

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial
National Historic Site

Administrative History **Jefferson National Expansion** **Memorial National Historic Site**

Sharon A. Brown

June 1984

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CHAPTER I:

1933-1935: The Idea

In 1803 Thomas Jefferson envisioned a future time in which the United States would stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans. This dream was later realized, as hundreds of thousands of European-Americans settled on western land in the Louisiana Territory and beyond. In the year 1849, for instance, emigrant Sarah Royce had visions of a new life as she plodded steadily west across the prairies. Eighty-four years later, St. Louisan Luther Ely Smith had a similar vision, in which his city's riverfront might be transformed by building a monument to Thomas Jefferson and such hardy pioneers as Sarah Royce.

Jefferson National Expansion Memorial symbolizes many things: westward visionaries, stalwart pioneers, and Thomas Jefferson's foresight. Still being built after nearly half a century, the memorial owes its formation to countless unsung people who gave their time, energy, money and talent to make it a reality. There is an obvious comparison between them and the western pioneering men and women they strove to honor; only with determination, patience, maneuvering, aggressiveness, perseverance, and sheer willpower were both groups able to realize their dreams.

Shortly after Thanksgiving of 1933 Luther Ely Smith, a St. Louis lawyer, was returning to St. Louis on a train from a visit to Vincennes, Indiana, where he toured the new memorial to George Rogers Clark. Smith served as a member of the memorial's Federal commission after being appointed by his college classmate, Calvin Coolidge. As Smith and his friends gazed out the train windows at the decaying St. Louis riverfront passing slowly by, they realized that only drastic measures could restore the district; yet a wealth of history existed in those narrow streets. The idea of a historical monument began.

When he heard Smith's idea of building a monument on the riverfront, Mayor Bernard Dickmann liked it and decided to test its support in the local community. On December 15, 1933, he called a group of civic and business leaders into his office to discuss Smith's plan. St. Louis historian McCune Gill was approached by the two men and came to the meeting armed with a tentative memorial plan. The group of men liked the idea and formed a temporary committee to look further into the matter. They named Smith chairman and Dickmann vice chairman. Other committee members included John G. Lonsdale, Carl F.G. Meyer, Jesse McDonald, Morton J. May, Sidney Maestre, Tom Gilmartin and McCune Gill. In the next few months this group planned to raise money and generate public interest. [\[1\]](#)

President Franklin D. Roosevelt was enthusiastic about the idea, stating that he was "greatly interested in the suggestion for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial for the St. Louis Riverfront ... I can ... tell you that I like the principle underlying the thought of a memorial to the vision of Thomas Jefferson and the pioneers in the opening up of the Great West." [\[2\]](#)

In April 1934 the committee obtained a state charter as the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association and acquired a nonprofit designation. [3] There was a strong effort from the beginning to keep the project bipartisan, especially by Smith, an independent Republican dealing with a Democratic city administration. This fortunate tradition would last throughout the memorial's history. With its good start, the group intended to arouse public interest, adopt suitable plans, solicit money and property, and improve a site for ... *a suitable and permanent public memorial to the men who made possible the western territorial expansion of the United States, particularly President Jefferson, his aides Livingston and Monroe, the great explorers, Lewis and Clark, and the hardy hunters, trappers, frontiersmen and pioneers who contributed to the territorial expansion and development of these United States, and thereby to bring before the public of this and future generations the history of our development and induce familiarity with the patriotic accomplishments of these great builders of our country.* [4]

Rebuilding the riverfront area was not a new idea. For years St. Louisans had watched the slow disintegration of the area bounded by Fourth Street, Washington Avenue, and Poplar Street. As early as 1887, statesman James G. Blaine made a suggestion to build a statue of Jefferson, memorializing the Louisiana Purchase. The next year interested property holders held meetings to discuss dwindling property values within the district, and they proposed an association to seek measures to restore property values in the area. Their efforts failed but interest in the problem did not die. In 1898, during planning for the Louisiana Purchase Centennial, an idea developed to rebuild a pioneer village on the site of St. Louis' founding. Such a project would have eliminated some of the riverfront's decayed buildings. This plan failed when a majority of the Centennial Committee decided to build a temporary city in St. Louis' Forest Park instead. The result: the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904. [5]

There were other proposals, such as that of architect Harland Bartholomew. Bartholomew worked for the City Plan Commission and in 1928 he drew up detailed plans for a riverfront development. A model was made and placed on public display. Luther Ely Smith served as chairman of the voluntary Citizen's City Plan Commission, which preceded the municipal body of the same name. It was this committee which brought Harland Bartholomew to St. Louis. [6]

None of these plans gained enough public support to become reality, but interest in riverfront development evolved during the Great Depression. This period of economic chaos meant lost jobs, idle workers and wasted skills. As a civic leader, then a member of the Council of Civic Needs, Luther Ely Smith saw the memorial as a way to relieve two problems, since monument construction would create jobs while clearing the decayed riverfront.

Max H. Doyme, an engineer, developed a plan in January 1933 to "improve the usefulness and value of the property" next to the river. [7] These and other plans came to Smith and Dickmann's committee. The Association of Citizens for Riverfront Improvement publicized its ideas in the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* in June 1933, but did not send them to the association for consideration until March 1935. These plans proposed razing all buildings between Third Street on the west, Washington Avenue on the north, and Walnut Street on the south. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a government agency, would foot the cost. Hudson R. Darst devised such a plan early in October 1933. After seeing publication of McCune Gill's plans in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* in December 1933, Darst claimed credit for the initial idea, and sent blueprints to Mayor Dickmann with a request that he "personally peruse" the material. [8]

Only the association headed by Smith progressed beyond the drawing-board stage. The group split into smaller subcommittees to consider various phases of the project — Legislative, Publicity, Finance, Historical Data, Plan and Scope. Within months the association members

introduced their idea to their congressional representatives, determined the necessary level of appropriation, and drafted bills for consideration by Congress. Group members met with prominent visitors, wrote publicity brochures and booklets, conducted fund raising campaigns, prepared budgets, employed St. Louis architect Louis La Beaume, gathered historical data, listed property holdings, and reported their results to the association's executive committee. The group designated the area to be considered for the memorial as "approximately one-half mile in length ... from Third Street east to the present elevated railroad." [9] These reports compiled by association members and interested St. Louisans provided a foundation for almost all work conducted over the next thirty years. At this early stage the memorial already appeared as not merely a local project, but an enterprise with national character and importance.

Legislative Efforts

In January 1934 Missouri Senator Bennett Champ Clark and Representative John Cochran, appropriating \$30,000,000 for the memorial jointly introduced a resolution into both congressional houses. Representative Cochran warned Mayor Dickmann that the resolutions needed the Bureau of the Budget's approval. [10] The resolutions (H.J. Res. 213, S.J. Res. 66) quickly ran into trouble, since they were asking for so large an appropriation in the midst of a depression. As the weeks passed Smith and the association realized that they would not obtain their appropriation at that session of Congress. Cochran reported to Dickmann that he had spoken with various congressional leaders, and warned him that he would not "get to first base" with a \$30,000,000 appropriation. "I do not think the President would even dare to make such a recommendation to the Congress with the finances of the country in the condition they are at present." [11]

Smith and Dickmann shifted tactics by proposing a commission patterned after the George Rogers Clark Memorial Commission. In March 1934 joint resolutions (H.J. Res. 302, S.J. Res. 93) were introduced in the House and Senate "authorizing the creation of a Federal Memorial Commission" to construct a permanent memorial. [12] Smith expected the commission to investigate the memorial's feasibility and report favorably to Congress. He hoped for the passage of this bill, which would encourage Congress to appropriate the money in its next term, "unless in the meantime it should be started as a Public Works project." [13]

Nevertheless, problems still arose in Congress. Even though the thrust of the group was now toward authorization only, critics accused the project's backers at every turn of wanting congressional appropriations. Association members themselves committed a major error when they mailed information booklets that contained the original resolution requesting a \$30,000,000 appropriation to congressional members. This action reinforced fears that the association later would return to ask for that amount. Political sense dictated that an authorization should be sought and acquired before making mention of appropriations. Cochran continued to assure Smith that he would do everything in his power to help [14] and he tried to counteract the booklet blunder by writing each House member an explanation that the new resolution would create a commission only. [15] But when asked on April 16 on the House floor if the resolution carried an appropriation, he gave a startling reply:

I want to be frank An association in my city, St. Louis, through its officers, approached me to introduce a resolution calling for an appropriation from the Federal Government of \$36,000,000 to construct a memorial ... in honor of Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase. The mayor of my city and other gentlemen made this request. I told them that I did not want to introduce such a resolution; that I knew it had absolutely no chance to pass. They insisted that the resolution be introduced. I introduced it; and on the day I introduced it I gave a statement to the press in my city practically ridiculing the idea of asking an

appropriation of such amount from the Congress for a memorial, calling their attention to the cost ... of other memorials that the Government has constructed. I suggested to them that they organize in the area covering the Louisiana Purchase, that they bring in all the States ... but not to ask the Government of the United States to construct it. They took my advice and drew a second resolution, which does not obligate the Government in any manner, shape or form; and it is the second resolution that is under consideration at the present time. [16]

When asked if he felt this resolution would be an opening wedge for later appropriations, Cochran replied, "I presume that some day this organization may return to the Congress and ask for a reasonable appropriation; but if I happen to be here at that time I assure the gentleman as far as I personally am concerned I would not ask for the appropriation of more than a limited amount. . . ." [17]

Smith was appalled. "I was under the impression that you no longer entertained any doubts as to the plan and its general outline," he wrote, emphasizing that the project was not to be local but rather national in scope. Smith asked Cochran to consider the resolution as an appointment of a commission only, and not an appropriation, whenever he wrote future letters to congressmen. [18]

Meanwhile the Senate bill (S.J. Res. 93) was reported out on March 28 and referred to the House Library Committee on April 5. The association hoped the committee would report favorably on this Senate bill, thus opening the door for its passage in the House on unanimous consent day, or under a rule from the Committee on Rules. Smith wrote letters to many congressmen and association lobbyists. Missouri representatives personally contacted others. Smith asked Representative James R. Claiborne (Missouri) to make sure that the House library Committee reported favorably and that proper steps were taken to have the Committee on Rules report a rule under which the resolution could be called up and passed in the House. [19]

There was a possibility that the House might pass the resolution on the next calendar day (Monday, May 7), but Smith did not want to run any risks due to the nearness of Congress' upcoming adjournment. His doubts proved valid, for on May 7 objections to the bill arose in the House. Republican opponents insisted it represented an opening wedge for millions of dollars in appropriations. Senator Clarence Cannon (Missouri) told Smith that if the Committee on Rules reported out a special resolution (H. Res. 356) providing for consideration of the Senate bill (S.J. Res. 93), the House could take up the bill

during the next week. This would be possible if Congressman Cochran could secure an agreement with the speaker and majority leader. A week later Claiborne explained to Smith that the House Library Committee had reported favorably on both the Senate and House bills. He contacted various congressmen urging them to put the resolutions on the calendar as soon as possible; however, he could not tell Smith when this would happen. Claiborne remained fairly optimistic, however, that the bill would pass before adjournment. [20]

Into the month of June Missouri's congressmen and association members continued to communicate with House leaders. Association member Max O'Rell Truitt learned early in June that the House might consider the bill, but that it would have problems gaining House attention because of the usual last minute rush to adjourn. Congressional leaders remained cautious on the bill's chances of consideration. Finally, on June 8 the bill held second place on the day's procedure. That day it was considered, special rule H. Res. 356 was agreed upon, and S.J. Res. 93 passed the House by an overwhelming majority. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the bill into law on June 15, 1934, establishing the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. [21]

The Commission would have fifteen members: three chosen by the President, three by the House of Representatives, three by the Senate, and six by the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association. In June the Senate and House chose their commissioners: Senators Alben William Barkley (Kentucky), James John Davis (Pennsylvania), and Frederick Van Nuys (Indiana); Representatives John N. Sandlin (Louisiana), Lloyd Thurston (Iowa), and Kent Ellsworth Keller (Illinois). Cochran and association members Jesse McDonald and J. Lionberger Davis suggested potential commissioners to President Roosevelt, including Roosevelt's own uncle, Frederic A. Delano, who did not receive an appointment. In October the President chose William T. Kemper (Missouri), J. Lionberger Davis (Missouri), and General Jefferson Randolph Kean (Washington, D.C., a great-great-grandson of Thomas Jefferson). For its choices the association primarily strove for a geographically diverse group, to emphasize the project's national significance. In November the members of the association chose (after considering, among others, John D. Rockefeller) their own Luther Ely Smith, Newton Baker (Ohio), William Allen White (Kansas), Matthew Woll (New York), Dr. Charles E. Merriam (Illinois), and Amon G. Carter (Texas). On December 19, 1934, the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission held its first meeting in St. Louis. [22] President Roosevelt personally sent them a congratulatory telegram: "All good wishes for the success of your Commission's efforts to recall and perpetuate the ideals, the faith and courage of the pioneers who discovered and developed the great west." [23]

Despite the commission's creation, association members continued to develop detailed plans for the riverfront. By December they talked of holding an architectural competition for the memorial. In January 1935 Louis La Beaume wrote his concept of a competition. It contained the principal elements of the competition which was actually held twelve years later: it was national in scope, a competition held in two stages, with data included in the program, and included the acquisition of a professional advisor. [24]

The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission did not waste time. At their first meeting in St. Louis the commissioners received a briefing from the association, reviewed plans for the memorial, visited the historic site on the riverfront, and elected an executive committee with Senator Barkley as chairman. Their second meeting, held in Washington, D.C., on February 1, 1935, attracted many influential observers: Missouri Senators Bennett Champ Clark and Harry Truman, Missouri Representatives John Cochran, James R. Claiborne, and Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., as well as Mayor Bernard F. Dickmann. [25]

Meanwhile Smith and Dickmann arranged through Senator Barkley to meet with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes on January 31. [26] Accompanied by William Allen White, Louis La Beaume, and association member William D'Arcy, the two answered Ickes' questions about how many workers could be employed. When Ickes asked about the memorial's maintenance, association members replied that "the National Park Service" would maintain it. Mayor Dickmann asserted that the city of St. Louis would contribute its share to the project by either providing the site or in some other way. Ickes became "very sympathetic toward the idea," and arranged a meeting for the group with the President. [27]

After the commission meeting the following day, February 1, the group met with Roosevelt at noon. Barkley, Keller, Dickmann, White, Smith, D'Arcy, and La Beaume presented a general outline of development, answered questions about the architectural competition, noted the number of St. Louisans who were unemployed, predicted a starting date, and estimated the project's duration. Although Roosevelt thought it impossible to obtain government funds for the memorial's entire cost of \$30,000,000, he thought that some available Works Relief Fund money could provide for a year's work on the memorial. [28]

During the next several weeks the association, under the supervision of the commission,

further developed the memorial plans. One step already taken was the hiring of Louis La Beaume as supervisory architect. Association members defined their rules of order, established functioning committee machinery, adopted fiscal procedures, and recommended Bon Geaslin of Washington, D.C. as their legal representative with Washington officials. William D'Arcy was very optimistic at this point. He recognized difficulties surrounding the project, but felt that "we seem to be under favorable guidance from some unknown source that makes me believe that we are going to win in spite of everything." [29]

Events indeed seemed favorable. An enabling act authorizing the issuance of bonds to aid the federal project was introduced into the Missouri State Legislature in February. After both houses passed the act unanimously, Governor Guy B. Park signed it on April 15. Almost simultaneously, on April 13 (by chance Thomas Jefferson's birthday), the Commission's executive committee approved plans for the memorial. They agreed to the association's proposed boundaries of the memorial area, the memorial's historical significance, the national architectural competition, and the cost estimate of \$30,000,000 for acquisition, development, and other planning matters. [30]

Finance

Smith and Dickmann turned their attention to financial matters. At the end of March they considered the Public Works Administration (PWA) as a source of funds, but realized they would have to approach Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes or other Federal officials for the money. A new relief disbursement office, the Works Progress Administration (WPA), had just been established, and Smith and Dickmann tried to discover how WPA funds could be disbursed, and by whom. Max O'Rell Truitt told them to have their plans in shape to present to the proper authorities, because "Activity will be necessary as soon as the Bill has been signed by the President." In April Senator Harry S Truman informed Smith that organizational machinery for the WPA was not yet in motion, as Roosevelt had not chosen a director. [31]

Commission members conferred on April 20 with Harry L. Hopkins, director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. He asked specific questions concerning amounts of work relief in the project, the number of employable workers, and other factors. He, too, showed interest. When Dickmann and association members left Washington, they felt optimistic toward both Hopkins and Ickes. [32] Only later did they discover that everything was not settled there.

On May 1 at the third session of the full commission, the commissioners approved their executive committee's favorable report concerning the memorial project. Members of both the commission and the association met the next day with Frank C. Walker, executive director of the National Emergency Council, and Rexford Tugwell, assistant secretary of agriculture. Smith supplied Tugwell with information concerning the purpose, scope, and significance of the project, estimating that between five and six thousand people would be employed. As a result of this meeting, Walker immediately wrote a letter of transmittal to an official at the National Emergency Council Office requesting that the plans and application for funds be received. This completed, the plans reached Assistant Director of the Public Works Administration Horatio Hackett, who sent them to the Missouri State PWA office in St. Louis. Formal application blanks were issued by the engineer-in-charge on June 15. [33]

On July 1 the St. Louis Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance permitting the holding of a special bond issue election to contribute \$7,500,000 toward the memorial. On July 19 the St. Louis Board of Estimate and Apportionment appropriated \$60,000 to meet the expenses of conducting registration required by law for special elections. The aldermen also approved spending \$63,000 to hold the election itself. All of this was done on the understanding that

Federal authorities would approve the project while contributing a substantial allotment before the election date. The city would contribute funds on a ratio with Federal funds. [34]

Ickes-Hopkins

Events moved fast in St. Louis, but in Washington, D.C., political wheels turned at a different pace. In 1935 federal relief existed under various programs. The Public Works Administration, established in June 1933, was under the chairmanship of Harold Ickes and enjoyed several kinds of authority, including initiation of its own construction projects. It emphasized large public works, and made loans and grants to states and other public bodies to stimulate nonfederal construction. Two of its members were Frederic A. Delano and Dr. Charles E. Merriam (also on the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission). Rather than manage the PWA as a direct economic stimulant, Ickes emphasized scandal-free spending. Since every PWA contract and plan was carefully reviewed, programs encountered long delays. Additional time was lost to advance planning and legal actions. Despite its slow pace, the PWA served a social function, if not an economic one. This agency's workers built public buildings, roads, schools, bridges, hospitals, tunnels, and hundreds of other projects. [35]

Another relief approach was established in May 1933 when Washington authorized \$500 million in relief money for distribution through state and local agencies. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), headed by Harry Hopkins, a social worker from Iowa, coordinated this effort. Within a half-hour after receiving his appointment at the White House, Hopkins placed a desk in the hallway of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation where he drank coffee and chain-smoked cigarettes. Within his first two hours in office, he spent more than \$5 million. After Hopkins convinced Roosevelt that emergency measures were needed to keep millions of people alive over the winter, the president established the Civil Works Administration (CWA). Half of CWA workers came from Federal relief payrolls and were paid minimum wages. Within a month Hopkins created four million jobs, providing \$1 billion worth of purchasing power over the winter. The program's high cost forced Roosevelt to end it the following spring. By April 1934 the CWA fired all four million workers, allowing FERA once again to manage Federal relief. [36]

By mid-1934 the Great Depression was still in its darkest hours, and one of seven Americans still received relief. The Federal Government had spent \$2 billion, yet twenty million people still needed assistance. Beyond merely continuing these relief programs, Washington intended to bring cohesiveness to them. Believing the government should quit the relief business, Roosevelt felt direct federal relief should end on a specified date. Local governments thereafter would provide pauper relief while Washington concentrated on providing every worker with a job through a massive public works effort costing \$5 billion the first year. This approach intended to serve both economic and social ends; it hoped to start recovery by providing work while aiding the unemployed until they found work in the private business sector.

Hopkins and Ickes both agreed with this policy. By November 1934 the Federal Government had set the broad design for the next phase of federal work relief, but actual composition of the works program remained a thorn in Washington's side. Authorized early in 1935, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, worth \$5 billion, represented the largest single appropriation in the history of the United States. Such a staggering sum fomented a battle over its control between Ickes and Hopkins. Secretary Ickes favored large public works while Hopkins stressed maximum employment. Hopkins finally won this contest when the newly established Works Progress Administration featured small projects providing relief work with negligible material costs. With relief money split between several agencies, Hopkins had only \$1.4 billion to spend. The WPA nevertheless hired some three million workers who left a

legacy still found today in the form of schools, hospitals, and playgrounds across the nation. [37]

Dickmann and Smith recognized these conflicts within the administration of Washington's relief policies during the summer of 1935 when they tried to obtain work relief money for St. Louis. As early as May Smith was warned of the Ickes-Hopkins rivalry. All through June, Smith kept the memorial alive by having association and commission members write to government officials. Ickes told William Allen White that he personally wanted to see the project adopted. National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer hinted that not only would the Park Service consider taking care of the finished memorial but that it might also supervise its construction. Since Luther Ely Smith believed the memorial offered the possibility of immediate expenditures for unskilled labor, he felt it fit "more into Mr. Hopkins' plan than any other project can possibly do." As a result, Smith concentrated on winning Hopkins' support, followed by the President's. [38]

At the end of June, Senator Alben Barkley spoke with Hopkins about the project and heard him express concern over the time required to finish the memorial. Barkley assured him that the association wanted to start as soon as possible. In consideration of the city's promised contribution, Hopkins thought he could add \$8,000,000 as a start. His division would handle the demolition. Barkley then saw Secretary Ickes, reported his conversation with Hopkins, and heard Ickes state once again that he favored the project. Ickes then discussed the idea with President Roosevelt, who hoped a satisfactory arrangement would develop. [39]

The assistant administrator of the WPA told Amon Carter in July that the application for the memorial was approved. It then went to the National Emergency Council for consideration by the Advisory Committee on Allotments. A few days later, on July 24, Hopkins himself wrote Carter that the project was "receiving considered and sympathetic attention." Colonel Horatio Hackett of the PWA planned to hold a conference with the commission to work out specific commitments if the city bond issue passed. [40]

Association members wanted a firm guarantee from the Federal Government as early as possible that it would support the bond issue campaign. On August 7, commission members, along with Mayor Dickmann, Senator Clark, and several association members, met with Secretary Ickes and Harry Hopkins seeking immediate federal action so that city officials could go ahead with final plans for the bond issue. Again Ickes and Hopkins approved the project and promised to allot \$10,000,000 for the first year's work. When Hopkins asked about memorial maintenance, Ickes replied that the National Park Service (an agency within his department) would assume this responsibility. The men from St. Louis asked for written confirmation of this agreement but Ickes refused, telling Senator Clark to make the agreement known in a statement to the press. [41]

St. Louis faced another concern: the acquisition of title to the property along the riverfront. During the spring and summer association members worked closely with Blair and United States Attorney Harry Blanton over the question of title. Blair outlined possible procedures for the association to follow. Title certificates needed dating, but he warned delays might arise if title abstracts became necessary for each lot. Immediate possession of vacant lots could be obtained, along with lots whose owners could move out at once. He gave Dickmann and Smith advice on how to shorten the time between the passage of the bond issue and the time needed to prepare the bonds. [42]

National Park Service officials began their preliminary investigations during August by sending engineer John Nagle to St. Louis to inspect plans and the proposed location. In the report on his three-day fact-finding tour Nagle favored the project, stating that the memorial would commemorate the Louisiana Purchase and Thomas Jefferson. He believed the national

significance of the project warranted federal aid. "If administered by the National Park Service ... or by some other competent federal agency, no reasons are apparent why the project should not receive the support of the National Government." [43] In this initial prospectus Nagle did not predict the pending bond issue election's outcome, but nevertheless, stated that official opinion remained quite optimistic while private opinion seemed more "restrained." Nagle noted that Federal approval of at least a major portion of the project was necessary before any city funds would be applied to it. The much quoted \$30 million price tag he thought was possibly too high, because it did not rest on any definite plans. St. Louis proposed to match Federal funds on a basis of three to one, supplying \$2,500,000 to Washington's \$7,500,000. Even though the memorial's condemnation of forty city blocks would decrease city revenues by \$180,000 a year, St. Louisans felt that subsequent development would offset such a loss. Nagle then touched upon an issue that would haunt the project for the next twenty-four years.

The most serious problem which will have to be solved is the proper handling of the elevated railroad viaduct which passes along the entire length of the front of the area to be improved and carries the passenger trains of all the railroads which cross the Mississippi over the Merchants Bridge. . . . Although this viaduct introduces a question as to the architectural design, it is thought that this can be handled successfully. [44]

Bond Issue

In St. Louis, attention turned to the approaching bond issue campaign. Fortified with assurances from Ickes and Hopkins, city officials pushed ahead with their plans. Smith became certain that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) could make a contract stating that if the voters approved the bond issue, the RFC would take the bonds. The RFC then would authorize an advance of funds to enable the Department of Justice to file condemnation suits. Others, however, did not share Smith's confidence. Association lawyer Bon Geaslin wondered if the PWA or the RFC would even take the bonds prior to a determination of their validity by the state supreme court. Edgar H. Wayman, first associate city counselor, stated his opinion on the validity of the proposed bonds without first having a test case decided by the court. He would regard it as "extremely unfortunate" to be compelled to bring a suit to test the validity of the bond issue, resulting in a delay which might cause the project's defeat. He thought the city held power to issue its bonds for a memorial without violating any constitutional provisions. St. Louis had power to condemn the land and to defray construction costs out of the bond issue funds. Furthermore, Wayman felt the memorial would furnish educational and recreational facilities for the city while attracting thousands of people to the city, promoting trade and commerce. Wayman believed that if a test case were brought before the Supreme Court, it would be sustained as valid. [45] Bon Geaslin advised Luther Ely Smith on a major question concerning the bonds. Should the bonds be sold on open market or should they be taken by the Public Works Administration? Bonds sold in the open market would not require as much paperwork as bonds assumed by the PWA or RFC. On the other hand, government bonds would be purchased at par, no premiums would be paid, and they would not be bought at the market price of St. Louis bonds. [46]

During the month preceding the referendum, various interest groups reacted to the need for property value appraisals in the memorial area. The city assessor believed that if property owners in the affected area were to receive just compensation they must secure the assessed valuation for their properties. Many owners in the area welcomed the chance to sell their properties and they notified the association of their property's assessed value. [47]

In the days before the election other WPA projects in the city and state were considered and

funded. The state administrator for the Federal Works Program Administration announced on September 2, 1935, that approximately \$63,000,000 in Missouri WPA projects were approved by his office for submission to the WPA office in Washington. A total of \$95,000,000 of the WPA budget was allotted for Missouri, and of this, \$22,000,000 was assigned to the Civilian Conservation Corps; \$12,000,000 for highway work; \$5,000,000 for miscellaneous expenditures; and the remainder for WPA projects. [48] On September 4 WPA department heads approved ninety-three projects on behalf of the city, costing \$14,052,165 and employing 21,175 people. The projects were intended to transfer city and county residents from relief rolls to WPA payrolls by November. [49] These actions set the precedent for the association's seeking of relief funds for the memorial.

Association members began extensive campaigning on behalf of the bond issue election. Speakers visited local group and club meetings to deliver speeches and to enlighten St. Louis citizens. Flyers and letters advertised the project's employment of five thousand men for three years. The association pointed out that sixty cents of every dollar spent on the memorial would go for wages, and they publicized favorable resolutions from many historical societies. Legal authorization, names of the commissioners, interest shown by Washington officials and the project's national importance were stressed in newspapers, flyers, handouts, and movie theaters. Association members also claimed the memorial would enhance property values, promote new city growth, and prevent the abandonment of riverfront property. The publicity also stressed costs. Since citizens paid taxes to support the unemployed of St. Louis, why not have Federal funds spent here for St. Louis' benefit? Three cents per hundred dollar-assessed valuation seemed a small price to pay for the project's rewards. "Here's your chance to vote for progress, to vote for your own interests and your city's future," proclaimed William D'Arcy, the association's publicist. Many St. Louis area unions endorsed the bond issue at their regular monthly meetings, and reported their actions to the association. [50]

Nevertheless, opposition arose, and many probing questions were asked. A committee appointed by the "Citizens Organization" asked the status of black workmen on the project and black citizens intending to use memorial facilities. A WPA administrative assistant replied that no needy person within the jurisdiction of the WPA would suffer racial discrimination. Everyone employed for a WPA project would be selected from United States Employment Service registers. [51] The "Committee Representing Industrial Properties South of Clark Avenue and North of Poplar Street" requested that the association restrict its purchases of property to north of Clark Avenue. They stated that the few blocks between Clark Avenue and Poplar Street east of Third Street were a highly developed industrial district with active industries, and owners expected reimbursement on an entirely different basis than the condemnation and purchase of the average property in the district. Painting a specter of thousands of lost dollars in taxable property, this committee warned that "suitable properties for private interests could not be obtained anywhere else" in St. Louis or Missouri under the same economical conditions. Their case received support by the news that the PWA funds might be unavailable because of the time limit on their expenditure. If opposing property holders forced long, drawn-out litigation, it was possible that the funds might disappear. Opposing interests had approached this committee to join forces, but the group promised not to do so unless forced to protect their properties. "Watch your step! ... Stop this spending. Do something!" proclaimed a flyer printed by the Taxpayers Defense Association. It insisted that the number-two Jefferson Memorial (after the one in Washington, D.C.) would be a "glorified parking lot for 10,000 cars." This association also claimed that the Federal Government had made no definite commitment of financial aid, and if it failed to provide the funds the district would become a "37-block mudhole." [52]

Gale Johnston, chairman of the speakers committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, quickly responded to such attacks. Association speakers received bulletins containing information to answer "leading questions" asked by opponents to the

bond issue. To charges that St. Louis would be burdened with the maintenance costs forever, that the tax rate would be thirty cents per \$100, that the fur industry would flee to East St. Louis, and that the Terminal Railroad Association elevated tracks would not be moved from the riverfront, the association replied that the National Park Service would maintain the memorial without cost to the city, the tax rate would be three cents per \$100 for the first ten years, and ten to twelve cents for the second ten years, that the leading furriers had indicated that they would stay on the St. Louis side of the river, and that the memorial architect would determine action on the tracks. Another question concerned the project's potential to employ workers for three years and fears arose also over the project's low pay scale. The association replied that Washington officials established the "conservative" estimate of workers, while a WPA-PWA conference would set pay scales. Although opponents questioned the estimate of \$7,500,000 for reimbursing property owners in the thirty-seven blocks as being insufficient, the association reported the total property assessment at \$5,700,000, to be covered by acquisition money. Even with a 10 percent additional amount for contingencies, the \$7,500,000 appeared ample. Such opposition and replies continued up to the date of the election. [53]

Six days before the election the Board of Directors of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce voted unanimously to endorse the bond issue. The group conducted a survey showing 290 businesses in the affected area, having a total floor space of 5,084,000 square feet. Thirty-four of the concerns, comprising 6 percent of the floor space, told the Chamber of Commerce they would go out of business if the bond issue passed. The other 256 concerns stated they would move elsewhere in the city. But the Taxpayers Defense Association characterized the action as an affront to the chamber's members who opposed the memorial. The Chamber of Commerce gave several reasons for its endorsement, all based on the city's business interests; the blighted area would be cleared, downtown real estate values would end their decline, and adjoining real estate would be enhanced. The Taxpayers Defense Association, however, countered by reemphasizing the fact that the Federal Government had not yet agreed to provide funds. It produced a telegram from the assistant administrator of the WPA stating there was no official notification of any Federal allotment for the proposed memorial. [54]

A straw vote conducted by city employees in sixteen city wards was announced on September 7. "Noncommitals" numbered 48,000, "yes" votes were 67,678, and those opposed, 19,964. The election board chairman predicted a voter turnout of 125,000 out of a registration of 349,132. [55]

Election Day, September 10, finally arrived. With the words and arguments over, the outcome rested in the voter's hands. At 4 p.m. the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* reported that "Mayor Dickmann's City Hall machine" was receiving the support of the entire Democratic organization. All city offices were closed under Mayor Dickmann's holiday proclamation, and all city employees had been ordered to work in their home precincts to get out the favorable vote. Dickmann warned that their jobs depended on the results. Party politics were put aside as Democrats opposed to Dickmann came out in support of the riverfront bond issue. The *Post-Dispatch* reported that "most of Dickmann's political enemies had hopped on the band wagon for the day at least." The vote totaled 174,012, far above the election chairman's prediction. It was 49.8 percent of registration, a heavy voter turnout for a bond election. In nineteen wards the bonds carried with a vote of two-thirds or more. In five wards the majority voted against them, while four wards had a favorable majority vote but less than two-thirds. The bonds passed 123,299 to 50,713. (Ward fourteen, Dickmann's own, failed to carry the proposal.) [56]

Mayor Dickmann's victory statement applauded everyone's work. "We have all worked together, regardless of political or other differences for a common victory." Rejoicing, William D'Arcy wrote Dickmann "It would have been a travesty on justice had the voter for

any reason not given approval." Smith quickly notified association and commission members, state and federal officials, congressmen, PWA and WPA officials — anyone and everyone who might contribute to the memorial's completion. In an editorial supporting the vote, the *Post-Dispatch* declared that "A 30-year dream is now about to become a reality." [57]

Following passage of the bond issue, the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission forged ahead with plans to enter into an agreement with Washington. Since formal applications for funds already had been filed in June, Smith and Dickmann made arrangements to travel to the capital. Mayor Dickmann and members of the commission and the association met with Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins, and officials of the Department of Justice. Once again politicking between Hopkins and Ickes probably accounted for some delay. On September 12 both visited the President's home in Hyde Park, New York, consulting Roosevelt about their differences. Ickes complained to the President that Hopkins was "wrecking" the PWA by rejecting projects already approved by Ickes. Hopkins responded that the rejected projects either cost too much for the number of men employed, or were in places where relief rolls could not supply enough workers. [58]

Legal Problems

After the bond election the *Post-Dispatch* revealed yet another hitch to the successful completion of the project. When the city board of estimate and apportionment approved the ordinance for the bond issuance, it stated the bonds could be issued only in an amount corresponding to appropriations obtained from the Federal Government at a ratio of \$3 federal to \$1 local. This opposed the plan announced by Dickmann during the bond campaign. Dickmann stated the bonds would be issued at once and rushed to Washington by plane. He turned over to the PWA collateral for a loan of the same amount to the city. This sum would be turned over to Ickes who would then turn over to the Justice Department a draft for \$7,500,000, accompanied with a request for the site confiscation. City Counselor Charles Hay disagreed with Dickmann, saying the city had no authority to pay the government more than \$1 for every \$3 expended by the government. Now, after the election, the board of estimate took Hay's position. [59]

Nevertheless, Luther Ely Smith, Senator Barkley, and others hoped to get an appointment with Ickes to earmark \$22,500,000 for completion of the memorial within three years. If Ickes and Hopkins accepted this proposition, they would reverse their past position that President Roosevelt was against obligating funds for more than one year. Harry Hopkins answered Smith and Barkley's request by saying some funds could be allotted to the memorial. When asked if \$22,500,000 would be earmarked to match the city's contribution, Hopkins replied that it was up to Ickes. The Board of Estimate's order that city money could be given only if matched three to one supported the argument for the entire allotment of \$22,500,000. [60] On September 26 Ickes announced his decision: the proposed memorial would not qualify for Work Relief Funds unless the legal problems were overcome. An allotment of \$22,500,000 could not be made, despite the ruling of the board of estimate. In no instance would more money be allocated than could be used in one year. [61]

Memorial backers approached President Roosevelt, singly and in groups, attempting to keep the project alive. Commission member Senator Alben Barkley talked with FDR about the memorial. In addition, Senator Bennett Champ Clark warned association members not to pressure the President when they made arrangements to meet him. Traveling west by rail, Roosevelt scheduled a stop in East St. Louis, Illinois to change railroad engines on September 27. He agreed to meet Mayor Dickmann, Senator Clark, and others. At the meeting the President himself brought up the matter. "I suppose you gentlemen are here to talk about your riverfront memorial." Ickes and Hopkins, both present, indicated they wanted to begin the project as soon as possible, promising to furnish the necessary funds for the first year's work

if the state enabling act authorizing the bond issue and financing would receive a favorable legal interpretation. The President told the delegation to define the law, with reference to the limitation on expenditures. Clark believed that a solution to the problem could be reached. Several days later a group of city officials, including the mayor, met to scrutinize the act for a "proper interpretation." [62]

City Counselor Charles M. Hay tried to determine the city's options in advancing funds for the project. "What we are now seeking to do is figure out a way through which the Federal Government may make a definite and authoritative allocation of its part of the funds without an Act of Congress." [63] Hay believed the President possessed authority to allocate funds out of the PWA or WPA without falling under the expenditure time limit and that with such power, Roosevelt could solve the problem. Hay then touched on an issue which would affect the memorial several months later. "If the President has this authority, then this becomes a question of policy, and, in a very real sense, of *politics*. I lay emphasis upon the last word, as I think of what we will be confronted with if for *any* reason we do not go forward with this project. It might mean the loss of Missouri in the next Presidential election, and the loss of Missouri might mean the loss of the Presidency." [64]

Although Luther Ely Smith agreed with Hay's interpretation, association lawyer Bon Geaslin expressed concern over whether the United States intended to spend the appropriation on improvements; the issue over the city's power to give Washington the full proceeds of the bond issue seemed secondary to him. Geaslin felt that if the President allocated the funds with no time limitation, the city would be able to contribute all the allotted funds immediately. But doubt remained over the ability of a presidential executive order to accomplish both aims. Can the President establish national parks and memorials by executive order where the site comes from private owners? Secondly, will the order be enough commitment to warrant the city putting up its \$7,500,000? If the President did have the power to approve the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission's report and authorize the \$30,000,000, then Congress would have to agree. The stage was thus set for drafting an executive order authorizing the establishment of a national memorial in St. Louis. The order would be a commitment; but at the same time it would mean to the Federal Government that no commitment had been made, except for the funds necessary for one year's work. [65]

Just as the legal problems were being interpreted, more opposition arose in the form of judicial action. A suit filed in St. Louis Circuit Court on September 13 foreshadowed some of the major opposition lodged against the memorial after the bond issue's passage. Opponents challenged the bonds' validity in *Claude E. Vrooman et al. v. City of St. Louis et al.*, argued on September 30, 1935. The city's demurrer to petition in the suit was sustained on October 1, resulting in the opponents appealing to the Missouri Supreme Court. This case was argued on October 15, and on November 2 the supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court ruled the city could deliver the entire bond issue as soon as Washington fixed the exact boundaries of the memorial and the necessary sum for its acquisition and construction. [66]

In addition to the test suit filing, one opposing group created enough disturbances to cause Luther Ely Smith and his backers very serious concern. Paul O. Peters, head of the Citizens Non-Partisan Committee, lodged protests against the election, and this action was joined by the Taxpayers Defense Association. Having lost the election, these groups turned toward challenging it. "We won the Bond Issue Election no doubt about it. But it was stolen," they cried. Paul Peters raised sufficient opposition to make city officials fearful he would receive attention in Washington. [67]

A draft of an executive order was finished by November 4, prepared by "Washington advisors" of the association. City Counselor Charles Hay judged the document to be in "compliance with the decision of the [Missouri] State Court setting forth the conditions upon

the fulfillment of which the City is authorized to turn over the proceeds of the bonds to the proper Federal Authority." [68]

Mayor Dickmann headed for Washington, D.C. on November 6 with Charles Hay, Edgar Wayman, Luther Ely Smith, Louis La Beaume, and commission secretary Russell Murphy. They met with Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins, National Park Service officials, and Justice Department officials. While Hopkins told the group he could begin transforming the site the minute it became public property, Ickes stressed that the funds must be spent within the fiscal year. After the PWA approved the executive order draft, President Roosevelt received it. He, in turn, sent it to United States Attorney General Homer Cummings for a ruling on its legality. [69]

The Attorney General's Opinion

While Cummings labored over his task, the memorial backers waited in Washington. Although they seemed so close to their goal, having promoted and worked to obtain the interest and backing of city and national figures, they faced a tantalizing delay. On November 18 the bomb fell. Cummings replied to FDR's inquiry, "I am herewith transmitting without my approval a proposed executive order approving the establishment and authorizing the construction of the Thomas Jefferson Territorial Expansion Memorial." [70] Cummings believed the President's only authority to construct the project lay in the National Recovery Act and the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935. Funds for the project were available under the latter act, but unfortunately these funds could not be allocated for future use. "The President has no authority to commit the Congress to future appropriations for the completion of this project," Cummings wrote. Any executive order operating on a legal basis would have to provide for the construction of the project out of funds then available and at the disposal of the President. In Cummings' opinion, the Federal Government had no right to accept the \$7,500,000 from the city of St. Louis on any other basis. To counter the claim that the Government had an agreement with the city to build the memorial, Cummings replied that acceptance of money implied only a moral commitment to complete the project, but not a firm legal agreement. He offered an alternative way to obtain the money — ask Congress for it. Then and only then could the project receive relief funds. [71]

Cummings' opinion left the association members bewildered. After the August meeting, Secretary Ickes had sought approval of the general plans and an appropriation for the first year's construction. Advisors in the PWA legal department had drafted the executive order, satisfying Ickes' desire for action. Consultation with the attorney general had never even been discussed. Ickes believed the executive order sufficient since he personally took it to the White House for Roosevelt's signature. Roosevelt certainly did not expect such a ruling. Missouri Senator Harry Truman had come to Washington to help, but he returned home after the President's favorable statements assured him of the project's approval. At two press conferences during the week, Roosevelt stated he would sign the executive order. Late on November 15, the day when the President was expected to sign the order, word came from the Justice Department about the delay. Smith stated, "The Department of Justice had been so cooperative in September that it seemed impossible that there could be any substantial objection coming from that office." Shortly thereafter, the stunned St. Louis delegation returned home empty-handed. [72]

For the next month Dickmann, Smith, and their congressional representatives sought a way to obtain the authorization. Representative John Cochran searched for non-allocated money controlled by the President, but the director of the Budget Bureau reported that no such funds remained in fiscal year 1935. "Frankly, to me, it appears that the red tape is slowly winding itself around this project," Cochran told Dickmann, and he doubted that any appropriation resolution would get through Congress. Dickmann was angry. He telegraphed Senator Bennett

Champ Clark that Cummings' opinion that only a moral binding held the Federal Government to the project disappointed him in view of the money spent by St. Louis on the election. "I know I need not impress upon you [the] fact that the people of St. Louis have ideas too regarding what morally binds. They don't like this even a little bit. If this communication sounds like lessons from [the] pulpit understand I am not responsible for this sudden emphasis on moral implications." [73]

Luther Ely Smith, optimistic as ever, believed this only a temporary setback, regarded it as a challenge, and determined to go ahead. Bon Geaslin, poking around Washington in search of support, reported that the solicitor general's office would not even informally suggest any form of an executive order which might be approved. These officials went on record as saying the project would proceed only if Congress furnished the money. Cochran discovered the same attitude in the legislature. Ickes' hands were tied as well as those of all other government officials. In view of the attorney general's ruling, Russell Murphy summed up everyone's feelings: "We might as well face reality." [74]

Other than drafting a new executive order, an appeal to Congress seemed the obvious recourse. A bill could approve the area as a site for a national memorial as recommended by the commission. Rather than seeking an appropriation, the law would provide authorization for the National Park Service to accept St. Louis' \$7,500,000. Roosevelt would possess authority to allocate the money that Hopkins had set aside for the project. Smith felt that the obvious advantages of such direct relief would appeal to Congress so much that even the toughest critics of spending policy and watchdogs of the treasury would favor allotting money for this project. Then, if future appropriations seemed unwise, Congress would hold the option of objection. [75]

Bernard Dickmann returned to Washington, D.C., on December 13, determined to hold the Federal Government to its agreement with St. Louis. Smith suggested that he "hold fire" with the President until Senators Clark and Truman could arrive, but Dickmann decided to use a little political clout. Unable to gain a meeting with Roosevelt, Dickmann called Homer Cummings, suggesting that he think about this issue not as attorney general but in his role as Democratic national committeeman. Dickmann reminded Cummings that FDR would be running for reelection in the coming year. If St. Louis was refused this request Dickmann would not hesitate to lead the fight in Missouri against the President. Cummings contacted Postmaster General James Farley, FDR's campaign manager in 1932. They discussed the problem, and Cummings called Dickmann back to tell him that they would arrange something. Roosevelt's secretary, Colonel McIntyre, called Cummings, two of his assistants, Harry Hopkins, and Harold Ickes into conference to decide upon a course of action. Ickes' diary recorded the meeting. Apparently the idea of the St. Louis project had progressed well until Cummings rendered his adverse opinion. [76] Ickes wrote, "One thing for Homer, however, is that he is agile. He found against it on one ground and now he discovers that he can qualify it under the Historic Sites Act, which was passed last session. I rather hooted at this, but since we are all committed up to our eyes on this project, I think we ought to go through with it under whatever guise." The group worked out a solution and Homer Cummings drafted a new executive order. Under this order, Harry Hopkins would authorize a contribution to the Department of the Interior. The city of St. Louis and the Public Works Administration would furnish the balance up to \$9,000,000 to be used on the project "until July 1, next." [77]

The Historic Sites Act

Previously, on August 21, 1935, President Roosevelt signed an act to provide for the preservation of historic sites, buildings, objects, and antiquities of national significance. The Historic Sites Act gave the secretary of the interior broad powers to carry out this policy

through the National Park Service. The secretary was to make a national survey of historic and archaeologic buildings, sites, and objects which possess "exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of the United States"; to contract or make agreements with municipal departments, educational and scientific institutions, associations, and individuals to preserve historic properties; and to acquire any real or personal property for purposes of the act. [78] Homer Cummings used this legality to justify establishing a St. Louis memorial to Thomas Jefferson. A new executive order was drafted, allocating \$3,300,000 in WPA funds and \$3,450,000 in PWA funds (under the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935) for site acquisition. Combined with the city's contribution of \$2,250,000 (and based on a three to one ratio) the order provided \$9,000,000 for one year's work. On December 21, 1935, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 7253 permitting the secretary of the interior to acquire and develop the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. This became the country's first national historic site designated under the Historic Sites Act. [79]

In the order Roosevelt cited the basis for the area's designation as a historic site. Several historic events occurred on the site, and historic buildings were located "at and near the site." Important buildings in the area included the Spanish Colonial office where the Upper Louisiana Purchase was transferred to the United States; the Government House where Captain Amos Stoddard took formal possession of the Purchase for the United States in 1804; the old French cathedral, earliest home of western religion on the western bank of the Mississippi; and the courthouse where the Dred Scott case was tried. St. Louis was the site where Laclède and Chouteau established "the first civil government west of Mississippi; the site where Lafayette was received by the people; the site where Lewis and Clark planned their exploration trip; and the beginning point of the Santa Fe, Oregon, and other trails." In addition to the historic significance of the area, Roosevelt cited another reason for the establishment of the memorial. In 1935, at the height of the Great Depression, Roosevelt stated that the project would be a useful one, and would "provide relief, work relief and increased employment." [80] Thus the memorial existed for two reasons: to memorialize westward expansion, and to provide work relief within St. Louis.

Mayor Dickmann returned home triumphant. He believed this executive order to be better than the original because the site was taken for its historical value and placed directly under the control of the Department of the Interior. Russell Murphy, considering the victory as St. Louis' "Christmas present," jokingly asked Senator Alben Barkley how long Santa Claus had been living in Barkley's home state of Kentucky. "This makes a mighty fine ending of the old year," exclaimed Luther Ely Smith. [81]

However, three days after Roosevelt signed the executive order, opposition again erupted in St. Louis. A taxpayer's suit was filed attempting to stop the city of St. Louis from issuing and selling the bonds. Little did Luther Ely Smith realize that the memorial to Thomas Jefferson faced thirty years of delay before it would become reality.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER I: Footnotes

¹Paul Simpson McElroy, *The Story of the Gateway Arch* (St. Louis: Nies Kaiser, n.d.), pp. 4-5. Few records of these early meetings have been found. One that does exist is that of the Historical Data Committee which met on January 31, 1934. McCune Gill headed the meeting, and those present represented St. Louis' most prominent historical authorities. Among those attending were Nettie Beauregard, archivist and curator for the Missouri Historical Society, and various Washington University and St. Louis University history professors. At this early date McCune Gill stated that it was evident "that this memorial must be truly national in scope" and that help would be needed from representatives, senators, and even the president. "Meeting of the Historical Data Committee," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, January 31, 1934, JNEMA. Gathering of historical data proved to be crucial to the project's success. For an example of McCune Gill's work emphasizing St. Louis as the "focus" of "National Expansion," see: McCune Gill, *The St. Louis Story*, 3 vols. (St. Louis: Historical Record Association, 1952), 1:383-386.

²Franklin D. Roosevelt to Bernard F. Dickmann, 19 February 1934, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association Papers, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial National Historic Site Archives, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter cited as JNEMA).

³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 October 1965; Dickson Terry, "The Story of the Arch - A Monument to Thirty Years of Patience, Perseverance, and Determination," *Cherry Diamond Magazine of the Missouri Athletic Club*, 57, no. 9 (September 1964), p. 31. The other names on the charter were: William O. Gibbons, Claude Ricketts, Frank Rand, Edna Gellhorn, Max O'Rell Truitt, Gale Johnston, and Isaac Orr. Luther Ely Smith (1873-1951), St. Louis attorney and civic leader for more than fifty years, strove to build Jefferson National Expansion Memorial for eighteen years of his life. Born in Downer's Grove, Illinois, he graduated from Williston Academy, Easthampton, Massachusetts, in 1890, and received his A.B. degree from Amherst College in 1894 (Chief Justice of the United States Harlan F. Stone, President Calvin Coolidge and Ambassador to Mexico Dwight W. Morrow were friends and fellow classmates). Smith received his law degree from Washington University of St. Louis in 1897. He was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws from Amherst in 1942, and from Washington University in 1950. Smith taught English at Smith Academy in St. Louis from 1894-1898 and lectured on contracts at the St. Louis University School of Law from 1908-1913. Off to Cuba in 1898, he served in the Spanish-American War and in 1917 volunteered in World War I, serving as a Captain of field artillery. Smith's involvement in civic affairs was long and fruitful and his interest varied. Some of his projects and organizations: chairman, Citizens City Plan Commission 1916-1922; Council of Civic Needs, 1929-1938; vice chairman, Civil Service Commission 1941-1945, chairman 1945-1950; participant in non-Partisan court plan 1940; organizer of Open-Air Playground Committee;

leader in Central Parkway movement; president of City Club; member of St. Louis Audubon Society; member of St. Louis Civil Liberties Committee. Luther Ely Smith served as president of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association from 1934-1949, (excepting one year) and as chairman of the Board of Trustees from 1949 to his death. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 April 1951; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 April 1951.

⁴Pro Forma Decree of Incorporation of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 11 June 1934, JNEMA.

⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 July 1888; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 October 1965; John Bryan, *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial - Its Origin, Development and Administration*, n.d., typed manuscript, National Park Service papers located in Jefferson National Expansion Memorial National Historic Site Archives, St. Louis, Missouri (hereafter cited as JEFF).

⁶Bryan, p. 4, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 April 1951.

⁷M.H. Doyne, *Plan For the Improvement of the Central River Front*, January 1933, pp. 1-15, typed manuscript, JNEMA.

⁸The Association of Citizens for River-Front Improvement to Carl F.G. Meyer, 14 March 1935, JNEMA; Hudson R. Darst to Dickmann, 26 December 1933, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 June 1933. For lists of the numerous riverfront development proposals, see: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 July 1968; Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. listed more plans: a 1903 plan by Louis Levy and Emmanuel Masqueray; a 1907 plan by Wilbur T. Trueblood, recommended by the Civic League of St. Louis; a 1918 waterfront terminal plan by Henry W. Kirchner; a 1926 riverfront plan and rapid transit terminal by E.R. Kinsey, president, Board of Public Service; a 1931 riverfront plan by F. Ray Leimkuehler; a 1933 plan by Norman Howard and George Mearer; and 1934 housing development on the riverfront by Walter J. Knight. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr, *Some Aspects of the Planning of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 1937, typed report, JEFF. For detailed information on the 1933 Howard plan, the organization of the Riverfront Improvement Association and the activities of other St. Louis organizations toward improving the riverfront, see: Paul Laidley, *The Waterfront Improvement and the Jefferson Memorial*, 31 October 1938, file: Monuments and Markers, 1926-1946, Missouri Historical Society.

⁹Louis La Beaume to Jesse McDonald, 20 July 1934, JNEMA. See also "Meeting Minutes of Executive Committee, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association" for the years 1934-1935, JNEMA. Officials of the association were: Bernard F. Dickmann, honorary chairman; Charles Nagel, honorary vice chairman; Rolla Wells, honorary vice chairman; Luther Ely Smith, chairman; Morton May, Carl F.G. Meyer, Frank C. Rand, vice chairmen; John G. Lonsdale, treasurer; Tom Gilmartin, secretary. Members of the executive committee and chairmen of the special committees were Judge Jesse McDonald, Plan and Scope; William C. D'Arcy, Press and Publicity; Sidney Maestre, Finance; Gale F. Johnston, William J. Gibbons, Isaac Orr, Legislation; McCune Gill, Historical Data; Charles P. Williams, Legal; Colonel Albert T. Perkins, Transportation; Edna Gellhorn, Claude B. Ricketts, Max O'Rell Truitt, speakers; Mrs. E.M. Grossman, executive secretary.

¹⁰John Cochran to Dickmann, 21 December 1933, JNEMA.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 13 January 1934, JNEMA.

¹²U.S. 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Joint Resolution 302 (1934); *ibid.*, Senate R.

Resolution 93 (1934).

¹³Luther Ely Smith to Mrs. Harry A. January, 22 March 1934, JNEMA.

¹⁴Cochran to Smith, 2 April 1934, JNEMA.

¹⁵Telegram, Cochran to Dickmann, 16 April 1934, JNEMA.

¹⁶*U.S. Statutes at Large*, XLVII, Pt. 1 (1934), pp. 967-968.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Smith to Cochran, 19 April 1934, JNEMA.

¹⁹Smith to J.R. Claiborne, 23 April 1934, JNEMA.

²⁰Telegram, Clarence Cannon to Smith, 7 May 1934, JNEMA; Claiborne to Smith, 15 May 1934, JNEMA.

²¹Telegram, Max O'Rell Truitt to Smith, 2 June 1934, JNEMA; telegram, Cochran to Smith, 8 June 1934, JNEMA; U.S. 73rd. Congress, Joint Resolution 48 Stat. 967 (1934); United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission members received no salary, but had all their lodging and travel expenses paid by the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association.

²²J. Lionberger Davis to Roosevelt, 21 June 1934, JNEMA; *Report of the Activities of the Commission*, U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, Alben W. Barkley, chairman, n.d., pp. 1-2, typed report, JNEMA; "Meeting of United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 19 December 1934, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA.

²³Telegram, Roosevelt to the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, 18 December 1934, JNEMA.

²⁴La Beaume to Smith, 10 January 1935, JNEMA.

²⁵"Meeting of United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 19 December 1934, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; "Meeting of United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 1 February 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA.

²⁶Ickes' first contact with the project came the summer before when he traveled through St. Louis. He was told of the proposed plans and was shown the levee. This marked the beginning of his interest in the project. Smith to Truitt, 2 June 1934, JNEMA.

²⁷*A Sketch of the Progress of Thomas Jefferson Territorial Expansion Memorial at St. Louis*, n.d., typed report, JNEMA. Luther Ely Smith and association members probably compiled this report. Russell Murphy to William T. Kemper, 7 February 1935, JNEMA.

²⁸Murphy to Kemper, 7 February 1935, JNEMA; *A Sketch of Progress*, JNEMA.

²⁹"Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 21 February 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association,"

10 April 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; William C. D'Arcy to Harrison Jones, 18 March 1935, JNEMA.

³⁰"Missouri, *Revised Statutes*, 1939, 58th General Assembly, 15 April 1935, vol. 2, art. 7, sections 15373-15376, chap. 133, pp. 3894-3895; "Minutes and Proceedings of the Executive Committee of the U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 13 April 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA. *Report of the Activities of the Commission*, p. 5, JNEMA. All the reports presented to this executive committee by association members are located in the JNEMA papers. Topics covered by the reports: Historical Importance, Plan and Scope, Man Hours Involved, Time Schedule, Tentative Programme for National Architectural Competition, Statistical Zoning Survey, Maps, Parking and Parking Problems, Municipal and State Cooperation, Editorial Articles, Resolutions, and Historical Background. *Reports Approved by the Executive Committee of the United States Commission at its Meeting in St. Louis on April 13, 1935*, United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, typed manuscript, JNEMA.

³¹Truitt to Murphy, 30 March 1935, JNEMA; Harry S Truman to Smith, 10 April 1935, JNEMA.

³²*Report of the Activities of the Commission*, p. 5, JNEMA.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 5-6, "Minutes of United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission" 1 May 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; telegram, Smith to William Allen White, 14 June 1935, JNEMA.

³⁴City of St. Louis Ordinance 40592, approved July 1, 1935, JNEMA; telegram, Murphy to Barkley, 19 July 1935, JNEMA.

³⁵Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt - The Coming of the New Deal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958), Chapter 17, "The Fight For Public Works," pp. 282-296.

³⁶William E. Leuchtenburg, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and The New Deal 1932-1940* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), Chapter 6, "One Third of a Nation," pp. 118-142.

³⁷Schlesinger, p. 294; Leuchtenburg, pp. 123-126.

³⁸Burdette G. Lewis to Smith, 22 May 1935, JNEMA; Ickes to White, 1 June 1935, JNEMA; Smith to Murphy, 19 June 1935, JNEMA.

³⁹Murphy to Smith, 30 June 1935, JNEMA.

⁴⁰Lawrence Westbrook to Amon G. Carter, 18 July 1935, JNEMA; Harry Hopkins to Carter, 24 July 1935, JNEMA.

⁴¹Smith to Truitt, 12 August 1935, JNEMA; *A Sketch of the Progress ...*, JNEMA.

