


Pacific West Region: Social Science Series
Publication Number 2011-00

National Park Service
U. S. Department of the Interior

A History of Indian Fur-Seal Hunting on the Olympic Peninsula of Washington State



Cary Collins

March 2012



A History of Indian Fur-Seal Hunting on the Olympic Peninsula of Washington State

Cary Collins

2012

Cary Collins, Ph.D.

Independent historian contracted through the Department of the Interior, National
Park Service, Olympic National Park, Port Angeles, Washington

Research and report production conducted under the supervision of

Jacilee Wray, M.A.

Park Anthropologist and
Agreement Technical Representative for
Olympic National Park

Cover photo description and source: Makah sealing schooner *Columbia* on the Washington Coast
(University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington)

Insert photo description and source: Fur seals in the Pribilof Islands, the primary rookeries in the
eastern Pacific Ocean (University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle,
Washington).

Back page photo description and source: Northern fur seal (National Archives and Records
Administration, National Marine Mammal Laboratory, Seattle, Washington).

Pacific West Region: Social Science Series Publication Number 2012-13

Frederick F. York, Ph.D., Regional Anthropologist and Series Editor

Pacific West Region, National Park Service
Seattle, Washington

Dedicated:

With the utmost appreciation and respect—

To those who have gone before . . .

To those who showed the way . . .

Edward Eugene Claplanhoo
1928-2010

Victor Blanchard Scheffer
1906-2011

Robert Lawrence Whitner
1917-1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication	iii
List of Figures	v-vii
Introduction	vii
Setting and People	1
Overview: Indian Fur Sealing	11
Maritime Fur Trade	24
Lewis and Clark	27
From Subsistence to Commercial Trading	35
The Stevens Treaties	46
Commercial Fur Sealing: Background and Beginnings	60
Commercial Fur Sealing: The Agrarian Alternative	80
Commercial Fur Sealing: Infrastructure and a Rising Industry	92
Commercial Fur Sealing: The Harvests and Their Impacts	110
Commercial Fur Sealing: The Introduction of Regulation and Its Aftermath	116
Commercial Fur Sealing: The Treaty of 1911	135
Commercial Fur Sealing: The Treaty of 1911 and Its Aftermath	141
Conclusions	157
Bibliography	162

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Makah on the beach at Neah Bay	2
Figure 2. Thunderbird and whale	3
Figure 3. Makah landing a whale	4
Figure 4. Early view of the village of Taholah	5
Figure 5. Head of a northern fur seal	7
Figure 6. Early view of the village of Taholah	8
Figure 7. Quinault Indians fishing	10
Figure 8. Indian dugout canoe with sails	12
Figure 9. Sea otter killed at Oyhut	13
Figure 10. Quinault sea otter derrick	15
Figure 11. Indian fur-sealing crew aboard the schooner <i>Favorite</i> in 1894	17
Figure 12. Dock at Neah Bay on the Makah Indian Reservation	19
Figure 13. Tribal members unloading sealing canoe at La Push, Washington	20
Figure 14. Sea otter tower on the Olympic Peninsula	24
Figure 15. William Clark and Meriwether Lewis	27
Figure 16. Fort Clatsop on the Oregon Coast	28
Figure 17. William Clark's sketch of a Chinook plankhouse	29
Figure 18. Man standing atop the remains of a beached whale	39
Figure 19. Makah whale hunter Lighthouse Jim on the beach at Neah Bay	41
Figure 20. Makah headman George of Tatoosh village in 1841	50
Figure 21. Coastal Indians in a dugout sealing canoe	60
Figure 22. Quileute Indians with northern fur seals on the Washington coast	63

Figure 23. Schooners of the Canadian sealing fleet, Victoria Harbor, 1894	64
Figure 24. A Quileute fur-seal hunter prepares to launch a harpoon	65
Figure 25. Hunters off the Pacific Coast in dugout canoe	66
Figure 26. Sealing canoe with outfit and catch	68
Figure 27. Indian hunter aboard a sealing canoe	74
Figure 28. Hunters spearing fur seals on the Pacific Coast	77
Figure 29. Hotel Neah located on the Makah Reservation	78
Figure 30. Sealing boats stored at Victoria, British Columbia	80
Figure 31. Canadian sealing schooner <i>Dora Siewerd</i> in the Bering Sea	82
Figure 32. Canadian sealing schooner <i>Ainoka</i> discharging fur skins at Victoria	85
Figure 33. Makah houses on the beach at Neah Bay	88
Figure 34. Sealing fleet lying in Victoria Harbor in 1894	89
Figure 35. Members of the Quileute tribe prepare to skin a fur seal	92
Figure 36. Makah hunters pulling a whale onto the beach	93
Figure 37. Members of the Quileute tribe cleaning their catch	96
Figure 38. Village of Neah Bay in 1905 shown with canoes lining the beach	98
Figure 39. View of the beach and canoes at Neah Bay	101
Figure 40. Hunters in pursuit of a sleeping fur seal	107
Figure 41. Sealing fleet in Victoria Harbor in 1894	108
Figure 42. Sealing schooners seized in the Bering Sea	114
Figure 43. Members of the Makah tribe in a canoe towing a whale	121
Figure 44. Quinault sea otter derrick located on the Washington Coast	122
Figure 45. Sealing schooner <i>Dora Siewerd</i> in the Bering Sea	130

Figure 46. Indian fishermen on the Pacific Coast prepare to eat a meal	132
Figure 47. Capturing fur seals on St. Paul Island in the Pribilof Islands	137
Figure 48. Fur seal derrick in the Pribilof Islands used for counting seals	139
Figure 49. Fouke Fur Company in St. Louis	141
Figure 50. Fouke Fur Company Showroom in St. Louis, Missouri	142
Figure 51. Masthead of Fouke Fur Company in St. Louis, Missouri	143
Figure 52. Canoe with fur seal catch at La Push	145
Figure 53. Fouke Fur Company trademark in vogue circa 1940s	146
Figure 54. Indian fur sealer and dugout canoe at La Push	154

INTRODUCTION

REPORT ON INDIAN FUR-SEAL HUNTING ON THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA OF WASHINGTON STATE

For thousands of years, Indians on the Olympic Peninsula of present-day Washington State relied upon and hunted whales, sea otters, and countless other varieties of marine life, including northern fur seals that travel off the Pacific Coast on their annual migration to their breeding rookeries on the Pribilof Islands of southwestern Alaska. As sources of subsistence and survival, fur-seal products rivaled in importance that of whales, supplying enormous quantities of meat, oil, and skins, the surpluses of which served as valuable commodities in the exchange economies of the Pacific Northwest coast. In the Washington territorial period (1853-1889), Olympic Peninsula Indian fur sealers drew on their unparalleled backgrounds and vast resources as the means to catapult themselves to paramount commercial successes. Effectively penetrating home and global economies, Makah and Quileute fur sealers especially invested heavily in schooners and equipment, personal initiative that returned to them substantial profits. But the boom proved unsustainable. Lack of regulation, in combination with rapid and extensive national and foreign harvesting, conspired to produce a stunning decline in the fur seal population which, in turn, resulted in the negotiation of international agreements that placed strict quotas on the number of animals that could be taken and imposed harsh rules on the methods that could be used to harvest them. For Indian fur sealers, the laws set the industry back on a strictly non-industrial footing, frustrating their attempts of adaptive integration and costing them dearly in treasure and morale. Although they were allowed to continue sealing, and were hired by schooner captains because they could still hunt using traditional weaponry, the legislation signaled the beginning of the end of fur sealing by Pacific Northwest coast Indians. This report provides background on and an understanding of the nature of fur-seal hunting and, by extension, many other related products of the fur trade. Explored are the positions that fur sealing held in relationship to other subsistence and commercial pursuits, its role in the exchange economies of the Pacific Northwest coast, its rise and decline as a commercial commodity and, finally, its importance in recent decades as a subsistence, ceremonial, and economic resource for Olympic and Washington coast peoples.

SETTING AND PEOPLE

THE OLYMPIC PENINSULA OF PRESENT-DAY WASHINGTON STATE JUTS out from the Pacific Coast like the bowl of a large smoker's pipe. On three sides it is bounded by water: To the west lies the Pacific Ocean, to the north the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and to the east Puget Sound. Its southern extremity forms its connective tissue, stitching it to the continental United States where rugged wilderness confronts the marshy alluvial lowlands of the Chehalis River drainage. In total, it embraces around 250 miles of coastline and comprises a huge corridor of riparian or freshwater spaces. The Olympic Peninsula encompasses 6,437 square miles or 4,119,680 acres, the centerpiece of which is the snowcapped 7,965-foot crest of Mt. Olympus of the mountain range that shares its name and is the dominant landform of the region. The northern border of the Olympic Peninsula stretches out along a west-east axis some ninety-one miles. The western edge straddles the Pacific Ocean for another ninety-six miles. Its eastern spine bends down and inward for a distance of seventy-five miles while the narrowest point, its southern boundary, extends from the ocean back into the interior for fifty-four miles. Hence, to express it another way, the Olympic Peninsula is shaped roughly in the form of a square that is pinched slightly at the bottom, but has distinct bulges protruding out along its northwestern flank, particularly at the two capes—Flattery and Alava. Those, on a map, give it the look of a chisel that could be clutched in one's hand at the base.

It was from the land—and the water—that the Indians of the Olympic Peninsula took their subsistence and also their identities. In some manner, most were known simply as “The People.” The S’Kallam, or Klallam (Elwha Klallam, Jamestown S’Klallam, and Port Gamble S’Klallam) were “The Strong (or Mighty) People.” In the northwestern corner, the Makah were “The People of the Cape” or “The People Who Live by the Rocks and Seagulls.” South of them, the word that the Quileute gave to themselves has often been ascribed to mean “Name” but, according to anthropologist Jay Powell, the term Kwo’liyt (pronounced quo-LAY-yoh-t) meant “The People Who Live at the Place of Kwo’li” (quo-LAY), referring to the chief of the wolves who inhabited the location that became the mouth of the Quillayute River [Powell: 2008]. The Hoh were “The People of the River” (preferred Hoh designation) or “The Upside Down People” (according to the Quileute legend of Q’Waati’) followed by their neighbors, the Queets, “The People Made From Dirt.” Below them were the Quinault, “The People,” “The Canoe People” or “The People of the Cedar Tree—The Tree of Life.” Then, along the middle coast, there were the

Copalis (Kópe'ls), the Humptulips (Xâmtu'lape), and the Oyhut. The Lower Chehalis, or *tshels* meaning “sand,” were “The People of the Sandy Place” and the Upper Chehalis, or Kwaiyaiihlk or Kwaiailk, claimed their name from the river that bears their name. The Squaxin Island were “The People of the Water” and above them the Skokomish, or Twana, occupying the southeastern perimeter, were “The Big River People” or “The People of the River.” And so, it can be said, an amalgam of tribes, bands, villages, and extended family groupings encircled the Olympic Coast Range, hunting the uplands and lowlands and plying and netting the rivers in their exquisite western redcedar dugout canoes, while others mined the Pacific Ocean and the Strait of Juan de Fuca for the profusion of marine life found there [Wray: 2003].

It was in their connectedness and proximity to the physical earth that defined Olympic Peninsula coastal Indians as culturally distinct, independent, sovereign, self-surviving peoples.



Figure 1 Indians on the beach at Neah Bay with their canoe. The woman at the left is holding the tail of a fur seal. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

The Makah, or Qwi-dich-cha-at-h or Kwih-dich-chuh-ahtx as they refer to themselves, occupied five permanent semiautonomous villages—baahada, deah, waatch, sooes, and

ozette—linked by common language, kinship, heritage, and traditions and they maintained other seasonal winter villages—Achawat, Kydikabbit, and Tatoosh Island—that date back at least thirty-eight hundred years at Cape Flattery at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca on the northwesternmost tip of the continental United States [Renker and Gunther 1990: 422; Lane 1972: 3].

Of Nootkan stock and the sole Wakashan speakers on the Washington coast, the Makah were the only group on the ocean side of the Olympic Peninsula *not* to have had their existence center around a river. Of crucial importance to them were “the halibut banks off Cape Flattery

and the fur sealing grounds off Cape Alava” [Gunther 1945-1977: 7; Renker and Gunther 1990: 422]. The Makah became signatory to the Treaty of Neah Bay in 1855 and today possess a 27,038-acre reservation that runs from Cape Flattery easterly along the Strait of Juan de Fuca for fifteen miles and southerly that same distance down the Pacific Coast [King 1969: 12].

The coastal tribes of the Olympic Peninsula have always maintained their own understandings of their creations, cultures, and histories. The Makah, for example, tell the story of their origin as animals that first inhabited Cape Flattery. When a star fell from heaven and united with them, their offspring became the Nitinnaht, Clayoquot, and Makah people [Densmore 1939: 1-2; Taylor, Jr., 1974: 58]. The first sea hunter was Thunderbird, a fantastic eaglelike creature. Upon its descent from the Olympic Mountains, it grasped in its mighty talons an enormous whale which it lifted bodily from the ocean. Soaring skyward on wings so powerful that they produced peals of thunder, Thunderbird carried the humungous beast back to the highest peak where it proceeded to devour its flesh. In this way, the Makah were shown that they could pursue and capture whales for their own use [Collins 1996: 180; Reagan and Walters 1933: 297-346; Russell 2001: 24].

There were also two brothers. Born of the sun and the moon and called The-Two-Men-Who-Changed-Things,

they came to the earth before there were people in order to prepare it for human habitation. To accomplish this, they gathered all the creatures and transformed them into plants, animals, trees, and birds. Amidst all this creation there lived a thief who was always stealing the food of the



Figure 2 Thunderbird and whale: The official seal of the Makah Indian Nation.

hunters and the fishermen. So The-Two-Men-Who-Changed-Things rendered him into a seal. Shortening his arms and tying his legs so that only his feet could move, The-Two-Men-Who-Changed-Things then tossed the seal into the ocean with the straightforward admonition: “Now you will have to catch your own fish if you are to have anything to eat” [Makah Stories: 2009].

Further down the coastline there were other tribes. The Quileute and the Hoh organized themselves into house groupings scattered among twenty to perhaps as many as fifty villages

dispersed as far as thirty miles upland along the rivers from which they took their names [Powell 1990: 431-7; Pettitt 1950: 3; Hobucket 1980: 3]. Perhaps the most prominent was the stockade community



Figure 3 Makah Indians landing a whale at Neah Bay, ca. 1910-1911. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D. C. Edward S. Curtis, photographer.

located on James Island, also known as Quileute or Ahkalot [Reagan 1928: 298] and Q̓ilyū̓t (today’s La Push) at the mouth of the Quillayute River [Curtis 1913: 143]. In the mid-twentieth century, the anthropologist George A. Pettitt found that the elders had “considered inland settlements their real homes . . . and they [had] visited La Push only seasonally.” Others spent the spring months on the water for fur sealing and whaling purposes [Pettitt 1950: 3]. Fur-seal hunting among the Quileute was known as *yashábalh* [Powell 2008: email]. In carrying out their hunts, their dugout canoes were always painted black [Howeattle: 1990].

Close trading ties were also forged with the Makah. The Quileute exchanged camas, whale oil, and dried whale flesh with them for dentalium shells and Hudson's Bay Company [HBC] blankets procured at Fort Victoria. The Makah in turn carried their newly-acquired goods north to Vancouver Island and the Quileute packed theirs south to Quinault country where they then bartered them for salmon [Curtis 1913: 145]. The Quileute, after the negotiation and ratification of their treaty, were erroneously assigned to the Quinault Reservation, but many



Figure 4 Early view of the village of Taholah on the Quinault Indian Reservation, probably taken circa 1908. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

Quileute recorded as living there [King 1969: 18-9; Van Mechelen 2000-2004: 1-11].

The Quileute, or Qūliyútk, according to the mythic account of their creation, descended from two wolves who were changed into people by K'wati, who was also known as Dokibatt. A wandering short and bald changer or transformer, he lived in the mountains and possessed the power to both change and conceal his identity as well as the

imagination to make the world as wondrous as it is. K'wati made the rivers of the Olympics and the features of the coastline while . . . being chased around by wolves. Carrying only a container of sea mammal oil and a comb, K'wati tried to slow down and elude the wolves by dumping oil here and there, which flowed downhill and turned into the rivers. He also used his comb to make great divots in the beach sand, which grew into headlands so that the wolves had to swim around them, which allowed the Changer to escape. Later K'wati came back and at a location near the mouth of

tribal members declined to relocate there. In 1899, a separate reservation composed of 595 acres was set aside by executive order for the Quileute on the Quillayute River at La Push. In 1944-5, there were about 120

the Quillayute River changed the wolves into the ancestors of the Quileute. So the Quileute have lived here since the Time of Beginnings [Morganroth 2002: 136].

The last of the Chimakuan speakers, the Quileute ranked second only to the Makah as whalers and they were unsurpassed as sealers. The Quileute arranged themselves into six societies based on factors of environment, culture, and subsistence. Those were Fisherman, Elk Hunter, Whale Hunter, Weather Predictor, Medicine Man, and Warrior (also called Wolf Ritual or Tlokwalí or Klukwalle), the latter which was the most prestigious, a secret dance society known for performing the Wolf Ritual through which Coastal Indians acquired “special powers and privileges from a spirit” [Ernst 1952: 2].

The mercurial K’wati also had his hand in the creation of the Hoh, or Chala’•kw. In his extensive around-the-world travels undertaken to make “things as they are today,” K’wati eventually came to the Hoh River, or Hoxw in the Quinault language and Cha’lak’at’sit by the Hoh River people themselves. There “he discovered that the inhabitants were upside-down people who walked on their hands and handled their fishnets clumsily with their feet. They were not very good at it, so they were hungry and skinny.” Changer, or K’wati, after apparently taking pity on the people, “set them right side up and showed them how to operate their nets with their hands.” In the language of one account, he told them “You shall use your feet to walk . . . Go and fish smelt. You shall catch much fish when you fish smelt.” And true to his word, according to virtually every known assessment, “Ever since then there has been a lot of smelt at the Hoh” River [Riebe and Lee 2002: 119].

Queets Indians are Salishan speakers. They inhabit the waterways of the Pacific Coast of Washington between the territories of the Quinault and the Quileute but south of the Hoh. Before the arrival of non-Indians, the tribe was said to be quite numerous. One Queets village on the Pacific Ocean supported a population that numbered at least two thousand residents [Reagan 1928: 297]. The Queets, like their neighbors, hunted sea otters, whales, and northern fur seals—in fact, fur seals along with salmon once constituted their principal dependence—and, at one time, this group comprised the geographical center of an expansive trade network that extended north from Vancouver Island all the way south to the Columbia River. The Queets enjoyed a closer affinity to the Quinault than to the Quileute and, with the Quinault, favored acceptance of the treaty offered at the aborted Chehalis River treaty council in early 1855. Under the terms of

the follow up Treaty of Olympia or Quinault River Treaty, the Queets failed to secure a land base but were incorporated within the Quinault Indian Reservation. Today, descendants of the aboriginal Queets tribe live predominantly in the towns of Queets and Taholah around which they have taken allotments [Ruby, Brown, Collins 2010: 243-4].

Among the Queets, legends tell of their creation. According to one, “The Great Spirit waded across the river . . . [and] upon reaching the other side . . . stopped to rub his legs to restore [his] circulation. He then threw the rolls of dirt, which came from his legs and they landed in the River. Out came a man and a woman to form the Qu-itz-qu tribe. The tribal name translates to ‘out of the dirt of the skin’” [James and Chubby: 2002: 100].

Another story, narrated by a member of the Quileute tribe, Esau Penn, relates how Kwatee, or Changer, and possibly the aforementioned K’wati, ventured up and down the Washington coast making from the earliest people animals such as Beaver and Land Otter and preparing the land for the people that were to come. When Kwatee happened into Queets country, he did not encounter any people so he vigorously rubbed his hands over his body until

little balls soon formed from his dirt and his sweat that he then transformed into the Queets people. Kwatee told them that they would eat fish but also anything else that seemed good and was plentiful. According to Penn’s account, when Kwatee finished his work at Queets, he continued his creation travels around the Washington coast begetting, through the course of his journey, the Quileute, the Hoh, and the Makah people [Clark 2003: 122-4].



Figure 5 The head of a northern fur seal with the right eye covered with a cataract. National Archives and Records Administration: Pacific Alaska Region, Seattle, Washington.

The Quinault, or Cht'qínaihl, comprise another tribe of Salish language speakers. Their ancestors lived in villages located along the Quinault River and no other Olympic Peninsula tribe hunted and maintained inland villages so far upriver from saltwater as them [Gunther 1945-1977: 7]. The largest Quinault village was Kwi'nail, later known as Grenville, and now called Taholah. The Quinault were able whale hunters, but they also relied upon salmon. Physically their homeland lay along a major geographical and cultural divide: the narrow and rocky jagged coast to the north and the sandy open beaches to the south. The Quinault nurtured strong trading ties in either direction, furnishing the Makah with “dried elk meat in return for whale oil and dentalium, an indication of their greater use of the mountain region of their territory” [Gunther 1945-1977:8]. Signatory to the Treaty of Olympia of 1855-56, the modern Quinault Indian Nation is composed of the Quinault and the Queets tribes and the allottees of five other Northwest coast and interior tribes: the Chehalis, the Chinook, the Cowlitz, the Hoh, and the Quileute [Ruby, Brown, Collins 2010: 250-4].

Like their neighbors, the Quinault trace their origins back to the Time of Beginnings. The rivers, the ocean, the land, and the sky were formed at the same instant that the Great Spirit created the Quinault people and sent them to live on earth. At that point which stretches back



Figure 6 Early view of the village of Taholah on the Quinault Indian Reservation, probably taken circa 1908. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

farthest in time,
there was no
human form. So
Wha-neh wha-
neh, the great
giver of life,
decided to invent
“the forces of

nature—clouds, mountains, ocean, rivers, and sky—as people” [James and Chubby 2002: 99]. A period followed when animals and birds possessed identical human characteristics and they coexisted in a state of equality until finally Misp the Transformer traveled throughout the land changing “the animals, birds, land features, and people into their present form and way of life” [Ibid.]. At first there had only been supernatural beings, or magical animals, inhabiting the planet. But one day Great Spirit called the mystical creatures into council, informing them that he wanted to place on earth humans whom he described and subsequently named “Quinault” or

“The People” [Ibid.]. Hence, in their cosmology, the Quinault have been on the Washington coast for as long as there has been human habitation.

Much of Quinault understanding of their identity and past extends back to the adventures of Bluejay and his wife Jui who lived at the headwaters of the Quinault River. According to legend, Bluejay resided in the same village and in the same house as his chief, but also with Land Otter, Beaver, and another man. There was also Grouse—a widower canoe builder and the father of many children—who sequestered himself and his family at the opposite end of the dwelling. The five men (but without Grouse) often went out seal hunting and whenever they did they always caught five large fat specimens, only the leanest and least desired portions of which they shared with Grouse. It was apparently Bluejay who was to blame. He mocked and ridiculed Grouse who, for his part, accepted with quiet resolve the maltreatment of his tormenters [Thompson 1966: 93-7].

But that state of affairs could not stand. So one day Grouse carved a fur seal from a block of cedar and burned it totally black. Issuing instructions on what it was to do, he threw it into the sea. The next day, Bluejay and his companions went out sealing as they were wont to do and, readily spotting a prized fat animal, speared it. But the seal lunged back and proceeded to carry them farther and farther out to sea before the line could finally be cut. By then, however, they had lost their way. Unsure where they were going, they traveled about from village to village. At the last one, which may have been a Makah community, they almost perished in a brutal storm. Eventually the wanderers felt their way back to Quinault country. Embedded in their experience was an invaluable life lesson: In the future the best and fattest portions of their catches should be shared with Grouse and, by extension, with the other members of their village and tribe [Thompson 1966: 93-7].

These stories are organic blueprints, historic roadmaps for the complexity of societies and cultures that existed—and continue to exist—on the Northwest coast of North America. From them comes a sense of the Indians’ world and their ways of living and thinking. Encountered are tribes inalterably linked to their natural environments, to the land and to the water and to the human and animal systems that they nourished which, by turns, inspired and shaped Native norms and protocols. Figuratively, the ocean was a multilane freeway in which the cars were sea creatures and the traffic was always rush hour until such time as the stocks of migrating whales and fur seals—and sea otters parked just offshore—were depleted through the advent of

commercial overharvesting. Each of these species amassed extensive histories over the centuries that reveal much in their telling: About the nature of the marine life, of course, but also about the people that

hunted them

and the

intricate

national and

international

relations that

evolved out

of those

intersections.

It was in

those

powerful

collisions of

creatures, man,

and

environment that the early growth of the American West was given impetus and the stage was set for the extractive industries and human settlement that was to follow.



Figure 7 Two Quinault Indians fishing in their dugout canoe unload fish from a net. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D. C. Edward S. Curtis, photographer.



OVERVIEW

INDIAN FUR SEALING

WHALES ARE THE LARGEST MARINE MAMMALS AND SEA OTTERS ARE the smallest. Between those extremes there is another species that was of crucial importance to Olympic Peninsula Indians, that which forms the primary subject of this report: northern fur seals (*Callorhinus ursinus*). Also known as Alaskan and Pribilof fur seal and kai-thlad-dose by the Makah, kí-hla-dus by the Quileute, and ma· a'í in the Quinault language [Swan Census 1861: 74; Olson 1936: 49], they possessed “since the drastic depletion of sea otters . . . the most sought-after fur in the world” [Lee 1998: 60]. Another smaller family of fur seal native along the California coast, identified as Guadalupe fur seal (*Arctocephalus philippi*), delivered a less desirable pelt than the thicker and silkier one of northern fur seal and, the same as its more popular cousin, was reduced nearly to extinction in the early decades of the nineteenth century [Busch 1985: 18]. Indians on the Olympic Peninsula hunted northern fur seals for at least two thousand years [Gustafson 1968: 50].

Northern fur seals are creatures of habit and seasons. Like whales, they adhere to a migratory pattern, ranging the waters of the Pacific Rim from the tip of Japan to the Sea of Okhotsk off Russia to the Pribilof Islands in the Bering Sea (but not going all the way to the Bering Strait) down the Alaskan coast through British Columbia and into the waters of Washington and Oregon and California to Baja California at its southern extent. In the north Pacific Ocean in November, female northern fur seals and juveniles of both sexes begin abandoning their breeding rookeries in the Pribilof Islands, concentrating in continental locations until March with few venturing beyond 35 degrees North in the south [Busch 1985: 95-8; Bockstoce 2009: 21].

Adult males do not travel with the others. They linger in northern waters before migrating east into the Gulf of Alaska and eastern Pacific Ocean or west to the Kuril Islands. Pups in their birth year surface along the Washington coastline as early as January. Throughout the winter months, females and sub-adult males can be found in coastal waters ten to twenty-five miles from shore on their passage through the blue waters off the continental shelf that contain the food resources—cod, halibut, squid, anchovy, pollock, and capelin—on which these opportunistic feeders rely. For Washington coast tribes, April and May formed the principal harvest months as

intrepid Indian hunters intercepted the mammals along the approach of their Alaska voyage [Olson 1936: 49].

All Washington Pacific Coast tribes hunted them. Edward Curtis interviewed elders who shared with him their knowledge that fur seals entered Quileute waters around the first of June of each year “on their annual migration from the South Pacific to the rookeries” in the Bering Sea. That development sparked a measured response as tribal hunters charred and smoothed the outsides of their canoes before setting off “before dawn to come upon the animals asleep” [Curtis 1913: 147]. In taking up the chase, fur-seal hunters paddled or sailed “as much as twenty-five miles from shore and returned about mid-afternoon with an average of one seal to each canoe” [Ibid.]. By 1913, when Curtis was on the coast, the harpoons and arrows of pelagic sealers had been replaced with rifles. Those, Curtis ascertained, had “resulted in a greater slaughter of the animals without a corresponding increase in the



Figure 8 Indian dugout canoe with cloth sails that were utilized at the turn of the century. Image probably taken at Cape Flattery. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

number actually taken, for a seal wounded by a bullet is lost, while one pierced by a harpoon or an arrow can almost always be recovered” [Ibid.]. In the assessment of one investigator of hunting among the Makah, sometimes ten seals in a single day were taken by members of that tribe [Densmore 1939: 13].

James G. Swan reported that among the Makah in the 1870s and 1880s, northern fur seals appeared off Cape Flattery usually about the first day of March and the migration continued

through the month of June. Although fur seals were sighted and were killed within the Strait of Juan de Fuca and along the coast, the migrating herds could route themselves as much as several hundred miles off the coast. “The great body of these seals keep well out to sea,” Swan said, “and during the present year (1880) have been reported by vessels bound in from China and the Sandwich Islands as having been seen from 100 to 300 miles off shore, covering the sea as far as the eye could reach, and looking like vast beds of kelp in the distance” [Swan 1887: 394]. In Swan’s analysis, prevailing weather conditions factored in the sea lanes that the seals chose to follow.

Fur seals were sources of subsistence as well as trade and also survival. The skins, which were fashioned into blankets and robes, generated less demand than those of the ever-coveted sea




Figure 9 Sea Otter killed at Oyhut in Grays Harbor County, Washington State. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

commercial manufacture of coats and other garments:

In that phrase [of manufacture] lies the problem, for the pelt is composed not only of the soft hairs lying close to the skin but also of a layer of stiffer outer guard hairs which keep the soft underfur from matting flat on the body and must be separated from it. An economical way to do this seems not to have existed much before 1750 and is generally regarded as a Chinese invention. Fur seal pelts need not be used directly for clothing, however; the fur itself

otters and surpluses were exported through intertribal exchanges. According to the late Briton Cooper Busch, the pelt of the fur seal, although far less luxuriant than that of sea otters or even those of some land furbearers, was nevertheless warm and comfortable and used as fur clothing once properly prepared. Commented Busch in regard to the

was sometimes taken off the actual skin, particularly where the skin was badly preserved (above all if sun-dried rather than wet-salted) and the fur was thus likely to come off in any case. Loose fur could be compressed for the preparation of felt, a common and popular Chinese clothing material [Busch 1985: 8].

The edible flesh was prepared by Indians in several ways. The fat was boiled and extracted and used like butter. The meat was cut into strips and smoke-dried or soaked in water and boiled. At different times and from place to place there is evidence that fur seals constituted the primary food source of Northwest coastal peoples [Olson 1936: 49].

In terms of those explorers that frequented coastal waters, it was sea otters—known as tee-juck by the Makah—and not northern fur seals that attracted the strange visitors [Swan Census 1861: 74; Mackie: 1997]. The sea otter trade, which was carried out in an unabated and unrestricted manner, flourished beyond all expectation and, by the first decade of the nineteenth century, Pacific traders and especially those of United States origin were looking to cash in wherever they could. For American ship owners and shipmasters, one of the first alternatives presented was fur sealing. That occupation targeted animals that possessed a similar although less plush or desirable pelt than that of sea otters, though the extraction of both resources occurred rather simultaneously. James G. Swan learned in 1861 that fur seal skins were traded by the Makah “to the whites.” Sea otters, he said, were “very rarely killed” at Cape Flattery, but were “more plentiful however further down the coast. Their skins are very valuable and are eagerly sought after by the traders” [Swan Census 1861: 74]. On a global scale and at least by as early as the late 1780s, American Nor’westmen had begun taking fur seals on the Falklands, South Georgia, Staten Island, Juan Fernandez, Más Afuera (today’s Alejandro Selkirk Island), St. Ambrose, St. Felix, and other islands in the southwestern Atlantic and the southeastern Pacific off the middle coasts of South America [Gibson 1992: 252; Busch 1985: 10-19; Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8].

In large measure the fur seal trade exploded onto the scene when it did out of sheer necessity. The islands that beckoned as the targets of those initial probes lay along the route traveled by traders in sailing to the Northwest coast for sea otters. In making the stopover, seamen were able to replenish themselves with fresh food and water as well as catching some badly-needed rest. It also enabled them to supply themselves with a conveniently marketable commodity which, in the form of the fur seals, served as an insurance of sorts against the much

more valuable but far less plentiful and harder to get at sea otters, those the pull factor in the foreigners having come in the first place. Because the main northern fur seal rookeries—the Pribilof and Commander Islands—were Russian possessions, it made sense that the seals should be gathered elsewhere [Gibson 1992: 252-3]. But the general thrust of the global fur-seal industry rose up as a colossus pincer movement. European and American operators worked the South American rookeries and Russians those of Alaska before those two vast sectors eventually converged onto a single pressure point: the marine assets of California, British Columbia, Washington, and Oregon [Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8].

The onslaught struck with a jarring ferocity. A majority of the sealing grounds lay uninhabited, which required that the skins be obtained through the demanding physical exertions of the voyagers. Outfitters, operating out of Boston and other eastern points, began dispatching sealing ships for the singular purpose of conducting seal hunts, seasonal campaigns which inflicted remarkable carnage. According to data collected by the historical geographer James R. Gibson, the crew of just one ship, the *Jefferson*, killed and cured in a span of two summer months in 1792 thirteen thousand fur seals on St. Ambrose Island on the west coast of South America. In addition, on Más Afuera Island between 1800 and 1804, ten to twenty ships visited annually and “in one year fourteen ships sealed there at the same time, and in 1802 there were two hundred men sealing on the island” [Gibson 1992: 253; Busch 1985: 10].

The ebb and flow of the trade is evident in statistics kept on the dominant peltry (sea otters, beavers, and fur seals) traded at Canton and London, the primary international depots where furs were taken for exchange. As was the case with all furbearers, the extent of the harvests started slowly, built to a peak over a spread of years or decades, and subsided as either



Figure 10 Quinault sea otter derrick, on the beach between Copalis and Pt. Grenville off the Washington coast. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

the population of animals waned or the market for them did. The sea otter (*Enhydra lutris*) trade, for example, had fanned red hot on the Pacific Northwest coast, but its halcyon days proved short lived. Shifts in fashion blunted the demand for peltry at the same time that the number of animals available for harvest was undergoing rapid depletion.

The greatest year for American sea otter imports to Canton was 1805-1806, coincidentally the identical period that Lewis and Clark lay camped along the Netul River. Sea otter deliveries remained fairly constant through the 1811-1812 season, at which point a steady and substantial decline set in. In fact, between 1811-1812 and 1832-1833, the bounty of sea otter skins taken in any single year compared to the previous year decreased in fifteen out of twenty years. To give a sense of just how precipitous was the drop off, American ships transported 17,445 sea otter skins to Canton in 1805-1806 compared to only 494 in 1832-1833, while the dollar value of American exports suffered a similar decay. In the 1820-1821 season (the earliest for which there are statistics), United States fur sales at Canton amounted to \$142,399, the most of any recorded year. By 1833-1834 that figure had hemorrhaged to \$8,383 and in 1840-1841, the last year for which there is data, the peltry brought in a mere \$2,368 [Gibson 1992: 311, 315; Busch 1985: 3-37; Ravalli 2009: 181-91].

Beavers (*Castor canadensis* and *Castor fiber*), another important furbearer harvested on the Washington coast, told a similar story. Beaver peltry was aimed predominantly at the European and American top hat trade. That industry boomed for several decades before sputtering out around 1830 due to changes in fashion, a switch in product manufacture from beaver fur to silk, and thinning stocks [Bockstoe 2009: 180]. Imports of beavers by American vessels at Canton peaked the same year as sea otter had, 1805-1806, and the returns remained consistent through the 1812-1813 season when, in the throes of the War of 1812, the beaver trade like the sea otter trade, suffered a steep drop off. Unlike with sea otters, however, a period of recovery followed and the years from 1817-1818 to 1822-1823 witnessed an almost uninterrupted string of good harvests, the only exception being 1821-1822. By 1829-1830 and in the season after that, 1830-1831, no beaver peltry whatsoever was traded at Canton, although some slight rebounding was experienced in subsequent years and significant peltry, especially product originating with the HBC, was being shipped directly on the London market [Gibson 1992: 311, 315; Busch 1985: 3-37].

The fur-seal trade in Canton held to the pattern. Peltry of that kind reached its highpoint in the 1806-1807 season. In fact, the number of fur seal pelts transported to China that year skyrocketed. But the slide proved equally pronounced and, in 1809-1810, no fur seal skins were brought there for exchange. That was backed by five good years, but then fifteen more in which the cargoes of skins were markedly diminished from what they had been. For example, in 1806-1807, 261,000 skins were exchanged in Canton and, of the years in which the delivery of fur seal peltry reached six figures, all but one—1821-1822—occurred before the 1815-1816 season. By comparison, in 1822-1823 and 1823-1824, 11,330 and 12,094 skins were traded, respectively, and, after 1822-1823, no more than 52,043 fur seal pelts were carried in any single year, specifically in 1824-1825. In 1832-1833, only four fur seal skins were shipped to Canton via American vessels. The year after that, none were [Gibson 1992: 311, 315; Busch 1985: 3-37].

In their totality, the returns comprised a stunning haul. In the fourteen years that elapsed between 1793 and 1807 (a period that experienced an equal if not more aggressive assault waged against sea otters), some three and a half million fur seals were killed on Más Afuera alone and



Figure 11 Portion of Indian fur-sealing crew aboard the Canadian schooner *Favorite* in 1894. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

in some years more animals were alleged to have been taken than may have populated the island. The result was the almost total extirpation of the herd. In 1801, a merchant related plaintively of the performance. The fur seal had been “most all killed,” he said, having been clubbed and skinned and the pelts “dried or slated and shipped to Canton.” There, “depending upon supply and quality, fur-seal skins fetched as much as \$3-4 or as little as 35¢ but generally \$1 each” [Gibson 1992: 253]. It was an amount that equated to about one-fiftieth the value of sea otter peltry [Busch 1985: 7]. In the six-year stretch between 1815 and 1821, sixty

in some years more animals were alleged to have been taken than may have populated the island. The result was the almost total extirpation of the herd. In 1801, a merchant related plaintively of the performance. The fur seal had been “most all killed,” he said, having

thousand fur-seal skins were exported to China annually at an average price of \$1.50 each. That haul spurred Gibson to remark that there was

Little wonder that the population of fur seals diminished at least as sharply as that of sea otters, and probably more so, and the trade in their fur plummeted accordingly. Indeed, by the time that sea otters had been depleted, fur seals had suffered the same fate, so sealing did little to offset the decline of the sea-otter trade [Gibson 1992: 253].

While Gibson was accurate in a general sense, he may have overstated the damage done to fur seals, at least in terms of location and chronology. By 1800 the sea otter population had been dealt a rocking blow, but fur seal continued to register in substantial numbers both then and beyond. Particularly was that true in the region of the Pribilof Islands of the north Pacific Ocean, although not on the Washington coast where, in the first half of the nineteenth century, there was apparently a diminution in species migration. The Russian-America Company, from its founding in 1799 through 1814, “traded up to half a million fur-seal skins to foreign, primarily American, skippers.” From 1786 through 1827, “the Russians killed up to 3 million fur seals on the islands” [Gibson 1992: 263-4].

The economy of the Pacific Coast experienced tremendous volatility as conditions shifted in the duration of only a couple decades. Many fur seal skins were going towards payments made by Russians to acquire essential goods from the Americans that they could not produce themselves. Due to insufficient stocks, sea otter peltry was no longer a reliable currency. Therefore fur seals, in the expanding and more complex trade that was rising to the fore on the Pacific Northwest coast, came to serve as the common medium of exchange, especially between American suppliers and Russian consumers. Throughout much of the first half of the nineteenth century this development inflicted significant impacts on northern fur seal populations, so much so that by the 1820s Russian America was suffering “a shortage of fur seals, and from 1831 American captains were paid in letters of credit on St. Petersburg rather than in skins . . . [and by] then Yankee ships were visiting Sitka ‘very rarely’” [Gibson 1992: 264].

In Alaska during the heyday of the 1820s, United States mariners were supplying virtually all of the basic foodstuffs upon which the Russian-American Company was reliant and for which the Americans were being compensated largely in fur seal skins. The latter, in turn, were being transported to Canton the same as had been the case with sea otter peltry. There an

equivalent of “1 ruble, 75 kopecks for each of them [was paid] in the late 1820s at Sitka and . . . [were sold] for up to 11 rubles each at Canton” [Gibson 1992: 264].

By the late 1820s (after 1828), six American trading vessels were leaving Boston for the Northwest coast annually. Coasting out in November, they scurried to the Hawaiian Islands where in March they were re-provisioned and additional crew was taken on. A month later, having reached the western coast of the continent, they worked for the next five months—or until about September—in ship teams of two, offering the Natives for their peltry commodities of “blankets, duffels, cottons, calicoes, firearms, ammunition, rum, axes, knives, buttons, fishhooks, vermilion, made clothing (frock coats, waistcoats, trousers, shirts, hats, handkerchiefs, shoes), and Indian slaves, plus beads, bracelets, and looking-glasses for land furs and sea-otter skins” [Gibson 1992: 266]. Land furs commanded only small articles in the trade and some large goods “such as blankets and duffels for sea-otter skins” [Ibid.].

At the close of the season in September the fleet separated. One or two ships remained on the Pacific Coast to conduct additional trading, which could now be done on cheaper terms. The other vessels retreated to Kaigani and Tongass in southern Alaska, the principal rendezvous. Overwintering there, the Boston men confronted the only Indians with whom they were on



Figure 12 Dock at Neah Bay on the Makah Indian Reservation. Image taken circa early twentieth century. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

friendly terms. The methodology employed by the Americans, of holding back one ship and returning so early in spring, was driven by the competitive spirit always characteristic of United States participation in the trade. “Their object,” Gibson made clear, was “to get first to the Market” [Gibson 1992: 266].

Exchanges varied depending on where they were

consummated. Americans most often frequented that stretch of the Pacific Coast between Dixon Entrance near Masset and Queen Charlotte Sound west of Bella Bella. Here both sea and land furs were bartered and crews purchased spars and planks (which, for the most part, they cut

themselves) as well as salmon that they cured and barreled. Back in Honolulu, the timber and fish could be sold at premium prices. The traders, once finished on the lower coast, typically continued on to Sitka where they traded goods for fur seal skins. In the midst of that bustle, the Nor'westmen were collecting the totality of the skins that the Indians had to supply and, as it has been said, "By the end of July, when the Indians began moving to their fishing grounds, the 'coast had been nearly swept of furs'" [Gibson 1992: 266].

The trade was ever evolving. In the 1820s, the HBC embarked on an ambitious campaign aimed at ridding the region of an American presence north of the Columbia River and, after about 1800, the maritime fur trade was ostensibly relegated to areas above Cape Flattery [Gibson 1992: 267]. After the founding of Sitka in 1799, the Americans became the prominent supplier of the garrison. But their participation flagged as the British reemerged on the coast and the HBC was able to fortify and consolidate their operations. Indicative of its emerging presence, the



Figure 13 Tribal members unloading a sealing canoe at La Push, Washington, on the Quileute Indian Reservation. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

Company signed a contract with the Russian-American Company in 1839 (to take effect in 1840) to provision Sitka and thus remove the Americans from a locale from which they had already largely taken their leave [Ibid.: 80]. By then the fur trade—both maritime and continental—was waning for everyone involved due to a conflation of factors, including changes in fashion, the

depletion of overall stocks, and the superior prospects perceived in other ventures such as north Pacific whaling and the California tallow trade [Ibid., 82-3; Bockstoe 2009: 355-60].

Commercial exploitation resulted in the near extirpation of northern fur seals. When the Pribilof Islands (also known as the Fur Seal Islands and separated from the nearest land in the Aleutian chain by 160 miles) were discovered in 1742, the species was estimated to have numbered between two and three million individuals. In the forty years that elapsed after Aleuts were brought there to hunt fur seals in 1786, the annual harvest averaged one hundred thousand

land kills per season. Most of those were in pups and there had been some two and a half million total kills by 1790 [Busch 1985: 8]. In 1822, restrictions on the unregulated harvesting of pups and bulls was imposed and thereafter only immature males could be pursued—an average of thirty to thirty-five thousand per year. That was a policy which, at the time of the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, had restored the population to near historic highs.

Under United States stewardship, however, regulations on fur-seal hunting were not immediately imposed and the number of animals taken in 1868 alone swelled to approximately 240,000. Between that year and 1911 there was another estimated eight hundred thousand pelagic kills. The majority of those were composed of adult females in the marine spaces of British Columbia [Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada 2006: 13; Tomasevich 1943: 80-9]. In 1910, not including those animals killed and not retrieved, the aggregate northern fur seal harvest amounted to 3,900,000 individuals [Busch 1985: 255].

Reeling from the slaughter perpetrated against them on both land and at sea, the Pribilof population had been decimated to about three hundred thousand individuals by the first decade of the twentieth century and the number of seals “that bred on the Pribilofs had decreased to 123,000 from nearly 1.3 million in the 1870s” [Madden 2000: 203]. The United States, confronted with the very real possibility of species extinction, undertook bold unilateral steps in 1897. Banned was the capturing, hunting, or killing of pelagic seals by all American citizens except Pacific Coast Indian hunters using traditional weaponry. Ratification of the Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals and Sea Otters broadened those regulations in 1911. That legislation imposed a moratorium on all fur-seal hunting by the nations of Britain (for Canada), Japan, Russia, and the United States and remained in force until 1917. Thereafter a prohibition on the most wasteful pelagic sealing was enacted and restrictions on the harvesting of immature males on land were renewed and extended [Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada 2006: 13; Tomasevich 1943: 80-9].

