangi Environmental, Inc.) was conducted in the Corinth public library on December 3, 2001. Approximately 50 people attended. The conclusions of the evaluation were discussed. The 17 sites considered appropriate for inclusion in the Corinth Unit were discussed, and the alternatives proposed by the study were presented. Public reaction was universally in favor of alternative C, and a general consensus in support of the eligible sites was expressed. Some discussion of other historic sites not considered for inclusion in the Corinth Unit was undertaken.

## APPENDIX A: LEGISLATION

114 STAT. 792

PUBLIC LAW 106-271—SEPT. 22, 2000

### Public Law 106-271 106th Congress

#### An Act

Sept. 22, 2000  
[S. 1117]

To establish the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park, in the vicinity of the city of Corinth, Mississippi, and in the State of Tennessee, and for other purposes.

Corinth  
Battlefield  
Preservation Act  
of 2000.  
16 USC 430f-6  
note.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

#### SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Corinth Battlefield Preservation Act of 2000”.

16 USC 430f-6.

#### SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that—

(1) in 1996, Congress authorized the establishment and construction of a center—

(A) to facilitate the interpretation of the Siege and Battle of Corinth and other Civil War actions in the area in and around the city of Corinth, Mississippi; and

(B) to enhance public understanding of the significance of the Corinth campaign and the Civil War relative to the western theater of operations, in cooperation with—

- (i) State or local governmental entities;
- (ii) private organizations; and
- (iii) individuals;

(2) the Corinth Battlefield was ranked as a priority 1 battlefield having critical need for coordinated nationwide action by the year 2000 by the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission in its report on Civil War Battlefields of the United States;

(3) there is a national interest in protecting and preserving sites of historic significance associated with the Civil War; and

(4) the States of Mississippi and Tennessee and their respective local units of government—

(A) have the authority to prevent or minimize adverse uses of these historic resources; and

(B) can play a significant role in the protection of the historic resources related to the Civil War battles fought in the area in and around the city of Corinth.

(b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act are—

(1) to establish the Corinth Unit of the Shiloh National Military Park—

- (A) in the city of Corinth, Mississippi; and
- (B) in the State of Tennessee;

(2) to direct the Secretary of the Interior to manage, protect, and interpret the resources associated with the Civil War Siege and the Battle of Corinth that occurred in and around the city of Corinth, in cooperation with—

- (A) the State of Mississippi;
- (B) the State of Tennessee;
- (C) the city of Corinth, Mississippi;
- (D) other public entities; and
- (E) the private sector; and

(3) to authorize a special resource study to identify other Civil War sites in and around the city of Corinth that—

- (A) are consistent with the themes of the Siege and Battle of Corinth;
- (B) meet the criteria for designation as a unit of the National Park System; and
- (C) are considered appropriate for inclusion in the Unit.

### SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

16 USC 430f-7.

In this Act:

(1) **MAP.**—The term “Map” means the map entitled “Park Boundary-Corinth Unit”, numbered 304/80,007, and dated October 1998.

(2) **PARK.**—The term “Park” means the Shiloh National Military Park.

(3) **SECRETARY.**—The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of the Interior.

(4) **UNIT.**—The term “Unit” means the Corinth Unit of Shiloh National Military Park established under section 4.

### SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIT.

16 USC 430f-8.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—There is established in the States of Mississippi and Tennessee the Corinth Unit of the Shiloh National Military Park.

(b) **COMPOSITION OF UNIT.**—The Unit shall be comprised of—

(1) the tract consisting of approximately 20 acres generally depicted as “Battery Robinett Boundary” on the Map; and

(2) any additional land that the Secretary determines to be suitable for inclusion in the Unit that—

(A) is under the ownership of a public entity or non-profit organization; and

(B) has been identified by the Siege and Battle of Corinth National Historic Landmark Study, dated January 8, 1991.

(c) **AVAILABILITY OF MAP.**—The Map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Director of the National Park Service.