⁴²Gill to Harry Blair, 29 May 1935, JNEMA; Blair to Murphy, 1 June 1935, JNEMA; Tom Smith to Dickmann and Smith, 10 August 1935, JNEMA.

⁴³John L. Nagle, *Report on United States Territorial Expansion Memorial at St. Louis, Missouri*, n.d., typed manuscript, p. 1, JEFF.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 2-5.

⁴⁵Smith to Truitt, 12 August 1935, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 16 August 1935, JNEMA; E.H. Wayman to Benjamin H. Charles, 16 August 1935, JNEMA.

⁴⁶Geaslin to Smith, 23 August 1935, JNEMA.

⁴⁷Ralph W. Coale to Blair, 26 August 1935, JNEMA.

⁴⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 3 September 1935.

⁴⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 September 1935.

⁵⁰Pamphlets, flyers, endorsement letters, and speeches are all located in the JNEMA papers. Association members delivered short film trailers for showing at theaters before the election, and thirty theaters were listed as cooperating "100%" with the association. William C. D'Arcy's advertising company did much of this work. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* publicized two editorials (one by William Allen White) and two editorial cartoons favorable to the project. See the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* for 2 September 1935; 6 September 1935; 8 September 1935.

⁵¹Committee, Citizens Organization, to Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, n.d., JNEMA; Alfred Edgar Smith to Murphy, 3 September 1935, JNEMA.

⁵²Committee Representing Industrial Properties South of Clark Ave. and North of Poplar Street to Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 26 August 1935, JNEMA; flyer, Taxpayers Defense Association, 4 September 1935, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 September 1935.

⁵³Bulletin, Gale Johnston to Members of the Speakers Committee, 29 August 1935, JNEMA.

⁵⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 September 1935; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 September 1935.

⁵⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 September 1935; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 September 1935.

⁵⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 September 1935; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 September 1935.

⁵⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 September 1935; D'Arcy to Dickmann, 11 September 1935, JNEMA. Luther Ely Smith's letters to these officials are located in the JNEMA papers. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 September 1935. The same editorial declared Luther Ely Smith's work like that of a "Hercules of the Homeric legend." The bond election was not headline news in St. Louis on September 10 because of the shooting of Louisiana "dictator" Senator Huey Long in New Orleans; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 September 1935.

⁵⁸"Meeting Minutes of Executive Committee of U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 19 September 1935, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; *A Sketch of the Progress*, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 September 1935.

⁵⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 September 1935.

⁶⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 September 1935, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 September 1935.

⁶¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 September 1935.

⁶²*A Sketch of the Progress*, JNEMA; Murphy to Geaslin, 30 September 1935, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 28 September 1935.

⁶³Charles M. Hay to Geaslin, 5 October 1935, JNEMA.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Telegram, Smith to Geaslin, 8 October 1935, JNEMA; Geaslin to Hay, 8 October 1935, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 16 October 1935, JNEMA.

⁶⁶*Vrooman et al., v. City of St. Louis et al.*, 24687 Supreme Court of Missouri, (1935); telegram, Smith to Truitt, 2 November 1935, JNEMA.

⁶⁷Flyer, "Executive Committee of River Front Defense Fund," n.d., JNEMA; Terry, p. 35. In the association's papers notes were found, written by someone who sat in on two of Paul Peters' opposition meetings. When Peters asked all those in favor of the project to leave, the writer stayed, although it is apparent from the notes' language that the author was a memorial sympathizer.

⁶⁸"Minutes of Board of Estimate and Apportionment Meeting," 4 November 1935 typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; Hay to Board of Estimate and Apportionment, City of St. Louis, 5 November, 1935, JNEMA.

⁶⁹*A Sketch of the Progress*, JNEMA.

⁷⁰Homer Cummings to the President (of the United States), 18 November 1935, JNEMA.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²*A Sketch of the Progress*, JNEMA; Smith to Kemper, 27 November 1935, JNEMA.

⁷³Cochran to Dickmann, 22 November 1935, JNEMA; telegram, Dickmann to Clark, 26 November 1935, JNEMA.

⁷⁴Smith to Edgar M. Eagan, 26 November 1935, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 27 November 1935, JNEMA; Cochran to Smith, 29 November 1935, JNEMA; Murphy to Truitt, 5 December 1935, JNEMA.

⁷⁵Smith to White, 10 December 1935, JNEMA.

⁷⁶Smith to Truitt, 13 December 1935, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 June 1968; Dickmann sat in the President's anteroom waiting for his 9:30 appointment when a man "wearing a big black hat" came in, headed straight for FDR's office. This was Homer Cummings, who came out of the office "after what seemed like hours" and told Dickmann that the President could not release the government money. Dickmann never did get in to see FDR. He returned to his hotel room and made the political phone call to Cummings.

⁷⁷Harold L. Ickes, *The Secret Diary of Harold Ickes — The First Thousand Days 1933-1936* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 489. Dickmann credited Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair with thinking of the Historic Sites Act as a justification for the

memorial. *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 June 1968.

⁷⁸*U.S. Statutes at Large*, XLIX, Pt. 1 (1969), pp. 666-668. Prior to the Historic Sites Act's passage, the President could protect historic areas by another means. On June 8, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Antiquities Act, authorizing the President to declare by public proclamation, historic landmarks, structures, and other objects of interest to be national monuments. This act made no provision for survey work, and the Department of the Interior often had to rely on other sources for National Monument recommendations. In 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt recognized there was no definite, broad policy for maintaining historic sites and sources. With his support, the Historic Sites Act was conceived, drafted, introduced in Congress, heard in committee, amended, passed, and signed into law within twenty-two months. Besides giving the secretary of the interior authority to designate national historic sites, the act resulted in establishing the National Survey of Historic Sites and Buildings for evaluating historic areas and structures proposed for inclusion in the National Park System. Ronald F. Lee, *Family Tree of the National Park System* (Philadelphia: Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1971), pp. 13-14, 47-50.

⁷⁹U.S., Executive Order 7253, 21 December 1935; see Clifford L. Lord (ed.), *Presidential Executive Orders*, (New York: Books, Inc., 1944), p. 616.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

⁸¹Dickmann to D'Arcy, 23 December 1935, JNEMA; telegram, Murphy to Senator and Mrs. Barkley, 24 December 1935, JNEMA; Smith to Cochran, 31 December 1935, JNEMA.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER II:

1936-1939

After the establishment of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, further development depended upon many different factors. Luther Ely Smith and other association members found themselves dealing not only with national political figures, but with condemnation proceedings, income tax deductibility, the lapse of their funds into the United States Treasury, verbal attacks delivered on the floor of the United States House of Representatives, endless museum studies, Government paperwork, legal court cases, railroad negotiations, and disposal of the buildings on the riverfront. From 1936 on, both the National Park Service and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association strove to familiarize themselves with these factors, determine their significance, prejudice their effect on development, and plan a course of action. Several decisions made by outside interests deeply affected both the pace and the scope of development. Demolition could not begin until the courts ruled on the validity of the action. The security of the association's funding depended upon the Internal Revenue Service's decision on its tax status. Whether or not the Federal Government accepted the deed to the Old Courthouse depended upon yet another outside legal opinion. Preservation efforts geared toward saving specific buildings within the memorial's boundaries could not occur until the buildings were judged to be "nationally" significant. Missouri's congressional delegation could not seek additional appropriations for the project because of outside opposition and the depressed economic state of the nation.

So it went throughout 1936, 1937, 1938, and most of 1939. Only in 1939 did the first building fall before the bulldozer, making way for Thomas Jefferson's memorial. Events seemed to be left hanging most of the time, with Smith and Park Service officials trying to keep control. Development moved in several different directions. The courts had to test the validity of the Federal Government's every move in establishing the park, allocating the money, and acquiring the land. In all cases for the next four years the courts ruled in favor of the Government. Association members, commission members and National Park Service officials made decisions during these years concerning types of museums to be included in the memorial, basic themes for the museums to illustrate, automobile parking, and which buildings would be spared the wrecking ball. Always they wondered where they could put the offensive elevated railroad trestle.

Major setbacks occurred. Thousands of allotted dollars lapsed into the United States Treasury, and it became known that corporate contributions to the association could not be deducted from federal income taxes. Bernard Dickmann, Luther Ely Smith, and other city leaders had to fight community groups attacking the project, while at the same time keeping local interest high despite the slow-moving development. Memorial backers managed to weather it all, from the city of St. Louis being characterized as a "cesspool" in Congress, to waiting out the period while opponents filed yet another injunction suit. But it all had to be

done. Court cases had to be settled; paperwork had to be filled out; and money had to be deposited with the court before visible results in the form of demolition could be seen. Little would National Park Service officials and Luther Ely Smith realize that even the slow-moving events of the late 1930s would be a fond memory during the total stagnation which occurred during the war years.

Engineer John Nagle of the National Park Service arrived in St. Louis on December 30, 1935, to meet with the St. Louis Board of Estimate and Apportionment concerning the Federal Government's land acquisition program. The injunction suit filed on the 24th by Edward Coleman and backed by the Citizens Nonpartisan Committee to restrain the city from issuing the bonds was thrown out of court the same day. "Appeal is now in the hands of the enemy," Luther Ely Smith stated, and St. Louis lawyers hoped for the upholding of the project's legality. [1]

Further progress depended on Secretary Ickes' next move. If the acquisition were accomplished by outright land purchase, the Department of Justice would not take part in the action. But if condemnation became policy the Justice Department would bring the suits. After January 1, National Park Service officials pursued a blanket condemnation suit, with further study needed to determine whether the property was best acquired by this method or by outright purchase. John Nagle made arrangements with Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair for a St. Louis lawyer to act as a contact with the United States district attorney's office in all matters pertaining to land condemnation. National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer believed that a well-equipped technical and administrative office should be established in St. Louis with real estate appraisers and contact men operating there so the Department of the Interior could develop itemized information about each piece of property. An "aggressive businesslike organization" would save time and money, and having National Park Service officials fully informed about real estate values would guarantee fair treatment for all property owners. Cammerer and Ickes agreed that the Park Service should proceed along these lines to insure action when funds became available. John Nagle became the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial's first superintendent. [2]

Money released in Washington and St. Louis for the project became available early in 1936. On January 22, President Roosevelt allotted \$6,750,000 to the Department of the Interior, which transferred it to the National Park Service on February 4. In St. Louis, Mayor Bernard Dickmann approved Ordinance 40,746 on February 1, authorizing the payment of \$2,250,000 to the United States Government. Nine million dollars were now available for land clearance. [3]

Despite this initial release of funds, association members kept watch on the political situation in Washington to determine an advantageous time to seek additional appropriations. Max O'Rell Truitt, association lawyer Bon Geaslin, and City Counselor Charles Hay lobbied House members in February, seeking information about the political climate. To their dismay they discovered that Congress probably would not approve any bills providing for either projects or appropriations. Geaslin warned Smith not to jeopardize the memorial by seeking more funds at this time. Nine million dollars were theirs for site acquisition; he suggested that the work begin. Congress could always be asked later for additional funds. [4]

Opposition Continues

Bon Geaslin discovered something else in Washington. Opponents of the project, headed by Paul Peters, had come to the capital distributing pamphlets. Every member of Congress received a copy of one called "Public Necessity or Just Plain Pork." Geaslin believed the pamphlets caused no damage, and may even have generated some interest in the project because members of Missouri's congressional delegation received inquiries concerning the

memorial from their fellow congressmen. When United States Territorial Expansion Commissioner Lloyd Thurston received the brochure, he wrote tongue-in-cheek to Luther Ely Smith, "While I was quite sure of my deductions in regard to your capability, I had not thought that your associates and you would drag me into a venal and corrupt movement to wreck the City of St. Louis as well as to rape the treasury of the United States Government, but it seems as though there might be some doubt in this respect. [5]

Representative John Cochran believed Congress would approve an association proposal asking for \$1,500,000 in federal funds, with the city providing another \$500,000. Geaslin did not agree. He knew Congress would not approve any specific sum for this project or any other. The best course of action now open to the association would be to keep a low profile, maintaining its current position during this session of Congress. Geaslin did not even want to send out an informational booklet on the project to congressional members until the association completed more supportive work. The lawyer could suggest only one thing the association could do to help their cause. He told Smith, "get a good strong editorial in one of the papers to the effect that a small group of tenants ... occupying certain premises in the area, is soliciting funds for the purpose of fighting the proposed improvement, and stating that these efforts do not represent the consensus of opinion in St. Louis or of the property owners and taxpayers in the downtown section of the city, and pointing out that such obstructions should be condemned." [6]

Since no progress could be made in Congress, National Park Service officials concentrated on clearing the land. They still wanted condemnation as opposed to purchase. Luther Ely Smith believed that as soon as the city's money arrived in Washington Secretary Ickes would direct the Department of Justice to obtain orders of taking from the federal courts. But the congressional emphasis on limiting spending affected even the memorial's already allotted funds. National Park Service officials had to explain to Congress why they had not pared down the memorial's federal allotment. John Nagle informed Smith, "It seems that in the recently instituted search for relief funds, covetous eyes have been cast upon the allotment for that project." [7] Park Service officials explained to Congress that all sorts of problems would arise if they cut this allotment. St. Louis would have to cut their contributed funds if the Federal Government did, causing complicated legal difficulties. An executive order authorized this allotment, officials pointed out, making it unavailable for administrative cutbacks. John Nagle was wary, fearing that what "one Executive Order does, another can undo." [8]

Early in March another attack came from a source closer to home. Representative John J. Cochran again made remarks in Congress, which potentially jeopardized the memorial. He stated that he would not vote for any measure providing for building the memorial or allotting funds to it. These words created political repercussions in Washington. Bon Geaslin did not know of any argument advanced by Paul Peters opposing the memorial construction which would prove more effective in defeating the purpose of the commission and the will of the city of St. Louis, than that spoken by Representative Cochran on the House floor. If the President and Congress thought that Cochran's views reflected the community's attitude then both the United States Territorial Expansion Commission and the city of St. Louis could be embarrassed in their efforts to secure additional federal aid. In Geaslin's opinion there existed no possibility now of securing legislation. [9]

Cochran's views had been at odds all along with those of the memorial backers. When Congress had considered the resolution establishing the commission two years before, Cochran had stated that no appropriation would ever be sought from them. Geaslin believed some officials in the Department of Justice and the Public Works Administration viewed these remarks as evidence that Congress had not intended for any funds to be made available to the President for constructing such a memorial. Those early statements by Cochran had

caused some of the current problems. Even though several people explained the commission's position to him, Cochran did not change his views. He agreed that no appropriation should be sought at this congressional session, and in this he was in consensus with the rest of the project's backers. Bon Geaslin believed St. Louisans needed to provide a united front in order to obtain any money at all, for no federal official would force a project of this sort upon any city. If the idea became prevalent that St. Louisans did not want the memorial, it would mean the end of the project as far as the Federal Government was concerned. [10]

Paul Peters stayed in Washington, seeking support. Members of his committees (Taxpayers Defense Association, Citizens Non-Partisan Committee) sent telegrams to President Roosevelt asking for a recession of the executive order creating the memorial. They urged him to donate the funds to the American Red Cross instead. Peters asked congressional members to oppose any appropriations for the project. Luther Ely Smith called this opposition "a group of soreheads," pointing out that none of the groups sending telegrams belonged to the Council on Civic Needs (composed of 140 civic organizations). In Smith's opinion, the individuals belonging to these committees were just "opposed to anything that is ever advanced in behalf of the city." [11]

A new crisis began which, although short-lived, became national in scope. A correspondent for the New York magazine *Nation* wrote a disparaging article about the memorial, which appeared late in February 1936. Criticism appearing in a nationally prominent publication could not be ignored easily by Luther Ely Smith, who stated that his "first impulse was to jump on it strong with hammer and tongs." [12] Commission member William Allen White, himself a prominent newspaperman, did not feel the concern. He consoled Smith; "The *Nation* episode will soon be forgotten." [13]

Alongside these attacks association members faced other problems affecting the memorial's progress. An uncertain situation existed because the executive order made no mention of the memorial's boundaries. Smith believed the forthcoming condemnation suits would be much stronger if the executive order contained a description of the property. Smith wanted the President to issue a new order including this information, to supplement the first. Bon Geaslin pursued this idea through Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair, resulting in an order being drawn up and ready for signature as soon as Secretary Ickes requested the attorney general to proceed with the land acquisition. The fact that this new order existed received no publicity. [14]

City Bonds Sold

Despite the opposition and problems, some progress occurred in early April. The September 1935 bond issue election had authorized the issuance of bonds for the memorial, so now city officials prepared to publicly sell city bonds. The bond market was jittery, but City Counselor Edgar Wayman did not worry. He predicted no harm would come even if there were no bids for the bonds at the public sale, for the city could always sell the bonds at a private sale with a clear conscience. True to Wayman's prediction, no bidders came forth on April 9. The bonds simply would not sell below the current 2-1/2 percent bond rate. Another attempt to sell them at the same interest rate came a few days later, on April 14, and met with the same response. City Comptroller Louis Nolte did not raise rates, the market was not a 2-1/2 percent market, and so no bonds were sold. There was speculation that the litigation threats kept buyers away, but Smith believed otherwise: he said it was Nolte's insistence on keeping the 2-1/2 percent bond rate when the market did not justify it that deterred the bidders. Other steps could be taken, but if they failed, Smith feared the Reconstruction Finance Corporation probably would have to take the bonds. He placed the blame squarely on Nolte. Luther Ely Smith had not anticipated this complication, and wrote that he "had supposed that our banker friends stood on firm ground when they stated that Mr. Nolte would come through all right."

[15]

In May 1936 bonds valued at \$1,800,000 finally sold at a 2 percent discount to private interests. A contribution totaling \$36,000 from the Progress Council, a business and civic group, made up for the discount. The city's Water Division bought the remaining \$450,000 in bonds for its sinking fund, money it set aside to invest. On May 15 St. Louis deposited \$2,250,000 with Secretary Ickes as its share of the memorial funds. Since the city had authorized an issue of \$7,500,000 in the bond election, unissued bonds totaling \$5,250,000 remained available to match any further Government appropriations at a ratio of three to one. Two law firms (Thompson, Wood, and Hoffman of New York, and Charles and Trauernicht of St. Louis) ruled favorably on the bonds' validity and legality, while Secretary Ickes formally accepted the St. Louis funds and notified the Department of the Treasury. By the end of May, legal matters progressed to the point where the Justice Department could begin condemnation of the riverfront properties. [16]

This progress did not serve to quiet the opposition. In Washington, on Thomas Jefferson's birthday, Paul Peters visited President Roosevelt, urging him to withdraw the project's funds. At the same time Peters and his group worked to defeat Representative Kent Keller in a reelection bid. Keller, from the Illinois Twenty-fifth Congressional District, was an appointed member of the United States Territorial Expansion Commission. Max O'Rell Truitt was not worried; in fact, he thought the effort would help Keller. Nevertheless, Truitt found the whole situation embarrassing. Wanting to assure people in Washington that Peters represented "no one of consequence" and that "substantial" St. Louisans favored the project, Truitt exclaimed that Peters' "activities have been most disgusting and in my opinion will prove hurtful if (a) he is not quieted down or (b) we do not start work immediately." [17]

Luther Ely Smith responded by mailing letters to commission members expressing his regrets if Peters' activities embarrassed them. William Allen White replied, "Don't worry about the activities of Mr. Peters. They have caused me no embarrassment. Takes more than that to excite me. [18] Smith considered Peters and his supporters to be nothing more than selfish individuals standing in the way of public improvements and refusing to move from the memorial district because they enjoyed low rents. As far as Bon Geaslin could discover, Peters did not make any progress in his talks with congressional members. [19]

Smith was on the mark when he identified the opposing groups as low-renters. City Counselor Edgar Wayman learned that a variety of factors contributed to the low riverfront property values. Of the approximately 5,000,000 square feet of space in the thirty-seven blocks, 40 percent stood unoccupied. Much of the property was worth less than its assessed value; the majority of tenants paid rentals easily matched by outside offers; and in some cases, lease terms could cover moving costs. A majority of the riverfront buildings did not possess sprinklers, resulting in these businesses carrying higher fire insurance rates than for sprinkler-equipped properties. Low rentals were directly attributable to the lack of leases, a condition precipitated by the possible Federal Government acquisition of the area, and the buildings' obsolescence. [20]

Uncertainties concerning the park's boundaries vanished in May after Bon Geaslin discussed the problem with National Park Service officials. Because the United States Territorial Expansion Commission had approved the project and established the memorial's boundaries in its May 1, 1935, meeting, Geaslin believed that no additional order was necessary. Superintendent John Nagle also believed the commission's action in the matter of the boundaries to be definitive. [21]

Legal Action

Owners of property located within the proposed memorial boundaries who objected to these plans took action on June 1. Thirty-six property holders filed an injunction suit in the United States District Court in Washington, D.C., restraining Secretary Harold Ickes and his associates from using the appropriated funds or proceeding with the work. Luther Ely Smith spent three days at the Department of Justice, conferring with Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair, Solicitor General Stanley Reed, Senator Bennett Champ Clark, and the association's counsel Bon Geaslin. They all agreed that the memorial commission should enter the case, filing a brief as *amici curiae* (friends of the court). Solicitor General Reed suggested filing affidavits supporting Ickes and Cammerer. During its meeting on June 19, the commission's executive committee adopted a resolution endorsing these two courses of action in the case of *August Balter et al. v. Harold L. Ickes et al.* [22] Twenty-three days later Judge Cox of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the suit. He held that the project, involving the preservation and memorialization of a historic site, was within the established and recognized scope of congressional power. He also ruled that the President had legal authorization to allot the project's funds. [23] The plaintiffs moved to appeal.

While these legal cases moved through the courts, John Nagle and his National Park Service staff established their headquarters in St. Louis in June. Nagle had prepared for the move immediately after the city deposited its funds in the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis on May 15. While still in Washington, he organized an office, drew up approved personnel lists, swore in persons already transferred or appointed to the new St. Louis office, and checked on the status of funds before making purchases. [24] The WPA accounting office paper work did not pass through channels until June 17, so Nagle used this time to organize. He made three return trips to St. Louis, "flying always by night so as not to lose any working time." He advertised and opened bids for office space, accepted the most favorable bid, and arranged to move into the Buder Building (at Seventh and Market Streets) even before he signed a lease. He also interviewed and concluded preliminary arrangements with three men to serve on the Real Estate Consulting Board (whose establishment Cammerer had requested). On June 16 Nagle sent Director Cammerer a draft of a letter from Secretary Ickes to Attorney General Cummings, seeking formal establishment of the memorial's boundaries and requesting that condemnation proceedings begin. [25] Just when Nagle was ready to move to St. Louis, a WPA accountant informed him on June 20 that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., had ordered all payments of memorial funds stopped. When Nagle inquired about this on June 22, National Park Service legal representatives told him not to spend any further funds, even though no formal word had reached them concerning Morgenthau's policy. Complying with this order, John Nagle stopped his purchasing, but nevertheless established his office in St. Louis in late June. [26]

Bon Geaslin, acting as *amicus curiae* representing the Commission, filed a brief in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the *Balter et al. v. Ickes et al.* case. The Justice Department also filed a memorandum in the case, one that Geaslin described as "extremely well done." No word came of any court action during July, causing Luther Ely Smith concern. As the guiding spirit of the association he received many inquiries from property holders and interested citizens. Seeking information from Bon Geaslin he wrote, "We are being bombarded every minute of the day by questions and we are doing the very best we can to parry them off." [27]

City Counselor Edgar Wayman took action in the court case, writing a memorandum citing the city of St. Louis as an indispensable party to the action. He did not file this memo on behalf of the city, however, as he feared it might have the effect of an entry of appearance. Instead, Geaslin filed the memorandum as a supplement to his original. Making comments on the plaintiffs' memorandum, Geaslin argued that the plaintiffs had misstated facts. He wanted to insure that the court's attention could be called to this important matter of the city's status in the case. [28]

Even though the indefinite status of the legal case affected National Park Service operations in St. Louis, Director Arno Cammerer advised John Nagle in late June 1936 to continue the project until further notice. Department of Justice officials informally told Cammerer that they held no objection to proceeding with the work, and that they did not object to the Park Service's efforts to commence a land acquisition program, so Cammerer proceeded to have the real estate consultants appointed. His main effort at this time pushed toward lifting the stop order issued by the Department of the Treasury against the expenditure of funds. [29]

John Nagle did exactly as ordered; he continued his activities to establish his office in the Buder Building. The leased space had to be painted and reconditioned, office furniture received, switchboard and telephones installed, and blueprint and photostat services acquired. He even provided soap and towel service for the employees. The Park Service's Landscape Branch had the immediate task of studying the memorial's design. By the end of July the payroll list contained twenty-one names. [30]

It seemed as if John Nagle could keep working throughout the court case's duration, yet this was not to be. On August 17 the United States Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs a temporary injunction, pending appeal. This prevented any land acquisition until the appeal's disposition. The Justice Department could only seek to have the case advanced for a hearing early in the court's October term. [31] Bon Geaslin admitted to Smith, "Frankly, I do not know just what to make of the Court's decision." [32]

Smith wondered whether the plaintiffs would be required to put up a bond, a normal procedure whenever an injunction is granted. Damages to the city and other property holders were substantial in this case. Smith stated, "We are constantly having inquiries from property holders as to what they can do and why it is that a very small number [with an] inconsequential interest at stake should be able to inflict such very great damage on all other property owners in the district." [33] Securing a bond from the plaintiffs would help insure damages for the city if the plaintiffs lost the case. Smith met with several property owners in the area who believed that if a bond were required most of the plaintiffs would drop the case. Contacts made with some of the plaintiffs revealed that quite a number of them wanted out, but did not want to withdraw and abandon the rest of the plaintiffs. Smith urged the property owners to join in a petition of intervention, appearing as friends of the court. [34]

Near the end of August the Department of Justice prepared a motion requiring the plaintiffs to give bond. They asked for bond sufficient to cover the interest on \$2,250,000 at a rate of 2-1/2 percent for a period of five months. [35] Officials also considered submitting affidavits from a few property holders showing that under the injunction they could do nothing with their property, being unable to sell or lease their holdings. [36] Bon Geaslin very carefully considered Luther Ely Smith's suggestion that the property owners intervene as it meant filing more briefs. This could result in more delays, while the only advantage would be in emphasizing to the court the interests of other property holders in the area. [37]

On September 25 the court of appeals ordered the plaintiffs of *Balter et. al. v. Ickes et. al.* to post a bond of \$7,500. [38] Park Service officials then resumed payment for administrative expenses by securing a removal of the stop order issued by the Treasury Department. John Nagle received procedural instructions to follow in securing bids for title certificates, but upon the advice of the Justice Department he could only perform administrative duties. Land acquisition was delayed for months until the court of appeals made its ruling. [39]

Officials prepared an alternate plan of action in case the judgment in the injunction suit proved unfavorable. If the courts kept the Federal Government from proceeding with development at all, the project would fail and be abandoned. On the other hand, the courts could tell the Government to restrain only certain matters in their real estate purchases,

allowing administrative duties to continue. John Nagle submitted an outline of matters needing consideration if either of these events occurred. Nagle did not prepare these plans in anticipation of any unfavorable developments, but as a routine matter of preplanning. [40]

Now the only action left open to Smith and Nagle was to wait until the various legal procedures passed through court. The case would not be heard before November; meanwhile, the temporary injunction prevented Ickes from making any start on the project. Even if the injunction were removed, no work could be done until the next spring. Printing the complete record in the case took thirty days after it was presented to the court of appeals. Attorneys for the opposing property holders had thirty days to file their brief, with another twenty-day period being granted the Federal Government for a reply before the case could even go into the court calendar. [41] Memorial backers just had to wait for further developments.

Alleged Election Fraud

They did not have to wait long for another crisis. "WIDESPREAD FRAUD FOUND IN JEFFERSON NATIONAL MEMORIAL BOND ISSUE ELECTION" ran the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* headline on September 8, 1936. Thus began the paper's exposure of "gross frauds" just discovered in the September 10, 1935, bond issue election. The paper's reporters had gathered evidence indicating there may have been enough ballot box stuffing and vote falsifying to invalidate the election. At the same time the paper sarcastically praised the ward precinct captains of the Democrat "machine" who had succeeded in getting out such a favorable vote in the election, stating that "They well deserved the compliments which Mayor Dickmann in his gratitude publicly heaped upon them." *The Post-Dispatch* predicted that the invalidation of the election through an official recount probably would end the whole riverfront project, "which has met strong opposition and had a precarious career from the beginning." [42]

One aspect of the law worked against the election's investigators. Section #10,315 of the *Revised Statutes of 1929* provided for the destruction of the ballots at the end of a year after any election, with the exception of those involved in any grand jury investigation pending at the year's end. In this latter case the ballots should not be destroyed until the investigation was completed. A grand jury could subpoena the ballot boxes and poll books, and examine every ballot. It was not in the grand jury's power, however, to declare an election invalid; only a circuit court judge, if he accepted a contest of determination, could declare a recount and then declare an official result. In this election, held September 10, 1935, the ballots could now be destroyed any time after midnight of September 9, 1936. [43] Whatever the city's action, it would have to be taken or the evidence would be invalid.

After disclosing an alleged election fraud, the *Post-Dispatch* launched a full-scale investigation. On September 8 the paper printed detailed reports of the votes by precinct, asking voters to scrutinize them and report any evidence of irregularity. [44] In the following days the paper carried accounts of new evidence ranging from poll clerks admitting they had witnessed ballot-stuffing, to forged names being discovered in the precinct registration books. Apparently fraud existed in all nineteen of the wards in which the bonds carried the election. [45]

The Post-Dispatch saw two clear conclusions coming from the fraud disclosures. First, an official recount should take place to determine the validity or the invalidity of the election, since doubt existed whether the election would have carried without the fraudulent stuffing. Secondly, the St. Louis Election Board had proved itself unfit and should be removed from office by Missouri Governor Guy B. Park. [46]

St. Louis' Board of Election Commissioners had already been charged with corrupt practices

earlier in the year. In early September the board worked to select 4,020 new judges and clerks of election to serve for the next four years because of the exposure, once more by the *Post-Dispatch*, of frauds in past registrations. The judges and clerks being removed from office had served in the bond issue election in 1935. This major scandal, coming on top of the earlier registration scandals, seemed enough reason for the *Post-Dispatch* to demand the removal of the board itself. The decision lay with Governor Park. [47]

On September 14 the September term grand jury was impaneled, with a major duty being the investigation of the election and registration frauds. On September 17 Governor Park appointed new Board of Election commissioners and named former city counselor Charles Williams as chairman. Nevertheless, St. Louis' taxpayers could not cancel the riverfront bonds. There was no method by which the riverfront bond issue election could be contested. Even if the grand jury could find in its recount of ballots that the election should not have carried, there was no way to cancel the bonds. [48]

Down on the riverfront reaction to the fraud exposé was one of joy, the *Post-Dispatch* reported. Business was better than ever in the area, with many firms making improvements in buildings and equipment. New companies had moved into the area and remodeled buildings for use. "No stone has been turned for the memorial," reported the *Post-Dispatch*, despite the fact that a year before, campaigners for the project predicted dirt would fly within ten days. Several of the riverfront opponents felt confident they would never have to move. [49]

Luther Ely Smith, assured that the bond issue could not be invalidated, told Bon Geaslin that if "mere evidence of fraud" in a municipal bond election could invalidate an issue, no municipal bond would be sold until a year from the time of that election when the ballots might legally be destroyed. Smith believed the whole thing rather confusing because of all the factors now entering the picture, which had nothing to do with the project's merits. "Never has the truth of the statement that 'politics makes strange bedfellows' been more evident," wrote Smith. [50]

Unfortunately, Smith thought, "all the propaganda" did little good for the project. The association's executive committee members adopted the policy of avoiding controversy by issuing no public comments or written statements. Smith would wait until "tempers once again become more normal." [51] Bon Geaslin did not believe these disclosures could affect the pending court case, since the record had just been printed, thereby denying the plaintiffs a chance to properly bring the news of the investigations to the court's attention. [52]

National Park Service administrative duties, permissible under the court injunction, continued despite the election fraud disclosures. The Park Service approved contracts for the abstracts of title on the memorial area in November, which then needed only Secretary Ickes' signature. Some confusion surfaced over whether the Park Service should obtain the titles or wait until after the court decision. John Nagle's office in St. Louis favored obtaining the titles immediately, and Luther Ely Smith also believed the Park Service should proceed. Nevertheless Nagle had to wait for clearance from higher authority before proceeding. Approaching Congress for a legislative appropriation still remained out of the question, as the political situation there stood unchanged. Association members could attempt to secure congressional funds only if the court of appeals dismissed the case, thereby not ruling on the validity of the various acts of Congress involved. [53] January 5, 1937, became the day set for argument in *Balter et al., v. Ickes et al.* Bon Geaslin filed a brief on December 29 supporting the Government's position that acts authorizing the memorial construction appeared constitutional. [54]

In December Luther Ely Smith tackled yet another problem, one affecting the association's funding. A few months before, the Bureau of Internal Revenue had disallowed a contribution

made by a taxpayer to the association. Smith wrote the department presenting reasons why he thought contributions to the association should be deductible as contributions for an educational purpose. He urged that the Bureau reconsider the question and rule the contributions deductible. This unresolved problem was to plague Smith for years, causing him constant worry about finances. [55]

In late November and early December opposition leader Paul Peters wrote Smith, appealing to him to make a frank statement about why he proceeded with preserving riverfront historic sites in substitution for the "improved National Park or Plaza" originally described by the association in 1935. Peters asked Smith and his supporters why they allowed their names to be used in the promotion of the memorial, "based as it is upon fraud, corruption, and misrepresentation." [56] Peters questioned the project's legality, the bond issue's validity, Cochran's statement that no money would be sought for the project, and the role of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. He taunted Smith by saying, "Where do these public minded citizens who formed your association now stand when the mask has been torn aside and the fraud and corruption connected with the election made public? Do they intend to hid [sic] behind a mask of silence and indifference[?]" [57]

Luther Ely Smith decided to ignore the letters. Association member William D'Arcy agreed with him. He believed that Peters probably was trying to provoke a newspaper controversy, since he had not succeeded in disrupting events in Washington, D.C.. Peters and his Citizens Non-Partisan Committee responded by sponsoring a public protest meeting offering Smith or any association member a place on the program. Smith ignored the invitation. [58]

While Luther Ely Smith handled his own problems, John Nagle tried to overcome others that disrupted the memorial's development. Some success finally came when Secretary Harold Ickes signed the first contract for the abstracts of title in December. Simultaneously, the Department of the Treasury ruled that they would not make payments in so-called "borderline cases." Until the injunction suit was settled, contracts for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial would be considered borderline. John Nagle promptly wrote Park Service officials, urging that they seek a Department of Justice ruling in the matter. Having written authority from the Justice Department would enable the Treasury Department to continue making payments on the title contracts. Luther Ely Smith also urged Bon Geaslin to try to obtain this important written authorization. [59]

Interpretation and Architecture

Despite the incessant delays and never-ending problems, John Nagle and his National Park Service co-workers kept up the necessary preliminary work for establishing the memorial. Starting in 1936, and continuing for the next four years, historical and planning studies developed along with the land acquisition program. Park Service personnel developed proposals for two different museums during the fall of 1936. In September Carl Russell sent Acting National Park Service Director Arthur E. Demaray a prospectus and tentative exhibit plan for a Museum of the Fur Trade. The proposed scope of the museum's interpretive program covered the early fur trade of the American colonists, the Mississippi Valley trade, the Far Western trade, and the modern trade. Russell believed the proposed memorial also offered an opportunity to memorialize Thomas Jefferson's acquisition of Louisiana. Because the western fur trade was a direct outgrowth of Jefferson's expansionist actions, Russell stated that a comprehensive Museum of the Fur Trade would be "a proper establishment in Americanism in which the nation may honor the memory of the author of the Declaration of Independence." [60]

Charles E. Peterson, landscape architect for the National Park Service, proposed a Museum of American Architecture. He described his plans in the *Journal of the American Institute of*

Architects in November, emphasizing that Thomas Jefferson was an "enthusiastic student of architecture." Proposed museum exhibits included entire buildings, parts of buildings (specimens of construction and ornament), architectural drawings, photographs of buildings, and craftsmen working materials "in the ancient traditions." [61] Peterson thought it possible to save structural and ornamental fragments from the more than four hundred buildings in the riverfront area slated for demolition. Cast iron facades on riverfront buildings particularly attracted Peterson's attention. Noting that the Park Service maintained as "historic" twenty-five buildings in the country, he believed that the proposed museum would preserve fragments of structures which might otherwise be lost due to lack of maintenance or mechanical obsolescence. In Peterson's view the builder's art was a graphic expression of political and social history; as he phrased it, "The nature of the American people and the chronology of their movements are permanently recorded in their structures." [62]

One building in particular possessed redemptive value. Built on a patch of ground deeded to St. Louis by one of its founders, Auguste Chouteau, the Old Courthouse stood empty in 1936 after use as a public meeting house and home for the courts for eighty-eight years. Its relationship to the memorial was unclear. John Nagle asked Russell Murphy, the Commission's executive secretary, to identify the building's position within the memorial scheme. Important both historically and architecturally, the courthouse possessed some "unusual" legal restrictions. According to the deed, the building could be used only as a courthouse. John Nagle could find no record of any commission decision to include the courthouse, or the land on which it stood, within the boundary of the memorial. Nagle understood the building held a place in the commission's plans, but he did not know whether the commission's members wanted the Federal Government to pay for the desperately needed repair and restoration work. The building stood in a conspicuously dilapidated condition. [63]

On behalf of the National Park Service, Charles Peterson desired that several suggestions be made to the commission for consideration. He believed the commission should thoroughly review all plans offered for riverfront development. Members should also consider the other current aspects of memorial planning: the two museum plans, the estimates and recommendations for the Old Courthouse restoration, the enlargement of the memorial's boundaries to include the Old National-Scotts Hotel (to be restored and leased for operation as a hotel), zoning plans for structure height and use, parking, the park's landscape design, and the possibility of development on the East St. Louis riverfront across the Mississippi River. [64]

Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., executive officer for the National Park Service, agreed with Charles Peterson that the commission should consider details of memorial planning. No one individual or group of individuals had taken a definite stand so far on the area's design and use. All responsibility passed to the Park Service, which Fahey thought proper since the Park Service was the executive agency entrusted with planning the memorial. The complete cooperation and backing of the Territorial Expansion Commission was necessary, because if a favorable decision came from the court of appeals, the National Park Service would have to make some definite, concrete recommendations. Fahey also wanted a policy statement from the commission concerning parking in the area. No determination had been made about whether parking should be available only for memorial visitors, or if plans should provide for general downtown parking. [65]

Late in 1936 the National Park Service asked Thomas E. Tallmadge, a fellow of the American Institute of Architects and a national collaborator for the Historic American Buildings Survey, to study the memorial site. The Park Service wanted his opinion of the architectural value of certain buildings in the memorial area, along with his thoughts on the form of the memorial itself, especially in regard to the Museum of American Architecture proposal. John Nagle, Charles Peterson, and John Bryan (a National Park Service historic

architect) held many conferences with Tallmadge, who visited the area three times, looked at almost every building, took photographs, and obtained statistical information. Several buildings in the area seemed "unusually interesting" [66] to Tallmadge. He praised the Museum of American Architecture proposal and believed the Old Courthouse should be included in the memorial's "great architectural scheme." He considered the building a very fine example of the Greek Revival style, though he believed the 1854 dome, which had been a lower Roman style, a much finer piece of design than the 1862 Renaissance revival cast iron dome. Despite this, he adamantly believed the Old Courthouse should be restored and made an important part of the memorial. [67] Tallmadge's opinion concerning the architectural, historical and aesthetic value of the buildings in the memorial area bears repeating here:

In general, I do not believe that the destruction of all of the buildings in the area, (provided certain details can be saved) with the exception of the old cathedral on Walnut Street, will result in serious loss to the city or the country as a whole; first, because while many of them are of considerable interest on account of age and architectural treatment, none is outstanding in this respect, second, because the area is apparently a blighted one, business having moved up town and there is no indication that any other activity except the memorial proposes to take its place. Without a possible return of business, the buildings are doomed to decay. With a return of business, they are doomed to destruction, and only the land would have value. There would be a conceivable value to future generations, in a social and architectural sense, if the area were preserved as an example of a business district of the second half of the 19th century — but the realization of such a scheme would be practically impossible, even if advisable, which in my opinion, it is not. [68]

Tallmadge's report proved significant in the sense that National Park Service officials followed proposals along this line when determining which buildings possessed enough historical and architectural value to be spared demolition. The Park Service later razed all the buildings in the thirty-seven city block memorial area, with just two exceptions: the Old Cathedral and Manuel Lisa's Warehouse (the Old Rock House). In 1936 the Federal Government could not justify saving more of the buildings. As Tallmadge stated, many buildings possessed architectural and historic value, yet, in his opinion, none were outstanding. In retrospect, St. Louis suffered a major loss of its heritage. Depression economics played a major role in this decision, for no monetary justification existed for saving decaying warehouses in an area plagued by depression. Maintaining restored buildings seemed economically prohibitive in 1936.

Thomas Jefferson's memorial remained in jeopardy two years after its conception and one year after its authorization. Legally, judges in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals held its fate in their hands. Morally, its reputation depended upon the outcome of the bond issue election investigations. Progress occurred only in the field of administrative planning as Park Service personnel proposed different programs to immortalize Thomas Jefferson and his western dreams. Still, enthusiasm for the project ran high in the Park Service and among Commission and association members, with the coming year promising more progress and even more problems. Uncertainty became a major factor in the minds of Bernard Dickmann, Luther Ely Smith, John Nagle, and others working for the memorial. Plans hung in the balance awaiting so many decisions from outside sources. It is a testament to the faith of men like Dickmann and Smith that they continued to hold on to their dream.

Part of this dream involved making the Old Courthouse a part of the memorial. Since the building stood on city property, condemnation seemed unnecessary to Luther Ely Smith, who recommended that the association advocate a supplemental resolution seeking an inclusion of

the building within the memorial. Smith stressed that the president's Executive Order of December 21, 1935, mentioned the courthouse as one of the historic spots in the area. For this reason Smith believed Roosevelt intended the building to be part of the memorial. [69]

During the year since the memorial's authorization many people proposed development ideas in addition to adding the courthouse. No architectural contest had been held as yet, so no one plan was touted above the others. John Nagle's office received plans that included museum ideas in addition to the two proposals already offered by Peterson and Russell. These included ideas for a natural history museum, a museum of science and progress, a planetarium, and an aquarium. [70] These proposals began to receive publicity, as St. Louisans began to take an interest in plans for their riverfront. In years to come additional ideas developed for airplane landing strips, a Mark Twain Memorial, low rent housing, a naval memorial, and a baseball stadium. The interest generated by such proposals aided the memorial in the sense that publicity and awareness helped keep the project alive. Detrimentially, these proposals tended to make the memorial limited in scope, giving the project purely local dimensions. Dickmann, Smith, and the association walked the fine line for years between generating interest and keeping a semblance of control over the memorial's development and form.

Association work could be carried on only if the group secured funds. Its financing fell into trouble in 1937 when the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled contributions to the association were not tax deductible. Because the association was a non-profit corporation without capital stock, dividends, or resources other than contributions, Smith could not understand why the Bureau ruled contributions not deductible. Smith asked the Bureau to reconsider the entire matter. After examining additional data concerning the association's purpose and activities, the Bureau ruled that the association was entitled to exemption under the provisions of certain sections of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1936. Individual contributions to or for the use of the United States for exclusively public purposes were deductible under section 23 (o). [71]

Smith rejoiced in the decision, until he caught its implication. Contributions by individuals were deductible, but nothing covered corporate contributions. Bon Geaslin checked on this and was told corporate contributions were deductible, but checked again upon Smith's insistence. He discovered the error the second time. Section 23 (o) covered only individual contributions made to or for the use of the United States. This caused a serious problem, as more than two-thirds of association subscriptions came from corporate contributions. After the Bureau ruled the first time that contributions were deductible for both corporations and individuals, association officers sent letters to all their contributors, informing them. Then they found the ruling did not apply to corporations, even though they inquired before they sent the letters. Smith was embarrassed. Corporate contributions were not deductible if made to the United States. They were deductible only if made to or for the use of a domestic corporation, organized exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes. Smith believed the Bureau's ruling to be too narrow. It was true that the contributions were given to the United States, but it was also true that they were made for educational purposes. [72]

This question of tax deductibility affected the memorial's development in several different ways. Association funds paid for all travel expenses of the United States Territorial Expansion Commission members, association lawyer Bon Geaslin's salary, and public relations work. The association later sponsored the 1947 architectural competition and paid expenses stemming from early 1950s congressional committee authorization hearings. The association's work remained vital throughout the years, making funding problems crucial.

Just as Smith took the deductibility problem seriously, National Park Service officials did not take lightly the alleged charges of election irregularities in St. Louis. When Secretary Ickes

requested information on the project's status, Director Cammerer told him of newspaper clippings charging fraud. Mayor Dickmann denied all charges and City Counselor Edgar Wayman stated that the bond issue could not be invalidated even if fraud existed, as there was no statutory provision made for contesting elections. As for the rumors that city officials were making improper profits on the area's real estate, Cammerer believed them untrue. No basis existed for such allegations because the Park Service had not acquired any land as yet. No land acquisition commitments could be made until the court acted. [73]

Court Decision

The long awaited court of appeals decision in *Baiter et al. v. Ickes et al.* came on March 8, 1937. Associate Justice Josiah A. Van Orsdel's written opinion served as the court's decision. The case had been a special appeal from the District Court of the United States on the District of Columbia's order denying an application for an injunction. The court of appeals affirmed this decree. The defendants had urged that the city of St. Louis was an indispensable party to the suit, and this objection proved fatal to the appellant's action. Van Orsdel examined the exact relationship between the United States and the city of St. Louis in connection with the memorial, for if the city was an indispensable party the case could be dismissed. After looking at the orders, enactments, and ordinances establishing the memorial, Van Orsdel believed that the Federal Government could establish the memorial provided the city donated one fourth of the cost. [74] He then developed an argument that the memorial backers seized and used as a weapon for the next twenty years whenever they ran into Government resistance:

We think that the action of the City of St. Louis in raising its portion of the money and paying it into the Treasury constituted an acceptance of the offer of the United States and resulted in a contract. So far as the City is concerned, the contract has been executed. All that remains to be done is for the United States to carry out its part of the agreement by constructing the proposed memorial. This is not a case where the United States was proposing to build this memorial regardless of the assistance of the City, and the City gratuitously contributed one-fourth of the total cost We think this creates a situation where the City of St. Louis is unquestionably an indispensable party. [75]

Van Orsdel considered both parties essential for the project's completion; neither one could proceed without the other. A decree in this case definitely affected the interests of St. Louis. The court believed that being a party to the contract, the city should be heard. The appeals court thus reversed the lower district court's injunction decree because of the plaintiff's failure to bring the city of St. Louis, being substantially interested in the result, into the controversy. [76]

The plaintiffs could now file a petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. [77] This eventually was done, but only after days of delay which served to aid the memorial's detractors. Both the Justice Department and the Interior Department held up all development and condemnation plans for the memorial while awaiting word from the Supreme Court, but this policy was not adopted until some time had passed after the court of appeals ruling. Until this course of action became apparent, John Nagle and other National Park Service officials believed they could commence with condemnation.

Confident that plans would move forward after the court ruling, John Nagle waited for positive written instructions to filter down from the Justice Department to the secretary of the interior. Justice officials gave oral assurances to go ahead, but Park Service officials would not proceed without specific written instructions. [78] On March 17 Director Arno Cammerer again wrote Secretary Ickes about the project's status. The funds would be available for land

acquisition only when the Treasury Department received formal clearance from the Department of Justice for the removal of the stop order issued by the Treasury Department against them. Cammerer believed the stop order would be removed within the week. Two days before, on March 15, Department of Justice officials informally advised the Park Service that they saw no reason to further withhold the institution of condemnation proceedings. In Cammerer's mind, the most feasible way of proceeding with the land acquisition program was to institute blanket condemnation proceedings. He anticipated that most of the condemnation suits would be of a friendly nature. [79]

By March 29 John Nagle had received no orders to proceed, even though he believed that the March 8 court of appeals ruling removed the only legal obstacle. The treasury secretary had just sent a letter to the attorney general asking his opinion regarding the project's legal status subsequent to the March 8 ruling. This led Nagle to believe that the Department of Justice would soon advise the Treasury Department to go ahead and spend the funds. Until this happened, the Department of the Interior was informed that no activity could be started. [80]

Another worry presented itself to the project's backers. Federal law stated that allocated relief funds had to be obligated within one year or else lapse back into the treasury, rendering them unavailable for use. Luther Ely Smith understood this, as did National Park Service officials. Even though the project was estimated at \$30,000,000, only \$9,000,000, or enough for one year's work, was available for use. Smith wanted proof that the funds were obligated. John Nagle told Smith of the Justice Department's opinion that the President's executive order covered the funds, and as a result obligated the money. Smith wondered if the treasury secretary's legal staff concurred with this view, while Nagle's impression was that they did. [81] Smith still did not feel secure about the fund's status. He wrote Geaslin that he "would feel more comfortable if I knew that you had seen or had a copy of the ruling by the Treasury Department that the funds are obligated by the order of December 21, 1935 and that there is no danger of the funds reverting back to the General Treasury." [82]

In an attempt to break the impasse on condemnation proceedings, newly reelected Mayor Bernard Dickmann and the city's counselor Edgar Wayman traveled to Washington for a discussion with various Federal officials. Wayman failed to accelerate filing of the condemnation suits, but he nevertheless concentrated on obtaining the comptroller general's ruling on the status of Federal funds. By this time association members discovered the reason the condemnation was stalled, even though they could do nothing to get the program started. Because the case was not yet disposed of in the courts, the solicitor general issued a stay of mandate to keep the injunction in force until the petition for certiorari could be filed. [83] The plaintiffs secured a continuance of the stay of mandate until May 6, and Edgar Wayman believed their petition would be filed on the last day. [84]

As May 6 approached, memorial backers were anxious to learn if any more applications for a further stay of mandate appeared. St. Louis property holders favorable to the project did not want the court to grant any further stays because every delay meant more monetary losses through lack of rents and property decay. One more delay was granted; a delay of one day of mandate until the petition for certiorari could be filed on May 7. [85]

Immediately after the court of appeals decided *Balter et al. v. Ickes et al.* in March, Luther Ely Smith correctly predicted that the Supreme Court would not review the case. Before adjournment on June 1, 1937, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, terminating both the case and the injunction in effect since August 17, 1936. [86] On June 3 the Federal Government finally filed the first condemnation suits. The months of waiting were over.

Other problems remained. Luther Ely Smith's deductibility problem took a turn for the worse

when the Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled on May 4 that corporate contributions were not deductible. Section 23 (q) of the Revenue Act of 1936 did not cover contributions made to or for the use of the United States for exclusively public purposes. The only alternative left for Smith and Bon Geaslin was to convince the bureau that the association was organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes. Smith became frantic. "We just HAVE to get that ruling reversed. I shall have to leave town and probably the entire country if we don't." [87]

Problems caused by the memorial's most vocal opponent, Paul Peters, gained new intensity during the summer of 1937. Representative William Lambertson of Kansas, taking up Peters' cause, stood on the United States House of Representatives floor, declaring that "The St. Louis proposition smells. It stinks. Sixteen wards where the election was carried to match this one dollar to the Government's three have been proven to be fraudulent.... The mayor of the city used to be head of the real-estate dealers. It is a real estate proposition." [88] Lambertson went on to attack Missouri Congressman John Cochran. He claimed that during the debate on June 8, 1934, Cochran stated twelve times that the Federal Government would never spend a dollar on the memorial. Cochran responded by reminding the House that the resolution then under consideration had created the commission, not authorized the project or appropriated any money. He reminded Lambertson that the original bill asking for \$30,000,000 had been withdrawn, but Lambertson retorted, "It was withdrawn because they knew it would be defeated and it gives us an inkling of St. Louis and the thing that has come about." [89] Cochran insisted that he had held true to his promise, made two years earlier, not to ask for any money for the project. Again he asserted he would never be in favor of spending so much money for a memorial on the St. Louis riverfront or anywhere else in the country. As for the people of St. Louis, he was confident that they knew his views on a memorial costing that much money. [90] Luther Ely Smith admitted his dismay over the whole episode, believing that Cochran had never understood the project's full significance. [91]

Less than three weeks later Lambertson again blasted the project. He pictured the President of the United States as misguided by the influence of "purported friends" in St. Louis, and "hornswoggled" into allocating the funds. Lambertson, as a member of a Department of the Interior subcommittee, promised he would be there to meet the National Park Service when they came to Congress for funds for this project. "Think of the National Park Service leaving the lofty grandeur of the Yellowstone to dip into this cesspool of St. Louis." [92] Congressman Lambertson made many charges. He told of the election fraud, charged that association members had monetary interests in the memorial's success, stated that the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission tried to obligate the Federal Government to spend money even though it possessed no power to do so, and believed the Departments of Justice and the Interior ignored the charges of fraud in connection with the memorial. In conclusion, Lambertson hoped Congress would begin a full and complete investigation into the memorial and its use of Federal funds. [93]

Paul Peters made even more charges in a letter to commission member William Allen White on June 4. After the 1935 election, the bonds were sold under "suspicious circumstances," Peters asserted, as they were sold only after giving the purchasers a "bonus or bribe" of \$36,000 to take \$1,800,000 of the bonds, and after taking \$425,000 out of the sinking fund of the city's water department. He also charged that of the eight historic sites named in Roosevelt's Executive Order of December 21, 1935, only two existed and could be improved. Peters stated that White's good name could only be "besmirched" by being associated with the memorial project. [94]

Luther Ely Smith answered Peters' charges by assuring William Allen White that every step taken by the memorial backers was done legally. All eleven court decisions (counting appeals) upheld the project's legality; estimates and plans had been checked by the best

engineering, construction, and architectural talents; and the historical sites within the area were authentic. Smith admitted some irregularities existed in the bond election, but he considered the election to be freer from fraud than most elections. The ballot boxes had not been opened, but Smith believed their full disclosure would help his movement. The project was not a real estate unloading deal, for all the memorial property would be acquired under Federal condemnation proceedings. Smith also offered a full explanation of the bond sale. The block of bonds valued at \$450,000, purchased by the sinking fund of the St. Louis Water Department, was done as an investment upon the unanimous vote of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment. There existed no mystery concerning the "bonus" or "bribe" of \$36,000. Smith went on to explain the "most suspicious circumstances":

Our State Constitution prohibits the sale of bonds below par. However, in order to expedite the transfer of the City's \$2,250,000 to Washington, it had been arranged that the bonds should be printed, and, in view of the money rates then prevailing, that they should carry a 2-1/2% coupon. Thereafter, the municipal bond market eased off, so that by the time the bonds were offered for sale, 2-1/2% bonds could not be sold at par. The bonds could have been sold at par or better if they had carried a higher rate than 2%, as for example a 3% rate, but this would have meant a reprinting of the bonds, or of the coupons, involving a still further delay. Therefore, buyers were asked to submit a bid for the 2-1/2% bonds at their best price. This turned out to be 98. Therefore, with a bid of 98 for bonds that had to be sold at par, there was a two point difference to be met. This two point difference aggregating \$36,000 (or two points on \$1,800,000) was made up partly by funds of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association and partly by advances made by public-spirited leaders of the community. [95]

Smith and other memorial backers had no fear of being "besmirched" by their connection with the project. On the contrary, Smith considered it a high honor. He and Bon Geaslin decided not to reply publicly to Lambertson's speeches, thinking that any attempt to make a reply might attract unfavorable attention. [96]

A month later, in August 1937, Representative Lambertson introduced a resolution calling for an investigation of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial project. The House took no action on it. John Cochran informed Mayor Dickmann that Lambertson put everything into the Congressional Record that Peters gave him. Had Cochran been on the floor when Lambertson introduced his resolution, he would have told Lambertson that the resolution was an insult to the six members of Congress (including Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley) belonging to the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. [97]

All of the charges lodged against the memorial evoked different responses from the various interested supporters. Luther Ely Smith bore the brunt of answering the charges, no matter where they originated. He answered Lambertson's and Peters' assertions whenever possible by letter, and by letter only. He never publicly answered either man, to avoid unfavorable publicity. Regarding the election fraud, Smith knew irregularities had occurred and admitted as much. Regardless of this fact, he did not believe the election should be invalidated; and legally this was impossible. Therefore, progress should continue on the project. The Missouri Supreme Court had not ruled as yet whether the election ballots should be opened; Peters could shout "fraud" all he wanted until the final decision came from the court.

Peters and Lambertson were successful in making their views known throughout Congress, but they did not succeed in halting the project. True, the National Park Service knew not to attempt to acquire funds for the project, but this situation was due to the national economic atmosphere rather than Lambertson's influence. Several times within the next few years, the

memorial's opponents introduced resolutions and amendments to cut off funds and kill the project. They never succeeded. Association members waited, sometimes not too patiently, until the time was right to obtain authorization and allocation.

In St. Louis, National Park Service officials kept at their administrative duties. They expressed concern about the accusations, communicated with their superiors about the alleged fraud, but continued the planning process for the memorial. Staff members reevaluated the reasons behind the memorial's creation, verified the site's significance, and justified in their own minds their right to be on the St. Louis riverfront. They believed Mayor Dickmann innocent of any wrongdoing, put their faith in Edgar Wayman's pronouncement that the bonds could not be invalidated, and had operational plans ready whenever the court cases were decided in the Government's favor. The opposition caused worrisome problems, but it also served to unite the association, the city and the Park Service in their individual desires to overcome all obstacles legally and completely.

It took more than twenty years to overcome the obstacles created by the existence of the railroad tracks running on the eastern boundary of the memorial. Negotiations took place principally between the Terminal Railroad Association (TRRA) of St. Louis and the city, with the National Park Service and the association being very interested spectators. Removal of the elevated railroad tracks always remained their goal. First mentioned as a desirable action in John Nagle's recommendations for the memorial, relocating the tracks became a highly emotional, controversial, and time-consuming task. Although the tracks stood outside Federal Government property, Secretary Ickes ruled that no money would be advanced toward building the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial until they were removed.