The 1911 treaty, which was hailed as “one of the greatest international conservation successes of the 20th century” [Madden 2000: 203], lived on in modified effect until 1941 when Japan abrogated. However, those restrictions endured as the international status quo until 1957 when the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals was adopted by Canada, the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. The terms of that treaty, which upheld the ban on pelagic sealing, allowed only the taking of females for research purposes by the

United States while preserving limited commercial harvests in the Pribilofs and allocating 15 percent of the skins to Canada along with a mandate for that country to conduct research on the species. In 1984, after the United States Senate declined to ratify a protocol to extend the treaty, the laws shifted again. The decision of the American legislature relegated management of fur seals in United States waters to the authority of the Fur Seal Act of 1966 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. Fur seal populations in the 1970s, after peaking around mid-century and for reasons still not fully understood, began to undergo a rapid constriction, a trend that continued in successive decades. In conjunction with a diminution in the world market in fur seal skins, a rising public sentiment that was opposed to sealing, a compression in the market for skins, and prohibitive legislation that criminalized the intentional lethal taking of fur seals except for subsistence hunting by Alaska Natives or for the protection of human life, commercial sealing had virtually ceased by the late 1990s [Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada 2006: 19].

From the outset the effect of regulation on the Olympic Peninsula was dramatic. In the second half of the nineteenth century when whaling began to falter as a subsistence staple, Makah, Quileute, and other Washington coast peoples turned their attentions to fur-seal hunting, both for their own use as a food resource and trade item and later as a commercial product. In 1869, commercial schooner owners hired tribal members to accompany them to the Bering Sea for the first time. American Indian sealers also harvested the residential populations in their home waters off Cape Flattery and in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and herds migrating back to the Pribilofs between the Columbia River and Barkley Sound. In 1880, a Makah invested his earnings in a small schooner, the tribe's first. By late 1893, members of the Makah tribe owned ten twenty-five- to fifty-ton craft and were employing white sealmen to work for them. It was a sea change that inspired Philip Drucker, in referencing the Nootka and the Kwakiutl who were also heavily involved, to describe sealing as the "national industry" of those tribes [Drucker 1955: 34].

In 1897, the burden of federal regulation began to encroach on Indian operations. Tribes were advised that their members could continue to conduct their harvests, but using only traditional methods. For them that constituted a debilitating reversal, one that threatened to render much of their financial outlay an empty investment. In order to police Pacific waters, customs officials deployed United States Revenue Marine Service ships, or revenue cutters, and

those hunters found in violation of the law were arrested and their schooners were seized [Ravalli 2009: 187]. At the turn of the century, Makah and other Olympic Peninsula tribes were still sealing in canoes, but rarely were their annual aggregate earnings rising above a few thousand dollars. That held until approximately the Second World War when severe restrictions interrupted access to the ocean and Washington Indians were forced to turn to other means of subsistence and support. Today there is no fur-seal hunting—either by Indians or anyone else—taking place off the coast of Washington.



MARITIME FUR TRADE

TWO SIMULTANEOUSLY OCCURRING EVENTS BURST FORTH ONTO THE Pacific Northwest coast in the closing decades of the eighteenth century: contact between Indians and whites and the introduction of the fur trade. In their own ways both were cataclysmic developments and each was destined to exert revolutionary impacts on the Indian populations and the marine assets of the Olympic Peninsula. For the first time—and starting as a trickle and then quickening as profits began to soar in the sea otter trade—the presence of non-Indians in coastal waters took place with astonishing rapidity. It was in the arena of this transformation that the stage was set for an extended, intensive run of fur hunting that culminated a century later with permanent settler occupation and full-fledged commercial fur sealing. But, back in the flush days of those first journeys, such changes still loomed a long way



Figure 14 Sea otter tower on the Olympic Peninsula. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

off, a mountain somewhere out in the distance, an utterly if not unfathomable tomorrow.

In the 1780s and 1790s and extending into the first three decades of the nineteenth century, voyagers sailed in from across the world—from Russia, Spain, England, France, and the United States—in search of a product popularly known as “soft gold.” Significantly, it was *not* northern fur seals that they coveted—those were relegated to subsistence in the period—but rather the lush,

silklike fur of sea otters which, before weakening and then vanishing completely, commanded stature for a span of roughly a half century as the preeminent saleable commodity in the

international marketplace. Those were formative years, ones molded in delicate maiden encounters in which the Indian populations readily controlled and dominated the nature and scope of the trade. Astutely consummating their exchanges, Indians were able to fortify their villages and communities with new and unimaginable merchandise as well as with previously unknown knowledge and perspective, a ransom of wealth and ideas that likely served to mask the larger threat posed by outsiders whose intentions had not yet been fully revealed. As one historian has boldly put it, “The local tribes grew wealthy, enriched by becoming part of global trade” [Gough 2007: 112; Ravalli 2009: 181-91].

In terms of participation, the sea otter trade separates into overlapping eras, each demarked by successive waves of foreign commercial traffic. Russia, the first nation to emerge on the scene, restricted their operations—at least until the last couple decades of the eighteenth century—to the far north Pacific. After that region was effectively hunted out, they turned by necessity southward. By then, however, there were ships of other countries operating on the Pacific Coast, most prominently those flying the Spanish colors, although the involvement of that nation too was destined to remain largely peripheral, in this case California centered. It was instead Great Britain that initiated the Pacific sea otter trade off the coasts of Washington and British Columbia and later it was the United States that refined it into a business and eventually a monopoly. By 1800, Russia was a secondary player, Spain and Great Britain had virtually abandoned the trade, and the region had been left to American interests and their Indian suppliers to harvest and carry to market the first great cash crop of the Pacific Northwest coast [Bockstoe 2009: 3-40; Ravalli 2009: 181-91].

The maritime fur trade was notable in that in terms of peltry it involved strictly sea otters and not northern fur seals. In fact, the historical record is devoid of a single transaction in fur seal during the period. But that is not to minimize the significance of the sea otter trade. Cape Flattery (or Neah Bay) was to become the hub of the sealing industry on the Olympic Coast, furnishing the human and natural resources vital to its development and success. Due to the limited population of sea otters inhabiting the waters directly south of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the far northern Washington coast was never able to generate a heavy traffic in those skins.

But northern fur seal was to prove a different animal altogether. It would be another three-quarters of a century before the market in that peltry took off, but when it did the Makah and the Quileute and other coastal peoples would be uniquely positioned and highly advantaged

to govern their participation in it, perhaps to a far greater extent than they had been at the end of the eighteenth century. By then the European presence was substantially diminished and the means of exchange was no longer barter but exclusively catch and cash on demand. For the Olympic Coast peoples, however, the era of exploration provided a grand proving ground, one which allowed them to apply their own patterns of intertribal exchange to new circumstances while attaining invaluable knowledge and understanding of EuroAmericans, particularly insights into their customs, values, and manner of conducting business. In ensuing decades, the tribes would exploit that awareness to their own benefit. They would situate themselves at the center of an industry that would for a few titanic years stand at the core of the maritime economy of the American Pacific Northwest.



LEWIS AND CLARK

BETWEEN 1804 AND 1806 THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DISPATCHED into the virtually unexplored North American west the thirty-three member corps of the Lewis and Clark expedition. The purposes of that landmark undertaking were many, but prominent among them was the compelling need to determine the status and nature of the West Coast in terms of the fur trade. Indeed, President Thomas Jefferson, [in all of his pre-departure communications with his Team Jefferson, invariably steered the](#) [conversations back to a](#)

[familiarity](#) [starting](#) [places](#) [spotpla](#) [ee](#). In

prepping Lewis for the obstacles

[that lay](#) ahead,

[he](#) Jefferson

sought to make the



Figure 15 William Clark and Meriwether Lewis, leaders of the famed Lewis and Clark expedition. National Park Service image.

objectives of the expedition, as well as his own motivations for organizing and sanctioning the operation, unmistakably clear. Jefferson, through the presence and the actions of Lewis and Clark was, among [a good many](#) other things, seeking to enlarge and solidify the standing and scope of American traders on the Pacific Coast. Should the Pacific Ocean be reached,

[he](#) Jefferson advised, [care](#) [pains](#) should be taken by Lewis to familiarize [apprise](#) himself with

the circumstances which may decide whether the furs of those parts may not be collected as advantageously at the head of the Missouri (convenient as is supposed to the waters of the Colorado & Oregon or Columbia) as at Nootka sound, or any other point of that coast; and that trade be consequently conducted through the Missouri & U. S. more beneficially than by the circumnavigation now practised [Jackson 1978: 65].

Jefferson concluded with this:

On your arrival on that coast, endeavor to learn if there be any port within your reach frequented by the sea-vessels of any nation, & to send two of your trusty people back by sea, in such way as shall appear practicable, with a copy of your notes: and should you be of opinion that the return of your party by the way they went will be eminently dangerous, then ship the whole, & return by sea [Jackson 1978: 65].




Figure 16 Artist's depiction of Fort Clatsop on the Oregon Coast. National Park Service image.

upriver as far as The Dalles and down ~~either both~~ sides of the Columbia to the mouth of the river and north to the Quinault River and as far south as the Willamette Valley. ~~Theis~~ trading web incorporated goods ~~that came~~ from as far away as California, Alaska, and the Great Plains.


~~Among those tribal groups in the region, t~~The Chinook proper—of whom segments of the tribe had ~~organized of whom were~~ under a one-eyed headman named Comcomly—~~occupied inhabited~~ village sites along the north side of the ~~L~~ower Columbia. In addition, ~~and, a~~ along the northwestern ~~ern~~ tip of Oregon and extending to the north shore of Point Adams, were three ~~more~~ separate Clatsop villages, one ~~of which was~~ that was headed by Coboway. ~~Relatively speaking,~~ ~~h~~He was destined to become a favorite of the explorers, ~~a close relationship- that would be as~~

The ~~L~~ower Columbia estuary supported a ~~complexicated~~ network of Chinookan, Salish, and Athapascan communities that survived within a ~~complicated complex~~ system of regional exchange. ~~The major~~ ~~arterials of this is~~ ~~Indians' economic~~ ~~lifeblood that~~ extended

~~would be~~ symbolized by the fact that ~~to him~~~~he given~~ were to be deeded ~~would be given~~ the abandoned remains of Fort Clatsop [Ambrose 1996: 331].

With the onset~~advent~~~~emergence~~~~advent~~ of the maritime fur trade in the 1790s, and with ~~Indians~~~~m~~ occupying strategic ~~fishing and~~ navigational, ~~fishing, and village~~ sites along the Columbia and the lower ~~reaches of the~~ Willamette River, the Chinook had emerged as middlemen in the regional exchange, ~~and~~ ~~A~~ as such ~~they~~ occupied a central position in regulating “the flow of goods between the lower Columbia River, the Plateau, and other regions to the north such as Vancouver Island” [Jette 2006-07: 4]. As ~~had been the case~~~~had~~ happened on the north Pacific Coast, as the number of foreign traders ~~had~~ proliferated, ~~lower~~ ~~Columbian~~~~coastal~~ groups ~~had~~ ~~had~~ begun ~~uan~~ integrating European trade goods into their economies. In fact, they ~~incorporated~~ ~~them directly into almost every~~ facet ~~of their day-to-day~~ ~~existence~~~~habits of life~~~~existence—from their methods of cooking to the clothes they wore to how~~ ~~they hunted~~~~ing and~~ ~~and the hooks they used to catch~~~~catching their fish~~~~of exchange~~.

~~While~~~~Although~~ Lewis and Clark appeared to ~~possesse~~~~contain~~ an im~~perfect~~~~full~~ knowledge of the Pacific fur trade, the lower Columbian peoples—and, by extension, those tribes lined up all up and down the Pacific Coast and including those of the Olympic Peninsula—knew it intimately and had ~~apparently~~ prospered ~~mightily~~ from it mightily. They knew where and in what seasons to hunt and harvest. At their disposal was the necessary equipment and tools. They



understood the rhythms and contours of the land and the sea. Of the animal kingdoms they knew the habits and tendencies of the water and ground species almost as well as they knew them in the human realm. According to the preeminent historian James Ronda,

When Lewis and Clark came to the

coast in 1805, they found a thriving people fully at one with a

Figure 17 William Clark's sketch of a Chinook plankhouse. Journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

bountiful physical environment. Arguments about cultural decline to the contrary, the maritime fur trade had dramatically augmented the wealth and power of the coastal people. One story, which described the advent of metal trade goods, put it this way: '[T]he people bought this and the Clatsop became rich' [Ronda 1984: 196].

- Echoing that sentiment sentiment are the affecting words of ~~was~~ another historian, those of the late Stephen Ambrose:

For the Clatsops and Chinooks, neither the weather nor the diet had an adverse effect. To the contrary. They were thriving tribes before the smallpox hit them, still vibrant when Lewis and Clark came to spend the winter. With few enemies and fewer wars, they were rich, enjoying an abundance of fish and furs and first access to European trade goods. They loved the food and the climate, had perfectly adjusted to them, and rightly thought of the Pacific Northwest as a bountiful provider, almost paradise [Ambrose 1996: 321].

By almost any barometer Indians had seized the moment and made it their own with a good deal ~~much~~ of their ~~new found~~ prosperity and status owing to their resiliency and very potent adaptive capacities ~~abilities~~. In comparison to later economic inventions and introductions, the transition of lower Columbian and Northwest coast peoples to the maritime fur trade had come about ~~taken place~~ ~~occurred~~ rather seamlessly. Facilitated by their ability, had effectively been able to incorporate ~~blended~~ effectively the old with the new, new syntheses had emerged al that were at once ~~once~~ two parts ~~both at the same time~~ familiar and ~~but~~ ~~and but in some ways one part~~ foreign, strands of continuous ~~al~~ societal blending and regeneration that some historians have termed "modern by tradition" [Bernstein and Rushing: 1995]. As those acts of inventive innovation have been explained by Professor Ronda, "Like those ingenious Mandans who dismantled a corn grinder to make tools more suited to their own needs, the Chinookans bought only certain European goods and then quickly made them a part of native life" [Ronda 1984: 196].

Because they had interacted with European and American traders on their coast for years for years, Indians perceived as inconsequential the under ~~down~~ sized Lewis and Clark delegation, —which had ~~come~~ wielding ~~burdened with~~ few trade goods to barter and those ~~they~~ had brought ~~did bring~~ exerting little meaning or relevance in the regional Northwest exchange

economies. They were a party-entity that could simply be ignored with little fear of retribution either now or in the future. In the context of their histories, lifeways, and cultures, within their world visions and the socioeconomic and political realities of the Lower Columbia, Lewis and Clark represented just a forgettable blip within the larger advent machinations of contact and commerce, the latter which they had fully participated in and molded to their own interests and needs. In contrast to white counterparts, they were truly operating on a wholly other different baseline from that of their white counterparts. Trade, for the members of the Corps of Discovery, could be a basic basic matter of subsistence and survival and it was certainly an unavoidable aspect of their working order charge from received from Jefferson. On the other hand, for the savvy and seasoned Indians living off the bounty of their homelands on the other hand, exchanges in commerce (in terms of Lewis and Clark at least) was a luxury that through the exercise of free will they could either choose either to either to engage in or simply backwalk away from and not come back return to unless they it was deemed it to their best interest advantages to do so.

The tribes were operating fully within their own element. They tribes possessed of their environment indispensable skills and unquantifiable knowledge of their environments and homelands of their environments, practicable assets that they had been both augmenting massing and honing for centuries. If they could have known of the continental vision of President Jefferson and their central position they occupied within his aspirations, there is little to suggest that the tribes of the lower Columbia would have paid much much more than passing heed to it. Already they had endured severe epidemics—and pathogens disease, more than any other thing threat, posed else the greatest challenged danger threat to their security and survival. But they had substantially withstood endured the initial blitz thrust onslaught waves of contact and even managed managed to control and prosper from a good number of those interchanges with outsiders. Undeniably some of their physical encounters had been lethal, and There had been resulted in tragic and unnecessary losses of life had ensued.

But many of their exchanges had also proved proven positive and rewarding. Novel and often valuable resources and new information and perspectives had been acquired that had readily been been able to incorporate integrated readily back into Indian practices and lifeways. Lewis and Clark, within this malleable large and dynamic environment milieu, presented little

~~about which they needed to worry~~~~about which to worry about~~, an annoyance -perhaps -or maybe an amusing curiosity. As traders without much of anything to trade, they were a feckless, ~~toothless-an feckless~~~~skeleton~~ presence, one so ~~physically irrelevant~~~~minimal~~ that in terms of Indian oral memories there is ~~not a lot~~~~little~~ to attest ~~to the fact~~ that they were ever there.

In keeping with what is known of the lack of commercial clout of northern fur seals during the period, Lewis and Clark uncovered little if any evidence of seal peltry exchanges, although they did observe the trading of sea otters and other furbearers. In addition, evidence shows that the explorers were deficient in their knowledge of fur seals and other species. Sea otters were often confused for harbor seals, for example, an error which possibly compromised the ability of the captains to verify accurately the trade in that peltry. Lewis identified and documented the characteristics of other furbearers, most notably harbor seals which, he acknowledged, he had earlier mistaken for sea otters. He also indicated that he knew of there were several species of fur seals on the Pacific Coast, but admitted that he lacked sufficient knowledge to be able to offer~~make~~ much more than ~~much~~ generalized comment on the subject [Moulton 1990: 340].

Although he could not have known it, in that regard Lewis was analyzing the two most important and influential marine mammals of the early contact period: sea otters and northern fur seals. “The mink,” Lewis reported, “is found in the woody country on this coast, and does not differ in any particular~~lar~~ from those of the Atlantic coast.” But

~~the~~ the [harbor] seal are found here in great numbers, and as far up the Columbia river as the great falls above which there are none. I have reason to believe from the information of the men that there are several species of the seal on this coast and in the [Columbia] river but what the difference is I am unable to state not having seen them myself sufficiently near for minute inspection nor obtained the different kinds to make a comparison [Moulton 1990: 340].

According to Lewis, the “skins of such as I have seen are covered with a short course stiff and glossy hair of a reddish brown colour. [T]he animal while in the water or as we saw them frequently in the river appear to be black and spotted with white sometimes” [Ibid.]. Lewis confessed that when he had first seen “those animals at the great falls and until our arrival at this place we conceived they were the Sea Otter. [B]ut the Indians here have undeceived us.— I am not much acquainted with the Seal but suppose that they are the same common also to the

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5", Line spacing: 1.5 lines

Atlantic Ocean in the same parallel of latitude. [T]he skins I have seen are precisely such as our trunks are frequently covered with—” [Ibid].

William Clark contributed a few more lines to a text that read similar to what Lewis had written. Harbor seals, which were known as “phoca,” were highly prized by Indians. In preparing them to eat, the fur was singed off. The flesh was roasted on sticks held over a fire [Moulton 1990: 341].

At midmonth the captains received what must have come as were bittersweet news. From visiting Clatsops who had heard it from a Makah paddling in a canoe six days out of Neah Bay, they were informed that the seasonal sea otter harvest trade was underway. Four ships were anchored at Cape Flattery under the respective ownership of a Mr. Haley and three other men identified only by their surnames: Moore, Callamon, and Swipeton. They were trading with the Makah for whale bone oil and furs products of various types. The captains, in order to initiate contact with the mariners, entrusted the Makah man and some other Indians with some a satchel of sealed documents and letters that they were charged with delivering to him at Neah Bay [Moulton 1990: 416].

The economic, cultural, and social ramifications of the Lewis and Clark expedition are impossible to ignore. The captains and their companions laid the groundwork for what many tribes today describe today as a massive invasion of Indian homelands and an equally aggressive assault waged against their resources and cultures. That is a characterization that the captains Lewis and Clark would be hard-pressed to refute. They might have been hesitant to deny, although they would almost assuredly have taken issue with the interpretation and meaning of it. For example, writing on September 23, 1806, on the very day of their arrival back in St. Louis, William Clark expounded on everything that he believed had been accomplished. In a letter penned to his brother, Jonathan, he declared his Pacific adventure an unqualified success. Highlighting especially the benefits to be extracted from the fur trade, Clark represented the Columbia River as navigable by crafts of up to of as much as three hundred tons burden to a point 125 miles upriver. Equally encouraging, the 3,555-mile cross-continental route they had just traveled was of a nature that it could be duplicated by others [Holmberg 2002: 101].

On the all-important question of transporting peltry to market, Clark envisioned the mouth of the Columbia River as setting up as a potential giant entrepot where

Formatted: Indent: First line: 0.5", Line spacing: 1.5 lines

nine-tenths of the most valuable furs in America could be collected and then carried across the Pacific Ocean directly to the East Indies and Canton. In that way the tedious and costly step of shipping them via eastern ports such as Philadelphia and New York could be avoided. If the new ~~route~~~~process~~ could be completed~~ed~~~~ompleted~~ by the first of August of each year, ~~he advised~~, the cargoes would reach market ahead of British shipments, Clark postulated hopefully, the latter which would persist in having ~~first~~ to go first to Montreal before being routed onward~~continuing~~ to Europe. Unfortunately, in ~~the~~ broad ~~realms~~~~erms~~ of American interests, the road described by Clark turned out to be less practicable than ~~he~~ advertised and the majority of American furs continued to be shipped by way of Atlantic cities well into the future [Holmberg 2002: 103].

With the delivery of Clark's lengthy communication, President Jefferson had in his possession precisely what he wanted: a detailed analysis of the fur trade and a powerful statement of its implications for the American West and for the nation. He now knew, and the transmission of the explorers' journals would provide additional verification of the fact, that the sea otter trade was an ongoing though limited proposition. Lewis and Clark had not encountered any non-Indian traders at Fort Clatsop and the number of sea otter skins they had seen was not insignificant but far from earth shattering. This intelligence, coupled with what was at the disposal of the president from other sources, probably underscored for him the slim opportunities that existed in that realm. By that juncture the best possibilities lay in the continental interior and Jefferson, with the information furnished to him by Lewis and Clark, could foresee a scenario unfolding in which the Columbia came to be the gateway to the Pacific, where all the furs of the West—sea otters and beavers and northern fur seals as well if, and when, a market opened up for them—were harvested and then shipped to eastern destinations. Hence, waiting on the Pacific Coast was an untapped industry, but one which required bold steps if the United States was to secure and fully capitalize on all that it had to offer.



FROM SUBSISTENCE TO COMMERCIAL TRADING

IF PELTRY WAS THE CATALYST, INDIAN HUNTERS AND TRADERS WERE THE kingpins in the leviathan of the Pacific Northwest fur trade. As all fur men of the Pacific Northwest coast would come to know, few tribes were more favorably advantaged to engage vigorously in the exchange economy than those on the Olympic Peninsula. Having always been skilled intertribal traders, they had been the first to confront explorers coasting off the Pacific Coast in search of peltry and they were the sole purveyors of those sea otter stocks that set off an increasingly rapid-fire chain of events that eventually climaxed in American domination of the West Coast of North America. Olympic Coast peoples, applying a vast repertoire of millennia-honed knowledge and capabilities, had managed to control a great deal of those start up canoe-to-ship transfers, utilizing sea otter skins as a powerful exchange medium to acquire a storehouse of coveted trade goods as well as a serviceable understanding of cultures that were not their own [Schefke: 2004].

The fur trade was perpetually in changing season. Following that inaugural wave of foreign shipping traffic in sea otters, which peaked in the final two decades of the eighteenth

century and to a lesser degree hung on for another three decades, the nature of the trade shifted rather dramatically inland even though a significant portion of furs continued to originate from destinations off the coast. Instead of marketing peltry exclusively to sea captains sailing from homeports located thousands of miles distant from Pacific Northwest waters, the tribes entered into a triangular trade concentrated at three major permanent, or at least stationary, exchange depots established at strategic points west of the Cascade Range. Those were at or near the mouth of the Columbia River, at Fort Nisqually on the southeastern fringe of Puget Sound, and at Fort Victoria, British Columbia. Those trading venues were not utilized to the same extent all the time by all traders. But it was here where the Indians of the Olympic Peninsula and others from across the Pacific Northwest carried their peltry to sell and to continue acquiring goods that could not be got through any other means or outlet [Schefke: 2004].

There was something in it for everyone and in more or less equal measures that remarkably failed to produce either dependency or destruction—other than to the populations of furbearers on which the whole edifice rested. In the analysis of one commentator,

The fur trade was one of the few instances in the history of Indian-European relations where both sides eventually got what they wanted and where neither side was entirely dominated or destroyed. Although it introduced capitalism to the Northwest Coast and thereby began the process by which humans assigned cash values to the wild animals of . . . [the region], the coastal trade did not destroy the subsistence economies of Native peoples. In the fur trade economy animals were saved or destroyed according to how readily their bodies could be converted into quick profits [Arnold 2008: 42].

Importantly, however, the interior trade reoriented the contours of supply. No longer did foreign traders track down Indians in order to bargain with them. Now Indians walked, rode, and paddled to the buyers at their fur stations, that the bases of a paradigm shift in which the locus of control came to be resituated away from Indians and towards their non-Indian counterparts. It was in these contact zones, or on this “middle ground” as it has been called, that opposing cultures continued to intersect and coalesce as both constituencies engaged in the social interplay of learning what the other was all about. For Indians residing on the far northwestern coast, the fur trade helped bridge the cultural gap that encompassed that period between the eras of exploration and settlement, an evolving process of continual melding and co-mingling energized through so many untold and largely unrecorded small-scale everyday encounters, those which

were still dominated by Indian traders but were increasingly pointing towards a more uncertain future [White: 1991a].

By the 1830s the fur economy had been recast from what it had been in the canoe-to-ship era in the age of exploration. Notably, the substance of the trade had changed. As in the earlier period, there was virtually no market in northern fur seal peltry, a reality which could be attributed to several factors. First, the hairs of the fur seal pelt were much less luxurious or plush than those of sea otters or even that of beavers, which greatly retarded its market value. Second, fur seals were more difficult to get to than many other furbearers and, as might be expected, Indians simply harvested first that which hunted easiest. Finally, global fashion persisted in coveting the fur of sea otters, beavers, and other small-animal peltry and, as long as those stocks continued to register in reasonable quantities, those skins would remain the most in demand, although it goes almost without saying that the sea otter population had been struck a piercing blow: The quantity of animals had been substantially reduced from what they had been even a decade or two earlier.

In fact, the records of Fort Nisqually suggest evidence of a precipitous drop off in the sea otter trade, almost so to the point that there were not any exchanges taking place in that peltry. Unfortunately, the post ledgers tended to employ a general category of “otter” to classify all skins of that type, but the occasional usage by the post trader of the words “‘sea’ Do.” or ditto below the line in which he wrote “Otters,” lends credence to the assumption that these two headings were being used to delineate species of river or land otters from sea otters, the latter which were being traded in overwhelmingly fewer numbers than the former.

Statistics illustrate the state of the market. The post traders at Fort Nisqually were required to keep careful and detailed records of each transaction and a monthly tabulation was frequently prepared that contained quantitative data. Among the first of those reports, which was issued in July 1834, showed that large beavers were by far the most common peltry brought in for exchange at 125 skins purchased. The next most popular was lynx (seventy-one pelts) followed by forty-eight dressed deer skins, forty-one otters (not specifically identified as river or sea otters, but assumed to be the former), thirty-three musquashes (or muskrats), nineteen small beavers, thirteen large black bears, five horses and one colt, two deers, one elk, and one fisher. Not a single transaction in northern fur seals was recorded [Bagley 1916: 68].

Another tally, compiled eight weeks later, covered the month of October 1834. Over that thirty-day block, ninety-six large beavers were exchanged in addition to sixty-two small beaver pelts, sixty-eight rats, thirty-nine ducks, sixty-six geese, twenty otters (assumed to be river or land otters), six raccoons, one sea otter (so identified in the record as of that type), one fisher, and one other unidentified skin. Also bartered were fifty-four fresh and ninety-six dried salmon. Post officials must have been pleased with the overall returns because, as before, their report included the affirmation: “There is not a day but Indians bring in some skins to trade” [Bagley 1916: 147-8].

But it was all relative. The reports filed in the “Journal of Occurrences” reflected a steady but limited harvest and based on the overall descriptions of the exchanges the cargoes might be judged as merely “acceptable” or “adequate” in terms of HBC expectations. The figures recorded for January read similar to those posted for December: sixty-two large and twenty-two small beaver skins, eleven muskrats, fourteen land otters, one raccoon, seven minks, two fishers, 230 pieces of dried salmon, fifty ducks, and two geese [Bagley 1916: 156].

Meanwhile, the returns for the year, which encompassed a span of ten and two-third months, proved satisfactory to the requirements of the HBC. In that period, 1,038 large beavers, twelve small beavers (clearly erroneously underreported or a typographical error in the published report), seven hundred muskrats, 340 land or river otters, 190 raccoons, 170 hiaqua (a slender, slightly curved shell strung on sinew and measured by the fathom and used as money by Indians at trading posts), eighty minks, forty chev or goats, thirty-three large and thirteen small black bears, two elk, and one sea otter [Bagley 1916: 156-7]. Again, conspicuously absent was mention of trade in northern fur seals and the reality was that only a single sea otter pelt had been purchased, an indication of the abrupt shift in both the market and fur fashion away from sea otters and towards beavers and the fact that a good deal of the sea otter trade—whatever it was—apparently remained ship based on the Pacific Coast.

As a commercial product, northern fur seals wielded little if any impact on the regional exchange economy, which was experiencing significant volatility. By the early 1840s, the British were poised to undergo another restructuring, this time one that was destined to shift the focus of their Pacific operations away from Fort Vancouver and the lower Columbia and in the direction of the region north of the 49th parallel and Vancouver Island. In 1843, that transition received official sanction with the founding of Fort Victoria in a sheltered and protected cove on the

southeastern flank of Vancouver Island. Driven to act with an eye toward the hard political and social realities of American territorial claims in the present-day states of Oregon and Washington, it was an advantage for the United States underpinned by the emergence of a burgeoning settler population and the 1846 treaty that established the international border in a manner that excluded the Columbia River and Puget Sound as British possessions. The removal of the English sounded the death-knell of the interior fur trade and the ascendancy of farming as the predominant commercial activity of the American West. With all those factors in play, HBC officials took prudent and substantial steps to firm up their business holdings.

The internal dynamics of the fur trade was also influencing decisions related to its management and ongoing sustainability on the Pacific slope. Impinging on HBC interests was the steadily diminishing global importance of beaver peltry. Stung by the unfettered machinations of fashion and a decline in animal populations, beavers had been ravaged by an assault similar to that which had been carried out against sea otters. In a brief span of roughly thirty years, from about 1810 to 1830 (the height of the sea otter trade dated from 1780 to 1810), the stocks of that species had stood as the target of an extraordinary offensive and although beavers may have survived the encounter more intact than the always hyper-valued sea otters, it too had experienced staggering losses that had in turn spawned yet another realignment of the Pacific fur trade [Gibson 1992: 315; Mackie 1997: 244; Schefke: 2004].

The construction of Fort Victoria arrived as something of a boon to Olympic Peninsula



Figure 18 Man standing atop the remains of a beached whale on the Olympic Peninsula. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

fur traders. The Klallam maintained village sites along the south coast of Vancouver Island and on the north coast of the Strait of Juan de Fuca. For the Makah, for the Quileute, and for others, Fort Victoria constituted a nearer, easier passage than Fort Nisqually, especially compared to the

significantly more distantly located Fort Vancouver, the latter which had always languished as the least accessed distribution depot of those tribes. The emergence of Fort Victoria effectively shut off the Olympic Peninsula trade to Fort Nisqually. In fact, after the founding of Fort Victoria, there is no record of any business taking place there by Makah or Quileute traders, although the documentation on that point is scanty due to the spotty nature of the extant files of the HBC.

Virtually in tandem with whales and following the decline of sea otters and beavers and marking a shift in demand to resources previously utilized for provisioning purposes only, northern fur seals finally entered into the commercial marketplace. The gradual introduction of fur seals into the exchange economy highlighted a resource that had long appeared in the constellation of native subsistence but which had struggled to emerge out of the florescent shadow of sea otters and beavers as a viable trade commodity. It was only after the populations of those most valuable of furbearers had been nearly extirpated—and a period in the mid-nineteenth century that had witnessed a global downturn in the fur trade—that fur seals harvested by Olympic Peninsula hunters were integrated into the commercial economy. Beginning ever so little and bit by bit in the 1840s and becoming ever more pronounced with each passing season, that species finally exploded in demand and thereafter dominated the fur trade throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.

But it entailed an incremental rise. In a major report on the international status of fur sealing in 1895 it was asserted: “It is undeniable that all the natives represented along this great line of coast have been accustomed from the earliest times to hunt the fur-seal.” However, it was explained,

so long as the sea-otter was abundant, little use was made of the inferior skin of the fur-seal, and that animal was prized chiefly as an article of food. At a later date, when the hunting of the sea-otter had become scarcely remunerative because of its increasing scarcity on this part of the coast, the price offered for the skins of the fur-seal was still insufficient to tempt the natives to engage systematically in the somewhat hazardous business of its capture; but as the skins became higher in price, and notably within the last twenty years, the hunting of the fur-seal has possessed a great importance for the natives [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 146].

Makah elders informed investigators in 1895 that sixty years before, at a time prior to their births and probably around the date of the construction of Fort Nisqually, “the fur-seal was hunted for food and clothing, and was abundant” [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 145]. James Swan maintained, however, that between the years 1857 to 1866, “but few seals were taken, they were in those years very scarce, and it is only since 1866 that they have been known to resort to the vicinity of Fuca Strait in such large numbers” [Swan 1887: 394]. “[O]f late years,” Swan emphasized, fur seals “seem to be steadily on the increase” [Ibid.].

Lacking market incentive, the dynamics of the hunt mitigated against intensive harvesting. Fur seals occupied marine spaces more difficult and dangerous to get at than the more shore-based but skittish sea otters and the pursuit of them came down to a calculation of profits over risk, the latter which loomed considerable. In orchestrating the fur-seal hunt, two to three men occupied each canoe, staying out all night on occasion and venturing as far away as thirty miles from land. In the early contact period, fifteen-foot-long spears with double-pronged detachable barbed heads were used. But those eventually gave way to rifles and still later to the more effective and lethal shotguns, those proving especially popular among younger hunters [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 145]. According to Makah informants, the tribe abandoned ocean-based fur-seal hunting in the decades of the 1830s and 1840s after a series of accidents at sea which resulted in losses of life. The chase was not taken up again until just a few years before the negotiation of their 1855 treaty with Isaac Stevens [Ibid.]. Doubtless its late emergence had something to do with the inclusion of that exclusive and coveted article that reserved to the Makah their right to take fur seals at all usual and accustomed places, but did not exclude other coastal tribes from hunting seals as all their rights were protected.

Where they were collected was not where they were sold. E. A. Starling, the first United States Indian agent assigned to



Figure 19 Makah whale hunter Lighthouse Jim on the beach at Neah Bay in 1900. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

present-day western Washington, reported in 1852 that the Makah were confining almost the totality of their trade to Victoria and “scarcely ever come into the country settled by the Americans. They trade mostly at Vancouver’s Island, and with vessels that frequently touch there for the purpose” [Whitner: WSHS Files]. As early as in the autumn of 1844, the HBC was coveting the largely untapped and lucrative nature of the fur resources located on the Washington coast, particularly around Cape Flattery. In October of that year, John McLoughlin, the chief factor at Fort Vancouver on the Columbia River, contacted his counterpart at Fort Victoria. Advising him of the opportunity that had manifested itself in relation to the coastal tribes, McLoughlin wrote: “I am happy to hear that the Cape Flattery Indians are beginning to visit the Establishment with their furs. You will of course give them every encouragement to visit you as often as possible, and endeavor to maintain a regular intercourse with them” [Ibid.].

McLoughlin seemed optimistic for the future. “This will be a great advantage to the post,” he conjectured, “and lend to an increase in returns, as these Indians may be brought by good management to give a great many valuable furs” [Whitner: WSHS Files]. From the vantage point of McLoughlin, the entire Cape Flattery region constituted a potential boom to the trade in furs:

The same remark will apply to the other tribes inhabiting the Straits of De Fuca, who possess a valuable country, which, for many years past has not been closely hunted. By including a few beaver traps to the most respectable hunters, bestowing small rewards upon the industrious, and urging upon all, the advantages to be derived from hunting, you will succeed in awakening among the natives a great degree of energy and enterprise than they now evince [Ibid.].

Roderick Finlayson, in command of the Victoria post, corroborated the contention that the Makah trade was evolving profitably. The traffic included sea otters, which were not being harvested by members of the tribe in their home waters, but rather were being gathered through exchanges with the tribes on Vancouver Island. In keeping with McLoughlin’s recommendations, Finlayson reported that

Every encouragement is being given to the Cape Flattery (Macca) Indians to bring furs to the Establishment, which no doubt prompted them to extend their field of enterprise along the Western Coast of the Island as far as Nootka, whence they procured the Sea Otters, brought by them here in October & concluding from the information I obtained from their previous intercourse with the

Natives of that distant quarter was comparatively trifling [Whitner: WSHS Files].

As best as they could but still not very successfully, the HBC attempted to assert control over the Makah trade. For example, Finlayson wrote John McLoughlin in October 1844, informing him that the Cape Flattery Indians had recently visited and while they were there they had revealed to the British that two whaling ships had stopped on their coast. Although HBC officials were want to do everything within their means to discourage the Makah—and Finlayson relayed the Indians' assurances to him that they had not sold skins to the whalers—the post commander placed little credence in their oaths. “Some American blankets were seen in their possessions,” he wrote [Whitner: WSHS Files]. In June of the following year, Finlayson confirmed his suspicions. “The Cape Flattery Indians paid us a visit a few days ago,” he recorded in his daily log, “and did not appear to be much encumbered with furs, having disposed of them previously to an American Whaler which lay for about two months at Neah Bay” [Ibid.]. Finlayson lamented the unavoidable potentiality—that “most likely others will call there in [the] course of the Autumn about the time the Indians return from their annual trip to Nootka” [Ibid.].

For their part, Makah traders were able to dictate the terms of their exchanges. When they arrived at Fort Victoria in June 1845 toting few furs to sell because much of what they had had already been dealt to American whalers, they promised Finlayson that they would “go to Victoria directly from Nootka on their way home when they go to Nootka in [the] fall” [Whitner: WSHS Files]. To the British, who were depending on the Makah for a great percentage of their intercourse, the pledge meant a lot. In this case their faith was rewarded. In early August, Finlayson wrote to McLoughlin conveying most welcome news: “The Cape Flattery Chief arrived with 4 canoes direct from Nootka, according to his promise when he last left this for that place, and I have just finished trading 6 large sea otters, 1 small & 10 beaver & otter from him and party. This last is not marked in the account of our trade” [Ibid.]. The Makah, Finlayson indicated, had retained in their possession about seventy gallons of oil and some hayquois. Those were stocks that he hoped to obtain as well.

The primary products of exchange were whale oil and sea otter peltry, the latter which were being procured at Nootka Sound by the Makah. Makah visitations to Fort Victoria were consistent in frequency and in substance. In mid-1846, the following transactions took place between them and the HBC. On May 22, two small sea otters as well as three beavers and other

small furs with some whale oil and hayquois were bartered. That was backed up on June 3 with one large sea otter pelt and some oil and hayquois. On June 15, the Makah traded one sea otter skin and seventy-five gallons of oil. Ten days later, it was seven beaver and otter pelts, a small sea otter skin, and 160 gallons of oil. On July 17, thirteen Makah canoes paddled in in the morning transporting some sea otter pelts and oil. Within forty-eight hours, the Makah had sold one large, five small, and two sea otter pup pelts along with about 150 gallons of oil. On September 28, the Makah landed again and another successful round of exchange ensued. Two adult and one pup skin of sea otter were put out as well as some oil. A week later, two Makah canoes came in. Those were hauling sea otter peltry, some miscellaneous furs, and oil [Whitner: WSHS Files].

Most Victoria trading took place in summer. Between the last visit in early October and July 1847, there were only two recorded transactions involving the Makah, on January 4 and 7 of the new year. Of the first, they “brought very little for trade.” Of the second, two canoes carried a cargo that consisted of one large beaver pelt [Whitner: WSHS Files].

And when the traffic did heat up, the Makah were as steadfast as ever in their determination to get the prices they wanted. On July 3, 1847, three Cape Flattery canoes floated in loaded with several sea otter skins. The occupants refused to release them for the number of two and one-half point blankets offered, although some smaller furs changed hands. According to HBC records, the Makah threatened to lug their peltry back to Cape Flattery rather than surrender them for less than what they thought they were worth. Ten days later the Makah were in Victoria again, trading several furs and a quantity of oil. Five days after that and at the same place, six canoes of Cape Flattery Indians exchanged additional furs and oil. On August 6, Cape Flattery Jack and another headman arrived in a single canoe. They traded seven sea otter and seven land otter pelts along with some other articles. Then, again, early in the morning on August 20, five Makah canoes landed. Two sea otter and a few land fur pelts as well as some whale oil were sold while, on September 12, another ten Makah canoes came in bearing sea otter peltry and oil. The next day, one hundred gallons of the oil was bartered, but not the sea otter skins “at the usual price” [Whitner: WSHS Files].

Makah-post trader relations sometimes deteriorated to the point of confrontation or even full-scale hostilities breaking out. An instance of the latter occurred in November 1847. Allegedly an Indian identified as from Cape Flattery was caught in the act of burglarizing the

storehouse at Fort Victoria. As punishment the man was whipped, which resulted in “a body” of the Makah tribe threatening “to attack the Post in retaliation.” To prevent that from happening and to demonstrate their loyalty to the British employees and to show their “special attachment” to the fort which, in fact, was sitting on their land, Songhees Indians “encamped within the range of the Bastions” took up arms against the Makah. Through their actions they blocked further escalation of the conflict [Bowsfield: 16].

By 1845, the fur trade—the “Great Fur Rush” in the words of the late historian Keith Murray and as it was known in the first half of the nineteenth century—was all but over in the region that encompassed the present-day state of Washington [Murray 1986: 28]. The fuel that had made it hum, peltry, had been worked to exhaustion. For all intents and purposes sea otters were gone. Harvestable beavers remained, but by the mid-1840s the felt top hat rage was merely a memory and those conditions necessary to stimulate the widespread pursuit of northern fur seals had not yet gained traction. Speaking to the miserable state of affairs was the cogent assessment of Lt. Charles Wilkes during his exploration of the Pacific Coast just a few years before mid-century. Having observed the trade from every angle and considered it from every vantage point, he came away with a dour conclusion: Only through an adherence to strict organization, economy, and system had the HBC been able to continue to turn a profit and, even at that, he described their operations as constituting at most a precarious proposition. The fur trade, he said, “as far as” he had been “enabled to gather from the happiest [participants], those engaged in it having fallen off 50 per ct indeed so as to make [it] scarcely worth while to follow it” [Meany 1925: 292; Mackie 1997: 244-56].