### SEC. 5. LAND ACQUISITION.

16 USC 430f-9.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary may acquire land and interests in land within the boundary of the Park as depicted on the Map, by—

- (1) donation;
- (2) purchase with donated or appropriated funds; or
- (3) exchange.

(b) **EXCEPTION.**—Land may be acquired only by donation from—

(1) the State of Mississippi (including a political subdivision of the State);

(2) the State of Tennessee (including a political subdivision of the State); or

(3) the organization known as “Friends of the Siege and Battle of Corinth”.

16 USC 430f-10. **SEC. 6. PARK MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary shall administer the Unit in accordance with this Act and the laws generally applicable to units of the National Park System, including—

(1) the Act entitled “An Act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes”, approved August 25, 1916 (16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.); and

(2) the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the preservation of historic American sites, buildings, objects, and antiquities of national significance, and for other purposes”, approved August 21, 1935 (16 U.S.C. 461 et seq.).

(b) **DUTIES.**—In accordance with section 602 of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 (16 U.S.C. 430f-5), the Secretary shall—

(1) commemorate and interpret, for the benefit of visitors and the general public, the Siege and Battle of Corinth and other Civil War actions in the area in and around the city of Corinth within the larger context of the Civil War and American history, including the significance of the Civil War Siege and Battle of Corinth in 1862 in relation to other operations in the western theater of the Civil War; and

(2) identify and preserve surviving features from the Civil War era in the area in and around the city of Corinth, including both military and civilian themes that include—

(A) the role of railroads in the Civil War;

(B) the story of the Corinth contraband camp; and

(C) the development of field fortifications as a tactic of war.

(c) **COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—To carry out this Act, the Secretary may enter into cooperative agreements with entities in the public and private sectors, including—

(A) colleges and universities;

(B) historical societies;

(C) State and local agencies; and

(D) nonprofit organizations.

(2) **TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.**—To develop cooperative land use strategies and conduct activities that facilitate the conservation of the historic, cultural, natural, and scenic resources of the Unit, the Secretary may provide technical assistance, to the extent that a recipient of technical assistance is engaged in the protection, interpretation, or commemoration of historically significant Civil War resources in the area in and around the city of Corinth, to—

(A) the State of Mississippi (including a political subdivision of the State);

(B) the State of Tennessee (including a political subdivision of the State);

(C) a governmental entity;

(D) a nonprofit organization; and

(E) a private property owner.

(d) **RESOURCES OUTSIDE THE UNIT.**—Nothing in subsection (c)(2) authorizes the Secretary to own or manage any resource outside the Unit.

**SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF SPECIAL RESOURCE STUDY.**

16 USC 430f-11.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—To determine whether certain additional properties are appropriate for inclusion in the Unit, the Secretary shall conduct a special resource study of land in and around the city of Corinth, Mississippi, and nearby areas in the State of Tennessee that—

- (1) have a relationship to the Civil War Siege and Battle of Corinth in 1862; and
- (2) are under the ownership of—
  - (A) the State of Mississippi (including a political subdivision of the State);
  - (B) the State of Tennessee (including a political subdivision of the State);
  - (C) a nonprofit organization; or
  - (D) a private person.

(b) **CONTENTS OF STUDY.**—The study shall—

- (1) identify the full range of resources and historic themes associated with the Civil War Siege and Battle of Corinth in 1862, including the relationship of the campaign to other operations in the western theater of the Civil War that occurred in—

- (A) the area in and around the city of Corinth; and
- (B) the State of Tennessee;

- (2) identify alternatives for preserving features from the Civil War era in the area in and around the city of Corinth, including both military and civilian themes involving—

- (A) the role of the railroad in the Civil War;
- (B) the story of the Corinth contraband camp; and
- (C) the development of field fortifications as a tactic of war;

- (3) identify potential partners that might support efforts by the Secretary to carry out this Act, including—

- (A) State entities and their political subdivisions;
- (B) historical societies and commissions;
- (C) civic groups; and
- (D) nonprofit organizations;

- (4) identify alternatives to avoid land use conflicts; and
- (5) include cost estimates for any necessary activity associated with the alternatives identified under this subsection, including—

- (A) acquisition;
- (B) development;
- (C) interpretation;
- (D) operation; and
- (E) maintenance.