Altogether there were three surface and two elevated tracks along the riverfront on the east side of the memorial, between Poplar Street and Washington Avenue. The city owned one of the surface tracks that the TRRA leased. The Missouri Pacific Railroad owned the other two surface tracks. Both the elevated tracks, which stood on city property, were owned by the St. Louis Merchant Bridge Terminal Railway company, and were leased and operated by the TRRA. [98]

National Park Service officials hired Frank C. Wright in March 1937 to serve as a negotiator between the railroads and the various memorial interests. Wright could begin work as soon as the court dismissed the injunction and he received clearance from Washington. When the Department of Justice refused to approve development until after certiorari was filed and decided, John Nagle thought it prudent not to start the negotiations. He urged Wright, however, to meet with railroad officials privately in his capacity as consultant for the Department of the Interior. [99]

After the United States Supreme Court decision of June 2 denying certiorari, John Nagle proceeded with the track removal negotiations. He carried on a confidential correspondence with the president of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company while meeting with the president of the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company upon the suggestion of Frederic A. Delano of the National Resources Committee. Both these railroads used the TRRA tracks and Nagle met with them to acquaint them with the Department of the Interior's policy regarding the tracks. [100] Superintendent Nagle also met with Missouri Pacific Railroad Company officials over a boundary dispute. When railroad officials examined the first condemnation petitions on several city blocks filed in Federal court, they discovered that part of the condemned land included Poplar Street between Third and Wharf Streets. Important tracks were situated on Poplar Street that caused the officials some concern. They did not want the Federal Government's condemnation to extend south beyond Poplar Street's northern boundary. After checking with his superiors, Nagle assured the railroad officials that the Park Service held no plans to interfere with their tracks. [101]

Now that initial contacts had been made for moving the tracks, memorial backers could deal with yet another lawsuit filed against their project. The same group of opponents who filed *Balter et al. v. Ickes et al.* attempted to obtain another temporary injunction in June when they filed *Balter et al. v. Nagle et al.* Luther Ely Smith felt confident that City Counselor Edgar Wayman and United States Attorney Harry Blanton could handle the case with no complications. William D'Arcy stopped by the court, and could immediately see by Wayman's face and Blanton's smile that they were confident of victory. D'Arcy described the opposition as attempting to "scratch a pyramid with a tooth brush." [102] Their optimism was founded in fact. On July 12, 1937, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the application, ruling the defendant's action of acquiring land to be constitutional. [103]

Advisory Board

Armed with this fresh court victory, National Park Service officials continued planning for the ultimate memorial. Part of the Historic Sites Act of 1935 established the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments. Composed of not more than eleven representatives competent in history, archeology, architecture, and geography, the board was appointed by the secretary of the interior. Members were paid travel expenses, but received no salary. The board advised the secretary on any matters relating to national parks or to the administration of the Historic Sites Act. It recommended policies to the secretary pertaining to the restoration, reconstruction, conservation, and administration of historic sites. [104] In mid-June, John Nagle asked Director Arno Cammerer to request an advisory board inspection of the memorial site to receive the benefit of their opinion on planning. [105]

Nagle's staff prepared lists of specific questions for the Advisory Board concerning the preservation and restoration of the Old Customs House, the Old Courthouse, the Old Rock House, the Old Cathedral, and the National-Scotts Hotel. Should the elevated railroad come down? Should the Museum of American Architecture appear within the memorial? Should the memorial encourage East St. Louis, Illinois, to improve the east bank of the river? Association members had contributed few additional development ideas, but Charles Peterson was concerned about any particular plan receiving approval without the local community's understanding and consent. [106] National Park Service officials still entertained doubts concerning the relationship between the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission and themselves. Roosevelt's executive order did not mention the commission or allocate funds to it; however, Director Arno Cammerer believed it desirable to develop memorial plans acceptable to the commission. [107] In June 1937 Secretary Ickes formally asked National Advisory Board members to visit St. Louis to make recommendations for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. John Nagle immediately contacted Dr. Hermon C. Bumpus of Duxbury, Massachusetts, chairman of the board, to advise him of present progress. Dr. Bumpus and two other members of the board, Dr. Herbert Bolton and Archibald McCrea, formed a subcommittee to make preliminary investigations and a report for the full board. [108]

Within the National Park Service itself, the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings prepared recommendations for the memorial. Historian Thomas M. Pitkin drew up preliminary estimates of historical research needed for the site. Research on the various historical sites, according to Pitkin, was to include collecting drawings, plans, and photographs. Questions of restoration, reconstruction, preservation, and maintenance of individual structures possessing historical interest would receive attention. Pitkin believed that a general historical and educational program relating the area to westward expansion and to other sites under the historic sites program should be developed. The Park Service's Museum Division should collaborate with the development of any historical museums. Pitkin stressed that this work should begin before demolition of the site, or else the bulldozers might destroy historical and

archeological information. A record of the area's history would form a principal basis for commemorative work in the area. Pitkin used the George Rogers Clark Memorial in Indiana and George Washington's Birthplace in Virginia as examples of sites compromised by inadequate treatment, and desired that no such oversight should happen in creating Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Believing the Louisiana Purchase the most important single event memorialized at the site, Pitkin urged its historical treatment to be "painstaking" and "thorough." [\[109\]](#)

Stuart Cuthbertson, a field curator for the National Park Service, realized that a good deal of time would pass before any museums would be built on the memorial site. With available funds going for acquisition and clearing of the site, additional provisions were needed for constructing the memorial's buildings. Nothing existed on the site itself to attract visitors, let alone present them with its historical significance. Cuthbertson thought it desirable to plan some feature to give visitors an introduction to the memorial's importance. One method already suggested would be to install a temporary historical museum in one of the historic buildings standing on the site. This museum could form the nucleus for any "ultimate museum development" in the area, while existing as a step toward the memorial's permanent development. [\[110\]](#)

Pitkin and Cuthbertson's observations proved to be the basis for commemorative work in the area. Park Service employees made detailed drawings and took photographs of each building destined to be razed; they answered the questions of restoration, reconstruction, preservation, and maintenance for individual structures (even though their reasons supporting the necessity of razing most of the buildings did not satisfy some St. Louisans); they created historical and educational displays; and they established a general historical educational program relating to westward expansion. In 1943 the Old Courthouse opened to visitors. Within its walls stood a "temporary" museum that served to attract visitors for several decades. The oft-described "ultimate museum development" would not open for public viewing until 1976.

Despite the progress being made by Park Service planners, other problems plagued Federal Government officials. Secretary of the Interior Ickes wanted to know if the obligation of the contributed funds for the project would prevent them from lapsing into the Treasury. In July, Ickes requested a ruling on the matter from the comptroller general. He specifically wanted a decision on the city's funds; after they merged with Federal funds, could the Department of the Interior use the money to pay expenses incurred in the memorial's development? Could the Federal funds obligated for land acquisition purposes support legal and administrative expenses as well as development plans? [\[111\]](#)

Acting Comptroller General R.N. Elliott's reply came in August. He believed that while the action of the city in contributing the money and its acceptance by the Federal Government constituted a contract, it did not serve as an obligation of the allocation to make it available after June 30, 1937, for any other purposes than land acquisition. The institution of condemnation proceedings obligated the funds for paying condemnation awards, but this obligation did not include paying administrative expenses incurred after June 30. The city's money, however, remained exempt from the fiscal year limitations imposed on the Federal allotment, so the local funds could be used for administrative expenses after June 30. The unexpended balance of the allocated funds proved available only for two items: land obtained in the condemnation proceedings and any other obligations legally incurred prior to July 1. [\[112\]](#)

While Ickes received this ruling on the fund's status, his advisory board subcommittee made their report on the memorial site. Dr. Bumpus, Dr. Bolton, and Mr. McCrea arrived in St. Louis on September 1 to compile their statistics. A day later they reported their findings to National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer, recommending that the Park Service acquire

the area to memorialize western expansion. The National Park Service should continue as the executive and administrative agency in the planning and operation of the project, which the board members considered to be of "very unusual memorial value." This subcommittee wanted the full advisory board to be convened soon to consider the project. [113]

Meanwhile, the city of St. Louis formally offered the title to the Old Courthouse to the Federal Government on July 1, 1937, by city ordinance, but a month passed with no response from Washington. Bon Geaslin talked three times during the month with both the Department of Justice and the National Park Service about accepting the building's deed. Interior officials told him that they submitted the question of the secretary's authority in the matter to the Department of Justice for its opinion. If the secretary could legally accept the deed, a policy question could arise whether the deed should be accepted before acquisition of the grounds. [114] On August 25 John Nagle provided Director Arno Cammerer with detailed information about the building, its history and importance. He insisted that the building seemed an appropriate part of the project under the terms of the executive order and the Historic Sites Act. The building stood in an advanced state of disrepair, with a leaking roof and faulty electrical wiring being its worst problems. Nagle predicted that the building would soon either collapse or disintegrate in a fire. [115]

In September Bon Geaslin talked with Interior Department lawyers. He discovered that officials did not want to accept the building's deed from the city of St. Louis until there had been a ruling on the legality of the procedure. Officials wanted to await the outcome of the condemnation proceedings before acquiring title to any property. Even the Old Courthouse's status as a gift did not influence Washington's decision. [116]

In November John Nagle again urged Director Cammerer to accept the building. He realized the legal difficulties involved if the Government accepted property before settlement of constitutional questions, but he still considered the addition worthwhile. Thomas Pitkin, Charles Peterson, and Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. provided Director Cammerer with many justifications for taking the Old Courthouse. It represented an integral part of the memorial, it cost the Government nothing to acquire the building, a rapid state of deterioration existed in the structure, the Park Service could devote more time to its restoration at the present time than later when memorial development started, architectural research on the building had progressed for a year and a half, restoration would employ enough labor to help solve the local unemployment problem, and the mayor had approved the transfer. In addition, acceptance would show the local community that the Park Service intended to proceed with the memorial. [117] Nevertheless, the Federal Government failed to acquire the Old Courthouse for several more years.

Land Acquisition

Just as memorial backers expected the Old Courthouse's acquisition, they also expected the land acquisition program to be carried out expediently after the first condemnation suits were filed on June 3. Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair's intent to purchase land at the earliest possible moment had guided the Park Service through all the court proceedings. Toward the end of the summer, the memorial's supporters recognized a situation developing within the Justice Department which led to further delay in the demolition process. A radical change of policy occurred. Previously, the Park Service placed all land in park projects under condemnation proceedings under a policy that did not interfere with the private sale of property. In August 1937, however, the Park Service in the St. Louis project wanted a determination of each property's value. To obtain a "yardstick" measure the Park Service first proceeded with a typical block to establish a standard of value, then acquired the land by condemnation. [118]

Luther Ely Smith failed to understand the necessity of this step. He believed such caution on the part of the Park Service and the Department of Justice slowed the project. Since Smith felt that most property would sell for the assessed valuation or less, he did not see any need for a yardstick of valuation. Washington could save thousands of dollars by immediately purchasing the land. In Smith's estimation, the Federal Government could run into a jury in a condemnation case that possessed "lofty ideas of value" if they waited for a yardstick to be established. [[119](#)]

Such a land policy delayed consideration of acquiring the Old Courthouse, in addition to preventing development of the memorial site. Property owners in the riverfront area responded by writing Mayor Dickmann, informing him of the difficulties imposed by the Federal Government's lack of action. Owners could not attract tenants because they could have no guarantees on length of occupancy. With no income, some owners had trouble paying their taxes. Many believed that three or four years would pass before the condemnation proceedings reached the stage where the Government would acquire property. The entire district's uncertain status adversely affected business. [[120](#)] Dickmann promptly sent copies of the letters to John Nagle, who forwarded them to Director Cammerer.

The turn of events affected John Nagle's mission in St. Louis. When the Park Service office was first created, Nagle understood from Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair that the Department of the Interior would immediately proceed with the land purchase without waiting for the institution of condemnation proceedings. Nagle's office was established to handle land purchases and demolition operations. When the Government actually acquired property, Nagle was to prepare construction plans and then all operations would have followed in an orderly manner. Now Washington intended to obtain real estate by condemnation rather than direct purchase. Such a policy shift prevented Park Service officials from obtaining any land, even after the St. Louis office had functioned for a year. [[121](#)]

It appeared to John Nagle that he could not acquire any real estate for at least several more months. If so, he proposed to reduce personnel in his St. Louis office. He asked Secretary Ickes to reconsider the new policy in light of its impact on his operation. Pure legal reasons determined the Department of Justice's desire to pursue condemnation instead of purchase; Justice officials sought a Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of the Historic Sites Act. They also wanted an indication of the area's probable cost under representative jury awards. Nagle stressed practical advantages available under the original policy. It would permit Washington to obtain a good portion of the land at or under assessed valuation, it soon would initiate demolition, it would start relief labor, and it would encourage favorable responses from business interests looking toward early land acquisition. If, however, the new policy were followed, Nagle recommended a departmental assessment of his personnel reorganization. [[122](#)]

Mayor Dickmann wanted to go to Washington to speak with Attorney General Homer Cummings about permitting direct purchases of the real estate. John Nagle spoke with him, informing him of the National Park Service's new policy. If the courts upheld the right of the United States to proceed by eminent domain, and if court awards were fair in the proceedings for the first block, then and only then would juries be sought and the acquisition program begun. The National Park Service was very reluctant to advise the Department of Justice on purely legal questions, and did not want Justice officials to think that the Service asked Dickmann to make the trip. Mayor Dickmann understood, but wanted to make the visit as the city's mayor, being vitally interested in seeing the work begin as soon as possible. [[123](#)]

On November 17 Mayor Dickmann held conferences in Washington with the attorney general and other Department of Justice representatives. The talks continued for three days, attended by St. Louis city officials such as Counselor Edgar Wayman and A.R. Ross of the Board of

Public Service; National Park Service representatives John Nagle and Donald E. Lee; Assistant Attorney General Carl McFarland; United States District Attorney Harry Blanton; and a number of attorneys from the Lands Division of the Department of Justice. They considered the possibility of obtaining clearance from the Department of Justice for the immediate purchase of land, if it seemed possible that purchases could be made at reasonable prices. [124] Out of these discussions Assistant Attorney General Carl McFarland developed a twenty page memorandum which he sent to the attorney general, in which he presented many legal reasons why it would be unwise to start land purchases. [125]

Mayor Dickmann presented forceful arguments favoring the acquisition of property by purchase, without waiting for any of the condemnation cases to be heard. Nevertheless, Park Service officials believed the legal situation warranted proceeding with condemnation. Voluntary purchases would not result in the safest and most orderly method of procedure. The Park Service would play directly into the memorial opponents' hands if purchases were started, for the prosecution of injunction proceedings in St. Louis had been suspended only because the United States had not purchased land in the area. If authority to proceed were established in the pending condemnation suits, there would exist no basis for an injunction. Department of Justice officials felt they could then sustain the National Park Service's position in the condemnation proceedings. Arguments on the Government's right to proceed had already been made in court. National Park Service Associate Director Arthur Demaray concurred with Assistant Attorney General McFarland's memorandum against revising the land policy for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Everyone representing the United States at the conferences felt the same way. In view of the serious legal problems involved, the Department of the Interior did not change their policy of proceeding with condemnation. [126]

Terminal Railroad Association President Henry Miller was not pleased with the turn of events. Although his company owned seven city blocks in the condemned memorial area, TRRA officials had refused so far to join other property owners in opposition to the project. Superintendent Nagle had agreed to negotiate directly when authorized to purchase the property, but when Washington changed its policy the company went to court. Miller still maintained that his company wanted to avoid litigation while preferring amicable adjustment. [127]

Up to that time, the purchase of TRRA's holdings remained distinct from the removal of the elevated tracks. As of November 16 the elevated track problem had not even been formally broached to the TRRA. The assessed valuation of the TRRA's property was \$240,000, but President Miller told John Nagle the book value stood at \$1,200,000. Nagle thought the discrepancy was striking, and did not know why the company objected to condemnation proceedings. He did not know if Miller expected to get a larger price by direct negotiation with Government officials than he could by condemnation. Because of the great difference between the book and assessed values, Nagle was tempted to believe that the company might expect more for its holdings as a result of condemnation. [128]

Henry Miller had other problems to handle involving the elevated tracks. The St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company held franchises for the elevated structure, first issued to them by the city in 1881. By 1937, the TRRA still held franchises revocable by the Board of Public Service on thirty days' notice. During the summer the franchise was due to expire, which prompted the city to take action. City officials ordered the TRRA to quit use of the elevated tracks by July 8. On July 13, the city issued a permit for a continuation, but raised the annual rent from \$5,000 to \$18,000. The TRRA kept operating on temporary permits throughout the year, but in November the city took even more drastic action against the company concerning construction of a new railroad bridge spanning the Mississippi River. The city filed a suit against the TRRA for \$5,000,000 damages because of the TRRA's

failure to carry out a 1930 contract for the construction of the new Municipal Bridge approaches. [\[129\]](#)

No development could take place on the memorial site until the tracks were removed. This fact was strongly stressed during a meeting of the full Advisory Board on Historic Sites on October 28 and 29 in Washington, D.C.. National Park Service Associate Director Arthur Demaray and Superintendent John Nagle presented plans for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial to the board. After offering information concerning legality, finances, site conditions, authorization, and real estate costs, Nagle proposed three historic buildings for preservation: the Old Courthouse, the St. Louis Cathedral, and the National-Scotts Hotel. He also explained the elevated railroad structure situation to the board, picturing the railroad's removal as an absolute condition of any future development. [\[130\]](#)

Prolonged discussion followed Nagle's presentation, and a board member noted the lengthy period of time which lapsed between the Executive Order of December 21, 1935, and the request for the Advisory Board's reaction to the project. The plan appeared to be a slum clearance project to some board members, who doubted the project's justification under the Historic Sites Act. Nevertheless, board members gave advice on how the Park Service should proceed to conform its actions to the intent of the Historic Sites Act. They believed St. Louis to be an appropriate site for a memorial to westward expansion, but thought the memorial's purpose should be redefined to stress this. Members agreed on the necessity of the track removal. Because there was no assurance that Congress would provide funds beyond the \$9,000,000 previously allotted, board members recommended limiting plans to that sum. Such a restriction would have made a radical impact on the memorial's scope and character. [\[131\]](#)

The board adopted a resolution stating further courses of action. Members wanted the National Park Service staff to prepare and submit recommendations concerning the memorial's objective form and subjective functions. They wanted a postponement of land acquisition until they received a concrete definition of the memorial's ultimate purpose. The Advisory Board members then recommended allotting \$100,000 to be used in preparing illustrative museum studies for the site. Chairman Bumpus formally told Secretary Ickes and Director Cammerer of the board's resolution late in November. John Nagle's reactions to the resolution were mixed, as the Advisory Board failed to consider what the Park Service wanted them to consider, namely the role of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission in the memorial's planning. Nagle did not believe the board intended the Park Service to proceed independently by their omission of the commission. He also objected to the label "slum clearance" by pointing out the scarcity of human inhabitants along the riverfront. Nagle complied, however, with the board's request for a definition of the memorial's form and function by supplying Cammerer with his own recommendations. [\[132\]](#)

Arthur Demaray thought it very important for all this to remain confidential. It would prove unfortunate if the board's opinion on land acquisition got into print. Nagle's reply was blunt. "Procrastination or an indecisive policy with regard to acquisition of the necessary lands will lead only to additional complications, difficulties and delay." [\[133\]](#) On December 16, Nagle and Demaray met with Dr. Hermon Bumpus concerning the Advisory Board's land acquisition statement. The Park Service's viewpoint on the matter was clarified for Dr. Bumpus, while John Nagle furnished additional information regarding the real estate policy. Bumpus consequently agreed with the Park Service representatives to disregard the real estate acquisition clause in the resolution in order to prevent needless reference to it in future correspondence. Cammerer asked Dr. Bumpus to put the understanding in writing. [\[134\]](#)

John Nagle started planning for museum development using the allotted \$100,000. He thought the museum program should be carried out under the direction of a Museum Coordinating Committee, consisting of himself as chairman, with members including Acting

Chief of the Museum Division Ned Burns, Executive Officer Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., Senior Landscape Architect Charles Peterson, and Historian Thomas Pitkin. Nagle wanted all museum material to be prepared in St. Louis utilizing studies already completed. Museum Division personnel, then engaged in museum work in the Interior Building in Washington, D.C., would begin working in St. Louis after they finished the Interior project. On December 17 Director Cammerer asked Secretary Ickes to approve the Advisory Board's resolution, which he did on January 10, 1938. [[135](#)]

John Nagle worried about how the National Park Service would arrive at an underlying idea for the artistic or historic development of the memorial. Charles Peterson thought the Park Service to be better equipped than any other agency to formulate the basic points; a more detailed development could be obtained later by an architectural competition. Nagle agreed that the Park Service could do the best job, but he wanted expert viewpoints from outside the agency. Director Cammerer insisted upon a competition, but Associate Director Arthur Demaray wondered if such a competition could encompass both the underlying idea and the design to dramatize the idea. He thought that Dr. Bumpus and the Advisory Board should write the basic fundamental idea that would serve as the basis for a competition. [[136](#)] These ideas later formed the nucleus for the architectural competition held in 1947. Those competing in the two-stage competition followed guidelines established in a written program. A professional advisory board coming from outside the National Park Service provided expertise that assured a high quality competition.

Progress proved slow during 1937 because of Government caution. One by one the United States District Court, Eastern Division of Missouri, handled the suits filed after June 3, 1937. Judges Charles Davis, George Moore, and J. Caskie Collet condemned thirty-seven city blocks between 1937 and 1939, even though more legal challenges arose in the next few years. In 1937 the courts cleared two court cases seeking to stop the Government's acquisition plans, the Advisory Board delivered their professional advice on the memorial's development, and definite guidelines evolved out of Park Service planning sessions. Despite these steps forward, Government caution regarding land acquisition held up tangible progress. By deciding to condemn only one city block in order to determine value and obtain a court ruling on constitutionality, the Federal Government brought both uncertainty to the area's property owners and pressure upon city officials, particularly Mayor Dickmann. Luther Ely Smith in particular became upset over the decision. He believed the project's Washington friends, in their zeal to save the Government pennies, failed to realize they would cost the Government \$1,000,000 to \$2,000,000 more by condemning rather than purchasing land. [[137](#)] Smith's fears proved to be partly unjustified, for the Government managed to keep under the \$9,000,000 limit as it acquired the land.

Park Planning

The slow condemnation process did not affect the National Park Service's planning processes. John Nagle's desire for a museum coordinating committee materialized when Charles Peterson, Thomas Pitkin, and Daniel Cox Fahey met in January 1938 to consider museum policy. Their objective was to prepare an exhibit plan to tell the story of national expansion. Studying the memorial's historic value, the group considered it imperative that the area be carefully studied so that no important historic fabric would be unwittingly destroyed. The staff members designated five classes of materials salvageable from the memorial site: entire existing buildings, moveable furniture and equipment within them, architectural ornament fragments, mechanical equipment, and buried antiquities. They recommended several buildings for preservation: the Old Cathedral, the Old Courthouse, the Old Rock House, the National-Scotts Hotel, and William Clark's Warehouse. In addition to these five buildings there existed in the area some four hundred buildings dating from the nineteenth century, which comprised a historic and architectural period collection. The Park Service staffers

wanted the country's best curatorial advice for the work. [138]

Dr. Hermon Bumpus reviewed the recommendations coming from the Park Service meeting. Pending approval by the secretary of the interior, these recommendations, along with Bumpus's comments and John Nagle's ideas became the general development principles. John Nagle's input proved especially significant. "The major purpose to be served in the establishment of the general plan for this project is to commemorate the westward expansion of the United States with emphasis on the Louisiana Purchase." [139] Their relation to national events, not local determined the importance of the site and its buildings. Buildings or portions thereof were to be preserved only because their history related to westward expansion. In Nagle's view, only the Old Courthouse and Old Cathedral were important enough in western history to be preserved. Justification for including any other buildings depended upon proof of their importance, judged by that criteria. As far as grounds development was concerned, Nagle wanted a minimum of pavement with a maximum of open green space. [140]

Nagle placed emphasis upon the relationship between the site and the Mississippi River. Because the relationship was historically close, the area's development would be intimate and apparent. The development's architectural elements would symbolize St. Louis' role in westward expansion, that of a "Gateway to the West." Composition of these elements would center along the east-west axis of the Old Courthouse. Any structures built on the site should house exhibits memorializing and illustrating the conditions and events prior to the Louisiana Purchase, including the economic and historic factors of westward expansion. Finally, Nagle stressed that a nationwide professional competition seeking the country's best talent should be held to utilize architecture in interpreting the memorial's fundamental ideas. [141]

Dr. Bumpus favored the proposals, but several members of the Advisory Board did not. John Nagle suggested that Associate Director Arthur Demaray write Bumpus a letter that might help sway the board members. Nagle guessed the problem lay with the uncertainty over the alleged election fraud. He wanted Demaray to explain to Bumpus that the Park Service should not be held accountable for any events relating to the project occurring before the Service entered the work. The Park Service held an objective view of the problem and interested itself only in solving the problem. Nagle drafted a letter stating these ideas for Demaray to send to Bumpus. [142] Nagle's concerns were valid in the sense that disapproval from the Advisory Board could lead to a slowdown in development. He wanted to prevent this by making sure the board members knew the National Park Service had not been involved in any of the alleged fraud of 1935.

Demaray refused to send the letter. He felt that certain Advisory Board members were not so much opposed to the project as a historic site as they were to the sheer size of the land acquisition. They were questioning the elaborate development that might be made on the land. Demaray's advice to Nagle was to let Dr. Bumpus handle the board members in his own way. He feared only that the members would recommend reducing the site's size. [143]

In St. Louis, National Park Service staffers completed three landscape studies for the area in March. The principal architectural features of the studies included two museum buildings on the east-west Courthouse axis, the Old Cathedral, the Old Rock House, and a formal approach from the river composed of steps and terraces. Nagle wanted the principal composition to be a strong dominant architectural feature which would "hold down" the remote north and south ends of the area. Other features exerting influence on the final design included the stone levee next to the river, and the freight switching tracks at grade on top of the levee. [144]

All these ideas were only proposals in 1938, but they became the strongest influences upon

the "ultimate" memorial project. Throughout the late 1930s, the association and the National Park Service kept their main goal foremost: a major memorial to Thomas Jefferson. They had \$9,000,000 to spend, they had problems to solve and criticism to abate, but they did not lose sight of their ultimate goal. Much of their planning served as guidelines for the construction of both the Gateway Arch and for grounds development twenty years in the future.

Since uncertainty over the relationship between the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission and the Department of the Interior still existed in March 1938, the secretary of the interior asked the United States Solicitor's Office to advise him if the commission had the authority for memorial planning. Did the Historic Sites Act and the Executive Order of December 21, 1935, require him to secure the commission's approval of memorial plans? Solicitor General Frederic Kirgus decided that if the secretary of the interior was working toward a common goal in establishing the memorial, the secretary may, under the authorization of the Historic Sites Act, plan and develop the memorial independent of the commission. In addition, the provisions of the 1934 joint resolution that established the commission did not limit the secretary. If, however, it were advisable to cooperate with the commission to establish the memorial, the secretary could do so. [[145](#)]

One common facet of the various memorial plans remained the acquisition and restoration of the Old Courthouse. St. Louis had offered the building's title in July 1937, and the Government had to come to some decision soon because the courthouse's rapid state of deterioration needed attention. Yet, Director Arno Cammerer and Secretary Harold Ickes considered a more fundamental question. Should the United States accept title to the Old Courthouse when the courts had not yet decided the constitutionality of land condemnation at the memorial? If the courts rejected the memorial project, the National Park Service would own only the Old Courthouse. Cammerer decided it would not be desirable to have the building alone as a historic site, so he recommended deferring acceptance of the title until the Department of Justice could accept memorial land titles. After Ickes concurred, the Park Service informed Mayor Dickmann, and asked if any city funds might be used to rehabilitate and preserve the Old Courthouse. [[146](#)]

City Counselor Edgar Wayman replied quickly. City funds could be used for rehabilitation only if matched three to one by Federal funds. Director Arno Cammerer disagreed totally with this view. Federal funds had use restrictions, but city funds existed to be used for purposes for which Federal funds were not available. Since Cammerer considered the project to be an indivisible whole, he saw no reason why an objection should be raised against using Federal funds to acquire land while using city funds to develop and preserve the additional property. This was provided, of course, that total expenditures kept the three to one ratio. Wayman's view would prevent the Park Service's preservation of the Old Courthouse. Cammerer believed that prior to July 1, 1937, Wayman's views were correct, but the expiration of the authority to use the 1935 Emergency Relief Appropriation Act funds past July 1, 1937, presented new considerations which Wayman overlooked. Because the differences between the two opinions were based purely on the fund's administrative handling, Cammerer did not consider them serious. [[147](#)]

Even though Secretary Ickes and Director Cammerer did not know if the Park Service should accept titles before the constitutional issues were settled, condemnation proceedings continued in the courts. Following administrative practices in handling condemnation awards, the United States attorney advised the attorney general of the award amounts. John Nagle held the acquisition authority, and furnished the attorney general his recommendations upon the awards. The real estate office established in St. Louis under Nagle gave careful consideration to the value of the lands sought by the Government. When the court's initial awards far exceeded the Service's appraisal, the Government filed exceptions. Some awards were the same as the Park Service appraisals, while others were near. Ickes thought it

advantageous for the United States to accept these if the owners were agreeable, provided it was proper to acquire the lands before the disposal of the constitutional issues. [[148](#)]

By March 28, 1938, the Government had filed twenty-seven condemnation suits, leaving nine blocks and three fractions of blocks to be obtained. All three Federal court judges involved in the proceedings ruled favorably for the Government. An appeal was taken on one of the suits as a test case in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This case, *Barnidge v. United States of America*, involved the constitutional questions raised by objectors. [[149](#)] The Federal Government suffered additional delay accepting title to the memorial land while awaiting the court's decision.

Meanwhile, the National Park Service reached a point in May 1938 when a definite statement of their major objectives had to be made. Several policies needed Secretary Ickes' approval before further planning could proceed. The elevated railroad definitely had to be removed, for no money would be spent on development until removal was assured. Secondly, the city's offer to convey the Old Courthouse should be accepted as soon as possible, providing that final action was deferred until the constitutional questions were cleared. Third, every effort would be made to retain the Old Cathedral. Fourth, the estimated cost of the area, together with demolition and other clearance operations would amount to not less than \$7,500,000. Taken from the \$9,000,000, approximately \$1,500,000 remained available for construction purposes. The National Park Service should submit a comprehensive prospectus to the Advisory Board, determining the extent to which Congress should be asked to authorize appropriations. Fifth, a policy of cooperation with the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission should be formulated. All of these recommendations dealt with the fundamental policy that influenced memorial planning. Acting Secretary of the Interior E.K. Burlew approved the Park Service recommendations on May 21, 1938. [[150](#)]

While Park Service officials planned future work, Luther Ely Smith tried to secure the association's future funding. For a year Smith tried to obtain a reverse ruling on the deductibility question, and in March the deputy commissioner of Internal Revenue reconsidered Smith's assertions that the association was organized exclusively for educational and charitable purposes. After carefully reviewing the case's entire file, however, the deputy commissioner found no error in the ruling of March 9, 1937, and affirmed it. [[151](#)]

Association members hired an attorney, John W. Cross, to handle the problem. He warned Smith that in view of the situation it would be very difficult to obtain a reversal of the two rulings, which stood on the basis of individual contributions being exempt if made to the United States for public purposes, while corporate contributions were exempt only if made to charitable or educational private organizations. Cross believed there was merit in Smith's position that a contribution might be for a public purpose and not necessarily be educational or charitable, but since the Bureau considered the question twice within the last year, it would be very difficult for the association to secure a favorable ruling. [[152](#)]

Fortunately for memorial backers another obstacle disappeared. The Missouri Supreme Court decided on May 22 that a section of the law that governed elections in St. Louis was unconstitutional. Their decision ended the possibility of a grand jury investigation of frauds committed in the bond issue election. The ballots used in the election should have been destroyed a year later, the court ruled, and they currently were "legally nonexistent." The section of the law held unconstitutional stated that ballots need not be destroyed twelve months after an election if there was an election contest, grand jury investigation, or prosecution pending in which the ballots were needed as evidence. The supreme court's decision, in a certiorari proceeding instituted by Circuit Attorney Franklin Miller, sustained Circuit Judge Frank C. O'Malley's refusal to issue a subpoena in April 1937 for a grand jury to examine some of the election ballots. O'Malley's action followed that of Judge John W.

Joynt, who in February 1937 declined to issue a subpoena. The state supreme court's action came after seven months of consideration. [[153](#)]

Thus ended all charges of corruption. No longer could Representative Lambertson and Paul Peters use the alleged fraud as a weapon against the project. Even though Lambertson renewed his demands for a congressional investigation during the summer of 1938, his peers took no action. [[154](#)] Other major problems remained to be solved, such as funding, but the court ruling allowed the memorial to continue development without a tainted reputation.

The summer of 1938 brought even more good news for the project's backers. Slowly but surely the condemnation cases moved through the courts. By September all the property, thirty-seven blocks, plus three fractions of blocks, was under condemnation. Purchases could not begin until the *Barnidge v. United States of America* case went through the appellate courts, so association members hoped for an early decision. Arguments in the case were heard on November 4, and Luther Ely Smith urged association members to attend the court's open sessions. United States Attorney Harry Blanton made an excellent argument, the judges grasped the facts well, and Smith hoped for a favorable decision before the new year. [[155](#)]

During the last months of 1938 St. Louis' Board of Public Service offered a very promising breakthrough in the railroad removal negotiations. In August the board's president, Baxter Brown, forwarded plans to the Park Service for consideration. Brown proposed placing the elevated double track line in a subway or tunnel along the levee, which would conceal more than half of the tracks. The tunnel would also eliminate the levee surface tracks. National Park Service Landscape Architect Charles Peterson examined the plans and objected to several facets; nevertheless the plans proved to be significant. [[156](#)] Twenty years' worth of meetings, politicking, newspaper campaigns, and work passed before the tracks were moved, but the final solution evolved from the proposals offered by Baxter Brown.

In November 1938 Dr. Thomas Pitkin recommended subjects and events to be memorialized in the site's museums. He outlined the main threads of westward expansion history, suggesting that a "dramatic approach" be taken. [[157](#)] Five months later, National Park Service Museum Division curators suggested museum plans that Pitkin approved. They recommended a central museum feature, composed of brief narrative groupings of exhibits on national expansion to tell the story in "dramatic, narrative form." Other exhibit halls would surround that group, displaying selected westward expansion topics. [[158](#)] In this way, research began for a museum commemorating westward expansion, and the National Park Service conducted intensive, detailed studies of the topic for many years.

Court Decision

The first major development of the new year came on January 27, 1939, with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the *Barnidge v. United States of America* case, in which the court declared all the steps taken by the Federal Government in acquiring land to be valid. Plaintiffs in the case contended that the Historic Sites Act did not authorize land condemnation and that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. They also charged that no funds were available to pay awards in the condemnation proceedings. The court found these assertions to be invalid. The Historic Sites Act did not need to specifically authorize land condemnation, because other legislation gave the Federal Government the authority to condemn whenever it had the authority to acquire. As for the charge that the act appeared to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the court held delegation by discretion of the secretary of the interior and of the President to be constitutional. Concerning the availability of funds, the objectors raised three points: there was not enough money available, the Presidential order allocating the funds was invalid, and the relief act unconstitutionally appropriated the funds. The court, however, passed no judgment on these

latter points because the case was a condemnation suit only, not a declaration of taking. The owner was not losing his property until the Government's money was actually placed in court. Since the Government had not taken the step of placing money into court, the court did not rule on the plaintiff's points. [159]

After the decision, congratulatory letters and telegrams flew between the memorial's principal backers. John Nagle told Luther Ely Smith that court machinery and written law did not obtain the victory; it was the conviction and determination of people like Smith. Nagle thought no one deserved the credit more. [160]

Now, the Federal Government could finally take title and acquire possession of the riverfront land, or so memorial backers thought. On February 10 Secretary Ickes released a memorandum for the press stating that the Federal Government would not pay excessive prices for the memorial land. Warning that the Government did not have to buy land where the awards ran beyond fair appraisal, he added, "My idea of a memorial to Thomas Jefferson is not to see how much money can be spent for land." [161] Court commissioners' findings ran in excess of appraisals made by the National Park Service, prompting Ickes to say there existed a strong possibility that he would not finish the project if he could not acquire lands at fair prices. [162]

What course the Federal Government would follow now remained undetermined. Ickes would not proceed. Government authorities had not taken any land titles yet and they would not suffer embarrassment by any ownership if the project fell through. [163] Luther Ely Smith believed Ickes' statement justifiable to a great extent, yet he believed the awards to be lower than those usually returned in the state court condemnation proceedings. [164] He expressed his views to Ickes, urging him to start immediate negotiations for purchase and payment. Assistant Attorney General Harry Blair tried to explain to Smith that Ickes did not want to file declarations of taking because the title would pass to the Government immediately, leaving open for determination the question of compensation to the land owner. Blair believed Ickes would not want to "tie his hands" by filing declarations. [165] Nevertheless, Smith knew that property owners would negotiate immediately for the sale of their property in order to pay accumulating taxes and dispose of their deteriorating buildings. "Instantaneous payment in cash would have an electric effect," Smith declared. [166]

Concerned as he was over acquiring land, specters of funds lapsing into the Treasury on July 1 haunted Smith even more. Money not spent on the site before the end of the fiscal year, June 30, 1939, would lapse into the Federal Treasury. (The money had to be authorized for expenditure by July 1, 1937 and spent by July 1, 1939.) Even if the Government succeeded in completing land purchases by June 30, Smith wondered how the memorial backers could spend the balance to prevent its return to the Treasury. At first, Smith believed the President's allotment and the Park Service's condemnation proceedings would appropriate or "spend" the fund to meet the Treasury act's technical requirements, but now he judged that a check must be drawn on the Treasury, paying someone the money. [167]

Smith confidentially learned that the Department of Justice wanted to prepare a resolution for introduction into Congress, seeking to extend for two to three years the time period within which the funds could be spent. Smith wanted to avoid Congress if at all possible, believing instead that the Government should make immediate direct purchases. [168]

Early in March John Nagle received instructions from Associate Director Arthur Demaray to proceed with negotiations for the property. For the time being, he confined all activities to negotiating with the property owners, obtaining signed agreements naming a purchase price for each holding. Conducting negotiations only with properties for which commissioners had returned awards, Nagle discussed these agreements with United States Attorney Harry

Blanton to avoid prejudicing the legal position of the United States in pending condemnation proceedings. The secretary of the interior approved each price of each agreement before submitting it to the courts for judgment. [[169](#)]

All the awards granted up to this time averaged 17 percent above appraisal. Harry Blair, now counsel for the association, thought that average good. If the commissioners' reports yet to be made kept within this 17 percent average, Blair had no doubts that the whole deal could close by June 30. Blair traveled to the Department of Justice to discuss the entire situation. Officials told him that no possibility existed of the funds lapsing and that every effort would be made to close the matter before the deadline. Smith was not convinced. He wrote Justice Department officials, asking why the Government could not execute its part of the contract with the city by checking out its funds from the Treasury and setting them up as a special fund in another depository. However, the Government could not justify checking the funds out of the Treasury without incurring the comptroller general's opposition. The only recourse once again proved to be either obtaining legislation indefinitely extending the money's availability, or spending the money by filing declarations of taking before June 30, 1939. [[170](#)]

All of the association's worst fears about going to Congress for additional funds proved true in March. During the House of Representatives debate over the 1940 Interior Department's Appropriation Bill, Congressman John Cochran stood on the floor reemphasizing that he would never ask Congress for money for a Jefferson memorial. If the park ever was created, he advocated erecting a great granite shaft, but he pledged never to seek the construction of a memorial building costing millions. [[171](#)]

On March 16, Representative William Lambertson offered an amendment to the Department of the Interior Appropriation Bill providing for no appropriation of funds for expenses connected with the memorial. Cochran rose in challenge, saying the amendment would shackle Park Service officials from pursuing their duties. He did not want money to go directly to the memorial, but neither did he want to stop paying Government employees. House members agreed with him, for they rejected the amendment. [[172](#)] John Cochran therefore fought to save the memorial's original \$9,000,000 allocation from Lambertson's political maneuvers. Cochran's attitude and desire to protect the project relieved Smith. [[173](#)]

July 1 loomed only three months away, with the Government still hedging on filing declarations. "We *are*, as I view it, in the direst need of a rational solution of our perilous problem," Smith complained. He feared the departmental delays. Harry Blair believed it impossible for Secretary Ickes to allow the money to lapse after the city deposited \$2,500,000 as its share of the contract. Surely Ickes would take the risk of filing the declarations. [[174](#)]

Secretary Ickes refused. He held a conference on March 29 with various National Park Service officials in which he told them his objections to acquiring land before Congress passed on extending funds and before a more satisfactory showing could be made on property awards. He refused to approve excessive awards or the Park Service's proceeding with the project until they could furnish assurances that ultimate awards and prices would conform to the appraised values. He considered issuing yet another statement that the Department of the Interior would not pay excessive prices, believing the 15 percent differential between the commissioners' awards and Park Service appraisals too great. Ickes would accept title to the land only if Congress extended the availability of funds, and if property could be acquired close to appraised prices. If these guidelines were not met, Ickes indicated he would withhold approval of any further memorial development, possibly indefinitely. [[175](#)]

Missouri Senator Bennett Champ Clark made his move to secure the funds in Congress on April 7. He inserted an amendment in the Interior Department Appropriation Bill specifically

reappropriating the memorial's money, making it available until expended. On April 18 the Senate passed the bill. Then the fight started in the House, whose rules required a separate vote on legislative items attached to appropriation bills by the Senate. Clark expected both a fight and a roll call because of the many attacks made against the project in the past. [176]

Luther Ely Smith consequently went to work to build support for the amendment. He informed United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission members, while St. Louis congressional representatives increased their activity, and both opponents and supporters placed pressure upon Congressman Cochran because of his influence in House financial affairs. Missouri Representative C. Jasper Bell received many letters opposing the rider from companies in the affected area. [177]

Despite Smith's effort, Representative Cochran learned on April 24 that the House conferees refused to accept the Senate amendment. Cochran tried another tack, asking the comptroller general whether the amendment was necessary, or whether the Government had obligated itself in making a contract with St. Louis. The comptroller assured him that additional legislation was necessary because of his August 7, 1937 ruling. The Emergency Relief Appropriation funds had been available for obligation only until June 30, 1937. The attorney general's institution of condemnation proceedings sufficiently obligated the funds for payments of awards. However, regarding those obligated funds, Congress could make no payments after June 30, 1939, without further action, because the appropriation lapsed on that date. (St. Louis funds were not subjected to the same limitations.) Conclusively, using the allotted funds for any obligation incurred after June 30, 1937, (aside from awards resulting from condemnation proceedings initiated prior to July 1, 1937, or for making payments after June 30, 1939, required of any obligations even though incurred prior to July 1, 1937) required additional legislation. [178]

Ralph Gilbert, floor leader of the Kentucky State Senate, went to Washington at that crucial time on behalf of the memorial. Speaking with several House conferees he knew personally, he learned that a feeling of unusual opposition had emerged in the House. The conferees would not yield to the Senate on the amendment, an action quite unusual, indicating an opposition based on more than patriotism. In Gilbert's estimation the St. Louis congressmen seemed "unable to cope with the situation." Speeches attacking the project went unchallenged. [179]

In early May, at the height of the memorial's uncertainty, Secretary Ickes took action by directing the payment of funds into court. On different occasions various memorial backers (Senator Clark, Frank Wright, and Senator Barkley) discussed the situation with the secretary, urging him to place the money into the court registry. They asserted that St. Louis citizens were entitled to that much, since they continued to pay interest on the bonds. Ickes, however, tied a string to the whole proposition. Willing to file the declarations of taking, he nevertheless required options on a number of parcels for safety. John Nagle had at this time approximately one half the land, at least \$3,000,000 worth, ready for acquisition at a satisfactory price. [180] Expediency seemed vital to prevent the opposition from filing another injunction suit. Such a suit easily could be thrown out of court, but it would use valuable remaining time. [181]

Immediate reaction occurred in Nagle's St. Louis office. Four days after Ickes deposited the money, Acting Assistant Chief Counsel Donald E. Lee arrived in St. Louis to begin assembly of the necessary papers. Lee and Nagle drafted legal forms to secure the memorial lands by process of declarations of taking. United States District Attorney Blanton arrived to discuss legal and fiscal details. An assistant accountant and an assistant disbursing clerk of the United States Treasury State Accounts Office in Jefferson City, Missouri, arrived on May 9 to help clear the papers. Lee and Blanton agreed to submit a declaration of taking for each city

block. One check, covering the aggregate of the estimated true value of the parcels within each block, would accompany the declaration of taking. [182]

By May 24 John Nagle had all the papers drawn up, expecting them to be signed the next day. All the money vouchers were ready, with the Justice Department awaiting only Ickes' go-ahead. Park Service officials arrived at the recommended amounts in accordance with several general principles, each discussed with Chief Counsel G.A. Moskey of the National Park Service and United States District Attorney Harry Blanton. Prices were never recommended in excess of the corresponding award fixed by the commissioners. Prices were not recommended in excess of the agreement with the property owners. In a few cases, owners who filed exceptions to the commissioners' awards agreed to withdraw their exceptions and accept the award prices. In all such cases, the spread between the awards and the first National Park Service appraisals amounted to only a few hundred dollars. [183]

Officials kept all their actions confidential in fear of last minute injunction attempts. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes executed the declarations of taking on May 25, 1939, for a sum of \$6,000,000. He deposited \$130,000 to cover appealed judgments. [184] Luther Ely Smith expressed concern about the monetary difference between the total amount of sums paid into court under the orders of taking and the \$6,750,000 Federal allotment. He feared the money would lapse into the Treasury when it could be used for a variety of memorial development needs. Smith thought it absurd that the excess Federal funds could lapse because the original estimate was not high enough. Condemnation commissioners filed the last of the condemnation suits on June 1. [185]

Even though Secretary Ickes directed that the funds be paid into court, no one knew if he had signed the necessary papers. Association members did not know what procedure the Departments of Justice and the Interior were following. Smith was terribly worried, because only three weeks remained before the lapsing date; and no one in St. Louis had the slightest idea what steps would be taken, when they would be taken, or if they would be taken at all. [186] Finally, on June 14, 1939, the registry of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri received funds totaling almost \$6,200,000. Half this amount represented values already agreed upon by property holders, with \$150,000 already expended. Out of the total allotment of \$6,750,000, \$400,000 in leftover funds still remained in danger of lapsing. [187]

Lapsed Funds

July 1, 1939, the day of the lapse of funds, arrived. Luther Ely Smith and Harry Blair held sessions with Department of Justice officials in attempts to change the ruling. City Counselor Edgar Wayman wrote an opinion in May offering a different interpretation of the fund restrictions, upon which Blair now seized. Wayman believed that the balance of money allocated by the executive order could be used for purposes other than land acquisition as designated in the executive order. Luther Ely Smith believed the key factor in Wayman's interpretation to be the differences, if any, between the city and Federal funds. Both funds became one fund when the secretary of the interior accepted St. Louis' contribution. It was impossible to separate them. Since the St. Louis contribution could not lapse, Smith believed the entire fund could not lapse. The \$9,000,000 fund therefore should continue as a whole to acquire, develop, and preserve the site. Blair argued that the three to one ratio would be destroyed if any portion of the funds reverted. [188]

Acting Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman jumped into the controversy when he wrote the comptroller general outlining the complete procedure followed by the National Park Service in acquiring the land titles. He explained why the declarations of taking, which could have been filed two or three years previously, were held up by the Department of the Interior

until the courts ruled on the legal cases. Chapman asserted that the National Park Service took the action they did to fulfill the contractual obligations of the United States with St. Louis. [\[189\]](#)

In September, St. Louis Budget Director Arthur C. Meyers still had doubts about the funds' status. He understood that the Federal fiscal restrictions did not apply to city funds and that there existed no time limit on their expenditure; however, there was a limit on the amount that could be spent, determined by the amount of Federal expenditure. If \$400,000 of Federal funds reverted, then \$13,333.33 of city funds should revert to keep the three to one ratio. Comptroller General Fred Brown answered that if the excess Federal funds reverted, it would not necessarily mean that city funds would revert if there existed obligations against the Federal funds. Brown's answer did not satisfy Arthur Meyers. How could obligations be incurred against the Federal funds and the reversions take place without the obligations being paid? What would happen if appropriations were not made? National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer answered that the Park Service intended, when using the city's funds, to reserve a balance of \$139,219.19, which could revert to the city if none of the lapsed Federal funds were used in the future. Cammerer did not agree to return the city's contribution, but he definitely kept the three to one ratio in mind. [\[190\]](#)

Neither the city nor the National Park Service pursued the lapsed funds situation for the rest of the year. At the end of October, counsel Donald E. Lee advised Director Cammerer to remember that Federal funds did lapse, and that money was earmarked for the city of St. Louis. If Cammerer tried to secure a reappropriation of the funds or an extension of their availability, Lee urged him to use the indefinite phrase "unexpended balance" rather than name any fixed sum. [\[191\]](#)

Beginning with condemnation petitions first filed in June 1937, court commissioners determined and reported values for each parcel of land. In January 1938 they submitted the ward reports to the court, filing the last one on June 1, 1939. The aggregate of the commissioners' awards for the entire area was \$16,985,054, not including property parcels already owned by the Service, or the Old Cathedral. Legal titles to the area were thus transferred to the United States between June 13 and June 30, 1939. The National Park Service Real Estate Branch started negotiations for offers to sell immediately after the declarations were filed. By November 1, 1939, officials offered to sell 351 (out of a total 481) parcels with a face value of \$3,788,000. Commissioners set awards for these areas at \$4,108,000, which was \$320,000 less than the commissioned amount. [\[192\]](#)

Demolition Begins

Demolition could finally begin, following delays not foreseen by the memorial's original backers. On October 10, 1939, Mayor Bernard Dickmann pried three bricks loose from a building at 7 Market Street that possessed no particular historical interest. (One person did suggest that the building be preserved as the abode of fifty-six ghost voters found registered there in the 1935 bond issue election). The city preserved the first brick while Dickmann sent the second brick to President Roosevelt. Brick three went to an enthusiastic young man in the crowd. Luther Ely Smith attended, and Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., gave a brief talk on behalf of the National Park Service. [\[193\]](#) So started visible evidence of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, four years after the park's establishment.

When demolition started, no one knew what shape the memorial would take, even though National Park Service planners attempted to define goals and desires. No one knew how much time would pass before additional funds could be obtained; no one knew if funds could be obtained. The Government did not own the Old Courthouse, and the elevated railroad tracks remained, symbolically blocking in the way of progress. Yet Luther Ely Smith and

John Nagle must have slept well the night of October 10, secure in their belief that the memorial's major stumbling blocks had been largely overcome. It was only a matter now of holding a national architectural competition and awaiting the right moment to approach Congress for funds; or so it seemed. Storm clouds rose in Europe to thwart the best laid plans. At the same time that St. Louis newspapers reported the news of the demolition, citizens read of Belgian senators debating the chances of Nazi invasion and of a British battleship sinking after a German U-boat attack.

Unaware of foreign threats to their plans, National Park Service officials concentrated on solving petty problems they faced once demolition started. Officials had difficulty removing tenants from the properties, even after title passed to the United States. In instances occurring in other Park Service areas, officials secured court orders evicting unauthorized occupants, yet Director Arno Cammerer wanted to avoid taking such drastic action. Other problems arose, including minor fires which occurred on several properties after the Government's take over. Should the United States collect the fire insurance? In addition, Federal courts fixed rents on the property; should proceedings be started against those delinquent in rent payments? [194]

Not all the problems were so trivial. There was no historical significance attached to the first building demolished, but that obviously was untrue of many other buildings in the condemned area. An increased awareness of the buildings' historical value prompted concerned St. Louisans to write Smith and Nagle. In response to an inquiry from the secretary of the General Council on Civic Needs, John Nagle detailed the reasoning behind the decision to tear down most of the buildings. Without exception each needed major repairs. Few were fireproof, officials could determine no use for them, and they proved economically prohibitive to maintain. The Park Service submitted each building to an examination based on historical and archeological criteria under the guidelines of the Historic Sites Act. Most of the buildings did not pass the test. Five buildings (the Old Courthouse, the National-Scotts Hotel, the Merchants Exchange, the Jean Baptiste Roy House, and the Joseph Labbadie House) whose architectural character if not actual existence remained in danger, stood outside the memorial area. The Park Service wanted an outside agency to care for these structures. [195] The council considered and rejected Nagle's explanation. They recognized the maintenance problems and removal costs, but thought them insignificant. Approaching demolition forced a hasty decision. Council members felt that in later years there would be severe criticism if efforts to preserve the historically important structures failed. [196]

Dr. Hermon Bumpus and the Advisory Board advised the acting secretary of the interior in November to exclude only the Old Cathedral and the Old Rock House from demolition. [197] This brought a memorandum of protest from Superintendent John Nagle to Director Cammerer. Newspaper articles and communications from interested citizens expressed civic concern for preservation of the historical values in the area. In view of the sentiment now being expressed and the obligations of the Historic Sites Act, Nagle believed several buildings should remain for a probationary period. [198]

The Old Courthouse

Nearly everyone considered the Old Courthouse worth preservation, yet Federal officials had taken no action since St. Louis offered the title in 1937. Park officials in early 1939 still did not want the building if acquisition plans for the riverfront area failed. Not until the National Park Service acquired titles to memorial property could it turn its attention to the Old Courthouse. John Nagle believed that the Old Courthouse would become a principal feature of the memorial if Congress authorized the project. To include the building in the present, limited project primarily represented a preservation measure. Estimated preservation costs stood at \$250,000 to \$500,000, while annual maintenance costs would approach \$35,000. Because Nagle would need Federal funds for annual maintenance, he needed to know if

existing authority allowed the Park Service to obligate such an expense. A ruling from the comptroller general was needed to change the memorial's boundaries before the funds were spent. [199]

In the same November 10 memorandum in which Dr. Bumpus and the Advisory Board cited buildings worthy of exclusion from demolition, they expressed their opinion of the Old Courthouse: "The preservation and restoration of the old St. Louis Courthouse is not needed or desirable because it does not possess the necessary historic interest or the 'requisite architectural pretensions' to warrant its being retained within the meaning of the Historic Sites Act, even if it could be related or adjusted to the desired expression of a Jefferson National Expansion Memorial." [200]

Nevertheless, John Nagle assumed that the Department of the Interior felt committed to accepting the building. He was so sure of this that he even suggested requiring the city to meet certain conditions before the Government would take over. The city should lease a portion of the building from the Federal Government to aid in the cost of maintenance and use the leased space for some form of public facility. Luther Ely Smith shared Nagle's belief that the Federal Government would be "really blind" if they did not accept title. Even more pressing was Smith's fear that the building might burn down at any moment. Unless something happened soon he feared he would wake some morning "to find only a pile of debris there." [201]

On the same date that the Advisory Board advised against accepting the building, November 10, Secretary Ickes wrote President Roosevelt recommending its acceptance. On November 16 the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* broke the news to the city that it was a mere formality before President Roosevelt approved taking the deed. Mayor Dickmann announced Ickes' assurance that \$250,000 was available for the structure's rehabilitation. On December 6 the newspaper announced that the Department of the Interior accepted the mayor's offer, even though the transaction still needed to be routed through the Bureau of the Budget and receive Roosevelt's approval. [202]

Despite all the news over the title acceptance, National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer had a few questions for Secretary Ickes. He made reference to Ickes' November 10 letter to the President recommending acceptance based in part upon the Advisory Board meeting held in Santa Fe in May 1938. At that meeting, the board approved accepting the Old Courthouse after constitutional questions were settled. Cammerer then drew Ickes' attention to the board's latest action toward the building; the action taken November 10 labeling the building undesirable for inclusion within the memorial. Cammerer stated, "In the light of this most recent action by the Advisory Board, the Department may wish to withdraw its letter to the President, dated November 10, 1939, now pending before the Bureau of the Budget. Your instructions in this matter will be appreciated." [203]

Although the Advisory Board's opinion reached the secretary on November 10, Ickes did not take action until Cammerer directed his attention to the paradox. St. Louis newspapers printed stories of the building's acceptance in early December; they did not know of the Advisory Board's changed opinion until February 1940. Even Luther Ely Smith, who usually heard all information in Washington concerning his memorial, did not receive accurate news about the snag. When Secretary Ickes' letter was referred back to the Department of the Interior in mid-December, Bon Geaslin informed Smith it was because the Budget Bureau did not consider the secretary's recommendation sufficient. John Nagle, of course, knew about the Advisory Board's opinion from Park Service correspondence. Luther Ely Smith wanted to have the Old Courthouse accepted before Congress convened. [204]

Throughout most of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial's history, developments and

setbacks occurred simultaneously. All during 1939, when concern revolved around lapsed funds, land condemnation, and the Old Courthouse, negotiations started again concerning the elevated railroad. Various interests involved with the question offered solutions to the problem during the year.

Railroad Negotiations

In the previous December, the city's Board of Public Service submitted some plans to John Nagle for the elevated track removal. They proposed depressing all the tracks into a tunnel entirely under cover at Eads Bridge, with the grade line continuing to rise to meet the existing elevated structure southwest of the area. Nagle wanted to review the idea with consultant Frank Wright, for he objected to several features in the plan that could seriously restrict the ultimate park design. [205] From the Park Service's standpoint, the most desired scheme was to place the tracks in a tunnel for the entire length of the area, thereby assuring no future interference with development. [206] The Federal Government did not want to dictate to the city of St. Louis and the Terminal Railroad Association how to accomplish the track removal; rather, they possessed final approval authority over schemes these bodies might develop to achieve the final objective.

The difficulty lay in trying to meet the needs of all three groups involved — the city of St. Louis, the TRRA, and the Federal Government. Problems were many; plans offered by the city did not meet National Park Service standards, the TRRA proposed minimal changes to protect their operations, the city did not believe the TRRA's expressions of sincerity in their attempts to move the tracks, and local public opinion was manipulated by both the city's government and the press in efforts to come to an agreement with the TRRA. All the various local pressures — economic, political, and social — came into play in these negotiations throughout the years. In 1939, for example, the city and the TRRA proposed several plans besides the tunnel plan, (some of which seemed half-hearted), each of which was scrutinized and rejected as being too narrow or not feasible.