THE STEVENS TREATIES

AFTERNOON WAS FAST PASSING INTO CHILLING WINTER TWILIGHT. THE official delegation had been expected and now they were here. On January 28, 1855, in the large half-moon bay that lies directly north of the village of Neah, Washington Territory, a schooner tacked to shore. Onboard stood a cluster of men, none of them Makah to whom the totality of this faraway northwestern corner of the Olympic Peninsula belonged. The boatmen had come that Sunday possessed of an uncommonly heavy if not overwhelming burden: to hold council and negotiate a treaty that would extinguish and transfer to the United States all the land title that these Indians had to give. Foremost among those making landfall was Isaac Ingalls Stevens, he the indefatigable and the indomitable, the always enigmatic, the young governor and the ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs for the freshly formulated territory. Seven others rode with him, most notably the Indian agent assigned to the district as well as an interpreter of English and the Native languages and a secretary. The latter would perform an all-important duty: recording for the ages the words of the speeches as they were orated over the course of the diplomatic exchanges [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

That night the treaty commissioners bunked aboard their boat, but early the next morning the tents, provisions, presents, and all the goods and other gear were unburdened onto the beachhead and then packed to the council grounds where the talks would be held. In addition, the governor immediately dispatched to the other four Makah villages news of his arrival along with fervent invitations for them to come and partake in the negotiations. A similar alert was relayed farther down the coast, to yet another village. The members of that group were informed that their presence was needed as well. For no one was there a moment to waste. The council, with whoever finally showed up, was scheduled to get underway as early as the day after next and the object of the proceedings promised to be of the utmost importance. It would be through the pledges and initiatives embodied in the treaty document presented by Governor Stevens along

with the amendments and modifications teased out by the Indian delegations that the futures of the tribes would largely be cast [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Treaties, as contests of land, lines, and paper, comprise the founding, living documents of Pacific Northwest Indian and white relations. Emblazoned onto their parchments are the articles and clauses that protect existing rights and those that govern the affairs and preserve the sworn and sacred obligations solemnized between governments and nations [Harmon: 2009]. Unfortunately, for all their lofty bearing the Stevens treaties as they have come to be known, which include the Treaty of Neah Bay and four others entered into between the United States and the Indian nations of present-day western Washington State (and five more concluded east of the mountains), persist as some of the most misunderstood in the annals of American Indian legal history. Although they have been the objects of intense scrutiny and extensive litigation, some of their provisions, exacerbated by the erratic temperament and behavior of Stevens and crucial documentation that has been lost, continue to frustrate those charged with trying to make sense of them and render transparent the intentions of the federal government. But what can be known is this: in their treaty Makah headmen effectively lobbied for a legal guarantee of their right to pursue whales and to harvest fur seals at all usual and accustomed places (they were the only Indian nation in the United States to articulate such treaty language) while all the treaty or federally recognized tribes in western Washington—among them the Makah, the Quileute, the Quinault and many others—successfully realized the insertion of a similar declaration that pertained strictly to fish and shellfish [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

At Neah Bay Governor Stevens hardly waited for the official start of council. In fact, a good deal of the back and forth of treaty making took place on Tuesday evening, January 30, 1855, aboard his schooner. By then a large number of Makah had either walked or canoed in from the other villages and word from the furthest place had been received that they would not be in attendance. Short notice, coupled with the distance that separated them from Neah Bay, prevented them from getting there for another several days. For Governor Stevens, that was simply too long a delay for him to countenance. Instead he elected to exclude that group from the Makah council and add them to those parties he planned to meet with at his next negotiation, which was scheduled to get underway in just a few weeks at a site on the lower Chehalis River near Grays Harbor. The Neah Bay council, then, would consist solely of Makah, a turn of fortune that probably worked in that tribe's favor by allowing for a more sharpened focus around those

issues specifically relevant to them. Despite having been afforded almost no advance warning, and it is unclear the depth of what the Makah knew of Stevens' intentions after he got there, tribal leaders would be standing alone in this instance and, in the heat of the deliberations, forcefully arguing for their interests. The most immediate and pressing of those would be the essential necessity of erecting a wall of protection around many of their most cherished rights, specifically those that related to their seafaring culture, which had supported them for millennia [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

On the evening of his second day at Neah Bay, Stevens gathered the headmen of the Makah Nation aboard his schooner. Earlier that morning he and George Gibbs, the secretary of his negotiating team, had tramped out and crossed the peninsula of Cape Flattery to the coast in order to conduct a general examination of the area and select a suitable location for a reservation for the Makah tribe. Gibbs described this as a "separate reserve" to be set apart for them and "such others" as might be placed with them. Presumably Gibbs was referring to additional Indians located on the Olympic Peninsula, but Stevens may have at one time contemplated a reservation of sufficient dimensions at Neah Bay that it could be adapted as a general reservation to accommodate all the Indians of western Washington. Other possibilities in that regard had included Squaxin Island, Tulalip, and the Quinault River, but the final location was negotiated into a special article in the Point Elliott Treaty [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Despite the very real achievements if not outright victories of Stevens to that point, the situation at Cape Flattery presented a different dynamic and series of challenges from those that had been encountered thus far. At Neah Bay the Makah were living as a single unified tribe (of all the Stevens councils, Neah Bay was the only one to involve just one group) and they occupied a tract of that sat largely isolated from that of their neighbors. In the Pacific Northwest the Makah also enjoyed what ranked among the longest periods of sustained contact with non-Indians. Thus they were sure to prove tough, shrewd negotiators, the same as they had shown themselves to be in the sea otter and beaver trades and in the limited marketing that had been accomplished in northern fur seals. Perhaps setting a tone for their convention with Stevens, the Makah held a fast reputation among settlers and others as fierce warriors who expected none and would give no quarter [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

There were also cultural considerations. Like all Washington coast tribes, the Makah thought of the water as simply a seamless extension of their land base and they would assert their

sovereignty over the sea and its resources just as vigorously if not moreso than they would their beaches, prairies, and uplands. More than anything, they would aggressively lobby for the right to continue hunting whales and fur seals, those marine assets which were the grist for vital occupations that cut to the very core of their existence, lifeways, and culture and which could under no circumstances be placed in jeopardy or merely negotiated away [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

With that in view, the Makah had potentially the most to lose in the negotiations, that is, if Isaac Stevens could not be persuaded to agree to the specific economic terms the tribe would be seeking: to fish, to seal, to whale—in sum, to have the water as they had always had it. But the Makah might have had the most to gain. If the governor could be moved to grant their request to remain on tracts that fronted the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Pacific Ocean, and with the insertion into the treaty of a provision that would sustain and guarantee them in their right to have access over those watercourses, they would be forfeiting a good deal of their land base while preserving a viable and vibrant way of life almost in its entirety. It probably seemed a reasonable trade off and the best that could be hoped for. To lose control over the water and its resources would be to lose everything, an unthinkable outcome that would place in jeopardy the deep connections of the Makah to the ritual and the spiritual, to their religion, to the lifeblood of their economy, to a world that embodied and informed all that they knew and believed [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Stevens wasted no time, but neither did the Makah. Onboard the schooner on the evening before the official start of council, the governor convened with the headmen of the five confederated villages. The primary purpose of this preliminary caucus was so that Stevens could explain informally and also in some detail the various articles framed in the treaty. It was a strategy clearly intended to grease the skids for a quick acceptance of his terms in the formal session that would follow the next day. Stevens, while the headmen were with him on the schooner, sounded them out on what they would be seeking from him. And in questioning them, he was able to glean some valuable information. The Makah indicated that while they were on friendly terms with the Quileute, that was not the case with the Queets. Allegedly a Queets tribal member had killed a Makah a few years back, and although the Makah maintained that they “did not however cherish any animosity . . . [they] did not know the feelings of that tribe towards them” [WSIA 1855: 43-9]. For Stevens such intertribal animosities posed a threat, particularly if

all coast peoples were eventually to be consolidated onto one reservation located either at Neah Bay or somewhere else [Ibid.].

Stevens' explanation of the treaty followed the pattern of previous councils. He painted a brave face on what it was he was after. Assuring the villagers that the treaty had been crafted with their benefit in view, he informed them that they would be coming under the benevolent care and protection of the United States government, which he portrayed as something of a supernatural being possessed of almost mystical powers of which he—Stevens—was the physical embodiment. This so-called “Great Father had sent him to watch over the Indians,” he explained, and he (Stevens)

had talked with the other Tribes of the Sound, and they had promised to be good friends with their neighbors and he had now come to talk with the Makah. When he was done here he was going to the Indians on the Coast and would make them friends to the Makah. He had treated with the Puget Sound Tribes for their land, setting aside reserves for them, and had stipulated to give them a school, farmer & a physician when he had finished [WSIA 1855: 43-9].



Figure 20 Makah headman George of Tatoosh village in 1841. University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

His words spoke not so much to the here and now but to tomorrow and to the untold days that lay ahead. Working in lockstep, American-style education and agriculture—along with Christianity—would form the triple pillars of assimilation, the federal policy that would reign as the dominant force in Indian affairs for the next three-quarters of a century.

The first Makah to speak was Kalchote of Neah village. It

was proper and expected social protocol for him to introduce himself and to explain who he was

and how he had come to occupy the position he held. He performed the role eloquently and admirably. Three important headmen of the tribe, including the great seaman Flattery Jack, had recently died, Kalchote related, and it had only been upon their deaths that he had stepped into a leadership role. Despite the fact that Kalchote was only a “small” chief, he asserted that he was familiar with “the Country all around and therefore he had a right to speak” [WSIA 1855: 43-9]. And speak he did, making it known in no uncertain terms his intention to retain “his right to fish and take whales and get food where he liked.” To Stevens he confided his apprehension that if he “could not take halibut where he wanted, he would become poor.” K’ch-chook, who was from what was called the “Stone House” or Tatoosh Island, immediately seconded the thought. “What Kalchote had said was his wish,” he affirmed. His country extended east to the Hoko River and “he did not wish to leave the Salt Water” [Ibid.].

Stevens responded to these proclamations with what must have come to the headmen as a highly encouraging—if not electrifying—rejoinder. “[S]o far from wishing to stop their fisheries,” he divulged, “he intended to send them oil, kettles and fishing apparatus.” In the context of the overall thrust of federal Indian policy and as articulated in the language of the treaties, the support of the governor for Makah maritime operations might seem puzzling, but it was actually very much in keeping with the approach he employed in all councils. Realizing that a large percentage of tribal subsistence derived from the streams, the rivers, and the sea, he confirmed their right to fish at all “usual and accustomed” places so long as in accessing those areas non-Indian operations were not infringed upon. To have done otherwise would have jeopardized for Stevens any hope he had of success in any of the negotiations, but particularly so in the case of the Makah, a tribe that could boast such a longstanding and rich tradition of trading with whites. From Stevens the Makah were extracting the means to maintain and even grow in their stature as the leading commercial seafarers on the Pacific Coast. For his part, Stevens was insuring for the ongoing nutrition of the tribe, but with minimal monetary outlay being borne by the American government in doing so [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Next to speak was Klah-pe-at-hoo, another headman of Neah village. A brother of the third chief who had recently died, he was “sick at heart” over his personal loss. To Stevens, he stated, he was “willing to sell his land; all he wanted was the right of fishing” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

If doubt existed on how the Makah felt about the treaty, it was erased by Tse-hau-wtl of Osette who had been named by Stevens as head chief of the tribe, probably in the belief that if the leadership of this most distant village could be convinced to relocate, the others would fall similarly in line. Tse-hau-wtl opened with a blustery demand. “He wanted the sea! That was his country.” And that was not all Tse-hau-wtl wanted. “If whales were killed and floated ashore, he wanted for his people the exclusive right of taking them and if their slaves ran away, they wanted to get them back.” Whether Stevens realized it, and it is not clear that he did, the expectations of Tse-hau-wtl in reference to whales and slaves were consistent with long-embedded protocols pertaining to Makah property rights. According to those proprietary laws, if a whale beached on *his* shore, it belonged to *him* and the slaves that *he* held were *his* slaves [Lane 1972: 44-48; Rigsby 2008: 263]. Not totally comprehending what was being said (or then again, maybe he was), Stevens ignored Tse-hau-wtl, preserving the language written into the draft treaty that precluded the Makah from keeping or owning slaves. The governor simply replied that “he wanted them to fish but that the whites should fish also. Whoever killed the whales was to have them if they came ashore.” Stevens then reiterated what he said had brought him to Neah Bay in the first place: Many whites were immigrating “into the Country” and “he did not want the Indians to be crowded out” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Meanwhile Kalchote was making it clear that there would be no compromise on the maintenance of Makah fishing rights. Nor was he showing interest in removing off his land, although he was willing to give up a good chunk of it if he was able to keep the patch he was living on. “He wanted always to live on his old ground,” he insisted, “and to die on it. He only wanted a small piece for a house and would live as a friend to the whites and they should fish together.” Klap-pe-at-hoo added that he and Kalchote lived together and they “did not want to leave their old House.” The affirming words of Tse-kau-wtl rendered it unanimous: “He too only wanted his house.” Ke-bach-sat, of Tsuess village, was even more explicit. “My heart is not bad,” he assured the council, “but I do not wish to leave all my land. I am willing you should have half but I want the other half myself. You know my country. I want part for my village. It is very good. I want the place where the stream comes in.” Haatse, brother of Ke-bach-sat, said that “he was of the same mind” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

It-andaha of Waatch village was speaking. “My father, My Father!” he implored Stevens.

I now give you my heart. When any ships come and the Whites injure me I will apply to my father and will tell him of my troubles and look to him for help and if any Indians wish to kill me, I shall still call on my father. I shall submit all my difficulties to him; my wish is like the rest. I do not wish to leave the salt water. I want to fish in common with the whites. I don't want to sell all the land. I want a part in common with the whites to plant potatoes on. I want the place where my house is. We do not want to say much. We are all of one mind. I have no particular country myself. Mine and that of Tse-kau-wtl are the same [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Chiming in again was Kalchote: "I do not want you to leave me destitute. I want my house on the Island" of Tatoosh [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Although the Makah had presented a unified front, Governor Stevens must have been heartened by much that had transpired aboard the schooner. From the upshot of this preliminary deliberation which, symbolically, had been held on water and not on land, it became apparent that the success of the council would pivot around two central and interlocking themes: The first was the retention of all rights over their fisheries by the Makah. The second was the acquisition of a reservation by them that would include access to those fisheries but also encompass the villages and islands of their variegated Cape Flattery homeland. Stevens gave no immediate outward indication that he opposed either demand. As the evening wound down, a probe was conducted of the assembled headmen: "[I]f the right of drying fish wherever they pleased was left [to] them, could they not agree to live at one place for a winter residence and potato ground, explaining [to them] the idea of sub-division of lands." What he seemed to be implying was that the Makah could continue to fish in season, but the remainder of the year should be spent on their reservation. Stevens finished by encouraging the Makah "to think the matter over during the night" and it would be taken up again the next day in general council [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

On Wednesday, the last day of January, Stevens and his commissioners assembled the Makah for the start of the formal council negotiations. A census taken at the start of the proceedings enumerated six hundred members of the tribe, although it is unclear how many of that number were Makah sitting in attendance. Then, as promised, Stevens resumed the discussions of the previous evening. Attempting to draw a bright line under his intention to support Makah fisheries, he specifically cited their formidable reputation as whalers and he emphasized the point that a federal school would be provided for the education of the children.

But in order for the Makah to receive any of what it was he was offering, first they had to agree to and sign the treaty.

Governor Stevens addressed the council delegation:

My children, I have seen many other of my children before you. They have been glad to see me and to have the words of the Great Father. I saw the Great Father a short time since and he sent me here to see you and give you his mind. The whites are crowding in upon you and in the Great Father wishes to give you your homes. He wants to buy your land and give you a fair price but leaving you enough to live on and raise your potatoes. He knows what whalers, you are, how you go far to sea, to take whales. He will send you barrels in which to put your oil, kettles to fry it out, lines and implements to fish with. The Great Father wants your children to go to school and learn trades and this will be done if we agree to day. I am now about to read you a paper. If you like it, we will sign it. If it is good I shall send it to the Great Father and if he likes it he will send it back with his name [on it]. If he wants it altered he will let you know. When it is agreed to, it is a bargain [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

The treaty was read and “interpreted clause by clause and explained” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

What the Makah heard was that they would be forfeiting a huge expanse of their homeland in exchange for the guarantee of certain rights, privileges, and benefits. The treaty stipulated that a sizable square-shaped section would be ceded to the United States that extended some twenty miles from Cape Flattery eastward to the Hoko River and another fifteen miles south and which embraced the village of Ozette. The southern edge would bump up against the borders of Quileute country and the eastern cession would run to the just-established boundaries incorporated in the freshly-signed Point No Point Treaty. All five traditional Makah villages were demarked in the land transmission except one—Neah, where the negotiations were taking place. It and only it would be retained by the Makah. All islands—on both the coast and the Strait—were slated for absorption as well. Finally, and maybe most important, the Makah would receive supplies of goods of various kinds that were intended to strengthen and help preserve their maritime economy [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

When the translations were finished, Stevens queried the Makah whether “they were satisfied.” If they felt they were, he invited them to speak up and tell him so. If they were not, he told them “to answer freely and state their objections” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

Not everything read in the treaty correlated exactly with what had been expressed by Makah headmen on the schooner. But, according to the official record, not a single objection was raised. Tse-kau-wtl, the appointed Makah head chief, responded by carrying forward a white flag. In presenting that universal symbol of peace and friendship to Stevens, he avowed: “Look at this flag. See if there are any spots on it. There are none and there are none on our hearts.” Kalchote demonstrated his support for Tse-kau-wtl by producing a second flag, which he offered to the governor with the positive acknowledgment: “What you have said was good and what you have written is good” [WSIA 1855: 43-9].

The Makah further manifested their approval by giving three cheers, or shouts, at the conclusion of each set of speeches delivered by their headmen. Seizing on the opportunity thus presented, Governor Stevens readily affixed his name to the treaty document, an act which was followed by forty-two head and principal men of the tribe stepping up to the table and either touching the pen or crossing their marks. The seven members of the Stevens treaty commission signed their names as well [WSIA 1855: 43-9]. And, with that, the principal work was finished and preserved for all time as very much a done deal.

On schedule and shortly after the conclusion of the Makah negotiation, another treaty council followed at Grays Harbor which, among other names, is known as the Chehalis River treaty council. Drawing in the tribes and bands of southwestern Washington Territory in addition to those living on the central and lower Pacific Coast, the negotiations faltered after the interior tribes refused to agree to terms that mandated their removal to a reservation to be located on or near the Quinault River. For Stevens and for the aims of his treaty commission, the miscarriage at Grays Harbor posed a setback. More negotiations awaited—most notably at Walla Walla with the Yakama, the Walla Walla, the Cayuse, and the Umatilla and the Blackfoot council in Montana—but the governor was leaving in his wake a huge swath of western Washington Territory not under treaty and an Indian populace that was at best suspicious and at worst hostile to his proposals and intentions [Van Mechelen 2000-2004: 1-11].

At the Chehalis council, Stevens had tried to accomplish in one fell swoop the ultimate objective of all his treaty making: to consolidate all Indians—coastal as well as those of the interior—onto a single general reservation that most likely would have been established in the vicinity of where the Quinault reservation is located today. The southwestern Indians, more out of the way and isolated than the small tribes with whom Stevens had previously negotiated,

apparently did not warrant the small temporary reservations granted to others. But that did not mean that the governor was ready to abandon all hope of bringing those tribes under treaty. On the contrary, as he finalized preparations for councils planned east of the mountains, he set in motion the machinery to complete what had been started but had failed at Grays Harbor and what would end in a series of presidential executive orders that would leave a landscape remarkably similar to that which had been proposed in the first place by Indians on the ground at the Chehalis council.

In typical fashion, Stevens let little grass grow up under him in tying up loose ends. The north Pacific Coast tribes and bands had expressed their willingness to come under treaty and had, in fact, gone so far in the Chehalis negotiations as to sign a draft document presented to the delegations. Stevens, preoccupied in prepping for negotiations soon to get underway elsewhere, delegated responsibility to Michael T. Simmons, Indian agent for the Puget Sound District, for treating with the Quinault, the Quileute, the Hoh, and the Queets tribes. Stevens, before departing Olympia for the Yakama treaty council, instructed Simmons to secure an agreement with the headmen of those groups, but to postpone the required signature signing until his return to the capital, at which time an official deputation of Indian leaders would be invited there to participate in a formal ceremony to be held in his office [Richards 1993: 207-10].

Agent Simmons, in carrying out his diplomatic charge, adhered to the same approach utilized by Stevens in earlier councils. Minimal time was devoted to the talks and the treaty articles were treated largely if not strictly as non-negotiable. This was the case in a council that resulted in what came to be known as the Quinault River Treaty or more commonly, because the signing took place in the capital city seven months after it was agreed to on the ground, the Treaty of Olympia. Influencing Simmons in his decision-making was the fact that he was serving as a deputy of Stevens and doubtless felt constrained in that capacity in his authority to veer too far afield from the directives given him by the governor.

There was much to be done and treaty making was only one part. The Treaty of Olympia came about in the midst of a five-week-long tour of the recently-so-designated treaty tribes of western Washington Territory undertaken by Simmons to disperse goods and ascertain conditions and attitudes in the months that had elapsed since the conclusion of the earlier negotiations. The agent embarked on his journey on May 23, 1855, conducting a swing around

the Olympic Mountains that culminated on July 1 with the completion of the Quinault council [LRIA Simmons: 1856].

Accompanied by three “gentlemen” assistants, Simmons set out on June 25 from Neah Bay where he had been busy distributing supplies issued by the federal government in anticipation of Senate ratification of the Makah treaty. As had occurred in almost all jurisdictions that Simmons visited, the Makah had requested of him that practical goods be added to the annuities they would be receiving in the future. Specifically, they wanted iron pots, harpoons, pails, and lances [LRIA Simmons: 1856].

From the village of Neah Bay, the Simmons party expended five days negotiating their way to the mouth of the Quinault River where the council would be held. The very next day after their arrival—on July 1—the talks got underway and in a rather ominous fashion: Simmons reported that the treaty commissioners found themselves surrounded by several hundred Quinault men all brandishing “large knives in their hands,” although their foreboding presence, he soon came to realize, belied their true demeanors. Simmons said that the Indian delegations included “very few women” and despite the weaponry displayed, all appeared before him “very friendly.” Per custom a census was ordered with Simmons counting 130 old and 175 young men, twenty old and thirty young women, fifty boys, sixty-three girls and fifteen male and ten female babies. The number of Indians on the ground totaled 493, a figure that was not broken down by tribal affiliation [LRIA Simmons: 1856].

Following Stevens’ practice, Simmons engaged in the process of “commissioning” headmen, or chiefs, for the tribes. Taholah was named as the Quinault head chief while Kler-way-sr-hun, Wah-kee-nah, and Kne-she-guartsh were appointed as his subchiefs. In the delegating of roles, some overlap occurred from the earlier Chehalis council. In addition to Taholah, a Quinault named Hay-et-lite-’l or John, acting as a subchief of his tribe, signed both the Chehalis treaty document and the Treaty of Olympia as did Kepp or Kape. The Queets headman Hoo-yalt-see (Hoo-e-yas’lsee) participated in the Chehalis council, having signed that treaty as a subchief and also having attended the Quinault River negotiations and touched the pen to that treaty. For the Quileute, How-yat’l was appointed as head chief and Kal-lape and Tah-ah-ha-wh’t’l as subchiefs while Cla-kish-ka served as another important leader of that tribe. The Hoh tribe was represented by Ash-chak-a-wick and Hay-nee-si-oos, among others. One other Indian leader was listed as a subchief on the treaty document, but not linked to a tribe: Yer-ay-let’l. He

was possibly a member of the Quinault or the Quileute tribes, but may have been a Queets or Hoh headman [LRIA Simmons: 1856].

Nothing further is known in the federal treaty record of the Quinault River negotiation. Simmons, in his annual report for 1855, included the brief descriptions recited above, advising Stevens that a more detailed account of the proceedings had been attached to another document. That file was apparently detached by the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D. C. and has never been recovered. Extensive queries made by this author to officials of that federal repository have proved fruitless, as have inquiries to each of the tribal offices of the Indian groups involved. The minutes of the council negotiation are simply lost and no longer extant.

In substance, the Treaty of Olympia differed from the Makah treaty, the latter document providing an important point of comparison since the tribes in both negotiations resided on the coast and shared similar traditions, histories, and methods of resource utilization. Whereas the Makah had managed to have an article inserted into their treaty dealing with whaling and fur sealing, no such clause was included in the Quinault River Treaty, although “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations” was “secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing the same; together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on all open and unclaimed lands” [Kappler 1904: 719].

The Quinault River council tribes agreed to surrender a huge reach of land that extended all the way to Makah country in the north, Chehalis territory in the south, the Pacific Ocean in the west and the middle of the Olympic Mountain Range in the east. In return, the Indians reserved for their exclusive use and occupation

a tract or tracts of land sufficient for their wants within the Territory of Washington, to be selected by the President of the United States, and hereafter surveyed or located and set apart for their exclusive use, and no white man shall be permitted to reside thereon without permission of the tribe and the superintendent of Indian affairs or Indian agent [Kappler 1904: 719].

Although neither its dimensions nor location were specified in the treaty, a ten-thousand-acre reservation was established in 1861 at the mouth of the Quinault River after Senate ratification of the treaty in 1859, an area that was expanded by presidential executive order to

220,000 acres in 1873 and set aside for the Quinault, the Quileute, the Queets, the Hoh and other fish-eating tribes living on the Pacific Coast. Meanwhile, in February 1889 another presidential executive order created the one-mile square Quileute reservation at La Push, a decree that four years later in 1893 was followed by a third presidential-executive-order reservation for the Hoh tribe [Ruby, Brown, and Collins: 127-30; 243-4].

As planned, the official signing of the Quinault River Treaty took place in the governor's office in Olympia on January 26, 1856. Four principal leaders and their subchiefs were invited. Taholah represented the Quinault, How-yat'l the Quileute (with two assistants), Hoo-yalt-see the Queets, and Ash-chak-a-wick the Hoh. Thirty-one Indian signatures were affixed to the treaty, although the name How-yat'l appeared on the document twice, possibly the result of that headman having signed at both the Quinault River treaty council and in Olympia [Kappler 1904: 721].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING BACKGROUND AND BEGINNINGS

WITHIN LESS THAN TWO DECADES AFTER GOVERNOR STEVENS completed his whirlwind treaty tour across western Washington Territory, fur-seal hunting burst forth onto the scene as a productive commercial enterprise among Olympic Peninsula tribes with the Makah, the Quileute, and the Quinault coming to be especially and uniquely involved along with the Queets, the Hoh, and the S'Klallam, although there is considerably less documentation on the participation of the latter three groups. In fact, throughout much of the assimilation period (dating roughly from 1860 to 1932), pelagic sealing constituted the primary revenue producer of Washington coast Indians as well as their principal

economic resource. As one Neah Bay official bluntly put it, “the chief obstacle in the way of the agent, while endeavoring to carry out the wishes of the [national] government, in leading the Indians to the cultivation of their lands, is the sealing business” [ARCIA 1882: 215]. Nor could other subsistence activities compete. “So



Figure 21 Coastal Indians in a dugout sealing canoe. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

lucrative for the Makah and West Coast native hunters” became fur sealing, concluded one historian, that “their traditional whaling expeditions virtually ceased” as a consequence [Webb 1988: 145]. The U. S. Indian inspector W. J. Pollock fittingly remarked that “seal catching is to these Indians what the Buffalo chase formerly was to those on the plains,” while another federal official gushed that he thought “per capita, these [Makah] Indians make as much money as any tribe west of the Rocky Mountains” [ARCIA 1886: 453]. Although the pursuit of fur seal as both a food source and a trading article by the Makah (and likely for the other tribal groups too) stretched back farther than whaling by maybe two millennia, activity heightened between 1869 and 1896 [Jupp 1967: 87-8]. In what was not an unprecedented but certainly an unusual occurrence in Indian and white relations in the late nineteenth century in the United States, members of the tribes became small-scale entrepreneurs, assertively hiring non-Indians to labor on the schooners that they owned [Collins 1996: 180-93].

Commercial sealing got underway at Neah Bay as a symbiotic relationship forged between Makah and American fishermen. In 1869, white schooner owners enlisted tribal members to accompany them to the Bering Sea for the first time. It was a monumental shift that transformed the nature of fur hunting on the Washington coast, renewing if not extending an economic relationship of longstanding among two races—Indian and white—that dated back nearly a century. In describing the arrangement, a Neah Bay agent commented:

The schooners engaged in this trade take from eight to sixteen canoes on board, each canoe manned by two Indians, and cruise on the sealing-grounds, coming into harbor only when the weather is bad, their trips ranging from two to eight days in length [ARCIA 1880: 277].

Native American sealers also harvested their home waters off Cape Flattery and the Strait of Juan de Fuca and they hunted herds migrating north between the Columbia River and Barkley Sound. Wages depended on the quantity and quality of the furs obtained along with the going rates for peltry. Often earning handsome salaries, Makah and other Indian crewmembers received two-thirds of the catches and schooner operators one-third. Annual incomes of twenty to thirty thousand dollars for the Makah tribe as a whole—or sometimes that amount even for individual sealers—were not uncommon or unexpected.

The genesis of the commercial industry traces back not to La Push and Taholah or even to Cape Flattery and Neah Bay, but rather to Victoria, British Columbia. At that place it was

reported that as much as four-fifths of the entire sealing fleet of some one hundred small schooners was based. The kingpins and those earliest pioneers in bringing industrial fur sealing to the Pacific Northwest coast were a trio of Victoria businessmen. Captains William Spring and Hugh McKay, having gotten their start in the early 1850s, established several trading posts on the west side of Vancouver Island. Those were frequented by local Indian hunters who canoed in quantities of fur seal pelts and some few sea otters to barter. In tandem with another sealing captain, J. D. Warren, Spring and McKay documented “impressive” herds of fur seals appearing off the Pacific Coast that in 1868 “they induced the Indians to make more of a specialty of catching” [Wright 1895: 425].

To encourage that result, Spring and McKay introduced into the business two schooners, the *Surprise* and the *Alert*, with Captain Warren tailing on their heels with another schooner named the *Kate*. The next year, opposite Port Angeles at Sooke, British Columbia, Captain Spring had a fourth schooner built, the *Favourite*. More than any other vessel, that craft came to be identified with the Pacific Northwest commercial fur-sealing trade. First envisioned as a cod fishing boat in the Sea of Okhotsk and later employed in the Honolulu salmon trade and after that operating as a lumber transport between Victoria and California ports, the *Favourite* was placed into the sealing service in 1874 under the command of Captain Laughlin McLean. Holding distinction until 1894 as the only British sealer to remain unmolested by American revenue cutters the *Favourite*, according to one source, achieved unparalleled financial successes. Reputedly it was her accomplishments that above all else “demonstrated the possibilities” of fur sealing as a viable commercial enterprise [Wright 1895: 426; Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8].

The floodtide of industry hoisted up vast opportunities from which iconic reputations could be made. For his exploits, Captain Spring was destined to have his name memorialized as “the first man to engage successfully in the sealing business in British Columbia,” and he was also the first broker to employ white men as hunters of fur seals in the Bering Sea [Wright 1895: 426; Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8]. In addition, he orchestrated what came to be known as the MacLean experiment, an unscientific test undertaken to determine the relative suitability of employing Indian and non-Indian sealing crews. In preparation for that exercise, he commissioned the *Mary Ellen* under Captain Dan McLean with a squad consisting of all white hunters and the *Favourite* under Dan’s younger brother, Captain Alex McLean, utilizing only

Indians. The death of Captain Spring during the course of the trial necessitated his eldest son taking charge who completed an investigation that revealed no discernable difference in the merits of the two teams of sealers [Ibid.]. With all indicators pointing in such a positive trajectory, the Victoria business community responded accordingly. Captain Hugh McKay, under the various business partnerships he molded in the final five years of his life (he died in 1882), owned the *Alert* and the *Caroline* while independently he operated the *Onward* and then finally the *Alfred Adams*. For his part, Spring's 1884 fleet of sealers included the *Kate*, the *Onward*, the *Alfred Adams*, and the *Favourite* [Ibid.].

So too, individual sealers amassed celebrated names for themselves, none of which loomed any larger than that of those same MacLean brothers. Born in Sydney, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, Daniel and Alex both mined the Pacific Coast and Alaska sealing grounds throughout much of the 1880s and '90s. The potential profitable nature of fur-seal hunting



became apparent to Daniel after he migrated to the region on a prospecting cruise while, for Alex, it was his involvement in transportation and communications operations, mostly in British Columbia.

Figure 22 Quileute Indians with northern fur seals on the Washington coast. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

However, according to the biographer of Alex MacLean, there was a deeper purpose animating the maritime activities of the two men. For some three years, Alex and Dan MacLean surveyed “the wider picture on the Pacific coast, separately working on various vessels and at varied occupations. It seems as if they were searching for an opportunity that had so far been overlooked, some activity to which they could direct their considerable energies and talents” [MacGillivray 2008: 17]. The opening they were seeking came in the form of the commercial

fur-sealing industry and it would turn out to be Alex's daring feats on the high seas that generated the grist for the cruel and brutish antagonist Wolf Larsen in Jack London's psychological adventure novel, *The Sea-Wolf*.

While the niche carved out by Canadian interests was consequential and impossible to ignore, few questioned that the greatest of the fur sealers hailed from other locales, most especially Neah Bay and the Cape Flattery region of the outer Northwest coast. Those were the hunters of the Makah tribe. Not only were they acting on what they trusted to be a long-established treaty right, they demanded a level of hard-earned respect that extended across the nation and even traversed international boundaries. "From the first the Makah Indians have been active participants in this industry," bragged one federal official, "and that tribe furnishes some of the most skillful hunters employed in the business—men who have both an inherited and acquired knowledge of the pelagic habits and movements of fur seals" [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 251].

To match the alluring prospect that pervaded the entirety of the Pacific Coast required considerable means, manpower, and drive with each divvied up in proper proportion. In 1869, a date so pivotal and one permanently etched into the history of the development of the fur-seal trade, there was limited hunting taking place in Alaska, at least in relation to the overall stocks teeming there for harvest, a situation that has been attributed to the small human population native to the region and therefore the number of workers available, able, and willing to wage the hunts. The main fur-seal rookeries of St. George and St. Paul islands fell under the exclusive



Figure 23 Schooners of the Canadian sealing fleet, Victoria Harbor, 1894.
University of Washington Digital Archives Collection, Seattle, Washington.

purview of a single commercial entity, the Hutchinson, Kohl & Company of San Francisco (to be renamed the Alaska Commercial Company) which, to native hunters, was remunerating between twenty and

forty cents per seal pelt, compensation that was dispersed in groceries and goods while the going rate for prime sea otter was topping out high end at forty dollars a skin. The physical destination of all fur seal peltry at that time was London by way of San Francisco where the best coats were returning forty shillings sterling apiece (approximately ten dollars in American currency), but with small pup skins garnering maybe a third of that amount. Between 1868 and 1869, Hutchinson, Kohl & Company shipped 190,000 fur seal pelts to San Francisco and a total of 269,400 fur seal skins passed through that major port on their exit to Great Britain, some of which (the exact tally was not documented) originated from Cape Flattery and were considered premium-quality stock commensurate in grade to that mined from Alaska and valued at between four and five dollars in gold coin per pelt [ARCIA 1869: 615-6].

The business evolved in sudden, incremental bursts. Indian sealers first began purchasing schooners of their own around 1880, eighteen years after the establishment of the Makah reservation and eleven years after coastal Indians set out working on non-Indian-owned vessels. In just a thirteen-year span, Makah Indians acquired at least ten sealing schooners, those ranging in size from twenty-five to fifty tons burden. James Claplanhoo, the hereditary head chief of the Makah tribe, owned a trio of vessels, the *Deeahks*, the *Puritan*, and the *Lottie*. Three tribal members, Chestoqua Peterson, Peter Brown, and John Taiusut (also Talnsub), threw in together and bought the *Columbia* (rated the best boat in the fleet) as well as the seized schooner *Anna Beck* that the sealers rechristened the *James G. Swan*. Sub-chief Lighthouse Jim had the *C. C. Perkins* and Albert Koatslanhoo the *Mary Parker*. The schooner *Emma Felix* was owned by Iniz Woodard and the schooner *August* belonged to Webahart




Figure 24 A Quileute fur-seal hunter prepares to launch a harpoon from his canoe in the Pacific Ocean. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

of Ozette. Yet another schooner, also named the *August*, was the joint property of Klahost and Schuyler Colfax [Costello 1895: 121].

Fur sealing relied on a synchronicity of human and animal endeavor. Hunters organized their annual rounds around the multifaceted demands of the harvests. Each year in the months of November and December this fleet of about ten vessels was rigged out for the upcoming sealing season and by January when in most years northern fur seals had embarked on their ritual passage off Cape Flattery, the crafts were out on the ocean running south along the coast to the Columbia River, tracking and harvesting the herd all along the route of its northern migration. But that hardly encompassed the extent of the field of operations. The Makah drove their vessels as far north as Alaska—that is where the bulk of the furbearers were—and they also hauled to Japan gaining, wherever they went, an intimate knowledge of the fur-sealing grounds but, to their consternation, having to employ non-Indian navigators on longer excursions. The Makah considered the latter a handicap that they hoped soon to rectify by having that skill taught to their older children in the federal boarding school on the reservation [Port Angeles Democrat and Leader: 1893].

There were other factors that remained outside the ability of fur sealers to control, not the least of which was weather. Meteorological conditions exerted a tremendous impact on the

behavior of fur seals as well as on the wherewithal of Indian hunters to get to and capture them. Compounding the problem was the fact that the fur seals were flirting along a coast known for producing among



Figure 25 Hunters off the Pacific Coast in dugout canoe. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

the most damaging of storms. The animals, migrating off Washington in the dead of winter and maintaining that run through the spring months, often enjoyed the protection of Mother Nature when the threat to body and boat simply boded too extreme for the Indians to drop their canoes [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 175].

Wind speeds and their directions were crucial elements of the hunts. For example, in general terms the sealing season commenced off Cape Flattery as early as in late December and usually concluded around the first of June. Strong easterly winds, however, coupled with heavy winter snows, tended to delay the appearance of the herds which, in some years, might not reach the Olympic Coast until as late as the middle of February or even the first of March. Southerly and southwesterly gales, in contrast, drove the seals closer to the shoreline and in “incredible numbers” [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 175]. But the gusts could also produce a counter effect, pushing the seals farther out to sea and preventing the schooners from getting off safely in pursuit of them. Most seals went all the way to the Bering Sea, but not all did, and Indian hunters took peltry throughout the entirety of the north Pacific coast from Queen Charlotte Island to Unimak Pass and other western openings into the Bering Sea, while some seals traveled only as far as Dixon’s Entrance where they were killed by Native hunters and skinned and their coats were sold to traders [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 175].

There was no skirting around it. Even with the backing of a formidable armada, the industry posed considerable risk to those willing to assume it. Hazardous weather could separate Indian canoes from the parent boat, thereby exposing crews to frightening conditions. “The prosecution of this industry at sea requires all the courage and skill which can be brought to bear on it,” documented a comprehensive report in 1895.

The canoes often find themselves far from the supporting schooner, and should bad weather or one of the frequent fogs of the northern part of the west coast set in, it may be difficult or impossible for them to regain her with ease. Several instances are known where Indian hunters out off the west coast of Vancouver Island have entirely lost the supporting schooner in fogs, and have only regained the distant shore after suffering great hardships [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 103].

When schooners were able to steer out they journeyed anywhere from twenty to fifty miles or more off the Pacific Coast in search of the advancing herds. The vessels, laden with numerous Indian canoes attached to a wooden platform especially rigged to hold them and

carrying a crew that could number as many as thirty Indian men, would continue trolling seaward until finally overtaking the fur seals, at which point the schooner would go quiet and still. The canoes were then lowered and launched off the main boat [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 102-3].

Holding two rowers and one hunter each and packed with spears, rifles, or perhaps a shotgun, the smaller crafts were stealthily rowed or paddled in the direction of the prey until near enough that the hunter could squeeze off a good shot. No doubt it was an occupation that benefited from inordinate patience and a faulty memory. According to one source, fully 90 percent of the time the thrust or round landed without effect, but in those instances when the projectile did find its mark, the injured and suffering animal instantly dived under the water for protection or, when the wound proved mortal, its body slowly began to sink below the surface. Meanwhile, the rowers were busily muscling the canoe closer to the kill site in order to be able to attach a line and heave the carcass into the boat. Because automatic firearms obviously produced a much louder concussion than the low whoosh of wooden spears, usually only a limited number of fur seals could be taken at a single site, sometimes just one or two. But it was not unheard of for upwards of thirty to be killed in a hunt [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 103].




Figure 26 Sealing canoe with outfit and catch off the schooner *Dora Siewerd*. University of Washington Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

In 1880, James G. Swan described a fur-seal hunt by Makahs undertaken by three hunters manning a single canoe paddling out to where the animals were found. After the incorporation of schooners, the technique changed little other than that

the canoes were transported to the harvest grounds in industrialized fashion and were now occupied by two sealers.

After a strong wind and the accompanying heavy sea have subsided, the seals lie on their backs in the water and sleep. Then the Indians cautiously and quietly approach them, and selecting a victim, silently paddle near enough to thrust the spear deeply into its body, and at once withdrawing the pole, leave the barbs embedded in its flesh, sometimes killing it outright, but often only wounding it; the barbed spear-head, however, holds fast, the line is quickly hauled in, and the seal knocked on the head with the club. They smash in every seal's skull, whether it has been killed by the spear or not, and so universal is this practice that although I have repeatedly offered to pay Indians liberally for a perfect skull, I have been unable to procure a single specimen [Swan 1887: 395].

Like all entrepreneurs, Indian hunters sought to maximize their profits. Having their own vessels and no longer obligated to share the proceeds of their labors and now better equipped to compete with their white counterparts, Makah sealers worked and their revenues soared. The tribal head chief Peter Brown owned three schooners in 1893 and was said to be worth one hundred thousand dollars. An Indian inspector, in reporting annual individual incomes as high as five thousand dollars, considered it doubtful in March 1894 “whether a given number of whites can be found who earn a better living” [Collins 1996: 185]. Another inspector learned that the “catch of seal is quite large, and the revenue derived from these resources is quite large and they all have plenty of money; far more than if they attempted to make a living by farming their reserve” [Ibid.]. In the 1980s an elderly Makah told an interviewer: “My mother said we [Makah] always had gold coins in our pockets” [Kirk 1986: 225]. Similarly, seventy-five-year-old Frank Smith, the son of a Makah who owned financial interest in a schooner, recalled his father saying that on “paydays seal hunters had to pack their money home in satchels because their pockets couldn't hold it all” [Smith Interview: 1995].

Prosperity did not necessarily equate to progress, at least in terms of how that concept was conceived in some quarters. The complex set of dynamics that complicated relations on all reservations pulled the Indians in two seemingly diametric directions, opposing poles that necessitated them having to satisfy the proscriptions of federal Indian policies on the one hand and meeting the practical realities of making a living and survival on the other. Enrollment of young men in the reservation schools, for example, did not preclude them from growing up and

going on and becoming prominent fur sealers. Swan, a government teacher and federal worker assigned to Neah Bay, recorded in his diary that the aforementioned James Claplanhoo—whom he accurately described as the principal headman of the Makah tribe—had lived intimately among the staff of the Indian agency from boyhood until the time of his marriage [Costello 1895: 121]. Claplanhoo bought a pilot boat named the *Lottie* that had been wrecked and after that he purchased two additional schooners, the *Deeahks* for thirty-one hundred dollars and the *Emmet Felix* for two thousand dollars. According to Swan, Claplanhoo's eldest son, Jongie James, became the captain of the sealing schooner *Deeahks*, while his oldest daughter Minnie married Chestoqua Peterson, "one of the smartest young men in the tribe, a graduate of the Indian school, who owns the sealing schooner *Columbia* and is a regular trader" [Ibid.]. Characterizing the Makah as a "self-supporting and thrifty tribe," Swan beamed that they possessed the "most expert surfmen" that he had seen [Ibid.]. In 1862 he had reported that the Makah were hunting only in their redcedar dugout canoes. But all that changed, he asserted, after he and officials of the Indian Office began encouraging them to acquire larger commercial vessels, which they did [Ibid.].

Fur-seal hunting demanded a level of technology and expertise proportional to the wealth of the resources they were designed to harness. Enjoying full access to and holding dominion over one of the most expansive and varied fisheries to be found anywhere—not only in the United States, but in the world—the Makah came to be involved along multiple extractive and marketing lines, such economic diversification serving as an insurance against the unreliability of the catches and the continually fluctuating demand for peltry. As it always had, the tribe harvested a great complexity of marine resources which, in addition to northern fur seals, included whales, halibut, salmon, ling, black, and true cod, sea lions, and varieties of rock fish. As one source has put it, the sealers and fishermen of the tribe demonstrated in their occupations "a spirit of enterprise which could be emulated by white communities with profit" [Port Angeles Democrat-Leader: 1893]. Fur seals, taken from as far as twenty to thirty miles and further off the coast of Cape Flattery, were pursued strictly in canoes until 1869. White schooner owners then undertook hiring Indian crews using Indian dugouts to participate in the increasingly mechanized harvests, those which were employing larger, safer, and more comfortable crafts.

The earliest days of industrial fur sealing on the Washington coast are not easy to piece together, although the general outline is there. There is little unanimity among either those

individuals who were on the coast in the second half of the nineteenth century when commercial fur-seal hunting got underway or in the scant documentation that has been left describing their actions. In the recollection of Swan who resided at Neah Bay during some of the period, the first schooner to have taken Makah Indians and their canoes on seal hunts was the *Lottie*; it apparently coasted out of the harbor at Neah Bay in 1869, Peter Thompson captain. Charles Spring of Victoria, however, while in agreement with Swan on the year of this major technological shift, thought that it had been the schooner *Surprise* piloted by a man named Captain James Christensen that initiated “the first attempt, in a practical way, with schooners and Indian hunters,” to harvest seals in Pacific Northwest coastal waters [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 151; Smith n. d. (a): 2; Jupp 1967: 87-8].