(c) **REPORT.**—Not later than 1 year and 180 days after the date on which funds are made available to carry out this section, the Secretary shall submit a report describing the findings of the study under subsection (a) to—

Deadline.

- (1) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and
- (2) the Committee on Resources of the House of Representatives.

16 USC 430f-12. **SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act, including \$3,000,000 for the construction of an interpretive center under section 602(d) of title VI of the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996 (16 U.S.C. 430f-5(d)).

Approved September 22, 2000.

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**LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 1117:**

**SENATE REPORTS:** No. 106-186 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources).

**CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:**

Vol. 145 (1999): Nov. 19, considered and passed Senate.

Vol. 146 (2000): Sept. 12, considered and passed House.



**APPENDIX B:  
ALTERNATIVE C STAFFING CHART**

**Unit Manager  
GS- 0025- 13**

| Administration                             | FTE | Interpretation                              | FTE | Maintenance                               | FTE | Resource Management<br>& Protection            | FTE |
|--------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------|-----|
|                                            |     |                                             |     |                                           |     | Chief, GS- 0025- 12                            | 1   |
| Computer Specialist<br>GS- 033- 09         | 1   | Education Program<br>Coordinator            | 1   | Maint. Mech. Supv.<br>WS- 4749- 08        | 1   | Historian<br>GS- 170- 11                       | 1   |
| Personnel Clerk<br>GS- 0203- 07            | 1   | Gs- 1710- 11                                |     | Maint. Mech.<br>WG- 4749- 09              | 1   | Natural Resource Spec.<br>GS- 401- 09          | 1   |
| Office Automation<br>Clerk<br>GS- 0326- 06 | 1   | Park Ranger<br>(Web Coord.)<br>GS- 0025- 09 | 1   | Tractor Operator<br>(STF) WG- 5705- 06    | .8  | Geographer<br>(GIS Specialist)<br>GS- 0150- 09 | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Ranger<br>GS- 0025- 09                 | 1   | Tractor Operator<br>(STF) WG- 5705- 05    | .8  | Museum Curator,<br>GS- 1015- 09                | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Guide<br>GS- 0090- 05                  | 1   | Motor Vehicle<br>Operator<br>WG- 5703- 04 | 1   | Archives Technician<br>GS- 1421- 06            | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Guide<br>GS- 0090- 05                  | 1   | Motor Vehicle<br>Operator<br>WG- 5703- 04 | 1   | Supv. Park Ranger<br>(6c) GS- 0025- 11         | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Guide<br>GS- 0090- 05                  | 1   | Custodial Worker<br>WG- 3566- 04          | 1   | Park Ranger<br>(6c) GS- 0025- 09               | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Ranger<br>GS- 0025- 04 (Seas)          | .67 | Custodial Worker<br>WG- 3566- 04          | 1   | Park Ranger<br>(6c) GS- 0025- 09               | 1   |
|                                            |     | Park Ranger<br>GS- 0025- 04 (Seas)          | .33 |                                           |     |                                                |     |
|                                            |     | Park Ranger<br>GS- 0025- 04 (Seas)          | .33 |                                           |     |                                                |     |

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## **PREPARERS**

**Shiloh National Military Park**  
Woody Harrell, Superintendent  
Stacy D. Allen, Park Historian

**Southeast Regional Office**  
Rich Sussman, Chief of Planning and Compliance  
John Fischer, Planner

**Denver Service Center**  
Joe Crystal, Project Manager  
Bill Koning, Park Planner  
Harlan Unrau, Historian  
Sandy Schuster, Editor  
Philip Thys, Graphic Artist

**Consultants**  
Ed Bearss  
Rosemary Williams  
Tim Kissel



As the nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering sound use of our land and water resources; protecting our fish, wildlife, and biological diversity; preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places; and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to ensure that their development is in the best interests of all our people by encouraging stewardship and citizen participation in their care. The department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under U.S. administration.

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Shiloh National Military Park