Frank Wright proposed a plan in April calling for the railroads to use the Municipal Bridge, which would result in abandoning the elevated railroad. His proposal involved giving certain privileges to TRRA, but Mayor Dickmann feared it might result in a monopoly on the bridge's use. The idea was rejected. [207] Later in April, representatives from all three groups met in Dickmann's office. The TRRA presented a plan to eliminate the elevated tracks by heading them three blocks north of the Eads Bridge, then west in an old tunnel running under Washington Avenue and along Eighth Street to Union Station. The double freight track on the levee would remain. Here John Nagle had to remind the officials that the Park Service reserved the right to eliminate the levee tracks. TRRA President Philip J. Watson, meanwhile, asserted that his company would suffer substantial damage from using trunk line railroads on the Illinois side of the river. He believed that public and city interests demanded a suitable means of railroad transportation on the riverfront. [208] Thus, another plan was tossed aside.

In May, Burlington Railroad officials proposed that their passenger trains run on surface tracks turning into Poplar Street in an open tunnel bridged at street crossings. The plan included a retaining wall built along the river side of the development. National Park Service engineers examined the plans, found various aspects unfavorable, but believed the effort exemplified a willingness on the part of the railroads to seek a solution compatible with the effect desired by the Federal Government. If absolute necessity demanded maintaining a rail connection between the city's north and south industrial sections, minimum amounts of track could be maintained along the Burlington plan's guidelines. [209]

To add to the confusion, TRRA president Philip Watson declared in a conference on June 20

that the proposed tunnel leading from Eads Bridge to Union Station was inadequate for the Burlington Route "Zephyr." He proposed that this and all other passenger trains should run on the levee tracks. John Nagle strenuously objected, as he knew serious automobile traffic problems would develop on the levee. He did not view the proposal as an honest attempt to solve the problem. Furthermore, Nagle believed that neither the city nor the TRRA had comprehensively studied a plan, from a city-wide standpoint, to eliminate the elevated tracks. Because the Burlington Route "Zephyr" only began service in May, Frank Wright declared that placing importance on changing the memorial construction to gain clearance to accommodate that one train seemed rather trivial. Wright hoped to reroute trains over the Municipal Bridge, scheduled for dedication in October. [210]

In August, Frank Wright spent several days in St. Louis conferring with city and TRRA officials. He met with Philip Watson, who declared that the city and the TRRA had agreed on a plan, with only certain steps needing the approval of both groups. The plan proposed a double track along the levee, curving into Poplar Street up to Union Station. Elevation of the double track measured two feet higher than the highest point along Wharf Street. The cost: \$1,500,000. The Park Service would pay \$900,000, the TRRA \$400,000, and the city \$200,000. Wright believed he could justify this money to Secretary Ickes, since many of the additional track adjustments needed in East St. Louis, Illinois, and north of the project would provide "inestimable value" to the city. [211]

John Nagle opposed the idea from the start. He stressed to Frank Wright the necessity for intimacy between the Mississippi River and the memorial. Separation by a railroad structure would affect the memorial's historic associations with the river. Nagle believed the project should reclaim recreational values almost entirely lost to the city on the riverfront. He disagreed with the TRRA's idea to replace the elevated tracks with a permanent low level line. He remained willing, however, to allow temporary retention of two freight lines at the levee level if the passenger trains on the elevated were removed altogether. Removal of the passenger trains would encourage the TRRA to develop some other means for freight transfer between the north and south ends of the city. If, however, passenger as well as freight trains continued to use the low-level tracks, a final solution would be hard to achieve. [212]

At the end of the year, the National Park Service still regarded track removal as essential. Considering what little Federal funds' would remain after demolition, Frank Wright hesitated to confer further with the railroads until he could offer some financial assistance. [213] Any additional appropriations could come only from Congress. Negotiations stopped until the city, the TRRA, and the Park Service could hold more conferences, obtain a promise of funds, or develop new ideas.

The year 1939 brought both progress and a major setback to the memorial. United States Circuit Court of Appeals rulings upheld the validity of the Federal Government's land acquisition, allowing the Park Service to proceed with its condemnation plans. Washington finally deposited funds in court for the declarations of taking, while demolition started in October. Problems cropped up, such as the attacks by Representative Lambertson and Luther Ely Smith's failure to get the deductibility rule changed. The worst blow was the lapsed funds — \$400,000 became unavailable because it was not spent by July 1, 1939. Discussion, letters of clarification, and last minute efforts all failed to prevent the reversion. Negotiations for the railroad removal crawled along, amid schemes of retaining walls, tunnels, low level tracks, and communication failures between the city, TRRA, and Federal Government. Through it all, Secretary Ickes remained adamant. The tracks must go before one cent would be spent on developing Jefferson's memorial.

The next decade saw a virtual standstill in development. With the exception of the architectural contest in 1947, no other major step took place until the 1950s. World War II

proved to be the most influential reason for the slow progress. No domestic memorial building could be constructed while the United States battled Adolf Hitler's Third Reich and the Japanese Empire.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER II: Footnotes

¹Luther Ely Smith to Bon Geaslin, 31 December 1935 JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 30 December 1935. Coleman did appeal, but later withdrew his suit. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 January 1936.

²Harry W. Blair to Smith, 28 December 1935, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 2 January 1936, JNEMA; Memorandum, Arno B. Cammerer to the Secretary (of the Interior) 2 January 1936, JEFF.

³Telegram, E.M. Mathis to Smith, 30 January 1936, JNEMA; City of St. Louis Ordinance 40746, approved 1 February 1936, JNEMA. Harold L. Ickes to Dickmann, 15 February 1936, JNEMA; various lawsuits filed at this time attempted to halt the project. A suit filed by Harry Rothslaeger January 7 was thrown out of court on the 20th. Two more filed in February met the same fate. (*Hole v. St. Louis*; *American Cone and Pretzel Company v. St. Louis*). In the *Hole v. St. Louis* case an appeal was taken, but the case was dismissed when Mr. Hole failed to file a brief within the prescribed time. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 January 1936, Smith to Charles P. Williams, 3 February 1936, JNEMA; Russell Murphy to Geaslin, 11 February 1936, JNEMA; Smith to Dickmann, 14 November 1936, JNEMA. In the district court where the city's motions to dismiss these two pending suits were argued, the judge treated the cases in a rather summary fashion. Smith met Mr. Robertson, attorney for the objectors, who commented, "I am going to take a change of venue to you — I think you would give me a fairer trial than Judge Davis is doing." Smith to Geaslin, 6 April 1936, JNEMA.

⁴Geaslin to Smith, 14 February 1936, JNEMA.

⁵Dickson Terry, "The Story of the Arch, A Monument to Thirty Years of Patience, Perseverance, and Determination" *Cherry Diamond Magazine of the Missouri Athletic Club* 57, no. 9 (September, 1964), p. 37; Lloyd Thurston to Smith, 8 February 1936, JNEMA.

⁶Geaslin to Smith, 14 February 1936, JNEMA.

⁷Smith to John L. Nagle, 13 March 1936, JNEMA.

⁸Nagle to Smith, 13 March, 1936 JNEMA.

⁹Geaslin to Smith, 27 March, 1936 JNEMA.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 March 1936.

¹²Smith to Geaslin, 2 March 1936, JNEMA.

¹³William Allen White to Smith, 3 April 1936, JNEMA.

¹⁴Smith to Geaslin, 2 March 1936, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 2 April 1936, JNEMA.

¹⁵Smith to Geaslin, 4 April 1936, JNEMA; Murphy to Max O'Rell Truitt, 6 April 1936, JNEMA, Smith to Geaslin, 13 April 1936, JNEMA.

¹⁶Nagle to Smith, 8 May 1936, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 October 1965; John M. Robertson to the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 9 May 1936, JNEMA; Smith to White, 23 May 1936, JNEMA; Nagle to Murphy, 27 May 1936, JNEMA. The private interests involved: Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., Mississippi Valley Trust Company, First National Bank, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York Trust Company, General American Company, Francis Brothers & Company, Edgar M. Queeny, Boatmen's Bank, Associated Retailers, and the city of St Louis.

¹⁷Smith to Geaslin, 13 April 1936, JNEMA; Truitt to Smith, 30 April 1936, JNEMA.

¹⁸Smith to White, 7 May 1936, JNEMA; White to Smith, 9 May 1936, JNEMA.

¹⁹Smith to White, 23 May 1936, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 26 May 1936, JNEMA.

²⁰S.J. Bernheimer to Edgar H. Wayman, 12 June 1936, JNEMA.

²¹Geaslin to Smith, 26 May 1936, JNEMA; Nagle to Murphy, 29 May 1936, JNEMA. In June, Acting Secretary of the Interior Charles West formally asked the attorney general to institute such proceedings as necessary to acquire the memorial property, which he described by miles and bounds. Charles West to the Attorney General, 30 June 1936, JEFF.

²²"Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission" 19 June 1936, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA. A person with a strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action may petition the court for permission to file a brief, ostensibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a rationale consistent with its own views.

²³Smith to William T. Kemper, 24 June 1936, JNEMA.

²⁴Memorandum, Nagle to the Director, National Park Service (hereafter cited as NPS), 23 June 1936, p. 1, JEFF. Incredibly, John Nagle followed the St. Louis contribution through its various governmental channels: through the Treasury Department to the Department of the Interior, then back to Treasury, then to the General Accounting Office, then to Treasury, and finally to the National Park Service. By visiting the comptroller general's office he verified on June 4 that a signed warrant was sent to the Department of the Treasury the day before. Nagle checked with this department, found that the warrant had reached there, that a symbol number was assigned, and that a memorandum giving the symbol number was being routed through the Treasury Department. Obtaining this number, Nagle returned to his office, added the number to requisitions for equipment, and placed them in channels leading to purchase. *Ibid.* p. 2.

²⁵Ibid. pp. 2-3.

²⁶Ibid. pp. 4-5. By June 22, 1937 the National Park Service office moved from the Buder Building to the Old Federal Building (Post Office) at Eighth and Olive Streets. John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origin, Development and Administration*, p. 13, JEFF.

²⁷Geaslin to Smith, 13 July 1936, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 29 July 1936, JNEMA.

²⁸Geaslin to Smith, 23 July 1936, JNEMA. An entry of appearance is a leave to appear in court as party to a suit, either in person or by an attorney, whether as plaintiff or defendant.

²⁹Arno Cammerer to Nagle, 26 June 1936, JEFF. The application of the plaintiffs for an injunction was denied on Wednesday, June 24, 1936 in the suit *August Balter et al. v. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. as Secretary of the Treasury, et al.* (in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia). The suit was filed to enjoin the defendants from using any part of the funds made available for the memorial by Roosevelt's executive order. Findings of fact and conclusions were to be settled within a few days, and an order formally denying the application for an injunction was to be entered thereafter. Therefore, the Department of the Interior could find no reason to stop any actions appropriate to carrying out Roosevelt's order. Thus the advice to Nagle from Cammerer. Frank Chambers to Harold Ickes, 26 June 1936, NPS Central Classified File 1933-1949, file No. 0.35, Pt. 2, National Archives.

³⁰Nagle to the Director NPS, 4 August 1936, JEFF.

³¹Smith to Dickmann, 17 August 1936, JNEMA. Max O'Rell Truitt wrote Smith that when Senator Alben Barkley heard of the court's decision he became very upset. "He is more anxious than I had appreciated heretofore to see the work commenced on the Memorial. I think that the European trip and the visits he made to the cathedrals and shrines of a lost civilization have given him quite an inspiration and burning desire to see that our great project goes forward at least in this generation." Truitt to Smith, 24 August 1936, JNEMA; Max O'Rell Truitt was Senator Barkley's son-in-law.

³²Geaslin to Smith, 19 August 1936, JNEMA.

³³Smith to Geaslin, 20 August 1936, JNEMA.

³⁴Smith to Geaslin, 21 August 1936, JNEMA.

³⁵Geaslin to Smith, 25 August 1936, JNEMA. Carrying out administrative duties under the injunction was permissible, but some thought photographing the site was not. When the newspapers reported that the National Park Service had contracted a photographer to take pictures of buildings in the memorial area, John Nagle received a letter from the plaintiff's lawyer wanting to know what the photographs were for. The lawyer believed this action to be in violation of the injunction. David H. Robertson to Nagle, 22 August 1936, JNEMA. Robertson's claim held no legal merit, and Nagle received orders to continue the work. Memorandum, Arthur E. Demaray for the Director NPS, 19 September 1936, JNEMA.

³⁶Geaslin to Smith, 29 August 1936, JNEMA.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Telegram, Geaslin to Murphy, 25 September 1936, JNEMA.

³⁹Memorandum, Demaray for the Director NPS, 19 September 1936, JNEMA.

⁴⁰Nagle to the Director NPS, 25 September 1936, JEFF.

⁴¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 September 1936.

⁴²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 September 1936.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 September 1936, 10 September 1936, 11 September 1936.

⁴⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 September 1936. The paper cried that the "honesty of the ballot in St. Louis" was at stake.

⁴⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 September 1936; 8 September 1936, 12 September 1936.

⁴⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 September 1936, 17 September 1936, 18 September 1936.

⁴⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 September 1936.

⁵⁰Smith to Geaslin, 25 September 1936, JNEMA.

⁵¹*Ibid.* One opposing businessman wrote association member L. Lionberger Davis, telling him to inform President Roosevelt of the "temper" of the St. Louis citizens regarding the fraud. Roosevelt should withdraw the executive order, the businessman thought. "I fear that the friends of the James Farley element in the Democratic Party are the ones who are misleading him [FDR] in this whole St. Louis proposition." See G.S. Robins to Davis, 2 October 1936, JNEMA.

⁵²Geaslin to Smith, 24 October 1936, JNEMA.

⁵³Smith to Geaslin, 23 November 1936, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 23 November 1936, JNEMA.

⁵⁴Telegram, Gleason to Smith, 28 December, 1936, JNEMA; *St. Louis-Globe Democrat*, 29 December 1936.

⁵⁵Smith to Charles T. Russell, 3 December 1936, JNEMA; Smith to Russell, 7 December 1936, JNEMA.

⁵⁶Peters to Smith, 26 November 1936, JNEMA.

⁵⁷Peters to Smith, 9 December 1936, JNEMA.

⁵⁸Smith to Geaslin, 27 November 1936, JNEMA; Peters to Smith, 18 December 1936, JNEMA.

⁵⁹Smith to Geaslin, 10 December 1936, JNEMA. Title abstracts used for the project came

from association member McCune Gill's Title Insurance Corporation of St. Louis.

⁶⁰Carl P. Russell, *A Museum of the American Fur Trade, Proposed Feature of the Jefferson Memorial, St. Louis, Missouri*, 1 September 1936, typed report, JEFF.

⁶¹Charles E. Peterson, *A Museum of American Architecture - A Proposed Institution of Research and Public Education Under Study by the National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior* (Reprint from *The Octagon, A Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, November 1936), JEFF.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Nagle to Murphy, 5 November 1936, JNEMA. In 1930 Henry Chouteau, a descendant of Auguste Chouteau, recommended preserving the courthouse as a historic landmark. He formally demanded that the mayor of St. Louis turn over the property to him as a representative of Chouteau's heirs. Henry Chouteau did not believe that the city's use of the structure as a home for the justice of the peace offices met with the approval of St. Louis' citizenry. In 1932 the Chouteau and John B.C. Lucas heirs sued for possession of the property on the grounds that the building's abandonment by the city courts constituted a violation of Auguste Chouteau's and John Lucas' stipulation that the building be used "forever" as a courthouse. The heirs lost the suit, with the city retaining title to the property. In 1937 Henry Chouteau stated he would not intervene if the city deeded the building to the Federal Government. *St. Louis Star-Times*, 30 June 1930; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 January 1937.

⁶⁴Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 25 November 1936, JEFF.

⁶⁵Memorandum, Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. to Nagle, 28 December 1936, JEFF.

⁶⁶Thomas E. Tallmadge to Nagle, 28 December 1936, JEFF.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Ibid.* For a more complete history of National Park Service preservation efforts in St. Louis, see: Charles B. Hosmer, Jr., *Preservation Comes of Age: From Williamsburg to the National Trust, 1926-1949*, Vols. I and II Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1981.

⁶⁹Smith to Judge Jesse McDonald, 26 January 1937, JNEMA.

⁷⁰Smith to McDonald, 27 January 1937, JNEMA.

⁷¹Smith to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 11 February 1937, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Missouri Historical Society; Acting Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue to Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 9 March 1937, JNEMA.

⁷²Geaslin to Smith, 2 April 1937, JNEMA; Smith to Bennett Champ Clark, 19 April 1937, JNEMA.

⁷³Memorandum, Cammerer to Ickes, 12 February 1937, JEFF.

⁷⁴*Balter, et al. v. Ickes et al.* In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia, No. 6827, decided 8 March 1937, p. 3; JNEMA.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 4-5. By leave of the court, Bon Geaslin, Edgar Wayman and Clifford Greve all filed briefs as *amici curiae*, supporting certain contentions of the appellees. Greve filed the petition on behalf of one hundred and twenty five property owners. "Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 10 March 1937, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA. Bon Geaslin knew where to place the responsibility for the favorable court decision: "In my judgment, the result of the litigation can be attributed directly to the time when you [Luther Ely Smith] and I went to the Attorney General's office, and persuaded the attorneys handing (sic) the case to abandon their intention in filing a motion to dismiss, and convicing (sic) them of the necessity of filing a return to the rule to show cause, by which method the facts would be before the court, rather than an admission of the allegations in the bill of complaint." Geaslin to Smith, 13 March, 1937, JNEMA.

⁷⁷Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court calling up records of an inferior court in order to provide speedy justice, or so that errors and irregularities may be corrected. The latter was true in this instance.

⁷⁸Smith to Geaslin, 22 March 1937, JNEMA.

⁷⁹Memorandum, Cammerer to Ickes, 17 March 1937, JEFF.

⁸⁰Nagle to the Director NPS, 29 March 1937, JEFF.

⁸¹Smith to Geaslin, 22 March 1937, JNEMA.

⁸²Smith to Geaslin, 16 April 1937, JNEMA.

⁸³A mandate is a formal order from a superior court to an inferior one. In most cases, the order contains a U.S. Appellate Court decision when final judgment is not entered and is sent to the court below.

⁸⁴Geaslin to Smith, 14 April 1937, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 28 April 1937, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 4 May, 1937, JNEMA.

⁸⁵Smith to Geaslin, 5 May 1937, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 6 May 1937, JNEMA.

⁸⁶Smith to William C. D'Arcy, 10 March 1937, JNEMA; Smith to D'Arcy, 1 June 1937, JNEMA.

⁸⁷Acting Deputy Commissioner, Internal Revenue to Geaslin, 4 May 1937; JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 6 May 1937, JNEMA; Geaslin to Smith, 19 May 1937, JNEMA.

⁸⁸U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 75th Congress, 1st session, 1937, 81, pt. 91:5867.

⁸⁹Ibid, pp. 5867-68.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 5869-70.

⁹¹Smith to Lloyd Thurston, 17 May 1937, JNEMA.

⁹²U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 75th Congress, 1st session, 1937, 81, pt. 108: pp. 7099-7100.

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 7100-02. William D'Arcy was unruffled in his reaction to this public attack. "It hurts to be called a shyster — but reflecting on who did the shouting I simply smile." He believed the noise in Congress to be worse than the noise of a circus, and that what people see and hear in Congress made them shake their heads in shame and wonderment. D'Arcy further predicted that the project's opposition would soon recognize they had no more chance of winning their point than a bit of snow did becoming an icicle in hell. D'Arcy to Smith, 10 July 1937, JNEMA.

⁹⁴Paul O. Peters to William Allen White, 4 June 1937, JNEMA.

⁹⁵Smith to White, 16 June 1937, JNEMA.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*; Geaslin to Smith, 8 July 1937, JNEMA.

⁹⁷John Cochran to Dickmann, 4 August 1937, JNEMA.

⁹⁸A list of the various railroads owning stock in and using the terminal service of the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis was as follows: The Alton Railroad Company; Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company; The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company; Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company; Missouri Pacific Railroad Company; The New York Central Railroad Company; The New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Railroad Company; the Pennsylvania Railroad Company; St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Company; the Pennsylvania Railroad Company; St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company; St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company; and the Wabash Railroad Company.

⁹⁹Nagle to the Director NPS, 31 March 1937, JEFF; Nagle to Frank C. Wright, 19 April 1937, JEFF. John Nagle also made a personal contact with a railroad official, meeting on February 9, 1937 with Ralph Budd, president of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad. Budd could not definitely advise Nagle regarding the railroad removal, but he volunteered to send an engineer to conduct preliminary studies. All the dealings were kept confidential. Cammerer to Nagle, 23 February 1937, JEFF.

¹⁰⁰Nagle to Wright, 16 July 1937, JEFF.

¹⁰¹Thomas T. Railey to Nagle, 26 August 1937, JEFF; Nagle to Railey, 14 September 1937, JEFF; Demaray to Nagle, 20 October 1937, JEFF; Nagle to the Director NPS, 22 October 1937, JEFF.

¹⁰²Telegram, Smith to D'Arcy, 25 June 1937, JNEMA; D'Arcy to Smith, 10 July 1937, JNEMA.

¹⁰³*Balter, et al. v. Nagle, et al.* in the District Court of the United States For the Eastern Judicial District of Missouri, Eastern Division, No. 12241, decided 12 July 1937, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁴U.S. Public Law 292 (49 Stat. 666) 74th Congress, 21 August 1935, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁵Nagle to the Director NPS, 15 June 1937, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁶Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 19 June 1937, JNEMA; Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 25 June 1937, JEFF.

¹⁰⁷Cammerer to Dr. Hermon C. Bumpus, 12 July 1937, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 July 1937; Nagle to Bumpus, 20 July 1937, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁹Thomas Pitkin, *Suggestions for the Participation of the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings in the Development of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, Saint Louis, Missouri*, 7 August 1937, pp. 3-5, and 7, typed report, JEFF.

¹¹⁰Stuart Cuthbertson, *Proposed Temporary Historical Museum, General Development Plan, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, Missouri, National Park Service*, August 1937, p. 1, typed report, JEFF.

¹¹¹R.N. Elliott to the Secretary of the Interior, 7 August 1937, JNEMA.

¹¹²*Ibid.*

¹¹³Hermon C. Bumpus, Herbert E. Bolton, Archibald M. McCrea to the Director NPS, 2 September 1937, JNEMA.

¹¹⁴Geaslin to Smith, 20 August 1937, JNEMA.

¹¹⁵Nagle to Director NPS, 25 August 1937, JEFF. The courthouse was structurally sound, but needed repair and restoration work. The National Park Service could not repair the building until it acquired ownership. Since most of the city courts abandoned the building in 1930, fire and water damage had taken its toll on the roof, walls and rotunda murals. For descriptions of the building's physical condition, see: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 November 1936; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 January 1937.

¹¹⁶Geaslin to Smith, 11 September 1937, JNEMA. Executive Officer Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. suggested to Nagle that the National Park Service should take the Old Courthouse immediately. If the memorial project did not materialize, the building could always be returned to the city with the restoration costs being deducted from the city's contributed funds. Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 10 July 1937, JEFF.

¹¹⁷Nagle to Director NPS, 30 November 1937, JEFF; Memorandum, Pitkin, Peterson, Fahey to Nagle, 30 November 1937, JEFF. John Nagle pursued many proposals during 1937 for the Old Courthouse's permanent use. He considered using some rooms for an exhibition of paintings, including portraits, views of historical events, and western development. He even considered having a temporary loan exhibition open when the building was rededicated. Nagle to Smith, 22 September 1937, JEFF.

¹¹⁸Dickmann to Smith, 25 August 1937, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 26 August 1937, JNEMA.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*

¹²⁰Letters protesting the Federal Government's land policy are located in the Jefferson

National Expansion Memorial Association's files.

¹²¹Nagle to the Director NPS, 3 November 1937, JNEMA.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Cammerer to the Secretary (of the Interior), 19 August 1937, JEFF; Nagle to the Director NPS, 15 November 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁴Memorandum, Demaray for the Secretary (of the Interior), 29 November 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁵Memorandum, McFarland to the Attorney General, 20 November 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁶Memorandum, Demaray for the Secretary (of the Interior), 29 November 1937, JEFF; Charles West to the Attorney General, 11 December 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁷Henry Miller to Frank C. Wright, 9 November 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁸Nagle to Wright, 16 November 1937, JEFF.

¹²⁹Memorandum, John Bryan to Nagle, 23 August 1937, JEFF. Order revoking Permit No. 8600, April 14, 1937, granted by the Board of Public Service of the City of St. Louis on July 13, 1937, to the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, JEFF. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. to Wright, 26 November 1937, JEFF; Fahey to Wright, 26 November 1937, JEFF.

¹³⁰"Extract from Draft of Minutes of Executive Session, Advisory Board, National Park Service," 28-29 October 1937, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²Ibid., Bumpus to Ickes, 26 November 1937, JNEMA; Nagle to the Director NPS, 30 November 1937, JNEMA.

¹³³Demaray to Nagle, 6 December 1937, JNEMA; Nagle to the Director NPS, 9 December 1937, JNEMA.

¹³⁴Cammerer to Bumpus, 17 December 1937, JNEMA.

¹³⁵Nagle to the Director NPS, 9 December 1937, JNEMA; memorandum, Cammerer to the Secretary (of the Interior), 17 December 1937, JNEMA. In a letter to Luther Ely Smith, John Nagle described the historical research being carried out by his staff. Most of the research concerned buildings and the sites where buildings once stood within the riverfront area. Preliminary reports existed for the four most historic buildings in the area — the Old Courthouse, the Old Cathedral, the National-Scotts Hotel, and the Old Rock House. Minor buildings and sites were researched. Staff members compiled a map of the riverfront area using St. Louis histories as sources. Researchers looked for the exact location of the first road headed west from St. Louis; John Bryan researched the Robidoux family; and staff members collected all the information they could find in county court records and St. Louis newspapers between the years 1828 and 1862 on the Old Courthouse's construction. The latter information would be used in the building's restoration. Dr. Thomas Pitkin worked on the history of the Dred Scott case. Nagle to Smith, 27 December 1937, JNEMA.

¹³⁶Nagle to Demaray, 22 December 1937, JEFF; Demaray to Nagle, 27 December 1937, JEFF.

¹³⁷Complete lists of condemnation suits and the actions taken on them through January 1938 are filed in the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association's legal files; Smith to D'Arcy, 11 December 1937, JNEMA.

¹³⁸*Report of the Museum Committee Meeting, January 28-29 at St. Louis*, 1 February 1938, typed report, JNEMA. An immediate project for the museum force was diorama production. Pitkin listed ten topics for depiction, which would utilize the \$100,000 fund. Pitkin wanted these dioramas to form the core of a temporary museum. Pitkin to Ned Burns, 15 December 1938, JEFF.

¹³⁹Bumpus to Nagle, 19 February 1938, JNEMA; Nagle to Bumpus, 3 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁴⁰Nagle to Bumpus, 3 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

¹⁴²Nagle to Demaray, 3 March 1938, JNEMA; Demaray to Bumpus, 3 March 1938, unsent draft, JNEMA. Memorial development was held up in 1938 when the Advisory Board decided that the Old Courthouse was not worthy of inclusion within the memorial. More historical research on the building had to be submitted by supporters before the Department of the Interior accepted the deed in 1940.

¹⁴³Demaray to Nagle, 4 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁴⁴Nagle to Bumpus, 12 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁴⁵Frederic L. Kirgus to Secretary of the Interior, 21 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁴⁶Memorandum, Cammerer to Secretary of the Interior, 1 March 1938, JNEMA; Cammerer to Dickmann, 19 March 1938, JEFF. To give an example of how dilapidated the building was, a National Park Service architect looking over the roof found huge holes that allowed further destruction by inclement weather. Since the city still owned the structure, Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., and the architect had to approach the Board of Public Service to get the holes repaired at city's expense. Memorandum, G. Vietor Davis to Nagle, 13 January 1938, JEFF. National Park Service architects pursued much historical research on the building before the Federal Government accepted the deed. By March 1938, Charles Peterson had done research for over a year and a half. Original contracts dating from the 1850s were found, one of them being for the interior painting. Besides mural decorations, there once existed in the building imitation paneling painted on walls with marbleizing and artificial graining. In Peterson's opinion, "This promised to be a real headache before everything is done." Peterson to Thomas C. Vint, 8 March 1938, JEFF.

¹⁴⁷Cammerer to Dickmann, 7 April 1938, JEFF.

¹⁴⁸Radiogram, Cammerer to Nagle, 24 February, 1938, JNEMA; Ickes to Attorney General, 16 March 1938, JNEMA. Representative William Lambertson had long alleged that the memorial was a real estate scheme. In September 1938 the National Park Service took steps to avoid actions giving substance to these charges. Mayor Bernard Dickmann was president of a real estate firm, with his brother the vice president. It was suggested several times to

Nagle that the Dickmann firm would be glad to help the Park Service in any way with real estate work. John Nagle avoided the offers. "For obvious reasons, and because the *Post-Dispatch* or some other St. Louis newspaper had previously voiced the charge, (which I believe to be unwarranted) that certain City officials had bought or taken options on most of the real estate in the Memorial area for the purpose of a later resale to the Government at a profit, I did not think it wise for the Service to have dealings with a real estate company so closely connected with the City administration." Nagle to Demaray, 2 September 1938, JEFF.

¹⁴⁹Smith to W. Scott Hancock, 28 March 1938, JNEMA. The Barnidge condemnation case came to trial on June 27, 1938. D.E. Lee, special assistant to the assistant director, National Park Service, attended the trial. He discovered that the Barnidge family would appeal the constitutional questions involved irrespective of the jury award. Proper exceptions had been raised to take the case to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. Lee was impressed by the wealth of material that the Real Estate Branch in St. Louis had prepared and by the complete preparation by the National Park Service witnesses. One problem arose because the Park Service officials believed that the Department of Justice special counsel who handled all the legal work incidental to the condemnation cases was of lesser quality and not aggressive enough during the trials. This posed a delicate situation, since the Park Service would not be warranted in charging that the man was incompetent, but they did consider asking the Department of Justice for a change of counsel. It became evident during the trials that independent realtors made the best witnesses for the Government, as regular Government consultants were subject to attack on the ground of bias. Many cases consisted of opinion evidence given by expert real estate people, resulting in a wide variance of values, since the property owners employed well-qualified experts to testify to high values. Lee thought it necessary for the National Park Service staff to be "on the alert" to have full information on each parcel. Memorandum, D.E. Lee to the Director NPS, 2 July 1938, JEFF.

¹⁵⁰Memorandum, Demaray to Secretary of the Interior, 11 May 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁵¹John R. Kirk to Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 14 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁵²Smith to John W. Cross, 17 March 1938, JNEMA; Smith to Cross, 15 March 1938, JNEMA; Cross to Smith, 25 March 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁵³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 April 1938, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 May 1938.

¹⁵⁴*St. Louis Star-Times*, 6 June 1938.

¹⁵⁵Smith to White, 8 September 1938, JNEMA; Smith to D'Arcy, 1 November 1938, JNEMA; Smith to Dickmann, 7 November 1938, JNEMA.

¹⁵⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 August 1938; Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 7 December, 1938, JEFF.

¹⁵⁷Memorandum, Pitkin to Nagle, 19 November, 1938, JEFF.

¹⁵⁸Thomas M. Pitkin, Robert D. Starrett, *A Supplementary Report on Exhibit Planning in National Expansion*, April 1939, typed report, JEFF. In a memorandum to John Nagle, Dr. Pitkin expressed his conception of the basic purpose in creating the memorial: "The visitor to the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial should leave with a vivid impression of the sweep of the American people across a continent, taking possession of it and stamping upon it the impress of their character. He should be made to realize the magnitude of this

achievement and to be made aware of his own responsibility in seeing that the promise of national greatness implicit in it does not fail." Memorandum, Pitkin to Nagle, 13 April 1939, JEFF. Museum plans called for fifty-eight cases of museum material. Charles Peterson knew this would fill the main hall of a memorial building, but what about other related museum buildings? More than one major monumental building would be needed to occupy such a large site. There currently was nothing to put in these buildings other than museum material to conform with the Historic Sites Act. More importantly, said Peterson, "This project was conceived with the notion that seven and a half million dollars for the site would be justified by *improvements* costing twenty-two and a half millions." Peterson believed the one-museum idea too small in scale to be suitable. The National Park Service had undertaken what was predetermined for them as the most extensive historical monument ever built. The precedent of building museums cramped the Service's outlook. Peterson's final thought: "If this project is successful — and I don't see how we can prepare plans with any other expectation — the museum program is going to be large. If all the program is packed into one structure it will be elephantine and the whole area will be embarrassed by its size." Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 16 May 1939, JEFF. Other historical research pursued in 1939 concentrated on examination of the site's justification under the Historic Sites Act. Dr. Thomas Pitkin and Dr. Alvin Stauffer considered each of Roosevelt's justifications in the Executive Order of December 21, 1935. They agreed with the statement of St. Louis' historical importance, but they held doubts about the accuracy of some of the other claims. The Old French Cathedral was not the earliest home of religion on the western bank of the Mississippi; St. Louis was not the first civil government west of the Mississippi; Lewis and Clark did not make primary preparations for their exploration trip in the city; and Dred Scott's landmark court decision came in Washington, D.C., not St. Louis. Nevertheless, they agreed that St. Louis played a significant role in westward expansion, and that the memorial site constituted the original heart of the city. Thomas Pitkin and Alvin Stauffer, *Historical Problems Raised by the Executive Order Authorizing the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis*, April 1939, typed report, pp. 1-12, JNEMA.

¹⁵⁹Telegram, Fahey to Nagle, 27 January, 1939, JEFF; McCune Gill to Nagle, 1 February, 1939, JNEMA; *Barnidge v. U.S.*, 101 F 2nd 295, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁰Nagle to Smith, 30 January 1939, JNEMA. William D'Arcy wrote to Smith following the decision, concerning the association's future course of action. He suggested re-establishing connections at the capitol, fixing up any "leaks" that may be in the "wires," and renewing the enthusiasm of friends of the memorial. He wanted to initiate a new public relations campaign to create a positive public opinion, and to articulate more clearly the memorial scheme. Obviously, association members worried about their effectiveness and image in promoting the memorial. D'Arcy to Smith, 27 January 1939, JNEMA. A report on the progression of condemnation at the time of the *Barnidge v. U.S.* decision declared the assessed valuation of the 40 city blocks at \$5,300,000. Condemnation suits had now been entered on all 40 blocks, with the Court Commissioners returning their awards on 31 of them. The awards ran 35 percent above the assessed valuation and 17 percent above the National Park Service appraisal. Memorandum, Nagle for the Director NPS, 27 January 1939, JEFF.

¹⁶¹Memorandum, Department of the Interior for the Press, 10 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*

¹⁶³*Ibid.* Wide differences of opinion existed between the National Park Service and the Department of Justice at this time on the proper procedure to follow. To give an example of the wide spectrum of thought, on January 27 the attorney general wrote the secretary of the interior giving reasons why the National Park Service should not file declarations of taking.

He believed all efforts should go into extending the time limit for availability of the funds. He knew that in a number of cases in which land was being acquired for the project, the awards had been in excess of actual value. Being advised that the court might require the deposits accompanying declarations of taking to be the equivalent of the amount of the awards, he wanted to avoid introducing this new problem, which could extend litigation. Additionally, disbursing deposits under the declarations of taking would put defendants into a position where litigation would be in their best interest, and not the Government's. Attorney General to Ickes, 27 January 1939, JEFF. John Nagle, on the other hand, believed the National Park Service should move ahead with the declarations. It was not at all certain that Congress would pass legislation extending the fund time limit, and if the Justice Department's judgment proved wrong, the consequences could be dire. Nagle believed the National Park Service should adopt every aggressive measure to acquire the land in view of the short time remaining before the lapse of funds. The recent court decision assured the commencement of land acquisition, but Nagle wanted this to happen as soon as possible to avoid losing any funds into the treasury. Memorandum, Nagle for the Director, 1 February 1939, JEFF. Nevertheless, the director took the attorney general's advice, and took steps to try and secure a reappropriation of the Federal funds. Memorandum, Demaray to Nagle, 21 February 1939, JEFF.

¹⁶⁴Smith to Dr. Charles Merriam, 10 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁵Smith to Ickes, 14 February 1939, JNEMA; Blair to Smith, 16 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁶Smith to Blair, 17 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.; Smith to Geaslin, 18 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁸Smith to Blair, 20 February 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Blair, 22 February 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁶⁹Memorandum, Demaray to Nagle, 4 March 1939, JEFF.

¹⁷⁰Blair to Smith, 3 March 1939, JNEMA; Blair to Smith, 10 March 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Charles R. Denny, Jr., 6 March 1939, JNEMA; Denny to Smith, 13 March 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷¹U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 76th Congress, 1st session, 1939, part 3:2727-28.

¹⁷²U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 76th Congress, 1st session, 1939, part 3:2891-92. In a letter to Harry Blair, Luther Ely Smith stressed that Representative Lambertson's Kansas district included Atchison, home of the original place of business (clover and seed) of the Mangelsdorf family. The Mangelsdorfs owned property located in the area designated for the memorial, and had made appeals to the National Park Service to stop the project at Clark Avenue, thereby excluding their property. Smith to Blair, 11 March 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷³Smith to Geaslin, 20 March 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷⁴Smith to Geaslin, 18 March 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 20 March 1939, JNEMA; Blair to Smith, 29 March 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷⁵Memorandum, G.A. Moskey for the Director NPS, 31 March 1939, JEFF.

Telegram, Clark to Smith, 7 April 1939, JNEMA; telegram, Clark to Smith, 18 April 1939, JNEMA; Blair to Smith, 19 April 1939, JNEMA; telegram, Clark to Smith, 20 April 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷⁷For representative letters written supporting and opposing the Clark amendment, see: Smith to Amon Carter, 21 April 1939, JNEMA; telegram, Smith to William Allen White, 21 April 1939, JNEMA; Kent Keller to Smith, 21 April 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Harry Truman, 22 April 1939, JNEMA; Officers and Employees of the A.C.L. Haase Company to C. Jasper Bell, 20 April 1939, C. Jasper Bell Papers, file no. 4079, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, (hereafter cited as WHMC); W.H. Gage to Bell, 18 April 1939, C. Jasper Bell Papers, WHMC, file no. 4079; W.A. Smiley to Bell, 19 April 1939, C. Jasper Bell Papers, file no. 4079, WHMC.

¹⁷⁸Cochran to Smith, 24 April 1939, JNEMA; Fred H. Brown to Cochran, 25 April 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁷⁹Ralph Gilbert to Smith, 27 April 1939, JNEMA. Judge Gilbert was a former member of Congress and a member of the George Rogers Clark Commission.

¹⁸⁰Smith to Truitt, 5 May 1939, JNEMA; Truitt to Smith, 6 May 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸¹Blair to Smith, 6 May 1939, JNEMA. William D'Arcy asked Smith at this time if it would be proper to establish a committee in St. Louis to see that the real estate was acquired quickly by insuring that nothing would come into the picture which would mar the program's reputation. He considered this because of current gossip about "deals" and "certain personalities." A committee of this kind would stand above "all contaminated interests." D'Arcy to Smith, 8 May 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸²Memorandum, Nagle for the Files, 10 May 1939, JEFF. Acting National Park Service Director A.E. Demaray informed Secretary Ickes that for legal reasons it was desirable to file all forty declarations at the same time. The Department of Justice informally requested that Ickes or the Acting Secretary sign these. John Nagle was securing options (offers to sell) in the meantime. If the Department of Justice approved an option for a particular parcel before a declaration of taking for that block was signed, the estimated compensation was the approved option price. Otherwise, stipulations were entered in the proceedings after the declarations were filed; the stipulated price for the parcel covered by the option in such cases being the option price. In the cases where acquisition was in the judgment stage, vouchers were submitted to Ickes for his signature. Checks were obtained and paid into court, and title to the first of the memorial property was handed over to the United States. Memorandum, A.D. Demaray for the Secretary (of the Interior), 12 May 1939, JEFF.

¹⁸³Blair to Smith, 24 May 1939, JNEMA; Memorandum, Nagle for the Director 23 May 1939, JEFF.

¹⁸⁴Blair to Smith, 24 May 1939, JNEMA; Blair to Smith, 25 May 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸⁵Smith to Blair, 2 June 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸⁶Smith to Blair, 8 June 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸⁷Smith to Blair, 14 June 1939, JNEMA.

Blair to Smith, 1 July 1939, JNEMA; Wayman to Clark, 4 May 1939, JNEMA; Wayman to Clark, 4 May 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Wayman, 26 July, 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁸⁹Acting Secretary of the Interior to Comptroller General of the United States, 3 August 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁹⁰Fred H. Brown to Louis Nolte, 13 September, 1939, JNEMA; Brown to Meyers, 28 September, 1939, JNEMA; Meyers to the Department of the Interior, 6 October 1939, JNEMA; Cammerer to Meyers, 12 October 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁹¹Memorandum, D.E. Lee to Director, National Park Service, 31 October 1939, JNEMA. Discussion started at this time regarding disbanding the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association. Members themselves started this discussion, but Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., urged Luther Ely Smith not to let it happen. He encouraged the association to provide continued assistance to the National Park Service. Fahey to Smith, 25 October, 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁹²John Nagle, *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Progress to Date*, 1 November 1939, typed report, pp. 2-3, JNEMA. Specifications for the first demolition in the memorial area were issued November 29, with amendments being added on December 12, 1939.

¹⁹³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 October 1939.

¹⁹⁴Cammerer to Blanton, 8 November 1939, JEFF; memorandum, Nagle for the Director NPS, 24 November 1939, JEFF.

¹⁹⁵Nagle to F.E. Lawrence, Jr., 18 October 1939, JNEMA. In the November 29 specifications written for the demolition work, John Nagle listed all materials and objects that were to remain the property of the United States. Particular specimens were to be stored by the contractor. In addition, all markers designating historic sites would be removed and stored. There followed a complete list, block by block, of architectural specimens for salvaging. John Nagle, *Specifications for Demolition Work in the Memorial Area, St. Louis, Missouri*, 29 November 1939, typed report, JNEMA.

¹⁹⁶*Report of the Public Buildings Committee to Members of the Council on Civic Needs*, 6 November 1939, typed letter, JNEMA.

¹⁹⁷Memorandum, Bumpus to Acting Secretary (of the Interior), 19 November 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁹⁸Memorandum, Nagle to the Director National Park Service, 14 November 1939, JNEMA.

¹⁹⁹Memorandum, Nagle to Director NPS, 8 September 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰⁰Memorandum, Bumpus to Acting Secretary (of the Interior), 10 November 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰¹Memorandum, Nagle to the Director NPS, 14 November 1939, JNEMA; Smith to Geaslin, 2 December 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 November 1939; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 December 1939.

²⁰³Memorandum, Cammerer to Secretary (of the Interior), 4 December 1939, JEFF; Geaslin to Smith, 14 December 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰⁴Smith to Geaslin, 21 December 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰⁵Nagle to Wright, 31 January 1939, JEFF; Nagle to Wright, 8 February 1939, JEFF.

²⁰⁶Fahey to Wright, 17 March 1939, JEFF.

²⁰⁷Blair to Smith, 17 April 1939, JNEMA.

²⁰⁸Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 5 April 1939, JEFF; Memorandum, Nagle for the Files, 24 April 1939, JEFF. Those in attendance: Mayor Dickmann, Edgar Wayman, and Baxter Brown for the city; for the TRRA, P.J. Watson, Jr., president, C.S. Millard, director, E.M. Durham, Jr., director; for the National Park Service, Frank Wright, John Nagle; Watson to Nagle, 24 April 1939, JEFF.

²⁰⁹Ralph Budd to Wright, 10 May 1939, JEFF; Wright to Budd, 17 May 1939, JEFF; memorandum, C.E. Howard to Nagle, 31 May, 1939, JEFF.

²¹⁰Memorandum, Nagle for the Files, 26 June 1939, JEFF; Wright to Nagle, 11 July 1939, JEFF; Memorandum, J.B. Rasbach to Nagle, 12 July 1939, JEFF.

²¹¹Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 10 August 1939, JEFF.

²¹²Nagle to Wright, 28 August 1939, JEFF.

²¹³Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 28 December 1939, JEFF.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER III: 1940-1945

With the dawning of 1940, old problems still remained to be solved, especially that of the Old Courthouse, which several people feared might burn down at any time. National Park Service officials regretfully informed the St. Louis backers of the Old Courthouse that the Advisory Board had recommended against including it in the memorial. As a result of this recommendation, Secretary of the Interior Ickes withdrew his request for the taking of the building. An amazed William C. D'Arcy stated, "A hundred years from now that property will be more valuable than the Egyptian tombs that people travel miles to see, and which they believe are indicative of past civilization." [\[1\]](#)

"What the snag is nobody seems to precisely know," the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* reported, and Mayor Dickmann scheduled a trip to Washington, D.C., to find out, for he was determined to have the building in the memorial. Local citizens and Missouri Historical Society members pursued more research on the building's historical significance, hoping to challenge and change the Advisory Board's opinion. Ickes had requested \$35,000 for yearly maintenance and \$250,000 to \$500,000 for repair and rehabilitation of the Old Courthouse, but in early February he withdrew this request. Mayor Dickmann and others could not change Ickes' mind without first changing the board's opinion. [\[2\]](#)

Various other protests and suggestions for saving the building came from St. Louisans and interested Park Service personnel. The St. Louis chapter of the American Institute of Architects wrote Harold Ickes that the building was in "excellent structural condition," with the apparent dilapidation being "superficial." National Park Service Supervisor of Historic Sites Ronald F. Lee thought it would be appropriate for the Missouri Historical Society to occupy space in the building. He further hoped this would make the advisory board consider the subject further, since they were interested in the Missouri Historical Society's collection. An arrangement could be worked out by a cooperative agreement under the Historic Sites Act. [\[3\]](#)

John Nagle happily received this suggestion — in fact he had already tried to arrange this with the society. Nagle had also thought of having the city make an annual appropriation toward the building's upkeep so that it could be used for civic or cultural affairs. He did not think that the Park Service should bring the matter up for reconsideration, but that the city should accept primary responsibility. "Anything further we could do would be a re-statement of our previous arguments and would not be nearly so efficacious as the intelligent and convincing arguments that can be marshaled and ought to be advanced by St. Louisans." [\[4\]](#) St. Louisans prepared a new justification with historical evidence gathered by members and staff of the Missouri Historical Society, the St. Louis Public Library, and Saint Louis University. [\[5\]](#)

Their evidence centered on the part the Old Courthouse had played in westward expansion. Numerous meetings and conventions held there espoused plans for transcontinental railways, with Senator Thomas Hart Benton and Senator Stephen A. Douglas being the main spokesmen. Another historical aspect emphasized the building's role in the Mexican War, as both a recruiting station and the scene of homecoming celebrations. [6] The acting president of the Missouri Historical Society wrote Harold Ickes that exclusion of the "monumental edifice" from the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial would make the project "alien and remote." He pointed out that while Thomas Jefferson had the vision to acquire the territory, great numbers of other people had carried out his vision. "What they did, how they built, and what those things meant to them, is inseparable from, and a most important part of the story of the Old Court House." [7] McCune Gill believed that if the building were to be rehabilitated for the society to use, the Park Service would be utilizing the riverfront in an "authentic and dignified manner" and would be carrying out the purpose of the Historic Sites Act. [8] Luther Ely Smith wanted to keep a general approach, preferably oral, avoiding details as much as possible to avoid the direct issue. He tried to obviate the danger of an immediate negative, leaving the matter open for further intensive work and documentation if it should become necessary. Mayor Dickmann and Edgar Wayman left for Washington D.C., and Smith and his backers crossed their fingers, touched wood, and hoped for good results from there. [9]

On February 14 the *Globe-Democrat* stated that the block bounded by Market, Chestnut, and Fourth Streets, acquired by the National Park Service to connect the main memorial to the Old Courthouse, was one of the most expensive blocks in the area. The declaration of taking cost \$287,290 in spite of almost a fourth of the block already belonging to the United States because of a purchase of one corner in 1917 for a proposed Federal building. The total cost of the block destined to become Luther Ely Smith Square was \$468,000. The newspaper stressed that the block was acquired only for the purpose of extending the memorial area to include the Old Courthouse. [10]

Upon Mayor Dickmann's return to the city the plan to include the Old Courthouse in the memorial gained strength. The structure was specifically mentioned in President Roosevelt's executive order, and Dickmann and Wayman had made this point in a conference with National Park Service Director Arno Cammerer, and Associate Director Arthur Demaray. According to Demaray, Secretary Ickes asked the National Park Service to look into the matter, although it was not known what action would be taken. In Demaray's opinion, Roosevelt's mention of the building had escaped the notice of the Park Service and Interior Department, but had been unearthed by Dickmann because "he was more interested in the project than anyone else." Luther Ely Smith discovered confidentially that because of this development the Park Service and the Interior Department would be inclined to revise their points of view, and that no further data were needed to convince them. [11]

Ickes responded to the question by writing President Roosevelt in March, telling him of the city's offer of title and the problem involved. Unless Roosevelt disapproved, Ickes proposed to accept the site as conveyed to the Federal Government without cost. Funds for restoration would be available from the city's \$2,225,000 contribution. Ickes thought revenues obtained from charging admission fees to the restored courthouse could balance part of the annual maintenance cost. While he was awaiting Roosevelt's reply, the Missouri Historical Society offered to supply historical material for exhibition in the Old Courthouse. [12] On April 29, 1940, President Roosevelt approved Secretary Ickes' action to take title to the Old Courthouse along with the land upon which it stood. He did so because the original plans had sought this acquisition for the memorial, and all obstacles preventing its conveyance to the United States had been removed. [13] Roosevelt thus overruled the Advisory Board, upon Ickes' recommendation, and the historic Old Courthouse that "morally and physically" dominated Jefferson National Expansion Memorial became a part of it. [14]

In June the acting undersecretary of the interior requested that Mayor Dickmann furnish an abstract or certificate of title as evidence to the attorney general, for his examination and opinion. The Interior Department was not questioning the validity of the city's title to the property, but nevertheless needed satisfactory evidence of the title. By July 9 the deed and abstract of title covering the site was sent to the Interior Department and referred to the attorney general. [15] Park Service officials in St. Louis agreed upon a program of development for the area, and on June 18 decided that the Old Courthouse project should take priority over other development work. They listed specific rehabilitation projects needing immediate attention. Several tenants remained in the building (even though the courts had long since been moved) and Charles Peterson thought it would be politically wise for the city to evacuate them, since it had arranged for the use of the building by the Federal Government. In this way no bad feelings would develop toward the Park Service on the part of city organizations. Peterson also warned about the fire hazard in the building, and upon examining the rooms found many of them almost impossible to inspect because of the tenants' belongings packed in them. [16]

Near the end of July the United States attorney general examined the Old Courthouse title and raised several questions. The deed that the title rested on was unrecorded, and furthermore appeared to be subject to the rights and claims of any parties in possession of it under any unrecorded permissive agreement granted by the city. To eliminate the first objection, the Park Service asked Mayor Dickmann to have the deed recorded and the abstract of title continued and recertified to a date subsequent to such recording. To answer the second objection, the Park Service enclosed for Nagle a form of certificate of possession, to be executed by the local United States attorney and returned to the Service. [17] Harry Blanton took care of these matters, had the certificate of possession drawn up, and asserted that it was the city of St. Louis that occupied the building through the tenancy of two justice of the peace courts and their constable offices. As for other parties occupying the building, he reported that they were tenants only, with no leases, who had been given notice to vacate. Blanton thus answered the attorney general's questions about the title's complete legality. [18]

At long last all the barriers were removed, and the Federal Government could take possession after the tenants had left. Smith wrote Dickmann, "That certainly is a mighty fine triumph, and it is a great tribute to your persistence and vision." By November workmen began moving piles of trash from the building, and the National Park Service approved plans and specifications for the restoration. [19] In December bids were opened to put a new roof on all four wings of the building. [20]

During the summer of 1940 a possibility existed that the headquarters of Region II of the National Park Service would be transferred from Omaha, Nebraska, to St. Louis. National Park Service Director Cammerer was not averse to the idea if there existed a definite desire on the city's part to welcome the move. Space was available in the rooms of the Old Courthouse, provided it could be restored and ready for use by July 1, 1941. Restoration was being done with Works Progress Administration funds, but it soon became apparent to National Park Service Executive Officer Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., that it would not be finished by July. Because construction of the new roof was contract work being performed by union labor, no WPA rehabilitation work could start until after the roof work was completed. Furthermore, new defense projects being set up in the St. Louis area threatened to create a shortage of WPA skilled labor. Fahey considered having the work done under contract to rush completion, but this would seriously deplete funds available for the other WPA projects. In Fahey's estimation it would not be possible to use both contract and WPA labor at the same time on the building. [21]

Transfer plans were still tentative at the end of the year, when the regional director of Region II made a trip to St. Louis to investigate the move's feasibility. He personally wanted to move

to Denver, but this created legal problems, as the Park Service owned no property in that city. Adequate space existed in the Old Courthouse, but other basic necessities were lacking, such as a garage for car storage and maintenance. Heating, lighting, janitor service, and trash removal required funding, and at this point, Park Service officials did not know where funds for these activities would come from. Doubt still existed whether the restoration would be finished in time. [22] As a result of the intricacies and the time table of the rehabilitation work, the Old Courthouse did not open to the public until January 1943. It then housed a "temporary" museum and the National Park Service St. Louis offices. Regional headquarters did not move to St. Louis.

Preservation Efforts

In all the reports recommending sites to be preserved, the Old Cathedral had been mentioned as worthy. Built in 1831 to 1834, the structure was a prime example of Greek Revival architecture, and was on ground set aside by St. Louis founder Pierre Laclede. Through the years, nonhistoric structures had been built on and around it, and now, 100 years after its construction, the Old Cathedral sat surrounded by warehouses in the decaying riverfront district. In December 1940 Mayor Dickmann and others asked questions about the relationship between the cathedral, the red brick priest's house, and the rest of the memorial development program. City officials asked if the Park Service could assist the Catholic Church in rebuilding the priest's house out of structural materials more harmonious and adaptable to the general surroundings. [23] Secretary Ickes in principle opposed spending public funds on private property, but was willing to have the Park Service look into the matter because of the proximity of the structure to the memorial. Any work done by the Park Service would be authorized by the Historic Sites Act if an agreement could be reached where the Catholic Church would preserve the historic property unchanged. [24]

Concurrent with interest in the Old Cathedral, several members of the community sought to save the National-Scotts Hotel, at Third and Market Streets. Luther Ely Smith asked John Nagle if the Advisory Board had reviewed the hotel's historical value, thinking this advisable before his group took any action. "If we are to judge from our experience with the Court House, we might encounter some risk of offending them, which of course is one thing we do not want to do by taking action first." [25] John Nagle received several endorsements for including the building within the park, and communicated with the Washington office in the matter. He appreciated Smith's interest and thought every consideration should be given the building, threatened after ninety-three years of use. Members of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association previously were interested in saving the hotel, but in view of the pending legislation they did not want to make a move necessitating an additional executive order. [26]

Historical research on buildings in the area continued, along with the various museum studies in 1940. National Park Service historians and researchers continued to define museum themes, and restoration and preservation specifications. Suggestions were made to try and settle public discontent over the destruction of so many buildings. Perhaps grading, covering with subsoil and topsoil, and planting each block with grass as the buildings were demolished could solve the problem. Also considered was a plan that entailed building a fountain on the mall running east from the Old Courthouse. It was felt that improving the appearance of the demolished blocks would help improve public appreciation of what was being done. [27]

Concern over preservation of buildings and facades occupied a great deal of space in these studies. One suggestion was to place some of the worthy facades close to or fastened to the walls of the Eads Bridge approach. One advisor thought the facades could be left in place, right on the street, rather than be dismantled and stored. One aspect kept in mind when this planning was undertaken was that there was no authority in the Historic Sites Act to construct

new buildings or to reconstruct old buildings, except when appropriations were authorized or made available by Congress. [28]

Lapsed Funds

Another consideration that followed the project into 1940 was the lapsing of the Federal funds. On July 10 the *Post-Dispatch* reported that \$417,657 had lapsed into the Federal Treasury (This information had just become publicly known, even though the event had occurred the previous year). The newspaper reported that the funds could be obtained now only by congressional appropriation. Funds contributed by the city of St. Louis were not affected and were therefore available to the Park Service with the exception of \$140,000 set aside as a reserve fund. This fund had been the city's one-third of the reverted money, and having been paid to the Federal Government, was not likely to be given back to the city. [29] St. Louis' Budget Director Arthur C. Meyers, however, did not accept this status of the city's contribution. Meyers wrote Arno Cammerer in July that he wanted a refund of the city's balance so that it could be placed in the Jefferson Memorial Bond Sinking Fund. Cammerer then requested Superintendent John Nagle to discuss the matter with Meyers, since "It is believed a more satisfactory solution of the problem may be reached in this manner." Meyers insisted that \$139,219.19 of the city's funds should revert to the city treasury because the unused portion of the Federal funds had already reverted to the Federal Treasury. He asked John Nagle to take whatever action was necessary to move the money. [30] John Nagle tried to explain the National Park Service's position to Meyers and Comptroller Louis Nolte. In the opinion of the Park Service, the refund should not occur unless and until it became definite that no further action would be taken to make additional funds available for the memorial. Nagle promised Meyers and Nolte official consideration of the matter upon their request. Nagle then suggested to the director of the Park Service that the question of the fund should not be made until a definite decision was made regarding further Federal action requesting additional funds. Nagle also duly passed this viewpoint on to Arthur Meyers. [31]

National Park Service Chief Counsel G.A. Moskey considered the matter and believed the Interior Department had to decide whether any additional steps should be taken to secure a reappropriation of the lapsed funds. This seemed a doubtful move in view of Congress' unfavorable budget action within the last year. National Park Service officials in St. Louis finally decided in August to recommend to Washington that necessary steps be taken to secure an additional appropriation of Federal funds to match St. Louis' appropriation three to one, or else secure an extension of the availability of the lapsed Federal funds. [32]

In October National Park Service Acting Director Hillory Tolson stepped into the confusion to set a course of action, working cooperatively with the city. The first step needed was a written statement from the mayor agreeing to match Federal WPA funds expended on the project in the future. The \$140,000 would be returned to the city if not matched by Federal funds. If the mayor should consider that funds would not be available to match WPA funds on the three to one ratio, the National Park Service would not be willing to recommend that a WPA project be undertaken. It was the Park Service's understanding that the city had agreed to contribute as much as \$7,500,000 towards a \$30,000,000 project. If the Park Service was able to secure allotments of WPA funds over and above the \$140,000, it was assumed that the city would continue to match these allocations. Tolson requested early advice along with a written statement from the mayor, so that recommendations concerning the WPA projects could be submitted. [33]

John Nagle informed Mayor Dickmann of these developments. He asked if the city of St. Louis would use the \$139,219 toward a grant from the WPA to the total sum of \$417,657.56, and if the city would contribute further funds toward WPA projects in the three to one ratio. [34] The Board of Estimate and Apportionment on October 17 considered these questions.