But other recollections contradict even that chain of events. As it was asserted by another elderly fur sealer, pelagic sealing was undertaken in schooners for the first time in the spring of 1866 by Captain Hugh MacKay in the little sloop *Ino*, but it was soon discovered that this vessel was too small to carry the canoes and crew necessary to conduct the harvests. So MacKay proceeded with the construction of a new boat, the seventy-five-ton *Favourite*, which was registered at Victoria on June 18, 1868. A year later, the first schooner to encumber Indian crews was said to be the *Lottie*, based out of Neah Bay, although an additional ship, the *Surprise*, had been launched around the same time from Victoria. The Indian hunters manning that schooner had been recruited from Pachena on the southwest coast of Vancouver Island near the entrance of the Strait of Juan de Fuca [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 151; Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8].

Yet another sealing captain stationed at Neah Bay postulated that it had been still another vessel, the schooner *Potter* and dating back as far as 1861, that had been the first to utilize Indian crews and canoes, although this recollection was roundly discounted by contemporaries who later remembered that the destination point of the *Potter* had been the halibut banks off Cape Flattery and not the sealing grounds located dozens of miles offshore. Whichever schooner was in the lead in involving Olympic Peninsula sealers, in the memory of Swan the principal market for Indian peltry remained Victoria, at least through a good portion of the second half of the nineteenth century and, interestingly, the *Lottie* was afterward sold to James Claplanhoo, the head chief of the Makah tribe and remonikered by him as the *James G. Swan*.

In slightly over two decades the industry expanded from a few rigs to a full flotilla. At the conclusion of the 1891 fiscal year, the north Pacific sealing fleet consisted of seventy-nine total vessels. The majority (forty-seven) sailed under a British or Canadian standard and another thirty were under American ownership. All the schooners had been constructed in North America, the British-Canadian ships mostly in Nova Scotia but some in British Columbia, while the American schooners had been manufactured predominantly in Massachusetts with a few originating from San Francisco and Puget Sound [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 245; Smith n. d. (a): 1-2, 6-8].

No matter the circumstances by which it came about, the fleet had quickly expanded to at least three schooners, and that remained the status quo from roughly 1871 to 1878, with that trio of boats operating off the west coast of Vancouver Island, participating in the fur-seal harvests, and trading for additional peltry with local tribes. Then, in 1879, the number of sealing schooners rose to four or five and in 1882 another milestone was reached when auxiliary steam power was installed in two of the vessels. That year the flotilla increased to eight and to nine in 1883 and eleven in 1884 after the introduction of the *Mary Ellen* in the Bering Sea in June (she stayed there until the end of August) being the first recorded instance of a British Columbia schooner having done so [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 151-2].

The size of the fleet remained on the increase. There were thirteen British Columbia sealing schooners in 1885, eighteen in 1886, seventeen in 1887, twenty-one in 1888, twenty-two in 1889, twenty-nine in 1890, and fifty in 1891. Statistics on American vessels are less available and reliable, but it is estimated that there were thirty-two in 1889, fourteen in 1890, and forty-two in 1891 [Behring Sea Commission 1892: 152-4].

They had not come cheap. The largest capital investment of sealmen rested in their schooners, consuming over half of the total expenditure of the average operator. In the aggregate, the seven Cape Flattery-based rigs were valued at \$16,600 with another \$3,850 having been expended on apparatus and rigging (principally boats, guns, and ammunition). Cash and credit capital composed another \$2,325 while outfitting, which included fuel, provisions, and money set aside for repairs, amounted to another five thousand dollars [Census Bulletin 1891: 1, 15-18].

While they constituted a significant monetary outlay for tribal hunters, it would be a mistake to overstate the nature or stature of the sealing schooners. In the estimation offered by one source, “the vessels employed in the seal fishery from Puget Sound and vicinity” were “small, roughly constructed, cheap craft, such as would scarcely command crews from many of

the Atlantic ports” [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 251] In fact, one New England captain testified before the Senate Committee on Relations with Canada that he had not seen a single craft on the Washington coast capable of enticing a full crew of Gloucester sealmen [Ibid.]. In cost, pelagic fur sealing schooners averaged between six and eighteen hundred dollars, each with another two thousand dollars put into fitting them out. All “schooner-rigged” craft carried “large crews and many boats,” which were “chiefly of two types, one introduced by the New England fishermen and the other a native dugout canoe” [Ibid.].

As in all things sea otters dominated, but by the decade of the 1870s the peltry of northern fur seals was coming into fashion. As an indication of that, miners, after hitting the mark in the goldfields of Nevada and California, typically reserved as one of their first purchases a coat fashioned of the skin, which was meant to serve as a statement of one’s status and standing. In colorful phrases, the local press extolled the true importance and best uses of a prime fur-seal coat. “A seal skin is the most valuable and useful adjunct to domestic comfort and to matrimony that the world knows . . . Let her put on a seal skin [coat] and everyone takes a look at her, and even turns back to take another . . . It puts the work girl on an absolute equality with the Nob Hill heiress. I have known a whole family of girls comfortably married off by judicious manipulation of a sealskin” [MacGillivray 2008: 27]. Fur-seal coats were worn by both sexes and sold for one hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars per garment.

Although there was considerable money to be had in the fur-seal industry, it was by no means a sure bet. In fact, the investments of sealers could exceed the revenues returned. With the eventual introduction of national and international regulation, fur seals were also seen in a different light. They were re-visioned as an off-limits attraction that could bestow a relative fortune on those willing to hazard the risk, but could just as quickly portend disaster for those undertaking the attempt and getting caught. So tenuous could be the profits in pelagic sealing that it prompted one observer to take note of “the financial hazard involved,” asserting that “few fisheries are more uncertain as to results” [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 250-1]. In the words of this onlooker, “the fact that vessels, catch, and all have sometimes been placed in jeopardy by the fishermen venturing to push their hunt into the waters of Bering Sea, from which they were excluded by law,” and although a “lucky” vessel occasionally managed to secure a large monetary sum for the capital invested and the time expended, “quite as often the financial results have not been very profitable” [Ibid.]. Nonetheless, he concluded, the possibility of being

the “lucky one” tempted “many to engage in the business from year to year; while others have followed this fishery so long that they have nothing better to do, and each season finds them starting out on a voyage as a matter of course” [Ibid.].

Another factor in the initiation of fur sealing off the Olympic Coast—and at least a partial explanation for why there are few if any extant accounts of hunting having occurred before the turn of the century—can be tied to one development that trumped all others. For reasons not fully understood, the population of animals off the north Pacific Coast and west of Washington Territory, near Cape Flattery and the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Vancouver Island, swelled dramatically around or just after the midway point of the nineteenth century. First coming to the attention of potential hunters in the decade of the 1860s, the larger size of the fur-seal herds was widely known by the early 1870s. In the 1868-1869 season it was reported that in comparison to previous runs fur seals were very abundant along the coasts of Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia. That trend deepened and expanded in succeeding years. A prominent official of the HBC documented in 1872 that “Very great and entirely unprecedented number of seals off Vancouver Island and the entrance to Fuca Strait, chiefly grey pups and yearlings” [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 201].

Coinciding with the expanding number of fur seals occupying Pacific waters was a growing market for such peltry. By the mid-nineteenth century the world glut in fur seal skins had become so acute that in 1865 there was an attempt to sell the entire stock to a hat manufacturer for processing into felt. But the nadir that had been reached quickly subsided and after the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, a revived interest started to coalesce, creating “a sudden increase in the demand for Fur Seal coats throughout the European Capitals, and commercial centres of Europe and



Figure 27 Indian hunter aboard a sealing canoe. Shown is a double-pointed spear pole, detaching spear points with thirty yards of line, a paddle, a killing club, and a wooden canoe bailer. The image was taken in 1898 on the schooner *Favourite*. University of Washington Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

America, especially New York, Philadelphia and San Francisco where money was plentiful” [Spring 1927: 1].

As the size of the harvests grew, the sealing fleets settled into an established pattern that depended on everything being at the ready and at the proper moment, which varied slightly from year to year due to fluctuations in conditions. Early in the season, which could range from January to April based on the appearance of the herds, vessels coasted out of their homeports with many cutting through the Strait of Juan de Fuca before pushing into the high seas. Tacking sharply south, the sealers then plied their way to a point near the Farallon Islands off the coast of San Francisco. From there they tracked the herds north and oftentimes, if the sealing proved satisfactory, employed shuttles to drop off their catches at Victoria, Port Townsend, or Seattle before refitting and returning back to the harvest fields and the migrating herds. At the height of the industry, relay ships were deployed, which shadowed the sealing fleets. Functioning as mobile, floating fur depots, their purpose was to eliminate all possible interruption to the harvests [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 253]. In the Arctic north of the Bering Strait, these ships were called “tenders” [Bockstoe 2009: 337].

Schooner crews divided into two categories of sealers, boat pullers and hunters, who occupied the smaller non-mechanized crafts—usually canoes—dispatched from the parent vessel. The two boat pullers on each rig earned about half the wages of hunters, the former typically receiving a set amount of twenty-five dollars a month and a bonus of ten cents for each seal taken by the triple-manned boats. The lone hunter was paid at a rate of \$1.50 for each pelt. Numbering eighteen to twenty-nine men and women per schooner, the crews also varied in the weaponry they employed. Before the introduction of restrictive legislation, white hunters used automatic firearms and Indians guns and spears. One ship’s crew in 1888 went so far as to take the novel step of fitting out their schooner with three large gill nets—those which had a total length of 350 fathoms and an overall thickness of three feet with a ten-inch mesh—but the experiment proved disappointing. Two crewmembers were lost at sea and the nets managed to pull in a meager 337 fur seals, an inferior catch in comparison to the average of 550 animals captured by other vessels that season [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 253-4].

To initiate contact with the seal herds required Indian sealers to venture far from their home ports of Neah Bay, La Push, and other coastal stations. Simply to catch up to the animals migrating off Cape Flattery could involve as much as an eighty-mile journey, one way. James

Claplanhoo, for example, reported that he traveled that distance while another hunter, Bowachup, said he usually went ten to eighteen miles off Cape Flattery. Peter Brown, Landis Kallapa, and Circus Jim all hauled out some thirty miles from shore. Forty-six-year-old Alfred Irving related that when he hunted in canoes he went out twenty miles to take seals, but since the advent of schooners he had been able to expand his field of operations from fifty to seventy-five miles west of landfall. Several tribal sealers reported that they undertook cruises as far away as the Columbia River and Barkley Sound and that they pursued fur seals within a range of one- to two-hundred miles up and down the coast. In 1892, seventeen Makah sealers boasted that they had been to the Bering Sea [Lane: n. d.].

While they shared considerable in common—location, history, and resources to name a few—Olympic Coast tribes and bands were not equally advantaged in terms of their access to the industry. Assets that might have seemed abundant at Neah Bay, for example, were not necessarily as plentiful just down the coast. Thirty-five miles away at La Push, the Quileute enjoyed few of the opportunities derived of natural environment that had enabled the Makah to benefit by all appearances so spectacularly. “These Indians have not a fair chance of doing what they could and what they wish to do,” their agent asserted dejectedly [ARCIA 1894: 317]. In 1894 they possessed only a single schooner and the fact that they lacked a protected bay made it impracticable for them to purchase more. And there were other problems. “They do all the sealing they can with their canoes and catch some salmon for their winter use when running up the river, but they are too far from the halibut banks to obtain many” [Ibid.]. In addition, they “would raise many potatoes, turnips, cabbages, and other vegetables for their use during the year had they the land” [Ibid.].

Location impacted on all aspects of the industry. The variegated and impenetrable landscape of the Northwest coast expanded the distances between villages, rendering it extremely onerous if frequently impossible for communication to pass freely between one place and another and physical movement was at times so impeded as to be brought to a virtual standstill. Over two hundred miles separated Neah Bay from Taholah and because the post traders were often stationed at key points at Grays Harbor on the south and Neah Bay on the north, all fur-seal hunters—other than those of the Makah tribe—had to voyage extensively in order to market their peltry. In 1881, Charles Willoughby described the great hardship that the challenge of mobility was imposing on members of the Quileute tribe. Their down-coast location

had thwarted them from engaging in gainful intercourse: “In concluding my report of the Indians,” he said,

I should neglect to do my duty did I make not special mention of this band, numbering 300, which has never availed itself of the advantages offered at the industrial school except in a very limited way. This is accounted for from the fact that the band is located 30 miles distant and no communication by road or trail, and the continued severe storms on this coast make it extremely hazardous for canoes, their only method of traveling, to make the trip except in the most favorable seasons [ARCIA 1881: 162].

Queets and Hoh sealers suffered especially. The dual problems of location and geography and their attendant affects on the capacity of Indians to transport and sell their goods hindered them in their ability to reap reward from their labors. According to one agent, the Indian villages were so situated as to be rendered “almost inaccessible” and he had been left with only a couple options to reach them: “either by sea in a canoe or on foot over the spurs of the bluffs and along the beach at low tides” [ARCIA 1881: 169]. The distance between Neah Bay and Taholah by way of the land route that had to be slogged over was estimated by one official to have encompassed three hundred miles and even by sea it was said to encumber a two-day journey of more than two days travel.

Complicating matters, Grays Harbor, located some thirty miles south

of Taholah, could be entered only during



Figure 28 Hunters spearing fur seals on the Pacific Coast. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

periods of low tide. Thus, with all the impediments thrust in his way, the federal officer lamented that he had been able to inspect those remote stations just once each year other than for the occasional employee sent in his stead. Regardless of the lack of government presence (or in spite of it), in proper season every member of this tribe capable of manning a canoe could be found fur sealing and obtaining “most of their means of living from this source” [Ibid.]. In 1881, the

aggregate revenue earned from the sale of their fur seal skins amounted to over twelve hundred dollars [Ibid.]. Four years later, the agent on the Quinault reservation complained that there was not a trader located within forty miles of the village of Taholah, a shortcoming that required the Indians to venture off reservation to dispose of their peltry [ARCIA 1885: 191].

Of vital significance, sealing functioned from early on as a fully, if sometimes ambivalently, federally-sanctioned enterprise; that is, it was an occupation often viewed as the irrepressible competitor to nationally-mandated field agriculture. Commented an observer on the bearing that aquaculture—in all its kaleidoscopic manifestations—tenaciously managed to hold over Makah society:

It has been the wise and humane policy of the United States government to encourage these Indians to become self-supporting; and as they derive all their subsistence and support from the ocean, the government has encouraged them to procure a larger class of vessels than the canoes of their ancestors, and has allowed them to own and command vessels capable of making voyages to distant seas in pursuit of their vocations of sealing, whaling and fishing [Port Angeles Democrat-Leader: 1893].

Operating with the full benefit of national signature (but significantly, not the financial backing of the U.S. Treasury), the Indian tribes of the Olympic Peninsula were refashioning a resource that they had possessed and relied upon for thousands of years to fit a new and dynamic industrial orientation. Fur-seal hunting was a brave and trending commercial enterprise, one that would in the near term at least continue to grow in its vitality, influence, and value.



Figure 29 Hotel Neah located on the Makah Reservation at Neah Bay, Washington. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

Markets opened and the tribes responded. Acting with a heady and smartly placed sense of purpose and energy, fur-seal hunters zealously labored to expand their fleets. The Makah head chief Peter Brown, in addition to the two schooners he had acquired with his partners Peterson and Taisut, was reported by Swan to have also had an old schooner named the *Letitia*. He had purchased that vessel in 1880, but had since sold it to Indians on Vancouver Island. Chief Brown had bought as well a fine schooner named the *Champion* that had been lost at that place. Another Makah had his hand in multiple business ventures. Yokum, the storekeeper at Neah Bay, operated a schooner named the *Matilda*. Two other sealing schooners, the *Puritan* and the *August*, were owned by members of the tribe along with an estimable flotilla of scows, sloops, and boats. Swan purported that the extensive fisheries of the Makah tribe, which could effortlessly lay claim to substantial, marketable stocks of seals, whales, cod, and halibut, had enabled the Indians to get along relatively well even during bouts of “hard times.” Many sealers had come to reside in “comfortable homes like white people” and a Makah man named Kobal had charge of the lone hotel in Neah Bay [Costello 1895: 121]. “[T]he old Indians and those who live in villages on the coast,” Swan asserted, “prefer their large wooden lodges, and it will take another generation or more before they will abandon their old customs and adopt the white man’s style of living,” although Swan at the same time offered up the colorful quip that the level of “industrious thrift” exhibited by the Makah “could be profitably emulated by croakers and idlers in all our towns” [Ibid.].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING THE AGRARIAN ALTERNATIVE

AND YET FOR ALL THEIR LUSTER, THE COMMERCIAL MARITIME pursuits of the tribes fell outside the federal blueprint drafted to force Indian assimilation. Often there was a palpable disconnect colliding at the intersection between the content and aims of national Indian policies and the requirements of local conditions and resources presenting on specific Indian reservations. From the very first, Governor Stevens had foreseen the limited feasibility of the Washington coast in terms of farming. The Indian



Figure 30 Sealing boats stored at Victoria, British Columbia in 1895. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

Claims Commission reached that same conclusion in the 1970s, ruling that “Stevens intended to grant the Makahs a small shoreline reservation which would serve primarily as a trading and fishing base, and only incidentally as an agricultural base”

[Indian Claims Commission 1976: 100]. Despite such an objective on the part of the highest-ranking government representative having direct responsibility for bringing the tribes under treaty, the clenched grip that the agrarian ethos held over Indians and their affairs would be a difficult one for Native hunters to break free of.

But they did break free, an accomplishment that had the effect of leaving the assimilators in the unenviable and, for some, doubtless uncomfortable position of having to prop up a lifeway that was thriving with little or no contribution from them. As fur-seal hunting continued to rev up in tempo among coastal peoples, federal agents overseeing the various agencies (those ever-changing constructs of a smothering government bureaucracy) to which the tribes were assigned, struggled to balance their official mandate of promoting husbandry among Indians with the

undeniable and frustrating certainty that considerable more money could be extracted through the harvesting of the seemingly inexhaustible products of the sea. A soggy Pacific marine climate combined with thickly forested uplands that lay hardly within a stone's throw off sandy and sterile ocean beaches conspired to ruin any chance there was for successful commercial cropping, a reality understood only all-too-well by those government officials working in the field. In fact, it was in their willingness to embrace fur sealing over farming that spoke to the potency of the former as a viable wage-earning occupation. "These Indians are not agricultural, and every inducement thrown out has so far resulted in failure," confessed their agent after having endured so many repeated and debilitating disappointments. It must not be assumed, however,

that no effort is made by them. Many cultivate to a limited extent; to raise a patch of potatoes, a few carrots and turnips, is all they can be induced to do. Seed in plenty is provided them year after year. The agency farmer plows their land and assists them in every way; but after the crop is in the Indian too frequently neglects to weed and hoe, and with a grunt of dissatisfaction he returns to the only industries he is master of, hunting sea otter and catching fish. By the former industry he obtains ready money; by the latter he can subsist, and as fishermen these Indians are hard to excel [ARCIA 1885: 190].

For coastal tribes, farming languished on the margins. Agriculture was at most a low-simmering outlier that was always confined to the realm of the hypothetical and the maybe and never rose to the status of accepted theory and practice, a prospect perpetually relegated to the backburner and possessing little relevancy other than perhaps to the overseers. By them, husbandry was often cited as a point of ponderance for no other reason than it seemed the in-vogue thing to do. Or, intentionally or otherwise, they were framing the anemic state of farming against the vibrancy of fur sealing. Another government officer, echoing a well-worn refrain in reference to members of the Klallam tribe, conceded that "some efforts should be made to turn the attention of the Indians to agricultural pursuits" although, he cautioned, they "being a peculiarly a salt-water Indian, will always derive a large portion of their subsistence from their native element, if I may so call it" [ARCIA 1860: 195]. His words exuded a prescient quality. Major shifts in the Indian economy were not in the offing. Said Quinault agent Charles Willoughby nearly three decades later: "The Indians of this agency are not an agricultural people, nor do I believe, had they ever such good opportunities, would they become so; at any

rate, not until the game had been driven from the hills, the rivers emptied of their fish, and the otter and seal seek other feeding ground” [ARCIA 1887: 294].

Opportunities seemingly abounded with sufficient sectors functioning in the economy to provide dependable incomes. The Makah Indians at Neah Bay were earning additional wages through logging, picking hops, performing off-reservation farming, and selling whale and dogfish oil, the latter comprising—along with fur-seal hunting—traditional enterprises of which the Indians possessed a greater knowledge than anyone and involved critical resources that could




Figure 31 Canadian sealing schooner *Dora Siewerd* in the Bering Sea in 1895. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

readily be converted into spendable currency.

Meanwhile, further down the coastline, the Quinault were working the oyster harvests on Shoalwater Bay. Wages obtained from that labor, which could range upwards as high as three dollars per day, reportedly constituted good money but an

amount that paled in comparison to what could

be amassed in fur-seal hunting and especially the sea otter trade. The latter was an occupation from which several hundred dollars might be cleared in a single outing [ARCIA 1875: 365].

From the extensive field operations maintained by the BIA, a vivid picture emerges of the state of Native America on the Olympic Peninsula. In fact, the Office of Indian Affairs must have felt itself under siege from the endless, repetitive string of messages emanating out of the Northwest coast. For decades federal officials endured the monotonous refrain, an inundation of truth and reality, pent-up irritation that ran counter to the stated goals set forth by the nation for Indians. What they were told was this: Indian sealers possessed only a marginal interest in agriculture, an attitude that would be impossible to alter or even soften so long as their maritime

resources held out sufficiently strong to provide for both their subsistence and their commercial interests.

“It will be difficult to induce these Indians to turn their attention to farming,” predicted Washington superintendent of Indian affairs B. F. Kendall in 1862 [ARCIA 1862: 308]. The Makah are “essentially a marine tribe, living on and around the water, and obtaining their principal support therefrom. They are experts in all arts of fishermen, and realize considerable income from the sale of oil obtained annually from various kinds of fish” [Ibid.]. Using that as his backdrop, superintendent Kendall apprised the Indian Office of his great hesitancy to expend “public money upon bleak and barren cliffs and unproductive soil” [Ibid.]. A few years later a successor of his said essentially the same thing. “The Makah Indians at this place are unlike those of any other tribe in the Territory,” superintendent of Indian affairs Samuel Ross declared in 1869. “They are bold, expert sailors and fishermen, and not only obtain their subsistence from the sea, but earn every year a large surplus” [ARCIA 1869: 20]. No sensible argument could be made for them doing anything else.

And there was no one seriously attempting to try. Being virtually self-contained, the tribes enjoyed everything they needed and more, a surfeit of raw materials and millennia-honed skills and knowhow that garnered for them a degree of autonomy and allowed them to maintain a connection to a lifeway that for other tribes, in other jurisdictions scattered all across the continent, had long since vanished. That same year Ross’s contemporary, T. J. McKenney, wrote:

The Indians obtain their subsistence chiefly from the sea. Whale and seal are captured in quantities to insure them always against want, while the beaver and other fur-bearing animals in their locality adds to their resources and makes them, in respect to a living, well off [ARCIA 1869: 131].

The tribes could fish and hunt fur seal and other wildlife on both land and water, not to mention the other assets that were at their direct disposal on their reservation holdings.

Two years later, McKenney reiterated his conclusions:

The Indians are a bold, hardy race, getting their subsistence principally from the ocean, and caring but little about tilling the soil, and it is with utmost difficulty they can be persuaded to work for the small wages of \$1 or \$2 per day, while they not

unfrequently make as high as \$40 by taking the fur seal [ARCIA 1871: 276].

With such reward looming so immediate and accessible, there would be no veering from the course thus set. Exactly two decades after that, another agent underscored what had by then become a hard-chiseled fact: “The Makah Indians are not dependent on agriculture for subsistence. Their wealth is in the rich products of the waters of the Pacific Ocean and the straits of Juan de Fuca, on which they live” [ARCIA 1891: 447]. Or, as it was put in the gutsy utterances of one administrator who, feeling similarly compelled in 1873, sarcastically but accurately ciphred the government farm on the Makah reservation as adding up to nothing more than “a mere sand-box” [ARCIA 1873: 308]. There could be no mistake; farming faced long odds.

But perhaps no one phrased it more succinctly than did agent E. M. Gibson. Referencing the Makah Indians under his charge in September 1871, he reported that

Nature supplies them abundantly with nearly all the necessities of life; consequently they do not appreciate what they receive from the Government. They are the most happy and independent people I have ever seen. They catch plenty of the finest fish, which they dry in great abundance for winter use. They take several kinds of shell-fish, which are unlike anything I have ever before seen, and which they eat with great relish. They catch a great many dog-fish, from which they make oil; and seal, from which they obtain both fur and oil, which they barter to the white traders for clothing, flour, and such other articles as they may need [ARCIA 1871: 280].

It constituted no small matter. For the Indians to have chosen wrongly in their stated profession, or to have had it chosen for them, would have been to expose themselves to impending hardship if not much worse. It also thrust those charged with administering federal Indian policy into an agonizing position, that of having to direct the Indians down a potentially perilous path, one in which the tribes would very probably end up struggling in their capacity to sustain themselves. The inherent irrationality of attempting to convert Olympic Peninsula Indians to commercial agriculture was captured in the ringing prose of John P. McGlinn. Writing in August 1890, the Makah agent rhapsodized that

with a climate whose moisture is proverbial, where it rains nine months of the year and the remaining three months being enveloped in dense fogs, and all the soil that is fit for cultivation

being thin and barren, can we blame them very much if they do not take kindly to agricultural pursuits; or if in the past, as I presume some of them must have tried to wrest a scanty living from the niggardly soil, need we be much surprised that they became discouraged and put aside the plow, the hoe, and spade to take up again the harpoon and seal spear? [ARCIA 1890: 224].

There was no reason for surprise. Better than anyone, Olympic Peninsula hunters understood the gravity of what was at stake and they were to prove anything but quiet advocates



Figure 32 Canadian sealing schooner *Ainoka* discharging fur skins at Victoria in 1898. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

of their own self-interest. They expressed themselves freely and astutely. As it was explained by one Indian agent stationed at Neah Bay, those sealers delegated under his charge were constantly regaling him with honest and reasonable

queries, challenges to the revolutionary lifestyle changes they were being pressed to make, questions that cut to the marrow such as “Why do you want me to grow things I can do without? If I have plenty of fish I am content. If I can catch a fish I have him; and if I work and bury seed in the ground, I don’t know if I shall get it again.” In the estimation of the writer of the report, “The Indian sees profit only in what comes ready to his hand; he has no idea of waiting for results” [ARCIA 1885: 190].

Perhaps. But what the agent neglected to say, of course, was the all-so-obvious: There was infinitely more treasure to be earned in the sealing business than there was in trying to cultivate what at best amounted to simple truck garden parcels located along exposed waterfront

properties up and down the blustery Washington coastline. Agent McGlinn of Neah Bay delivered up a bitter taste of that reality in 1892 when he announced to the Indian Office that between 1855 after the Makah Treaty had been signed and extending all the way to 1892, not a single bushel of cereal grain—wheat, oats, barley, rye, or corn—had been raised at Cape Flattery [ARCIA 1892: 494].

To run up against such practical realities was to swim against a strong current. In August 1881 the federal superintendent having jurisdiction over the Makah and Quileute tribes underscored the dilemma perpetually faced by those in his line of work when he commented that the tribes under his supervision—who altogether comprised approximately one thousand individuals—had to contend with the Pacific Ocean to their west, the Strait of Juan de Fuca to their north, and “an almost impenetrable barrier of timber and chaparral on the east and south,” those the combustible elements of a perfect storm, a convergence of impervious factors, a confluence of nature and environment that “by force of necessity” compelled them “to obtain the greater portion of their subsistence from the sea, in the shape of seal, otter, salmon, halibut, and codfish, which in years gone by has been given with no niggard hand” [ARCIA 1881: 161-2]. The agent blushed that “this year has been no exception to the past.” Although the total yield of fur seal had experienced a drop off from the season before, the higher prices that the pelts had generated had fully compensated Indian hunters for the decline. That measure of positive good news, in tandem with the rich harvests enjoyed in salmon, halibut, and codfish that year, had left all Makah homes “abundantly supplied” with their staples of fish and other sources of marine nourishment [Ibid.].

But that prosperity was one face of a double-sided coin. An outlook that could glow so intensely bright in one sector of the Indian economy could appear distinctly gloomier in another. If fur sealing was the linchpin, farming was only a spare part. The next year, the Indian agent expounded, “A good-sized schooner will carry from ten to fourteen canoes and their crews, and this is at a time when the agent is most desirous to have them on their land, and busied with their crops. Hence it is no easy matter for him to make head[way] against such odds” [ARCIA 1882: 215]. Whereas Indian farming on the Olympic Peninsula entailed the production of nothing more than a bare subsistence yield, sealing and fishing ushered up phenomenal payouts by comparison. In fact, there was no comparison.

It is no uncommon thing for a couple of Indians to leave the deck of a schooner [in their canoes] in the morning and before night-fall return with a catch worth, say, \$40 to them. Even an occasional catch like this is a stimulus hard to resist, and the agent finds himself in the main dependent upon the women of the tribes, and has to tax the energies of his employés to aid in this matter [ARCIA 1882: 215].

Barren land, harsh climate, and the competition arising from fishing and fur-seal hunting were strong bulkheads against agriculture. “I am convinced after repeated trials, that the soil of this reservation is of such an inferior quality that farming cannot be successfully carried on,” agent G. A. Henry wrote from Taholah in 1872, “and that the Indians must depend chiefly upon the salmon and other fish which they have in great abundance most of the year.” While there is no indication during this early commercial period that Quinault, Queets, Hoh, and Quileute hunters were capturing as much of the fur-seal market as the Makah, the fisheries of those tribes and bands, the same as the one at Cape Flattery, ranked as their foremost industrial asset.

When we take into consideration the fact that nature has surrounded these people with an abundance of game, such as elk, deer, and bear, and that the river abounds in salmon of the finest quality, it is not to be wondered at that they prefer to obtain a support from the river and forest, as was done by their fathers, to going into the dense forests by which they are surrounded to clear a farm [ARCIA 1873: 311].

What must have seemed in the best interests of Indians did not always translate as the paramount concern of BIA personnel. Personal considerations oftentimes trumped the public good and moreso when mandates handed down from officials occupying the highest offices in the land factored into the equation. Although federal agents demonstrated overwhelming support for Indian fur-seal hunting and fishing operations, their frustrations understandably grew as they perceived their own performances being weighed against the national agrarian standard, which was a one-size-fit-all policy set down by officials of the Office of Indian Affairs in Washington, D. C. that had been implemented in a wholly generic fashion that ignored the unique circumstances and conditions encountered at hundreds of individual locations.

In the far northwestern perimeter of the territory the issue of whether, and to what extent, the tribes of the Olympic Peninsula would take up the plow never strayed far from the center of

conversation. “It is not possible to make self-supporting farmers of these coast Indians,” Oliver Wood briefed his superiors,

for the reason that the farming lands are only to be had in isolated patches along the streams that flow into the sea, and the expense of clearing and preparing these lands in a manner suitable for farming would be more than enterprising white people would pay, and I feel safe in saying that if this [Quinault] reserve was thrown open to white settlers it would be many years before respectable people would undertake to make homes on it [ARCIA 1882: 221].

It was a tough situation to find oneself in. Most bothersome to Wood was his inability to do much of anything to improve what he considered to be the unsatisfying nature of his



Figure 33 Makah houses on the beach at Neah Bay. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

matter how hard he may labor or how painstaking he may be, when the annual statistics are made up they indicate but little improvement, and any one not familiar with the situation would, on reading the statistics, be inclined to the opinion that the agent had done little else than draw his salary [ARCIA 1882: 221].

Throwing himself on what he hoped would be the kindness and understanding of senior officials headquartered in the nation’s capital, Wood offered up a carrot: He “would be happy to make a better showing,” he promised, “but the facts will not allow it, and rose-colored statements

professional circumstances. He sorely wanted to push the national agenda, but he also recognized the futility of trying to do so at his current duty station. The outlook “is very discouraging to an agent that desires to make progress in industrial pursuits,” he winced.

No

are not wanted” [ARCIA 1882: 221]. The agent might have marshaled a stronger response had he referenced the explicit guarantees that Governor Stevens had laid down at the Neah Bay treaty council in early 1855, when the solemn support of the United States government had been verbally lodged behind Makah maritime enterprises.

There was indeed very little that could be done. The Indians entertained no intention of abandoning their fishing stations and the federal government was equally committed to holding the line on its agrarian program. Hence, the fragile balance, or uneasy coexistence that had always been there at the sharp crossroads that existed between husbandry, fishing, sealing, and whaling never seemed to find total resolution. “But little has been done by these tribes so far as I can ascertain in breaking new land in the past year; and, in fact, it is hard to turn their attention

from their old pursuits of hunting and fishing. These modes of life are more remunerative than farming patches of land, and they adhere to them with the tenacity [that] they adhere to some of the



Figure 34 Sealing fleet lying in Victoria Harbor in 1894. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

heathenish customs and superstitions of their forefathers,” wrote one official burdened with administering the federal Indian policy of assimilation [ARCIA 1883: 204].

Or consider the lyrical statement articulated by agent Oliver Wood in 1884:

These Indians, however, are not dependent on agriculture for subsistence. The sea is their great harvest field, and from it the industrious ones derive a fair income. During the past year they have realized fully \$25,000 from the sale of seal skins, fish, and oils, and it is a rare thing to find a healthy Indian without a goodly supply of fish prepared for food [ARCIA 1884: 163].

Everyone knew it. The breadbasket of the Olympic Peninsula lay in its rivers and streams and nearshore waters off its two coasts, not in the mottled acreage set aside for Indians within the prescribed boundaries of their reservations. The Makah Indians “have from time immemorial made their living from the water, living as they do at Cape Flattery, with the Straits of Fuca on one side and the Pacific Ocean on the other,” chimed in Indian agent W. L. Powell in 1886, and there was nothing that was going to dislodge them from it [ARCIA 1886: 453]. “Had these Indians the best agricultural land it would not be cultivated by them, nor would I blame them,” he confessed,

for the reason that they can do better, make more money by fish, seal, and oil, than they would by cultivating the soil. The past season was a very unfavorable one for sealing, owing to the windy, strong weather; yet my calculation is that \$16,000 were taken in by the Indians at this agency from seal-skins alone. Large quantities of halibut have been caught and sold at Victoria and other towns up the sound, besides drying a great quantity for their own use during the winter [Ibid.].

There was no dispute. All aspects of reservation life pointed to the sea; it was the anchor, the major chord, the mainspring upon which all else was hinged. Confronted with such an incontestable reality, most administrators approached their duties with a strong sense of resigned helplessness. While obligated to pay at least lip service to farming instruction and practice (or at least many believed that to be the case), most of their supervisory weight was thrown behind fishing operations that afforded a great deal of freedom and personal autonomy to those falling under their authority and that carried Indian hunters far outside the direct control and oversight of the federal bureaucracy. In the calculus of Charles Willoughby, the whole issue was one that could be chalked up to factors of economy, habit, and human nature, those a series of obstacles that could not easily be overcome, at least by any means that had been placed at his disposal to do so. “This has been my experience,” the agent concluded, “and cultivation by the Indians of this agency only commenced with my advent. The end of the sealing season would be too late; nor do the Indians feel disposed to begin a new labor. Flushed with their success, and the money they have earned, they look coldly upon work harder and less remunerative, and the proceeds of which must be waited for, and uncertain” [ARCIA 1882: 156]. When the Indians did desire fresh

vegetables or other foodstuffs that could not be produced within their own communities, they smartly put their fur-seal earnings to good use. They simply purchased those products elsewhere.



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING INFRASTRUCTURE AND A RISING INDUSTRY

OFFICIALS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HARBORED NO DOUBT OF what the Olympic Peninsula Indians were about. The sea was the pivot around which all else revolved, a fact that was at once reassuring but also in some aspects limiting. “On the other hand, the waters contain [an] abundance of fish of many varieties, and of fur-bearing seals at certain seasons,” asserted an Indian agent based at Neah Bay. “Hence it becomes to a fishing people (as these Indians are) all that can be desired” [ARCIA 1882: 215]. Charles Willoughby described communities wholly marine in their economic and cultural orientations, that were striving to make their resources



Figure 35 Members of the Quileute tribe prepare to skin a fur seal on the reservation at La Push. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

work for them: “These tribes have always been fishermen,” he implored, “and it requires no great amount of exertion to secure their supplies from these waters at any season of the year; and now in these latter years, and when they have learned that the fruits of their labors have a market value, these waters are at present a greater source of wealth to them than their land could be, no matter how much pains were taken in its cultivation” [ARCIA 1882: 215].

Fishing and fur sealing benefited the tribes on multiple levels. For Olympic Peninsula peoples, their fisheries were their strongest hedge against outsider interference and a potent force for achieving and maintaining financial independence as well as the means through which they could anchor their local economies to larger developments and conditions. That it removed them out of the immediate reach of the federal bureaucracy was not lost on Indians either. Exhibiting

an inexhaustible work ethic, the Makah and the Quileute Indians were touted as peoples who understood the meaning of a dollar and were taking every step to boost their earnings. They patterned their hunts around the resources lying off their coast, conducting harvests in proper months and following the rhythms of the herds and the seasons. “The Indians of this agency are by no means an indolent people,” Willoughby advised his superiors back in Washington, D. C.

They know the value of money full well, and are keen in trading. The industries from which their chief gains are derived are sealing and fishing. From January to June they are engaged in catching fur-seals, generally attaching themselves and their canoes to some one of the schooners engaged in that business; and if the season is a good one, they make considerable money, payments for their skins being made them in hard cash [ARCIA 1882: 215].

Sealers spent the remainder of each year carrying out their extensive salmon and halibut fishing expeditions.

With money came empowerment, at least in the workplace. In combination the resources and immense knowledge base of the Indians supplied them at times with a profusion of riches that positioned them enviably and strategically in terms of their ability to dictate the course of their lives. At many junctures during the height of the commercial fur sealing era, more work was offered to the Makah, the



Figure 36 Makah hunters pulling a whale onto the beach at Neah Bay.
University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

Quileute, the Hoh, the Queets, and the

Quinault Indians than the members of those tribes could reasonably perform. They were, with remarkable élan and vigor, situating themselves center square in the marketplace. “They know how to, and do, make their own living,” one federal official declared [ARCIA 1886: 453].

Possessing an intimate and exhaustive background of marine life and how best and where to conduct the harvests, Olympic Peninsula Indians were a constantly-in-demand commodity, so much so that fur-seal hunters enjoyed the luxury of being able to choose the fleets that they signed on to and, in many instances, even setting the level of pay they would receive for their services. In 1882, Indian agent Willoughby related that the “schooners, which, since my advent here, have taken to invading these waters, are each anxious to secure a complement of these experienced Indians, and the demand is generally greater than the supply. Consequently, every conceivable move is resorted to, to induce them to take to their canoes [all along the coast] and join the fleet. Often competition runs so high that the full value of the pelts are given and occasionally exceeded” [ARCIA 1882: 215-6].

But it was not all good. From season to season and from place to place there was significant variability in the yields of fur seal. There could be great variance in the number of animals taken in a given year, often based on the critical and wholly uncontrollable factor of the weather conditions encountered. In 1883, Makah and Quileute sealers and fishermen were earning almost the entirety of their livings through their preferred avocations while other members of those tribes were working at logging and picking hops as well as maintaining their small garden spaces. Disappointingly, however, the fur-seal harvest proved a “comparative failure” that year. Not more than five thousand skins were taken and, with the average price per pelt not exceeding three dollars, only ten thousand dollars remained to be dispersed to Indian hunters after the obligatory five thousand dollars was paid to the schooner owners. Those earnings of the fur-seal hunters added up to a fifteen thousand dollar drop off from the returns reported in 1883 [ARCIA 1883: 202]. Still, from almost any vantage point, fur-seal hunting continued to rate as the best thing going.

Indians lived the life that sealing made for them. Without question, there were residual benefits that accrued from a maritime economy. The money obtained in fur sealing afforded a modicum of personal freedom to Indian hunters that they otherwise would not have had, welcome financial independence that enabled them to devote themselves to wage-earning activities while relegating to others more mundane jobs that paid less or almost nothing if anything at all. Evidence of this is gleaned from the fact that they accumulated the wherewithal to hire outsiders to perform manual tasks that under different circumstances they would most assuredly have done for themselves. “Now the Indians of this agency do not cut their own wood,

save in a few instances,” the Indian agent related in 1882, “but to-day they have white men employed just beyond the limits of the reserve who are cutting their winter’s supply of cord-wood, also rails and pickets for fencing; and they pay to these whites better prices than the government pays for the cutting of the agency wood” [ARCIA 1882: 216]. Observed the federal official matter-of-factly on this stunning turning of the tables, “They can sit in their canoes and earn five dollars while they would be earning one dollar at the more laborious labor” [Ibid.].

Conditions dictated outcomes. By the early 1880s, commercial fur-seal hunting had become fully entrenched in the economies of the coastal tribes of the Olympic Peninsula. While Indians continued to gather a livelihood from other traditional resources, they had heavily brokered themselves in fur seal. Having invested in both accoutrements and vessels, they had ordered their daily and seasonal routines around the varied obligations of the chase. Indian agent Oliver Wood, writing from the village of Taholah in August 1882, noted that the “main dependence” of the Queets and the Hoh Indians was “hunting fur seals during the spring, and in salmon fishing in the Columbia River in June and July” [ARCIA 1882: 220]. In addition, further south down the coast, “quite a number” of Quinault Indians were engaged “in seal hunting and large numbers of them are employed by the oyster companies on Shoalwater Bay, and fishing companies on the Columbia River, during the proper seasons” [Ibid.].

The stories needed no embellishment. A continuity of purpose permeated the abundantly-endowed expanses of land- and waterscapes that extended the length and breadth of the Olympic Peninsula. At Neah Bay, the Makah were not relying “very much on what vegetables they [were] rais[ing] for subsistence.” Rather, they were receiving from their sales in furs, whales, and seal oil “not less than \$15,000 per annum, and in favorable seasons nearly or quite double that amount” [ARCIA 1885: 188]. Once the fur-seal hunt closed, the workplace veered in another, perhaps unanticipated, direction. Indians promptly vacated the harvest fields of the Pacific Ocean, although not to return to their thinly-soiled reservation plots as might have been expected, but instead to travel to the hop farms located in and around the region of Puget Sound. They also worked as laborers for farmers on the Strait of Juan de Fuca, which was seasonal employment by which another several thousand dollars could be earned every year [Ibid.].

But their primary focus remained centered on the object of their main chance, a prospect which required no small investment in vigilance. In the commercial era, fur-seal hunting underwent relentless reformulation and modernization, refinement reflective of an age when

advanced technology was infiltrating and becoming increasingly prevalent in all segments of industry. In many ways, it was a matter of either adapt or face the jarring prospect of being swallowed up and consumed by those willing to position themselves all the way out in front, and commercial sealing was certainly no exception to that trend. In 1885, Oliver Wood, previously agent at Quinault and now the agent at Neah Bay, suggested to a Makah tribal member that he purchase a schooner to go sealing in. The counsel worked to good effect. Acting on that advice, the sealman paid in coin (or cash) for a vessel that in just its inaugural season returned to its new owner nearly one thousand dollars in profit [ARCIA 1885: 188].

So energized was the Makah sealer with that success that he indicated his intention to buy a second schooner in time for the forthcoming season and agent Wood, equally enthused with the result, reported that he had been “encouraging the notion” of private ownership “as much as



Figure 37 Members of the Quileute tribe cleaning their catch on the beach at La Push. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

possible” [ARCIA 1885: 188].

Wood had been doing so because he considered it “far better if the Indians had vessels enough to accommodate all the Indians that go sealing and save a greater profit for themselves, and also save the agent no end of trouble from the advent of white men”

who frequented Neah Bay for sealing purposes, but were in his

less-than-congenial encounters with them “never satisfied unless allowed their own way and a free run on the reservation at all times” [Ibid.].

That is the way it had always been. Demonstrable benefit observed in a new invention or methodology validated it for acceptance and ultimately incorporation into daily routines, conventions, and protocols. Wanting to be more than hunters solely, Indians availed themselves to whatever tools and machinery they could get that could be put to good use and that would bolster them in their extractive industries. All Olympic Peninsula tribes, for example, sought to enhance and grow their maritime operations by controlling and performing as much of the boat-to-buyer processes as possible. Those encompassed a diversity of operations that ranged all the

way from conducting the harvests to preparing the fish or furs for market and everything that fell in-between. But the inroads that they were able to achieve in upgrading and integrating their economy in that manner extended only so far and, in the end, met with only some success.

Notably, the coastal tribes were demonstrating a willingness to embrace what constituted for them the best of non-Indian society, although the contents of that cultural toolbox contained elements that stood far removed from the mainstream of the BIA agenda. Hence, tribal members were not told that they could not fish or hunt fur seal; rather, they were encouraged to do so, but that is about as far as it went. In terms of curing and packing fish products, for instance, the Makah and the Quileute established it as their foremost demand of the national government that the tribes be informed of the “latest improved methods.” The practices being used in their fisheries, they realized, were “not producing a desirable article of commerce acceptable to the taste” of the consuming public. With a “little assistance and proper teaching in this branch of the industry,” one Indian agent conjectured hopefully, “but few years would elapse before the Indians of this reservation [at Neah Bay] would rival in wealth any equal number of any nationality in the most favored locality of the older States” [ARCIA 1881: 162]. Unfortunately, in the realm of industrial training and promotion, the federal government doggedly continued to plow almost every ounce of its supports and helps back into farming and farming-related initiatives, not aquaculture.