The board had no objection to the Park Service using the remaining \$139,219.19, provided the money was matched by a Federal contribution of \$417,657.56. On the second question, the board members agreed that the city would be authorized and willing to contribute more money in the same ratio. To raise any more city money, however, more city bonds would have to be sold; and to make the bonds attractive to buyers, at least \$500,000 should be offered for sale. Yet the board did not want to sell bonds and pay interest on them when the money derived from their sale was idle. The city would be willing to raise the necessary money only with Nagle's guarantee that the projects instituted would need at least \$500,000 of the city's money in addition to WPA money. [35]

Informing Director Cammerer of the city's decision, John Nagle believed that a satisfactory solution of the problem could be reached. He felt that city officials were justified in their desire to realize the most advantageous sale of bonds. Possibilities did exist that WPA aid in either smaller amounts or on a larger scale would be more advantageous both to the National Park Service and to the city of St. Louis. [36] In this spirit of cooperation, both parties attempted to watch their own interests while working toward building the memorial.

Railroad Negotiations

National Park Service officials tried to foster the same spirit of cooperation between the city and the Terminal Railroad Association over the question of track removal, although the Park Service itself could not participate officially. Its function was to approve or disapprove solutions advanced by the city and the TRRA "from the viewpoint of the ultimate project."

John Nagle could not agree to any schemes proposed for sharing costs, as this meant agreeing in principle to Government participation. As a result, in all negotiations he refrained from agreeing to any cost division, although he personally believed the Government should bear a proportionate share of the cost. [37] Early in 1940 Park Service Executive Officer Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., restated the position that the ideal solution to the problem was to have no railroad tracks at all separating the Mississippi River from the memorial area. At this point in the negotiations, Park Service officials in St. Louis took the position that the passenger trains should be removed as a first step, to be followed by relocation of the freight surface lines. Fahey believed that if this position became policy it would aid in solving the whole problem. It was known that the Interior Department's special advisor, Frank Wright, wanted to recommend to the secretary of the interior that the government give financial assistance, but it was not known to what extent. Wright had never stated specifically that any of the alternative plans should be carried out. He worked to bring together the city, the railroads and the National Park Service rather than as an advisor to the Park Service. [38]

On February 14, 1940, John Nagle met with Frank Wright in Washington to discuss the various agreements and understandings worked out thus far between the city and the TRRA. Several of the railroads were starting to send their passenger trains over the just-opened Municipal Bridge, while others were still using the Merchants Bridge and the elevated tracks. Wright proposed building a double track passenger line that would serve to route traffic over the Municipal Bridge. Nagle told him that the plan recently submitted by TRRA President Watson, which provided for two low level tracks over which passenger trains as well as freight trains would pass in front of the area, was not acceptable to the National Park Service. Nagle also told Wright that the Park Service would keep a stronger position by not assuming the role of deciding what routes the trains would take. Any attempt on the Park Service's part to dictate these routes would not be acceptable to the city or the TRRA. It was up to the railroads to study the problem on a city-wide basis, and as far as Nagle was concerned neither the railroads nor the city had made any satisfactory broad study of the problem. He again stressed that if attention was focused first on eliminating the elevated passenger trains, some means could then be found to remove the freight trains. If the argument kept dividing

between the passenger and freight trains, then nothing would be accomplished. [39]

Terminal Railroad Association President Philip Watson's plan, submitted to Nagle on January 18, did not contain a lot of detail, but it did call for a new line to be substituted for the elevated structure. This plan, forwarded to Director Cammerer along with Nagle's objections, was then sent to the secretary of the interior. Cammerer pointed out that the double track passenger and freight line placed along the front of the area would separate the memorial from the river. A harmful precedent would be set for all future planning work aimed at reclaiming the historic and recreational values of the waterfront areas. Cammerer recommended to the secretary that the plan not be approved, and that Frank Wright and John Nagle devise another plan in which an adequate city-wide study of the railroad problem in relation to the memorial would be performed. Harold Ickes approved these recommendations on March 21, 1940. [40]

Tensions now began to build. Mayor Dickmann requested that Frank Wright come to St. Louis for a "showdown" on removing the elevated structure. The two met with Philip Watson on April 11, but nothing was accomplished. Mayor Dickmann met again on April 12 with TRRA officials, insisting that the tracks be moved. Since Watson represented many different railroads, he suggested that some of their officials be called into a conference. Dickmann thought these gentlemen should be reminded of the desirability of their cooperating with the Federal Government to build the memorial. For fifty years they had sustained tremendous savings in their operations as members of a terminal system, as compared with the potential costs if they had operated their lines individually. Dickmann stressed that it was necessary for the railroads to cooperate with the city and the Federal Government in developing the memorial, even though their costs would be higher. [41]

The city Board of Estimate and Apportionment had not yet taken action on the provisional agreement entered into with the TRRA on February 1. Dickmann's anger over the TRRA's opposition to a smoke elimination ordinance led him to declare that he would reconsider all the agreement's terms. [42]

In June, both Philip Watson, Jr., and Mayor Dickmann received notice from Secretary Ickes that the TRRA's January 18 plan was unacceptable, and that both were requested to submit a new plan. [43] Watson promptly corresponded with the directors of his association, citing the fact that in the past twelve months more than 500,000 railroad cars (passenger and freight) had traveled across the Merchants Bridge and St. Louis Transfer Railway lines. In Watson's opinion these railroad facilities were essential to railroad traffic through St. Louis. Focusing on national and international events and the increasing possibility of war, Watson made the following observation to his directors:

It is, to my mind, incredible and unthinkable that, at this time when there appears to be good reason to believe that the railroads will soon be called upon to furnish additional, speedy, and efficient transportation of both freight and passenger requirements to meet the emergency growing out of the national defense program, anyone would give consideration to the removal and destruction of such important rail facilities as these tracks along the riverfront provide, certainly not unless as good or better ones are provided in their place. [44]

Another meeting was held July 2 in Mayor Dickmann's office to consider Secretary Ickes' request for a new plan. John Nagle stated the National Park Service's chief concerns: that all trains discontinue use of the elevated structure, that the structure be removed, and that the Park Service was not interested in the details of how this was to be accomplished by the TRRA and the city. Any studies pursued toward this goal would have the financial aid of the Park Service. Philip Watson, Jr., remarked that the Government should not ask the TRRA to

pay for the necessary changes, to which Nagle replied it was useless to insist upon any definite plan for dividing costs before any study was done on the benefits and disadvantages brought upon each party and the total cost determined. Mayor Dickmann then requested that a committee of engineers be formed, one each appointed by the city, the TRRA, and the Park Service, to make studies toward this end. Nothing further could be done until meetings of the city board of estimate and the TRRA board of directors were held. Nagle was to be notified of the results of these meetings. [45]

The matter moved in a different direction than John Nagle or Frank Wright had anticipated. They had previously considered bringing in an engineer on the problem, but now they delayed until the situation was a little better defined. Watson's attitude did not please John Nagle, who thought Watson was "inclined to drag 'red herrings' across our trail." Nagle further believed that Watson complicated the discussions by making "gratuitous and unnecessary arguments." [46]

After the July 2 meeting the TRRA and the city both appointed engineers to study and report on technical and physical problems involved with removing the tracks. John Nagle held conferences with his superiors, who decided that the Park Service should not be represented on this committee. Their reasoning was that the objectives of the Park Service in requesting that the structure be removed were fully recognized by everyone, and train rerouting would be done over tracks on lands not owned by the Park Service, thereby eliminating any need for the Park Service to be consulted in any phase of this work. It was up to the city and the TRRA to arrive at a solution. Thus, National Park Service officials felt they could not participate in the engineer committee. [47]

The St. Louis Board of Estimate and Apportionment acted on July 25 to revoke the TRRA's permits for operating the tracks. The city's appointed engineer, City Railway Engineer A.R. Ross, was to collaborate with the TRRA's engineer, F.E. Bates of the Missouri Pacific, to determine some plan to get trains into Union Station without using the elevated tracks. This action by the board was deemed necessary in view of Secretary Ickes' rejection of the TRRA's plan and the National Park Service's decision not to hire a consulting engineer. [48] Several months passed before Ross and Bates evolved a plan for consideration. In late September John Nagle visited the two engineers and learned they had prepared a plan for carrying both passenger and freight trains through a tunnel across the area. In Nagle's judgment this represented the most feasible solution presented so far. He suggested that they pursue their studies further and prepare cost estimates. Nagle would wait to hear from the city and the TRRA before hiring Max Doyne as Frank Wright's consultant assistant. [49]

Plans progressed for the proposed railroad changes as survey data were secured along the elevated tracks. Neighboring streets and the memorial area were surveyed at the same time. Max Doyne selected four men to perform the investigations and studies, men trained in railroad terminal studies and construction problems. These plans had to be completed before the Park Service officials in St. Louis could do anything. In November came a discussion of ventilating the proposed tunnel, with various solutions being offered. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., noted that the question of ventilating outlets would require careful consideration because diesel-driven engines were "notorious for being horribly smelly." [50]

During these months Frank Wright and Mayor Dickmann asked Park Service officials various questions ranging from whether the studies had been approved as they now stood, to how far the Park Service would go in defraying costs. Executive Officer Fahey's personal belief was that the Park Service could do little except to confirm that the plan now under consideration served to remove the surface and elevated tracks, and that the tunnel location did not interfere with any foreseeable development of the memorial project. He stressed that the National Park Service should keep the position of being neither railroad experts nor city

planners. All they wanted was the removal of the tracks, and it was not within their authority to say how this should be done. [51]

Secretary Ickes met with National Park Service Acting Director Arthur E. Demaray, Mayor Dickmann and other city officials in December concerning the new tunnel plan. When Mayor Dickmann demonstrated that this plan could be worked out and the costs divided, Secretary Ickes said there were no funds available to the National Park Service and he doubted whether any more would be appropriated by Congress. Dickmann proposed obtaining a WPA project for part of the park, stating that the cost might be as high as \$3,000,000. Since Max Doyme had just been appointed to make a study, Demaray believed no action should be taken until Doyme's findings were available, and Secretary Ickes agreed. [52] Negotiations came to a standstill until further studies were completed.

Thus another year of development came to an end, with buildings being torn down, local politics becoming inflamed over the railroad issue, and National Park Service studies continuing. Jefferson National Expansion Memorial gained a new superintendent near the end of the year; Julian Spotts, who had served as advisor for the project, ascended to the top position on November 16, 1940, as John Nagle resigned to accept a position with the War Department. Nagle took charge of developing air bases leased from Great Britain in the Caribbean Islands, a prelude to the entry of the United States in World War II. A major personnel change also occurred in the National Park Service hierarchy when Arno Cammerer stepped down after seven years as director, to be succeeded by Newton Drury on August 20. [53]

Demolition Continues

Changes in personnel did not shift the principal goals in the memorial's development. Park Service officials kept the demolition program on schedule. Despite opposition in some quarters, all buildings on the riverfront came down, with the exceptions of the Old Cathedral, the Old Rock House and the Denchar Warehouse (which temporarily served as shelter for the salvaged facades and iron work). Interested citizens made last minute efforts to save two structures: the National-Scotts Hotel at Third and Market Streets, adjacent to the memorial area, and the Old Customs House at Third and Olive Streets. National Park Service Historical Architect John Bryan documented the historical and architectural significance of the National-Scotts Hotel, and the Missouri Historical Society adopted a resolution favoring its acquisition. Superintendent Julian Spotts recommended changing the memorial's boundaries to keep the building, yet after the Park Service studied all the data and recommendations about the hotel, the decision was made not to include the structure in the memorial. The hotel's history was interesting, but its structure had been considerably altered through the years. Funds for extensive restoration and rehabilitation were not available, and even if restored, the hotel was unadaptable to museum or administrative use. As for the suggestion that the hotel be utilized in its original function, the Park Service definitely could not justify engaging in the hotel business. So it was not included within the memorial, but all of the Service's files, historical data, and reports on the building were made available to local groups or individuals who wanted to undertake restoration. [54]

Also destined for demolition was the Old Customs House, built between 1852 and 1859. It was used as a post office, a customs office, and a home for Federal courts, and served as the center of Government activities in St. Louis through the Civil War period. Only in 1888 did it lose its prominence to the larger Post Office Building at Eighth and Olive Streets. One of the first protests against razing this building came in 1938 when Postmaster W. Rufus Jackson made his opposition public. But the determining factor against saving the building evolved from its location on Third Street (now Memorial Drive). In 1940 John Nagle became convinced that the building could not remain permanently, as it would prevent the

improvement of Third Street, which was needed for the area's future development. In Nagle's estimation, widening the street was more essential than saving the Old Customs House. [55]

As soon as demolition of the Customs House began in January 1941, Director Newton Drury explained why the building was being demolished in an attempt to answer the growing public sentiment to save it. A thorough study by National Park Service architects and historians had concluded that the building was not of sufficient national architectural significance to justify the high cost (estimated at \$450,000) of restoration. Traffic safety would be impaired if the building were left standing to interfere with the widening of Third Street. Nonetheless, while making architectural and historical records, the Park Service determined that selected columns, column caps, and cast iron ornaments would be saved from the building. [56]

The cast iron architecture on the St. Louis riverfront was considered by architectural experts to be unique. Nowhere else in the country had a similar large cluster of buildings of cast iron architecture been preserved. As demolition continued through 1941 and 1942, various ornaments, architectural details, and metal columns selected for preservation were taken down by the wreckers and stored in the Denchar Warehouse. Charles Peterson and John Bryan marked each specimen, believing they would eventually be displayed in the proposed architectural museum. During the war years, drives for scrap metal occurred frequently. In the interest of national security, Julian Spotts had to maintain the position that these preserved pieces would be available as scrap if the military situation demanded. Fortunately, this never came to pass. [57]

Besides preserving selected architectural pieces, National Park Service officials chose to keep the Old Rock House at Wharf and Chestnut Streets. This building was the oldest standing structure in the city, having been built in 1818 by the fur trader Manuel Lisa for use as a warehouse. Starting in 1936 Charles Peterson and his staff gathered information on the building, which by that time housed a tavern. Enough historical data was collected about the structure to justify its restoration by the Works Progress Administration. Peterson believed that the "proportion of known fact and reasonable deduction to conjecture" in terms of restoring the building was no lower than any other "average" National Park Service restoration project. Using WPA labor and funds, National Park Service architects started in January 1941 to restore the Old Rock House. They removed all nonhistoric additions (particularly a mansard roof added late in the previous century), and did an exterior and interior restoration with some original flooring and floor joists remaining in place. The work was finished in just over a year. [58]

For the next seventeen years the restored Old Rock House stood as the only completed development in the memorial area. Overshadowed physically by the elevated railroad, it nevertheless served, along with the Old Courthouse several blocks away, as an interpretive feature within the memorial. The only other development to occur on site for the next seventeen years was a conversion of a portion of the razed area into a municipal parking lot. Park Service officials restored the Old Rock House with the idea that it would comprise a portion of the "ultimate" memorial development, even though they still had no concept of what form this development would take. [59] The Old Rock House, however, did not remain as part of the memorial plan because of the overshadowing elevated tracks.

Works Progress Administration money paid for more than the Old Rock House restoration, as the Old Courthouse rehabilitation proceeded throughout 1941. After the new roof was in place, work began on the interior. The building's exterior design had changed very little over the years, but the interior had experienced almost continual remodeling. Only the rotunda, the two oval courtrooms on the second floor, the corridors, and the stairways had not undergone modernization. Thus, rooms already stripped of their old character were converted into office space; only the two largest courtrooms on the second floor were worthy architecturally and

aesthetically of preservation. [60] By December 1941 rehabilitated rooms in the south wing housed the National Park Service offices of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.

During the summer of 1941 the Works Progress Administration granted \$76,852 to the memorial for the preparation of museum exhibits. Work commenced in September with four workmen, but by January 1942 only 2 percent of the project was completed. By this time, completion of other WPA projects had moved forward; the Old Rock House restoration was 95 percent complete, and grading and general improvement of the memorial area was 60 percent complete. Because of war conditions no work had started on the other WPA projects, including partial restoration of the Old Courthouse, construction facilities within the memorial area, and the Third Street improvement. Julian Spotts hoped to apply for a project to complete restoration of the Old Courthouse after the partial restoration project was finished. [61]

Museum exhibit work continued to progress slowly, suffering further delays when Julian Spotts received unofficial information that the Missouri WPA Art Project, upon which the Park Service depended for much of the installation work, would be required to work on military and civilian defense needs. Spotts could only hope that WPA assistance would not cease before some of the most pressing work could be completed. By June, however, the WPA drastically cut the number of their assigned workers. Spotts learned that certain specific jobs could be finished, but that the complete restoration work was in jeopardy. The entire Third Street project fell by the wayside. Later, it would be officially approved as part of the Strategic Highway Network, thus gaining a higher priority. [62]

Works Progress Administration assistance on the exhibits continued to the point where St. Louisans saw a preview of an exhibit room in the Old Courthouse in October 1942. Association member William D'Arcy described it, saying that "There is nothing like it in the United States and it will grow to bigger proportions and be increasingly more interesting to the public." [63] Works Progress Administration activities terminated on January 3, 1943, when the museum rooms opened to the public. [64]

Demolition work progressed throughout 1941 and 1942, leading to other questions needing answers. As some bulldozers moved through the area tearing down buildings, others worked to grade and level the old basements. Debris filled up the holes and the site was leveled off. Memorial staff members made arrangements with owners of unexcavated borrow pits to obtain clean earth. Lespedeza seed, a clover-like ground cover, was planted over the graded area to prevent erosion and improve the area's appearance. All the old streets remained intact, however, which created differences between St. Louis authorities and the National Park Service beginning in February 1941. These differences centered on claims to vested rights in the streets and alleys made by the utility companies, which owned equipment beneath the street surfaces. City authorities wanted the Park Service to save the city from any costs, claims, or suits by the utility companies resulting from the city's passage of ordinances vacating the streets and alleys. Luther Ely Smith believed that because everyone concerned wanted the projects to progress there would be no serious problem in resolving the differences. [65] Smith's opinion changed several days later when local papers alleged that the dispute was snarling the memorial plans. Prompt action was necessary to keep the cooperative working agreement between the city and the Park Service. [66]

Federal officials wanted the city to unconditionally vacate the streets and alleys at once. Thereafter the Federal Government would take care of all claims that the utilities could legally establish. Department of Justice officials believed that the act of vacating sheds would terminate many of the rights that the utilities might claim. Foremost in the Government's mind was conserving its funds. [67] Time was of the essence as Park Service officials had several hundred thousand dollars of WPA money to spend before July 1, 1941. Some of this

work centered on obliterating and grading the streets. When declarations of taking were filed on the property, they provided that the land taken was subject to the rights of the public utilities using the streets, and subject to the rights of the city. Owners of abutting property caused a problem, since their property extended to the middle of the vacated streets. The owners had the legal right to order the utility companies to remove utility facilities from their land. If the utilities removed their facilities, they had the right for compensation against the city for the cost of this removal, based upon the precept that the city's contract was breached. It would prove a major obstacle if the Government had to pay for these costs. City Counselor Edgar Wayman prepared an ordinance providing for vacating the streets, but he did not solve this problem. For the Park Service, the solution lay with an unconditional vacation so that the United States would not have to reimburse the utilities. Wayman could not recommend this because the city would be open to a damage suit by the utilities. Park Service Acting Chief Counsel Lee recommended seeking a decision from the solicitor general. [68]

More than a month passed before the solicitor general was in a position to render an opinion. Director Drury recommended to Counselor Wayman that the city vacate the streets unconditionally in order to start the project immediately. If this seemed unsatisfactory to the city, the Park Service would try to enter into a contract with the utilities or condemn city streets, but this required additional time. Because the city did not desire to vacate unconditionally, the Park Service had no other course open except to hold up the project until title to the streets was cleared and the utility problem solved. [69]

On March 4, 1941, the St. Louis Board of Public Service approved Ordinance 42059, providing for the vacation and abolition of alleys within the memorial's historic site. The ordinance stated that Julian Spotts, on behalf of the United States of America, had waived all claims for damages occasioned by the vacation of the streets and alleys. [70] Federal officials evidently won this disagreement, even though it clearly involved city politics. Mayor Bernard Dickmann had just suffered political defeat in St. Louis' mayoral election as he sought a third term. This election influenced the ordinance's passage, in that Mayor Dickmann exerted political pressure over several of the bitter, defeated aldermen. They were willing to leave the whole problem for the next administration, but Mayor Dickmann made a "very vigorous and eloquent appeal" for a rise above partisanship. As a result, the aldermen followed Mayor Dickmann's wishes. [71]

Another issue in which city leaders staked an interest was the Park Service's plan for parking. In January 1941 a Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association meeting brought all the problems out into the open. Smith believed this issue attracted the largest attendance of any association meeting in years. [72] Director Drury acknowledged that automobile parking would have to be provided for memorial visitors, while warning that it would in his view "tax the ingenuity" of architects to do it satisfactorily. He stressed that they should not make "automobile parking a major dominant function of the area." Drury realized that St. Louis desperately needed additional downtown parking facilities, but a project such as this one, sponsored under the Historic Sites Act, could not be shaped primarily to meet such a need. [73]

Director Drury not only had to answer criticism and inquiries coming from St. Louisans; his agency had to justify expenditures in St. Louis before a House Appropriations subcommittee. Under questioning by Republican members of the subcommittee, Arthur E. Demaray denied that any funds appropriated for the Department of the Interior had been spent on Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. According to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, the Republican opposition repeatedly tried to show that the Interior Department had continued to develop the memorial despite congressional refusal of funds for the project. [74]

On June 12, debate over the Department of the Interior's Appropriation Bill for 1942 involved

more testimony on the memorial. An amendment was offered providing that no funds appropriated by the act should be used for the St. Louis project. Critics charged that using WPA funds for this work only thwarted the law, since Congress had not wanted funds spent unless they were sufficient to complete the entire project. Missouri Representative John A. Cochran opposed the amendment, saying that denying the National Park Service the sponsorship of improvement projects through WPA was going too far. House members rejected the amendment 82 to 47. [75]

Controversy over WPA funding did not stop completion of the projects or demolition. Near the end of 1942 the memorial staff successfully negotiated with owners of 448 parcels to sell for a total amount of \$5,368,568, or 93 percent of the \$5,789,653 awards returned by the court commissioners. Seventeen trials on values had been held by this date, with 17 parcels left needing settlement on value. [76] By 1943 final judgments totaled \$5,976,040, with 9 parcels remaining to be settled. The real estate program, involving the acquisition of 484 separate parcels, (of which 482 required purchase), was completed by 1945. [77]

While these court settlements dragged on, Park Service officials allowed utilization of the leveled site in various ways. The city of St. Louis initiated the idea of constructing a parking lot in 1943 for its buses, thereby saving gasoline and rubber during the war years. Temporary paving was placed along the west portions of four blocks extending south from Washington Avenue to Pine Street, providing space for 200 buses. The United States Coast Guard, taking over control of the wharf as part of its wartime functions, used portions of the site for its headquarters. By 1944 they used the ground floor of the Old Rock House for storage and the upper story as a brig for prisoners. Five thousand granite paving blocks, salvaged from the vacated streets, were transferred to the War Department in 1943. By 1945 450,000 more blocks went to several Government agencies. The National Park Service obtained no satisfactory bid prices for mowing plant growth in the area, so the area was burned over. By 1945 the area's unsightly appearance brought unfavorable criticism. [78]

Public reaction toward the memorial's museum program proved gratifying, however. With the opening of the museum in the Old Courthouse, the memorial's staff introduced a weekly "travelogue series." Sunday talks were modified for the summer season, taking into consideration the war situation and gasoline rationing. A special exhibits program began in 1943. Talks and tours given to special groups increased during the war years, the topics being of historical interest, with emphasis on the relation of the area to national expansion. By 1945 the interpretive program consisted of three activities — guided tours of the memorial, Sunday afternoon programs, and off-site programs. The National Park Service presented illustrated talks in the rotunda for the first time, which permitted larger audiences. The year 1943 brought 31,321 visitors, 2,010 of which were in military uniform. [79]

St. Louisans saw physical evidence of progress during these years. Grading, demolition, restoration of the Rock House, rehabilitation of the Old Courthouse, opening of the museum — all served to show the determination of National Park Service officials to make their presence known. Operating only on WPA and city funds, they started to build basic elements of the ultimate memorial. No congressional funds were available for the development, but this was true for all nonessential construction because of the war effort. By the war's end, National Park Service officials began planning for possible postwar development. Before any further construction could begin, however, the first requirement made by Secretary Harold Ickes had to be met: the elevated railroad tracks must be moved.

Further Railroad Negotiations

Negotiations continued through the war years between the city and the railroads, with the Park Service lending assistance from the sidelines. The most promising plan, the tunnel first

proposed in 1939, eventually became the solution, but only after twenty years of tension-filled negotiations. During 1941 other plans were considered, but throughout the year the most promise came from the tunnel plan. Charles Peterson believed any tunnel running through the memorial area would be least likely to interfere with future development if it ran close to the levee. It should, of course, avoid the Old Rock House. [80] Engineers Ross and Bates developed two plans for placing the railroad tunnel in the area between the Eads Bridge and Poplar Street (called the First Street Plan, or Commercial Alley Plan) which Consulting Engineer Max Doyne studied, coming to the conclusion that costs for the proposed tunnel construction would be considerably more than the east side track relocation plans. [81] Early in February, Doyne himself developed preliminary reports on rerouting passenger trains through St. Louis over the Municipal Bridge. By April Doyne had prepared cost allocation suggestions for removing the elevated railroad. Cost figures used in the allocations for the two plans, providing for a railroad tunnel, were submitted by the city and the TRRA, while Doyne supplied the estimate for rerouting the trains over the Municipal Bridge. [82] Doyne believed the net cost to be allocated to the National Park Service would be moderate. [83] Julian Spotts continued holding meetings with Mayor Dee Becker concerning the railroad problem. He reminded Becker and Max Doyne of the National Park Service's stand that the low level tracks as well as the elevated trestle would have to be removed before the Park Service would proceed with the final development of the area. Becker and Doyne agreed. Because final plans had not been determined, however, they suggested leaving the low level tracks for future developments. [84]

On July 1, 1941, Mayor Becker held a conference with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, during which he outlined the plan to eliminate the elevated tracks and suggested that if these efforts proved successful, the remaining low-level tracks could be used temporarily. Ickes did not object to such an agreement as a temporary expedient, although he had not deviated from his decision to require the removal of all tracks from the memorial's east boundary. Another problem was that funds available to the National Park Service could not legally be expended to defray track removal or relocation expenses. Ickes tried to solve this problem by directing Superintendent Spotts to assist Mayor Becker in preparing a WPA project if the city desired to do so. [85]

After another conference in Mayor Becker's office on July 12, Terminal Railroad Association President Philip J. Watson, Jr., stated that his company favored removing the elevated structure if a new double track railroad was constructed on the level surface. His company could not approve rerouting trains on the east side, as this rerouting could not be done without the approval of the individual railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Moreover, TRRA's general counsel expressed practical reasons for the unfeasibility of this scheme. [86]

On September 25, yet another meeting in Mayor Becker's office attracted more than thirty railroad executives and attorneys. The "Doyne Plan," affecting the rerouting of thirty-two passenger trains owned by four railroads, was presented by Mayor Becker and Max Doyne. The mayor of East St. Louis, who was present, agreed with Mayor Becker's plans, hoping that unity between the city administrations would aid in solving the problem. Railroad officials were still not certain that the plan provided the best solution. Mayor Becker asked for written replies from each of the member railroads. Only the vice president of the New York Central System raised questions as to financing the work. [87] At no time did Becker use the city's pending \$5,000,000 damage suit against the TRRA as a threat. Former Mayor Dickmann left that suit, based on an allegation of breach of contract, for Becker. The city did not refer to the suit, as it had nothing to do with the elevated problem. Despite the "obstructionism" of the TRRA, Becker believed he was receiving good cooperation from the individual railroads. [88]

Special committees of TRRA officers appointed to study both the west and east side phases of the track problem submitted their reports to Mayor Becker in January 1942. In their estimation, the initial cost of the east side route exceeded \$5,000,000, while that of the west side route exceeded \$1,500,000. In addition to these initial costs, there would be substantial additional operating expenses, including track rental and longer mileage. The officials stated they wanted to solve the whole problem, yet they believed Mayor Becker would concur that during the period of maximum war effort, it would not be fitting that any work should be started which would result in the diversion of materials from war purposes. They did not want to interfere with the efficiency and free flow of traffic through St. Louis, so they asked Mayor Becker to meet with them after the termination of the war. [89]

At this point Mayor Becker became angry. He wrote Joseph B. Eastman, who was the director of the Office of Defense Transportation as well as the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, explaining the situation. Becker asked whether to appeal the controversy to the Office of Defense Transportation or to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Becker wanted the trains diverted over the Municipal Bridge, believing the rerouting should be considered on its own merit, without regard to removing the elevated structure. [90] Max Doyne believed the railroads seized upon the war emergency as an excuse to delay the track solutions, even though such a solution would mean, in Doyne's opinion, improved railroad operations in St. Louis. [91]

Mayor Becker formally charged the TRRA with "obstructionist" tactics on February 15. He, along with Doyne, believed the war emergency excuse was just that — an excuse for doing nothing. The TRRA did not even consider many variables, and its estimate of \$5,000,000 for east side development was too high; Becker stated the cost would be only \$600,000. Becker believed it regrettable that the company would compel the city to take the matter up with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). To avoid this action, Becker asked the TRRA officials to reroute passenger trains over the Municipal Bridge and to consider removing the trestle, using the wharf temporarily. Becker's position was clear, the city's decision final, with the answer being up to the TRRA. Becker asked only that it be to the point and "without evasion or equivocation." [92]

The Terminal Railroad Association's three-page answer was short and blunt. To interfere with the Merchants elevated line or to reroute trains over already congested tracks would tie up traffic. The TRRA did not ask that the city recede from its position; it sought only a suspension of the project until after the war. Further studies would, however, continue. [93]

Editorial reaction to the impasse was mixed at first. The *Star-Times* believed the mayor made a brave decision in warning the TRRA he would go to the ICC to stop their obstructionism. The people of St. Louis would not warrant interference with the war effort, but at the same time they did not want community progress halted. The paper placed the blame squarely on the TRRA. The *Globe-Democrat* adopted a "wait and see" attitude, leaving the *Post-Dispatch* to say that Becker would be acting with public sympathy if he arraigned the TRRA before the ICC. [94] All three newspapers carried editorials favoring Mayor Becker's efforts. [95] National Park Service officials sat on the sidelines, not involved with the stalemated negotiations, and followed their policy of not caring how the tracks were to be removed as long as they were. Officials nevertheless followed the scenario closely. [96]

Joseph Eastman's reply to Mayor Becker's request came on March 4, 1942. His advisers were not persuaded that there would be any important improvement in the train movement, regarded solely from the standpoint of traffic expedition, if the changes in routing were made. At the same time they could find no reason why taking steps to remove the tracks should be deferred. Eastman sympathized with Becker's desire to reroute the trains, but he did not feel it was a matter justifying his formal interference as director of the Office of

Defense Transportation. [97]

Mayor Becker submitted more factual information as evidence for Eastman to consider in an attempt to have him intervene, but he took more substantive action when he publicly announced that the city would now prepare its petition to the ICC for an order directing the TRRA to take down the elevated tracks and to reroute its trains. [98] In addition, the Board of Public Service on April 14 revoked the TRRA's temporary permit to operate on its riverfront tracks. Ever since July 1937, when the franchise right to use these tracks expired, the TRRA had begun operating on the riverfront by virtue of city permit. The TRRA was expected to appeal the order to the ICC, which the city would, in turn, ask to make a decision on the elevated track removal. Both major St. Louis newspapers backed this move. [99] The TRRA declined to comply with the Board of Public Service's order. Their firmly stated position was that no right or power existed in the city of St. Louis to order the removal of the tracks, which were essential to war transportation through St. Louis. None of the carriers would consider taking any step to abandon the tracks. [100]

Mayor Becker went ahead with his plans by corresponding with Joseph Eastman, who sent an associate to St. Louis to gather information. On June 25, 1942, the city of St. Louis filed its suit before the ICC. By July the city of East St. Louis, Illinois, backing the mayor's action, not only petitioned the ICC for leave to intervene in St. Louis' suit, but also filed separate complaints against the TRRA before both the Illinois Commerce Commission and the ICC. [101]

Knowing they would be called upon to supply witnesses and documentation, National Park Service officials prepared their case. The city of St. Louis drafted a "petition for leave to intervene" to be filed by the National Park Service. Superintendent Spotts forwarded the draft to Arthur Demaray for consideration. The Department of the Interior could choose from three different courses: take no action, file a petition for leave to intervene, or address a letter to the ICC stating the department's position without being made a party to the proceeding. In view of the department's desire to move the tracks, the city's endeavor would have to be supported; however, if the Federal Government intervened, it might have to pay a portion of the rerouting costs, thereby getting involved with the railroads' operating problems. Demaray doubted the wisdom of intervening in the proceedings. The most logical course for the Park Service would be to support the city's position by informing the ICC of the Department of the Interior's interest in the successful outcome of the city's action. [102] Thus Harold Ickes on July 31, 1942, wrote Joseph Eastman stating his belief in the feasibility of the "City's plan." He recommended that the ICC give favorable consideration to the problem. [103]

The hearing before the ICC started September 17, 1942, and continued through October 1. Julian Spotts testified on September 22, presenting the Department of the Interior's and the National Park Service's position in the controversy, which was, simply stated, that the memorial would not be developed until the elevated tracks were removed. The ideal situation for the Park Service was the removal of all surface tracks between the memorial and the Mississippi River, even though no final permanent plans for the memorial existed at that time. A decision came in April 1943, but not in the city's favor. An ICC examiner recommended that the city's complaint be dismissed because the ICC did not have the authority to compel the execution of either the rerouting of the east side passenger trains or the west side razing of the elevated structure. Further, evidence submitted at the hearing did not demonstrate that public convenience and necessity required the execution of the city's plan to tear down the elevated. [104]

In an attempt to keep negotiations open on the railroad removal several Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association members and city officials met with Julian Spotts in November 1943. During October they had formed a coordinating committee (Harland

Bartholomew, Charles Nagel, Milton Kinsey, Luther Ely Smith, and Louis La Beaume) to study the basic requirements for adequately developing the site, and coordinating the work of the agencies involved. They hoped to solve the track removal, parking, and Third Street problems. Julian Spotts focused attention on the underground tunnel scheme (Bates-Ross plan) previously proposed. Over succeeding months Milton Kinsey researched the tunnel feasibility with TRRA engineers. By May 1944 the committee proposed yet another plan. They suggested connecting the elevated tracks to those in an already existing tunnel under Washington Avenue, leaving the levee surface tracks where they were. City officials actively sought solutions to these problems because of their interest in increasing real estate values in the eastern portion of the downtown district. [[105](#)]

Kinsey conferred informally with Watson about the tunnel plan in May, but Watson stated his engineers had already studied this possibility, and doubted its feasibility. He did, however, show Kinsey an alternative solution that he would willingly discuss with the coordinating committee. Watson proposed placing the tracks into a cut along the entire length of Third Street from Washington Avenue to Poplar Street. This plan could be combined with the proposed north-south highway. The railroad right-of-way might be covered for a certain distance and bridged at other places for easy access to the memorial area. Kinsey presented a drawing showing a proposed treatment of the TRRA tracks in conjunction with the Third Street Interregional Highway. The plan contemplated routing all railroad traffic through a tunnel in Third Street along the western boundary of the memorial area. [[106](#)]

Quite apart from the plan's virtues or flaws Kinsey was pleased; he believed any public statement made by the TRRA to be a positive occurrence, showing their sincerity. Possibly their desire to maintain good public relations would deter any desire to recant. [[107](#)]

Park Service officials participated in the committee deliberations only to the extent of cooperating in good spirit, though of course any plan the committee evolved would have to be approved by the National Park Service director. Spotts' office made no commitments to the group nor did they discuss distribution of costs. The TRRA's plan to put the tracks in a tunnel running along the west side of Third Street seemed a permanent solution. [[108](#)]

The TRRA's plan focused attention back upon the work being conducted on the Third Street thoroughfare by the Works Progress Administration. After February 1, 1943, the WPA had ceased to operate any federally sponsored projects, and as a result only grading work had been done on the Third Street project. Remaining work included removing old paving, water mains and other utilities. Subgrading, new paving and drainage needed to be finished. The WPA could not even begin this work. [[109](#)]

Association members sought help to complete the project. Asserting that Third Street was a strategic highway and that finishing it would be an aid to defense, Luther Ely Smith and William D'Arcy appealed to both Park Service and other Federal Government officials. The initial response was negative; the work could not be finished because President Roosevelt had halted all WPA projects. Smith even thought of going to the Federal Highway Department or the Public Roads Administration for aid, but it still seemed nothing could be done. So, pending the final development of Third Street, the National Park Service did not oppose the city of St. Louis' use of the widened portion of the street, provided the city supplied all supervision, temporary pavements, and maintenance without cost to the United States. [[110](#)]

Not only were memorial backers concerned about losing WPA funds, but they also continued to seek the restoration of lapsed funds. United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission member Amon G. Carter wrote Comptroller General Lindsay Warren in January 1943 concerning the fate of the lapsed funds. Carter believed the money should be returned as a reward for good management in keeping the land costs low. Warren, however, did not

possess the power to recall the funds or make them available for expenditure without a specific congressional act. Warren pointed out that WPA money spent for the memorial totaled \$959,504, more than twice the amount of the lapsed funds. [[111](#)]

The stoppage of WPA projects marked the end of an era in the nation's history. No longer could local and state governments depend upon this type of developmental aid. Jefferson National Expansion Memorial stood at a crossroads, with all of its available funds spent and further development depending entirely upon Congress. Park Service personnel nevertheless turned their attention toward postwar planning, believing that additional funds would eventually become available.

Landing Strip Plans

An immediate problem presented itself in the empty acres on the riverfront. Land sitting empty was symbolic of uselessness. Money could not be made, nor any profits turned. Empty land called for development, structures, and buildings. Several St. Louisans had their own dreams as to how the riverfront land could be utilized; yet the National Park Service could pursue no construction without authorization and appropriation. This situation gave rise to an idea for use of the land in the minds of two prominent St. Louisans.

Major Albert Bond Lambert and Oliver Parks desired to augment the aircraft facilities of St. Louis. Looking at the empty riverfront they saw in their mind's eye a good site for an aircraft landing strip. Lambert inquired about the site's status, only to be told by National Park Service Director Newton Drury that there existed no legal authority for the construction of an aircraft landing strip on any portion of the memorial grounds. The issue did not stop there. Drury expected a formal application for temporary use of the memorial land to be sent to him in the near future. If the issue arose in this way he wanted to have the opportunity to view the conditions and talk with people of diverse viewpoints. This would aid him in making the situation clear to the secretary of the interior. [[112](#)]

As Lambert's and Parks' plans evolved, they wanted to use the site temporarily for testing experimental aircraft. These two highly motivated men talked up their ideas and gained support from sections of the city administration, which resulted in dissension among civic leaders. The feeling arose that if the new Mayor, Aloys Kaufmann, sponsored the plan he and his administration would be accused of destroying another's good work. Luther Ely Smith, the association, and the majority of St. Louisans still favored developing a historical monument. The quarrel threatened to divide the city's loyalties. The association adopted a resolution opposing the plan even though they did not question the sincerity of any of its proponents. Even though the strip was to be only temporary, association members feared that it might not ever be removed. Association members were especially angry with Milton Kinsey, president of the Board of Public Service, whom they thought would file the airstrip application without consulting with the coordinating committee. Kinsey denied this, and had every intention of hearing the committee's view before the city took action on the not-yet-completed application. [[113](#)]

It took only a word from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to halt the accusations, worry, and politics: "The use of a large part of the Memorial grounds as a landing strip for airplanes would be inconsistent with the purposes for which the area was established; consequently, I am opposed to such a development." [[114](#)] Even though Kinsey indicated that an application for the airstrip would be sent to the National Park Service for consideration, neither Newton Drury nor Julian Spotts ever received any such application. Despite Parks' and Lambert's enthusiasm, promises that the strip would be temporary, and a city counselor ruling that such a strip would not be illegal, no application was ever filed. On September 5, 1944, the city's Airport Commission decided not to present an application to the National Park Service. [[115](#)]

Amidst criticism that the association was at fault for not keeping the memorial ideals before the public, Luther Ely Smith and memorial supporters examined other considerations. In January 1944 Smith approached the City Plan Commission about passing zoning ordinances. Smith wanted uniform building heights for property next to the memorial area. No matter what the ultimate memorial scheme, the adjacent area should be of an orderly design. A major concern remained the parking proposals, for the civic leaders believed parking should be provided for both memorial visitors and downtown patrons. Association member William D'Arcy publicly proposed an underground parking area to pay for the proposed riverfront development. D'Arcy predicted thousands of vehicles could be parked underground, generating annual revenues as high as \$900,000. During the course of the war, city buses had parked on the memorial area as a conservation effort, and Luther Ely Smith proposed using this area for general public parking at the war's end. The city could administer such a parking project with the understanding that the National Park Service could revoke the permit at will. [116] This basic agreement worked for many years, for the memorial site served as a large parking lot operated by the city with revenues going to the memorial until the memorial construction began in 1959. A much smaller lot continued to provide this service until 1984.

In the fall of 1944 the Park Service prepared itself for the site's postwar development by examining the memorial's purpose and theme. National Park Service Assistant Chief Historian Charles W. Porter III believed it necessary to understand the relationship of the Park Service's national historic site project in St. Louis to the older project, that of a national expansion memorial, started by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. The two projects were legally separate. The distinction was, in Porter's opinion, important because a memorial's scope would be broader than that of a national historic site. This could result in a wide variance between the two interpretive programs. The National Park Service fully intended to develop the historic site harmoniously with the commission; but the project still needed to conform to the Park Service's ideals. [117]

Porter believed Jefferson National Expansion Memorial's interpretive program should interpret United States history, especially as related to physical remains and sites on the memorial grounds. This interpretation should not duplicate the historical stories of other Park Service historic areas, though the program should be integrated with other areas interpreting the Louisiana Purchase story. If Jefferson National Expansion Memorial were a national historic site rather than a memorial, existing historical remains on the site should be preserved. Porter suggested preserving the old city street layout and the streets themselves, if they still possessed their historical character. No physical object on the site remained to signify the history of the Louisiana Purchase. A symbolic memorial, however, could not tell the historical story as effectively as a good museum. Porter believed that only by emphasizing one theme, the Louisiana Purchase, making it the legitimate theme of the historic site, and by interpreting only the sites of outstanding national importance, "could there exist spontaneity and genuineness in the interpretive program." If the Park Service kept memorialization at the level of small, artistically excellent bronzes with a courthouse museum serving as the central feature, the memorial would possess the best of national historic site preservation and interpretation. [118]

Director Drury requested that Julian Spotts and his staff members submit their ideas on the memorial's concept and the treatment they deemed best. Drury also wanted their comments on Porter's report. Spotts believed the memorial feature of the project to be the most difficult to solve, because it was quite possible that as a historic site, no memorial feature would be necessary. Spotts believed that an inspirational memorial on the site could be a Mecca, attracting people who would then come into contact with the Park Service's interpretive work. If the National Park Service had no memorial plan, Spotts thought it best to cooperate with the association's and the commission's proposed competition. [119]

As the war drew to a close the association prepared to hold a national competition for a memorial design. Two suggestions for a memorial arch surfaced earlier than 1948. Architect Louis La Beume received a proposal from a man named William W. Steel in July 1936. Steel thought the memorial's central feature should be an arch; the most beautiful arch ever built, surpassing the Parisian *Arc de Triomphe*. Standing 200 feet tall with an observation platform on top, the structure would be made of granite "to endure forever." [120] In 1945 Julian Spotts considered suggestions that the memorial should preserve the area as a "historic site with interpretation," as well as be enhanced by an "inspirational" memorial along the lines of a Washington Monument or a Statue of Liberty. Spotts viewed these memorials as "stunts" which in time became traditional landmarks. However, he informed Director Drury of an idea which had developed in St. Louis, but which Spotts considered to be nothing more than a stunt. The idea was for a free-standing hollow arch 1,200 feet wide and 240 feet high with buildings at each end used for museum and interpretive purposes. The arch itself would consist of two arches, one above the other, with transverse partitions at intervals and an open corridor longitudinally the full length of the arch and side walls at the outer edge of both faces. Windows in the walls would permit views of the surrounding country, with the interior being decorated with exhibits and maps. Pedestrians could walk through the arch at no charge. Such a structure could possibly exist as an inspirational memorial representative of the "Gateway to the West," symbolic of westward expansion. Julian Spotts did not advocate nor promote the memorial arch, thinking it too bold in conception. If such a memorial were forced upon the National Park Service Spotts could take the idea seriously, but his purpose in explaining the plan to Drury was informational. [121]

Franklin Roosevelt was a President who possessed a sense of history; an ability to look into the future and make decisions based upon what he saw. In the midst of the burden of guiding a nation fighting for its economic life, Roosevelt took time to consider building a monument to another American's vision. Members of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association planned to commemorate Thomas Jefferson's 202nd birthday on April 13, 1945. In gratitude they invited both Roosevelt and Vice President Harry Truman to the ceremony in the Old Courthouse. Both sent their regrets; and on April 12, Roosevelt died in Warm Springs, Georgia, leaving the man from Missouri to lead the grieving nation.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER III: Footnotes

¹E.K. Burlew to Frank C. Wright, 16 January 1940, JEFF; Smith to Geaslin, 18 January 1940, JNEMA.

²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 February 1940; *St. Louis Star-Times*, 3 February 1940; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 3 February 1940, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 February 1940.

³George Spearl to Ickes, 6 February 1940 JNEMA; Lee to Nagle, 3 February 1940, JNEMA.

⁴Memorandum, Nagle to director NPS, 8 February 1940, JNEMA.

⁵Smith to William L. Mason, 8 February 1940, JNEMA.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷James M. Douglas to Ickes, 10 February 1940, JEFF.

⁸Gill to Smith, 12 February 1940, JNEMA. This last-minute research on the Old Courthouse's historical significance seemed minute compared to the research done by Charles Peterson and his staff over the four years before the Federal Government accepted the building. They discovered that the structure was built under the supervision of the St. Louis County Court between 1839 and 1862, with the architects being appointed by the judges. See Peterson to H. Sam Priest, 20 June 1940, JEFF.

⁹Smith to D'Arcy, 13 February 1940, JNEMA.

¹⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 14 February 1940.

¹¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 February 1940; Smith to Geaslin, 19 February 1940, JNEMA. John Nagle mentioned President Roosevelt's inclusion of the building in the executive order in the preliminary investigative National Park Service reports.

¹²Ickes to President (of the United States), 4 March 1940, JNEMA; Gill to Nagle, 9 March 1940, JEFF; Stella M. Drumm and Charles van Ravenswaay, *The Old Courthouse* (St. Louis, Missouri Historical Society, 1940).

¹³Roosevelt to Secretary of the Interior, 29 April 1940, JEFF.

¹⁴*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 May 1940. The function of the Advisory Board remained just that — advisory, not administrative, because the Interior Department possessed full administrative and supervisory responsibilities over the memorial. The acting secretary of the interior reminded Dr. Hermon Bumpus of this fact in 1938, and it remained true in 1940 when the Federal Government accepted the Old Courthouse over the Board's objections. Acting Secretary of the Interior to Bumpus, 7 September 1938, JNEMA. During 1939 and 1940 the memorial's architectural staff kept busy while waiting for the decision on the Old Courthouse. Historic American Building Survey and Works Progress Administration projects proceeded during these years. One chore undertaken was the translation and transcription of Spanish and French records from court documents. Linguists were hired from WPA rolls to do the work, which still can be seen in JEFF files. John Bryan, *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial — Its Origin, Development and Administration*, n.d., p. 17, typed report, JEFF.

¹⁵W.C. Mendenhall to Dickmann, 7 June 1940, JEFF; Mendenhall to Attorney General, 9 July 1940, JEFF.

¹⁶Memorandum, E.F. Batchelor for the Files, 18 June 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 25 June 1940, JEFF.

¹⁷Memorandum, G.A. Moskey to Superintendent JNEM, 2 August 1940, JEFF.

¹⁸Blanton to Moskey, 12 August 1940, JEFF. Tenants in the Old Courthouse included: the St. Louis Art League, St. Louis Museum of Science and Industry, WPA Toy Project No. 5608, and the Board of Religious Organizations Toy Guild. Besides the tentative plan to house the Missouri Historical Society displays, other St. Louis interests wanted space in the building. In December 1939 the Board of Trustees of the Academy of Science of St. Louis sought room for a Museum of Science. William C.E. Becker to Dickmann, 11 December 1939, JEFF. In July 1940 the St. Louis Art League was interested in space for an art gallery. John B. Denvir, Jr. to Nagle, 23 July 1940, JEFF.

¹⁹Smith to Dickmann, 29 August 1940, JNEMA; *St. Louis Daily Record*, 8 November 1940; memorandum, A.E. Demaray to Acting Superintendent JNEM, 26 November 1940, JEFF. Progress on the exhibits and dioramas for the temporary museum (eventually placed in the Old Courthouse) went slowly, for the work had started in 1938. Even then, confusion existed over the varied responsibilities of the Park Service Museum Division and the Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., thought the production of exhibits was slow because the responsibility lay with the museum division. He felt the branch should handle the fundamental historical content while the museum division handled the details of the exhibit preparation. Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 1 November 1938, JEFF. By 1940 work was completed on three dioramas, constructed in the museum division's laboratory in Ford's Theatre, Washington, D.C. These dioramas were installed in the museum during the year; the museum opened to the public in January 1943. See: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 28 August 1940; *Monthly Report(s) of the Museum Branch, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, February 19-September 1940, typed reports, JEFF; John Bryan, *JNEM — Its Origin*, pp. 18-19, JEFF.

²⁰John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origin . . .*, p. 18, JEFF.

²¹Smith to Dickmann, 18 June 1940, JNEMA; memorandum, Demaray to Regional Director Region 11, 8 November 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Fahey for the Files, 12 December 1940, JEFF.

²²Memorandum, A.E. Demaray to Acting Superintendent JNEM, 18 December 1940,

JNEMA.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Memorandum, Demaray to Regional Director, Region 11, 8 November 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Regional Director to Director NPS, 28 November 1940, JEFF.

²⁵Smith to Nagle, 10 September 1940, JNEMA.

²⁶Nagle to Smith, 17 September 1940, JNEMA.

²⁷I.T. Frary to Nagle, 30 July 1940, JEFF. Frary suggested having a steamboat moored permanently for musical and theatrical productions.

²⁸Ibid.; memorandum, Thomas C. Vint to Superintendent JNEM, 25 July 1940, JEFF; memorandum, E.F. Batchelor to Starrett, 6 November 1940, JEFF. Batchelor made several interesting observations concerning museology and the memorial: "The ground work for establishing a Museum within the boundaries of the Memorial area is predicated upon the collector's ability to discover and collect artifacts and reliable information of the nature of the person or thing to be perpetuated. In our case it seems that the difficulties in this respect are more intense — because of the lack of quality rather than quantity of the material preserved ... It seems to me that a Museum to be a profound success must be based upon broad principles rather than an accumulation of antiquated remnants of past inhabitants. To confine the scope of a Museum to local artifacts can certainly not do justice to the Historic Sites Act, or the Executive Order Emphasis should not be placed upon any one feature of past culture The question that confronts me is, can all these events and their contemporary actors be portrayed in such sequence ... so as to present a true picture of National Expansion and what form should the portrayals take? I realize that a history making event may be superimposed upon another important event, so likewise one character upon another, thereby reflecting variable values for the curator to unscramble. However, from a layman's point of view, the whole picture should be presented so that I may read as I run."

²⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 July, 1940.

³⁰Meyers to Cammerer, 12 July 1940, JNEMA; Hillory A. Tolson to Meyers, 23 July 1940, JNEMA; Meyers to Nagle, 2 August 1940, JNEMA.

³¹Memorandum, Nagle to Director NPS, 5 August 1940, JNEMA; Nagle to Meyers, 6 August 1940, JNEMA.

³²Memorandum, G.A. Moskey to Chief of Operations, 12 August 1940, JNEMA; Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr. to Smith, 19 August 1940, JNEMA.

³³Memorandum, Hillory Tolson to Superintendent JNEM, 5 October 1940, JNEMA.

³⁴Nagle to Dickmann, 15 October 1940, JNEMA.

³⁵E.H. Wayman to Nagle, 18 October 1940, JNEMA.

³⁶Memorandum, Nagle to Director NPS, 22 October 1940, JNEMA.

³⁷Memorandum, Nagle for the Confidential Files, 15 January 1940, JEFF.

³⁸Memorandum, Fahey to Nagle, 22 January 1940, JEFF.

³⁹Memorandum, Nagle for the Confidential Files, 16 February 1940, JEFF.

⁴⁰Philip J. Watson, Jr. to Nagle, 18 January 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Cammerer to Secretary (of the Interior), 13 March 1940, JEFF.

⁴¹Radiogram, Rasbach to Fahey, 9 April 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Dickmann to Wright, 12 April 1940, JEFF.

⁴²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 April 1940.

⁴³Ickes to Watson, 14 June 1940, JEFF; Ickes to Dickmann, 14 June 1940, JEFF.

⁴⁴Watson to Directors, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 17 June 1940, JEFF.

⁴⁵Memorandum, Nagle for the Files, 5 July 1940, JEFF.

⁴⁶Nagle to Wright, 6 July 1940, JEFF.

⁴⁷Nagle to Dickmann, 22 July 1940, JEFF. Nagle praised Mayor Dickmann highly, stating that the Service valued Dickmann's grasp of National Park Service objectives, and that his cooperation made the work much lighter. "I therefore hope for your continued efficient and helpful efforts in the furtherance of the solution of this problem."

⁴⁸Press Statement by Arthur C. Meyers, Acting Secretary, Board of Estimate & Apportionment, 25 July 1940, typed statement, JEFF.

⁴⁹Radiogram, Nagle to Director NPS, 27 September 1940, JEFF.

⁵⁰A.R. Ross to Nagle, 3 October 1940, JEFF; Doyne to Fahey, 18 October 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Fahey for the Files, 18 November 1940, JEFF.

⁵¹Memorandum, Fahey for the Files, 29 November 1940, JEFF.

⁵²Memorandum, Demaray to Julian Spotts, 13 December 1940, JEFF. Max Doyne's report covered important aspects of the railroad problem. He investigated the practicality of diverting passenger trains currently using the Merchants Bridge and the elevated trestle to a route on the river's east side and over the Municipal Bridge. Diverting these trains required constructing two additional freight tracks in East St. Louis, Illinois. Additional interlocking would be needed in East St. Louis to take care of the increased traffic. Frank Wright believed these new tracks and interlocking should be paid for by the "Memorial project," with Max Doyne preparing cost estimates. Wright to Julian Spotts, 13 December 1940, JEFF. Luther Ely Smith had several thoughts about these developments. He knew the elevated tracks would have to be removed, but thought the surface tracks posed a more serious problem. He worried about the proposed tunnel causing future construction problems when buildings were added to the site. He also did not want the tunnel to interfere with the association's underground garage and parking plans. Smith to William Allen White, 20 December 1940, JNEMA.

⁵³John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origins ...* p. 18, JEFF; memorandum, Demaray to Regional

Director, Region II, 8 November 1940, JEFF; John Ise, *Our National Park Policy - A Critical History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press 1961), pp. 355, 443. Drury served in the top post until 1951.

⁵⁴John Bryan, *An Historical and Architectural Sketch of the National Scott's Hotel*, October 1937, typed report, JEFF. McCune Gill to Spotts, 19 December 1940, JEFF; Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 27 March 1941, JEFF; Spotts to Smith, 24 June 1941, JNEMA. Spotts sent letters stating a position which advocated restoration of the hotel by an outside group or agency to the various individuals and organizations sponsoring the structure's preservation. Those interested ranged from the mayor and Luther Ely Smith to the Chamber of Commerce and the State Historical Society of Missouri. Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 24 May 1941, JEFF. Nevertheless, the costs of restoration were considered too great and the building was demolished in January-February 1949. Memorandum, J.B. Rasbach to Director NPS, 11 March 1949, JEFF.

⁵⁵Memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 9 August 1940, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 23 February 1938; Memorandum, Nagle for Director, NPS, 3 August 1940, JEFF.

⁵⁶Drury to Ernst C. Krohn, 21 February 1941, JEFF. For a sampling of opposition to the building's razing see *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 January, 18 January, 20 January, 21 January, 22 January, and 23 January 1941; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 January 1941. National Park Service historian John Bryan recorded his version of how Director Drury made the decision. Ned Burns, chief of the National Park Service Museum Branch, wanted to save the building for museum space, since the tentative plans to move the regional headquarters into the Old Courthouse would occupy much of that building's available space. Bryan, Charles Peterson and Judge James M. Douglas (president of the Missouri Historical Society) all wanted to save the building. However, Director Drury agreed with the highway engineers and Harland Bartholomew (director of the City Plan Commission) that Third Street should be the connecting road link between the city's two main thoroughfares, Gravois and Natural Bridge. (Bartholomew also wanted to move the Old Cathedral, but church officials successfully opposed this suggestion). Thus the move to make Third Street (rather than Broadway) the major downtown highway artery doomed the Old Customs House. See John Bryan, *JNEM — Its Origin ...* pp. 16-17, JEFF.