But it was not as if federal agents were not trying. Those officials having direct intercourse with the Makah and their seal hunters recognized, as Governor Stevens had realized decades before, the pressing need to assist the tribe with accoutrements and infrastructure, that is, tools and technology that would allow them to remain competitive with non-Indian fishers and hunters. M. T. Simmons, the recently-appointed Indian agent for the Puget Sound District and a witness to and signee of the Treaty of Neah Bay, knew fully of the pledges that had been articulated on the ground over the course of that negotiation in January 1855. And he indicated his intention to honor those promises. “The treaty of Neah Bay with the tribe of Makah Indians comes next under consideration,” Simmons wrote to the commissioner of Indian affairs in 1860. “Living as they do on the straits, their characteristic traits, their habits and pursuits are the same as their neighbors, the Clallam. They are bold and experienced pursuers of the whale, and carry on a considerable trade in oil with Victoria and Port Townsend” [ARCIA 1860: 195].

Because of the dominant marine culture on the Northwest coast, all federal initiatives had to be administratively governed through that filter. In that regard, agent Simmons sought to align the Makah more strictly in accord with Governor Stevens' original maritime intentions for them. Based on the language inserted into the treaty document, phrases which Simmons had helped to formulate, he recommended enforcing a ban on their Canadian trade, even though such a move would threaten a reduction in tribal bargaining power and market position. "The thirteenth article of their treaty prohibits them from trading elsewhere than in the dominions of the United States, and the trade with Victoria should be stopped, and can be as soon as they have a resident agent among them" [ARCIA 1860: 195], he counseled.

As a final admonition, Simmons argued for immediate government intervention in the maritime operations of the Makah tribe. Cape Flattery, he had ascertained, was lacking in many of the latest amenities needed to push it to the head of the industry. "Halibut are taken in great quantities by this tribe, and I would

recommend that, in addition to the farming operations that should be commenced on their reservation, houses for salting and drying these fish should be erected, and that they should be taught to cure them after the fashion of the whites. These fish command a good price and ready sale, and I think a lucrative trade in them can be established" [ARCIA 1860: 195]. From what can be extracted from the federal record, it is apparent that the facilities Simmons proposed were never constructed, a failure of action that was to become a major bone of contention—both then and extending well into the twentieth century—between the Makah tribe and the federal government.



Figure 38 Village of Neah Bay in 1905 shown with canoes lining the beach. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

Simmons's appeal prefaced others. C. H. Hale, the superintendent of Indian affairs for Washington Territory, reasoned in 1862 that it just made good business and policy sense to fortify the Quinault and the Quileute tribes in modes of living that had already long proven their worth and feasibility. Those Indians, particularly the Quinault, boasted one of the finest fisheries on the Pacific Coast. So why not utilize that resource to its fullest capacity? Hale wondered. He proposed trying "the experiment next spring, if it be practicable, by giving them all the encouragement in . . . [his] power to put up all the salmon they can, so that after their wants are provided for, the surplus may be sold for their benefit" [ARCIA 1862: 391]. Summarized Hale of his thinking and with no mincing of words: "The present generation cannot be made an agricultural people; and it would be [a] waste of time and money to endeavor to make them so" [Ibid.: 392].

Hale was not alone in his assessment. In the summer of 1867 as a humanitarian gesture, Makah Indian agent Henry A. Webster urged the national government to purchase a smaller-sized schooner for his tribe. The road to sealing prosperity ran through a potential minefield, he knew, the penetration of which could unleash lethal consequences. Of greatest threat, Indians traveled far out to sea in their canoes in pursuit of fur seals. That, an imminently dangerous undertaking, could be rendered considerably safer with a larger craft, the acquisition of which would secondarily serve as tangible evidence of the good faith of the United States towards tribal hunters. So too, it would fulfill a treaty promise and demonstrate genuine concern for the well-being of the Indian community on the Northwest coast, a positive first step forward that Webster thought would "do much to produce respect for, and show the moral superiority of a civilized and educated people" [ARCIA 1867: 44].

There was mounting consensus. The Indians needed to be accorded full *entrée* into the far-flung fisheries of the West Coast. Henry Winsor, the agent at Quinault, issued a similar epistle the very next year in 1868. Having observed and studied the issue at firsthand, he wanted his tribe underwritten with all the necessary means to see their maritime operations prosper and grow. Commenting that their primary sources of subsistence and revenue derived from their plentiful harvests of furs and fish, Winsor contemplated the launch of a two-pronged offensive. The first would sustain adult Indians in their marine pursuits. The second would instill in the younger generation values commensurate with American-style education and assimilation policy, that a requirement for any plan that might be adopted. "My own judgment is," he offered, "that

by encouraging their fishing, and furnishing them all needed facilities for procuring otter, beaver, and other furs, and at the same time give to their children the benefits of instruction, we can do more for their welfare than by undertaking to change them into farmers and artisans” [ARCIA 1868: 148-9].

All down the coast there was surging unanimity. Robert H. Milroy, a major general of volunteers in the Union Army during the Civil War, was a rabid abolitionist and Indian assimilationist. Soon after he assumed the office of Indian superintendent for Washington Territory, Milroy aligned himself with the supposition that Indian fishing operations offered up the best hope for future prosperity. Although he had not yet visited Neah Bay, he had seen enough of the lay of the land—and the sea—to realize the futility of trying to support the Makah Indians strictly through the meager means of their reservation assets. “The Indians of Neah Bay are ‘fish-eaters,’” he affirmed, “and the most skillful and intrepid fishermen and watermen of the Pacific coast. Therefore, efforts for their civilization would be more successful on the fishing line than on the agricultural” [ARCIA 1872: 345]. Milroy viewed the Pacific Ocean and the Strait of Juan de Fuca as the twin drivers of the days ahead. “I am informed that under proper management a fishery of great value could be built up there,” he said, “sufficient not only to render the Indians self-sustaining in a few years, but to lead them to great wealth. I therefore recommend an appropriation sufficient for their construction and furnishing of a large fishery there” [Ibid.].

For Milroy there was no conflict in the assimilative properties of fur sealing and fishing with other modes of work such as farming, a sentiment that would be shared by American officials and those of other nations for years into the future. In that regard, the so-called “civilizing” aspects of fur-sealing were thrust into bold relief in the report of the British commissioner in the Proceedings of the Bering Sea Tribunal in 1895. According to the findings contained in that document, “The Indians themselves benefited largely from a pecuniary point of view, and, in consequence of the encouragement offered by the pursuit of the fur-seal, began themselves to own and navigate sealing schooners” [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 151].

It was that element of free enterprise and the apparent embracement of the American economy by Indians that held out a potent appeal to officials in the nation’s capital.

Perhaps in no other way is the influence of the sealing industry toward the civilization of the Indians rendered more apparent than by the facts, that three sealing schooners are now actually owned by the Makah Indians of Cape Flattery, while five are similarly owned by Indians of the coast of Vancouver Island, while in addition it is estimated that the payment to the Indians employed in the British Columbia sealing fleet in 1890, calculated on the number of skins obtained, was probably between 35,000 dollars and 50,000 dollars [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 151].

As the years passed in the second half of the nineteenth century, the prospects for aquaculture were trending upward. Technology was gaining traction and by the early 1870s federal officials on the ground were realizing the benefits to be derived from making the transition from

canoes to

schooners, a

paradigm shift

which was

being touted as

a precautionary

measure of

health and

safety. In 1874,

members of the

Board of Indian

Commissioners

visited Neah

Bay and within

hours those

dignitaries had

taken full stock of the situation. Superintendent Milroy, along with a number of agents assigned to the Neah Bay Agency, had recommended that the federal government expend funds to upgrade the crafts of Makah sealers. “It is well known that this portion of the coast during a portion of the year is dangerous to navigation, even by vessels of considerable size, and although



Figure 39 View of the beach and canoes at Neah Bay in 1905. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

the canoes used by the Indians are very large and superior in their construction, and are managed with a degree of skill scarcely equaled, many of the fishermen who venture out to a distance of thirty or forty miles into the ocean, in pursuit of whales and seals, never return” [Board of Indian Commissioners 1874: 79]. The commissioner, with such unvarnished knowledge at his grasp, acted quickly. He advised approval of a five-thousand-dollar appropriation to be used by the Indian agent to purchase a vessel adequate to meet the maritime requirements of the members of the Makah tribe.

Similar appeals originated from more than just BIA officials and other federal functionaries in charge. Indian leaders and fur-seal hunters pressed the national government to aid them in their commercial endeavors. Of particular interest were methods of modernization, new ways and processes and the necessary associated hardware that they hoped would catapult them to the pinnacle of the industry. They possessed the product. Now all they needed was the means placed at their disposal to mine, process, and transport to market their wares using the latest conveyances. One wish in that aspiration overshadowed all others: The Indians, as the Board of Indian Commissioners had so viscerally come to know, wanted a modern sea-worthy fishing craft. “I have been asked by the chiefs of this tribe a number of times to urge the Government to furnish them a schooner, and I suppose there is nothing that these Indians have a greater desire to possess, or that would please them better or be more beneficial to them, of a good schooner of about fifty tons burden,” wrote agent E. M. Gibson in 1873. “They are natural sailors, and from infancy spend much of their life upon the water” [ARCIA 1873: 308].

Such phrases captured the zeitgeist of the Olympic Coast. The earnestness and inherent truthfulness of Gibson’s remarks continued to reverberate throughout the next two decades and beyond, especially as the relative positions of fur sealing and farming to each other became more hardened in the economic cosmology of Indian hunters. “These Makah Indians are really much better off as a whole than many settlements of white people on the [Puget] [S]ound or elsewhere,” reported Makah agent W. L. Powell in 1894. “Let them have a schooner worth \$1,800 or \$2,000 with their canoes and they would not trade them for the best 500-acre farm in Pennsylvania or the valley of Virginia, provided they had to live on it” [ARCIA 1894: 317].

Gibson perceived it as more than just a local issue confined to the reservation at Neah Bay. He viewed it as one that had the potential to resound throughout the region and the nation. Makah fishers were harnessing an industry that in Gibson’s analysis was reaching out and

touching all of America. “They obtain nearly all their resources from the sea,” he explained, and the

products of the waters about Cape Flattery, which amount to many thousand dollars annually, would be lost to the country were it not for these Indians, as there are perhaps no other people who would or could take their places and obtain a support as they do, and besides produce annually what is worth thousands of dollars to the several interests of our country [ARCIA 1873: 308].

Like so many who had come before and so many who would follow, Gibson felt it incumbent upon the federal government to underwrite tribes possessed of little economic fallback other than their fisheries. It was their only recourse, their lifeblood, the gold standard. “It seems to me that a race of people like this,” Gibson expounded,

who inhabit a portion of the country which, without them, would be desolate and almost worthless, should be fostered, protected, and cared for, and, if possible, civilized as a matter of interest, to say nothing of their claims upon our charity, or the general good that intellectual and moral advancement always produces upon society [ARCIA 1873: 308].

It sounded imminently doable. The agent sought to replace Indian canoes with a schooner and he predicted that failure to act was a recipe for losses of life. The sealing season encompassed some five months, from about January to May, a period when the Pacific Ocean was always active and at its most tempestuous and treacherous. Hunters, vulnerable and lacking any means of weather prediction and journeying as far out as forty miles or more from shore, often found themselves trapped squarely in the eye of a storm from which there could be no hope of escape. Fur sealing was an “extremely dangerous business,” Gibson cautioned, and sometimes the Indians were “blown so far out to sea by a strong east wind that they never return[ed]” [ARCIA 1873: 308].

And yet they persevered. Despite that mortal threat to life and limb, as fur hunters were able to procure “ready sale for the skins at from two to ten dollars apiece, and sometimes kill[ing] fifteen hundred seal in a single season,” the agent warned that it was too lucrative an occupation to expect them to stand down on [ARCIA 1873: 308]. To the contrary, it was something they could build on. As an added incentive to pull the trigger on a schooner deal, it was envisioned that the same craft could be employed in the whale industry, which started up later in the season and, conveniently, after the termination of fur sealing for the year. Makah

hunters, Gibson related, took nine whales in the summer of 1872, some of them very large, and two more in 1873. All things considered, the agent concluded that

If they had a good schooner it would be of great advantage to them in sealing and whaling, as they could put their canoes, provisions, and water on board . . . and go out to sea among the seals and whales, and, leaving the schooner, they, in their canoes, could engage in sealing or whaling all day, and return to the schooner at night to sleep and rest, and renew their supply of water and food; and in case of a storm the schooner would be a safe refuge for them. With a schooner they would be able to remain at sea for many days, or even weeks, at a time, in almost perfect safety, and would undoubtedly be far more successful in their perilous pursuits than they are [Ibid.].

Gibson too proposed approval of a five-thousand-dollar appropriation “for the purpose of procuring a schooner for the use of this tribe” [Ibid.].

Like his federal brethren had done, another Makah agent and Gibson’s successor, C. A. Huntington, recommended the purchase of a schooner for the Makah and when loss of life ensued in the 1875 season, he responded in kind by ratcheting up the heat on his request. “The Indians are generally unwilling to work at civilized pursuits,” he reminded the Indian Office while delineating what to them did constitute acceptable modes of labor. “Their main dependence is upon their fishery, the productions of which give them means of trade for all needed supplies. A few of them will work for wages when short of supplies, and when positively [disposed] that they can obtain . . . [what they need] in no other way” [ARCIA 1875: 364]. In making a living, Huntington said, their chief source of revenue was their seal fishery, which was the basis of an occupation that exposed them to hardship and often grave danger. From February to June, fur seal rendezvoused near the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca on their yearly migration from the southern latitudes all the way to the Alaska Isles where they birthed their young and were thought to linger in those waters “to feed upon a certain kind of fish” that was “more abundant” there. During the course of their “sojourn” at that place, they were “captured by spearing . . . [and] pursued by Indians in their canoes . . . and . . . found at various distances from land, from five to twenty miles, being governed in their movements by the direction of the wind” [Ibid.].

The “pursuit” was “often dangerous.” Frequently “adverse winds” blew in with the canoes “far out at sea,” which were consequently driven beyond sight of land and tragically, any

“possibility of return” [ARCIA 1875: 364]. In that vein, Huntington related, “A year ago a canoe containing three Indians . . . [had been] picked up forty miles out by a ship bound for Asia. They were afterwards transferred to a ship bound for San Francisco, and at the end of two months returned by the same ship to the straits, much to the joy of their friends who had given them up for lost” [Ibid.]. Even with rescue of crew and craft—a reference in this instance to a single canoe having been saved—seven other Makah fur-seal hunters had perished in the past year, prompting Huntington to place the case at the feet of the compassion of officials in the Office of Indian Affairs in the nation’s capital.

From the perspective of Indian fur-seal hunters, to undertake the switch from canoes to schooners made imminent sense on several levels. First, there was nothing codified in federal Indian policy that prohibited the national government, if it chose, from expending capital in such a manner for tribal benefit. And while it is clear in hindsight that significant departures from prescribed norms were unlikely to go very far, Indian fur sealers could not have been able to deduce that at the time. Indeed, routine appropriations were authorized in support of agrarian programs and comparable large expenditures were issued in stock and tools in addition to expert teachers known as farmers-in-charge and their assistants, all who lived and worked on reservations. Hence, money earmarked for agrarian training could easily be redirected, or so it must have seemed, for the purpose of growing Indian fishing operations which, to the good and in all actuality, possessed similar assimilative qualities to husbandry and required considerably less oversight and investment in federal labor and training.

Second, the Makah treaty negotiation of 1855 specifically raised the specter that that tribe would be invested in its maritime economy and that possibility had certainly been held out by Governor Stevens as an inducement to get the Indians to come to terms. Those tribal members on the ground at the council and their descendants had every right to expect that the articles of the treaty and everything that had gone into codifying those into law would be honored. But it went beyond just a matter of following through and doing what was right. Compounding matters, sealing and whaling comprised extremely hazardous occupations from which injury and even loss of life were the all-too-stark realities off Washington’s coast. Schooners were safer and more productive than canoes, enabling hunters to access fisheries unapproachable in smaller vessels. Along that line the wages earned in sealing and fishing directly reduced the federal burden to buttress the tribes with provisions and issues of beef and other foodstuffs. Whereas

millions of pounds of meat were being supplied annually to reservations on the Great Plains, Olympic Coast peoples required no such massive intervention. One can only imagine how different their circumstances would have been without their fisheries and the full access they enjoyed to them.

Finally, fishing and sealing—although a throwback in the eyes of some to precontact lifeways—could, when modern methods and conveyances were applied, be confidently embraced as a potent agent of assimilation. Hence, what had once been viewed as a hallmark of traditional culture and a primitive means of subsistence and survival, could now command stature as a leading-edge testament to Gilded Age commercialism.

No matter the identities or the business associations of the participants, there were always obstacles and many schemes that showed initial promise eventually degenerated into nothing more than report boilerplate for those charged with producing such documents. By the mid-1880s, outsiders were viewing with covetous eyes the various Indian reservations off the Washington coast where they knew there was excellent money to be had. In 1884 on the Quinault reservation it was relayed to the Indian Office that a businessman and trader named John W. Hume had begun “erecting suitable buildings for canning the salmon,” an undertaking that onlookers conjectured would provide “employment to all the adult Indians during the fishing season” [ARCIA 1883: 203]. And it seemed that might turn out to be the case as resources existed in ample quantities to insure the success of such a project. As the Indian agent on the reservation expounded, the Quinault possessed “a greater abundance of salmon, and of a better quality than any stream of its size on the Pacific coast,” and the Indians had responded with great elation “at the prospect of having more constant employment and better pay than ever before” [Ibid.].

Unfortunately, economic potential has a propensity to remain just that, potential. The very next year the annual report of the commissioner of Indian affairs included an ominous passage: The Quinault Agency had been functioning without the services of a trader, a vacancy that meant that the tribe had no local outlet to market their products. The deficiency was proving a detriment. “Isolated as it is, this is a great inconvenience to the Indians, while, at the same time, the amount of ready money in circulation among them, and their own exorbitant demands while trading, furnish[ed] little inducement to new comers,” the agent said. Due to the prices allegedly “demanded by the Indians for their salmon,” too little margin had been left to turn a profit and

the enterprise had thus been shuttered. The trader removed his goods because “the store alone was not profitable” [ARCIA 1884: 165].

What the Makah could not do for themselves others were ready to do for them, not as some grand act of benevolence but rather for the explicit benefit of those performing the service. By 1860 four California settlers had taken claims and established a trading post and fishery on Waadah Island situated directly north of the village of Neah Bay on the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Those men had been at Cape Flattery for about nine months when, in the annual report of agent Simmons, they were described as having “uniformly treated the Indians well.” They had, “at liberal prices,” purchased “all the fish and [whale] oil” that the Makah “could bring for sale.” Yet, despite the fostering of those positive relations, Simmons pointed out that the tribe refused to let the traders fish on the banks of the bay and Indian hunters continued to market a great deal of their whale oil at Victoria, British Columbia. In the opinion of the agent, the latter practice had allowed them to “smuggle many blankets and muskets [back] into the country” [ARCIA 1860: 195].

Indians differed in their views on the sealing industry and there was also considerable variance in the level

and nature of their participation. From

the perception of non-Indians, the ample revenues infused into the economy of the village of Neah Bay (and the same doubtlessly could be said of population centers scattered all the way down the coast) had split the tribe, at least in terms of their adoption of American methods and lifeways, or, to couch it another way, the level of their assimilation. Based on their responses to the new economy, the tribe had ordered itself into three classes. The first, and the one over which




Figure 40 Hunters in pursuit of a sleeping fur seal in the Pribilof Islands on August 7, 1894. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

the agent felt he had the least ability to induce change, included elderly Makah closely aligned with and bound to traditional Indian culture and values. “To prove” that the advancement of those on the opposite divide of the cultural spectrum from them, that is, the most progressive Makah Indians which, parenthetically, had been at first “slow” but “has been not only gradual but permanent, one has but to visit, first, the lodge of an old fossil of the tribe, of which there are but few remaining,” wrote Charles Willoughby, the Indian agent supervising the Makah reservation in 1881. He “still clings to the ways of his ancestors with a tenacity only terminated with death, and for one moment take in the utter disregard” for “comfort or convenience, to say nothing of the demands of common decency” ignored by this least acculturated segment of the Makah tribe [ARCIA 1881: 162].

To underline his point, Willoughby compared those tenaciously traditional tribal members to a second core grouping whom, he reported, were residing in “large though rudely-constructed cabin[s] of split boards, roomy, well ventilated, and arranged with some degree of taste, [and] certainly of convenience” [ARCIA 1881: 162]. These Indians were functioning within a complex middle ground in which they continued to demonstrate an allegiance to old forms and what had come before but, from a federal standpoint, were nonetheless undertaking positive strides to embrace the habits of the dominant society. They had reached the midway point to where it was hoped they would find themselves in the years ahead [White: 1991].



Figure 41 Sealing fleet in Victoria Harbor in 1894. University of Washington Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

The final classification of Makah, and the one which federal officials were obviously the proudest even if the result had not been attained through the favored conduit of agriculture, were those who were living in “neat” and “painted” cottages inside which one would not see “mahogany and

Eastlake” but rather “comfortable furniture, neat and clean blankets, and the luxury of a cook stove with its steaming pots and kettles.” Here the “father, mother, and children . . . [were] well clothed, and all apparently anxious to show visitors that they . . . [knew] how to enjoy the comforts of civilization—a contrast so great [to the first constituency] as to seem hardly credible” [ARCIA 1881: 162]. Notably, fur sealers and their families fell generally into this last category, their laudable acts of individual accomplishment an indication of how those national officials overseeing Indian assimilation perceived those Indians that had utilized their marine economy to take charge over their own acculturation.

On the Olympic Coast, as everywhere, the market reigned supreme. Some agents viewed fishing as simply too lucrative an endeavor to expect the Indians to give up and the only way to induce such a shift, they theorized, was for farming somehow to become considerably more remunerative than it was. Unfortunately, the means through which that was to happen was never made clear. “Thus far I have not induced the Indians to turn their attention to farming,” Makah agent Huntington admitted in 1874. “They are a sea-going people, more fond of fishing than of farming, and until a more encouraging field is provided for them than any that is now under cultivation, they can actually do better with the products of the sea than of the land, and will continue to seek the one and neglect the other. But when farming can be shown to pay better, I believe they will many of them be induced to change the habits of their life” [ARCIA 1874: 331].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING THE HARVESTS AND THEIR IMPACTS

THAT WAS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM. THE year 1874, for example, proved a great one for fur sealing after the down season of the year before. In 1873, the entire catch was documented at about fifteen hundred skins whereas in 1874 it increased nearly three-fold, to four thousand pelts, all but one thousand of which had been procured by Makah hunters. According to reports assessing the harvest, the season commenced earlier than usual and the number of animals available to be taken exceeded that of most years. In addition to the pelts, the Makah were utilizing fur seal for their oil, which was considered a commodity equal in quality to that of porpoise and dogfish. The Makah were also generating considerable traffic in whale oil, having sold one thousand gallons at 37.5 cents per gallon, while their catches in salmon and halibut were extensive, sufficient to provide not only for their own needs but also producing surpluses that could be sold. But again, the Makah were failing to squeeze out of their industry all that they might have. Huntington conjectured that had the Makah possessed “the proper appliances for preparing these fish for commerce a large revenue might . . . [have been] derived from them, for the finest salmon and halibut in the world abound in these waters” [ARCIA 1874: 332]. The fur seal pelts sold for five dollars apiece, returning to Makah hunters twenty thousand dollars in the aggregate.

Fur-sealing always exuded an international flavor. In the second half of the nineteenth century, raw skins were being marketed to British Columbia from where they were shipped directly to London for processing. The local monopoly that emerged on the Pacific Coast, however, stunted the prices that Indian hunters received for their peltry, an unhappy circumstance that prompted them to turn to the BIA for relief. In April 1874, superintendent Milroy visited the agency at Neah Bay to investigate charges of unfair treatment alleged by members of the Makah tribe. Finding “the business . . . more extensive” than he had “supposed” it to be, Milroy failed to uncover evidence of obvious wrongdoing, but he did find that upon “careful observation & inquiry a combination of influences” were “working serious injustice to the Indians” [Milroy: 1874]. The trade in fur seal peltry was “peculiar,” he posited, with all skins “on the coast from Alaska down” being “exported direct[ly] to England” where they were “colored by a secret process unknown” to anyone in the United States and then imported by American furriers for manufacture. Milroy concluded that the American market in raw skins was

limited to exporters and were not sold in any of the major commercial centers such as Portland or San Francisco “unless to some agent of an exporting firm in British Columbia” [Ibid.].

The export monopoly was working to the detriment of Olympic Peninsula hunters. According to Milroy, there were only three outlets on the Northwest coast where skins were bought and sold, Bahada Point at Neah Bay, Port Townsend in the interior of western Washington Territory, and Victoria, British Columbia, and all three operated under the same pricing regimen with a single entity controlling all aspects of the market. “Our own seal producing islands in Alaska are farmed out to parties who are connected with British operators who are all combined to keep down the price of seal skins and compel the Indians all along the coast to sell them at half their value,” Milroy reported. “Whenever any trader here or elsewhere acts independently of the combination, and offers more than the prescribed rate, then he finds himself opposed by the whole monopoly which don’t mind the sinking of a few thousand dollars to crush out an individual of small means that stands in their way” [Milroy: 1874]. As an example, Milroy offered that after a rival trading house opened at Bahada Point just inside the boundaries of the Makah reservation, the monopoly immediately shot up its prices in an attempt to undercut the firm and drive it out of business.

And that is what happened. The so-called monopoly trader, in Milroy’s view working in the interest of a Victoria exporting house, expended a total of seven thousand dollars by boosting their rate to fifteen dollars per skin to rid itself of its competitor. Then, as soon as the new trader at Neah Bay closed his doors, the old firm eased back their prices to \$4.50 a pelt, the same low-end figure that was being offered at Port Townsend and Victoria. “In one year,” the Bahada merchant “was entirely crushed out,” Milroy lamented. There was very little in it for Olympic Peninsula hunters. “Now there is no rival here or anywhere on the Straits. The combination have it all their own way. As it is they are entirely at the mercy of a monopoly both in selling and in buying,” Milroy concluded [Ibid.]. The superintendent suggested renting out the government building at Bahada Point to an independent trader for a nominal fee, in that way providing the agent with a leg up in the intense battle that was certain to ensue with the export monopoly traders.

By the latter nineteenth century, the fur-sealing industry in Washington was centered at four axis points: Seattle, Dungeness, Port Townsend, and Neah Bay. Seattle, a city of thirty thousand residents, constituted the most important fishing hub on Puget Sound in 1888. Besides

its vast fleet of vessels engaged in all aspects of the maritime industry, six pelagic sealing schooners claimed that city as their homeport, including two large New England ships from Gloucester, Massachusetts, the *Mollie Adams* and the *Edward E. Webster*. Port Townsend, about a sixth the size of Seattle and strategically positioned at the junction of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound, had five schooners that regularly sealed out of Neah Bay. Port Townsend—or the “Key City” as it was known—was also home to a trading house where sealmen came to dispose of their cargoes. In addition to those two ports, there was a single pelagic schooner, the 49.62-ton *Granger*, operating out of Dungeness with a crew of three white men and eighteen Klallam men as well as two Klallam women whose charge it was to dress the skins. Meanwhile, in 1879 at Neah Bay which ranked, outside of Victoria, British Columbia, as perhaps the most important fur-sealing harbor in the region, was homeport to another six schooners, the *Endora* from San Francisco and the *Champion*, the *Teaser*, the *Lottie*, the *Letitia*, and the *Mist*, the latter all out of Port Townsend. Also marking Neah Bay for its fishing vitality were some two hundred dugout canoes there, those owned by the nearly five hundred members of the Makah tribe and employed in the various fisheries of the Makah [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 244-54].

The unpredictability of the sealing seasons flashed starkly into evidence in 1887, a year that the federal agent characterized as “a disastrous one” for Indians. “Owing to the very stormy weather not more than half the number of seal were taken,” reported W. L. Powell. So brutal were the “fearful” conditions that the finest of the five Makah schooners dispatched from Neah Bay wrecked off Vancouver Island, causing the death by drowning of one Indian crewmember. Nonetheless, the harvest continued and in mid-August a Makah schooner carrying an all-Indian crew was in the Bering Sea pursuing seals [ARCIA 1887: 292].

Due to a series of factors, the returns proved no better the next year. The most immediate issue probably involved schooners hailing from San Francisco and Victoria that introduced the use of automatic weaponry rather than relying on the spears common at the time. Olympic Peninsula hunters detested the new technique, believing that the noise had the ruinous impact of scaring away the seals. The Indian agent argued, though, that if Indian hunters wanted to remain competitive in the industry, they too in the not-too-distant future would have to embrace such methods [ARCIA 1888: 225].

The 1888 harvest was far from a total loss. The *Granger*, operating out of Dungeness and outfitted with nine Klallam canoes and a mostly Klallam crew wielding a mix of guns and spears, returned a catch of 510 sealskins valued at \$2,550. Their season's work brought each Klallam hunter \$1.15 for each pelt while the captain received a set salary of seventy-five dollars per month and the white hunters a lesser salary of forty dollars per month. In addition, the vessels operating out of Port Townsend brought in 1,040 fur seal skins and another thirty sea otters, a haul valued at \$5,835 and \$3,450 for each cache of animals. Those sealing crews enjoyed a higher wage, two dollars for each fur seal recovered, while the boat pullers received fifty cents per pelt. The cooks also got a half dollar per skin and schooner captains earned an amount considered "regular wages" as well as "a commission on the gross stock." Meanwhile, the vessels sealing out of Neah Bay—according to the official federal report on Fish and Fisheries, the crews comprised almost entirely Indians and the vessels were in actuality Indian owned but the ruse was being used of employing white shipmasters to satisfy the customs regulation that those officers be citizens of the United States—took in 1,250 fur seals having a market value of \$5,925 [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 253-4].

Washington's year of statehood, 1889, proved important for a reason other than marking that historic milestone. That year three schooners from New England arrived off the Olympic Coast sporting large non-Indian crews and an elaborate array of smaller boats and equipment. The *Mollie Adams*, the *Edward E. Webster*, and the *Henry Dennis* successfully assimilated into the Pacific pelagic sealing fleet with their crews reputedly forging friendly relations with the native sealers of the region [Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries 1892: 251].

The fluctuations in catches, both per vessel and in the aggregate, were also evident in the 1890 and 1891 seasonal returns. In 1890, four schooners operated out of Neah Bay, three under Makah ownership—the *James G. Swan*, the *Lottie*, and the *C. C. Perkins*—and the *Teaser*, which belonged to a non-Indian based at Seattle. That year the *Swan* took in 136 seals, the *Lottie* 120, the *Teaser* 250, and the *Perkins* thirty, making for a final count of 536 skins. The following year, 1891, the number of kills doubled, with the *Swan* bringing in 160 pelts, the *Lottie* 480, the *Teaser* 195, and the *Perkins* 190, a total of 1,025 skins in all. The 1891 returns were so lucrative that Captain James Claplanhoo, skippering the *James G. Swan*, turned a net profit of seven to eight thousand dollars after paying all the expenses of his Bering Sea voyage. With his earnings, Claplanhoo deposited five thousand dollars in gold in the Merchant Bank of Port Townsend and,

in anticipation of the upcoming sealing season, he set his sights on the purchase of a second schooner [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 244].

Not all Indian schooners were moored at Neah Bay. At the beginning of the 1892 season in January, James Swan noted that a number of Makah sealmen known to him visited him in his Port Townsend office. They had come to fit out their schooners, the *Lottie* and the *James G. Swan*, for the forthcoming season. The vessels, Swan recounted, were docked there in “winter quarters” opposite the city in Scow Bay. To their Caucasian friend the Indians divulged that the seals were “unusually plentiful” that winter at Cape Flattery and Barkley Sound and they hoped, if the weather held, “to make a large catch” [Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration 1895: 243]. The next month another contingent of Makah sealers dropped in on Swan and while they were with him the conversation turned to sealing and the techniques and methodologies used by Indians in hunting them. From the Makah Swan learned that “whether they spear or shoot them,” the Indians lost “very few seals” as the hunters were always sure to creep “so near the seal at such times that they can recover them before they sink” [Ibid.].




Figure 42 Sealing schooners seized in the Bering Sea by United States Revenue Cutters and beached at Unalaska. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

By at least the decade of the 1880s, the fur-seal hunters of the Olympic Peninsula had made themselves largely self-supporting. That is to say, they had always provided for their own subsistence and survival and

in doing so had amassed an incredibly rich marine culture and heritage. But from the perspective of federal agents, the concept of “self-support” referred to the extent that tribes depended on what was known as government issue, or goods appropriated for the benefit of tribal members.

“Judging from the reports from other agencies, I should say these Indians are above the average, so far as being able to support themselves is concerned,” wrote agent Powell in 1888. “Nothing,” he assured the Indian Office, “is issued to them in the way of food or clothing, except to the helpless, sick, and indigent.” Powell noted that children in attendance in the reservation boarding school were cared for with government funds, but that expenditure was explained away as an investment in the future and a time when even that so-called largesse would not be necessary. Members of the Makah tribe “have a good deal of work done in the shops to fit them out in their fishing of different kinds; have their schooners repaired, [and] their few farming implements kept in order” [ARCIA 1888: 225].

Conditions at Quinault were much the same as those presenting at Neah Bay and elsewhere. Tribal members were making a heady showing in their fisheries and there was little that could disabuse them of that occupational preference. The Quinault, along with the Queets, the Hoh, the Quileute, and the Klallam had most everything they needed and then some and there seemed little incentive to change—particularly for the sake of a policy that ran counter to their own sensibilities and which conflicted with their own already fully vetted economic pursuits. Thomas H. Hay of Taholah submitted a rosy agency report in 1870, bragging that the salmon run that season had supplied plentiful catches of “supreme quality” fish as well as a sizable harvest of fur seal skins, altogether an abundance that had left the tribes by their own admission better off than they had ever been [ARCIA 1870: 48].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULATION AND ITS AFTERMATH

SO LARGE BECAME THE ANNUAL FUR SEAL CATCH FROM THE 1880s onward—more than one hundred thousand skins in peak years—that the United States took energetic steps with other nations to stop what many officials believed would result in the ultimate extermination of the Pribilof herd. First indication of heightened American involvement appeared in the mid-1880s: the federal government claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the eastern Bering Sea. When United States officials seized several sealing schooners of Canadian registry operating in those waters in 1886, the Bering Sea controversy erupted. Half a decade of negotiations between the United States and Great Britain resulted in the litigants agreeing in 1891 to a temporary *modus vivendi* to prohibit sealing in the Bering Sea. A year later in 1892 a treaty was signed that submitted the issue to arbitration. In 1893 an international tribunal convened in Paris to take testimony. In December 1897, the federal government banned the killing, capturing, or hunting of pelagic seals by all United States citizens except Native hunters using traditional weapons. In 1911, the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention obligated Britain, Japan, Russia, and the United States to the same conventions that had been unilaterally adopted by the Americans in 1897 [Collins 1996: 187].

Ramifications of the American government's assertion of authority over the Bering Sea reached Cape Flattery in July 1889. Federal officials seized the fifty-nine-ton sealing schooner *James G. Swan*, owned and operated by twenty-one-year-old Makah Chestoqua Peterson for breaking U. S. laws that restricted pelagic sealing. Seventy miles off St. George Island, the revenue cutter *Rush* had spotted the crew taking seals in violation of a statute that forbid such activity in Alaskan waters under penalty of forfeiture of vessel, tackle, and cargo. Sharply contesting the confiscation, the Makah sued. Their counsel was James G. Swan for whom their schooner was named. Although Swan considered sealing to be in contradiction to the primary tenants of assimilation, its importance as an economic staple compelled him to defend it. Swan argued that the seizure violated the 1855 treaty which, he believed, sustained the tribe in its right to hunt and fish on the high seas. As the basis for his position, he cited article 4 of the treaty language: "The right of taking fish and of whaling or sealing at usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the United States, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting

and gathering roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands: *Provided, however*, that they shall not take shell-fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens” [Collins 1996: 187-9; Kappler 1904: 682].

The Peterson case stood as a precursor to later treaty adjudications, a congeries of suits that appeared before the courts in the mid- and late-twentieth century. In 1952, *Makah Indian Tribe et al. v. Schoettler* determined that state fishing regulations could displace treaty provisions, but only if states could demonstrate that the legislation had been imposed as a necessary conservation measure. The controversial *United States v. Washington* (in 1974 and commonly known as the Boldt decision) defined procurement allowances for harvestable salmon. A decade later, *United States v. Washington* disallowed a treaty right to fishing venues that had been made accessible with the arrival of modern technology, but which had not been established as “usual and accustomed” places in 1855 [Collins 1996: 187-9].

Whether the Makah’s treaty superseded covenants entered into between the United States and foreign governments formed the crux of the 1889 dispute. James Swan maintained, in *United States v. The James G. Swan*, that the treaty afforded tribal members a higher claim, or a special license, to seal as they always had except now by using modern equipment, a guarantee which could not be abridged by international agreement. Cornelius H. Hanford, district judge for the Ninth Circuit, disagreed however, finding it “obvious . . . that the treaty secures to the Indians only an equality of rights and privileges in the matter of fishing, whaling, and sealing.” The treaty, he ruled, insured for the Makah rights “in common with all citizens of the United States, [but] certainly such treaty stipulations give no support to a claim for peculiar or superior rights or privileges denied to citizens of the country in general.” Judge Hanford ordered that Peterson forfeit ownership of the schooner [Collins 1996: 187-9].

During this period in 1891 the “modus vivendi” that was reached between the United States and Great Britain placed further restrictions on pelagic sealing. In addition to limiting the seasons and excluding firearms from the Bering Sea, prohibited as well was the killing of fur seals until May of the following year in certain parts of the Bering Sea “in excess of the 7,500 to be taken on the islands for the subsistence and care of the natives.” To give teeth to the moratorium, “Every vessel or person offending against the prohibition in the said waters of Bering Sea, outside the ordinary territorial limits of the United States” was rendered subject to seizure and detainment “by the naval or other duly commissioned officers of either of the high

contracting parties; but they shall be handed over as quickly as practicable to the authorities of the nation to which they respectively belong[ed]” who alone maintained “jurisdiction to try the offense and impose the penalties for the same” [Wright 1895: 436].

The *modus vivendi* of 1891 would be superseded by even more aggressive and extensive legislation in 1911 (to take effect in the 1913 season) that constricted the industry. According to one study, “By the outbreak of World War I the only large-scale commercial North American sealing was of the two substantial herds remaining in the subarctic waters on either side of the continent: the northern fur seals of the Pribilofs, and the harp and hood seals of the Northwest Atlantic” [Busch 1985: 224]. Another source decried that “Victoria was the home port of three score two-masted schooners engaged in the pelagic sealing industry—an industry peculiar to this port, which began soon after the dawn of settlement on these shores, and continued until a treaty wiped it out in 1911. It is now a dead industry” [Smith n. d. (a): 1].

Despite the unfavorable judgment rendered against them and the introduction of additional regulation, the Makah remained steadfast in their determination to continue fur sealing in the northern Pacific Ocean. Their efforts, however, met with no better results. Customs officials seized two more schooners in June 1894 and, in August 1896, the *James G. Swan* (now operating under different ownership) was again detained. Without doubt, the regulations and confiscations deleteriously affected Indian fur-seal harvests; in fact, the Makah’s bold penetration of the non-Indian’s highly specialized and industrialized economic system had seemingly been brought to an abrupt halt. A Seattle newspaper sympathized. Commenting in May 1894, a reporter submitted that the Cape Flattery Indians had skillfully managed to transform their traditional mode of living to suit the Anglo-American commercial economy only to be told suddenly that their labors and investments had been in vain: “Since white men have gone into the business these Indians found it impossible to follow it up successfully unless they adopted the white men’s methods, so they have invested thousands of dollars in the purchase of seagoing sealing schooners, which they have fitted up, manned and provided with improved firearms. They are now informed that they cannot pursue this business any longer, but must abandon their schooners and fall back on their primitive methods” [Collins 1996: 189].

Two weeks later, the same paper editorialized again. Federal restriction, its columns read, “practically compels [the Makah] to abandon the [sealing] business altogether” [Collins 1996: 189].

The journalist likely overreached in his assessment of the damage. Although obviously bowed, the sealing economy of the Makah had not been broken. Yet the requirement that tribal members use only traditional accoutrements, together with a sharp downturn in fur seal prices—20 percent in 1896 alone—retarded profits. The statutes, moreover, though effective in the long run, proved ineffectual in preserving the herds in the short term. After conducting an examination of the evidence, one historian bluntly stated: “The regime of seal protection introduced by the regulations of the Paris Tribunal and special agreements that soon followed proved a total failure” [Tomasevich 1943: 89]. The Makah would continue to hunt fur seals, but from that point forward their annual communal earnings would rarely rise above a few thousand dollars.

And yet fur sealing remained the best thing going. By 1891 the fur-seal industry comprised one of the most gainful business opportunities on the Pacific Coast. In fact, data shows that in terms of sea mammals, fur sealing ranked second only to whaling in both the amount of capital investment and the profits that could be expected. In 1889, the total outlay in all branches of sea mammal extraction totaled \$2,081,636. Of that figure, \$1,913,275 had been expended on pelagic whaling, \$15,604 on shore whaling, and \$152,757 on fur seal and otter fishing. (It should be noted that sealskins constituted by far the most common product of the commercial sea trade, but it accounted for a disproportionately lesser percentage of the revenues generated. For example, 3,478 fur seal pelts sold for \$19,580 or \$5.63 per skin, while just 28 sea otter skins brought \$3,500 or \$125 per skin; as another point of comparison, a single cargo of fur seal was said to be worth ten of halibut) [Port Townsend Morning Leader 1903 b: 2].

Statistics compiled on infrastructure told a similar story. There were 101 vessels engaged in the whale fishery, forty-two of which were stationed in the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean, thirty-six in the Atlantic Ocean, nine in the Okhotsk and Japan seas, eight in the south Pacific Ocean, and six in the Indian Ocean. Of the nineteen fur seal and sea otter vessels, eleven hailed from San Francisco, seven from Port Townsend, and one each from Santa Barbara, California, and Salem, Massachusetts. The pelagic whale fishery employed 3,017, shore whaling seventy-four, and fur seal and sea otter fishing 422, under half (or 155) of whom were Indians fishing off Cape Flattery. Although almost the totality of all whale fishing was being conducted by fishing fleets originating from outside the region, as late as 1889 Makah Indians were the “irregular” pursuers of shore whales. The seven schooners operating out of Port Townsend were actually

based at Neah Bay and included the *Challenge* (37.69 tons), the *C. C. Perkins* (25.38 tons), the *Granger* (49.62 tons), the *James G. Swan* (a 44.33-ton steamer), the *Lottie* (28.60 tons), the *Mary Parker* (58.50 tons), and the *Teazor* (31.61 tons) [Census Bulletin 1891: 15]. Fur-seal hunters had, from any standpoint, placed their hopes and their finances at the mercy and vicissitudes of the fur-sealing industry.

For all the advantages of their fisheries, there was cause for concern. Makah hunters, for example, were amply aware that a downward spiral experienced in one sector of their economy could seep into others, a reality that they had tried to guard against for years. In 1880, James Swan calculated that the seven-hundred-member tribe had caught 1,586,200 pounds of fresh halibut during the season, an amount that after drying and canning for winter use weighed in at 395,555 pounds. Just over a decade later in 1891, the Makah numbered 454 persons and their catch of fresh halibut had dropped to 280,000 pounds. The agent in charge of the reservation assigned blame for the decline to the failure of the Makah to keep up with the highly-mechanized competition that was now infiltrating tribal waters each year. In 1891, a mosquito fleet of some twenty fishing boats and another four or five schooners—all owned and manned by non-Indians—converged on Cape Flattery and, “with their improved appliances,” took in “enormous quantities” of halibut. According to the agent, “One of the schooners left the bay with 35,000 pounds of fresh halibut packed in ice, [bound] for up-sound ports, the fish to be shipped east by rail.” Meanwhile, two of the other schooners bagged twenty-five thousand pounds apiece, that product preserved in cold storage in Seattle waiting shipment to eastern markets [ARCIA 1891: 447-8].

It was a daunting display of industrial might. The Caucasian launch of crew and equipment and infrastructure comprised a strength of force that could not be matched by the Makah. Despite continuous appeals by Indian hunters and, by extension, Indian Office personnel to upgrade the fishing assets of the tribe, the entreaties fell largely without effect. The expected support failed to materialize and the result was the infliction of injury on Makah fishermen and their families as well as the entirety of the tribe. “I would respectfully call your attention to one very great demand brought on by white competition; that is, a knowledge of the latest improved methods and appliances for curing and packing fish for shipment as a source of revenue,” agent John P. McGlinn related in a message that could just as easily have been sent decades before. “Their present method of sun-drying, with thousands of flies covering the exposed fish, is rather

primitive, and would hardly recommend itself to the taste of an epicure, neither is it a desirable article of commerce” [ARCIA 1891: 447]. Still, the colonization of their waters and fisheries constituted a troubling turn of events about which the Makah were far from pleased. Tribal members viewed “with jealousy the encroachments of the white men on what they . . . [had] always regarded as their exclusive possessions” and now found “for the first time in their history that white competition . . . [had] overstocked” and, in the opinion of agent McGlinn, would “eventually take from them a market of which heretofore they . . . [had] had almost a monopoly” [p. 448].

And yet fur-seal fishing continued to hum along. The 1891 season was rated a success with peltry commanding excellent prices, only ten dollars per skin at season’s start, but eventually edging upwards to \$19.50 and most of the Makah peltry selling for no less than fifteen dollars per

skin. That year members of the tribe owned three schooners. Remaining “at the bay” all season was the *Perkins* and its all-Indian crew, which gathered three thousand dollars in fur-seal skins while the *James G. Swan* and



Figure 43 Members of the Makah tribe in a canoe towing a whale on a whale hunt. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

the *Lottie* churned out to the Bering Sea where at Sand Point, just south of the Alaskan Peninsula, the *Swan* was overtaken by a revenue cutter and ordered back to Neah Bay. Fortuitously for its Makah crewmembers, the vessel was allowed to keep its catch of 155 pelts, 125 of which were sold for \$19.50 per skin and the other thirty at eighteen dollars each. The nearly three thousand dollars in revenue that the

coats generated proved a great boon to the entire tribe as did the northern catch of the *Lottie* and the earnings of those Makah employed on the non-Indian-owned *Teazer*. Its crew harvested another two hundred pelts [ARCIA 1891: 448].

In addition to all that activity, tribal whalers captured twelve “of those monsters of the deep” that season, selling the oil to neighboring tribes for the price of one dollar per gallon and setting aside meat and oil for themselves as well. According to the agent at Neah Bay, fur-sealing at Cape Flattery took place some twenty to thirty miles offshore with Indian hunters paddling out of the main village in the middle of the night and then returning with their catches by the following nightfall. The incredible courage and fortitude exhibited by Makah fishermen had a profound impact on their federal supervisor who commented that it struck him “very forcibly that a tribe of Indians hardy and brave . . . in their frail cedar canoes to engage in such perilous business that require[d] undaunted courage, self-possession, and presence of mind, *have all the elements of a great people*” [author’s emphasis; ARCIA 1891: 448].

The bell tolled often and loudly and for many reasons the next year. Although the average price per pelt dipped to just eleven dollars in 1892, the seasonal catch by Makah hunters of



Figure 44 Quinault sea otter derrick located on the Washington Coast between Copalis Beach and Point Grenville, circa 1885. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

1,931 fur seals equated to a “respectable sum” of \$21,241. Bolstered by those returns, the Indians added two schooners to the five that went out that year and they also caught three whales as well as “great quantities” of halibut, cod, sea bass, and salmon. Executives of the Puget Sound Fish Company in Tacoma, recognizing the production generated at Cape Flattery, dispatched the steamer *Francis Cutter* to that place. Undertaking biweekly excursions from Commencement Bay to the far edge of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the floating container car procured from Indian and white fishermen twelve to sixty tons of fresh fish each week. Packed in ice, the product was preserved in cold storage in Tacoma until ready for market and shipment to New York [ARCIA 1892: 495]. The vitality of the harvests continued to validate the faith placed in them. In 1893, despite the wreck of the *Lottie* in the Strait of Juan de Fuca during the pounding of a hellacious storm, 1,752 fur seal pelts taken by Makah hunters sold for \$19,272 [ARCIA 1893: 326].

They composed a small but eclectic workforce. In 1892 there were at least twenty-one Makahs engaged in the industry, who ranged in age from twenty-four to sixty-six years. Most had been sealing all their lives or, as they put it, “ever since I was a boy” or “since I was old enough,” or “more or less all my life.” But that was not always the case. Frank Davis, the oldest Makah sealer, had been going out for seventeen years, which fit a pattern for most participants who said that they had been sealing for about fifteen to twenty years, or, beginning in a period that dated around the late 1870s. In fact, Jeff Davis told an interviewer that he had been sealing since 1876. Several of the sealers received their introduction to the occupation at a very early age: Jeff Davis was only eight years old when he started. Thomas Zolnoks was just a year older than that. Osly was ten [Lane: n. d.].

Census data indicates that there were Klallam sealers as well. In 1881, George Butler, age forty-four, was dually listed as a fisherman and a fur sealer. A year older than Butler, Jim Pysht was designated under those same occupations as was seventeen-year-old Tenas Charley and twenty-five-year-old Tenas Jack. John Mesachie, age fifty, was classified as a fisherman, a fur sealer, and a shaman [Klallam-Pysht Census: 1881].

The revenues generated by Makah fishermen began to seep into all aspects of tribal life. Most immediately, the money allowed individual tribal members to assume ownership over many of the businesses in the main village of Neah Bay on the reservation. By 1892, the two mercantile stores in town had been purchased and were being operated by full-blood-degree Makahs, one of whom had bought out the white trader, paying cash for the three thousand dollars

in merchandise that was included in the transaction. Meanwhile, the hotel was also acquired by another full-blood-degree Makah who planned to invest one thousand dollars of his earnings to erect “a more pretentious building for the accommodation of his guests” [ARCIA 1892: 495].

More than just economic enterprises were being affected. The year 1892 also represented a milestone in the curriculum of the boarding school operating on the reservation. That spring the decision was made for five boys to go out for a few days fur-seal hunting with their fathers. The experiment generated quick dividends as all-together the students caught thirty fur seals, which returned to them something over three hundred dollars in cash [ARCIA 1892: 497], success that prompted the industrial school teacher to extend the opportunity again the following year. “When we take into consideration the utter unfitness for agricultural pursuits of the Makah Reservation, it is evident to one familiarly acquainted with their situation, that for maintenance and existence these Indians must necessarily depend upon other resources for a livelihood,” the educator explained. “They are, however, tributary to the inexhaustible seal, whale, and halibut fisheries of the Pacific Ocean, and are rapidly branching out in this industry, which even now yields them a large revenue” [ARCIA 1893: 327]. Reckoning agriculture to be essentially a dead letter on the north Pacific Coast, the teacher decided to move in a different direction.

Having mulled over every possibility and convinced that it was the best thing to do, he masterminded the forward-looking decision to educate his students in the fine art of fishing which, no matter how he broached it to the Indian Office, entailed a de-emphasis of national agrarian policy. To justify the change in course, the teacher wrote that

It is therefore apparent that the future success and prosperity of the boys that are now being educated here will depend largely upon their efficiency in handling vessels and their knowledge of sealing, whaling, and fishing. With these facts in view, I have considered it a pleasure to permit five of the older boys to make frequent trips with their fathers during the sealing season, and had it not been greatly to our disadvantage, owing to the limited number of large boys to perform the industrial work, I should have encouraged this part of their education with a greater degree of enthusiasm [ARCIA 1893: 327].

Concluded the man proudly, “They were all very successful and remuneratively rewarded for their efforts” [Ibid.].

Even more curious was the pedagogy employed by another government teacher just two years later. He had the male students under his supervision construct model replicas of the

sealing crafts of their parents, a curricular initiative which was designed to showcase their prowess with wood and carpentry tools. “The boys, both large and small, have, under my immediate care,” he reported without hesitation or fear of censure, “made 35 miniature full-rigged schooners, as complete as could be constructed, from leaden keel to top mainsail, and to the great delight of all the school these little crafts have been sailed during some of the pleasant summer evenings on the calm and placid waters of the bay” [ARCIA 1895: 317].

The highpoint of commercial fur sealing could not be sustained. Statistics gathered on pelagic fur seal catches and recorded at Victoria, British Columbia, shed light on the scope of the harvests, although Indian hunters active off the Washington coast also transported their furs to Port Townsend, a fact which rendered the Victoria figures likely more revealing of trends than the actual number of seals taken. From what can be gleaned from the Canadian records, between the years 1883 and 1911, the peak year for fur sealing in terms of vessels was 1892. Sixty-six were launched that year, although the five years that elapsed between 1890 and 1895 witnessed a consistently high number of schooners operating in the industry with no less than fifty-one participating in the hunts during that span. In that same period and by about a two to one ratio, white laborers dominated over Indians. For example, in 1891 there were 716 non-Indian and 336 Indian sealers based out of Victoria. The next year the number was 961 compared to 571 followed by 847 white and 432 Indian sealers in 1893 and 888 and 578 in 1894, respectively. In 1895, a major shift occurred when, for the first time, the number of Indian sealers outpaced white hunters 854 to 705, a trend that persisted through the 1911 season, with only one exception, in the year 1908 [Victoria Pelagic Sealers n. d.: 1].

In June 1893, Makah sealers were observed marketing their fur seal peltry in Seattle. That month Clohosth, the father of another sealman, Schuyler Colfax, negotiated the eighteen-ton schooner *Amateur* into the city. Carrying a cargo of 208 skins, those comprised the returns of a three-week voyage. Per custom, a third of the money received for his catch was allocated to the schooner owner with the remainder dispersed among the crew of seal hunters. In addition to the *Amateur*, there were some dozen other Makah sealing schooners operating on the Pacific and those earning a “considerable sum every sealing season” [Port Angeles Democrat-Leader: 1893]. As a result of the sealing business, the Makah could aptly be described as “entirely self-supporting” [Ibid.]. The schooner itself represented a significant fourteen-hundred-dollar investment.

Regulation continued to play havoc with Makah sealing operations. As they did every season, tribal hunters ventured out in their schooners a distance of some twenty to fifty miles to confront the herd on its annual approach off the Pacific Coast. A few days of hunting resulted in a harvest of three hundred pelts, which were hauled back to the village of Neah Bay and then transported to Victoria where they were sold. Meanwhile, the five or six revenue cutters operating out of Puget Sound and which had to pass directly by the Makah sealing fleet on their passage to the sea, became aware of the fur seals that had been taken. The revenue cutter *Grant*, in support of recent legislation, coasted into Neah Bay where its crew carried out the seizure of the Makah schooners. Adding hurt if not humiliation to heartbreak for the Indian hunters, the owners of the vessels were ordered to deliver them to customs officials in Port Townsend and then to pay their own fares back to Neah Bay aboard the steamer. The Makah hunters, backed by the testimony of their agent, alleged that they had never been informed of the desist order not to seal, a stance which was upheld later in the summer, but not before a good portion of the harvest season was over. "Sealing is the principal industry among these Indians," their agent informed the Indian Office, "and the new international treaty as to seal hunting on the North Pacific and in Bering Sea is a great hardship to them" and "to be told now that they can not do this . . . is something they can not readily understand" [ARCIA 1894: 316].

The Makah got their schooners back, but the April 30 sealing cut off threatened to be costly. As a possible solution to the issue, their agent proposed that they be allowed to use their schooners as a safe haven of sorts, transporting Indians and their canoes far out to sea and remaining there as sanctuary in dangerous weather and then returning the sealers back to the coast with their dugouts and their catches. In this scenario, spears and not rifles would be the weaponry of choice and the season would be extended until June 1 if not longer. The Indian Office did not act on the recommendations and, at least in the immediate aftermath of the international law going into effect, the harvests did not suffer. 1894 bested the previous season. Twenty-five hundred fur seals were taken and the Indian agent at Neah Bay conjectured "that had they been permitted to seal a month longer, from the quantity that were running, they in all probability would have doubled this number" [ARCIA 1894: 316].

Meanwhile the Bering Sea remained a target. Two Makah schooners hauled there in the 1894 season. The *Columbia* and the *Deeahks*, coasting out of Neah Bay for that place, left with the intention of "spearing" fur seals after August 1. According to the agency report, a good many

of the occupants of the reservation were either on those two boats or at Westminster, British Columbia, where they had gone to fish for salmon bound for the cannery there. The exodus left very few Indians at Cape Flattery and those mostly comprising elderly men and women and small children and even their presence was thought tenuous. Adult Makah were busy catching halibut off the coast and the young people were preparing to leave for the hop and potato fields of Puget Sound. There it was expected they would remain until the middle of October [ARCIA 1894: 317].

Storm clouds, however, always seemed to be gathering on the horizon. In July 1895, customs officials arrested a coterie of Neah Bay sealers allegedly for smuggling goods out of Victoria, British Columbia, but without having paid customs duties on what had been taken. Landes Kallappa and his crew of Makah hunters had traveled to that place transporting a cargo of twenty-one fur seal skins when they ran afoul of the law [Port Angeles Democrat-Leader b: 1895]. The contraband, with an estimated market value of three hundred dollars and consisting of raiment, articles of food, luxury items, and two canoes appraised at eighty dollars, was seized by customs officials at Neah Bay. When they were brought into court, the Makah defendants were remanded to the Neah Bay reservation and ordered by the judge to pay either the customs duty fee or face forfeiture of the goods [Port Angeles Democrat-Leader a: 1895].

The greatest year to date in the history of Makah fur-sealing came in 1896. That season a record forty-four thousand dollars was collectively earned in the sale of peltry, all of which originated from hunting that had taken place on the high seas. With the money in their pockets from that haul, their agent could honestly say that he had never seen a more industrious people. Both the men and women had performed the “hardest of manual labor” [ARCIA 1895: 315]. And while the government official admitted that there were some elderly and infirm who depended on federal assistance, he said that there were many more Makah who had been able to salt away funds for future use. Meanwhile, on top of everything else going on, garden vegetables continued to constitute all that could be grown on the reservation and even those products lacked a market. Tellingly, older adult Makah reportedly knew “scarcely nothing” of farming and it was only those recently educated in the boarding school who understood that root crops could be raised more cheaply than they could be purchased in open market [Ibid.].

The voyage of the *Deeahks* in 1897 gives another indication of the nature of the seal hunts. Owned and skippered by forty-eight-year-old James Claplanhoo, the double-masted forty-

two-ton schooner coasted out of Neah Bay on January 26 carrying a mixed crew of two Indians and one white man as well as ten Indian hunters. Hauling ten canoes and well fortified with an arsenal of four rifles and twenty spears, the *Deeahks* remained in U. S. and British Columbian waters for nearly five months, until May 1, amassing a catch of one male and twenty-nine female fur seals, nine of which had been shot and the remainder that had been speared. There were at least another four Olympic Peninsula shipmasters out on the high seas that season, including eighteen-year-old Jongie James (or Claplanhoo), the son of the head chief of the Makah tribe [Lane: n. d.].

Sealing attracted substantial interest in the best means of preserving the herds. Pelagic sealing—that is the method of taking mammals at sea—inflicted the greatest damage on the herds and considerably more than land sealing. The problems that arose in harvesting seals on water was said to lay in the difficulty of differentiating the age and sex of the animals and being able to identify those seals “not necessary to the natural growth of the herd” [Commerce Report: 1931]. As described in one report documenting the drawbacks of pelagic sealing, “no selection of individuals is possible, animals of both sexes and of all ages being killed indiscriminately, the young whose mothers are killed at sea starve ashore, and the skins of the animals secured average of lower grade than when animals are selected for killing on shore” [Ibid.]. Summarized the author of the study: “Killing at sea is not only economically wasteful but when practiced threatens the very existence of the fur seals from the commercial standpoint” [Ibid.].

The half decade from 1890 to 1895 also represented the pinnacle in terms of the number of sealskins taken, maximizing out at 95,048 pelts in 1894, a figure preceded by 70,592 seals in 1893 and followed by another 73,614 in 1895. The greatest recorded value (figures are not available for all years) of fur-seal peltry occurred in 1900. That season 35,523 skins translated to a market value of \$562,845 [Victoria Pelagic Sealers n. d.: 1]. But the seasonal fluctuations could be hair-raising to those that fell on the short end of the harvests. Established in 1881 and for some sixteen years, the Washington Fur Company had been collecting between two and twelve hundred skins per year among the Quileute at La Push and shipping them to Port Townsend for inspection and then onward to Victoria. By June 28, 1897, however, they had only purchased eight. “As seals are the equivalent, and more, of money we are unexpectedly sure shook,” the trader there wrote [Washington Fur Company: 1897]. Hunters sealing off the beach in small canoes had achieved no better success than those further out in schooners. In another

letter, he reiterated: “We regret to report no sealing here yet. Such a season we have not had in 15 years; and therefore no business of any account; that is we have no seals and therefore no collections” [Ibid.]. Marred by inclement weather, the season ended the first week of July with Quileute hunters having failed to bring in additional peltry. The sealing season was a “complete failure,” the trader remarked later that month, “and the goods that ordinarily would have been converted into sealskins and thence cash are on our shelves” [Ibid.]. “I am so hard up for money,” he lamented at another point, “owing to no sealing and the consequent lack of business” [Ibid.].

In the summer of 1896, the owner of the Washington Fur Company, who also operated a salmon processing plant at La Push, was contacted by members of the Queets tribe. They wanted a similar establishment opened on their reservation. The Queets Indians, the trader informed United States Senator John L. Wilson of Washington State, were wholly dependent on “hunting and fishing for their subsistence,” but lacked a market for any of their resources [Washington Fur Company: 1897]. Queets fishermen had the choice of either traveling thirty miles south to Grays Harbor or fifty miles north to Neah Bay to dispose of their product. The Washington Fur Company sought the assistance of the senator in securing a license from the Indian Bureau to fish and trade on the Queets reservation [Ibid.].

The 1902 season proved disappointing, particularly so when it is taken into account that the hunters spotted a large number of seals that they were unable to get to due to adverse weather conditions. The Bering Sea roiled and turned almost from the beginning. For sixteen days a howling gale blew, rendering it absolutely impossible to lower a single boat and in the final fifteen days of the season they were put down on just four occasions. Owing to the punishing state of the seas, only three of the sealing fleet could be sighted: the *Victoria* on August 29 with a catch of 109 skins, the *Zillah May* a day earlier with forty-six skins, and the venerable *Favourite* on September 7 with 109 skins. According to a media source, “each schooner had the same story of bad weather to report” [Port Townsend Daily Leader 1902 a: 4].

That year the catch of the *Victoria* sealers operating in the Bering Sea amounted to fewer than six thousand skins, a decrease of forty-five-hundred pelts from the number taken the year before and even the catch off the coast of British Columbia was half of the previous spring run. The number of schooners nosing out of Victoria that year was down as well, from a count of twenty-four to fourteen, which meant that the average catch per craft had actually remained

fairly constant. Statistics across the board were retarded from what they had been in 1900 when thirty-eight schooners harvested 17,577 skins in the Bering Sea. In the 1902 season by comparison, the total catch by all nations operating in the north Pacific Ocean amounted to a mere twenty thousand pelts, which was said to be the worst catch in years [Port Townsend Leader 1902 b: 3].




Figure 45 Sealing schooner *Dora Siewerd* in the Bering Sea in August-September 1895. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

If hunters rated the 1902 season a poor one, the next year proved only “satisfactory,” at least according to descriptions of the returns. The season started slowly and in a discouraging fashion. Few fur seals were found near Copper Island, a

development which required captains to switch their compass points and haul over to the Bering Sea. Meanwhile, a crewmate on one of the schooners contracted smallpox, a disastrous turn that forced the skipper to pull into Sitka where his full crew was placed under twenty-day quarantine. In the end, the 787 fur seals taken by the *Dora Siewerd* distinguished her as the “topliner” of the season closely followed by the *Triumph* with 689 pelts in addition to three hundred pounds of whalebone. Many captains expressed their intention to remain at sea for as long as their provisions held out in order to make up for the sluggish start to the season [Port Townsend Morning Leader 1903 a: 1].

Extractive industries always spawn dangerous occupations and fur-seal hunting was no exception. At no time did that prove more apparent than in the 1904 season. That year three

sealing schooners sunk to the bottom resulting in significant losses of life. For three weeks in April pieces of wreckage ominously drifted to shore off the coast of Vancouver Island, those the stark and tragic remains of the *Triumph*, the *Kailua*, and the *Lamorna*. In the case of the *Triumph*, that British sealing schooner had been skirting off the coasts of Washington and Oregon for several weeks before turning north to Hesquiat Sound off north Vancouver Island in late February. Vital requisitions of fresh food and supplies awaited her there in preparation for a scheduled jaunt to the Bering Sea. But the *Triumph* never arrived. Last spotted off the mouth of the Columbia River, the schooner apparently broke apart in a terrible north Pacific gale. Not a single sealing vessel escaped harm during the tempest, but the fate of the *Triumph* soon became known. “While there was some uneasiness over the non-appearance of the *Triumph* immediately after the storm when the other vessels began arriving [back at port], no positive alarm was felt until a few days ago, when the name board of the vessel was picked up on Entrance Island at the mouth of Quatsino Sound” [Port Townsend Daily Leader 1904: 1]. In total, the three shipwrecks caused the deaths of sixty crewmembers and a quarter million dollars in property loss [Ibid.]. In the 1906 season, a similar weather-attributable disaster occurred. The schooner *Fawn*, sailing out of the Bering Sea carrying a cargo of 502 sealskins and a crew of six white and twenty-one Indians, never reached its destination of Victoria. Its destruction was finally confirmed after its name board was picked up in the surf [Port Townsend Daily Leader 1906: 4].

In the 1905 season a considerable Indian presence continued to be felt in pelagic fur sealing. That year there were ten vessels employing Indian crews (and five with all-white crews) including the *Alli I. Algar*, the *Dora Seward*, the *Libbie*, the *Victoria*, the *Zillah May*, the *Carrie C. W.*, the *Ida Etta*, the *Ainoka*, the *Director*, and the *Teresa*. All of those schooners, sailing out of Victoria, returned lucrative salaries to Native sealmen. The *Libbie*, for example, harvested a total of 1,079 skins in 1905, a catch that remunerated to its Indian crewmembers \$9,222.70. The least amount returned to any vessel was the *Zillah May*, which took in 302 fur seal pelts and paid out \$3,147.80 in wages. The total payout in Indian fur sealing earnings in 1905 amounted to \$54,320.80 with another \$1,939.00 dispersed in bonuses. 6,085 fur seal skins were taken by Indian hunters that year, garnering the second highest average price before the imposition of the 1911 treaty, \$24.50 per skin [Victoria Sealing Fleet: 1905].

The 1905 fur-seal season on the Washington and Oregon coasts turned out to be the best one experienced by Indian hunters in years. One hundred Quinault hunters navigating a fleet of

twenty canoes achieved eighty kills right off in January, retrieving and returning to Taholah with the full carcasses of the animals. Those were subsequently skinned and butchered, allowing the members of the tribe to enjoy a great “winter feast” of seal steaks at all three meals: breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Meanwhile, the oil was tried out for year-round use and the pelts were preserved for shipment to Victoria where they were transported for sale [Port Townsend Daily Leader 1905: 2].

Although the ten schooners realized a net profit of nearly ten thousand dollars per vessel, the 450 non-Indians and Indians engaged in the sealing industry represented a decline over



Figure 46 Indian fishermen on the Pacific Coast prepare to eat a meal of seal meat. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

previous years. In 1891 there had been more than double that number of sealmen—1,082—with another several thousand employed in the manufacture and processing of the sealskins in the continental United States. By the turn of the century, the principal sealing grounds comprised the north Pacific Ocean, but

there were also herds in the south Pacific Ocean, “off Cape Horn, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Argentine coast, where the Argentine government” had taken measures to protect “the rookeries on Lobos Island” [Smith n. d.: 79]. There were rookeries on the Kurile Islands as well but “the chief rookeries of the world” were “those in the Bering Sea, on the Pribilof Islands and on the Commanderofski Islands, Copper and Bering Isles, and on the Robben bank in the Okhotsck Sea. The rookeries in the Bering Sea fell under American control, [and] the Commanderofski and Robben rookeries under Japanese jurisdiction” [Ibid.].

In October 1906, a story appeared in the *Victoria Daily Times* documenting the eight-month seal-hunting journey of the sixty-four-ton sealing schooner *City of San Diego*. Coasting

out of Victoria in the third week of January, the vessel cruised through the Strait of Juan de Fuca to Cape Flattery, encountering severe weather at Neah Bay and a harbor full of other crafts, those ranging from “four-masted schooners and full rigged ships, all outward bound” [Victoria Daily Times: 1906]. Once the skies cleared, the *City of San Diego* hoisted sails and voyaged into the open ocean. Turning south and with their minds filled with images of “seals thicker than bees,” the sealmen traveled all the way down the coast to Monterey [Ibid.]. But failing to locate herds anywhere close to the amount that had cluttered their dreams and tormented by additional inclement skies, the mariners reversed course, having procured only a few fur seal skins [Ibid.].


Navigating their way back past Cape Flattery and arriving at Cloyoquot Sound on May 2, the crew shipped 171 pelts to the Victoria Sealing Company. Moving on to the Bering Sea, the *City of San Diego* encountered a number of Japanese schooners the crews of which informed the Canadian sealers that they had journeyed near the Pribilof Islands and spotted few seals. The white sealers complained that the Japanese sealers were allowed to travel within three miles of land and use modern weaponry while they could get no nearer than sixty miles and had to employ primitive spears [Victoria Daily Times: 1906].

The ratio of skins to profits peaked in the 1907 season. “Last year,” reported a British Columbia news source,

although the fleet which hunted the seal herds was small, not more than 15 vessels, and the catch was not equal to that of many years—less than half of some, and less than a sixth of the biggest catch [made] during the palmy days of the industry—the price realized by the sealers for their catches was so high, the highest on record, that the financial results were better than they had been in many years. The amount received for the catch of 13,382 skins was close to \$350,000. All those engaged in the industry realized large profits. The Victoria Sealing Company, which include[d] the owners of all but three of the sealing vessels—the *Umbrina*, of Captain J. W. Peppet; [the] *Eva Marie*, of Victor Jacobsen, and [the] *Jessie*, of Captain Byers, and others, being known as the independents—posted a dividend of 25 per cent, and the independent owners, having no dormant stock in the shape of ancient vessels now unfit for sea, could have declared a larger one.

According to the report, “Some of the schooners earned as high as \$25,000 for the year as a gross total of which between \$6,000 and \$8,000 was paid to the hunters of the vessel, who took the skins from the face of the waters” [Smith n. d.: 79].

In 1909, five schooners coasting out of Victoria secured a total catch of about fourteen thousand Pribilof skins. A year earlier, the harvest by Victoria sealers had been thirteen thousand skins and in 1907 it was 5,397 skins. As a general rule, the price paid for skins was inversely proportional to the size of the catch; that is, larger harvests returned less per skin than smaller ones. In 1906, the average price paid per sealskin climbed to twenty-seven dollars, an all-time high and a substantial increase over the eight to ten dollars common in the mid to late nineties and a sufficient inducement to propel twenty schooners to cruise out of Victoria that year. One observer declared that there would have been an even larger flotilla if crews could have been mustered to man them “for of the fleet of about 40 or more schooners lying in Victoria harbor from 25 to 30 are considered to be in sea-going condition” [Smith n. d.: 79].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING THE TREATY OF 1911

BOTH LITERALLY AND SYMBOLICALLY 1911 WAS AN IMPORTANT YEAR in the history of the industry as it represented the generally agreed upon nadir of the fur-seal population, which comprised three hundred thousand individuals in comparison to the two to three million that were estimated to have existed in 1867. Decades of largely unregulated pelagic sealing, compounded by the industry failing to fall under the oversight of any single government, had dramatically brought about a loss so extensive that the Pribilof Islands herd had been thrust into grave jeopardy. The North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 (also known as the Convention between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals) and signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, placed a ban on all pelagic sealing and granted jurisdiction to the United States to manage and oversee all on-shore fur-seal hunting. Excluded from the requirements of the treaty were aboriginal tribes—specifically the Aleut and Ainu—that hunted fur seals using traditional methods for non-commercial purposes, including subsistence and shelter. In addition, restrictions were imposed on the number of seals that could be harvested each season and, in exchange for relinquishing their rights to annual seal harvests, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia were guaranteed monetary compensation and/or a minimum number of the fur seals harvested annually. The treaty, which remained in effect until the outbreak of the Second World War and with its modest kill-rate schedule maintained throughout the 1920s, allowed the herd to reconstitute itself to such an extent that by the end of the 1930s its population “approached 2—2.5 million and seemed capable of sustaining such a yield indefinitely” [Busch: 224].

The covenant instituted government-to-government safeguards and paved the way “for effective conservation and economic use of the Pribilof Islands fur seals.” The terms of the 1911 negotiations prohibited pelagic sealing “in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean north of the 30th parallel of north latitude, except for the small numbers that could be taken by primitive methods of capture by Indians and other aborigines dwelling on the coasts of the protected waters.” In addition, the convention afforded security to the Japanese fur-seal herd based at Robben Island and the Russian herd at the Commander Islands as well as providing for “the maintenance of a suitable patrol in the protected waters” and prohibiting “the importation of fur-seal skins unlawfully taken” [Commerce Report: 1931]. For the tribes of the Olympic Peninsula, the 1911

Treaty meant that they could conduct hunts using traditional weaponry and dugout canoes, but not with any of the modern accoutrements that they had begun acquiring as far back as the 1860s.

The signatory nations adopted immediate measures to enforce the varied emphases of the convention. Each year during the sealing season a patrol of Coast Guard and Bureau of Fisheries vessels was to be stationed in those waters frequented by fur seals. In addition, “all fur seal skins taken at sea by Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” had to be “marked and certified by an agent of the Government as having been lawfully taken in accordance with the provisions of the Convention before they” would be “permitted to be shipped to market” [Commerce Report: 1931]. Those fur seal skins found to have been harvested unlawfully “in the protected waters” of the north Pacific Ocean were to be “seized wherever found in the United States and sold for the account of the Government” [Ibid.] The status of the Pribilof Islands as a government reserve rendered it off-limits to occupation by any persons excepting those laboring under the immediate supervision of government agents authorized to be there by the Bureau of Fisheries and for the express purpose of overseeing the fur-seal harvests, the bulk of the labor which would be performed by resident Aleuts and some seasonal employees. According to statistics kept by the American government, by at least 1931 the measures had worked to some positive effect. The quantity of skins taken illegally had been reduced to a “very small” number [Ibid.].

The convention also mandated extensive tracking of fur seal herds and a close calculation kept on the number of animals harvested each year. Allowable yearly yields varied based on the size of the herds in their various classes as counted and reported each previous season. Regulation confined Pribilof harvests exclusively to males and “as far as practicable to those 3 years of age” [Commerce Report: 1931]. Three-year-old males delivered the highest quality fur which in turn commanded the maximum market value and because young males tended to herd by themselves, it was possible “to drive and kill 3-year-olds without disturbing the breeding animals” [Ibid.]. The highly polygamous nature of fur seals in the Pribilof Islands allowed a large percentage of males to be killed without threatening “the natural increase in young seals.” In order to quarantine three-year-old breeding stock from harvest, sealmen marked the animals by shearing a patch of their fur and in that way “protecting it from slaughter in the current season” [Ibid.]. In almost all instances, the number of animals held in reserve proved greater than

those marked because not all available three-year-olds could be gathered into the killing drives or selected out as breeding stock.

By virtually every assessment the regulation worked to great effect. By August 10, 1928, the population of the Pribilof Islands herd had increased to 871,513 animals from the 132,000 individuals enumerated in 1910. Between the years 1912 and 1928, a total of 302,284 fur seal



Figure 47 Capturing fur seals on St. Paul Island in the Pribilof Islands on June 10, 1872. University of Washington Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

skins were harvested in the Pribilof Islands with 31,099 pelts taken in the last year of that census [Commerce Report: 1931].

Olympic Peninsula media outlets blamed the great depletion of the fur seal herds on the granting of a monopoly over the Pribilof Islands to what

they considered a self-interested and rapacious company. According to the Port Townsend *Daily Leader* in March 1910, not only had the North American Commercial Company acted duplicitously in the number of fur seals it harvested each year, but it had been negligent and tardy in remunerating revenues to the United States government for its portion of the value of the peltry. Admitting that “disastrous inroads” had been made in recent years that had led to the apparent destruction and ultimate extermination of the furbearers in the north Pacific Ocean, the editor hailed the restrictive legislation as imminently necessary and long overdue, his only regret being that the fleet of revenue cutters dispatched to the West Coast to enforce the laws were likely to prove inadequate to prevent the raids of pirates, poachers, and rogues along thousands of miles of unprotected coastline. Yet, all factors considered, “wiser counsel” had finally “prevailed” and “now it is proposed by the authorities to give the seals complete protection for such a term as will allow them to multiply until they have resumed the proportions that made sealing a profitable industry in years gone by” [Port Townsend Daily Leader 1910: 1].

Those possessing knowledge of fur sealing placed little or no blame on Indian hunters for what had come to be the precarious nature of the herds, stocks that had seen their populations decrease in a slight three decades from some four million animals in 1874 to 200,000 in 1903. In 1904, for example, the *Victoria Times* advised its readership that the United States Congress had contacted the government of Great Britain in an attempt to reformulate the rules that regulated the harvesting of fur seals in the North Pacific Ocean. The editors of the newspaper left no doubt where they stood on the issue when they blamed American operatives for the pronounced depletion of fur seals. As reported in the media story, the problem lay in the land harvesting of fur seals during the breeding season, a technique that the writer had no doubt had contributed to the pervasive population loss. “If it were possible to do so without offense,” the editor explained, “we might point out that if the American government and those who have inspired it in all its acts in relation to this question of the preservation of seal life were really anxious to carry out in private the benevolent designs they could take some really effective measures without saying a word to the government of Great Britain or consulting the seal “pirates” of this province.” Rather the only course that the United States needed to undertake was to “permit the seals to rest in peace upon the breeding grounds during the breeding season.” Concluded the writer, “By taking similar measures and insisting upon” those “being strictly carried out, there is not a virile beast or bird upon the earth that will not increase and multiply and effectually prevent its own extinction” (*Victoria Times*: 1904).

At least by 1910, the high seas were becoming more and more a less frequent destination point for Olympic Peninsula fur-seal hunters. “The Indian is respecting the law,” commented a federal observer that year. “Indeed, his fear of incurring the displeasure of Uncle Sam entails upon him probably needless hardship in the matter of seal hunting.” Quinault tribal members, he wrote, were “becoming increasingly timid about venturing out thru the surf” but instead “had found a good market for their fish caught in the river” and thus no longer possessed “any considerable incentive to frequent the sea” and were “forgetting their ocean craft.” The situation at La Push was much the same but, perhaps surprisingly, the Quileute were not relying on their fisheries but were turning to agrarian pursuits and “inland labor.” Finally, the Ozette and Makah had become more and more consumed in the halibut banks that lay near the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca [Dawson: 1910].

The downturn in sealskins taken after the Treaty of 1911 was remarkable. While the 2,673 pelts harvested in 1911 paled in comparison to the halcyon days of the middle 1890s, when tens of thousands of fur seals were killed, in 1913 (apparently figures were not kept for 1912) a scant 192 skins were shipped to Victoria, returning to the Indian hunters (non-Indians were now prohibited from taking fur seals) a monetary sum of a



FIG. 3.—OBSERVATION TRIPOD FOR USE IN TAKING FUR-SEAL CENSUS.

Figure 48 Fur seal derrick in the Pribilof Islands used for counting seals. University of Washington Libraries Digital Collections, Seattle, Washington.

1915, and \$13,170 in 1916. Those years were followed by three consecutive down years during and immediately after the First World War: \$4,770 in 1917, \$3,320 in 1918, and \$1,294 in 1919, the last total based on the harvesting of only seventy fur seals. The beginning of the decade of the twenties, however, experienced another sudden uptick with the value of the peltry going to Victoria ballooning to \$24,712, a figure that just three years later skyrocketed even further: to \$78,475. Interestingly, the amount paid for dressed and dyed sealskins reached its peak in St. Louis in 1920, topping out at a net price of \$121.55 per pelt in February of that year, although by May the average price had dropped to \$57.84, a decrease of 52 percent in a span of just three months. According to the analysis included in a government report, it was “quite probable” that there would be “a further serious decline in price so that the financial returns” would in the

mere
\$5,760.
The
collective
income of
Indian
sealers
increased
over the
next three
seasons—
bringing
them
\$12,120 in
1914,
\$10,560 in

future “doubtless be proportionately less than they have been to date” [Victoria Pelagic Sealers: n. d.].

On the other hand, the changes in law failed to alter the overall nature of the hunts, although the changes that were introduced were not inconsequential. As always, the pelagic sealing fleet based at Victoria and involving schooners from several Indian villages on the Pacific Northwest coast, including Neah Bay, La Push, and Taholah, intercepted the great seal herds on their northern migration to the Pribilofs beginning in late January and continuing off the coasts of Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia through the end of April when the season ended in that region and before the legal commencement of the Bering Sea hunt, which got underway on August 1 and kept going until such time as inclement weather forced its closure. In the Bering Sea, firearms were restricted and only spears could be used and, as an additional conservation measure, no vessel was “permitted to hunt within a prescribed zone drawn sixty miles about the Pribilof Islands” and a fleet of warships and revenue cutters were deployed to enforce the regulation, “the penalty being seizure and confiscation if the infraction” was proven to the satisfaction “of the admiralty court” [Smith n. d.: 79].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING THE TREATY OF 1911 AND ITS AFTERMATH

IN CONTRAST TO THE EARLIER ERA WHEN INDIANS COULD SIMPLY PADDLE out to sea in their redcedar dugout canoes, which without doubt required a certain bankroll in muscle and skill, the industry in the commercial age had demanded a substantial investment in labor, knowledge, and accoutrements. According to one account, a startup cost of as much as fifteen thousand dollars could be expected just to get into the sealing business, although it was admitted that a smaller sum was frequently sufficient. By the turn of the century, there were taxes on vessels to be paid, insurance on skins and schooners, towage, shipping, and customs fees, rental and interest fees, printing and stationary costs, office furniture investments, telegram and telephone expenses, auditor fees, upkeep on vessels, guns repaired and lost, and boats damaged and lost. These were no simple operations undertaken on a whim or without adequate infrastructure and the financial backing necessary to participate in what was a highly competitive and demanding field [Victoria Sealing Fleet: 1905].

The cost of construction of a new wooden sailing schooner of fifty to eighty tons burden could run as high as ten thousand dollars with another three thousand dollars expended in rigging, boats, guns, spears, and other accoutrements and



Figure 49 Fouke Fur Company in St. Louis in room where washing and hooping is taking place.

of fifty to eighty tons burden could run as high as ten thousand dollars with another three thousand dollars expended in rigging, boats, guns, spears, and other accoutrements and

equipment. Typically, sufficient food to last a season totaled one thousand dollars and another five hundred dollars was needed in advance wages and a like amount in insurance fees [Smith n. d.: 79].

Until 1913, fur seal peltry was shipping directly to London (before 1867, it had been Canton), that place being the chief sealskin market in the world where they were dressed, dyed, and sold. After being processed for sale, the skins were then transported to the United States. Upon expiration of the twenty-year lease to a private corporation to harvest fur seals in the Pribilof Islands in 1910, the American government placed the Department of Commerce in charge of the fur-seal harvests and the associated marketing of peltry. To accomplish that end, the United States established an in-country commercial plant in St. Louis, Missouri, where the skins were to be “dressed and dyed before being sold.” The first lot of fully-finished skins was sold at market in September 1916 under the preparation of the Fouke Fur Company [FFC], which

continued in that capacity of fur-seal production into the 1960s [Commerce Report: 1931].

Prior to being shipped under contract to the FFC where the skins were readied for public auction, all Pribilof Island



Figure 50 Fouke Fur Company Showroom in St. Louis, Missouri, with buyers examining fur seal skins. National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Alaska Region, Anchorage, Alaska.

skins underwent a rigid process of preparation. Early on the skins were simply cured in salt,

packed in barrels, and sold in that rough condition, but techniques eventually evolved in which the pelts were thoroughly washed and removed of blubber before being salted and packed. Upon their arrival in St. Louis, FFC employees subjected them to a process of dressing, dying, and machining to rid the pelt of the rough hairs (dehairing), and fluffing, trimming, and cleaning. Over time, the strictly black dyes of the early period gave way to a popular logwood brown dye (Bois de Campeche), which commanded a higher market value (in 1929, for instance, \$33.92 on average for each black-dyed skin compared to \$48.28 for each brown-dyed one) [Commerce Report: 1931].

Sold in lots of ninety skins or less each, fur seal skins were presented twice a year—in the spring and fall—at auction. In the spring of 1929, for example, 15,224 fur-seal skins from the Pribilof Islands were sold at public auction for a total return of \$469,442.50. By the terms of the North Pacific Sealing Convention, 15 percent of fur seal skins harvested in the Pribilof Islands were earmarked for delivery to the Canadian government but, in practice and by an agreement of the participating nations, that requirement was never strictly enforced. Instead, all skins were sold on the American account at auction with the proceeds then remitted to Canada and Japan “in return for their relinquishment of pelagic sealing in the waters covered by the North Pacific Sealing Convention” [Commerce Report: 1931].

Established during World War I, the Fouke plant in St. Louis sold its first batch of finished fur seal skins in September 1916. Those had been dressed, dyed, and machined. By then, all prep work was being performed in the Midwestern United States where the skins were immediately shipped after harvest and after they had been skinned and cured in salt and packed



Figure 51 Masthead of Fouke Fur Company in St. Louis, Missouri.

detached from the peltry prior to shipment, but that step could be performed in St. Louis as well.

Once delivered to the Fouke facility, the skins were washed in large machines similar to those used in commercial laundries after which they were wringer dried. The next step, which involved suspending each skin in an oval-shaped iron hoop, stretched the skin back to its original size and

in barrels or
casks.
Sometimes
all blubber
was

shape before it was hung in a heated drying room to prevent wrinkling and contraction

[Commerce Report: 1931].

With the completion of that base work, the coarse outer guard or protective hairs were now ready to be removed from the fur. For that delicate operation, the skins were soaked in cold water for several hours until the fibers of the hide were rendered pliable and soft and the hair had been sufficiently loosened “to be pulled out without dislodging the fur” [Commercial Report: 1931]. To assist in the separation process, the skins were exposed to repeated intervals of intense dry heat which, in conjunction with the natural moisture in the skins, promoted in relaxing the hair and making possible its removal without causing damage to the fur. To complete the unhairing, the skins were laid out over “beaming boards” and the hair pulled out with the downward scraping movements of a double-handled, curved knife the edge of which was kept sufficiently dull to prevent cutting of the hair and fur [Ibid.]. Once rid of hair, the peltry was hooped and dried another time and then inspected prior to tanning. The skins, typically stiff at this point and not ready for leathering, were wetted using a salt solution on the fleshy side and allowed to stand for several hours until becoming appropriately sleek and supple. To evaporate some of the moisture and further soften the furs, they were tumbled in sawdust until dry and ready to be “beamed mechanically to separate the hide fibers enough to admit the oil used in tanning to all parts of the skins” [Ibid.]. Applied to the skin portion of the pelt with a brush, the oil constituted “a mixture of seal oil and certain soap and fats compounds” [Ibid.].

To allow the oil to soak into the raw fibers of the skins, the treated pelts were rolled into bundles and laid flatways across a table for a few hours before being run in mills and tumbled again to work the oil into the hairs to render the skins into leather. The process was repeated three times before the skins were fully tanned. Finally, the pelts were cleaned by milling them in sawdust and then hooping and drying them, which was done before they were advanced to the dying stage in which a grounding solution was applied followed by several applications of color. Each application included drying and milling in sawdust until the desired hue and luster was achieved. In the finishing department, the skins were “fluffed on emery-covered revolving rollers to reduce the thickness of the leather” with the “pressure required for this operation . . . applied by hand” and with “the operator holding the skins against the roller hard enough to remove the excess leather but not long enough in one position to burn them by friction.” Before being “carefully sized, graded, and inspected in readiness for sale,” the skins were “trimmed by cutting

away the rough edges” and “cleaned in an air-suction cylinder equipped with baffle plates” [Commerce Report: 1931].



Figure 52 Canoe with fur seal catch at La Push on the Quileute Reservation on the Washington Coast. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

For decades their economy had remained largely unchanged. For a majority of coast tribes, fishing or fur sealing or a combination of those dominated everything, so much so that other jobs that offered even cash on the barrelhead could not be filled. An inspector that visited the Quinault reservation in January 1917 reported his

observation that the members of that tribe were a fishing people in full and the Indians living in the village of Taholah were “too busy with their fishing operations during the summer to consider a \$25 job, and, moreover, they are strictly a river tribe, and have no seagoing boats and an occasional launch that ventures over the dangerous bar at the mouth of the river is often obliged to remain inside months at a time, before the surf will allow a passage out again” [Wildlife Refuges, Copalis: 01/30/1917]. According to the inspector, the villagers at Taholah possessed only two seagoing canoes, and those were then located thirty miles to the south at Grays Harbor and were not expected to return until spring. All the other canoes were “slim shovel-nosed affairs” designed strictly for river transportation [Wildlife Refuges, Copalis: 09/06/1914].