⁵⁷Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 19 October 1942, JEFF; John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origin ...* pp. 16-17, JEFF. Bryan, possessing high interest in preserving the salvaged material, worried that patriotism would carry off his treasured gleanings. The only precaution he could take consisted of keeping the public out of the Denchar Building.

⁵⁸Charles Peterson, *Map of the Site of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Showing the Location of Various Historic Sites and Buildings*, 17 May 1937, typed report, p. 3, JEFF; memorandum, Peterson to Nagle, 4 September 1940, JEFF; memorandum, Nagle to Ned Burns, 27 September 1940 JEFF; John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origin ...* p. 18, JEFF. Memorial files contain many photographs and specifications of this restoration project.

⁵⁹Memorandum, Nagle to Ned Burns, 27 September 1940, JEFF.

⁶⁰National Park Service, *Data for Architects' Inspection Trip to the Old St. Louis Courthouse, 16 October 1941*, typed newsletter, JEFF. Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 4 March 1941, JEFF.

⁶¹Telegram, Harry S Truman to National Park Service, 9 June 1941, JEFF; memorandum, Spotts to Regional Director, Region Two, 14 January 1942, JEFF.

⁶²Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 9 January 1942, JEFF; William Judson Gray to Spotts, 30 June 1942, JEFF.

⁶³D'Arcy to Smith, 27 October 1942, JNEMA.

⁶⁴John Bryan, *JNEM - Its Origin ...* p. 18, JEFF.

⁶⁵*History and Accomplishments of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 15 September 1942, typed report, p. 3, JEFF; Smith to Frank Wright, 18 February 1941, JNEMA.

⁶⁶Telegram, Smith to Wright, 21 February 1941, JNEMA.

⁶⁷Smith to Wright, 24 February 1941, JNEMA.

⁶⁸Memorandum, D.E. Lee for Director NPS, 21 March 1941, JNEMA.

⁶⁹Telegram, Drury to E.H. Wayman, 1 April 1941, JNEMA.

⁷⁰City of St. Louis Ordinance 42059, approved 4 March, 1941, JNEMA.

⁷¹Smith to Wright, 16 April 1941, JNEMA.

⁷²Smith to Drury, 7 January 1941, JNEMA.

⁷³Drury to Harland Bartholomew, 14 April 1941, JNEMA.

⁷⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 April 1941.

⁷⁵U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 77th Congress, 1st session, 87, pt. 110: 5236-5237. Debate did not end there, for another amendment was entered the next day providing for no funds from the appropriation act being expended for any project sponsored by any department, agency, or independent establishment of the Federal Government unless justification for the sponsor's contribution was specifically included in the individual appropriation. This, of course, aimed at cutting off WPA funds specifically from Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Missouri Representative Clarence Cannon opposed the amendment, stating that it directly sabotaged the WPA's principal objective. All WPA work being done for the Army and the Navy as well as other agencies would have to be abandoned. The amendment failed to pass. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 77th Congress, 1st session, 87, part III:5249-50.

⁷⁶*History and Accomplishment ...* p. 2, JEFF.

⁷⁷*Report of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial For the Fiscal Year 1943* n.d. p. 1, typed report, JEFF; *Report of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial For the Fiscal Year 1945*, 7 August 1945, p. 1, typed report, JEFF.

⁷⁸*Report ... Fiscal Year 1943*, p. 4, JEFF; *Report of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial For the Fiscal Year 1944*, 28 August 1944, pp. 2-3, typed report, JEFF; *Report ... Fiscal 1945*, p. 2, JEFF.

⁷⁹*Report... Fiscal Year 1943*, pp. 2-3, JEFF; *Report... Fiscal Year 1944*, p. 2, JEFF; *Report ...*

Fiscal Year 1945, pp. 3-4, JEFF; Sunday afternoon talks at the Old Courthouse fell into five subject areas: Know Your National Parks, The Story of National Expansion, Historic Highways, History Through Objects, and Episodes of the Fur Trade. The war effort affected the memorial in many ways, most notably in the postponement of development plans. National Park Service officials and Luther Ely Smith received several suggestions about how to best utilize the site during the war. One association member asked Smith if sections of the razed riverfront area could be used for thrift gardens, with the city providing the fertilizer. Carl Meyer to Smith, 2 February 1943, JNEMA. The Salvation Army wanted the ground floor of the Old Courthouse to be rehabilitated and turned into a U.S.O. headquarters. The Park Service could not rehabilitate any further portions of the building due to priorities, and the request was turned down. Smith to Spotts, 15 July 1943, JNEMA; Spotts to Smith, 16 July 1943, JNEMA.

⁸⁰Memorandum, Peterson to Spotts, 4 January 1941, JEFF.

⁸¹Doyne to Spotts, 17 February 1941, JEFF; A.R. Ross, F.E. Bates, *Report on Removal of Surface and Elevated Tracks from Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 25 February 1941, typed report, JEFF.

⁸²M.H. Doyne, *First Preliminary Report on Rerouting Passenger Trains Through East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis Municipal Bridge*, 13 February 1941, typed report, JEFF.

⁸³M.H. Doyne, *Suggestions For Allocating Cost of Removal of Railroad Traffic and Facilities Now in Front of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial at St. Louis, Mo.*, 30 April 1941, typed report, p. 15, JEFF.

⁸⁴Spotts to Wright, 28 May 1941, JEFF.

⁸⁵Ickes to John B. Sullivan, 25 July 1941, JEFF; Ickes to William Dee Becker, 30 July 1941, JEFF.

⁸⁶P.J. Watson, Jr. to Doyne, 19 July 1941, JEFF; Carleton S. Hadley, Memorandum on the "Doyne Plan" as to the St. Louis Riverfront Tracks and the Legal Obstacles to the "Rerouting" Portion thereof, 19 July 1941, typed memorandum, JEFF.

⁸⁷Memorandum, J.B. Rasbach for Director NPS, 26 September 1941, JEFF.

⁸⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 October 1941.

⁸⁹Executive Committee, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis to Becker, 22 January 1942, JEFF.

⁹⁰Becker to Joseph B. Eastman, 24 January 1942, JNEMA.

⁹¹Max Doyne, comments on letter of January 22, 1942 from Terminal Railroad Association to Mayor William Dee Becker, 9 February 1942, typed sheets, JEFF.

⁹²Becker to members, Executive Committee, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 18 February 1942, JEFF.

⁹³Statement on Behalf of Executive Committee of Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, representing the St. Louis Railroads, to Mayor Becker at Meeting in City Hall, St.

Louis, Missouri, on February 18, 1942, typed sheets, JEFF.

⁹⁴*St. Louis Star-Times*, 21 February 1942; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20 February 1942; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 February 1942.

⁹⁵*St. Louis Star-Times*, 11 March 1942; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 March 1942; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 March 1942.

⁹⁶Memorandum, Drury for Secretary (of the Interior), 3 March 1942, JEFF.

⁹⁷Eastman to Becker, 4 March 1942, JNEMA.

⁹⁸Becker to Eastman, 21 March 1942, JNEMA: William Dee Becker, Statement of City's Position on Terminal Railroad Association Refusal to Remove Elevated Tracks and Reroute Passenger Trains., n.d., typed statement, JEFF.

⁹⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 April 1942; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 April 1942.

¹⁰⁰Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis and St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company to Board of Public Service, 12 May 1942, JEFF; P.J. Watson, Jr. to Becker, 12 May 1942, JEFF.

¹⁰¹Becker to Eastman, 11 May 1942, JEFF; *The City of St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis et al.*, Complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 25 June 1942, JEFF; *The City of East St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis*, Complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 27 June 1942, JEFF; The City of East St. Louis, *Petition of the City of East St. Louis, Illinois For Leave to Intervene Before the Interstate Commerce Commission*, July 1942, JEFF; *The City of East St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis*, Complaint before the Illinois Commerce Commission, 10 July 1942, JEFF.

¹⁰²Memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 11 July 1942, JEFF; memorandum, Demaray for Secretary (of the Interior), 24 July 1942, JEFF.

¹⁰³Ickes to Eastman, 31 July 1942, JEFF; Drury to Doyné, 6 August 1942, JEFF. Contrary to the Park Service's action, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association decided to file a petition for intervention in the case. *Petition for Leave to Intervene of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, A Corporation*, before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 27 August 1942, JEFF.

¹⁰⁴Memorandum, Drury to Under Secretary (Department of Interior), 28 August 1942, JEFF; *The City of St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, et al.*, ICC Docket 28851, 17 September - 1 October 1942, vols. 1-17, Stenographer's Minutes, taped testimony, JEFF; *The City of St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis et al.*, ICC Docket 28851, 22 September 1942, Stenographer's Minutes, Testimony of J.C. Spotts, typed testimony, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 April 1943.

¹⁰⁵Memorandum of the Coordinating Committee, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 26 November 1943, JNEMA; *St. Louis Star-Times*, 23 October 1943; "Meeting Minutes of the Coordinating Committee of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 8 March 1944, typed minutes, JNEMA; memorandum of Meeting of Coordinating Committee of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 21 April

1944, JEFF; Coordinating Committee to Watson, 1 May 1944, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁶Memorandum of Meeting of Coordinating Committee, 18 May 1944, JNEMA; Memorandum of Meeting of Coordinating Committee, 25 May 1944, JNEMA; Memorandum of Meeting of Coordinating Committee, 14 July 1944, JNEMA.

¹⁰⁷Milton M. Kinsey to Louis La Beaume, 22 July 1944, JEFF.

¹⁰⁸Memorandum, Spotts for Director, NPS, 7 August 1944, JEFF.

¹⁰⁹E.W. Bayse to William Judson Gray, 2 January 1943, JNEMA. President Roosevelt approved paving Third Street in 1938 as a WPA project, providing for a concrete base with a granite block surface. In the fall of 1942 the manager of the St. Louis WPA revised the paving design, resulting in saving \$150,000 of Government funds. The new design required the elimination of steel, a strategic material during the war. Delays in getting clearances and installing sewers prohibited the project's completion before the close of the WPA program. Smith to Robert E. Hannegan, 23 July 1943, JNEMA.

¹¹⁰D'Arcy to Max O'Rell Truitt, 15 January 1943, JNEMA; Drury to Smith, 18 January 1943, JNEMA; Alben Barkley to D'Arcy, 19 January 1943, JNEMA; Smith to D'Arcy, 3 February 1943, JNEMA; Spotts to Becker, 28 July 1944, JNEMA.

¹¹¹Amon Carter to Lindsay Warren, 28 January 1943, JNEMA; Warren to Carter, n.d., JNEMA.

¹¹²Drury to A.B. Lambert, 10 May 1944, JNEMA; Drury to Smith, 21 June 1944, JNEMA.

¹¹³James L. Ford to A.P. Kaufman, 5 July 1944, JNEMA; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to Kaufman, 12 July 1944, JNEMA; Kinsey to Louis La Beaume, 22 July 1944.

¹¹⁴Ickes to Smith, 1 August 1944, JNEMA.

¹¹⁵Drury to Smith, 8 August 1944, JNEMA; Smith to Frank C. Wright, 23 August 1944, JNEMA; Smith to Max O'Rell Truitt, 15 September 1944, JNEMA.

¹¹⁶James L. Ford to Smith, 26 July 1944, JNEMA; Smith to City Plan Commission, 27 January 1944, JNEMA; Louis La Beaume to Smith, 17 January 1945, JNEMA; Smith to Spotts, 6 December 1945, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 April 1945. As an example of other suggested uses for the memorial area the Engineers' Club of St. Louis passed a resolution favoring construction of a municipal stadium and recreation center as tribute to World War II heroes; Resolution of the Engineers' Club of St. Louis, 5 April 1945, JNEMA.

¹¹⁷Charles W. Porter III, *The Purpose and Theme of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Project, St. Louis, Missouri, Together with Comments on the Proper Scope of the National Park Service's National Historic Site Project at that Place*, 27 November 1944, pp. 1-2, typed report, JEFF.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.* pp. 10-12, 14.

¹¹⁹Memorandum, Drury for Superintendent, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 25 January 1945, JEFF; Julian Spotts, *Concepts of the Memorial Together with Comments on*

Dr. Porter's Report of November 27, 1944, n.d., p. 6, typed report, JEFF.

¹²⁰William W. Steel to Louis La Beaume, 9 July 1936, JEFF.

¹²¹Memorandum, Spotts for Director, NPS, 9 February 1945, JEFF.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER IV: 1945-1948

The end of World War II meant renewal — a time to stop, assess, reorganize, and accomplish new goals. For the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, the postwar years meant holding a national architectural contest. This contest would produce a plan, a visual conception of the ultimate Jefferson memorial. The contest bridged the gap between conjecture and fact, fantasy and reality, images in the mind and images on paper. Original 1934 plans called for \$22,000,000 improvements on the land, which would make it the largest memorial concept ever. Association members wanted the best talent available to transform their as yet unstated visions into tangible forms such as a drawing, a model, or an engineer's rendering. Loose ends had to be tied off to prepare for the effort. Several priorities existed: finances, increased public support, stronger public image, removing the tracks, and producing an inviting, challenging competition program worthy of the country's best talent.

Association members started with themselves, reorganizing their hierarchy when they adopted a new plan of organization in the fall of 1946. William C. D'Arcy became president and chairman of the organization's executive committee. The association created a new body, the Board of Trustees, with Luther Ely Smith as chairman. [1] Members hoped the new organizational plan would respond to some of the past charges of ineffectiveness and failure in keeping the project preeminently before the populace.

Next, the association tackled the deductibility problem. Smith sought deductibility based upon the fact that a specific contribution would be for the purpose of expediting and aiding the development of the memorial by providing funds to hold an architectural contest. He also wanted the contributions to be deduced as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Whether or not a contribution was deductible on that basis bore a direct relationship to the particular taxpayer's business and the propriety of the contribution. Smith wanted a specific ruling: could corporations make contributions to the association for the use of the United States in raising money for holding a competition? In March 1945 Luther Ely Smith's patience and persistence paid off. The Internal Revenue commissioner decided that the association was considered to be acting as a collecting agency for the United States. Accordingly, corporate contributions made to the association were considered for the use of the United States, thereby making them deductible. [2]

More good news came to the city's business community when National Park Service Director Newton Drury decided that a portion of the memorial grounds could be used for parking. [3] The action met with Smith's approval, as he had always received pressure from association members to secure parking in the area. The temporary lot helped relieve the acute shortage of parking space in the downtown area, and it remained there until the late 1950s. The question of how much, or if any, parking space should be provided on the site popped up again and

again throughout the memorial's history. National Park Service officials stated they were not in the parking lot business, and would not provide space for the city's needs, but agreed to provide temporary space until construction of the ultimate memorial began.

Along with desire on the part of many downtown merchants to provide parking on the site, other interests holding other ideas continued to look at the empty riverfront acres. Mayor Aloys Kaufmann, keeping an interest in the association's growing fund drive for the architectural competition, realized that both civic-minded citizens and others wanting "personal gain" were proposing plans to use the grounds for things other than a memorial. Kaufmann felt it imperative that the association continue to promote the memorial to insure that the land would be used for that purpose. [4]

Preliminary plans existed for development alongside the memorial on Third Street. Neither Harland Bartholomew of the City Plan Commission nor Milton Kinsey of the Board of Public Service had evolved any final plans, but they sought to control the development and the architectural character of the proposed highway. Final plans for the highway needed approval by the State Highway Department, the Bureau of Public Roads, the city of St. Louis, and the National Park Service. Charles Peterson and other Park Service architects and engineers conducted studies and made recommendations in order to exercise control over the development while St. Louis tried to meet its transportation needs. [5] This was not a small problem: many more zoning and highway studies evolved after the architectural competition provided specific memorial development plans.

Railroad negotiations proved to be as frustrating in the postwar years as they had been during the war. Terminal Railroad Association President Philip Watson's 1944 plans to place the tracks in a tunnel along Third Street from Washington Avenue to Poplar Street remained under study in 1946. City and association representatives comprising a coordinating committee kept their communication open with the railroad officials. An engineering firm was hired by the city and railroad to make surveys and collect data on the feasibility of Watson's plan. Its report, due during the summer of 1945, was delayed until early 1946. Philip Watson's death in 1946 caused even more delay. Since Third Street was to include both the interregional highway and the railroad tracks, surveys and studies made for one had a direct bearing on the other's feasibility. By December 1946 surveys were finished for the highway between Twelfth Street and Gravois, and contracts were awarded for completion of structural designs. Milton Kinsey's drawings showed generally the location of the highway and tracks. Philip Watson's original plan called for the tracks to be in an open cut, but Julian Spotts stated that his main objections to the plan would disappear if the tracks were covered over in a tunnel formation. [6]

Despite the effort, railroad officials apparently still hoped to keep the *status quo* and in 1947 went to Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug to ask if former Secretary Harold Ickes' policy concerning the tracks was still in effect. Secretary Krug stated that the department's position remained the same. Perhaps a genius could think of a plan to keep the tracks in their place, but he himself could not think of such a solution. Any plan providing for freight cars passing in front of the memorial would not be up to the standards of the National Park Service, and entirely out of the question. The secretary indicated that if the city of St. Louis wanted a "utilitarian" memorial, including landing fields, underground parking, and railroads, he would propose abandoning the project as a national memorial and turning it over to the city. [7] With that, railroad officials agreed several months later that their companies would probably approve removing the tracks if they could substitute new tracks on the grounds at an elevation above flood stage. Negotiations then stalled until the architectural contest was held, as railroad officials waited to see how the competition dealt with the problem. No amount of pressure from Mayor Kaufmann could make the officials proceed until after the design of a specific memorial scheme. [8]

National Park Service officials, nevertheless, called on the Terminal Railroad Association to aid in preparing a northern entrance into the memorial area from under the Eads Bridge approach. In September 1946 the Park Service had no immediate plans to construct such an entrance, but they wanted to prepare for any future developments. Julian Spotts called upon the railroad officials to give the Park Service an easement. The TRRA agreed, upon the conditions that the easements would not impair the use of Eads Bridge or its railroad operation, and that the Federal Government would reimburse it for any construction expenses incurred by the TRRA in preparation for such an easement. The Department of the Interior went along with the conditions, executed a waiver of damages, and the Park Service got vacation of the streets and alleys under the Eads Bridge approach. [9]

Fund Raising

In ways such as these, the association and the Park Service tied off loose ends and attempted to solve old problems while still putting most of their efforts into raising funds to hold the national architectural contest. Luther Ely Smith, more than seventy years old and often ill during these years, once again had to keep the varied interest groups happy. While he and the association geared up for the campaign, the pressure was on, most strongly for a permanent parking lot. In December 1944 when businessman Ingram F. Boyd contributed \$5,000 to the fund, he offered the suggestion that if a statement were made that there would be parking space for several hundred automobiles on the memorial site, retail business people would be influenced to contribute. [10] Yet Luther Ely Smith knew the National Park Service's negative feelings on the subject. Later Smith had to drop all mention of the parking lot to keep the Government's crucial interest.

Smith was scheduled to meet with National Park Service Director Newton Drury near the end of October 1944, and when he went, he wanted to have at least \$200,000 in hand. He believed he could not face Drury unless he had the fund completed. [11] Smith did not complete the fund in time, but this proved to be only the beginning of his troubles. Throughout 1945 he appealed to businesses and individuals alike to raise the necessary \$225,000. Sixty retailers, anxious to maintain downtown property values, pledged \$50,000 while urging that the final plans include facilities for parking 5,000 automobiles. Despite Smith's and the association's efforts, the response was not enough. By June 1945, after the first burst of pledges, the drive bogged down with only one-third of the needed \$225,000 contributed thus far. [12] Mayor Aloys Kaufmann realized the danger involved if the money was not obtained quickly. The end of the war loomed near, bringing with it reconversion, dislocation, and unemployment. It was of utmost importance that postwar plans be developed to where bids and contracts could be obtained as soon as possible after the war ended. More importantly, the longer action was deferred on the original project, the greater the danger was that the ground would be diverted to some other use. Kaufmann suggested setting up an organization to collect the competition money, because he realized that if the association's program did not gain more popular acceptance, many leading citizens would start believing it was an unrealizable dream and push for adopting another plan. [13]

Concern came not only from Kaufmann but also from other interested backers who knew Smith was carrying most of the burden. Association members were criticized for letting everything drop. Association members criticized others for suggesting new uses for property, but they made no suggestions themselves. It was no wonder that other proposals cropped up. Despite Kaufmann's belief that the entire fund could be raised within six months, another year passed and still the fund raisers had not reached their goal. In May 1946 the fund stood short by \$40,000. In desperation Luther Ely Smith underwrote the balance. Additional subscribers had to be signed up by June 1, although their pledges did not have to be paid until 1947. Smith searched for support by obtaining additional underwriters. Ingram Boyd, Jr. believed he could find ten individuals willing to sign up and solve the problem, but he

accused the association of doing a poor job of public relations and said that consequently, people who wanted to support the project did not have enough confidence to contribute. He believed Luther Smith was grasping at straws to accomplish something his own group could not do. [14] It was at this point that the reorganization took place, resulting in Smith being made chairman of the board and relieved of much of the personal responsibility for the association's activities. It was hoped that association members would experience a renewal of spirit from the change. [15]

Despite the reorganization, Luther Ely Smith continued to search for ten people to help defray the cost of his \$40,000 underwriting. The fact that these people had underwritten the deficit was not to be known to anyone except Smith. Letters were written, the money solicited, and questions of city politics raised. One businessman, asked to contribute, stated he thought real estate owners in the district should rally to the cause and accused them of causing the chaotic condition of downtown values. [16] At the end of June 1946 Smith overcame the petty charges, internal politics, and city apathy, and found underwriters for most of the remaining funds. The good news was marred, however, by Smith's own personal underwriting, which still stood at \$17,000. [17]

Now the effort began to complete the subscriptions to pay off the underwriters. Twenty-seven thousand dollars were still needed in December 1946. Ingram Boyd, Jr. succeeded in obtaining contributions from downtown businesses which hoped to receive advantages from the project's completion. By February 1947 the association's treasurer announced the competition fund total: \$231,199.26, including a cashier's check for \$35,000 from anonymous underwriters represented by Luther Ely Smith. In addition there were new pledges totaling \$7,650. Association members voted to refund \$6,000 to Smith, and to keep making refunds to him in denominations of \$1,000 or more until his entire contribution was repaid. [18]

Finally it appeared that the money had been raised, and association members began gathering ideas and plans for the competition. As early as 1943 architect Louis La Beaume had drawn initial drafts for an architectural competition. When Luther Ely Smith met with National Park Service Director Newton Drury in November 1944 he expressed his personal view that there should be one central feature: a single shaft, a building, an arch, or something else that would symbolize American culture and civilization. Smith wanted something "transcending in spiritual and aesthetic values" which would attract people from other nations. He and his association formally announced the national architectural competition in January 1945. [19]

Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes believed that the association's success in raising funds to hold the competition revealed the organization's deep interest and support, but, nevertheless, he would not commit the Department of the Interior to accepting the jury's award. Neither would he approve of the association's desire to provide underground parking in the area for the use of the city's downtown district. At this point association members decided it was in their political interest to drop the parking idea. William D'Arcy knew they should watch every word and paragraph when promoting the memorial, in order to stay in Washington's good graces. D'Arcy also realized the importance of keeping favorable publicity about the memorial in the forefront. He met with other association members about policy, how to attract and keep support and how to state in concrete terms what the plans were for the empty land. With the fund drive completed, D'Arcy believed that the association had finished the last task they possibly could before turning the project over to the Federal Government for building. [20]

Louis La Beaume agreed. Local support could raise funds, formulate a program, and hold a contest, but this would serve no purpose without the Federal Government's endorsement. The association wanted assurances that the National Park Service would approve the competition and abide by the jury's decision. Without such assurance no progress could be made.

Therefore La Beume proposed omitting all reference to parking facilities from the program. [21]

Superintendent Julian Spotts knew of the association's desire to have the Federal Government approve the competition. He also knew of their desire that the competition winner be hired by the National Park Service as a consultant in carrying out the winning design's details, and believed that the association would resist any attempt on the Government's part to divorce itself from participating in the competition or being obligated by the results. National Park Service officials needed to determine the extent of their participation. [22] Spotts, Director Drury, and Charles Peterson reviewed the materials Luther Ely Smith submitted. Drury did not foresee any great difficulty in agreeing on a working basis for the competition, his conditions being that the design should carry out the theme of westward expansion with emphasis on the site's historical significance, and that a division be made for four million cubic feet of museum space. Aside from these limitations, Drury believed the designer should have absolute liberty to design whatever best expressed the memorial's theme. [23]

Luther Ely Smith understood the implications, and assured Director Drury that the association knew that no money could be spent until all the government agencies involved endorsed and ratified the program. Meanwhile, the National Park Service itself moved to draw up specifications for the competition after which any area where its ideas conflicted with the association's could be solved in conference. Drury notified Smith that the Department of the Interior could not commit itself to accepting either the design or the architect without specific congressional authority. The association could not assure that the Federal Government would employ the winner as architect; it could only submit its recommendation to the Department of the Interior. Whether the winner was employed at all as either architect or consultant depended upon congressional authorization of the work and appropriation of funds. Despite all the legal restrictions, Newton Drury believed that Smith's desire for aesthetic and inspirational values in the design could be achieved. [24]

An important aspect of the competition remained, that of hiring a professional advisor. National Park Service officials agreed with Smith that an advisor from outside St. Louis would give the competition national scope. Another factor on future plans was the treatment of Third Street, involving both the highway and the railroad tracks. The competitors needed to know the main access points to the memorial in order to plan vehicular and pedestrian traffic. National Park Service officials placed emphasis on relating the design of the memorial to the policies of the Historic Sites Act, meaning that the Old Courthouse and Manuel Lisa's warehouse were to be preserved *in situ* and that a major museum would be developed. By July Park Service officials placed these requirements in perspective and worked up an outline draft of the competition. [25]

Competition Advisor

At the end of August 1946 Luther Ely Smith asked Philadelphian George Howe, fellow of the American Institute of Architects, to serve as professional advisor for the competition. He agreed to do so on several conditions, which corresponded to his architectural philosophy. Howe held a radical attitude toward modern architecture. He admired ancient architecture but was convinced it did not meet the needs of modern life either materially or spiritually. Having suffered through battles with conservative colleagues in the past, he believed he would be either useless or troublesome in the complex situation surrounding the memorial, involving the satisfaction of Congress, Federal agencies, local government, and public and private interests. Howe warned Smith in advance so that if he were employed, the authorities would know what they were getting into. [26] Howe held specific views on the competition program. He thought the proposed museum and reproductions of old structures would be expensive dust collectors. The modern architectural point of view was activist, rather than

stylist; the area should be dedicated to inspirational, educational, and recreational facilities. Howe wanted the grounds to be used for pageants, concerts, and open-air dances. A monument might be included as a reminder of the past, but Howe thought Jefferson and the western pioneers would have placed emphasis on living life rather than remembering it. [27]

George Howe was confirmed as the competition advisor, and spent the next few months working up the competition's specifics. He followed many of the association's original plans, stating that the competition should be in two stages, the first to eliminate all but a few competitors, the second to select one architect and one design. Both stages were to be anonymous. The competition was open to all architects, landscape architects, sculptors, and painters who were citizens of the United States. Howe anticipated more than 500 submissions to the first stage, from which the jury would select five architects to participate in the second stage. [28]

In the midst of this active involvement and work association president William C. D'Arcy resigned for health reasons. Association members searched among themselves for a replacement for a month and a half before news of the resignation appeared in the papers. They needed someone who could secure the confidence of the other officers, sponsors, and general public to avoid letting the project die. There were no takers. Finally Luther Ely Smith stepped down as chairman of the board to assume the reigns and responsibility of the presidency. Edward D. Dail was appointed temporary executive director in September, but Smith retained the presidency for a year, guiding the association through the entire competition proceedings. [29]

Internal organizational uproar did not prevent Smith from exerting his influence over events. He and George Howe met with National Park Service representatives in March to discuss the competition. [30] Both groups wanted an approach to the competition that would assure the best design, but the Park Service especially wanted to be unhampered by preconceived provisions such as the underground parking. Director Newton Drury felt compelled to approach Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug with the problems concerning inclusion of underground parking. Krug took a hard line. The provisions for underground parking and a helicopter landing pad were incompatible with the nature of a national memorial. If the city of St. Louis considered parking an imperative need, the Department of the Interior would consider supporting legislation transferring the area back to the city. If such a transfer occurred, the National Park Service would keep the Old Courthouse with a limited area between the building and the river, and administer it as a national historic site. [31]

Luther Ely Smith backpedaled from Krug's strong statement. He explained that the competition's first stage intended to encourage competitors to propose a wide variety of treatments and suggestions, leaving the second stage to solve the specific problems. None of the first stage proposals were to be made public until the second stage winner was chosen. Smith requested that Secretary Krug wait until after the first stage results had been assembled to confer with association members about the situation. [32] When questioned further by association members regarding his objections, Krug remarked that the Park Service was getting worried over the influence of St. Louis' commercial interests. They worried particularly about the Terminal Railroad Association. As far as parking was concerned, Krug said he would keep an open attitude until he thoroughly discussed the subject with association members. [33]

Architectural Competition

The competition, scheduled to open May 30, 1947, received an important endorsement just a few days before, when the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission unanimously approved the plans on May 28. As soon as the contest opened, the *St. Louis*

Star-Times rejoiced somewhat prophetically in its promise for the city. The memorial was not simply to be a huge shaft of stone, a statue of Thomas Jefferson, or a monumental structure that people would visit only once or twice and then revisit only when showing a stranger the city's sights, the paper said. Instead, the area must be made an integral part of the community's life, and revive the adjacent downtown area in terms of beauty and vigor. [34] Again, the basic difference in viewpoint between the local business community and the Federal Government on the main purpose and function of the memorial revealed itself, as one group concentrated on commercial benefits and the other on historical significance for the nation as a whole.

The competition program addressed this problem:

The purpose of the U.S. Commission to formulate plans looking to the creation of a Memorial, of the City to assist in creating the Memorial and to make certain that the throngs who will visit it from all parts of the world are provided with sufficient parking facilities and conveniences in a location where existing provisions are already inadequate, and of the Park Service to preserve an Historic Site within the meaning of the Act, are separate and distinct in legal theory, while the present purpose of the Association to create a Living Memorial to the vision of Thomas Jefferson in the form of Continuing Activities is a private concern and without legal sanction of any kind. Yet in reality all four have a common purpose, namely to develop an historic metropolitan area to the greatest advantage of the citizenry of the world at large, and each recognizes a moral obligation to consider the interests of the other three. The apparent conflict, then, is a conflict only in the best democratic sense. It is a conflict over means, not over ends. [35]

The association believed it was fulfilling its obligation to assist the Government agencies by holding the competition. The second stage would be designed to arrive at a solution acceptable to all; yet the first prize winner could not be given positive assurance that he would be employed by the Federal Government to design the memorial, or even that the memorial would be built. [36]

The requirements of the program significantly reflected the diverse purposes of the memorial project. They fell into seven categories: building an architectural memorial, preserving the site of Old St. Louis with a museum provision, creating a living memorial to Thomas Jefferson, exploiting the recreational possibilities of the site, providing access for parking on the site, relocating the railroad tracks, and providing for the interstate highway which officials knew would be coming through St. Louis. "Preserving the site" included landscaping, providing for an open air campfire theater, and reproducing typical Old St. Louis buildings. [37]

The competition jury was composed of seven prominent architects selected by the association. The jury's deliberations, scheduled to take four days in the first stage of competition and two days in the second, centered on the response of the entries to the site, and the intent. George Howe, as advisor, participated in the deliberations but had no vote. The competitors' identities were kept secret until after the final awards in the second stage. The judging was by secret ballot and by majority vote. The five first stage winners received \$10,000 each. First prize for the second stage winner was \$40,000; second prize \$20,000; third prize \$10,000; and runners-up \$2,500. [38]

After the first stage mailings, competitors had three months within which to submit their entries. More than 200 architects had signified their intention of submitting designs and by the deadline of September 1, 1947, Howe received 172 entries. [39] On September 23 the

seven jury members, S. Herbert Hare, Fiske Kimball, Louis La Beaume, Charles Nagel, Jr., Richard J. Neutra, Roland Wank, and William W. Wurster, met in St. Louis with George Howe. They met with the press and then retired to the upper rooms of the Old Courthouse to view the submissions. The jury spent the afternoon eliminating the more obviously inadequate submissions, which numbered more than 60. On the second day of deliberation they considered the remaining 110 designs, and eliminated another 51. During the third day the members analyzed the designs, exchanged opinions, and took several ballots, finally getting down to approximately 15 designs. On the fourth and final day of deliberation the jury voted on a series of five ballots, selecting the final five finalists. [40]

All five designs were known to the jurors only as numbers, and comments were written on them, which ranged from "impractical" to "inspired" on the design destined to win, number 144, that of an immense arch. S. Herbert Hare held doubts of the arch's practicality while praising the considerable thought that went into the plan. Roland Wank considered it to be "relevant, beautiful, perhaps inspired would be the right word." Charles Nagel, Jr., thought the arch monumental, imaginative, exciting, "an abstract form peculiarly happy in its symbolism." [41]

After four days of deliberation the jury had selected five projects representing a variety of concepts and ideas. The differences in treatment resulted from the entrants' handling of the requirements: building grouping, traffic questions, and memorial character. Since the objective of the first stage was to select five designers rather than five designs, selection depended upon breadth of conception rather than on particular details. Announcements of the numbers of the five finalists were made to the press on September 27. [42]

George Howe began drafting the second stage addenda to the program. He described fine details needing consideration for the final development: the levee was city property and had to be left in its present state, the railroad tracks were to be handled as if they had already been removed and relocated (competitors were to assume that when the tracks were moved they would be below present grades and not affecting surface layout), the interstate highway would be assumed to be constructed along Third Street; and any underground structures, such as parking facilities, should not affect the site's surface development. Generally, the site was to be treated as a tree-shaded park, terraced down to the river and leaving a view from the Old Courthouse to the levee. The architectural memorial itself was to be conceived as an element visible from a distance; it had to be a notable structure. Its purpose, according to Howe, was to attract the interest of both the multitudes and the connoisseur of art. Howe extended the time for submitting the designs by ten days, to February 10, 1948. [43]

Superintendent Julian Spotts took note of the second stage specifications. The biggest factor, that of the track removal, remained unsolved. The Terminal Railroad Association members had not committed themselves to any solution, insisting instead that they could better solve the controversy after the Park Service had determined their development plans. Spotts believed the plan to place the tracks in a tunnel diagonally across the memorial area to be the most practical and feasible idea, but he assumed the TRRA would oppose all efforts to remove the tracks until they secured a solution more advantageous to themselves. Concerning the parking lot controversy, the association intended to make a separate issue of it after the competition's completion. After examining the second stage addenda, Director Newton Drury and Assistant Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman approved its requirements. [44]

Association members made elaborate plans for revealing the grand prize winner. During the five months which passed between the first and second stages, they planned a prize award dinner for February 18, 1948, inviting the governors of all the states in the Louisiana Purchase, plus Federal, state and local officials, and representatives of civic and other private organizations. George Howe would let the five competitors know the results before the dinner

so that they would not suffer nervous indigestion, but the official announcement would be the culminating moment of the banquet. [45] Meanwhile, George Howe kept in contact with all five competitors, making arrangements for the shipment of their final designs. Association funds paid for all their expenses in shipping their entries. [46]

Amidst the activity, rumors and complaints spread about George Howe's relationship with certain contestants. The chairman of the Washington University School of Architecture received complaints of "frank and undisguised intimacy" between Howe and several people involved in the contest. There apparently existed a breakdown of anonymity and rumored identification of some or all of the first stage winners. Other complaints centered on "unexplained knowledge or presumptive knowledge of certain solutions." None of the rumors could be traced to authoritative sources, and the National Park Service tried not to fuel them. For example, when Charles Peterson sought permission to observe the second stage deliberations, Superintendent Julian Spotts worried about the local criticism charging association members and employees with favoritism toward local competitors, and Peterson did not get his request. [47] Spotts personally believed no grounds existed for the charge, but he wanted to avoid involvement and public attack if a local competitor should win.

The deadline for the second stage arrived and the jury met on February 17 to take care of old business first. Publicity, disposal of the rejected entries, preparation of reports, and the question of anonymity in the competition were discussed. Jury member William Wurster read passages from the competition program on specific points to refresh fellow jury members' memories. George Howe stressed the importance of a memorial of striking design and character. After reconsidering the drawings, the jury decided to hold an anonymous trial ballot for first place, just to show the general trend of opinion. Design number 144 won unanimously. No further balloting was needed. After more discussion the jury awarded second, third, and runner-up prizes. The winners: Saarinen, Saarinen and Associates of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. Jury members met the next day to prepare their reports and a summation of the judgment. [48]

The formal black tie dinner at the Statler Hotel proved to be a resounding success both in function and publicity. Local radio carried part of the ceremony live, various political dignitaries spoke, and National Park Service Associate Director Arthur Demaray attended. Luther Ely Smith barely made it from his sick bed to attend; unfortunately, former Mayor Bernard F. Dickmann was in Washington. Jury member William Wurster explained how the decision was made and then announced the winners and presented the checks. Through the efforts of the St. Louis Advertising Club publicity covering the event reached 127 radio stations across the country and newspapers and magazines carried the story. [49]

The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial competition proved to be Eero Saarinen's first opportunity to produce a major work independent of his father, architect Eliel Saarinen. Their office in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, was one of the most widely known in the country, and during the war years Eero carried most of the responsibility for his and his father's combined effort. Each entered a contribution to the St. Louis competition. Ironically, in September 1947 when George Howe informed Saarinen of his selection in the first stage competition, he mistakenly sent the congratulatory telegram to Eliel. There were three days of celebration at the firm's headquarters in Eliel's honor before Howe rectified the error. [50]

Eero Saarinen's major idea was to search for a simple, basic form as the centerpiece of his design. He wanted to create a monument that would have lasting significance and would be a landmark. He considered several basic shapes, including an open vaulted structure, and a three-legged dome; but after visiting the St. Louis site he decided that neither obelisks nor domes seemed right. Eventually the initial concept of a three-legged dome evolved into a two-legged arch. Saarinen wanted the arch to be the purest expression of the forces within it;

a mathematically precise catenary curve in which the thrust forces are kept within the center of the Arch legs. It was an upward-thrusting form, not an earthbound one. To be constructed of materials emphasizing permanency, specifically stainless steel with a concrete core, Saarinen believed his creation to be the right monument for that place, purpose, and time. "The arch could be a triumphal arch for our age as the triumphal arches of classical antiquity were for theirs." [51]

Saarinen's winning design contained many other features in addition to the central memorial Arch. He met the competition program's basic concepts by placing the Arch on an axis with the Old Courthouse, and by drawing the river into the total composition. The Arch would bring people to the river's edge to find museums, restaurants, and historic riverboats. On the levee side of the Arch Saarinen designed a stairway that would be monumental in terms of size and the symbolism of the westward pioneers moving through a "gateway." Sculpture and paintings situated along an arcade below the Arch would tell the story of America's westward expansion. A campfire theater and a village of pioneer houses would stand on the site for historical/interpretive purposes. Saarinen provided for two museums, one historical, one architectural. [52] Years later, many of these additional aspects were dropped because of monetary problems. Saarinen himself redesigned the project in 1957, but his main concepts, that of the Arch, the tree-lined mall, and the staircases, have continued to provide the main core of development.

Saarinen's design more than just pleased Luther Ely Smith, who attempted to congratulate Saarinen after the dinner. Smith had nothing but words of praise. "We are still breathless at the vision you have opened up for us by your marvelously fine design. The more we gaze upon it the more wonderful and gripping it grows." [53] Saarinen returned the good feelings when he congratulated Smith on the masterful management and planning of the competition. Speaking from experience, Saarinen knew that many competitions create interest in the architectural profession but fail to become reality because they fail to close the gap between the profession and the world at large. Saarinen believed Smith, Howe, and the association had done a magnificent job, and that Smith's initial vision for the memorial was more beautiful than anything that could be put down on paper. Saarinen considered his own lot to be one of crystallizing Smith's dream, realizing that [54] "When the project someday becomes a reality, we will remember this and, by refinement of detail, we will try to gain some of what has been lost by stepping down from a great dream to reality." [55]

As soon as various versions of Saarinen's rendering of the "great dream" appeared in the national press, the nation had a field day rendering its judgment on the design. Comments ranged widely once again, from a *New York Times* judgment of "a modern monument fitting, beautiful and impressive" to a local citizen calling it a stupendous hairpin and a stainless steel hitching post. [56] One criticism, coming from Gilmore D. Clarke, chairman of the National Commission on Fine Arts, attracted national attention. In a letter to William Wurster he charged that Saarinen's idea of an arch was not new because it resembled an arch approved by Benito Mussolini for a Fascist exhibition in Rome in 1942. In Clarke's mind the important question was not whether or not the design was plagiarized, but rather whether it was appropriate to perpetuate Thomas Jefferson's memory by building a monument similar to one designed to glorify fascism. [57] As soon as Clarke's charge became publicly known, controversy arose around the design and its creator. William Wurster argued that hundreds of arches existed in architecture and Saarinen asserted that it was preposterous to link a basic form with any ideology. The arch was an impersonal, simple, pure form: a symbolic gateway, and Saarinen thought the whole controversy a big joke. [58]

Nevertheless, William Wurster and the jury of award drafted a rebuttal for circulation, since they feared Clarke's influence as chairman of the National Commission on Fine Arts. Their rebuttal emphasized that the Arch was of a general type going back many centuries, but

nevertheless was not merely an adaptation of classical or historical motifs, for it was also one characteristic of modern architecture and engineering. The arch form was in the public domain, the jury asserted, and was not invented by the Fascists. Saarinen's arch as a commemorative monument was wonderfully suitable in its symbolism as a Gateway to the West. Their statement ended the controversy, and the *New York Herald Tribune* provided a bit of humor when it envisioned tall, redheaded, freckle-faced Thomas Jefferson having a good laugh over the whole matter. [59]

While the sparring was going on over this controversy, Eero Saarinen and the association went on working. Saarinen immediately made plans to build a scale model, including all features of the design, at a cost of \$5,000, paid by the association. Meanwhile, Superintendent Julian Spotts sent Director Drury a draft of a proposed bill to secure congressional authorization for the project. He suggested that the association through the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission sponsor the bill. The bill did not provide for an appropriation, although it did empower the Department of the Interior to negotiate and enter into a contract with Saarinen for his services in preparing detailed plans and specifications that would depend, of course, upon congressional appropriation of money. Drury decided not to act just yet. By mid-March the association had not officially presented the results of the competition to either the Department of the Interior or the commission, which made Drury wary of any kind of National Park Service promotion of the development. Any assistance or advice given to the association by Park Service officials should be kept on an unofficial, personal basis. As far as using Park Service funds to pay for surveys and designs, Drury thought it undesirable to spend money on these types of projects until there existed definite indications that the memorial would proceed. [60]

United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission members took a step in that direction in May when they unanimously adopted a resolution approving the selection of Eero Saarinen's design. The commission recommended to the National Park Service and the secretary of the interior that Saarinen be selected as architect for the memorial's development and construction. Eero Saarinen personally attended the meeting, along with many national and local project supporters, to describe his design and show commission members the completed model. [61] Senator Alben Barkley, chairman of the commission, duly informed the Department of the Interior of the decision. On June 4 Acting Secretary of the Interior William Warne advised Barkley of his approval of the Saarinen design as the basis for the memorial's future development. The design could not be executed, he warned, until the elevated tracks in front of the memorial were removed. He assumed that the city of St. Louis would continue to work for that removal. These plans were all contingent upon future appropriations from the Congress of the United States. [62]

Chances for such an appropriation being made remained slim. Missouri Congressman Claude Bakewell asserted that any effort to obtain an appropriation would be futile because of the current world unrest. As a result of that assessment, association executive secretary Edward Dail announced the postponement of plans to obtain Federal funds. In addition, the association's office closed down in April, with all activities needing full time attention being handled by the National Park Service and by the association's executive committee. Further association expenses were approved only with a justification of importance. With these actions the association stripped down to the bare necessities to await a favorable point when their time, money, and effort could be put toward obtaining Federal appropriations. [63]

Working without a contract or guarantee that he would be hired as architect, Eero Saarinen considered the as-yet-unsolved problems of parking, railroad relocation, and zoning. After serving on the competition jury, Louis La Beaume was commissioned by the TRRA to prepare studies seeking a harmonization of their track right-of-way with Saarinen's treatment of the area. The railroad wanted to lower the elevated tracks to the grade of the top edge of

the levee, with river access provided for pedestrian and automobile traffic. Since Saarinen's firm had not been officially commissioned to develop the project, Saarinen's associate J. Henderson Barr told La Beume to inform the association of the proposal. Saarinen was alarmed at such an idea, and said that any type of train passing through the memorial area would be a detraction. La Beume's solution meant compromising the whole idea of the memorial, and association members were at a loss to explain why La Beume would associate himself with such a scheme. [64] Saarinen also needed more information regarding parking. He knew the National Park Service's attitude, but wondered if provisions were being made for underground parking. Edward Dail informed him of the association's decision to drop the parking plans until after the National Park Service and Congress approved the memorial project. Present officials might not be in office at that time, and their successors might not hold the same negative feelings about the issue. St. Louis retailers and businessmen remained strongly in favor of having onsite parking. [65]

Saarinen became involved with zoning when the executive committee of the association recommended to the City Plan Commission the establishment of a special zone to limit use in the memorial's immediate border, preventing unregulated growth. Saarinen approved of the action, and recommended that zoning restrictions extend to height also. St. Louis Real Estate Board members, taking an interest in the proposal, contacted Luther Ely Smith to find out just what type of protective zoning he wanted. Saarinen, together with William Wurster, developed preliminary objectives for the type of development he wanted to occur around the memorial so that it would not interfere with his vision of the memorial as a whole. He drew up four major objectives: to prevent any future buildings from dwarfing the Old Courthouse, to make the buildings along Third Street more harmonious, to enhance the redevelopment of the narrow streets between Third and Fourth Streets, and to prevent the construction of high towers which would compete with the Arch. [66]

This early involvement with such issues kept Eero Saarinen involved in the project for the rest of his life. For the next thirteen years Saarinen kept contact with National Park Service and city officials concerning various aspects of the memorial development. Even though no construction money was forthcoming for years, Saarinen expressed his views on zoning and railroad removal to lend guidance to the numerous interests attempting to carry out his design. Months passed before the Federal Government was able to execute a contract with Saarinen for his services. Decisions made by National Park Service officials concerning Saarinen's status, pay rate, and areas of responsibility lasted throughout the summer of 1948. The association donated \$15,000 for cost estimate studies. While drafts of contracts authorizing Saarinen's employment as a technical and professional advisor were being drawn up, Saarinen continued to pursue investigative studies into the physical construction of the Arch. He consulted with engineer Fred Severud on wind tunnel tests as well as technical problems such as footing connections, which were paid for in part by the association's donation. United States Corps of Engineers professionals drafted topographical maps of the memorial grounds. More work needed to be done on the site, which prompted Saarinen to accept a certain amount of monetary loss to advance the project because the National Park Service did not pay him and his consultants enough to cover the costs of conducting all the necessary tests. Not until September was the Park Service ready to approve a contract with Saarinen, and then with several reservations. Saarinen was to be held responsible for the final work, regardless of how many professions contributed data; the association had to approve the use of their funds; and most importantly, Saarinen had to understand that the Government was not obligated to continue his employment in the later stages of the project's development. The contract provided for a lump sum of \$7,700 for payment to Saarinen, to be spent for travel and for architectural and engineering services for the memorial's preliminary investigations, design, and cost estimates. [67]

In late October, after Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug and National Park Service Director

Drury gave general approval to Saarinen's plan, various Park Service officials still needed assurances that they would have the opportunity to review the plans and submit comments. Spotts assured them that all Park Service offices would be able to review and comment after the preliminary plans and estimates were completed. In addition to placing those restrictions, the Park Service could not supply any professional landscape or architectural assistance to Saarinen. Luther Ely Smith thought it satisfactory to pay for those services out of the association's \$15,000. [68]

Thus the stage was set for the next phase of memorial development. There now existed definite plans for the form the memorial would assume, and National Park Service officials ceased speaking of the "ultimate" memorial development in vague and ill-defined terms. After the competition, definite plans existed which fit their ideas for a memorial, a single architectural structure that embodied the westward expansion movement. Saarinen's plan met the standards set by the Historic Sites Act and the standards set in the minds of those who initially conceived the project. Newspaper and magazine publicity made St. Louisans realize that completion of the project might not be too far away. Increasing interest from people outside the local area added to the realization that the project would be a great asset and attraction when completed. The next step was to promote the memorial in Washington, D.C., among those holding the power to make the plans become reality. Lawmakers controlled the funds; they had to be reached with the Arch design serving as the selling point in the redevelopment of St. Louis' riverfront. The vision of Thomas Jefferson could only be memorialized with their approval.

Near the end of 1948 the association's executive committee met to assess their spheres of influence in the nation's capital. Despite the earlier closing of their office, the committee felt they had a good opportunity to successfully seek an appropriation. Several vital people were situated in key places. President Harry S Truman was familiar with the project because of his former position as Missouri senator, and Commission Chairman Alben Barkley now served as Truman's vice president. Missouri Representative Clarence Cannon served as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. The Federal Government had already invested \$6,500,000 in the project, and when congressional members learned of the competition results and the \$15,000 donation they certainly would be impressed enough to grant appropriations for the project's completion. [69]

Or so association members thought. In reality their struggles to obtain funds would continue for years. By this time even Luther Ely Smith began losing his capacity to keep up the pressure, if not his enthusiasm, for the project. In June 1948, he stepped down as president of the association, unable to handle the arduous duties any longer. [70] Association members knew their first priority lay in getting the city of St. Louis and the Terminal Railroad Association together to remove the elevated tracks. Only then would the Federal Government provide funds to construct Eero Saarinen's stainless steel Gateway Arch.

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CHAPTER IV: Footnotes

¹Smith to Drury, 19 October 1946, JNEMA.

²Smith to Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., 28 November 1944 JNEMA; George Schomman to Smith, 30 December 1944, JNEMA; Smith to Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 6 February 1945, JNEMA; Joseph D. Neman, Jr. [sic] to Smith, 10 March 1945, JNEMA.

³Drury to Smith, 24 January 1946, JNEMA.

⁴Aloys P. Kaufman to Smith, 16 October 1946, JNEMA.

⁵Kaufman to Spotts, 22 June 1946, JNEMA; Smith to Hillory Tolson, 9 July 1946, JEFF; Memorandum, Peterson for Superintendent Spotts, 23 May 1946, JEFF.

⁶Smith to Kaufman, 16 January 1946, JNEMA; "Meeting Minutes of the Coordinating Committee," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 27 December 1946, typed minutes, JNEMA.

⁷Memorandum, Demaray for Director NPS, 3 July 1947, JEFF.

⁸Milton M. Kinsey to Smith, 3 October 1947, JNEMA; George Howe to Smith, 8 January 1948, JNEMA.

⁹Spotts to Warner Fuller, 4 September 1946, JEFF; P.J. Watson, Jr. to Spotts, 18 September 1946, JEFF; Spotts to Watson, 19 September 1946, JEFF.

¹⁰Ingram F. Boyd to Smith, 6 December 1944, JNEMA; Boyd was Smith's son-in-law.

¹¹Smith to Max O'Rell Truitt, 17 October 1944, JNEMA. Smith tried to obtain the financial backing of the Astor family by appealing to their sense of family fur trade history. In Smith's opinion, if Vincent Astor contributed \$200,000 he would be helping to create something more far-reaching than John D. Rockefeller's Williamsburg. Astor did not contribute. Smith to Charles S. Whitman, 20 October 1944, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: W miscellaneous, Missouri Historical Society (hereafter cited as MHS); Smith to Whitman, 31 October 1944, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: W miscellaneous, MHS.

¹²*St. Louis Star-Times*, 26 March 1945; Sidney R. Baer to W.L. Hemingway, 14 May 1945, JNEMA; A.P. Kaufman to Smith, 19 June 1945, JNEMA.

¹³A.P. Kaufman to Smith, 19 June 1945, JNEMA.

¹⁴James L. Ford to Kaufman, 21 June 1945, JNEMA; Smith to Gale F. Johnston, 13 May 1946, JNEMA; I.F. Boyd, Jr. to Ford, 22 May 1946 Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition, MHS.

¹⁵Ford to Boyd, 23 May 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS.

¹⁶Boyd to Joseph Sunnen, 29 May 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition, MHS; Charles Caspari, Jr. to Harry Matthews [sic], 6 June 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers; Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS; Mathews to Caspari, 10 June 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS.

¹⁷Ford to Smith, 28 June 1946, JNEMA; a list of the underwriters: Ingram Boyd - \$4,000, Hugh H.C. Weed - \$4,000, Fred Gerber - \$4,000, Carl F.G. Meyer - \$4,000, Eugene & Marguerite Pettus - \$4,000, XYZ (anonymous) - \$4,000, Smith - \$17,000. Smith to W.L. Hemingway, 22 June 1946, JNEMA.

¹⁸Boyd to Frank Mayfield, 6 December 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition, MHS; *St. Louis Star-Times*, 10 January 1947; "Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 13 February 1947, typed minutes, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS. Some of the larger contributions: Associated Retailers of St. Louis - \$57,000, May Department Stores Co. - \$10,000, Boyd-Richardson Co. - \$4,000, Clearing House Association - \$15,000, twenty-one downtown buildings - \$28,540, St. Louis Public Service Co. - \$7,500, Union Electric Co. - \$5,000, International Shoe Co. - \$5,000, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. - \$5,000, Edgar Queeney - 45,000, Harry B. Matthews - \$5,000.

¹⁹[Louis La Beaume] to President Roosevelt [10 June 1943], unsent draft, JNEMA; Report, Smith to Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 4 November 1944, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 January 1945. In accordance with the current political philosophy of a "Good Neighbor Policy," Smith proposed opening the competition to qualified architects of all Western Hemisphere countries. He also wanted to open it to all qualified architects in the armed forces, although he realized that they would be working "under conditions of extreme difficulty." See "Minutes of Informal Luncheon Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 16 September 1943, JNEMA.

²⁰Ickes to Smith, 3 May 1945, JEFF; D'Arcy to Smith, 9 May 1945, JNEMA; D'Arcy to Smith, 6 August 1945, JNEMA. William D'Arcy's view of those who offered alternative plans for the riverfront: "As long as there is a vacancy on the riverfront ... and the public does not know in more concrete terms just what we are going to do with it, there will be suggestions from time to time as to how they think it should be used. Man is still free to let his mind wander and his tongue wag and whether he is a statesman or a hobo he likes to put his ideas forward even though he may be talking up the side of a mountain." D'Arcy to Smith, 22 June 1945, JNEMA.

²¹Louis La Beaume to William C. D'Arcy, 10 October 1945, JNEMA.

²²Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 8 February 1946, JEFF.

²³Drury to Smith, 26 February 1946, JNEMA. Drury warned against letting the architectural aspects of the memorial dominate the plan, which might result in delegating the historical aspects to a subordinate position. "The right conception would, in the course of providing the interpretive facilities, create the memorial."

²⁴Smith to Drury, 12 March 1946, JNEMA; Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 13 March 1946, JEFF; Drury to Smith, 1 April 1946, JEFF; Drury to Smith, 14 May 1946, JNEMA; Drury to Smith, 7 June 1946, JNEMA.

²⁵Memorandum, Hillory Tolson to Superintendent, 17 June 1946, JEFF; Tolson to Smith, 26 June 1946, JNEMA; Drury to Smith, 13 July 1946, JNEMA; Outline Draft [of competition], 10 July 1946, JEFF.

²⁶George Howe to Smith, 29 August 1946, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Riverfront JNEM file, MHS.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸George Howe, *Interim Progress Report on the Preparation of the Program for the National Competition to Select an Architect and a Tentative Design for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition January 19th to February 10th, 1947*, 11 February 1947, typed report, pp. 1-3, JNEMA; "Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 28 February 1947, typed minutes, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS.

²⁹Smith to D'Arcy, 1 February 1947, JNEMA; I.F. Boyd, Jr. to Chester C. Davis, 11 March 1947, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition, MHS; I.F. Boyd, Jr. to Morton J. May, 13 March 1947, Luther Ely Smith Papers, Jefferson Memorial River Front Competition file, MHS; News Release from the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 7 September 1947, JNEMA.

³⁰Hillory Tolson to Smith, 20 March 1947, JNEMA; the representatives: Director Newton Drury, Regional Director Lawrence Merriam, Chief of Development Thomas Vint, Acting Chief Historian Herbert Kahler, Chief Naturalist Carl Russell, Assistant Director Tolson.

³¹Drury to Smith, 14 April 1947, JNEMA; Julius A. Krug to Smith, 17 April 1947, JEFF.

³²Krug to Smith, 8 May 1947, JEFF.

³³Chester C. Davis to Howe, 29 July 1947, JNEMA.

³⁴"Minutes of the Meeting of the U.S. Territorial Expansion Commission," 28 May 1947, typed minutes, p. 3, JEFF; *St. Louis Star-Times*, 7 June 1947.

³⁵*Architectural Competition for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Program St. Louis, Missouri 1947*, p. 4, JNEMA.

³⁶Ibid; pp. 4-5.

³⁷Ibid; pp. 14-15.

³⁸Ibid; pp. 5, 8-9.

³⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 4 September 1947.

⁴⁰Charles Nagel, Jr., *A Sketch Report of the Jury Proceedings, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 23-26 September 1947, JNEMA; Louis La Beaume, *Jefferson National Memorial Competition - First Stage*, n.d., JNEMA; *Proceedings of the Jury of Award for the Architectural Competition Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, n.d., JNEMA; "Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association," 26 September 1947, typed minutes, JNEMA. George Howe opened the discussion as to the possibility of releasing the names of the five winners and designs for publication. He believed this would stimulate public interest through the press. Several of the jury members thought anonymity could not be maintained while others warned against changing the program at the last minute. After consulting legal advice Howe stated that the program could be modified if everyone agreed. Louis La Beaume did not, and stated he would resign if the program's terms were modified. By the third day of deliberation, pressure regarding anonymity was removed and the conditions of the program prevailed. La Beaume, *Jefferson . . .*, JNEMA; n.a., *Proceedings. . .*, JNEMA. The jury members and their positions at the time of the competition: S. Herbert Hare, Fellow of the American Society of Landscape Architects, Kansas City, Mo., Member of the American Institute of Planners; Fiske Kimball, Fellow of the American Institute of Architects, (AIA) Philadelphia, Pa., Director of the Philadelphia Museum of Art; Louis La Beaume, Fellow of the AIA, St. Louis, Mo., Associate of the National Academy of Design; Charles Nagel, Jr., Member of the AIA, Brooklyn, N.Y., Director of the Brooklyn Museum; Richard J. Neutra, Member of the AIA, Los Angeles, CA, Chairman of the California State Planning Board; Roland A. Wank, Member of the AIA, New York, N.Y., Consulting Chief Architect for the Tennessee Valley Authority; William W. Wurster, Member of AIA, Cambridge, Mass., Dean of the School of Architecture and Planning of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

⁴¹Comments of S. Herbert Hare on Designs Selected by the Jury for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association Competition, n.d., JNEMA; [Roland Wank] untitled descriptions of chosen entries, n.d., JNEMA; LaBeaume *Jefferson . . .*, JNEMA; Nagel, *A Sketch. . .* JNEMA.

⁴²Charles Nagel, *Report of the Jury of Award to the Professional Adviser on the First Stage of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition*, n.d., JNEMA; *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 27 September 1947.

⁴³George Howe, *Second Stage Addenda to the Program, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition*, n.d., pp. 1-3, JNEMA.

⁴⁴Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 20 October 1947, JNEMA; Memorandum, Drury to Secretary (of the Interior), 17 November 1947, JNEMA; Chapman to Edward D. Dail, 18 November, 1947, JNEMA.

⁴⁵[George Howe] to Eero Saarinen, 29 January 1948, JNEMA. So many government officials attended the dinner that the wives of the five competitors were not invited because of lack of space. (This, of course, with the exception of Eero Saarinen's wife Lily Swann Saarinen, a noted sculptor who was part of the five-person winning team; she attended the banquet). Only two governors of states within the Louisiana Purchase (Wyoming, Arkansas) attended besides Missouri Governor Phil Donnelly. Donnelly to Smith, 6 February 1948, Phil M. Donnelly Papers, file No. 1169, WHMC.

⁴⁶Memorandum, George Howe to the Five Participants in the Second Stage of the Jefferson

National Expansion Memorial Competition, 15 January 1948, JNEMA.

⁴⁷Lawrence Hill to George Howe, 25 October 1947, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts for Director NPS, 9 February 1948, JEFF.

⁴⁸Charles Nagel, Jr. "Minutes of Meetings of Jury of Award in the 2nd Stage of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition," 17-18 February 1948, JNEMA. Eero Saarinen's design team: J. Henderson Barr, associate designer; Dan Kiley, landscape architect; Alexander Hayden Girard, painter; and Lily Swann Saarinen, sculptress. The other prize winners: Second Prize - Gordon A. Phillips, William Eng, architects; both of Champaign, Ill.; Third Prize - William N. Breger, Woodstock, N.Y., Caleb Hornbostel, New York City, George S. Lewis, New York City, architects; Runner-up - Harris Armstrong, Kirkwood, Mo., architect. Runner-up - T. Marshall Rainey, Cleveland, Ohio, architect. The runner-up awards were made simply in alphabetical order. The association kept many of the entry drawings for publicity purposes, returning only those whose designers asked for them. Still existent entries are in the JEFF archives.

⁴⁹Carl F.G. Meyer III, *Report of the February 18th, 1948, Award Dinner Conducted by the JNEMA*, n.d., JNEMA; Smith to Mr. & Mrs. Carl F.G. Meyer, 27 February 1948, JNEMA; Statler Hotel. Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association Riverfront Prize Award Dinner, n.d., chronology of dinner proceedings, JNEMA.

⁵⁰Allan Temko, *Eero Saarinen* (New York: George Braziller, 1962), p. 18; telegram, Howe to Eliel Saarinen, 26 September 1947, JNEMA; Howe to Eero Saarinen, 29 September 1947, JNEMA. George Howe placed the blame for the mistake on his secretary, who allegedly took Eliel's name from the Saarinen letterhead. Eero Saarinen, born August 20, 1910, in Kirkkonummi, Finland, immigrated to the United States in 1923 with his family. His father Eliel was a leading architect, and after studies in Paris and the Yale School of Architecture, Eero joined his father's Architectural firm at Bloomfield Hills, Michigan. He served with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D.C. during World War II. He was married twice, to Lily Swann Saarinen in 1939 and to Aline B. Louchheim in 1953. Besides the Gateway Arch, Saarinen's other major contributions to the field of architecture include the General Motors Technical Center, Warren, MI; the auditorium and chapel at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Transworld Flight Center at Idlewild, later John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY; and the Dulles International Airport Terminal Building in Chantilly, VA. Saarinen was awarded several honorary degrees and was a fellow of both the American Institute of Architects and the American Academy of Arts and Letters. The AIA posthumously awarded him its Gold Medal. Saarinen never saw the Arch completed, for he died after brain surgery on September 1, 1961, just when foundations were being poured. See *Saarinen on His Work*, ed. Aline B. Saarinen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 104-5.

⁵¹Temko, *Eero Saarinen* pp. 18-19; Saarinen, *Saarinen* p. 18; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 March 1948.

⁵²Saarinen, *Saarinen* p. 18; Eero Saarinen, *A Tour Through the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, (extract from an address given at the Associated Retailers of St. Louis meeting, 29 April 1948), pp. 1-4, JNEMA; Saarinen's first major speech unveiling the fine details of the design was given to this group of St. Louis retailers.

⁵³Smith to Saarinen, 25 February 1948, JNEMA.

⁵⁴Saarinen to Smith, 1 March 1948, JNEMA; Saarinen to Smith 28 May 1948, JNEMA.

⁵⁵Saarinen to Smith, 28 May 1948, JNEMA.

⁵⁶*The New York Times*, 29 February 1948; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 February 1948.

⁵⁷Gilmore D. Clarke to William Wurster, 24 February 1948, JNEMA.

⁵⁸*St. Louis Star-Times*, 26 February 1948; *New York Herald Tribune*, 26 February 1948; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 February 1948.

⁵⁹William Wurster "Log of the week of 22 February - 28 February in regard to the prizewinning award for the Architectural Competition for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial," 28 February 1948, p. 2, JNEMA; *Statement by the Jury of Award on the Winning Designs in the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Competition*, n.d., JNEMA; *New York Herald Tribune*, 27 February 1948.

⁶⁰Saarinen to Edward Dail, 26 February 1948, JNEMA; Howard F. Baer to William H. Semsrott, 5 March 1948, JNEMA; Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 26 February 1948, JEFF; Memorandum, Drury to Superintendent, JNEM, 18 March 1948, JNEMA.

⁶¹"Report of U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission Breakfast Meeting," 25 May 1948, typed meeting minutes, JEFF.

⁶²William E. Warne to Alben Barkley, 4 June 1948, JNEMA. Even though congressional financing would prove difficult to obtain, the association contributed \$15,000 to the National Park Service for Saarinen's use in preparing preliminary designs and reports. Price, Waterhouse & Company audited the association's handling of the competition fund from 1945 to 1948. The audit showed the group kept well within their budget and conducted excellent record keeping. Price, Waterhouse donated their services as their contribution to the project. Price, Waterhouse & Co., *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association Competition Fund Report and Statement of Income and Expenditure for the Period from May 4 1945 to May 14 1948 inclusive*, n.d., JNEMA.

⁶³Chester C. Davis to Smith, 12 April 1948, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 April 1948; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to Edward Dail, 20 April 1948, JNEMA.

⁶⁴La Beume to Saarinen, Saarinen & Associates, 25 March 1948, JNEMA; J. Henderson Barr to La Beume, 6 April 1948, JNEMA; Saarinen to Dail, 6 April 1948, JNEMA; Charles Nagle to Smith, 21 April, n.d., JNEMA.

⁶⁵Saarinen to Dail, 6 April 1948, JNEMA; Dail to Saarinen, 8 April 1948, JNEMA.

⁶⁶Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to City Plan Commission, 24 August, 1948, JNEMA; Saarinen to Smith, 31 August 1948, JNEMA; St. Louis Real Estate Board to City Planning [sic] Commission, 14 September 1948, JNEMA; George Kempland to Smith, 21 September 1948, JNEMA; preliminary memorandum, Saarinen to Charles Nagel, Jr. and William Wurster, 19 October 1948, JNEMA. Saarinen proposed that apartments and hotels be built along Third Street, and that a shopping arcade be developed from Washington to Poplar Streets. He also recommended widening Clark, Elm, Pine, Olive, and Locust Streets. Eero Saarinen & William Wurster, *Report on the Development of Land Surrounding the Jefferson National Memorial Park, St. Louis, Missouri*, 14 December 1948, JEFF.

Memorandum, Hillyory Tolson to Regional Director, 9 July 1948, JNEMA; Saarinen to Spotts, 14 August 1948, JNEMA; memorandum, Lawrence C. Merriam to Superintendent JNEM, 23 August 1948, JNEMA; memorandum, Demaray to Superintendent JNEM, 13 September 1948, JNEMA; memorandum, J.B. Rasbach for the Director NPS, 8 October 1948, JEFF; Spotts to Smith, 20 October 1948, JNEMA.

⁶⁸Memorandum, Howard Baker to Regional Director, 27 October 1948, JNEMA; Smith to Spotts, 2 November 1948, JNEMA.

⁶⁹Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, "Meeting Minutes of the Executive Committee," 29 November 1948, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA.

⁷⁰Ingram F. Boyd, Jr. to Members of the Executive Committee, 18 February 1948, JEFF.

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CHAPTER V: 1949-1952

Symbolically speaking memorial supporters could, in 1949, see the light at the end of the tunnel — the railroad tunnel. Surely with Eero Saarinen's plan now in hand the city and the railroads could agree on an action to move the tracks in a way satisfactory to the Federal Government. The best plan proposed so far recommended placing the tracks into a tunnel running diagonally across the memorial, and with this the project's proponents hoped to head for Washington, D.C., for authorization and appropriation. The time seemed ripe for a fund allocation, with the war over and imminent prosperity beckoning. Missourian Harry Truman's presence in the White House added significantly to this feeling among memorial supporters. Surely the project's completion was near.

Several developments made the situation look hopeful. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had begun making core borings at the points of the triangular base section of the Gateway Arch. The action provoked much local publicity. National Park Service personnel in St. Louis received detailed plans for the development from Eero Saarinen, which included alignments for a railroad tunnel diagonally across the area. Saarinen continued to oppose the recent La Beaume-Terminal Plan which provided for three tracks on a contained fill along the lines of the elevated tracks; Park Service officials agreed with his objections. [\[1\]](#) Instead, they favored either the Bowen Plan or the Bates-Ross Plan, both of which called for the tracks being placed in a tunnel diagonally across the memorial area. Differences between the two plans lay in the connections at both the north and south ends of the property. Julian Spotts believed the Terminal Railroad Association's counsel Richmond Coburn to be making a sincere effort to solve the problem. Spotts wanted to leave the name-calling behind, start from "scratch," and give out no publicity until there was a tentative agreement. Flexibility remained Spotts' creed, for he thought it might be fatal to the negotiations if he adhered rigidly to only one plan. His office preferred the Bates-Ross Plan, but remained willing to accept the Bowen Plan if the TRRA preferred it. Eero Saarinen agreed to adjust his memorial plans to fit the railroad scheme adopted. [\[2\]](#)

Spotts did not know if the negotiations would be successful, but he believed the TRRA wanted to cooperate, possibly being forced to do so by public opinion. Finding a solution would not be easy, but Spotts thought the outlook to be more hopeful now than at any other time in the project's history. There existed no alternative to placing the tracks in a tunnel if they were to be eliminated from sight. Saarinen impulsively stated he would not want to be architect for the memorial if the tracks separated the memorial from the river. Director Newton Drury reaffirmed the Department of the Interior's opposition to the tracks remaining between the area and the river and any design which provided parking facilities other than those essential to the operation and interpretation of the memorial. [\[3\]](#)

Optimism soon faded. By April all the involved interests again began stalling to gain leverage in the negotiations. TRRA counsel Coburn wanted to avoid introducing an enabling act into Congress because he believed it would prejudice the possibility of reaching an agreement favorable to the TRRA. The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association's tentative draft contained two major difficulties for the railroad. It made the memorial's improvements conditional upon the Saarinen plan, and it provided that the relocation costs be borne, not by the Federal Government, but by the other interests involved. The railroads balked, saying they would not approve any tunnel plan. The National Park Service responded that they would not agree to the La Beume Terminal plan. Eero Saarinen was again consulted and asked if he could approve more changes in his plans to accommodate the railroad. In May, Julian Spotts conceded that the prospects had dissolved and that negotiations apparently would continue indefinitely. He could not predict the problem's solution or a date of agreement. [4]

An uproar occurred in June. In a meeting with the association at city hall, Frank J. McDevitt, president of the Board of Public Service, submitted another modified railroad relocation plan. He wanted to lower the tracks and place them in a 1,500 foot cut immediately in front of the Arch, shielded by retaining walls and landscaping. The plan, labeled the Levee-Tunnel Plan, took the association by surprise. Spotts' and Saarinen's plan to place the tracks in a tunnel under the area between Second and First Streets was now called the Hill-Tunnel Plan. Eero Saarinen came to St. Louis to state his views in conferences with various officials. For days Saarinen objected to the Levee-Tunnel plan, while the railroad officials blasted the Hill-Tunnel plan as too hazardous for operation. Finally, at a much publicized meeting in the mayor's office on July 7, the city went for the Levee-Tunnel plan. All three city newspapers reported this as the tentative agreement, even though it was simply city officials praising the plan. Railroad representatives said they would cooperate, Spotts and Saarinen expressed their unhappiness, association members said nothing. No mention was made by anyone about costs. [5] On July 8 Saarinen met again with city officials to study the Levee-Tunnel plan, which he did not like, but which he said he would try to work with to achieve the best possible development. He made several technical propositions, such as placing more tracks in the tunnel to make the plan aesthetically acceptable. [6]

Politics played a major role in the scenario. Association members believed that McDevitt's Levee-Tunnel plan had been deliberately railroaded through by city and TRRA officials when Luther Ely Smith was on vacation and not present at the meeting. Association President William Crowder's stand was that the group could not in good conscience agree in principle to the Levee-Tunnel Plan. Saarinen was placed on the spot to defend his plan, but his view was not considered. It became evident to association members that Mayor Joseph Darst and city officials were determined to get the Levee-Tunnel plan adopted. Crowder believed it all had been set up for political reasons. [7] National Park Service representatives had also not been included in the discussions, prompting Julian Spotts to suspect that whatever final plan the city and railroads agreed to would not be satisfactory to the Park Service. He was right, but Eero Saarinen continued to both revise his design and point out the problems connected with having the tracks in a tunnel on the riverfront. The competition set the park's design to a certain extent, such as in the plan for the Arch; however, several other features could yet be changed, and Saarinen feared that the railroad tunnel would interfere with these features. The question of underground parking remained unsolved, as did the final treatment of the restaurants, museums, frontier village, and levee. As far as Saarinen was concerned, "The ideal way for achieving a completely integrated design, in detail as well as in broad outline is to keep the solutions of all the component parts fluid until we know as much as we ever will about the programs of each one of them." [8]

Mayor Joseph Darst took the first step after the meeting. He contacted Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug and informed him that the Levee-Tunnel Plan had been adopted in

principle. Darst enclosed a compendium of facts giving details as to the memorial's history and proposals for expediting the project. He recommended that a corporation be formed with the authority to deal with all phases of construction, maintenance, and operation. This corporation could also construct a garage for parking on the memorial site. Darst also wanted the back taxes on the property in the area (approximately \$300,000) to be considered as a city contribution, to be matched three to one by the Federal Government. The average value of the streets and alleys vacated by the city for use by the memorial were also to be matched in value three to one, and the Old Courthouse and the property on which it stood, assessed at \$1,000,000, was to be considered a city contribution to be matched three to one. [9]

Secretary Krug read the mayor's letter with "deep interest" and appreciated the fact that the city was vitally interested in the memorial project. He did not understand, however, why Darst thought a corporation would successfully manage the construction, maintenance, and operation of the project any better than the National Park Service could. Krug believed that a corporation comprised of Federal and city interests would not prove effective. Even though the Department of the Interior had cooperated with the city in every way, it was apparent to Krug that traffic, railroad, and financial matters concerning the memorial caused the city grave concern. If these matters were of such importance as to require active participation by city officials in the project's future development and administration, then Secretary Krug would join Darst in recommending that Congress legally authorize the city to take over the project, thereby insuring that no interference with city planning would take place. Krug favored this move over the formation of a corporation. If, on the other hand, Mayor Darst concluded that the National Park Service was the proper agency to oversee the memorial's completion, then Krug suggested that the mayor and members of his staff meet with service representatives to discuss other recommendations, including removal of the railroad tracks, and the underground parking problems. [10]

The controversy did not end with this exchange of correspondence. Mayor Darst was determined to get action of some sort on the riverfront, while the association played a waiting game until the city and Federal governments resolved their differences. Local National Park Service officials found "misstatements of fact and errors in logic" as they took exception to Darst's statements concerning the streets and alleys, and cost estimates. Superintendent Spotts explained the controversy surrounding the July 7 meeting to Director Drury, and analyzed the differences between the Hill-Tunnel and Levee-Tunnel plans. Spotts asserted that the Hill-Tunnel plan would cost only \$500,000 more than the Levee-Tunnel. [11] Association members lamented the fact that their relationship with the city stood so low. President William Crowder thought it "rather coincidental" that rumors of opposition to the Saarinen plan started following the railroad negotiations in July. The principal rumors were that no railroad settlement would be made, that Congress would not approve the funds, that Saarinen's arch would not be built, and that the city's businessmen opposed the Saarinen plan and felt that a stadium or housing should be built on the site instead. Luther Ely Smith was busy trying to stop such rumors. The association's only course of action was to confer with Mayor Darst, urging that the National Park Service and the Terminal Railroad Association resume negotiations. [12] Eero Saarinen kept going over the various railroad plans, attempting to eliminate the threat of rumbling trains and fumes from the memorial area. [13]

In November Secretary of the Interior Krug decided to stop in St. Louis while on a trip to Los Angeles. He and New Mexico Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, wished to confer with Luther Ely Smith and the association. Word of his planned arrival could not have come at a more crucial time, for renewed attacks had been made against Saarinen's Arch. Newspapers reported that Mayor Darst himself proposed that Saarinen's design should be dropped in favor of some other development, although the mayor denied this. In a letter to the *Post-Dispatch*, Darst stated that he favored moving ahead with the project without further delay. Association members

were violently opposed to what the newspapers reported the mayor as saying. [14] Even William Wurster, at M.I.T. in Cambridge, Massachusetts, warned, "Darst is ill-advised and he will end in disaster if he has his way." [15] National Park Service officials prepared for the scheduled November 10 meeting with Secretary Krug. Four issues would be raised, including the relocation of the railroad tracks, for which the Park Service favored Saarinen's plan to place the tunnel underground, as opposed to the McDevitt plan seeking an open railroad cut. Second, the Park Service favored retaining the symbolic arch. Memorial proponents believed the arch to be essential even though the mayor and others raised questions of propriety and practicality. Third, National Park Service officials did not want to pay to provide a parking garage for local use. Last, since Secretary Krug rejected Mayor Darst's suggestion of joint administration of the area, and because of the city's great interest in the project, National Park Service officials would not object to introducing legislation transferring the entire area to the city. This would occur only if this would be the most effective way for the city to achieve its ends. [16]

After months of trying to fit the railroad schemes in with his design, Eero Saarinen finally decided to take a firm stand. Because the railroad plan finally chosen would seriously influence the park's design, Saarinen clarified his position to the National Park Service. In his estimation, any of the railroad plans that placed the tracks in an enclosed tunnel west of the memorial arch plaza could be incorporated into the project's overall design. The Hill-Tunnel plan and the Bowen plan met his approval. Conversely, plans placing the tracks on the levee created "great hardships" on his design. The Levee-Tunnel plan established a "formidable barrier" between the memorial and the levee in Saarinen's estimation, and he hoped that everything possible would be done to place the tracks where they would not conflict with the arch design. [17]

Unexpectedly, the November 10 meeting was canceled. Both the mayor and association members Smith and Crowder had recently been to Washington to see the President, and they accused each other of canceling the meeting. Senator Anderson explained that the meeting was canceled because of the controversy over the project. In actuality, the cancellation was because of a personnel change in the Department of the Interior. [18] Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug resigned on November 11, 1949. The new secretary, Oscar L. Chapman, rescheduled the meeting for December 5 in Washington with all interests to be represented. The meeting proved to be one of the most significant in the history of the memorial. The city, the association, the railroads, and the Federal Government met to obtain an agreement on an authorization bill, to be introduced in Congress in January 1950, as well as to solve the other major uncertainties surrounding the memorial. [19]

Since no decision had ever been made as to relocation, no cost distribution had been discussed between the several interests. Armed with preliminary estimates prepared by Saarinen and Fred Severud, the National Park Service prepared to make recommendations as to their maximum participation in costs. Julian Spotts wanted to avoid any commitment to percentages of the total cost. He further believed that the Park Service should not pay any costs of moving tracks outside the area, nor should they pay all the costs of relocating tracks inside the area. The Park Service's contribution should only be in paying for excavating, lining, waterproofing, and backfilling the portion of the tunnel on memorial property. All other costs should be borne by the railroads. Spotts estimated the National Park Service's costs would be about \$2,500,000. [20]

Railroad Agreement

On December 6, after a full day's negotiations on the 5th in Washington, D.C., the various groups vitally interested in the memorial's construction authorized a "Memorandum of Understanding" which was, in effect, a plan for the relocation of the surface and elevated

railroad tracks extending in front of the historic site. The relocation was based on a plan designed by Eero Saarinen. The five tracks on the levee would be replaced by three tracks, one owned by the Missouri Pacific Railroad and two by the TRRA, proceeding through a tunnel not longer than 3,000 feet. The tunnel would be approximately fifty feet west of the current elevated line. The agreement would not become effective until several conditions were met. Approval of an eighteen foot vertical clearance (instead of the twenty-two feet normally required in a tunnel) had to come from the Missouri Public Service Commission. Permanent easements had to be granted by both the city and Federal Government to the Missouri Pacific Railroad and the TRRA for the track locations. The city was to be granted an easement for underground parking, while the Department of the Interior would recommend to Congress the transfer of certain areas from the memorial to the city for above-ground parking structures, if needed. No cost divisions were solved in the memorandum; but it said the document would not be effective until all parties agreed on the cost division and the project's cost as a whole. [21] Park Service officials were pleased, thinking that the agreement would serve as a satisfactory basis for future negotiations regarding cost allocations and authorizing legislation. They recommended Secretary Chapman approve the document, which he did on December 22, 1949. [22]

Major compromises had taken place, especially on the part of the National Park Service and Eero Saarinen regarding their long-held positions on both the underground parking and on the tracks remaining between the Arch and the river. At the December 5 conference in the secretary's office, the National Park Service said it held no objections to underground garages at certain locations if their construction, maintenance, and operation were performed without cost to the Federal Government. The garages could not interfere with any subsequent surface development. If city officials wanted above-ground parking, the Park Service would give them the land for such structures. [23]

An agreement about the railroad tracks did not come as easily, for the conference became deadlocked on the matter. After the meeting's breakup in the secretary's office, another conference ensued in National Park Service Associate Director Arthur Demaray's office. This meeting, too, broke up with no results. Eero Saarinen and Julian Spotts stayed together, working until 4:00 A.M. in an architect's office in Georgetown. They developed two plans that were shown to William Wurster over breakfast. On the morning of December 6, 1949, in a conference in Mayor Darst's hotel suite, they reached an agreement on one of the plans, which placed the tracks in a tunnel fifty feet west and parallel to the existing elevated trestle. [24] Thus the "Memorandum of Understanding" could claim that the plan was Saarinen's own.

Now began the campaign to have an authorization bill passed by Congress. The bill drafted earlier in the year was introduced in Congress in January. Julian Spotts wanted all preliminary work finished and construction preparations made immediately following passage of the bill. Eero Saarinen, too, knew that congressional members would want to see railroad, highway, and parking plans during the committee hearings. Yet so many uncertainties still existed that Saarinen did not know if he would design the railroad tunnel, or if the railroads would. Engineer Fred Severud's calculations on the amounts of stress and strain the Arch could endure indicated that placing the tracks next to the Arch would create more expense because of the deeper footings needed, but Severud felt assured that vibrations from the trains would not shake the Arch due to its mass and the bedrock. The design size and location of the parking garages would have to wait until the city was ready to proceed. [25]

Superintendent Julian Spotts helped Saarinen whenever possible by informing him of the exact plans needed. All details of the relocated tracks including design, location grades, allocation of costs, and approval of the Public Service Commission needed determining as soon as possible. Saarinen also needed studies of the tunnel's location with a profile of the

grade lines. To stop any rumors that might jeopardize the authorization bill's passage, Spotts believed that Saarinen's plan should remain essentially the same as the one accepted in the "Memorandum of Understanding." His plan, drawn up in the early morning hours of December 6, provided that the Arch would be placed *east* of the railroad tunnel. There were major construction difficulties in this but they were not insurmountable. Nevertheless, Spotts assured Saarinen that if subsequent studies indicated a more desirable location, Saarinen should feel free to adopt a better solution. [26]

Jefferson's memorial appeared to be on the brink of reality. More than ten years of negotiations between the railroads and the city of St. Louis came to an end as the TRRA agreed on a solution to the track problem approved by the Federal Government. Mayor Joseph Darst took an aggressive stand to solve the situation, which hung like a pall over his city's development. By provoking action and making statements against Saarinen's design, he generated controversy and thus publicity for the memorial. The association initially labeled Darst's remarks as "sabotage" but they presented a unified front with the mayor when they went to Washington. Publicity, in the form of newspaper items, editorials (the *St. Louis Star-Times* ran a series of six favorable to Saarinen's Arch in November and December), and paid advertisements (purchased by the association) seeking citizen response, appeared almost daily during the last few months of the year. The project was publicized as a national affair, not local. [27] This was brought to Darst's attention with deafening reality when Secretary Krug offered to give the site back to St. Louis if their local interests were more important than the nation's. Even as late as 1949, fourteen years after the park's establishment, the possibility existed that the site might not be used for the purpose intended.

The National Park Service's long-held position on parking was altered as the city promised not to let their underground parking interfere with above surface development. Even more radical was the decision to put the tracks in a tunnel on the levee. Only a threat that the entire project might fail if no agreement were made could have influenced Park Service officials and Eero Saarinen to accept less than what they wanted. Saarinen's last minute revisions, accepted by all concerned, saved the project, at least for the time being, since memorial supporters had believed the railroad relocation to be the worst obstacle in the memorial's path.

Ailing seventy-six year old Luther Ely Smith was cheered as "Mr. Riverfront" for his work toward his dream. [28] He personally felt indebted toward Secretary Chapman for holding the conference, and praised the "earnest spirit" of the meeting's other participants which made the agreement possible. Smith's principal hope was that the authorization bill would be ready for introduction into Congress on January 3 by Representative John Sullivan. [29]

A stiff battle lay ahead. The National Park Service needed money for other more pressing problems. Many national parks stood in states of disrepair after the war years. The growing number of postwar visitors created demands on the already inadequate accommodations; many western parks needed road repairs, and money was needed for protection, maintenance, and preservation throughout the entire system. Ever present calls for cuts in government spending threatened expenditures for parks. Additionally, St. Louis itself had to convince Congress that the memorial was nationally significant and worthy of receiving Federal funds. [30]

Work on drafting an authorization bill began earlier in the year when the association sought an appropriation (pending the track removal). Since any bill had to pass judgment by each of the varied interests, the association started in February by submitting their drafts to the executive committee of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug and National Park Service Director Newton Drury also examined the drafts and made changes. In April 1949 Luther Ely Smith was told that

Congressman John Sullivan had received a draft approved by the Department of the Interior, containing a provision that no money would be spent until the tracks were removed. Because this conflicted with the basis of the association's negotiations, Smith asked Sullivan not to introduce the bill. Meanwhile, city officials worked with TRRA representatives to resolve their objections. Julian Spotts attended so many group conferences with association members in connection with the legislation drafts that he wished for "more action and less discussion." [31] Eventually, after adoption of the "Memorandum of Understanding" in December all groups agreed on a version of the bill. [32]

Authorization Efforts

As soon as Congress convened in January 1950 Representative John B. Sullivan of Missouri introduced the bill (H.R. 6573) which was referred to the Committee on House Administration. On the Senate side Senator Clinton P. Anderson introduced the same bill (S. 2784) and it was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration. The identical bills provided for the construction of the memorial in accordance with the plan (Saarinen's) approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. The secretary of the interior would be authorized to grant easements and such sums needed to carry out the project would be appropriated. The bills called for the project's completion in 1953, the 150th anniversary of Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase. Luther Ely Smith worried that in this short session and election year, congressional members would want to get home for the primaries and general elections, and thus would avoid all issues raising economic questions. Smith feared the bill would not be passed, which would mean the loss of a year. [33]

After both bills were referred to subcommittees, Senator Anderson, Representative Sullivan, and association member Judge James Douglas watched their progress through the maze of congressional law making. Luther Ely Smith gave Representative Ken Regan (Texas), chairman of the House Library Subcommittee, full details of the project's history, stressing its public support, the lack of "competent" opposition, and its potential economic benefits. All through the ensuing battle to secure the appropriation, Smith, association members, city officials, and others with varied interests in the memorial bombarded the congressional committee members with letters, telegrams, and other messages of support for the bill. [34]

Despite his agreement with the basic bill, Secretary of the Interior Chapman recommended to both Senator Carl Hayden (Arizona), chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and Representative Mary Norton (New Jersey), chairwoman of the Committee on House Administration, that another section be added to the bill. Chapman wanted to add the provision that the project not be undertaken until an agreement was reached, satisfactory to him, providing for relocation of the tracks. Luther Ely Smith opposed adding the amendment, as he believed it would both encourage other interests to offer amendments, and would jeopardize the bill's passage. [35] The bills retained their original wording when in May Representative Ken Regan's House subcommittee scheduled a hearing on H.R. 6573. The Senate subcommittee was invited to attend. [36]

With the association paying expenses, the project's supporters gathered materials and traveled to Washington. On May 10 they submitted oral and written statements, documents, and miscellaneous material to the legislators. City officials presenting oral arguments included the current mayor, two former mayors (Dickmann and Kaufmann), the city's counselor, the comptroller, and the presidents of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce and the Associated Retailers of St. Louis. Railroad officials, St. Louis businessmen, state governors, and George Howe, the competition advisor, all contributed written statements. The association supplied documents pertaining to the memorial's establishment and Saarinen's winning design. Even though Representative Regan wanted Senator Theodore Green's (Rhode Island) Senate subcommittee present at the hearing, Green could not attend, and only a scant quorum was

present. Nevertheless, to accommodate the St. Louisans Regan agreed to hear as much testimony as possible. Superintendent Julian Spotts attended the hearing but did not testify, and Representative Regan made arrangements to hear late testimony from Director Newton Drury. Luther Ely Smith regrettably could not attend because of illness. [37]

Six days passed while the House subcommittee considered the testimony and preferred amendments. On May 16 the committee reported the bill out favorably, but with several amendments recommended by the city, the Department of the Interior, and the committee itself. The bill now called for the project's construction, provided that the secretary of the interior be authorized to convey portions of the site to the city for an above ground parking structure. The railroads were to be relocated with limited Federal funds (\$1,875,000). No appropriations would exceed \$5,000,000, and only five specific elements would be completed: railroad relocation, grading and filling, landscaping, paving, and restoration of the Old Courthouse. The work was to be finished by 1953; the bill did not authorize construction of the Arch. Representative John Sullivan introduced the amended bill (H.R. 8591) into the House on May 22, 1950. [38] He kept up the pace by seeking a special meeting of the House Administration Committee to consider the bill. Sullivan wanted the authorization passed before President Harry Truman's scheduled visit to St. Louis on June 10. Truman, a member of the Thirty-fifth Division Association (a veteran's group), was to attend that organization's thirtieth reunion in St. Louis, make a major foreign policy address, and dedicate the site of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. [39] Despite Sullivan's desires, authorization was not in hand by the dedication date.

The reunion proved to be a momentous affair in St. Louis. President Truman, walking in a parade with his fellow Thirty-fifth Division veterans from Seventeenth and Olive Streets to a reviewing stand on the east steps of the Old Courthouse, attracted crowds estimated at 250,000. In his speech he concentrated on the growing crisis in Korea (which would later seriously affect the memorial's progress). Truman dedicated the site and once inside the Old Courthouse further indicated his interest by inspecting Eero Saarinen's model. [40]

The resultant publicity given to the memorial project added irony to the fact that no authorization or appropriation existed for the memorial's main features. Mayor Joseph Darst capitalized on the publicity by telegraphing Representative Mary Norton and many other members of the House and Senate Administration Committees, telling them of the dedication and urging them to support the bill. [41] Two days later, on June 29, Representative Norton's Committee on House Administration reported favorably on H.R. 8591. Representative Regan immediately went to the House Rules Committee in an attempt to get the bill on the House floor before adjournment. [42]

His efforts proved fruitless because of an event then occurring halfway around the world. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean People's Army invaded South Korea. Within three days Seoul had fallen and the Republic of Korea's Army was shattered. On June 30, the day after the House committee's favorable report on the memorial bill, President Truman ordered United States ground forces into Korea.

As yet unaware of the effect these events would have upon his dreams, a thrilled Luther Ely Smith turned toward getting action on the Senate side for the bill which had to pass through Senator Green's subcommittee, Senator Hayden's committee, and the Senate itself. Senator Clinton Anderson began the process by introducing the amended bill (the counterpart of H.R. 8591) into the Senate (S. 3867) on July 6. The lobbying onslaught began again as association members, St. Louis businessmen, and other project supporters contacted members of the Senate subcommittee both orally and with written material supporting the project. In previous years members of the House of Representatives had been the major opponents of the project, but in 1950 the stumbling block proved to be the Senate. Two weeks after Anderson

introduced the bill, the subcommittee met and failed to report out the bill. Instead, the senators decided to confer with the National Park Service to consider giving a portion of the site back to St Louis to be sold with the proceeds then being used to finish the grounds and rehabilitate the Old Courthouse. Fiscal conservatism clearly became the principal consideration; for in fact the Senate had just killed a bill for construction of a Senate Office Building to save money for the Korean Conflict. Senator Clinton Anderson could not envision his colleagues voting down their own office building and then giving money for a memorial in St. Louis. [43]

In St. Louis, association members correctly read the Senate mood and took steps to appease some of the opposition. They adopted a statement of policy requesting that everything possible be done to have the authorization bills passed, but they decided to postpone seeking an appropriation until the President of the United States or the secretary of the interior believed the time to be propitious. Association members believed that if the authorization bills died during the current congressional session, all their expenses and preparation time incurred for the House Library Subcommittee hearing would be for naught. All involved congressmen were notified of the association's statement, especially Representative Ken Regan, who continued to monitor the bill's progress in the House. [44]

Luther Ely Smith found himself caught between two crises, the one in Korea, and the climax of his own seventeen-year effort for the memorial. Smith did not want to see the memorial fail after the efforts of the past few months in Congress, so he proposed dropping the bill's clause providing for completion by 1952 in hopes of eventual passage. [45]

Senator Anderson wanted the National Park Service's opinion of the proposal to return a portion of the site and contacted Director Newton Drury, who immediately saw the implications. The reasons for developing the area according to the plan adopted by the Commission far outweighed any reasons for compromise involving reducing the site's size. The memorial's boundaries were essentially those of St. Louis at the time of the Louisiana Purchase and thus of great historical significance. Drury pointed out that reducing the memorial's size probably would result in the abandonment of Saarinen's plans. Any revision would probably produce a design resulting in an unsatisfactory national memorial. Selling the most valuable commercial property near the north end of the site would not yield enough funds to affect the project's overall cost. Drury believed that only \$3,000,000 or \$4,000,000 could be raised in this manner, and this at the sacrifice of the memorial's approved design. He predicted considerable protest from previous property owners if the property were released for commercial purposes. [46]

After this reply from the National Park Service, Senator Green, to avoid having the bill reported out of his subcommittee adversely, submitted it to the full committee without recommendation. Senator Anderson emphasized the association's stand on deferring the appropriation, but the full committee decided not to pursue any further action on the bill during the current session. [47] In the House the bill fared little better. Because H.R. 8591 authorized the expenditure of more than \$1,000,000, it required concurrence from the House Committee on Rules, headed by Representative Adolph Sabath (Illinois), before the House could consider it. Such a ruling could not be requested by anyone except Representatives Mary Norton or Ken Regan. Norton told John Sullivan that she would immediately ask for a ruling, while Sabath told him he would grant it. Unfortunately, her doctor ordered Mary Norton to bed and Ken Regan went home to Texas to fight for reelection, so the right people were not present in Congress for the needed results. Luther Ely Smith and William Semsrott believed they should not ask Regan to apply for a ruling because of the association's policy concerning appropriations and the completion date, unless they had President Truman's support for such legislation. [48] But Harry Truman's concerns were in Korea, not St. Louis. By October United Nations Forces crossed the Korean thirty-eighth parallel and the first

Chinese Communist troops entered the country. On October 15 the President and General Douglas MacArthur met at Wake Island.

In the same month the association's executive committee contemplated having a hearing before Senator Green's subcommittee, bringing in prominent figures to testify. The association members realized that they had the approval of those who had been present at Representative Regan's hearing, and the disapproval of those on the Senate side who missed the hearing. After meeting with Vice President Alben Barkley and Senator Anderson, association leaders were assured of a hearing before the full Senate committee during the current congressional session. Simultaneously, association president William Crowder appealed to Representative Ken Regan to make an application to the House Rules Committee for a ruling on the million-plus amount. [49]

When another month passed with no action, the association's executive committee prepared for the worst. They proceeded to write a new authorization bill to be introduced into the new Congress in January 1951. Only a bare possibility existed for passage during the current session, although there would still be a hearing before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee. More pressure was placed on Representative Regan to secure a ruling, but both he and John Sullivan believed they should wait. Considerable difficulty lay in passing legislation because of the international situation and its effect on Washington. By December Regan, so far an avid supporter of the bill, wondered if it were advisable to attempt anything during the current situation, since if the bill failed it might adversely affect efforts in the spring. [50] Vice President Alben Barkley strongly recommended against holding a Senate committee hearing, saying nothing would be accomplished by it. With this advice from one of their own commission members, the association gave up any further attempts to have the authorization bills passed. They focused instead on their chances in the coming year. These depended most directly upon the international situation, but also indirectly upon the makeup of committees in the new Congress. John Sullivan did not believe that the value of all the work and effort in the past year was wasted. Impressed members of Congress would stay impressed, most of them would probably be returned to Congress, and the record of proceedings before the House subcommittee was one of the finest. Additionally, it would be preferable to present their case to a new Congress, which might act on the authorization. [51]

Events had taken a harsh turn against the Jefferson memorial project. At the beginning of the year the situation had seemed ripe for the project's authorization and appropriation in Congress. Association members had come out of a slumber using the momentum started by the architectural competition to push through their bills. They had identified the pivotal congressmen, placed pressure upon them, worked with them — but in the end had to take congressional advice to abandon the efforts. All the vested interests (city, Federal Government, railroads, and association) had presented a united front once they worked out an authorization bill to their liking. But as unfamiliar names such as Inch'on, Wonsan, and P'yongyang entered the vocabulary of Americans, the memorial backers had to abandon their domestic desires for the sake of national interests.

Railroad Tunnel Clearance

While project supporters waited in Washington, decisions were made in St. Louis concerning the railroads. The 1949 "Memorandum of Understanding" called for an eighteen-foot clearance in the railroad tunnel, and for the Arch to be placed to the east of it. The substandard clearance had to be approved by the Missouri Public Service Commission. Meanwhile, Eero Saarinen considered Superintendent Julian Spotts' suggestion to move the Arch's location from the east side of the tracks to the west side. Spotts believed there was merit in moving the Arch while leaving the tunnel plans as they were. The tunnel could be built while the elevated still operated, and Saarinen risked starting a new controversy if he

departed from the memorandum's requirement that the tunnel be fifty feet west of the present elevated line. [52] Saarinen finally agreed and made the changes. He moved the Arch west of the tracks, eliminated the historic arcade, which was to be composed of courts with sculpture and paintings, and removed the recently restored Old Rock House, as it stood in the way of the tunnel. Julian Spotts did not think the changes were the railroads' concern, but he was anxious to avoid any controversy that might arise. For that reason only Spotts' office, Saarinen, Luther Ely Smith, and a few National Park Service officials knew of the changes. They did not affect the memorial's concept or cost.

This secrecy proved justified in Julian Spotts' mind, for several railroad officials expected Eero Saarinen to solve all the problems attendant to relocation. Looking at Saarinen's plans, they raised so many problems about grades, tie-ins, and other matters that Spotts thought them delinquent in their cooperation. He felt it was not Saarinen's function to investigate all the problems involved, and Saarinen agreed. If all the burden of proof fell on Saarinen, he would have to hire a railroad consultant, something he wanted to avoid until the project was actually commissioned. Spotts' policy was to keep the status quo agreement to avoid jeopardizing the authorization, while studying the detailed problems. [53]

Mayor Joseph Darst stayed active and interested in the railroad plans. He held conferences with the National Park Service and railroad union representatives interested in the operations aspect of the project. Committees were appointed to study various problems and to secure conferences with the public representatives concerned. One particular problem was the tunnel clearance question and the resultant need to get a ruling from the Missouri Public Service Commission allowing the tunnel roof to be lower than standard. [54] The normally required twenty-two-foot clearance was, in this case, impractical. Certain physical facts made it impossible to depress the tracks to gain the necessary twenty-two feet. Conceivably, the tunnel's height could be raised to the same elevation as the elevated tracks, but this was not satisfactory in the minds of Park Service, association, and city officials because it ruined the so-called "Saarinen vista." This was the aesthetic view between the Old Courthouse and the Mississippi River. City officials believed it necessary to provide Eero Saarinen with impartial expert testimony to defend the vista's aesthetic importance before the Public Service Commission. [55]

The hearing began June 14, 1950, in Jefferson City, Missouri, four days after President Truman dedicated the memorial site. Additional testimony came on July 17 to 19, with oral arguments given on September 8. As complainants, the city of St. Louis and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association sought an order from the commission requiring the defendants, i.e. the Terminal Railroad Association, Bridge Terminal Railway Company, and the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, to execute the eighteen-foot vertical clearance tunnel plan in accordance with the "Memorandum of Understanding." The complainants wanted detailed plans and specifications of the project to be approved by the commission, along with restrictions and safeguards on operating practices the commission deemed necessary for public safety. [56]

Fifteen witnesses testified for the complainants on June 14, including Julian Spotts, William Crowds, Bernard Dickmann, and Eero Saarinen, who defended the three main points of his design. Most important was the Arch. Secondly, he wanted to use as much of the site as possible for a forest with trees. The third factor was the relation of the monument to the river. The Arch was not placed in the center of the site, but on its edge on the levee. One of the memorial's most historic aspects was its relationship with the river, because "Most of the history of the west has passed by that levee." [57] If there were any way of preventing it, Saarinen wanted to keep the tunnel's elevation from extending above 429 feet to preserve the sloping area between the levee and the memorial plaza. Saarinen testified, "It is not only the relation between the levee and the Plaza which becomes so very difficult, it is also the profile

through the whole project. At present you can see the river from the Old Courthouse ... and if this was raised beyond 429 you would not see enough of the river to know that there was a river there." [58]

The dean of the architectural school at Washington University testified after Saarinen and provided more support for the 18-foot clearance from an aesthetic viewpoint. Having a 22-foot clearance would raise the tunnel to an elevation of more than 429 feet, which would be extremely harmful to the overall design. In the dean's mind, adding anything to the crest of the hill between the levee and the site would harm or destroy one of the basic relationships that made the memorial distinctive. Furthermore, since the memorial was not a utilitarian project, beauty remained a principal consideration. [59]

Opposition to shortening the tunnel by four feet came from five St. Louis railroad brotherhoods, which did not oppose the memorial's construction or Saarinen's design. Rather, they opposed the construction of the relocated track in violation of safety laws of the state of Missouri when there existed no "real" reason as they saw it, to depart from the vertical clearance statute. In their opinion the complainants had not demonstrated by any physical means that the additional four feet of tunnel would be a visual barrier. Even if ventilation and operational restrictions were placed in the tunnel to eliminate dangerous working conditions, the defendants' counsel still opposed the tunnel because it was a substandard clearance and because it was a tunnel. He was not convinced that a tunnel was even needed in the situation. [60]

The completion of oral argument on September 8 closed all testimony, and the Public Service Commission retired to ponder the evidence. Their task was to weigh whether aesthetics were important enough to influence the construction of a substandard tunnel. Two years passed before the commission made its decision. On August 7, 1952, they approved the eighteen-foot vertical clearance in the tunnel for relocating the tracks. Their approval fulfilled one of the conditions of the "Memorandum of Understanding." Eero Saarinen offered faint words of hope to Julian Spotts, saying "Congratulations! If we live long enough we'll have the railroad underground and the monument built." [61]

Building the monument still meant having all aspects of the development ready as soon as Congress passed authorization bills. Even while the tunnel clearance controversy was going on, other National Park Service officials were reexamining the memorial's initial "interpretive prospectus," a Park Service document setting out the basic theme of the park to guide planning. It was obvious that correlation was needed between the Saarinen plan and the Park Service's pre-war interpretive planning. Park Service officials accepted Saarinen's space allotments for the proposed western museum and museum of architecture as well as the other general building plans. The proposed building interiors needed additional study by the chief historian and chief of the museum division on cost and space allotments for laboratories, storage, and exhibit space. After the historical museum's completion Park Service officials planned to move the Old Courthouse exhibits into the new building and incorporate them in the new exhibits. The plan was to use the Old Courthouse only for offices. According to Acting Director Conrad Wirth, using the building as a museum was a makeshift arrangement only. Some differences existed between Saarinen's plans and Park Service ideals over the proposed frontier and cathedral villages. Park Service officials simply did not want them. It was left up to Superintendent Spotts to work with the chief historian to review the interpretive proposals and prepare a memorandum for Director Drury formulating a definite interpretive plan. [62] Later developments changed Saarinen's grounds development plans considerably. Soaring costs effectively forced the removal of the proposed villages, trails, and outdoor campfire theatre. In the late 1950s Eero Saarinen had to drastically cut his proposals down to the basic elements of Arch, forest, and the memorial-river relationship to get congressional appropriations.

Further Authorization Efforts

In 1951 the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association and its supporters in Congress attempted once again to secure authorization for the memorial. Specific changes were made in the 1950 (81st Congress) bills, S.3867 and H.R. 8591, to increase their chances for survival. After conferring with the National Park Service and City Counselor James Crowe, Luther Ely Smith readied new bills for introduction. Appropriations for the five elements to be completed by 1953 could not exceed \$5,000,000, as in the previous bills, but there was no longer a written ceiling on the amount of money the Government could spend for railroad track relocation. Another change resulted from the highly charged atmosphere of the Korean War. The new bills provided for construction of underground bomb shelters on the site. Senator Clinton Anderson introduced the Senate bill, now S. 230, on January 8, 1951, and it was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The House equivalent, H.R. 2937, was introduced by Representative Frank Karsten (Missouri) and referred once more to the Committee on House Administration. [63]

Several basic facts influenced the two major changes. There was strong demand for bomb shelters and within the business district of St. Louis the memorial site was the only large vacant space available for the purpose. The ceiling on Federal costs for track relocation was dropped because of the uncertainty as to future cost levels. Because the construction date seemed remote, association members deemed it advisable to leave the determination of the Federal Government's limit of fiscal contribution until a later date. Association members also wanted other changes in the new bills.

They wanted to eliminate the \$5,000,000 appropriation limit, the reference to the 1953 completion date, and the project's limitation to the five central elements (still excluding the Arch). Instead, they preferred that the bill authorize up to \$15,750,000. They believed placing dollar limitations in the authorization bill to be dangerous, in that any restrictive language would prejudice the ultimate grant of sufficient appropriations. The \$15,750,000 figure came from the remaining unexpended portion of the 1934-1935 Government funds. [64]

Despite the association's wishes, Senator Clinton Anderson reintroduced the bill with the first two amendments but without the others. In his opinion it would be difficult enough getting the \$5,000,000, let alone \$15,750,000. He left the original request for \$5,000,000. [65] Association members sought to delete the 1953 completion date because they were not requesting any appropriation and wanted to be certain that there existed no misunderstanding about their position as to future appropriations. They feared Congress conceivably could take action to change the project's scope by completing only portions of the plans and not authorizing the Arch's construction. Finally, Missouri Senator Thomas Hennings, Jr., agreed that changing the bill would clarify the backers' position, and leave no room for misunderstanding on the appropriation question. He promised to consult Senator Clinton Anderson on the subject. [66]

Association member William Semsrott spent some time in Washington, D.C. with Representative Frank Karsten, going over details of H.R. 2937 before its introduction in the House. Karsten, too, knew there was no chance for a \$15,000,000 authorization. He believed it best to make the bill identical to S. 230, so that it would pass the House Committee on Administration. [67] After the bill's introduction, Representative Karsten took additional efforts to point out to his fellow legislators the distinction between an authorization and an appropriation. He pointed out repeatedly that the memorial bill was an authorization only, but he soon discovered that many legislators found it difficult to distinguish between the two. Nevertheless, Karsten believed that if those in opposition would analyze the situation they would agree to the authorization. [68]

Association members hoped to have a joint session of the Senate and House committees to consider the bills. They received no support in the endeavor from either Frank Karsten or Clinton Anderson, both of whom believed the best approach lay in securing a Senate hearing a day or two after the House hearing. [69] In the early months of 1951 several outside conditions affected the attempt for authorization. The Korean conflict continued and there was no end in sight. General Douglas MacArthur had promised that United States troops would be home by Christmas. Now, in April, the old soldier was relieved of his duties by President Truman. Truce talks would not begin for another three months.

Death of Luther Ely Smith

On April 2, 1951, another blow shattered the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association. Luther Ely Smith, the group's guiding light for seventeen years, suffered a fatal heart attack while walking to his office for another working day. His death at age seventy-seven came at a time when his riverfront project remained a plan on paper. Friends, associates, and co-workers sent their contributions for his memory to the association for use in furthering the memorial. Just a month before his death, Smith received a fitting tribute from National Park Service Director Newton Drury, who was leaving office. "Part of the compensation for distasteful aspects in this job has been the rich associations with cultured gentlemen like yourself and the opportunity to observe your skill and accomplishments." [70]

Association members carried on Smith's work, determined now more than ever to get the project authorized. But the Senate committee refused to set hearing dates until it received reports on the measure from the secretary of the interior and the Bureau of the Budget. [71] Even after reports came in favoring the project, Congress took no action. By June, association members deferred their request for a hearing, even though the bills sought no appropriation. They decided to postpone their efforts because of the pressing problems facing Congress. Representative Frank Karsten approved of the move. [72]

The maneuver did not mean the project was abandoned. On the contrary, while the memorial's supporters felt justified seeking the authorization, they merely decided to wait until the international situation improved. At this point yet another suggestion was made to return the site to the city of St. Louis. The suggestion came from Representative Ken Regan, one of the association's congressional supporters, and association president William Crowds denounced it. Strong legal and moral grounds existed, in Crowds' estimation, for the Federal Government to complete the memorial project. [73] In Washington the situation remained at a standstill. While the association's congressional backers watched developments, spoke to members of the two administration committees, and remained ready to give the word when the situation might turn favorable, the members themselves coped with the loss of Luther Ely Smith while trying to do things the way Smith would have wanted them done. Trying to economize, the association essentially closed down their office, leaving it open only two days a week to keep contacts. [74]

Association member William Semsrott kept communication open with the various involved congressmen. Representative Karsten remained interested and advocated the project among his colleagues, but reported that their principal priorities, the military situation and fiscal conservatism, seemed to add emphasis to the idea of having the Federal Government return the site to the city. Representative Ken Regan agreed to be flexible, to "tread water" until the group wanted to try again for authorization. At the same time he was willing to arrange for the site's return to the city if St. Louis so wished. [75]

St. Louis city officials made arrangements during the year with the secretary of the interior to use revenues from the municipal parking lot on the memorial property to pay for temporary landscaping. Under the old contract the city had to pay \$10,000 a year rental to the National

Park Service for the parking site. Now all the parking fees were to be used for maintenance and beautification. On March 30, 1951, Mayor Darst turned the first spade of earth for the beginning work on the section of land east of the Old Courthouse. This block held first priority for grading and seeding, to turn it into a sunken garden. [76]

In 1951, in addition to the city's efforts to improve the site's condition, and the association's effort to secure authorization, Eero Saarinen continued carrying out his contract with the National Park Service. His services were used more broadly than was first anticipated because of the railroad and parking lot situations. By January 1951 he completed work on twenty-one drawings, including profiles of the Arch, scale drawings of the museums and restaurants, various parking proposals, the effect of the levee-tunnel railroad plan on the Arch footings, the Arch foundations, the Third Street Expressway, and the internal and external structure of the Arch. The engineering firm of Fred N. Severud provided the Arch's structural calculations, based on wind tunnel tests of an Arch model. Conferences were held with a bridge company to solve erection and stainless steel fabrication problems. When Saarinen fulfilled his contract for the preliminary investigations, the National Park Service approved his work and paid him. [77]

While Saarinen and Superintendent Spotts awaited the outcome of the Missouri Public Service Commission case (the eighteen-foot tunnel), Spotts appeared before the commission in another hearing, this time regarding the Missouri Pacific Railroad tracks on Poplar Street. St. Louis city officials had the tracks. The city, the railroads, and the State Highway Department all agreed on costs and design, but protests came from several railroad labor unions over some substandard clearances. Spotts testified that the plan would benefit the memorial, even though the National Park Service was in no way concerned with the case because of the tracks' location outside the memorial's boundaries. [78]

In 1952 the Missouri Public Service Commission approved the tunnel's eighteen-foot clearance. This was the single decision of that year toward the memorial's development. No further work was done on the physical site itself, Congress took no action on the authorization while the war raged, and the association sat in shock after Luther Ely Smith's death. The Korean war effectively served, as had World War II, to stop all progress on the Jefferson memorial.

The post-competition years were bittersweet. Saarinen's plan was the prize at the end of the rainbow, but the project's supporters were finding the way there a rough road indeed. They could see some encouraging signs; they had managed to unite all the involved interests on the railroad question, arriving at a "Memorandum of Understanding." Eero Saarinen kept up his flexibility and optimism by drawing scaled plans and shifting the Arch's location. President Truman provided legitimacy for the project by dedicating the site. But the bitterness came when the association failed for three years to secure an authorization, let alone an appropriation. The association felt Luther Ely Smith's loss, both emotionally and professionally. And of course they would try again in 1953 to obtain the coveted authorization; they still held faith in the project. As Minette Forthmann, the association's long-time secretary, asserted to Eero Saarinen, "But we all still have enough hope and determination to see it through." [79] Success was just around the corner.

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CHAPTER V: Footnotes

¹Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 12 January 1949, JEFF; memorandum, J.B. Rasbach to Director NPS, 15 February 1949, JEFF.

²Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 1 March 1949, JNEMA.

³Ibid.; memorandum, Drury to Superintendent JNEM, 4 March 1949, JNEMA.

⁴Richmond C. Coburn to Smith, 21 April 1949, JNEMA; Spotts to Saarinen, 22 April 1949, JNEMA; Spotts to Clifford Shoemaker, 31 May 1949, JNEMA.

⁵"Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting" Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 29 June 1949, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 8 July 1949, JNEMA; memorandum for the files, comments made at meeting of July 7 1949, in Mayor Darst's office, typed comments, JNEMA.

⁶Eero Saarinen, *Report on Modifications to the McDevitt Levee Tunnel Plan as requested by architects in meeting July 8 1949*, 14 July 1949, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 8 July, JNEMA.

⁷William Crowds to Smith, 8 July 1949, JNEMA; Chester Davis to Smith, 11 July 1949, JNEMA.

⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 July 1949, JEFF; Eero Saarinen, *Levee Plan Limits Freedom to Cope with Unknown Factors in Design of Memorial*, 15 July 1949, JNEMA.

⁹Joseph Darst to Julius Krug, 22 July 1949, JNEMA; *The Jefferson Memorial: A Compendium of Relative Facts to Date*, n.d., typed report, JNEMA.

¹⁰Krug to Darst, 11 August 1949, JNEMA.

¹¹Crowds to Saarinen, 15 August 1949, JNEMA; memorandum (confidential), Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 21 September 1949, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 28 September 1949, JNEMA. In stressing the need for parking, Mayor Darst estimated that space would be needed for 3,500 autos daily. Spotts doubted that 10,000 visitors would ever attend the memorial on any given day except for special occasions. Such a large visitation would seriously damage the area from overuse. In 1978 the memorial's

highest attendance stood at 3,500,000 for a calendar year.

¹²"Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 30 October 1949, meeting minutes, JNEMA.

¹³Saarinen to Smith, 24 October 1949.

¹⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 26 October 1949, JNEMA; *St. Louis Star-Times*, 26 October 1949, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 October 1949.

¹⁵William Wurster to William Crowdus, 1 November 1949, JNEMA.

¹⁶Memorandum, Director NPS to Secretary of the Interior, 2 November 1949, JNEMA.

¹⁷Saarinen to Spotts, 5 November 1949, JNEMA.

¹⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 November 1949; telegram, Clinton Anderson to Smith, 7 November 1949, JNEMA.

¹⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 14 November 1949; Darst to Smith, 23 November 1949, JNEMA.

²⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 30 November 1949, JNEMA. Saarinen and Severud estimated that the Arch, complete with foundations and elevators, would cost \$6,500,000.

²¹Memorandum of Understanding, 6 December 1949, JNEMA. Those signing the document: Mayor Joseph Darst, P.J. Neff, chief executive officer for the trustees, Missouri Pacific Railroad; Armstrong Chinn, president, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis; Luther Ely Smith for the commission, William Crowdus for the association, Eero Saarinen and National Park Service Director Newton Drury.