That period during the First World War saw some bountiful catches. In June 1916 an official in charge of a game preserve on the Washington coast reported that there had been “an unusual run of fur seals off the coast this season.” According to his statistics, some three hundred



Figure 53 Fouke Fur Company trademark in *vogue* circa 1940s.

pelts were harvested that year, returning to the fur sealers fifteen to twenty dollars per skin [Balmer: 1916]. That year a study showed that the only pelagic hunting taking place on the Olympic Peninsula was in northern fur seals. The writer of this report described the income earned from that endeavor as “not unimportant” and in 1915 the Quileute had earned six thousand dollars in the aggregate. Apparently the Quileute had learned the art of fur-seal hunting from the Osette who had acquired their skills from Indians on Vancouver Island. The latter two tribes had allegedly abandoned the

occupation, “partly voluntarily, and partly owing to public interference, so that, to-day,

the Quileute are the only Indians in the United States proper who are permitted to hunt and kill fur seals” [Smithsonian Explorations 1916: 115]. The Quileute sealed in special cedar dugout canoes with three sealers occupying each craft. The season lasted from March through July and much of the hunting was taking place thirty to forty miles off the coast [Ibid.].

According to a comprehensive article that appeared in the Tacoma *Daily News*, Quileute hunters were in a propitious location to get at the fur seals and they were the only tribe on the Olympic Peninsula still hunting those furbearers, the Makah apparently having turned to other resources such as halibut fishing. Whereas some observers had reported that the down-coast location of the tribe constituted a significant obstacle to large-scale harvests, the writer of this feature story asserted that fur seals migrated northward “in the middle of the ocean except at this one spot at the mouth off the mouth of the Quillayute [River], where they drive inshore to a distance only 20 or 30 miles from the coast” [Stone: 1916]. In fact, the reporter argued that “This

is the only place along the entire continent where they are within 100 miles of the coast, and the fur sealing industry,” he said, had been “the principal one of the Quillayute tribe for ages” [Ibid.].

In describing the equipment utilized by Quileute hunters, the writer painted a vivid picture. “In a notch in the bow is carried the long slender seal harpoon,” he said. “The shaft is 15 feet long and made of cedar. It is about 1 ½ inches in diameter. The head [is] double-pronged, three feet long, [and] fashioned from yew wood.” The latter were “tipped at the ends with elk horn, [and] fastened in such a way as to be barbed like an arrow.” They were “bound together with fiber” and “made hard and smooth with pitch, the horns tipped with steel as sharp as a razor” [Stone: 1916]. “To the head of the harpoon” was “fastened by a special knot the line attaching the loose harpoon head permanently to the head of the shaft.” By being rigged in such manner, when a fur seal was hit, the barbed harpoon head would pull loose and the animal could thereby be “maneuvered” to the canoe by the cord that until then had “lain taut along the side of the harpoon shaft.” As he motioned to throw, the hand of the harpooner fit “into a notched fan-shaped wood at the other end” as it rotated forward [Ibid.].

Quileute canoes, which constituted valuable specialty crafts constructed specifically for seal hunting, measured as much as twenty-five feet in length and were painted “coal black” with a “bright red band around the top.” So indispensable were the canoes that the owner of each vessel received half of the catch whether or not he had participated in the hunt and at the end of each outing those most prized of possessions were affectionately rubbed down with a special oil in order to remove any “fuzz” or “splinters” or other damage that may have been incurred [Ibid.]. Each dugout carried a three-man crew consisting of a spearsman, a steersman, and a seal clubber. The spearsman held the most prestigious of the jobs and, based on ability, they were selected by their fellow boatmen [Ibid.].

A sealing cruise usually encompassed a one-day outing. Typically crews departed La Push before daylight and returned after sunset. To intersect the migrating herds usually involved a twenty to thirty mile paddle with the dugouts approaching the seals as they lay asleep on their backs. The few bulls were found out in front followed by “droves” of females who, conveniently for the hunters, were inclined to sleep side by side. Just getting near the herds was no easy accomplishment. “The seal sleeps with his head just below the surface,” it was explained, “and even in slumbering raises his head frequently above the water for a breath of air. They are keen

of hearing and smell and when awake, with all senses alert, cannot be approached close enough to be caught” [Stone: 1916]. After surveying the harvest field and deciding on a plan of attack, the sealers crept “noiselessly” towards the herds, “using paddles only and coming up against the wind.” An expert spearsman, if he could slink within twenty-five to thirty feet of his prey, was almost assured of success, while a kill from a distance of fifty feet was considered an “exceptional” feat [Ibid.].

In documenting the hunt of Quileute sealers, the reporter explained that “As a rule the barbed head” would penetrate “entirely through the seal” before pulling “out of its socket on the opposite side.” For the hapless victim, there was virtually no possibility of breaking away. “A seal that is hit almost never escapes, since the nicked prongs of the elk horn with their outward curve and the steel harpoon head bury themselves under the thick, tough skin of the animals,” the writer learned. At that point, the hunt had reached its most dramatic moment. Using the loose cords which were at the ready, the crew would undertake to “guide” the “impinned” fur seal to the canoe. Mortally injured but alive, suffering excruciatingly and fighting for its life, the animal would turn away in what it perceived as its lone outlet of escape, pulling the canoe as it began to make “spectacular” lunges and jumps at the end of the line in a “frantic effort” to free itself. The sealsmen would suddenly begin to “yell and shout with glee of the chase during this part of the adventure and call advice to the man who is guiding the beast to the boat.” When within a reachable distance from the craft the clubber would rise up, brandishing a weapon about the size of a baseball bat, which he would swing at the head of the fur seal which, in its delirium, would at times “bury” its sharp teeth into the side of the boat and if the clubber ventured too near in delivering his blow, fur seals were known to bite into the exposed arms of their pursuer. If the fur seal continued to show signs of life, two parallel rods joined together with a line would be thrust around the neck of the animal and squeezed until death occurred [Stone: 1916]. Females typically carried two young so that one kill resulted in three seals landed.

Once dead, the seal was hoisted into the canoe. Skinning took place back on land at La Push, a task which was performed by women. As the dugout and its cargo got within shouting distance of land, the residents of the village were alerted to its impending arrival with loud “shouts and calls.” The seal meat was preserved and used as food and the oil was kept as well. The fur was taken to the beach and hand washed and then “tagged with a leather serial tag provided by the United States government and filled out as to size, sex, date, weight, name, to

whom sold, and an affidavit swearing the truth.” The skins were “then sacked and rolled up.” Once sold, dealers dyed the brown fur black at the tips and that tincture, combined with the long white hairs, gave the pelt “a hoary appearance, beautiful in itself but lacking the velvet luster of the skin in commercial demand.” That would be achieved only when the coarse outer hairs were removed in processing, a transformative procedure from which the pelt took its value [Stone: 1916].

That month in May 1916, Quileute hunters—including among others Charles and Arthur Howeattle, Tommy Brown, Billy Hudson, Conrad Williams, and Ya-ka-la-di-Obi —harvested three hundred fur seals. Foul weather had delayed their departure and prevented them from taking more than they did. But it was still an admirable haul. Ten canoes captured an average of fifty skins per day and all the pelts were gathered in less than a week. The top rig for the season was the one manned by the Howeattles and Brown. Their catch totaled fifty skins, which were sold for fifteen dollars apiece [Stone: 1916]. But it was physical, onerous labor. “On foggy days it is very difficult for the Indians to return to shore since they are without compass and frequently they land far down the shore with a walk of miles to the village and the heavy seals, weighing from 75 to 100 pounds to drag along with them” [Ibid.], the reporter pointed out. Yet, for all the danger and demands, it was apparently the most popular occupation among the members of the Quileute tribe. Boys learned to handle a harpoon when they were still quite young and, during the sealing season, throwing them at every imaginable object served as a favorite pastime [Ibid.].

In June 1920 a similar expose appeared in the *Seattle Times*, which underlined the reality that there was still good money to be made in the sealing business, even when traditional methods had to be employed. “Ten months vacation, two months work, salary \$2,000 to \$3,000,” the article declared in bold phrases referring to the perceived carefree life of the Quileute fur sealer. Noting that only Makah, Ozette, and Quileute tribal members possessed a legal right to pursue fur seals, the report stated that the average price of a coat of that material was two to three thousand dollars and Indians were the first to be paid in the creation of that luxury garment. Hunters patrolled the sea in teams comprised of as many as twenty thirty-foot dugout cedar canoes. Each vessel held three mariners, the hunter (or spearman) in command and he sitting in the bow with two steersmen (or boat pullers in the jargon of the earlier period) positioned in the stern. During periods of calm weather, the fleet would leave La Push as early as at one-thirty o’clock in the morning for the sealing grounds located at least some fifteen miles offshore. Those

took some two and one-half hours to reach. Contact with seals was achieved before sunrise and usually while the animals remained asleep. Spying only the heads of the mammals peaking up over the waterline, the occupants of the canoes would float in stealth-fashion and without detection to within a distance of forty feet of the prey. At just the opportune moment, a double-pronged twenty-foot-long spruce spear would be launched with two detachable harpoons, the last to allow the animals to be reeled into the canoes. In one hunt composed of five canoes, the least number of fur seals snagged was eight while the largest single-day catch was twenty-five, with the fifteen hunters raking in a total haul of ninety-six skins, those having an equivalent market value of three thousand dollars. Rex Ward, reputedly the most skilled of the hunters, declared with understandable pride that “That’s some wages” and added that “this is the life.” To that point when the article was written and with three weeks remaining in the sealing season, Ward had collected seventy-five skins valued at \$2,325 or thirty-one dollars per pelt. The number of skins taken in 1920 and the price paid for them were both considered records, the latter a significant increase from the going rate of twelve dollars per skin that had been received just five years earlier [Seattle Times: 1920].

The return of the sealing fleet sent reverberations throughout the village of La Push. In early afternoon, perhaps around two o’clock, Quileute women would begin scattering out and scaling the highest points on the edge of the coast, scanning the horizon for any indication of the colorful square sails bending and tugging their way inland. On blustery days, with the wind kicking up white caps, fear would spread among the crowd for the greater danger of their sealmen. Then, the “news of the first sail” would bring the entire village careening down to the waterfront as the light canoes were “blown into shore at the rate of twenty miles an hour” [Seattle Times: 1920]. Outstretched onshore were a hundred eager and willing hands all “waiting to help the weary hunters out of their places when the first canoe nosed into shore. Every man, woman and child in the village want[ed] to help carry out the seals” [Ibid.].

Despite the favorable remuneration received for their peltry, Quileute hunters often expressed frustration with the prices paid. High-grade skins brought \$160 to \$170 apiece in St. Louis and the Indians had hoped to realize commensurate prices of fifty dollars per skin on the Washington coast. Two thousand skins were taken by Quileute sealmen in the 1920 season. Skinned the very next morning after reaching La Push, they were then washed and packed in salt prior to purchase on the ground by buyers having come to the reservation for that purpose. In

transporting the hides to Seattle from where they were shipped to their ultimate destination of St. Louis, the pelts were carried to Mora by boat and from there they were loaded onto trucks and driven to Fairholme on the west end of Lake Crescent. From Fairholme the pelts were ferried to Piedmont and from there they were taken to Port Angeles. From the latter place they were moved by steamship to Seattle [Seattle Times: 1920].

The cash infused into the Quileute economy exerted a dramatic impact on the entire tribe. According to the Seattle *Times* newspaper, in addition to enjoying the ten month's vacation afforded them through fur sealing, "the Indians in their daily life enjoy[ed] the most modern methods of spending." It was said that "Every seal hunter on the reservation either own[ed] an automobile or [was] sending [away] for catalogues." In addition, "Half a dozen or more [were] building racing motor boats, while some own[ed] fast horses." The clothes they wore were reportedly taylor-made and they traveled as far away as Port Angeles to get the most fashionable "feather-edged" haircuts. The Quileute tribe boasted the only "Real American" baseball league in the United States, sporting four teams whose schedules were calibrated around the fur-sealing season and the tribe was left with hundreds of pounds of fresh seal meat, surplus which was made available to everyone [Seattle Times: 1920].

There were always competing interests that often did not turn out in the favor of the fishing community. The same year that the story appeared in the *Times*, a fishing company in Seattle made application to the federal government for permission to found a temporary fish station on the island of Ozette, an undertaking which would have included the erection of at least one building and the construction of a landing. The appeal was turned down, however, due to the stress that such a plant could impose on animal habitat, particularly at Ozette Island, which was part of the protected Flattery Rocks Bird Reservation. "To establish a fish station on Ozette Island during the summer months covering the entire breeding season of the birds is likely to result in the practical abandonment of the greater part of the [reservation]," responded the chief of the Fish and Wildlife Bureau to the Commissioner of the General Land Office in Washington, DC., "inasmuch as the fishermen constantly coming and going and landing on the island would not only disturb the birds but plunder the nests, unless a force of wardens was constantly on hand." Hence, this official concluded, "The demand for the use of Ozette as a station to facilitate transfer of fish does not seem to be so important as to warrant placing in jeopardy the breeding colonies in this part of the Flattery Rocks Reservation" [Nelson: 1920].

In addition to all the other contingencies that had to be accounted for in the sealing business, there were always manuals of regulation to be heeded. The duty of authenticating harvested sealskins often fell to the superintendent in charge of the agency who held jurisdiction over the Indians and the regions where the hunts were conducted. This BIA official was provided leather tags to identify the skins and certificates in triplicate (called Form 642) to record all pertinent information on each skin. The Bureau of Fisheries reimbursed the traveling expenses of each official engaged in documenting the skins taken in the seasonal harvest [Taholah Indian Agency: 12/09/1930].

Sufficient concern lingered for a semblance of oversight to be maintained on the Pacific Coast. In the spring of 1931, the Bureau of Fisheries took steps in keeping with what that federal agency had been doing for decades to protect “the American fur seal herd on its annual migration northward along the coast of Washington to the Pribilof Islands, Alaska” [Brown: 1931]. That year a temporary official was assigned to La Push on the Quileute reservation in order “to make observations and perform other duties in respect to fur-seal matters without in any way interfering with the work of the Office of Indian Affairs” [Ibid.]. C. J. Rhoads, the commissioner of Indian affairs, responded that his office would be “glad to concur in such arrangement” as long as his staff was kept informed of the findings and actions of the Fisheries agent, especially as those related “in any way to the interest of the Indians” [Rhoads: 1931]. That overture of cooperation was accepted.

Indian fur-seal harvests, of course, had always faced scrutiny. By March 1931 coastal hunters had taken some forty seals, a number which, when reported locally in newspapers, prompted the Bureau of Fisheries to alert the superintendent of the Neah Bay Agency that he be notified if and when Indians ventured out on a hunt. “We are very anxious to know this at an early date,” an official advised, “so that we may send our patrol vessel down there” [Christopher: 1931]. Explaining the situation, he stated that “On account of international agreement, it is very important that we have our patrol vessel there just as soon as the natives go out after seals” [Ibid.].

The worry over unregulated Indian sealing was apparently unfounded, however. The Indian superintendent at Neah Bay, who had also been designated as an “authenticator” of those fur seals taken by Makah Indians under his jurisdiction, responded that upon investigation he had found that only a single member of the tribe had gone out sealing that season, prompting him to

conjecture “That it is doubtful as to whether or not they will do any amount of sealing other than for food, as there is no market for their skins” [Bitney: 1931]. The official further reported that there had been no fur-seal hunting whatsoever taking place on the Quileute reservation at La Push and he questioned whether there would be any such activity in the immediate future. In explanation he offered that “The water has been too rough for sealing there as well as here,” meaning Neah Bay [Ibid.]. He summed up the big picture on the Olympic Coast by concluding that “Of course they will seal a little for food as they do enjoy their seal meat. They eat the meat and “boil” out the fat for their bread,” using “it like butter” [Ibid.].

True to their charge, officials stationed at Neah Bay reported the catches as they occurred. According to Captain Hunter of the patrol boat *Brant*, on one day in April 1931 two Makah hunters achieved some success: Paul Parker took fourteen fur seals on the twentieth of the month and Johnson Barker killed eight more on that same day [Neah Bay Agency:04/27/1931]. By mid-July 1931, the Bureau of Fisheries was ready to issue its final season report. That year off the entire coast of Washington State there had been 165 certificates executed in authentication of fur seal skins taken by Indians [Radcliffe: 1931].

One bland season tended to blend into the next. The following spring another boat patrol was authorized to operate out of La Push and the Department of Fisheries assigned a special agent to that location to oversee the fur-seal harvest in conjunction with the Indian policemen who were charged with examining, tagging, and observing all Indian actions in relation to the protection of the fur-seal herd. Agency officials stated that “In view of the fact that there will be no Indian Bureau representative at La Push this year[,] I have asked the Washington office to authorize the Bureau of Fisheries agent to authenticate skins taken at La Push only.” He harbored no doubt that the plan should meet with BIA approval and thereby “facilitate the handling of the skins so that the Indians [could] sell their Fur Seal as soon as possible.” Concluding his note, he thanked the Indian superintendent at Neah Bay for the “splendid cooperation” his agency had received in past years [Neah Bay Agency: 03/23/1932].

There was little change in the first years of the Great Depression. In the 1935 season, the Bureau of Fisheries again sought to enlist the assistance of the superintendent of Taholah Agency in “authenticating sealskins taken by Indians in the waters off the coast of Washington in pursuant to the law and the treaty for the protection of fur seals” [Taholah Indian Agency: 04/04/1935]. The official for the Fisheries Department placed special emphasis on the status of

unborn pups, recommending that they be authenticated in the same manner as other peltry and that “Certificates for unborn pup skins should bear a notation to that effect so that such certificates may be definitely determined here.” He urged “that the notation be made in the upper right-hand corner of the certificate form” [Ibid.].

But the Pacific Coast was not as trouble free as it might have seemed. In the heat of the harvests (presumably involving salmon in this case) relations between federal and state



Figure 54 Indian fur sealer and dugout canoe at La Push, Washington, on the Quileute Reservation. Jacilee Wray Collection, Port Angeles, Washington.

inspectors and Office of Indian Affairs personnel could become strained. An instance of that occurred in September 1936. That month two Makah Indians were cited for allegedly illegally operating a set net on the Ozette River, an action which reportedly had completely destroyed a

fish run on that waterway. The auditor for Clallam County, who claimed to have personally observed the men fishing, advised the Indian superintendent at Neah Bay that his interest in what had transpired derived from a sport fisherman’s standpoint and he was “indignant to think that any public official, National, State, or County” would refuse to render aid [and] justice in a matter of this kind.” According to him, the mesh of the nets had been so constructed “that a great many Cut Throat Trout . . . [had been] caught along with the salmon” with the trout being “thrown out on the bank and left to decay” [Bowles: 1936]. Wrapping up his letter, he asserted that “Putting it mildly, I wish to say that there is a great deal of feeling over this situation in this vicinity. We in Clallam County have not been unfair in our prosecution of Fisheries cases, and have not, in any instance turned prosecution into persecution. If these men are not guilty, they will have an opportunity to prove their innocence before the court, and I assure you they will get a fair trial” [Ibid.]. The Indian superintendent at Taholah might have explained the concept of


innocent until proven guilty, but instead N. O. Nicholson responded that the Indians had indeed been on the Ozette River and the men admitted having placed a net in the water and that they may have taken a few fish, but he countered that on several occasions he had received complaints “that some white persons were improperly fishing the river” [Nicholson: 1936].

Even with the precautions set in place to protect the seal herd, harvests continued to decline, primarily due to a shrinking market in skins. In May 1940, the superintendent for Taholah Indian Agency based at Hoquiam, Washington, advised officials in the Department of Fisheries in Seattle that Quileute Indians at La Push had been “getting a few seal,” returns that necessitated that someone be sent to the reservation “to check and certify the skins on hand.” An authenticator had “not been assigned to this jurisdiction” in several years, he related, although it was “quite probable” that there would be a number of fur seal taken at Neah Bay in addition to those brought in from further down the coast. In whatever decision was made, he promised his full cooperation [Taholah Indian Agency: 05/18/1940].

The low prices impacted the number of Indians willing to engage in the hunts. By the middle 1930s, there were no Olympic Peninsula tribes pursuing whales and only the members of two tribes were participating in the harvesting of sealskins: those of the Quileute and those of the Makah. In April 1937, the Indian superintendent for Taholah Agency reported that “The income realized by the Indians from this source for the past seven or eight years has been very small. For example, prices on raw skins during 1932 and 1933 were as low as two and three dollars” [Taholah Indian Agency: 04/12/1937]. He explained that the prices in the current season were expected to be higher, demanding as much as six and one-half dollars per skin, but the overall outlook remained dismal [Ibid.]. On another occasion, this same superintendent wrote similarly, stating that the Indians did “engage in sealing by their old primitive methods,” but the returns realized on the skins had been “so low the last several years that the Indians have engaged in this occupation to a very small extent” [Taholah Indian Agency: 06/28/1934].

No matter how precariously, the industry managed to hang on. Coastal hunters were still pursuing seals in an occupation that nearly rivaled whaling in its daring, drama, and impact on the tribe. “A day of offshore wind and sun... and a stone-age canoe with a fabulous carved beak swooped hissing, broadside on, down a wrinkling slope of dark water” was how a photographer working in the employ of the Seattle *Post-Intelligencer* newspaper described the seal-hunting excursion that he experienced with Quileute hunters in 1934. From what he reported, it is clear

that the Indians had remained adept in their skills. “A lean Indian crouched in the bow of the whirling dugout, and the northern sun glinted on the head of the harpoon in his hand as he stared unblinking at three fur seals rolling drowsily below him in the cold green hollow of the sea,” he continued in colorful prose. Heard suddenly was the “sharp plunk of a paddle against the side of the canoe, a smother of smothering foam—and the three seals flipped into the falling hill of water and vanished.” Moments later, “as the dugout was flung to the heaving crest of a great sea, they could see the dim snows of Mount Olympus shouldering above the sea-haze which hid the Washington coast, twenty-five miles away.” According to the newspaper article, such went “one of the most remarkable adventures left in a mechanized world—the annual raid of the coast Indians upon the migrating fur seal herds, with the stone-age boats and weapons of their fathers as provided by treaty with governments” [Seattle Post-Intelligencer: 1934].



COMMERCIAL FUR SEALING CONCLUSIONS

THE 1911 LEGISLATION HAD A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE FLEET OF THE Victoria Sealing Company and other Pacific Northwest coastal sealers. In the three years leading up to the imposition of the treaty, only some half dozen schooners ventured out for the harvest out of a total available fleet of forty-odd vessels that sat “rotting at its moorings.” Because “prices remained extremely high for the few pelts brought in,” the industry continued to be viable and, “as always, the prospect of high profit kept sealers and vessel-owners in the business, though now the latter were mainly the wealthier men who could afford the overhead, and the gamble.” The five schooners that sailed in the 1910 harvest brought in a total catch of 4,652 skins which, at the going rate of approximately thirty-five dollars per pelt, returned over \$140,000 to the fleet. But for the Victoria Sealing Company, such profit “was never to return, and after 1911 the fleet vanished.” According to Briton Cooper Busch, “Some [of the schooners] simply disintegrated on Sitka’s aptly named “Rotten Row.” Others became sodden hulks in “the Arm,” a neglected corner of Victoria’s inner harbor: “a dismal, stagnant sort of spot, dedicated to garbage, and dead cats, and snags, and sawmill refuse, and mouldery slipways, and sinister leaning boathouses that seemed waiting for murders to be committed in them” [Busch: 152].

Pelagic sealing had been the most wasteful and the first form of hunting to encounter regulation and ultimately sanction and restriction. And for good reason. One source has described the slaughterhouse scene that played out on the boats and schooners introduced in pursuit of this prey. Fully in contrast to the land harvest of which they shared only the same starting time—before the break of dawn—pelagic sealing took place aboard schooners off which eighteen- to twenty-foot longboats would be launched “which were sharp at the bow and stern and called double-enders, with a hunter—the elite of the sealing crew, armed with a rifle or, later, a shotgun—as well as a boatpuller and a steersman” [MacGillivray: 26]. In conducting the hunts, Indian hunters employed “two-person canoes and spears with a detachable harpoon end.” With them they carried some light rations, a small cask of fresh water, and maybe two gaffs. Distancing themselves from the schooner, they paddled out until they spotted seals, which they “shot or speared instead of clubbed” as would have been the practice on land. Not all the carcasses were able to be retrieved into the canoe and “once a seal was killed, if there was time,

it would be skinned on the small boat and the carcass thrown overboard.” According to one informant, the interior of the longboats was described as “slippery with grease and blood, and as the boat tossed in rough seas the men fought to keep their footing as their chilled hands wielded the blubber-coated skinning knives.” Skinning, if not completed on the longboat, was performed upon the return of the sealers to the schooner [Ibid.].

Even by the 1920s and under optimal conditions, the returns in fur seal peltry could be substantial and represent considerably more in monetary payout than any other occupation. Illustrative of how the diversity of resources could work in the Indians’ favor, salmon fishing in the 1920 season proved a virtual failure while fur sealing among Quileute hunters brought them thirty-one thousand dollars. In addition, tribal members sold fifty-one tons of fish and their reservation had become something of a summer tourist destination, attracting visitors from throughout the state of Washington traveling over the Olympic Highway to Mora seeking to access the bathing beach on the reservation. One observer commented that no longer was La Push the isolated locale that it once was and the Quileute Indians were probably “better known to more white people in the State than any other Indians in Washington” [Board of Indian Commissioners 1920: 91].

The erratic nature of fur sealing and the perilous state of the salmon runs made federal agents fear for the future of the Olympic Peninsula tribes. While each of the industries provided Indians with an insurance against the lack of productivity of the other, the possibility always loomed of multiple subsistence and economic failures. “If the salmon supply should continue to diminish,” explained a member of the Board of Indian Commissioners investigating conditions on the Neah Bay reservation, “the Makah Indians would face a problem in economics which they would find most difficult to solve, for the salmon, fresh, dried, or smoked, is their principal food. The fewer the salmon the keener would be the fishing competition between the companies and the individuals, and the Indians would be thrust aside.” The commissioner urged the Indian Office “to provide for any contingency,” which included reclaiming the allotments that had been made a little over a decade earlier and providing for the harvest and sale of the timber resources of the reservation, the value of which was assessed at a quarter of a million dollars [Board of Indian Commissioners 1920: 89]. The basis of the agrarian initiative was the prospect that Neah Bay could become a comfort station for non-Indians trolling the waters off the reservation. “The soil [at Cape Flattery] is good river bottom,” it was explained, “well suited for potatoes, cabbage,

lettuce, peas, and like garden truck. All such supplies now come from Seattle. Fishermen who put into Neah Bay crave fruit and fresh vegetables, and the fishing population is so large that everything an Indian could grow . . . would be marketed within a few hundred feet of his garden” [Ibid.].

In the eyes of outsiders in 1920, the village of Neah Bay resembled any other maritime community. As a group and through their various fishing operations the Makah were self-supporting with only a few elderly and indigent members of the tribe requiring disbursements of federal rations. The Indians were perceived as “thrifty” and were said to “know the value of money.” Their neighbors considered them “keen traders” and “trustworthy.” There were very few younger men incapable of providing for themselves and their families. In every sense they were, as their ancestors had been before them, a “fishing people” and expert “mariners,” plying the waterways of western Washington and visiting the major cities of the region—Victoria, Vancouver, Seattle, and Tacoma—to transact business. According to the Board of Indian Commissioners, they almost all spoke and wrote in English, they dressed in white man’s clothing and, besides finding work in logging, farming, fishing, and fish canneries, were holding positions as engineers and firemen on Puget Sound steamers while others were working as petty officers, dock workers, and freight haulers. Some owned fishing motorboats that they constructed and operated themselves. In total, the Indians had done everything in their power to fit their local resources to the local economy and despite all the roadblocks that had been thrust up in front of them, the Makah had continued to thrive and survive under the most difficult circumstances [Board of Indian Commissioners 1920: 88].

The concern felt by Indian sealers over their fisheries was amply demonstrated through their exchanges with and interactions among federal officials on their reservations who in turn communicated that unease to their supervisors back in Washington, D. C. And despite a half-century of incessant appeals for treaty-promised aid, those entreaties fell largely on deaf ears. According to the findings of the Indian Claims Commission, the requests “frequently reflected the specific wishes of the Makahs themselves” and included “houses for salting and drying fish, for furnishing of fishing seines and iron and steel for hooks and spears, for instruction in methods of preservation and preparation of fish for market and the making of barrels, for provision of schooners and sea-worthy vessels” [Indian Claims Commission 1976: 102].

Astoundingly, for all the truckloads of paper and massive expenditures in time consumed in issuing those petitions and not to mention the explicit, bold proclamations etched into history in the form of the weathered parchments of the treaties that had been consummated between nations, the United States, in the century that elapsed after the utterances of those heady guarantees and by its own admission, had expended only a miserly \$265.40 for such purposes (article 5 of the Makah Treaty had earmarked thirty thousand dollars for fishing gear). That outlay by the Indian Bureau would barely have outfitted a lone fisherman for a single season and included one large seine net, four fish lines, a dozen fish hooks, three-quarter pound shot, two pounds of wire, seven fish barrels, 710 pounds of salt, two paddles, one cod line, two pounds of brass wire, four pounds of seine twine, fourteen fathoms of hemp cable, and one row lock for a boat [Indian Claims Commission 1976: 102-3].

That was the extent of it. No vessels. No packing or storage houses. No expert training in modern methodologies. No, none of those, but rather a hodgepodge of metal wire and fish hooks given in exchange for a massive land transfer that forever transformed the lives of those falling under federal authority and a failure of promise that has been derisively characterized by the Indian Claims Commission as an obvious and overt breach of contractual obligation and one entered into by the United States for the explicit purpose of inducing the Makah to endorse the treaty [Indian Claims Commission 1976: 134; 1977: 105].

By the end of the Second World War, fur-sealing was only a shell of its former self. Regulation had largely taken over, the market had all but disappeared, and public sentiment had shifted away from using finite resources for clothing manufacture. Accordingly, the sealing tribes of the Olympic Peninsula had moved in other directions. There was a breakwater to be built at Neah Bay. Logging and employment in lumber mills had taken off there and at other locations. The halibut fishery at Cape Flattery would remain strong for decades to come. But even though it had went the way of its furbearing predecessors, sea otters and beavers, northern fur sealing had served vital purposes. It had introduced Pacific Coast hunters to the commercial marketplace and it had served as a crucial resource and readily sellable commodity during a challenging period of Indian and white relations. The tribes had been able to carve out their own path and although the disappointments had been many, some of the harsher aspects of assimilation had been tempered. Schools charged with instilling assimilationist principles had presented fur sealing as a positive endeavor and perhaps most importantly, federal administrators

had showed a willingness to move away from their obsession with agriculture if the maritime pursuits of the tribes could prove viable and sustainable which, for most of the assimilation period, they did. The fur sealing era stands out for another reason. Native hunters adjusted their traditional economies to new conditions, in doing so preserving a level of independence and aspects of their cultures that could have been lost. As they had always done, the tribes staked out their futures without abandoning their pasts while providing for the present and the ongoing needs of the people.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alcorn, Rowena L. and Gordon D.
1976 Way up There “Ah-kah-lahkt” Quileute Island Fortress. *Pacific Search*.
10 (9): 16-17.
- Ambrose, Stephen
1996 Undaunted Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of
the American West. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- ARCIA
1854-1907 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
- Archer, Christon I.
1978 Spanish Exploration and Settlement of the Northwest Coast in the 18th
Century.” *Sound Heritage* 7 (1): 32-53.
- Arima, Eugene Y.
1983 The West Coast People: The Nootka of Vancouver Island and Cape
Flattery. British Columbia Provincial Museum Special Publications No. 6.
British Columbia Provincial Special Museum, Victoria, British Columbia.
- 1988 Notes on Nootkan Sea Mammal Hunting. *Arctic Anthropology* 25 (1): 16-
27.
- Arnold, David F.
2008 The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska. Seattle:
University of Washington Press.
- Augaitis, Diana and Nika Collison, Vince Collison, et al. eds.
2006 Raven Travelling: Two Centuries of Haida Art. Vancouver, British
Columbia: Vancouver Art Gallery.
- Austin, Oliver L. Jr. and Ford Wilke
1950 Japanese Fur Sealing. Tokyo. Report: Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers, Natural Resources Section, No. 129.
- Averkiewa, Julia
1971 The Tlingit Indians. Pp. 317-342 in Eleanor Burke Leacock and Nancy
Oestreich Lurie, eds., *North American Indians in Historical Perspective*.
New York: Random House.
- Baird, Robin W.
1996 Status Report on the Northern Fur Seal, *Callorhinus ursinus*, in Canada.
Ottawa: Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada.

- Bagley, Clarence B. ed.
1915-1916 Journal of Occurrences at Nisqually House. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 6 (July 1915): 179-97; (October 1915): 264-78; 7 (January 1916): 59-75; (April 1916): 144-67.
- Balmer, T. S.
1916 In charge of Game Preservation to Preservation Inspector. June 24. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- Bancroft, Hubert Howe
1884 History of the Northwest Coast. San Francisco, California: A. L. Bancroft.
- Banta, Isaac
1898 Banta to O. S. Willoughby, January 3, 1898. Mss 8C, Folder 6. Charles H. Willoughby Family Records, Jefferson County Historical Society, Port Townsend, Washington.
- Barbeau, Marius
1944 Siren of the Seas. *The Beaver* (December 1944): 20-23.
- Barragy, Terrence J.
1975 The Trading Age, 1792-1844. *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 76 (3): 197-224.
- Barsh, Russel L.
1982 The Economics of a Traditional Coastal Salmon Fishery. *Human Organization* 41 (2): 170-176.
- Barton, Karen Samantha
2000 Red Waters: Contesting Marine Space as Indian Place in the U. S. Pacific Northwest. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Geography and Regional Development, University of Arizona, Tucson.
- Bell, Edward
1915 A New Vancouver Journal. Edmond S. Meany, ed. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 6 (1): 50-68.
- Bernstein, Bruce and W. Jackson Rushing
1995 Modern by Tradition: American Indian Painting in the Studio Style. Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press.
- Bertelson, Ernest B.
1948 He Hunted Seals in Demons Lairs. *Seattle Times*, Pacific Parade Magazine, August 29, 1948, p. 2.

- Bigg, Michael A.
1990 Migration of Northern Fur Seals *Callorhinus ursinus* Off Western North America. Nanaimo, British Columbia: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Fisheries Research Branch, Pacific Biological Station.
- Bitney, Raymond H.
1931 Neah Bay Indian Agency Files, Received March 17. Seattle, WA: National Archives and Records Administration: Pacific Alaska Region.
- Blackhawk, Ned
2006 Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Blinman, Eric, Elizabeth Colson and Robert Heizer
1977 A Makah Epic Journey: Oral History and Documentary Sources. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 68 (4): 153-163.
- Blumenthal, Richard W. ed.
2004 The Early Exploration of Inland Washington Waters: Journals and Logs from Six Expeditions, 1786-1792. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.
- Bockstoce, John R.
2005 The Opening of the Maritime Fur Trade at Bering Strait: Americans and Russians Meet the Kanighmiut in Kotzebue Sound. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
- 2006 Nineteenth Century Commercial Shipping Losses in the Northern Bering Sea, Chukchi Sea, and Beaufort Sea. *Northern Mariner* 16 (2): 53-68.
- 2009 Furs and Frontiers in the Far North: The Contest among Native and Foreign Nations for the Bering Strait Fur Trade. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Boit, John
1921 John Boit's Log of the Columbia—1790-1793. F. W. Howay and T. C. Elliott, eds. *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 22 (4): 257-356.
- 1981 Log of the Union: John Boit's Remarkable Voyage to the Northwest Coast and Around the World, 1794-1796. Edmund Hayes, ed. Portland, Oregon: Oregon Historical Society Press.
- Bowechop, Janine
2004 Contemporary Makah Whaling. Pp. 407-419 in Mauzé, Harkin, and Kan, eds. Coming to Shore: Northwest Coast Ethnology, Traditions, and Visions. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

- Bowles, Rollin E.
1936 Taholah Indian Agency Correspondence, Letter Received, September 26. Seattle, WA: National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Alaska Region.
- Boyd, Colleen Elizabeth
2001 Changing is Coming: History, Identity and the Land among the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe of the North Olympic Peninsula. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Boyd, Robert T.
1999 The Coming of the Spirit of Pestilence: Introduced Infectious Diseases and Population Decline among Northwest Coast Indians, 1774-1874. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Broderson, Paul, and C. J. Hopkins
1939 Pelagic Seal Hunting as Carried on by the Makah and Quileute Indians of Washington. *Indians at Work* 6 (7): 12-16.
- Brown, Albert K.
1931 Neah Bay Indian Agency Files, Received April 15. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Fisheries.
- Buchanan, Lorna May
1929 History of the Fur Seal Industry in the Pribilof Islands. M. A. thesis, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Buckingham, Nelsa M. et al.
1995 Flora of the Olympic Peninsula. Seattle: Northwest Interpretive Association.
- Buell, Robert Kingery and Charlotte Northcote Skladal
1968 Sea Otters and the China Trade. New York: D. McKay Company.
- Busch, Briton Cooper
1985 The War against the Seals: A History of the North American Seal Fishery. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- 1997 Fur Traders from New England: The Boston Men in the North Pacific, 1787-1800: The Narratives of William Dane Phelps, William Sturgis, and James Gilchrist Swan. Spokane, Washington: Arthur H. Clark Company.
- Buxton, Michael
2007 The Sea Otter Hunters of San Diego and the Lower Coast, 1846 to 1903. *Mains'l Haul* 43 (3-4): 8-19.

- 2007a Henry Delano Fitch and the Lure of the Sea Otter Trade. *Mains'l Haul* 43 (3-4): 88-94.
- Calloway, Colin G.
2003 One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West before Lewis and Clark. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.
- Camfield, Thomas W.
2000 Port Townsend: An Illustrated History of Shanghaing, Shipwrecks, Soiled Doves and Sundry Souls. Port Townsend, Washington: Ah Tom Publishing, Inc.
- 2002 Port Townsend: The City that Whiskey Built, An Illustrated History. Port Townsend, Washington: Ah Tom Publishing, Inc.
- Campbell, Patricia
1977 A History of the North Olympic Peninsula. Port Angeles, Washington: Peninsula Publishing, Inc.
- Capoeman, Pauline K. ed.
1990 Land of the Quinault. Taholah, Washington: Quinault Indian Nation.
- Carpenter, Frank G.
1906 The Great Fur Business of British North America and How it is Managed. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, May 13, 1906.
- Cavanagh, Deborah M.
1983 Northwest Coast Whaling: A New Perspective. M. A. thesis, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
- Census Bulletin
1891 Publication of the Department of Fish and Fisheries: Marine Mammals. Dated October 20.
- Chalcraft, Edwin L.
2004 Assimilation's Agent: My Life as a Superintendent in the Indian Boarding School System. Cary C. Collins, ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Chandler, Graham
2003 A Slave among the Nootka. *The Beaver* 83 (1): 39-43.
- Christopher, Harry J.
1931 Neah Bay Indian Agency Files, Received March 13. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Fisheries.

- Clark, Donald H.
 1940-1963 Handwritten notes on logging and experiences on the Makah Reservation. Folders 5 and 7 of Box 37 of the Donald H. Clark Papers collection. University of Washington Manuscripts and Special Collections, Seattle.
- Clark, Ella E.
 2003 Indian Legends of the Pacific Northwest. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Coates, Kenneth
 1982 Furs along the Yukon: Hudson's Bay Company—Native Trade in the Yukon River Basin, 1830-1893. *BC Studies* 55: 50-78.
- Collins, Cary C.
 1996 Subsistence and Survival: The Makah Indian Reservation, 1855-1933. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 87 (4): 180-193.
- Colnett, James
 1940 The Journal of Captain James Colnett aboard the Argonaut from April 26, 1789 to November 3, 1791. F. W. Howay, ed. Toronto: The Champlain Society.
- 2004 Voyage to the Northwest Side of America: The Journals of James Colnett, 1786-1789. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- Colson, Elizabeth
 1942 New Customs at Neah Bay: The White Man's Ways Come to the Makah Indians. *Radcliffe Quarterly* 26/4: 18-21.
- 1953 The Makah Indians: A Study of an Indian Tribe in Modern American Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- 1967 [1949] The Assimilation of an American Indian Group. Pp. 209-226 in Paul Bohannon and Fred Plog, eds. *Beyond the Frontier*. New York: National History Press.
- Commerce Report
 1931 Preparation of Pribilof Islands Fur-Seal Skins for Market. Washington, DC: Bureau of Fisheries.
- Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada: Assessment and Update Status
 2006 Report on the Northern Fur Seal in Canada. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Wildlife Service.

- Cone, Joseph and Sandy Ridlington, eds.
1996 The Northwest Salmon Crisis: A Documentary History. Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State University Press.
- Conley, Arlyn
1998 "Never Trust a White Man": I Am Makah, Son of Whaling Nation. Gig Harbor, Washington: Red Apple Publishing.
- Conover, C. T.
1955 Quillayutes Used Hot Water in Battle. *Seattle Times*. July 14, 1955.
- Cook, Warren L.
1973 Flood Tide of Empire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest, 1543-1819. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Costello, Joseph Allen
1895 The Siwash: Their Life, Legends, and Tales, Puget Sound and Pacific Northwest. Seattle: The Calvert Company.
- Cote, Charlotte June
2002 "It's Who We Are": Makah and Nuuchah-nulth Whaling, A History. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley.
- Crooks, Drew
2001 Past Reflections: Essays on the Hudson's Bay Company in the Southern Puget Sound Region. Tacoma, Washington: Fort Nisqually Foundation.
- Crossman, Carl L.
1972 The China Trade: Export Paintings, Furniture, Silver & Other Objects. Princeton, New Jersey, Pyne Press.
- Culin, Stewart
1901 A Summer Trip among the Western Indians. *Bulletin of the Free Museum of Science and Art of the University of Pennsylvania* 3 (3): 143-152.
- Curtis, Edward S.
1978 The Nootka and Haida. In *The North American Indian: Being a Series of Volumes Picturing and Describing the Indians of the United States, the Dominion of Canada, and Alaska*. Volume 11 of 20. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.
- 1978a The Salishan Tribes of the Coast: The Chimakum and the Quilliate. The Willapa. In *The North American Indian: Being a Series of Volumes Picturing and Describing the Indians of the United States, the Dominion*

of Canada, and Alaska. Volume 9 of 20. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.

Cutter, Donald C.

1991 Malaspina & Galiano: Spanish Voyages to the Northwest Coast, 1791 & 1792. Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre.

1991a The Other Explorers: Alcala Galiano and Valdes. *Columbia* 5 (2): 16-21.

Danver, Steven L.

2007 American Indian History from the Right Perspective. *Journal of the West* 46 (1): 81-3.

Davidson, Donald C.

1941 Relations of the Hudson's Bay Company with the Russian-American Company on the Northwest Coast, 1829-1867. *British Columbia Historical Quarterly* 5: 33-51.

Dawson, Leon W.

1910 Miscellaneous Quillayute Wildlife Report. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.

Day, Albert M.

1949 Old Man of the Pribilofs. Washington, D. C.: United States Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Wildlife Leaflet 323.

De Armond, R. N.

1986 Seal Hunters of Washington. *The Sea Chest* 20 (2): 66-83.

Dean, Jonathan R.

1997 The Sea Otter War of 1810: Russia Encounters the Tsimshians. *Alaska History* 12 (2): 24-31.

Demos, John

2005 Viewpoints on the China Trade: A Young Nation Looks to the Pacific. *Common-Place* 5 (2): 1-7.

Densmore, Frances

1923 Conscious Effort Toward Physical Perfection among the Makah Indians. *American Anthropologist* 25 (October-December 1923): 544-567.

1939 Nootka and Quileute Music. *Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin* 124. Washington. (Reprinted: Da Capo Press, New York, 1972.)

Dolin, Eric Jay

2008 Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

- Dorchester, Daniel
 1890 Dorchester to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 4, 1890. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 75, Education 31481, Letters Received—1881-1907, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
- Dorsey, Kurk
 1991 Putting a Ceiling on Sealing: Conservation and Cooperation in the International Arena, 1909-1911. *Environmental History Review* 15 (3): 27-45.
- Drucker, Philip
 1939 Rank, Wealth, and Kinship in Northwest Coast Society. *American Anthropologist* 41 (1): 55-65.
- 1951 The Northern and Central Nootkan Tribes. Washington, D. C.: United States Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 144.
- [1955-1963] Indians of the Northwest Coast. Garden City, New York: Natural History Press.
- 1965 Cultures of the North Pacific Coast. San Francisco, California: Chandler Publishing Company.
- Eder, Jeanne Oyawin
 1999 The Makah. Austin, Texas: Raintree Steck-Vaughn.
- Eells, Myron
 1887 The Indians of Puget Sound. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 9 (1): 1-9.
- 1887a Traditions and History of the Puget Sound Indians. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 9 (2): 97-104.
- 1887b Decrease of Population among the Indians of Puget Sound. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 9 (5): 271-276.
- 1888 Puget Sound Indians. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 10(1): 26-36.
- 1888a Indians of Puget Sound. *American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal* 10 (3): 174-178.
- 1889 The Twana, Chemakum, and Klallam Indians of Washington Territory. Pp. 605-681 in *Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution for the Year*

1887. Washington. (Reprinted: Shorey Bookstore, Seattle, Washington, 1971).

Ellsberg, Helen

1974 Furs that Launched a Thousand Ships: The Innocent and Playful Sea Otter Helped to Change California and Western History—and was Nearly Exterminated in the Process. *The American West* 11 (6): 14-19, 63.

Erickson, K. O.

1946 Indian Invaders Get in Hot Water. *Seattle Post Intelligencer*, February 4, 1946.

Erikson, Patricia Pierce, with Helma Ward and Kirk Wachendorf

2002 Voices of a Thousand People: The Makah Cultural and Research Center. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Erlandson, Jon M., Mark A. Tveskov and R. Scott Byram

1998 The Development of Maritime Adaptations on the Southern Northwest Coast of North America. *Arctic Anthropology* 35 (1): 6-22.

Ernst, Alice H.

1952 The Wolf Ritual of the Northwest Coast. Eugene: University of Oregon Press.

Etnier, Michael A.

2002 The Effects of Human Hunting on Northern Fur Seal (*Callorhinus ursinus*) Migration and Breeding Distributions in the Late Holocene. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.

Etulain, Richard W.

2006 Beyond the Missouri: The Story of the American West. Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press.

Fagan, Brian M.

1978 The Makah Find Their History. Pp. 59-81 in *Quest for the Past*. Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Farris, Glenn

2007 Otter Hunting by Alaskan Natives along the California Coast in the Early Nineteenth Century. *Mains 'l Haul* 43 (3-4): 20-33.

Fisher, H. D.

1952 The Status of Harbour Seal in British Columbia, with Particular Reference to the Skeena River. Fisheries Research Board of Canada, Bulletin 83.

- Fisher, Robin
1977 Contact and Conflict: Indian-European Relations in British Columbia, 1774-1890. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- Forester, Joseph E. and Anne D. Forester
1975 Fishing: British Columbia's Commercial Fishing History. Saanichton, British Columbia: Hancock House.
- Frachtenberg, Leo J.
1920 Eschatology of the Quileute Indians. *American Anthropologist* 22 (4): 330-340.
- 1921 The Ceremonial Societies of the Quileute Indians. *American Anthropologist* 23 (3): 320-352.
- Gay, James Thomas
1987 American Fur Seal Diplomacy: The Alaskan Fur Seal Controversy. New York: P. Lang.
- Gentry, Roger L.
1998 Behavior and Ecology of the Northern Fur Seal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gibbons, F. Austin
1974 End of Terror. *Pacific Wilderness Journal* 2 (1).
- Gibbs, George
1877 Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon. *Contributions to North American Ethnology* 1 (2): 157-361. John Wesley Powell, ed. Washington: U. S. Geographical and Geological Survey of the Rocky Mountain Region. (Reprinted: Shorey, Seattle, Washington, 1970).
- Gibbs, James A., Jr.
1955 Sentinels of the North Pacific: The Story of Pacific Coast Lighthouses and Lightships. Portland, Oregon: Binfords & Mort.
- Gibson, James R.
1991 A Diverse Economy: The Columbia Department of the Hudson's Bay Company, 1821-1846. *Columbia* 5 (2): 28-31.
- 1992 Otter Skins, Boston Ships, and China Goods: The Maritime Fur Trade of the Northwest Coast, 1785-1841. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.

- Giesecke, E. W.
 2007 Unlikely Partners: Bostonians, Russians, and Kodiaks Sail the Pacific Coast Together, 1800-1810. *Mains 'l Haul* 43 (3-4): 34-69.
- Gill, Steven J.
 1983 Ethnobotany of the Makah and Ozette People, Olympic Peninsula, Washington (USA). Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Botany, Washington State University, Pullman.
- Goetzmann, William H. and Kay Sloan
 1983 [1982] Looking Far North: The Harriman Expedition to Alaska, 1899. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Goodman, Linda Jean
 1978 This Is My Song: The Role of Song as Symbol in Makah Life. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Pullman.
- Goodman, Linda J., and Helma Swan
 2003 Singing the Songs of My Ancestors: The Life and Music of Helma Swan, Makah Elder. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Gorsline, Jerry, ed.
 1992 Shadows of Our Ancestors. Port Townsend: Empty Bowl.
- Gough, Barry M.
 1978 James Cook and the Origins of the Maritime Fur Trade. *The American Neptune* 38 (3): 217-24.
- 2007 Fortune's a River: The Collision of Empires in Northwest America. Madeira Park, BC: Harbour Publishing Company.
- Grinnell, George Bird
 1994 Alaska 1899: Essays from the Harriman Expedition. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Gunther, Erna
 [1923-1934] [Field Notebooks] (Accession No. 614-70-20, Manuscripts and University Archives Division, University of Washington, Seattle).
- 1927 Klallam Ethnography. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- 1936 A Preliminary Report on the Zoological Knowledge of the Makah. Pp. 105-118 in *Essays in Anthropology Presented to A. L. Kroeber*. Robert Lowie, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- 1942 Reminiscences of a Whaler's Wife. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 33 (1): 65-69.
- [1945-1977] Ethnobotany of Western Washington: The Knowledge and Use of Indigenous Plants by Native Americans. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- 1972 Indian Life on the Northwest Coast of North America, as Seen by the Early Explorers and Fur Traders During the Last Decades of the Eighteenth Century. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.
- Gustafson, Carl E.
1968 Prehistoric Use of Fur Seals: Evidence from the Olympic Coast of Washington. *Science* 161: 49-51.
- Hacking, Norman R.
1982 The Victoria Sealing Fleet. *The Sea Chest* 15 (3): 97-101.
- Haeberlin, Hermann and Erna Gunther
1930 The Indians of Puget Sound. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press. Also published as Indians of Puget Sound in Volume 4, Part 1, University of Washington Publications in Anthropology, Seattle.
- Hancock, Samuel
1927 The Narrative of Samuel Hancock, 1845-1860. New York: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1927.
- Hanson, James A.
2005 When Skins Were Money: A History of the Fur Trade. Chadron, Nebraska: Museum of the Fur Trade.
- Hanson, Timothy R., ed.
1991 The Autobiography of Charles Huntington. *The Pacific Northwest Forum* 4 (1): 5-94.
- Harmon, Alexandra
1998 Indians in the Making: Ethnic Relations and Indian Identities around Puget Sound. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Harris, Cole
1997 The Resettlement of British Columbia: Essays on Colonialism and Geographical Change. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.

- Haswell, Robert
1928 Haswell's Log of a Voyage Round the World on the Ship Columbia Rediviva and the Sloop Washington. T. C. Elliott, ed. *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 29 (1-2): 162-88.
- Hatch, David R.
2001 Oregon's Elakha: The Sea Otter Has Played a Leading Role in Northwest History. Is It Time to Bring Them Back to Oregon's Coast? *Tide Pool*, January 4, 2001.
2002 Message from the Middens: Ancient Middens May Lead to Oregon Sea Otter Restoration. *Tide Pool*, May 7, 2002.
2003 Lewis and Clark: The Elakha Connection: Why Did Clueless and Lark Cross the Continent? To Get Sea Otter Pelts. *Tide Pool*, May 7, 2003.
- Hatch, David R. and Kim Valentine et al
2001 Who's Elakha? The Sea Otter Has Played a Leading Role in Northwest History and Coastal Ecology But Important Research Is Needed Before It Can Be Reintroduced to Oregon's Coast. *Tide Pool*, February 8, 2001.
- Haycox, Stephen and James K. Barnett and Caedmon A. Liburd, eds.
1997 Enlightenment and Exploration in the North Pacific, 1741-1805. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Hewes, Gordon W.
1947 Aboriginal Use of Fishery Resources in Northwestern North America. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley.
1950 Doctoral Thesis Relates How Olympic Peninsula Indians Caught Food Fish in Happy Days Before White Men Came. *Port Angeles Evening News*. January 20, 1950.
- Hitchman, James H.
1990 A Maritime History of the Pacific Coast, 1540-1980. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
- Hobucket, Harry
1934 Quillayute Indian Tradition. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 25 (1): 49-59.
1980 Journal. Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society Archives. Filed under "Indians"—T-141/3.

- Holmberg, James J. ed.
2002 Dear Brother: Letters of William Clark to Jonathan Clark. New Haven:
 Yale University Press.
- Hoonan, Charles E.
1964 Neah Bay, Washington: A Brief Historical Sketch. Seattle: Crown
 Zellerbach Corporation.
- Howay, Frederic William
1911 Early Navigation of the Straits of Fuca. *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 12
 (1): 1-32.
- 1973 A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1785-1825. Richard
 A. Pierce, ed. Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press.
- 1990 [1941] Voyages of the "Columbia" to the Northwest Coast, 1787-1790 and 1790-
 1793. Portland, Oregon: Oregon Historical Society Press.
- Howeattle, Pansy
1990 Interview with Jacilee Wray, July 2, 1990.
- Huelsbeck, David R.
1983 Mammals and Fish in the Subsistence Economy of Ozette. Ph.D.
 dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Pullman.
- 1988 Whaling in the Precontact Economy of the Central Northwest Coast.
 Arctic Anthropology 25 (1): 1-15.
- Ingraham, Joseph
1971 Joseph Ingraham's Journal of the Brigantine Hope on a Voyage to the
 Northwest Coast of North America, 1790-92. Mark D. Kaplanoff, ed.
 Barre, Massachusetts: Imprint Society.
- Irvine, Albert
1921 How The Makah Obtained Possession of Cape Flattery. Translated by
 Luke Markistun. Pp. 5-11 in *Indian Notes and Monographs*.
 F. W. Hodge, ed. New York: Museum of the American Indian, Heye
 Foundation.
- Jackson, Donald, ed.
1978 Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, 1783-1854 (2 vols.). Urbana:
 University of Illinois Press.

- James, Francis W.
1882 James to Thomas H. Brents, January 24, 1882. Mss 8C, Folder 6. Charles H. Willoughby Family Records, Jefferson County Historical Society, Port Townsend, Washington.
- James, Justine E. and Leilani A. Chubby
2002 Quinault. Pp. 99-117 in Jacilee Wray, ed. *Native Peoples of the Olympic Peninsula: Who We Are*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Jensen, Philip
2004 Strange Voyage. *The Beaver* 84 (2): 38-40.
- Jetté, Melinda Marie
2006/07 "Beaver are Numerous, but the Natives . . . Will Not Hunt Them": Native—Fur Trader Relations in the Willamette Valley, 1812-1814. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 98 (1): 3-15.
- Jewitt, John R.
1987 [1824] *The Adventures and Sufferings of John R. Jewitt: Captive of Maquinna*. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Johnson, Katherine Jean
2005 *The Living World of Aniakchak: How Fire, Furs and Fish Shaped History on the Central Alaska Peninsula*. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Washington State University, Pullman.
- Jones, Dorothy K.
1980 *A Century of Servitude: Pribilof Aleuts Under U. S. Rule*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
- Jones, George Neville
1947 *A Botanical Survey of the Olympic Peninsula, Washington*. Seattle: University of Washington.
- Jupp, Ursula.
1966 Sealing Schooners Brought Wealth to Victoria Until Pelagic Treaty. *Victoria Daily Colonist*. April 3, 10, 1966.
- 1967 Home Port Victoria: A Collection of True Stories of Men and Ships That Sailed from this Port, Told by Old Seamen at Meetings of the Thermopylae Club. Victoria, British Columbia: Ursula Jupp.
- Kappler, Charles J. ed.
1904 *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Vol. II)*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

- Karamanski, Theodore J.
1983 Fur Trade and Exploration: Opening the Far Northwest, 1821-1852.
 Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kemble, John Haskell
1969 The Cruise of the Schooner Tamana, 1805-1807: An Episode in the
 American Penetration of the Pacific Ocean. *Proceedings of the American
 Antiquarian Society* 78 (2): 283-98.
- Kendrick, John
1991 The Voyage of Sutil and Mexicana 1792: The Last Spanish Exploration of
 the Northwest Coast of America. Spokane, Washington: The Arthur H.
 Clark Company.
- 1992 "End of the Northern Mystery: The Spanish in Juan de Fuca and Beyond,
 1790-1792." Pp. 100-118 in Robin Inglis, ed. *Spain and the North Pacific
 Coast: Essays in Recognition of the Bicentennial of the Malaspina
 Expedition, 1791-1792*. Vancouver, British Columbia: Vancouver
 Maritime Museum Society.
- King, Virginia
1969 Indians of the Olympic Peninsula and Puget Sound: A Survey. Published by The
 College.
- Kirk, Ruth
1986 Tradition & Change on the Northwest Coast: The Makah, Nuuchah-nulth,
 Southern Kwakiutl, and Nuxalk. Seattle, Washington: University of
 Washington Press.
- Kirk, Ruth with Richard Daugherty
1974 Hunters of the Whale: An Adventure of Northwest Coast Archaeology.
 New York: William Morrow and Company.
- Kirker, James
1970 Adventures to China: Americans in the Southern Oceans, 1792-1812. New
 York: Oxford University Press.
- Klallam-Pysht Census
1881 Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- Knight, Rolf
1996 Indians at Work: An Informal History of Native Indian Labour in British
 Columbia, 1858-1930. Vancouver, British Columbia: New Star Books.

- Kool, Richard
1982 Northwest Coast Indian Whaling: New Considerations. *Canadian Journal of Anthropology* 3 (1): 33-44.
- Lamb, W. Kaye and Tomas Bartoli
1989 James Hanna and John Henry Cox: The First Maritime Fur Trader and His Sponsor. *BC Studies* 84: 3-36.
- Lander, Robert H. and Hiroshi Kajimura
1980 Summary of Northern Fur Seal Data and Collection Procedures, Vol. 3: Western Pacific Pelagic Data of the Soviet Union and Japan, 1958-78 (Excluding Fur Seals Sighted). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Seattle.
- Lane, Barbara
n.d. Depositions of 21 Makah Indians: April 27, 1892. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- 1972 Makah Economy Circa 1855 and the Makah Treaty: A Cultural Analysis. *U. S. v. Washington*, U. S. District Court, Seattle, Washington.
- Lavender, David
1988 The Way to the Western Sea: Lewis and Clark across the Continent. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Lee, Molly
1998 The Alaska Commercial Company: The Formative Years. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 89 (2): 59-64.
- Lewis, Lucien M.
1905 The Last of the Makah Chiefs: Chief Peter. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, October 22, 1905.
- Lightfoot, Kent G.
2005 Indians, Missionaries, and Merchants: The Legacy of Colonial Encounters on the California Frontiers. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
- Lindley, Will
2006 Oregon—Maritime Portland: With Sailing Ships and River Boats, the Harbor City Crew and Prospered. *Journal of the West* 45 (3): 72-84.
- Litwin, Thomas S., ed.
2005 The Harriman Alaska Expedition Retraced: A Century of Change, 1899-2001. Piscataway, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

- Lokken, Harold E.
1997 James Gilchrist Swan: The Unsung Pioneer in The History of the Pacific Halibut Fishery. *The Sea Chest* 30 (4): 173-187.
- Love, John A.
1992 Sea Otters. Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing.
- MacGillivray, Don
2008 Captain Alex MacLean: Jack London's Sea Wolf. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- Mackie, Richard Somerset
1997 Trading Beyond the Mountains: The British Fur Trade on the Pacific, 1793-1843. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- Madden, Ryan
2000 "The Government's Industry": Alaska Natives and Pribilof Sealing during World War II. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 91 (4): 202-209.
- Maggs, J. S.
1877 The Neah Bay and Quileute Indians Produce Over \$20,000 Every Year in Furs, Skins, Oils. *Washington Standard*, December 29, 1877, p. 4.

1882 The Store of William Gallick at Neah Bay was Burned a Few Days Ago. *Washington Standard*, September 15, 1882, p. 2.
- Makah Stories
2009 When the Animals and Birds were Created. <http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/makah-stories/blog-49264/?page=2>
- Malloy, Mary
1998 "Boston Men" on the Northwest Coast: The American Maritime Fur Trade, 1788-1844. Kingston, Ontario: The Limestone Press.

2000 Souvenirs of the Fur Trade: Northwest Coast Indian Art and Artifacts Collected by American Mariners, 1788-1844. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University.
- Manby, Thomas
1992 Journal of the Voyages of the H. M. S. Discovery and Chatham. Fairfield, Washington: Ye Galleon Press.
- Markishtum, Henry
1906 Whale Hunting with the Makah Indians Off Cape Flattery. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, February 18, 1906.

- 1907 Allotting Land to the Makah Tribe. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, July 25, 1907.
- 1907a Site of Old Spanish Fort at Neah Bay. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, September 15, 1907.
- Marr, Carolyn J.
1983 Washington Coastal Indian Villages, 1907: The Photographs of Albert Henry Barnes. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 74 (3): 106-113.
- Marr, Carolyn J., Lloyd Colfax, and Robert D. Monroe
1987 Portrait in Time: Photographs of the Makah by Samuel G. Morse, 1896-1903. Neah Bay, Washington: The Makah Cultural and Research Center in Cooperation with the Washington State Historical Society, Tacoma.
- Marsh, Katherine
2004 Bering's Big Find: The Explorer Showed Russia Its Greatness. *U. S. News & World Report*. February 23, 2004.
- Martin, Fredericka I.
1960 She Bears: The Story of the Fur Seal. Philadelphia: Chilton, Company.
- May, Allan
1957 Last Indian Sealer Dies at Neah Bay. *Marine Digest* (July 27, 1957): p. 13.
- 1968 Makahs Order Ten Fishing Vessels. *Marine Digest* 46/25 (February 17, 1968): p. 35.
- 1968a Fish Protein Plant to Open at Neah Bay. *Marine Digest* 47/3 (September 14, 1968): p. 32.
- 1975 The Sea People of Ozette. B & E Enterprises.
- May, Ernest R. and John K. Fairbank, eds.
1986 America's China Trade in Historical Perspective: The Chinese and American Performance. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- McCurdy, James G.
1937 By Juan de Fuca's Strait: Pioneering Along the Northwestern Edge of the Continent. Portland, Oregon: Binfords & Mort, Publishers
- 1961 Indian Days at Neah Bay: From an Unfinished Manuscript by the Late James G. McCurdy. Gordon Newell, ed. Seattle: Superior Publishing Company.

McDonald, Lucile

- 1951 A Woman Artist in Early-Day N. W.: Crayon Sketches in the Wilderness. *The Seattle Times*, January 28, 1951, 4-5.
- 1955 Tragic Episode at Neah Bay in 1792. *The Seattle Times*, March 4, 1956.
- 1955a Quimper's Experiences at Neah Bay. *The Seattle Times*, October 16, 1955.
- 1955b Spanish Penetrated Far into Strait of Juan de Fuca in 1790 Expedition. *The Seattle Times*, October 9, 1955.
- 1955c First Charting of Tatoosh Area. *The Seattle Times*, July 3, 1955.
- 1955d Cook's Discovery of Cape Flattery. *The Seattle Times*, May 22, 1955.
- 1969 Bodega at Point Grenville, 1775. *The Sea Chest* 2 (3): 87-94.
- 1972 Swan among the Indians: Life of James G. Swan, 1818-1900. Portland, Oregon: Binfords & Mort.
- 1972a The First Pilots on Juan de Fuca Strait. *The Sea Chest* 5 (3): 79-86.
- 1975 The First Neah Bay Lifesaving Station. *The Sea Chest* 9 (2): 69-71.
- 1976 Pioneer Government Agent on the Washington Coast. *The Sea Chest* 10 (??): 47-50.
- 1977 Early Spanish Explorations on N. W. Coast. *The Sea Chest* 10 (3): 100-106.
- 1978 Kaigani, The Fur Traders' Port. *The Sea Chest* 12 (2): 73-78.
- 1979 When Neah Bay was a Sealing Port. *The Sea Chest* 12 (3): 99-106.
- 1981 Ancestors of Puget Sound's Fishing Fleet. *The Sea Chest* 14 (4): 119-122.
- 1988 How the Spaniards Came to Washington. *The Sea Chest* 22 (1): 37-41.
- 1993 Early Days on the Washington Coast. *The Sea Chest* 26 (3): 130-142.
- 2001 Lightkeeping on Tatoosh: The Island Lighthouse on Cape Flattery was Built in 1857. *The Sea Chest* 34 (3): 138-143.

- 2001a The Revenue Cutters: Cutter Service Created in 1790, Northwest Service Begins in 1854. *The Sea Chest* 34 (4): 171-175.
- McDonald, Lucile and Zola Helen Ross
1952 Stormy Year. New York: T. Nelson.
- McFeat, Tom, ed.
1966 Indians of the North Pacific Coast. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- McMillan, Alan D.
1999 Since the Time of the Transformers: The Ancient Heritage of the Nuuchah-nulth, Ditidaht, and Makah. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- McNeill, J. R.
2001 Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
- McReavy, John Morgan
1973 Makah: Indian Whale Hunters. Healdsburg, California: Naturegraph Publishers.
- Meany, Edmond S.
1905 Indian have Lived at La Push for Countless Centuries. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*. September 10, 1905. (University of Washington Archives, Bagley Scrapbook, Vol. 12, Pg. 100).
- 1905a Why Makah Tribe is Highest of Canoe Indian. *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*. September 24, 1905.
- 1925 Diary of Wilkes in the Northwest. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 16: 290-301.
- Meares, John
1790 Voyages Made in the Years 1788 and 1789, from China to the Northwest Coast of America. London: Logographic Press.
- Menzies, Archibald
1923 Menzies Journal of Vancouver's Voyage: April to October, 1792. C. F. Newcombe, ed. Victoria, British Columbia: William H. Cullin.
- Mill, Hugh R.
1905 The Siege of the South Pole. New York: Frederick A. Stokes.

- Miller, Beatrice D.
1952 Neah Bay: The Makah in Transition. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 43 (4): 262-272.
- Miller, Genevieve
1925 Indian Village: Neah Bay. *Americana* 19 (2): pp. XX.
- 1972 Our Northwest Heritage: Peter, Chief of the Makahs. *Age of Achievement* 3 (2): p. 1.
- Miller, Robert J.
2006 Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Mills, John Edwin
1955 The Ethnohistory of Nootka Sound, Vancouver Island. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Millerd, Frank
1988 Windjammers and Eighteen Wheelers: The Impact of Changes in Transportation on the Development of British Columbia's Fishing Industry. *BC Studies* 78: 28-52.
- Milroy, Robert H.
1874 Correspondence of the Washington Superintendency of Indian Affairs. April 9. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- Morganroth III, Chris
2002 Quleute. Pp. 135-149 in Jacilee Wray, ed. *Native Peoples of the Olympic Peninsula: Who We Are*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Morris, Lisa Marie
2001 Keeper of the Seal: The Art of Henry Wood Elliott and the Salvation of the Alaska Fur Seals. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Alaska, Fairbanks.
- Mouat, Jeremy
2005 Situating Vancouver Island in the British World, 1846-49. *BC Studies* 145: 5-30.
- Moulton, Gary E. ed.
1986 The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition, August 30, 1803—August 24, 1804. V. 2. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- 1988 The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition, July 28—November 1, 1805. V. 5. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

- 1990 The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition, November 2, 1805—
March 22, 1806. V. 6. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- 1995 The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition: The Journals of John
Ordway, May 14, 1804—September 23, 1806, and Charles Floyd, May
14—August 18, 1804. V. 9. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- 1996 The Journals of the Lewis & Clark Expedition: The Journal of Patrick
Gass, May 14, 1804—September 23, 1806. V. 10. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
- Murray, Peter
1988 The Vagabond Fleet: A Chronicle of the North Pacific Sealing Schooner
Trade. Victoria, British Columbia: Sono Nis Press.
- Nelson, E. W.
1920 Letter to the Commissioner of the General Land Office. February 19. Port
Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- Nelson, Sharlene and Ted Nelson
2003 The Makah. New York: Scholastic, Inc.
- Newell, Gordon, ed.
1977 The H. W. McCurdy Marine History of the Pacific Northwest, 1966-1976.
Seattle, Washington: Superior Publishing Company.
- Nicholson, George
1961 Vancouver Island's First Sealers. *Victoria Daily Colonist*. December 31,
1961, p. 15.
- Nicholson, N. O.
1936 Taholah Indian Agency Correspondence, Letter Dated September 22. Seattle,
WA: National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Alaska Region.
- Norton, Helen H.
1985 Women and Resources on the Northwest Coast: Documentation from the
18th and Early 19th Centuries. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Nugent, Walter
1999 Into the West: The Story of Its People. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Ogden, Adele
1941 The California Sea Otter Trade, 1784-1848. Berkeley, California:
University of California Press.

- Olson, Ronald L.
1936 The Quinault Indians. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- O'Leary, Beth Laura
1984 Aboriginal Whaling from the Aleutian Islands to Washington State. Pp. 79-102 in M. L. Jones, S. L. Swartz, and S. Leatherwood, eds. *The Gray Whale*. Orlando, Florida: Academic Press.
- O'Malley, Henry
1930 Fur-seal Industry of Pribilof Islands, Alaska. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Bureau of Fisheries. Economic Circular No. 71.
- O'Neil, Marion
1930 The Maritime Activities of the North West Company, 1813 to 1821. *The Washington Historical Quarterly* 21 (4): 243-67.
- Osborn, Alan
1977 Aboriginal Exploitation of Marine Food Resources. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
- Owens, Kenneth N.
2006 Frontiersmen for the Tsar: Timofei Tarakanov and the Expansion of Russian America. *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 56 (3): 3-21.
- Owens, Kenneth N. ed.
1985 The Wreck of the Sv. Nilolai: Two Narratives of the First Russian Expedition to the Oregon Country, 1808-1810. Portland, Oregon: Western Imprints, The Press of the Oregon Historical Society.
- Perry, John Curtis
1994 Facing West: Americans and the Opening of the Pacific. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.
- Pethick, Derek
1968 Victoria: The Fort. Vancouver, British Columbia: Mitchell Press Limited.
- 1980 The Nootka Connection: Europe & the Northwest Coast, 1790-1795. Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre.
- Pettitt, George Albert
1950 The Quileute of La Push, 1775-1945. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Portlock, Nathaniel
 1789 A Voyage Round the World; But More Particularly to the North-West Coast of America, Performed in 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788, in the King George and Queen Charlotte, Captains Portlock and Dixon. London: J. Stockdale, and G. Goulding.
- Port Angeles Democrat-Leader
 1893, 1895 December 12, 1893; July 5 (a) and 12 (b), 1895.
- Port Townsend Leader/Daily/Morning Leader
 1902-1906, 1910 October 9, 1902 (a); November 7, 1902 (b); September 30, 1903 (a); November 3, 1903 (b); April 17, 1904; January 31, 1905; January 25, 1906; March 27, 1910.
- Powell, James V.
 1990 Quileute. Pp. 431-437 in Wayne Suttles and William Sturtevant, eds. *Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 7: Northwest Coast*. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution.
- Powell, Jay
 1976 Quileute: An Introduction to the Indians of La Push. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- 2008 Email communication to author via Jacilee Wray.
- Powell, Jay and Vickie Jensen
 1976 Quileute: An Introduction to the Indians of La Push. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Powell, J. V. and Bill Penn, et al.
 1972 Place Names of the Quileute Indians. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 63: 105-112.
- Price, Hiram
 1882 Price to Charles Willoughby, September 14, 1882. Mss 8C, Folder 6. Charles H. Willoughby Family Records, Jefferson County Historical Society, Port Townsend, Washington.
- Primm, James Neal
 1998 Lion of the Valley: St. Louis, Missouri, 1764-1980. St. Louis, Missouri: Missouri Historical Society Press.
- Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration, Convened at Paris Under the Treaty Between the
 1895 United States of America and Great Britain Concluded at Washington February 20, 1892 (Vol. VI). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

- Radcliffe, Louis
1931 Authentification of Fur-Seal Skins. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Fisheries. National Archives and Records Administration: Pacific Alaska Region.
- Ramsey, James E.
1901 A Trip to Neah Bay. *The Coast* (August 1901): pp. XX.
- Ravalli, Richard
2009 The Near Extinction and Reemergence of the Pacific Sea Otter, 1850-1938. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 100 (4): 181-91.
- Reagan, Albert B.
1925 Whaling of the Olympic Peninsula Indians of Washington. *Natural History* 25 (1): 24-32.

1929 Traditions of the Hoh and Quillayute Indians. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 20 (3): 178-189.
- Rathbun, Richard
1900 A Review of the Fisheries in the Contiguous Waters of Washington and British Columbia. Report of the United States Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries for 1899. Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office.
- Reagan, Albert B.
1928 Ancient Sites and Burial Grounds in the Vicinity of Queets, Washington. *El Pelacio* 25 (19): 296-299.
- Reagan, Albert B. and L. V. W. Walters
1933 Tales from the Hoh and Quileute. *Journal of American Folklore* 5 (46): 297-346.
- Reid, Joshua L.
2009 “‘The Sea Is My Country’: The Maritime World of the Makah, an Indigenous Borderlands People.” Ph.D. dissertation, History Department, University of California, Davis, Davis, California.
- Renker, Ann M.
n. d. The Makah Tribe: People of the Sea and the Forest. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Libraries, Digital Collections.
<<http://content.lib.washington.edu/aipnw/renker.html>> site referenced September 16, 2006.
- Renker, Ann M. and Erna Gunther
1990 Makah. Pp. 422-430 in Wayne Suttles and William Sturtevant, eds. *Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 7: Northwest Coast*. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution.

Report of the Behring Sea Commission, and Report of British Commissioners of June 21, 1892.
1893 London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

Richards, Kent D.

1993 [1979] Isaac I. Stevens: Young Man in a Hurry. Pullman: Washington State University Press.

Riebe, Viola and Helen Lee

2002 Hoh. Pp. 119-133 in Jacilee Wray, ed. *Native Peoples of the Olympic Peninsula: Who We Are*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Riley, Carroll L.

1968 The Makah Indians: A Study of Political and Economic Organization.
Ethnohistory 15 (1): 57-95.

Riley, Francis

1967 Fur Seal Industry of the Pribilof Islands, 1786-1965. Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.

Rhoads, C. J.

1931 Neah Bay Indian Agency Files, Received April 15. Seattle, WA: National Archives and Records Administration: Pacific Alaska Region.

Robertson, R. G.

1999 Competitive Struggle: America's Western Fur Trading Posts, 1764-1865.
Boise, Idaho: Tamarack Books.

Ronda, James P.

1984 Lewis and Clark among the Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Roppel, Alton Y.

1984 Management of Northern Fur Seals on the Pribilof Islands, Alaska, 1786-
1981. Washington, D. C.: National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service.

Roth, Lottie Roeder, ed.

1926 History of Whatcom County. Volume 1. Chicago and Seattle: Pioneer
Historical Publishing Company.

Ruby, Robert H., Brown, John A. and Cary C. Collins

2010 A Guide to the Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest. Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press.

Rushton, Gerald A.

1980 Echoes of the Whistle: An Illustrated History of the Union Steamship
Company. Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre.

- Russell, Dick
2001 Eye of the Whale: Epic Passage from Baja to Siberia. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Samuels, Stephan R. ed.
1991 Ozette Archaeological Project Research Reports, Volume I, House Structure and Floor Midden. Reports of Investigations 63. Department of Anthropology, Washington State University, Pullman, and National Park Service, Pacific Northwest Regional Office, Seattle.
- Scammon, Charles M.
1874 The Marine Mammals of the Northwestern Coast of North America. San Francisco: J. H. Carmany and Company.
- Scheffer, Victor B.
1940 The Sea Otter on the Washington Coast. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 31: 371-378.
- 1958 Seals, Sea Lions, and Walruses: A Review of the Pinnipedia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- 1962 Pelage and Surface Topography of the Northern Fur Seal. No. 64. United States Department of the Interior Fish and Wildlife Service. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office.
- 1970 The Year of the Seal. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- 1981 The Amazing Sea Otter. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- 1984 History of Scientific Study and Management of the Alaskan Fur Seal, *Callorhinus ursinus*, 1786-1964. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service.
- 1999 The Last of the Sea Otter Hunters. *Columbia* 13 (4): 14-16.
- Scheffer, Victor B. and Karl W. Kenyon
1952 The Fur Seal Herd Comes of Age. *National Geographic* (April 1952): 491-512.
- Schefke, Brian R.
2004 An Environmental History of the Hudson's Bay Company's Fur Trade in the Pacific Northwest: A Thematic Overview. University of Washington, Seattle: Department of History.

- Schreiber, Dorothee
2006 First Nations, Consultation, and the Rule of Law: Salmon Farming and Colonialism in British Columbia. *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 30 (4): 19-40.
- Seattle Post-Intelligencer
1934 Seal Hunting in Primitive Fashion Told. N. D.
- Seattle Times
1920 Indian Seal Hunter's Life Full of Romance. June 6.
- Sebastian, R. L.
1890 Sebastian to Superintendent of Indian Schools, January 24, 1890. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 75, Education 3433, Letters Received—1881-1907, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.
- Sedam, Mike
2002 Olympic Peninsula: The Grace & Grandeur. Stillwater, Minnesota: Voyageur Press, Inc.
- Sepez, Jennifer
2001 Political and Social Ecology of Contemporary Makah Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Shellfish Collecting Practices (Washington). Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Shields, Ed
2001 Salt of the Sea: The Pacific Coast Cod Fishery and the Last Days of Sail. Lopez Island, Washington: Pacific Heritage Press.
- Singh, Ram Raj Prasad
1956 Aboriginal Economic System of the Olympic Peninsula Indians. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle.
- Sirridge, Agnes T.
1954 Spanish, British and French Activities in the Sea Otter Trade of the Far North Pacific, 1774-1790. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri.
- Smith, J. Gordon
1911 Romance of the Pacific Coast Sealing Trade. Toronto *The Globe*. February 18, 1911.

- n. d. Saving the Seal. Victoria, British Columbia: Royal BC Museum, British Columbia Archives.
- n. d. (a) The Chase of the Fur Seal: A Romantic, Forgotten, Industry of Victoria, British Columbia. Victoria, British Columbia: Royal BC Museum, British Columbia Archives.
- n. d. (b) Victoria's Pelagic Sealing Industry. *The British Columbia Review*.
- Smith, Frank
1995 Interview with Cary C. Collins.
- Smith, Tim D.
1994 Scaling Fisheries: The Science of Measuring the Effects of Fishing, 1855-1955. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Smithsonian Explorations. Ethnological Researches in Oregon and Washington. Explorations
1916 and Field-work of the Smithsonian Institution in 1916. Publication 2438. Washington, DC: The Smithsonian Institution: Pp. 111-17.
- Sperlin, O. B.
1917 Washington Forts of the Fur Trade Regime: Nunez Gaona, Spokane House, the Okanogan Post, Astoria, Fort Vancouver, Fort Nisqually. *Washington Historical Quarterly* 8 (2): 102-113.
- Spores, Ronald
1993 Too Small a Place: The Removal of the Willamette Valley Indians, 1850-1856. *The American Indian Quarterly* 17 (2): 171-191.
- Spring, Charles
1927 Origin of Pelagic Sealing in British Columbia, and Its Progress. Dictionary of Canadian Biography.
- Starbuck, Alexander
1964 History of the American Whale Fishery: From Its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876. 2 Vols. New York: Argosy-Antiquarian LTD.
- Stauss, Joseph H.
2002 The Jamestown S'Klallam Story: Rebuilding a Northwest Coast Indian Tribe. Sequim, Washington: Jamestown S'Klallam.
- Stiritz, Mimi
2001 "The Romance of Alaska Sealskin": The Fur Trade in Twentieth-Century St. Louis." *Gateway Heritage* 21 (4): 30-40.

- Stone, Francis
1916 Indian Sealers Make \$6,000 Catch. Tacoma Daily News, June 23.
- Sturgis, William
191- The Northwest Fur Trade, and the Indians of the Oregon Country, 1788-1830. Boston, Massachusetts: Old South Association.
- Sullivan, Robert
2000 A Whale Hunt. New York: Scribner.
- Suttles, Wayne
1987 Coast Salish Essays. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Swan, James G.
1857 The Northwest Coast; Or, Three Years' Residence in Washington Territory. New York: Harper. (Reprinted: Ye Galleon Press, Fairfield, Washington, 1989).
- 1861 Murder of Wha-lathl, or "Swell," one of the Makah Chiefs by the Elwha Indians, near Old Dungeness. *Washington Standard*. Olympia, Washington, March 30, 1861.
- 1861a Scenes among the Mackahs. An Indian War Party. *Washington Standard*. Olympia, Washington, November 2, 1861.
- 1870 The Indians of Cape Flattery, at the Entrance to the Strait of Fuca, Washington Territory. *Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge* 16 (8): 1-106. Washington. (Reprinted: Shorey Publications, Seattle, 1972.)
- 1871 Almost Out of This World: Scenes From Washington Territory. The Strait of Juan de Fuca 1859-61. Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society.
- 1887 The Fur-Seal Industry of Cape Flattery and Vicinity. Pp. 393-400 in George B. Goode, ed. The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of the United States. Section 5, Volume 2. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.
- Swanson, Earl H.
1956 Nootka and the California Gray Whale. *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 47: 52-56.
- Swanton, John R.
1973 Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest: Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, the Dakotas. Seattle: Shorey Book Store

- Sweeney, E. M. Mrs.
1969 Captain Jacobson's Sealing Schooners. *Victoria Daily Colonist*. June 8, 1969, p. 4.
- Taylor, Herbert C., Jr.
1974 Anthropological Investigation of the Makah Indians. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.
- Taylor, Herbert C., Jr., and Catherine Zentelis
nd The Peculiar Importance of Oysters to the Economy of Early Territorial Washington and its Impact on the Aboriginal Population. Copy in author's possession.
- Taylor, Herbert C., Jr. and James Bosch
1980 The Makah Whalers. Pp. 25-32 in James W. Scott, ed. *The Pacific Northwest and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Howard J. Critchfield*. Occasional Paper #14, Center for Northwest Studies, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington.
- 1984 Makah Whalers. Pp. 133-141 in Herbert C. Taylor, Jr. and Garland F. Grabert, eds. *Western Washington Indian Socio-Economics: Papers in Honor of Angelo Anastasio*. Bellingham, Washington: Western Washington University Press.
- Taylor, Rodney J.
2007 The Log of the Brig *Betsy*, 1799-1801. *Mains 'l Haul* 43 (3-4): 70-87.
- Thistle, John
2004 "As Free of Fish as a Billiard Ball is of Hair": Dealing with Depletion in the Pacific Halibut Fishery, 1899-1924. *BC Studies* 142/143: 105-125.
- Thompson, Stith
1966 Tales of the North American Indians. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Thomson, Duane and Marianne Ignace
2005 "They Made Themselves Our Guests": Power Relationships in the Interior Plateau Region of the Cordillera in the Fur Trade Era. *BC Studies* 146: 3-35.
- Thurman, Michael E.
1967 The Naval Department of San Blas: New Spain's Bastion for Alta California and Nootka, 1767 to 1798. Glendale, California: The Arthur H. Clark Company.

- Todd, Ethel I.
1976 Recent Literature on the Northern Fur Seal. Seattle, Washington: Marine Mammal Division, Northwest Fisheries Center, National Marine Fisheries Service.
- Tomasevich, Jozo
1943 International Agreements on Conservation of Marine Resources with Special Reference to the North Pacific. Palo Alto, CA: Food Research Institute.
- Tweedie, Ann M.
2002 Drawing Back Culture: The Makah Struggle for Repatriation. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- United States
1977 The Story of the Pribilof Fur Seals. Washington, D. C.: Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
- 1985 North Pacific Fur Seals: Current Problems and Opportunities Concerning Conservation and Management, a Special Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, D. C.: National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere.
- Vancouver, George and Lieutenant Broughton
1798 A Voyage of Discovery to the North Pacific Ocean, and Round the World and Performed in the Years 1790, 1791, 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795. London: G. G. and J. Robinson, Paternoster-Row, and J. Edwards, Pall-Mall.
- Van Mechelen, Dan
2000-2004 History of the Quinault Reservation. Available at www.vanmechelen.net/quinres.html
- Vandiveer, Clarence A.
1971 [1929] The Fur-Trade and Early Western Exploration. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.
- Vaughan, Thomas and Bill Holm
1982 Soft Gold: The Fur Trade & Cultural Exchange on the Northwest Coast of America. Portland, Oregon: Oregon Historical Society.
- Veirs, Valerie C.
1969 The Makah Adolescent: A Descriptive Study of a Selected Sample Residing in Neah Bay and Seattle. Masters thesis, Department of Social Work, University of Washington, Seattle.

- Veltre, Douglas W. and Mary J. Veltre
1987 The Northern Fur Seal: A Subsistence and Commercial Resource for Aleuts of the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands, Alaska. *Etudes Inuit Studies* 11 (2): 51-72.
- Vibert, Elizabeth
1998 Traders' Tales: Narratives of Cultural Encounters in the Columbia Plateau, 1807-1846. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Victoria Daily Times
1906 Graphic Story of Sealing Trip. October 3.
- Victoria Pelagic Sealers
n. d. Catches Made by Victoria Pelagic Sealers. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Fur-Sealing Collection.
- Wagner, Henry R.
1933 Spanish Explorations in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Santa Ana, California: Fine Arts Press.
- Waterman, T. T.
1920 Puget Sound Geography. Manuscript 1864. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution: National Anthropological Archives
- Washington Fur Company
1897 Records of the Washington Fur Company, La Push, Washington. Port Angeles, WA: Jacilee Wray Collection.
- 1920a The Whaling Equipment of the Makah Indians. *University of Washington Publications in Anthropology* 1(2). Seattle, Washington.
- Webb, Robert Lloyd
1988 On the Northwest: Commercial Whaling in the Pacific Northwest, 1790-1967. Vancouver, British Columbia: University of British Columbia Press.
- White, Richard
1991 "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
- 1991a The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- 2006 Born Modern: An Overview of the West. *History Now: American History Online*. Issue 9, September 2006.

- Whitner, Robert L.
1981 Makah Commercial Sealing, 1860-1897: A Study in Acculturation and Conflict. Unpublished paper prepared for the Fourth North American Fur Trade Conference.
- nd Whitner Files of unpublished manuscript materials housed in the Washington State Historical Society archives in Tacoma, Washington. At the time of the completion of this report, the Whitner papers remained unprocessed.
- Wike, Joyce Annabel
1951 The Effect of the Maritime Fur Trade on Northwest Coast Indian Society. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, New York.
- Wilcox, R. Turner
1951 The Mode in Furs. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Wilen, James E.
1976 Common Property Resources and the Dynamics of Overexploitation: The Case of the North Pacific Fur Seal. Resources Paper, No. 3, University of British Columbia. Vancouver.
- Wilke, Ford
1958 Pelagic Fur Seal Investigations, California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska, 1958. Seattle, Washington: U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Section of Marine Mammal Research.
- Williams, Gerald O.
1984 The Bering Sea Fur Seal Dispute: A Monograph on the Maritime History of Alaska. Alaska Maritime Publications, Eugene, Oregon.
- Willoughby, C.
1882 Willoughby to Hiram Price, October 7, 1882. Mss 8C, Folder 6. Charles H. Willoughby Family Records, Jefferson County Historical Society, Port Townsend, Washington.
- 1886 Indians of the Quinault Agency, Washington Territory. *Smithsonian Institution, Annual Report*: 267-282.
- Wilson, George O.
1850-1851 Journal of a Voyage from East Machias, State of Maine, to San Francisco, California 1849-50 On Board of the Brig Oriental and from San Francisco to Puget Sound, Oregon on Board the Brig Geo. Emery, 1850-1851. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Manuscripts and Special Collections.

Winthrop, Theodore

2006 The Canoe and the Saddle: A Critical Edition. Paul J. Lindholdt, ed.
Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Wray, Jacilee

1997 Olympic National Park: Ethnographic Overview and Assessment.
Prepared for Olympic National Park, Port Angeles, Washington.

Wray, Jacilee, ed.

2002 Native Peoples of the Olympic Peninsula: Who We Are. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press.

Wright, E. W. ed.

1961 [1895] Lewis & Dryden's Marine History of the Pacific Northwest. New York:
Antiquarian Press, LTD.

WSIA

1855 Records of the Washington Superintendency of Indian Affairs, 1853-1874.
Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, Microcopy Number M-
5, Roll #26.