²²Memorandum, Associate Director NPS to Secretary of the Interior, 8 December 1949, JNEMA; Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 January 1950, JEFF.

²³Memorandum, Superintendent, JNEM to Regional Director, Region Two, 8 December 1949, JNEMA.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵Spotts to Saarinen, 22 December 1949, JNEMA; Saarinen to Spotts, 14 December 1949, JNEMA.

²⁶Spotts to Saarinen, 22 December 1949, JNEMA.

²⁷See *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* and the *St. Louis Star-Times*, October-November-December, 1949 (especially the *Star-Times*, 28-30 November, 1-2 December, 1949). Association members sought citizen support by placing an ad entitled "Wake Up St. Louis" in all three newspapers on November 8. Many letters of support came in. Attacks on the Arch came from some businessmen who feared a "white elephant." *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 28 October 1949. The president of the Cardinal baseball organization proposed placing a stadium on the site, which provoked even more controversy. *St. Louis*

Post-Dispatch, 4 November 1949.

²⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 December 1949.

²⁹Smith to Chapman, 10 December 1949, JNEMA.

³⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 14 November 1949. For more information on the deteriorated state of the parks in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see John Ise, *Our National Park Policy* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1961), Chapters XXI and XXV.

³¹Memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 18 February 1949, JNEMA; Smith to Drury, 24 February 1949, JNEMA; "Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 6 May 1949, typed meeting minutes, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts to Director NPS, 11 May 1949, JEFF.

³²Spotts to Saarinen, 22 December 1949, JNEMA. St. Louis Counselor Crowe, Terminal counsel Richard Coburn, and association members agreed on the draft. The commission's executive committee approved the draft on December 19. Smith to John Sullivan, 29 December 1949, JNEMA; Smith to Wayne Morse, 30 December 1949, JNEMA.

³³Smith to Oscar Chapman, 11 February 1950, JNEMA; Bill, S. 2784, U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 5 January 1950, JNEMA; Smith to Horace Albright, 21 February 1950, JNEMA.

³⁴Smith to Clinton Anderson, 17 February 1950, JNEMA; Smith to Ken Regan, 6 March 1950, JNEMA; see Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association legislative files.

³⁵Secretary of the Interior to Carl Hayden, 3 May, 1950, JNEMA; William Warne to Mary Norton, 10 May 1950, JNEMA; telegram, Smith to Chapman, 6 March 1950, JNEMA.

³⁶Smith to Morse, 2 May 1950, JNEMA.

³⁷*Record of Reports to the Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives and Hearing Before the Library Subcommittee*, 10 May 1950, typed report, JNEMA.

³⁸Sullivan to Crowds, 16 May 1950, JNEMA; Bill, H.R. 8591, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 22 May 1950.

³⁹Joseph Darst to Forrest Smith, 2 February 1950, Forrest Smith Papers, file No. 858, WHMC.

⁴⁰Program, Thirty-Fifth Division, Thirtieth Reunion, 9, 10, 11 June 1950, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 June 1950. The reunion attracted such notables as the French ambassador to the United States, various state governors, cabinet members, congressmen and army brass. Both Mayor Joseph Darst and Missouri Governor Forrest Smith walked in the parade with Truman, but newspaper accounts said that Darst was wilting and Smith was limping by the time they reached the Old Courthouse. The walk did not seem to affect "spry" Truman. In his speech, Truman accused the Soviet Union of preparing for war, had harsh words for American isolationists, and compared the importance of foreign policy in Jefferson's day with that of 1950.

⁴¹Telegram, Joseph Darst to Mary Norton, 27 June 1950, JNEMA.

⁴²*Report* (to accompany H.R. 8591), House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd session, no. 2433, 29 June 1950; telegram, William Semsrott to Smith, 29 June 1950, JNEMA.

⁴³Smith to Clinton Anderson, 1 July 1950, JNEMA; Bill, S. 3867, U.S. Senate, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 6 July 1950, JNEMA; Anderson to Semsrott, 25 July 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁴Crowdus to Alben Barkley, 27 July 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁵Smith to Barkley, 2 August 1950, JNEMA; Anderson to Drury, 3 August 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁶Drury to Anderson, 9 August 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁷Anderson to Semsrott, 14 September 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁸Memorandum, Smith and Semsrott to Ronald J. Foulis, 15 September 1950, JNEMA; Sullivan to Crowdus, 20 September 1950, JNEMA.

⁴⁹Semsrott to Anderson, 2 October 1950, JNEMA; Crowdus to Regan, 5 October 1950, JNEMA.

⁵⁰Mrs. Perry S. Forthmann to Foulis, 21 October 1950, JNEMA; Smith to Howard I. Young, 24 November 1950, JNEMA; report by William Semsrott, 1 December 1950, JNEMA; Regan to James Douglas, 4 December 1950, JNEMA.

⁵¹Stanley Rector to Douglas, 7 December 1950, JNEMA; Crowdus to members of the Board of Trustees, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 14 December 1950, JNEMA; Sullivan to Crowdus, 20 September 1950, JNEMA.

⁵²Spotts to Saarinen, 16 January 1950, JNEMA.

⁵³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 25 January 1950, JNEMA.

⁵⁴Armstrong Chinn to Frank J. McDevitt, 1 February 1950, JNEMA; Spotts to Saarinen, 3 February 1950, JNEMA; Saarinen to Spotts, 14 February 1950, JNEMA.

⁵⁵Darst to Spotts, 7 March 1950, JEFF; "Minutes of Conference, Mayor's Office," 14 March 1950, typed meeting minutes, JEFF; James Crowe to C.O. Griffis, 14 April 1950, JEFF; Armstrong Chinn to Forrest G. Ferris, Jr., 26 April 1950, JEFF.

⁵⁶Forrest G. Ferris, Jr. to Smith, 31 May 1950, JNEMA; *Complaint Before the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, City of St. Louis, Missouri and Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company* 24 May 1950, JEFF.

⁵⁷State of Missouri Public Service Commission *City of St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad*, transcript, 14 June 1950, p. 51, JEFF.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁶⁰State of Missouri Public Service Commission, *City of St. Louis v. Terminal Railroad*, transcript, oral argument, 8 September 1950, pp. 23, 33-34, JEFF. Louis La Beaume, a former jury member for the architectural competition, also testified before the commission. He advocated placing a concrete embankment carrying the tracks across the front of the memorial. In his judgment the proposal would not destroy Saarinen's plans but would serve useful purposes. Cheaper than a tunnel, the embankment would allow the train passengers to see the memorial. The defendant's counsel, Ernest Hubbell, praised the plan while city counselor Forrest G. Ferris, Jr. condemned it; pp. 21-22, 42-44.

⁶¹Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to Clinton Anderson, 18 August 1952, JNEMA; Saarinen to Spotts, 13 August 1952, JNEMA.

⁶²Memorandum, Lawrence Merriam to Director NPS, 24 February 1950, JNEMA; memorandum, Conrad Wirth to Regional Director, 16 March 1950, JNEMA; memorandum, Regional Director to Superintendent JNEM, 31 March 1950, JNEMA.

⁶³Smith to Wayne Morse, 3 January 1951, JNEMA; Bill, S. 230, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st session, 8 January 1951, JNEMA; Bill, H.R. 2937, U.S. House of Representatives, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, 27 February 1951, JNEMA. The introduction of the House bill was delayed due to the death of Representative John B. Sullivan in January 1951. House Speaker Sam Rayburn appointed Representative Frank Karsten to the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission to fill Sullivan's vacancy. Smith to Alben Barkley, 6 February 1951, JNEMA.

⁶⁴Ronald Foulis to William Semsrott, 19 January 1951, JNEMA; *In Re Jefferson National Expansion Memorial* S. 3867 and H.R. 8591, 81st Congress, typed report, n.d., JNEMA.

⁶⁵Anderson to Smith, 10 January 1951, JNEMA.

⁶⁶Foulis to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 22 January 1951, JNEMA; Foulis to Frank Karsten, 8 February 1951, JNEMA; Hennings to Foulis, 8 February 1951, JNEMA.

⁶⁷*Report by W.H. Semsrott on Status of Riverfront Legislation in Washington*, 19 February 1951, JNEMA.

⁶⁸Karsten to Foulis, 5 March 1951, JNEMA.

⁶⁹Stanley Rector to William Semsrott, 23 April 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 April 1951; William Crowds to Luther Ely Smith, Jr., 4 April 1951, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: death, Smith, L.E., MHS; Drury to Smith, 20 March 1951, Luther Ely Smith Papers, file: Personal Files N, MHS.

⁷¹Hennings to Crowds, 8 May 1951, JNEMA.

⁷²Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to Clinton Anderson, 7 June 1951, JNEMA; Karsten to Crowds, 9 June 1951, JNEMA.

⁷³Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to Clinton Anderson, 7 June 1951, JNEMA, Crowds to Regan, 7 June 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁴Mrs. Perry S. Forthmann to Saarinen, 17 July 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁵*Report of Mr. William H. Semsrott*, 30 August 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁶Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 April 1951, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 23 February 1951; JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 February 1951; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 30 March 1951.

⁷⁷Saarinen to Spotts, 26 January 1951, JNEMA; memorandum, Spotts to Regional Director NPS, 6 February 1951, JNEMA; memorandum, Regional Director to Director NPS, 21 February 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁸Memorandum, Spotts, to Regional Director, NPS, 2 July 1951, JNEMA.

⁷⁹Forthmann to Saarinen, 26 January 1951, JNEMA.

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CHAPTER VI: 1953-1958

Determined to act in a decisive and united manner, on January 29, 1953, the St. Louis area congressional delegation introduced five identical authorization bills in the House of Representatives to get work started on Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Sponsored by Representatives Leonor Sullivan, Thomas, Curtis, and Frank Karsten of Missouri, and C.W. "Runt" Bishop and Melvin Price of Illinois, the bills (H.R. 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, and 2219) called for the memorial to be built in accordance with Eero Saarinen's plan as approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission in 1948. The bills did not limit authorization to just five elements, they also authorized the Arch's construction. Within a month, on February 18, Missouri Senator Thomas Hennings, Jr. submitted a similar authorization bill into the Senate (S. 970). [\[1\]](#)

All six bills authorized the secretary of the interior to grant easements for above-ground parking and for underground bomb shelters. The cost of relocating the railroad tracks was limited to \$1,875,000, a figure placed in the bills by the National Park Service even though no exact figure had yet been worked out as to the total relocation cost. [\[2\]](#) While awaiting the bills' consideration before the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, association members geared up once again to exert their influence. They contacted local supporters, Park Service officials, United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission members, and political figures throughout the nation. They sought out witnesses to testify at the hearings, and collected written endorsements of the project. [\[3\]](#)

On May 18, 1953, Senator William Purtell's (Connecticut) Senate Subcommittee on the Library considered S. 970. The subcommittee heard testimony from two senators, four representatives, the current and two former mayors of St. Louis, association and commission members, local St. Louis businessmen, Missouri's governor, the memorial's superintendent, and Eero Saarinen. The greatest emphasis was placed on the unfulfilled contract made between the city and the Federal Government twenty years previously to build a memorial. Also, the witnesses made it clear that they wanted an authorization, not an appropriation. [\[4\]](#)

The next day, May 19, the House Subcommittee on the Library, chaired by Representative Robert Harrison (Nebraska), considered the five house bills and quoted Representative Price's bill, H.R. 2216. Once more the project's supporters extolled the memorial's virtues, repeated its history, and emphasized that the current year was the 150th anniversary of Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase. [\[5\]](#) By June 10 the House subcommittee approved the measure and sent it to the House Administration Committee for action. [\[6\]](#) In the Senate Thomas Hennings, Jr., urged the subcommittee to pass S. 970, but found some new opposition. The Bureau of the Budget advised the Department of the Interior that construction of the memorial would be

inconsistent with current national budgetary objectives, and suggested deferring the project until it was warranted from a fiscal standpoint. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis forwarded this ruling on to Senator William Jenner (Indiana), chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. [7] Hennings and Curtis immediately attacked this opinion. Writing to Budget Bureau Assistant Director Rowland Hughes and to Assistant Secretary Orme Lewis, Hennings stressed that the bill was for authorization only. Curtis met with Hughes, explaining once again that no appropriation was being sought. Both men, as well as Mayor Tucker and association president William Crowdus, urged the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of the Interior to reconsider their reports. [8] Their pleas were heard. The Bureau reconsidered its unfavorable report on S. 970 and decided to report the measure favorably *if no funds for the project would be requested until the national budget was balanced*. Curtis immediately informed the Senate subcommittee of the action while Hennings appeared before it to urge authorization. The senators, however, deferred action. [9]

On the House side, the Committee on House Administration followed the advice of its subcommittee and passed the memorial authorization bill on July 27, only after financial constraints dictated once again that authorization be limited to just five elements of the memorial plan: railroad relocation, grading and filling, landscaping, paved areas and utilities, and restoration of the Old Courthouse. Introduced as H.R. 6549 by Representative Sullivan, the bill passed the House on July 31 and was referred to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration the next day. The bill carried a \$5,000,000 limitation and was similar to H.R. 8591 that had not passed the House in 1950. [10]

After the Bureau of the Budget reversed itself on the bill, the Department of the Interior followed suit. Senator Jennings hoped this action would help in the drive to secure Senate approval. Throughout the rest of the year the project's supporters answered inquiries, sought sources of objections, and generally kept abreast of developments. In November, when Senator Theodore Green (Rhode Island), a member of the subcommittee, stated his opposition to the memorial, Hennings contacted former President Harry Truman, who subsequently wrote Green, urging his approval. [11]

Despite all these efforts, 1953 passed with no Senate action. Then, in January 1954, Senator Green withdrew his objections and time became important. The bill had to go through soon or it would get mired with the forthcoming appropriation bills in the Senate. On February 25 Hennings called the bill before the full Senate Committee for Rules and Administration, only to have the committee's meeting cut short due to another meeting. Chairman William Jenner promised Hennings he would bring the measure up at the committee's next meeting on March 10. Jenner did so, and the committee reported the measure unanimously on March 11, sending it to the full Senate. [12] The bill stalled in the Senate, however, when two senators voiced objections on fiscal and political grounds. Almost a month passed before the Senate approved the House measure in May 1954. Several more days passed while the House completed additional action. The basic bill, H.R. 6549, had obtained House approval previously, but House concurrence was needed on several minor Senate changes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower received the bill on May 11 and signed it into law on May 18, 1954. [13]

No matter that the bill only authorized five stages of development! No matter that the Arch was neither authorized, nor that any more than \$5,000,000 in Federal funds could be spent! For the first time in twenty years the project's backers had paper proof that the Federal Government would go through with the plans. They believed they could obtain an appropriation whenever the national budget was balanced and then work to authorize the Arch's construction. It was a giant achievement, but not final success; two years would pass before an appropriation would be acquired.

Work On Site

While the authorization bill moved slowly through the maze of congressional committees, work continued on the site in St. Louis. Extra attention was drawn to the project, primarily because of the Louisiana Purchase Sesquicentennial in 1953, and also because of St. Louis' continuing parking problems. Approximately 3,500 motorists routinely used the memorial area for a downtown parking lot during the 1950s. The National Park Service and the city rewrote their cooperative agreements to maintain control and efficiency in the expenditure of funds coming from the riverfront parking operation. Realizing that this parking area would not be permanently available, former Mayor Kaufmann proposed yet another underground garage in 1954. As if to punctuate this proposal, landfill was brought onto the memorial site. Starting in late December 1954, the Missouri Highway Department dumped 80,000 cubic yards of earth on the site northward from Clark Street toward the Eads Bridge, between Memorial Drive and Wharf Street. Almost 300,000 cubic yards had already been deposited from Clark Street south to the memorial boundary. [14] The new soil gave city officials physical proof that riverfront parking would not be available forever, and pressed Park Service officials even harder to solve the parking question.

In the years since 1940 that the National Park Service had maintained the Old Courthouse, no restoration work had occurred in either the rotunda or the west courtroom. By 1951 the rotunda was deteriorating; the entire center section of the floor had to be roped off to prevent accidents from falling plaster. Superintendent Julian Spotts and his staff began alleviating the most serious deterioration by removing ceiling plaster, wooden laths, loose wall plaster, and old white paint in the rotunda and south wing corridor. Original wood framing dating from 1839 to 1845 was discovered in place. Staff workers removed large amounts of wood chips, old gas pipes, and electric wiring. This work was primarily fire preventive. [15]

National Park Service museum preservation specialist Walter Nitkiewicz and a staff of eight art students from Washington University restored the rotunda paintings in 1955. They cleaned and touched up the murals while working on 145-foot high scaffolds. As much restoration as possible was done with the 1862 creations of Charles Wimar and the 1880 paintings of Ettore Miragoli under Nitkiewicz's supervision, while historian John Bryan pursued research to identify the painted figures and emblems. [16]

The work on the rotunda was just part of the Old Courthouse restoration program which began in 1953. Replastering rooms, restoring balconies, replacing doors, setting granite steps, installing lights, laying brick sidewalks, and refurnishing courtrooms were just a few of the projects conducted in and around the old building. In 1954, a new exterior coat of white paint gave the structure prominence in the city. The new image was heightened by the addition of a wrought iron fence around the building in 1956. [17] Lifting the aged face of the Old Courthouse focused more attention on completing the memorial.

Appropriation Efforts

Association members became frustrated with the now familiar slow progress in Congress. No construction appropriations other than for restoring the Old Courthouse and acquiring and clearing the site were forthcoming from Congress because of national budgetary considerations. Association President William Crowds decided in 1955 to look elsewhere for funds. He appealed to both the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, saying that the citizens of St. Louis were deserving of their assistance, and asked for \$10,000,000 to complete the work. Both groups replied that as foundations they could not make grants for national memorials. [18]

A breakthrough in the funding impasse occurred late in 1955 when the Federal Government announced that a strong possibility existed for a balanced budget in 1957. Representative Tom Curtis, William Crowder, and Julian Spotts met and discussed introducing yet another bill into Congress. Rowland Hughes of the Budget Bureau assured Curtis that the memorial was in a favored position. When President Eisenhower formally announced the 1957 balanced budget in January 1956, Representative Leonor Sullivan made sure the National Park Service had included the riverfront project in its 1957 budget. Representative Frank Karsten suggested reactivating the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission to support the \$5,000,000 request. The Bureau of the Budget informed Karsten on February 1 that the balanced budget removed the legal bar to appropriation of funds, and he and Sullivan introduced the legislation into the House. [19] After various supporters urged the Department of the Interior to act, the department requested \$3,000,000 for the memorial project. The Budget Bureau received this request and on February 22 approved spending \$150,000 on Old Courthouse landscaping and fence restoration (this figure was part of a \$415,963,000 Interior Department appropriations bill). On March 1 the White House requested \$3,000,000 for the memorial as a supplemental appropriation for fiscal year 1956. If the House and Senate concurred, the money would be available by summer. Added to a \$1,000,000 city contribution, the total fund could even cover the cost of relocating the railroad tracks. [20]

The House moved swiftly. Early in March the Appropriations Committee considered the \$3,000,000 supplemental appropriation, part of a \$795,768,832 supplement to various Federal agencies. After National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth testified in its behalf, the House passed the measure on March 22, 1956, but with a limitation: the funds would not be available for use after June 30, the end of the fiscal year. A provision for the money to remain available until expended was knocked out of the bill the previous day on a point of order. Missouri Senators Hennings and Stuart Symington appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee in an attempt to get the Senate to reverse the House's action in placing the restriction on the money. [21] Then, in a completely unexpected move, the Senate Appropriations Committee removed the memorial appropriation from the supplemental bill by a voice vote on April 10. The project seemed stalled once more. A week passed before a breakthrough came when a joint House-Senate conference committee restored the funds. Congress agreed to provide \$2,640,000 for the project, available until expended. As soon as the conferees agreed on the total appropriations bill, the Senate and House reviewed it a final time. [22] In the House there was a last minute attempt to kill the appropriation, and Representative Thomas Curtis charged that the railroad interests were trying to defeat the memorial. Curtis had no concrete evidence that the railroads were responsible for the specific delays of the present session of Congress, but he believed they had been behind many of the delays over the years. Despite the effort to kill the measure, the House approved it 134-10 on May 16. The Senate approved the measure that night. Controversy reared over the bill in the Senate chamber, but the disagreement was over appropriations for the Tennessee Valley Authority, and not Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Three days later President Eisenhower signed the supplemental appropriation bill into law, giving St. Louis \$2,640,000 in Federal funds to use in relocating the railroad tracks. [23]

One of the project's supporters, Representative Frank Karsten, wanted more and sought to remove the restriction in the 1954 authorization bill against using Federal money to build the Arch. He prepared such a bill, but Leonor Sullivan criticized his timing and Thomas Curtis believed Karsten should wait until negotiations began on the preliminary grading and railroad relocation work. Only cooperation between the area's Democratic and Republican representatives had worked in the past to achieve any measure of success for the memorial. [24] Despite the criticism, Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, supported Karsten's efforts. Anderson wanted the commission to adopt a formal resolution expressing its desire for a fitting memorial. Now that money was appropriated, rumors of building stadiums instead of the Arch on the site

were circulating. [25] Anderson wanted to squelch such talk, but Leonor Sullivan again criticized taking this action. When H.R. 6549 came out of the Senate with the restricting amendment attached to it, she had to accept it or lose the bill altogether. Supporters were just now getting a partial appropriation, won only after a long struggle in Congress even with Representative Clarence Cannon as chairman of the House Managers in the Conference Committee and chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. Sullivan believed the appropriated \$2,640,000 would be jeopardized over the controversial issue of funds for the Arch. She wanted to wait. [26]

Continuing Railroad Problems

The Department of the Interior agreed with Sullivan. In August Secretary Fred A. Seaton refused to promote the drive to acquire Arch funds. He believed that reconsideration of the original authorization should wait until after the Department of the Interior and the railroads completed an agreement on removing the railroad tracks, because such a decision would affect all future development. [27] This statement reopened the railroad question. Even though the 1949 "Memorandum of Understanding" was still in effect, new questions were being asked about the past negotiations. In March several National Park Service officials questioned whether all the possibilities of relocating the tracks elsewhere than stated in the "Memorandum of Understanding" had been examined. Superintendent Julian Spotts could not convince them that the memorandum was the product of thirteen years of work and negotiation. Spotts thought it perilous to reopen the question of placing the tracks elsewhere. His office had an agreement with Eero Saarinen, and Spotts wanted to consult with Saarinen immediately regarding final technical details before resuming negotiations with the railroads. [28] However, the National Park Service administration told Spotts not to confer with Saarinen, to make no contact with the railroads, and that whenever there were discussions with Saarinen and the railroads there were to be representatives from the Washington and Regional National Park Service offices present. Spotts was even told how and when he should meet with the railroads, and what he should say. These instructions came as a surprise to Spotts, considering the history of the project's development. His office had always carried on railroad negotiations. He welcomed upper echelon Park Service participation in the deliberations, but he believed that his office staff was in the best position to determine what approach should be taken regarding the railroads. If these new restrictions prevailed, office morale, incentive, and efficiency would be impaired. Spotts could not see how the project could proceed unless the design, construction, and authority to make decisions rested in his office. [29] This growing misunderstanding served to undermine Superintendent Spotts' control over developments in his park, and led to his premature resignation from the National Park Service several years later.

A few months after Secretary Seaton wondered if all possible solutions had been explored on the railroad issue, a Chicago-based engineering firm, Alfred Benesch and Associates, was asked to prepare plans for the railroad relocation and estimates of cost. Their report unleashed a furor, for they did not stop at making cost estimates; they went on to say that the tracks in front of the memorial should not be removed. Response to these findings came sharply and swiftly. William Crowds, Eero Saarinen, and the American Institute of Architects all immediately denounced the idea. National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth simply stated that the Park Service would have to analyze the report, then sit down with the city and the railroads to come up with a solution. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* led the attack while the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* surprisingly endorsed the Benesch report; the paper wanted to drop the idea of moving the tracks and to concentrate instead on building the monument. [30] The conflict raged for several days until the *Post-Dispatch* uncovered and printed the fact that Alfred Benesch and his firm were hired at the suggestion of the president of the Terminal Railroad Association. This was enough of a link to convince the *Post-Dispatch* that the firm's "gratuitous advice" not to move the tracks should be ignored. [31]

This situation developed because the Park Service and the Terminal Railroad Association joined in a cooperative agreement in October 1956. The TRRA would hire an engineer with Superintendent Spotts' approval to survey, design, estimate, and report on the cost of all materials concerned with relocating the tracks. Alfred Benesch and Associates submitted an interim report in December that analyzed five relocation methods. On February 6, 1957 representatives of the National Park Service, the city of St. Louis, the TRRA, and the Missouri Pacific Railroad met and agreed that Benesch should prepare final plans and cost studies for two of the five plans; an open cut containing three tracks lower than the levee's present surface, and a modified tunnel plan which would carry three tracks through the memorial area in a tunnel not longer than 3,000 feet. [32] Thus the final Benesch report that appeared on May 3, 1957 was expected; what was unexpected was the opinion against removing the tracks at all. Director Wirth could only seek additional conferences to work out a solution.

Representative Leonor Sullivan was surprised and disturbed to learn that the city and the National Park Service had agreed to go along with the railroads in subsidizing such a study. She heard from several people that the railroads considered the Benesch study a good delaying tactic. Now memorial supporters were confronted with the unwanted suggestion not to move the tracks. Moving the tracks was a vital ingredient for completing the memorial, and Sullivan did not want the railroads to upset the "ambitious plans" of the city and the Federal Government. She wanted Mayor Tucker to explore every means by which the city could back the National Park Service in forcing the railroad's cooperation. She did not want to threaten the railroads if they did not cooperate, but she wanted Tucker and Conrad Wirth to remember that it was worth keeping in mind that the Federal Government and the city were far from powerless in the situation. [33]

Alfred Benesch's cost estimates for both plans were high. Placing the tracks in an open cut would cost more than \$11,000,000, while the estimated tunnel costs ran in excess of \$14,000,000. [34] The National Park Service had to make a statement concerning the issue, so Director Conrad Wirth gave assurances that the Park Service would draw up a definite program of construction in accordance with Saarinen's plan. "It's time to stop talking in generalities and go ahead with a definite order of procedure, definite cost estimates, and a definite schedule," Wirth asserted. [35] Believing that relocation costs might not be as expensive as Benesch stated, Wirth had Eero Saarinen study the possibility of making minor design changes. The changes would be technical, to see if several phases of development could occur simultaneously. [36]

Saarinen worked all summer. The National Park Service's final recommendations depended upon what adjustments Saarinen could make to achieve minimum relocation of the tracks. By October Saarinen finished his changes. The revised plans called for placing the five sets of railroad tracks into a shortened tunnel 100 feet west of the trestle, with the tracks being lowered sixteen feet. This did not mean that the memorial would be cut off from the river, however, for Saarinen provided a 960-foot long tunnel to be placed over the railroad where a "grand staircase" rose from the levee to the Arch. At the north and south ends of the park, 150-foot tunnels spanned the tracks, and led to the overlook museum, restaurant, and stairways down to the levee. Saarinen designed a subterranean visitor center the length of the distance between the legs, to include two theaters and an entrance by inward-sloping ramps. The new positioning made the Arch more prominent and reinforced its axial relationship with the Old Courthouse. This strong association with downtown St. Louis came at the sacrifice of association with the river, which could no longer be seen from the base of the Arch or from the Old Courthouse steps. The "Saarinen vista" was destroyed, and the Museum of Architecture and reproductions of early St. Louis buildings abandoned. [37]

These revised plans had to pass the scrutiny of several groups. The United States Territorial Expansion Commission approved the plans as did Russell Dearmont, president of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, while the TRRA studied the changes. On October 2, when Saarinen presented his plans in the west courtroom of the Old Courthouse, he spoke not only to officials of the National Park Service and the railroads, but also to city officials and the congressional delegation. Tucker, Crowds, Sullivan, Karsten, Curtis, Wirth, Spotts, Armstrong Chinn, and Dearmont — all parties holding interest in the memorial for whatever reason — were there to support the final push for planning, appropriation and construction. [38]

By November 15 the railroads, the Department of the Interior and the city agreed on the general terms of the revised plans, deciding that \$5,053,000 would be needed to carry out the relocation. On November 29, 1957, all parties signed another "Memorandum of Understanding" accepting the revised plans for relocating the tracks. The signers agreed that the plans were practical and aesthetic. Since allocation remained a problem, a subcommittee was later appointed to recommend a division of costs. Their recommendations were submitted to the National Park Service, city, TRRA, and the Missouri Pacific for a final agreement. By December 17 the secretary of the interior signed the memorandum. To save money, Eero Saarinen agreed to allow two surface tracks to remain on the levee. The \$5,000,000 estimate covered only the cost of moving the elevated tracks and not those on the surface. [39] Finally, after more than twenty years of negotiations and planning, the physical work could begin.

Or so the project's supporters believed. The only remaining task, cost allocations, was thought to be a minor detail. It proved to be a major stumbling block, however, because of the Terminal Railroad Association. Discussions continued throughout December. On February 20, 1958, when the TRRA met with Mayor Tucker to tell what share of the cost it would bear, its officers attempted to reduce use of the tracks to cut the cost of relocating them. The TRRA also offered a plan eliminating the tunnel altogether, settling on an open cut 960 feet long shielded by shrubs and trees. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* berated the TRRA's attitude and last-minute plan changes after Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton had clearly stated that local agreement was crucial for further development. [40]

On March 10, in a meeting in his office, Mayor Raymond Tucker announced yet another plan, this one designed to save \$1,500,000 in relocation costs. He called for dropping the tunnel idea in favor of open cuts roofed with concrete slabs. Initial reaction from Eero Saarinen and the National Park Service was favorable. Mayor Tucker, who was an engineer by profession, had simply taken the TRRA's economical open cut idea and covered its ugliness by placing concrete slabs on top as a roof in strategic locations. The cost of this plan stood at \$2,684,000. Saarinen approved the concept, as the tracks remained where he had placed them, and with the slab being at the same elevation as his proposed tunnel would have been. The two ground level Wharf Street levee tracks would remain as situated. A day earlier the TRRA had dropped plans for a floodwall, saving \$816,000, and offered to contribute \$500,000 toward track removal. [41]

On March 31, 1958, the TRRA accepted Mayor Tucker's plan. Their general counsel and City Counselor Forrest Ferris drew up outlines of the estimated costs, while two weeks later Eero Saarinen placed the final estimated cost at \$2,940,000 after conferring with Mayor Tucker and Superintendent Spotts. On May 12, 1958, city and railroad officials signed their final agreement. Mayor Tucker, Armstrong Chinn, and Russell Dearmont agreed on open cuts and roofed areas covered with slabs or "bridges." The TRRA would place \$500,000 in escrow for the project, and the city needed to sell \$980,000 of the 1935 bonds to match the Federal contribution. Now the only signatures needed were those of Director Wirth and Secretary Seaton, and their addition on June 2 finally satisfied the 1954 authorization requirement that

an agreement for track relocation satisfactory to the secretary be made before any of the funds appropriated in the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1956 could be spent. [42] Two weeks later the TRRA paid the Mercantile Trust Company \$500,000, to be held in escrow until all terms of the agreement were met. When the National Park Service let contracts to start on the memorial's construction, the TRRA money would be paid to the secretary of the interior. The contribution also cleared some old debts and litigation, because it was agreed that donating \$500,000 would end the 1937 city suit against the TRRA for their failure to build railroad approaches to the MacArthur Bridge. Also dropped was the 1943 city suit against the TRRA over unpaid bridge rentals. [43]

Several other minor details needed attention. In July the city obtained a court ruling stating that the 1935 bonds were still valid, and the city could proceed with raising funds to match the Government appropriation. Superintendent Spotts appeared before the Public Service Commission to have them modify their original order to permit the location of the tracks according to the new agreement, still retaining the eighteen-foot tunnel clearance. [44]

With these chores completed, National Park Service Director Wirth announced that relocation could begin by June or July 1959, and success was around the corner. One of the prime factors breaking the years-long impasse over the railroad question was the leadership shown by Missouri Pacific Railroad President Russell Dearmont. The TRRA consistently opposed the relocation because of the expense, but in 1957 the new Missouri Pacific president believed the memorial was necessary. Dearmont persuaded his associates on the TRRA's board of directors to agree with the city and the Federal Government on the relocation. For his efforts Dearmont received the 1958 St. Louis Award, on which occasion he gave additional credit for breaking the impasse to TRRA officers and Mayor Tucker. Within the National Park Service hierarchy Julian Spotts deserved some credit for the achievement partly because the agreement was based on some of his designs, recommendations, and estimates. He told the regional director that despite all newspaper accounts to the contrary; it was he who broke the negotiation deadlock. [45]

Increased Authorization

During the railroad negotiations memorial supporters attempted to obtain the balance of the 1956 appropriation. Of the \$5,000,000 authorized in 1954 only \$2,640,000 had been appropriated. The United States Territorial Expansion Commission voted on March 21 and April 25, 1958, to request an immediate appropriation of the remaining \$2,360,000. Fourteen Missouri and Illinois legislators sought the funds in a supplemental appropriations request. Acting Secretary of the Interior Hatfield Chilson could not give any assurances as to when such a request could be placed in an appropriation estimate, but said the department would do the necessary preliminary work to start the additional authorized phases of development whenever funds were appropriated. [46]

The St. Louis area congressional delegation went one step further. On July 1, 1958, they introduced six identical bills amending the 1954 authorization to provide for the construction of the entire Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Senators Hennings, Symington, and Clinton Anderson introduced S. 4085, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Bills H.R. 13242 (Sullivan), H.R. 13243 (Karsten), H.R. 13244 (Curtis), H.R. 13245 (Price) and H.R. 13246 (Kenneth Gray) were referred to the Committee on House Administration. [47] The bills moved quickly. One month after introduction the Department of the Interior and Bureau of the Budget approved the bills authorizing a \$12,250,000 increase in Federal funds to the memorial without reservation. Added to the \$5,000,000 previously authorized, this would make a total of \$17,250,000 of Government funds available. The Bureau of the Budget approved the increased monetary authorization only, not the previously sought additional appropriation. Despite this, the congressional delegation

expressed approval of the action, for with these bills they were concentrating on increasing the authorization rather than seeking additional appropriations. They wanted to lift both the 1954 restriction against planning for the Arch and the balanced budget requirement. [48]

On August 12 the Senate Interior Committee approved S. 4085 without dissent or changes and sent it before the full Senate. Five days later the Senate passed the bill unanimously, and sent it to the House where Representative Paul Jones (Missouri), chairman of the House Administration subcommittee, assured Leonor Sullivan that his subcommittee would consider the bill. Within days House committees approved the bill and the House itself unanimously passed the bill within minutes after it was brought up on the consent calendar where one member's objection could have blocked it. Because the House approved the Senate version of the bill, no conference between the two houses was required. President Eisenhower signed it on September 7, 1958, authorizing an increase of \$12,250,000 in funds for the memorial and dropping the 1954 restrictive language. Appropriation bills would have to wait until a later session of Congress.

The National Park Service, however, had no plans to ask Congress for any additional funds. Their budget for 1959, long submitted to the Department of the Interior, did not seek more funds for St. Louis. The Park Service intended to begin work on the railroad removal with money already appropriated. Director Wirth wanted the project to be finished by 1963, but this date, of course, depended upon further appropriations. [49]

Superintendent Julian Spotts dearly wanted to see the project finished. He had already invested eighteen years of his life overseeing the birth struggles of the memorial. Yet during the last years of the 1950s he had found himself becoming increasingly discouraged with the National Park Service hierarchy and his own limited role in overseeing development. In 1956 he protested against the limitations placed on his duties as he saw them, and the conflict intensified as the date of construction became a reality. Spotts wanted to carry two responsibilities: to direct the work of the architect, and to supervise the construction of the memorial. He thought it was understood that he as Superintendent would be the engineer for the actual development, and that his office would cooperate with other Park Service offices in preparing all engineering designs, plans, and specifications, and supervise and execute all contracts in cooperation with the architect. Consulting engineers would lend assistance for some of the most difficult engineering problems. He insisted that "The mental strains of steering this project through precarious channels are not endurable by me without the anticipated reward of performing the engineering services in addition to being Superintendent." [50]

Park Service officials expected Spotts to be the area supervisor, to be the Park Service representative, and to do basic surveys and prepare preliminary data as needed for furthering Saarinen's work, but they decided that responsibility for the project's engineering should rest elsewhere. With this, Spotts retired in protest on December 8. He believed he could not support his negotiated commitments, develop strategy in further negotiations, or coordinate the various construction elements in proper sequence unless he controlled design and construction. He also believed that his public relations had been impaired to the point that the general public had no confidence in his authority to support its commitments. For these reasons Spotts felt that his removal would be in the memorial's best interest and he went on annual leave until his retirement became effective January 10, 1959. St. Louis newspapers printed the news on January 1. [51]

Julian Spotts' departure marked the end of an era for the memorial. When he started working in St. Louis the concept had been new, the site covered with old decaying warehouses, and Bernard Dickmann sitting in City Hall. Spotts oversaw the Old Courthouse and Old Rock House renovations, and watched the site turn into a large parking lot just as its opponents said

it would. For eighteen years he dealt with city officials, railroad officials, association and commission members, architects, engineers, and a handful of congressmen and women attempting to get the memorial off the ground. Now construction would begin as the National Park Service brought in a young, dynamic lawyer to take charge. George B. Hartzog, Jr., would clear the way for the building of Saarinen's Arch.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER VI: Footnotes

¹Bill, H.R. 2215, U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 29 January 1953; Bill, H.R. 2216, U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 29 January 1953; Bill, H.R. 2217, U.S. House of Representatives, 83d Congress, 1st session, 29 January 1953; Bill, H.R. 2218, U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 29 January 1953; Bill, H.R. 2219, U.S. House of Representatives, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 29 January 1953; Bill, S. 970, U.S. Senate, 83rd. Congress, 1st session, 18 February 1953; copies in JNEMA Papers.

²Ibid.; Ronald Foulis to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 19 February 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4913, WHMC.

³Memorandum, Preparations for hearing on authorization bills, 6 May 1953, JNEMA.

⁴Hearing Before Subcommittee on the Library, Committee on Rules and Administration, United States Senate, S. 970, 18 May 1951, JNEMA.

⁵Hearing Before Subcommittee on the Library, Committee on House Administration, United States House of Representatives, H.R. 2216, 19 May 1953, JNEMA.

⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 June 1953.

⁷Orme Lewis to William E. Jenner, 10 July 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4916, WHMC; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 July 1953.

⁸Press Release from the Office of U.S. Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 16 July 1953; Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4917, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 July 1953; telegram, William Crowds to Joseph M. Dodge, 11 July 1953, JNEMA; telegram, Raymond Tucker to Roland Hughes, 15 July 1953, JNEMA.

⁹Memorandum, Rules Committee (Senate) to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 17 July 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4917, WHMC; Rowland Hughes to Thomas Curtis, 20 July 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4916, WHMC.

¹⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 28 July 1953; Bill, H.R. 6549, U.S. Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, 1 August 1953, JNEMA.

¹¹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 13 August 1953; Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. to Crowds, 2

November 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4917, WHMC; Harry S Truman to Theodore Green, 4 November 1953, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4917, WHMC. Association members discovered the reasoning behind Senator Green's opposition. He did not care anything about St. Louis, he was opposed to the Arch, and even added, "who cares about Jefferson?" Memo, Rase to Crowdus and Semsrott, 29 September 1953, JNEMA.

¹²Crowdus to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 29 January 1954, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4918, WHMC; News Release from the Office of U.S. Senator Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 9 March 1954, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 March 1954.

¹³U.S. Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 83rd Congress, 2nd session, 1954, 100, pt. 62: 4293-4294; U.S. Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 83rd Congress, 2nd session, 1954, 100, pt. 81: 5619; U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 83rd Congress 2nd session 1954, 100, pt. 85: 5938; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 5 April 1954; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 May 1954; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 May 1954; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 May 1954. Representative Leonor Sullivan later explained that as a member of the three-man subcommittee handling the legislation in the Senate, Senator Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island was in a position to make sure that the Arch was not included in the bill. "Usually, when legislation appears to be of rather localized concern, those who want the legislation have very limited bargaining power, and have to settle for what they can get, knowing that in any showdown in either house, a majority of the Members are inclined to accept the supposedly objective views of the Committee having the legislative jurisdiction when there is a conflict between the Committee and the sponsors of the legislation. So those of us who were fighting for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial authorization bill had no choice but to accept the abbreviated version of the legislation which Senator Green and his colleagues were willing to let out of Committee." Sullivan believed it to be important to get a bill enacted that would at least get the project started. Address by the Honorable Leonor K. Sullivan (D.-Mo.) at the Annual Meeting of Trustees of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 12 July 1974, JEFF.

¹⁴*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 24 November 1954; Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 2 February 1955, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 7 December 1954, JEFF. Two years later the city still agonized over the possibility of constructing a parking garage during the railroad relocation. The Bi-State Development Agency proposed excavating for the garage and using the fill as needed for the memorial. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 June 1956; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 June 1956.

¹⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 August 1951, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 April 1955.

¹⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 August 1955; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1955, JEFF.

¹⁷For detailed information on the Old Courthouse restoration see John Bryan's administrative history, *JNEM Its Origin ...*; and the *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, 7 December 1956.

¹⁸Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, *Request of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, a non-profit corporation, for financial assistance in the amount of \$10,125,000 from the Ford Foundation to Complete the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, typed manuscript, 1955, pp. 1-17, JNEMA; Joseph McDaniel, Jr. to William Crowdus, 24 June 1955, JNEMA; Lindsley F. Kimball to William Semsrott, 22 July 1955, JNEMA.

¹⁹Memorandum from Mrs. Perry Rase, 9 September 1955, JNEMA; Leonor K. Sullivan to Crowdus, 6 January 1956, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 1 February 1956; Percy Rappaport to Frank Karsten, 1 February 1956, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2569, WHMC.

²⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 February 1956; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 February 1956; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 March 1956; Stuart Symington to Crowdus, 2 March 1956, JNEMA.

²¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 March 1956; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 March 1956; *Testimony by Senator Hennings before the Senate Appropriations Committee in behalf of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 22 March 1956, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4921, WHMC.

²²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 April 1956; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 April 1956; telegram, Richard Brown to Hennings, 11 May 1956, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Papers, file No. 4922, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 12 May 1956.

²³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 May 1956; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 May 1956; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 May 1956.

²⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 4 June 1956.

²⁵Clinton Anderson to Crowdus, 25 June 1956, JNEMA.

²⁶Sullivan to Crowdus, 18 July 1956, JNEMA.

²⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 August 1956; Fred A. Seaton to Karsten, 11 September 1956, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2571, WHMC.

²⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 March 1956, JNEMA.

²⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 19 May 1956, JNEMA.

³⁰Alfred Benesch and Associates *Report on Reconstruction of Railroad Facilities in Connection with Jefferson National Memorial Park in St. Louis, Missouri*, 3 May 1957, JNEMA; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 May 1957; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 May 1957; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 May 1957.

³¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 May 1957.

³²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 April 1957; Conrad Wirth to Hennings, 6 May 1957, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4924, WHMC; Alfred Benesch and Associates, *Interim Report Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Park in St. Louis, Missouri*, 20 December 1956, JNEMA. The three plans dropped included rehabilitating an old tunnel and rerouting traffic across the MacArthur Bridge. They were dropped because of excessive expense and severe effects on railroad operations. Benesch, *Report on Reconstruction*, p. 3.

³³Sullivan to Wirth, 10 May 1957, JEFF.

³⁴Benesch, *Report on Reconstruction . . .*, appendix 4 & 6, JNEMA.

³⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 May 1957.

³⁶*Ibid.*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 May 1957.

³⁷Hennings to Morton D. May, 7 August 1957, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4925, WHMC; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 October 1957; Statement by Eero Saarinen, St. Louis, Missouri, 2 October 1957, JNEMA; George McCue, "The Arch: An Appreciation" *AIA Journal* (November, 1978), pp. 60-61.

³⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 October 1957; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 November 1957, JEFF.

³⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 November 1957; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 November 1957; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 December 1957; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 17 December 1957, JEFF. At this time Conrad Wirth negotiated a contract with Eero Saarinen for architectural, landscape architectural, and engineering services for preparing plans and supervising construction of the memorial according to his winning design. Saarinen submitted a proposal for the contract based upon labor cost plus a percentage for architect's fee, overhead, and incidentals, with specified items beyond the usual project expenses to be reimbursed. Since the May 17, 1954 act prohibited Government expenditure for planning the Gateway Arch, Wirth believed that the contract would suffice as an interim contract for the preliminary development. It could later be supplemented or renegotiated when additional structures (the Arch) were finally authorized. Wirth to Saarinen, 15 November 1957, JEFF.

⁴⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 15 January 1958, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20 February 1958; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 February 1958, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 March 1958.

⁴¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 March 1958.

⁴²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 March 1958; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 March 1958; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 April 1958, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 13 May 1958; Track Relocation Agreement, The City of St. Louis, National Park Service, Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 2 June 1958, JNEMA.

⁴³Hillory Tolson to Sullivan, 10 June 1958, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4928, WHMC; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 June 1958; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 September 1958.

⁴⁴*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 29 July 1958; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 7 July 1958, JEFF.

⁴⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 December 1958; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 6 December 1958; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Region Two, 20 May 1958, JEFF.

⁴⁶Clinton P. Anderson to Frederick A. Seaton, 30 April 1958, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4926, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 12 May 1958; Hatfield Chilson to Anderson, 23 May 1958, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4927, WHMC.

⁴⁷Aloys Kaufmann to Stuart Symington, 2 July 1958, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4929, WHMC.

⁴⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 August 1958.

⁴⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 August 1958; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 August 1958; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 August 1958; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 September 1958; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 December 1958. Representative Leonor Sullivan's thoughts on the action: "I won't say that the 1958 amendment was slipped through Congress when no one was looking, but it is probably fair to say in retrospect that it was done rather quietly. It was on August 22, 1958; (late in the afternoon) the House had just completed action on a bill to regulate the importation of wild ruminants and swine, in order to prevent the introduction of livestock diseases, after having earlier disposed of a measure to change the garnishment laws of the District of Columbia, and another to provide retired former policemen and firemen in the District of Columbia with an increase in their pensions. The Chairman of the Committee on House Administration then called up for consideration by unanimous consent a series of bills and resolutions which were presented as routine and non-controversial and were passed without debate. One, accepted from the State of Colorado, a statue of Dr. Florence Rena Sabin for placement in the Rotunda of the Capitol; another repealed an obsolete law dealing with the employment of messengers by the House Committee on Ways and Means; next, came one favoring Congressional recognition of baseball's Hall of Fame; two bills authorizing the printing of additional copies of some committee reports; and then there was a measure which carried the vague title "Amending Act of May 17, 1954 (68 Stat. 98)." No one paid much attention to it either and it also passed without debate. For some strange reason ... several Members of the House who might have expected to ask some questions about the bill to amend the Act of May 17, 1954, particularly if they noted that it provided for an additional \$12,000,000 in expenditures, were not on the House Floor at the time." Address by the Honorable Leonor K. Sullivan (D.-Mo.) at the Annual Meeting of Trustees of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 12 July 1974, JEFF.

⁵⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 18 November 1957, JEFF.

⁵¹Memorandum, Acting Regional Director, Region Two to Director NPS, 8 August 1958, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, NPS, 8 December 1958, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2580, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 January 1959.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER VII: 1959-1968

George Hartzog started work on February 1, 1959. For almost four years he readied the rough site to receive the Arch foundations. The elevated trestle would be torn down, the tracks relocated; but Hartzog would leave before a single section of the stainless steel Arch was in place, because he could not see sitting there "watching other guys having fun building it." [1] Hartzog, coming fresh into the project, strove to set schedules, prioritize items, expedite tasks needing completion, and prepare contract plans to meet completion schedules. [2]

Hartzog inherited several unfinished projects. On the site, remaining buildings and parking lots had to be removed so construction could begin in midsummer. The Old Rock House, which had been painstakingly restored, now stood in the way of the proposed railroad relocation and the grand levee staircase. As soon as the National Park Service announced it would tear the structure down, numerous protests arose which resulted in Eero Saarinen studying the possibility of relocating the building. But even if the Rock House could be moved, Hartzog would have to obtain Federal funds for moving and staffing. [3]

Dismantling began in August 1959. The public protest served to save Manuel Lisa's warehouse from total destruction, for some original stones were saved. Each was numbered and stored on the grounds of the Old Cathedral. When several of the stones were stolen from that location, they were placed in the basement of the Old Courthouse for safe storage. Park Service plans were to reassemble the building and open it as a museum. [4] The Old Courthouse was also destined to be a museum. Even though initial plans were for the building to be used for office space only, it served as a temporary museum until the new museum and visitor center were completed on the riverfront. Plans called for the new exhibits to consist of ten principal units, each containing twenty-five exhibits in wall panels or cases. Dioramas, photographic displays, and Indian and frontier artifacts were to be exhibited. All rooms in the Old Courthouse except the two courtrooms and Park Service offices were destined to be temporary exhibit rooms. [5]

The Denchar Warehouse still stood south of the Old Cathedral, containing the iron and architectural fragments salvaged from the demolition of 1939 to 1942. For many years plans had called for an architectural museum to be built in the memorial with the fragments serving as the principal resource. Economic reality struck in 1957, however, resulting in Eero Saarinen dropping the Museum of American Architecture from memorial plans. During 1958, when hundreds of cubic yards of fill were spread on the site according to the grading plans, the warehouse had to be removed. Age and decay made the building difficult to maintain, so Julian Spotts requested that the fragments be given away because they could not be used at the memorial. National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth approved the request, form letters were prepared and sent to local universities and museums offering the fragments at

cost, and the Park Service staff developed a plan for disposal by the spring of 1958. [6]

The Smithsonian Institution selected one-third of the fragments before Walter Huber, chairman of the National Park Service Advisory Board, expressed concern to Director Wirth about the situation. Superintendent Spotts was told to stop further action until the Park Service could restudy the collection. Spotts noted, however, that every time a delegation studied the fragments, more material was marked for retention. Spotts wanted a final selection to be made. In August Wirth finally stated the Park Service policy governing the preservation of the fragments. He believed that every reasonable effort was made to use as much of the material as possible in the memorial and by donation to the Smithsonian Institution. The remainder of the fragments not taken by schools, museums, and historical societies would be disposed of when the Denchar Warehouse was razed. This served to allay Mr. Huber's fears that valuable historic objects were being destroyed needlessly. [7]

By September 1958 the National Park Service decided which objects it wanted to keep. Within the next few months the Smithsonian Institution, the Missouri Historical Society, and other organizations hauled away selected items. [8] In the winter of 1959, the Denchar Warehouse was torn down, ending all hopes of having a Museum of American Architecture on the memorial grounds.

The parking lot on the north end of the site continued to shrink as the fill was spread on the grounds. To save the parking space, distressed downtown merchants proposed stockpiling the dirt instead of spreading it, but Park Service officials believed this would entail unnecessary time and extra expense. By March 1959 all dirt immediately available was on the site. In December 1959 Mayor Raymond Tucker negotiated with the Park Service on plans to build a parking garage on the memorial grounds. He issued an order to a drilling company to make test borings for the garage construction. In the previous year the city had awarded an \$8,000 contract to Eero Saarinen for a feasibility study for the proposed garage. Saarinen thought the proposal was feasible. [9]

Mayor Tucker also worked with various city and state officials to solve another planning problem. The states of Missouri and Illinois planned to build a free bridge near Poplar Street at the south border of the memorial. Their plan calling for usage of twenty five acres of memorial land caused considerable controversy, so Mayor Tucker appointed a committee (composed of Eero Saarinen and the City Plan Commission) to work out a plan to the satisfaction of the city, state, and Saarinen. In June 1959 the committee agreed on a plan requiring only two and a half acres of memorial land on the southern end. Missouri was then ready to proceed, and submitted the plan to the Illinois Division of Highways for approval. The Bureau of Public Roads also had to approve the plan because the bridge was part of President Eisenhower's Federal interstate highway system. [10]

Zoning Questions

Eero Saarinen worked with city officials on yet another aspect of planning and zoning buildings near the memorial. Saarinen believed to a large degree that the memorial's success depended upon the harmonious development of the adjacent areas, including the north, west and south sides, the bridges spanning the river, and the east river bank. The design of the new bridge was most important. Saarinen envisioned the redevelopment as a chance to impose desirable restrictions, saying "Here is a rare opportunity to develop these areas in a unified way with the highest standards of design creating high property values." [11]

In the summer of 1959 Saarinen had to voice his views to exert some control over beginning neighboring development. Lewis Kitchen, a real estate developer from Kansas City, Missouri, announced plans in April to build two forty-story buildings on Third Street

opposite the memorial. When critics charged that the tall structures would interfere with the 590-foot Saarinen Arch, Kitchen offered to lower the buildings' height. He met with city and park officials to solve the height problem in July. Even though the city controlled construction, the National Park Service and Eero Saarinen were consulted. One step already taken by the St. Louis Board of Aldermen was providing for a declaration of blight to be placed on a fifteen-block area west of the memorial. The aldermen thus possessed control over the area because all developers would have to submit their plans to the board for review. All redevelopment and rehabilitation would have to be in accordance with the city's general plan. [[12](#)]

Months passed as consultations were held between city and Federal officials. As of October, Park Service officials did not know just how tall the Arch was going to be. Saarinen was considering a height anywhere from 590 to 630 feet. He had not yet designed the Arch foundations, considering this task unfeasible until a definite height was determined. The delay caused some concern among Park Service officials because of the tight construction schedule they faced. Saarinen's decision on the Arch's height depended in part on adjacent development heights. A decision had to be made soon on the Arch so that the foundations and visitor center could be designed. Director Conrad Wirth decided to meet with Mayor Raymond Tucker to try and solve the problem. Late in October Tucker and Wirth agreed to limit the total height of buildings facing the memorial to 275 feet or about twenty-seven stories. Lewis Kitchen cut down his height proposal for the Mansion House development and the city announced that any developers who wanted to build structures facing the memorial would have to have the city approve their plans. The National Park Service, along with Eero Saarinen, agreed to raise the height of the Arch. [[13](#)]

With all these additional issues being solved and the way cleared for construction, St. Louis congressional leaders sought more money. Unfortunately, Department of the Interior officials believed that it would be well into the 1960 fiscal year before construction would proceed into the next phase of grading, landscaping, and paving. Since only the railroad relocation work had been funded, the next phases of construction needed additional appropriations. Considering the national budgetary and fiscal situation, Department of the Interior officials did not include a request for any extra funds in the 1960 fiscal year budget. [[14](#)]

Despite the Interior Department's attitude, St. Louis congressional members submitted a request for \$2,491,100 in extra funds to a Senate appropriations subcommittee on May 16, 1959. National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth thought the request could not be justified. Instead, he suggested that the supplemental appropriation could be sought in January 1960 if the construction were to the point where money could be spent on the project in fiscal 1960. The Senate Appropriations Committee, acting upon this opinion, omitted the money for the project in the Interior Department appropriation bill. Committee members approved only \$133,000 for operations and maintenance. Now congressional members had to wait until January 1960 to seek the funds again. [[15](#)]

Although memorial supporters obtained no additional funds, they still had final plans to finish and ground-breaking ceremonies to attend. In March 1959 the National Park Service announced new plans for a historical museum on the site. Because Saarinen had abandoned all plans for museums on the grounds for reasons of cost, he and George Hartzog decided to place the Museum of Westward Expansion underneath the Arch. The 1959 National Park Service Master Plan revealed that the memorial's visitor center, housing the museum, an auditorium, and an information center, would be located beneath the promenade at the foot of the Arch. Access was gained by ramps leading to the elevators for the "sky-ride" to the top of the Arch. [[16](#)]

All development would follow the general pattern of Saarinen's revised plans, with the

dominant physical and inspirational feature of the memorial remaining the stainless steel Arch. The only historic structures to be preserved within the memorial were the Old Courthouse, the Old Cathedral, and the Old Rock House, which was to be reconstructed near the south terrace overlook. The two river overlooks at the north and south ends of the memorial would contain exhibits concerning the river and railroad transportation aspects of westward expansion. The Old Courthouse was to serve as the administrative and operational headquarters for the area. Interpretive elements would include the structure's history and the St. Louis phase of westward expansion. [\[17\]](#)

Two developments specified in the 1959 plan were later dropped. Plans then called for two planted areas containing trail systems with interpretive devices relating to the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails. Another provision stated that any sculpture added had to be related to the theme of westward expansion. Other 1959 policy decisions have remained in effect throughout the years. It was decided not to allow eating facilities within the area, and parking facilities above or below ground would be constructed and operated by the city of St. Louis at the north or south end of the memorial. Ample room existed on the grounds to assemble crowds for infrequent dedication, ceremonial, or patriotic events directly related to the proper functions of the park but there were to be no special facilities for large scale crowd events such as pageants, concerts, or other extravagant affairs. The National Park Service believed that the city of St. Louis possessed the facilities for such events. It was not intended that the memorial be viewed or used as another city park. [\[18\]](#)

The memorial's development program was part of the National Park Service's Mission 66 program. Designed to preserve the park areas through adequate development and staffing, Mission 66 was the Park Service's long range improvement program. The name came from the original target set for completion of the program, 1966, which would be the fiftieth anniversary of the Park Service's establishment. Completion of the memorial's development was scheduled for 1964, the 200th anniversary of the founding of St. Louis. [\[19\]](#)

The Master Plan was revealed to the press and city officials on March 10, 1959 in a meeting in the Old Courthouse's oval east courtroom. Park Service Regional Historian Merrill Mattes explained the plan's guidelines, which were well received by the city and association officials. The mayor of St. Louis delivered a check for \$888,000 to Regional Director Howard Baker as the city's contribution to the first phase of the development. [\[20\]](#)

By the end of April, plans and specifications were approved for the railroad relocation, the first phase of the memorial's development program. Earlier in the month Park Service engineers made an agreement with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen to provide ventilation in the railroad tunnel. The union had gone to the Missouri Public Service Commission with their objections to the tunnel plans and an agreement was reached. On April 22 representatives from the various National Park Service offices, along with Eero Saarinen and his consulting engineers, Amman and Whitney, met in the Old Courthouse to discuss any questions concerning the tunnel plans. They wanted to solve all differences before the Public Service Commission's formal hearing on the tunnel plans and specifications. This was done, and on May 6 the commission ordered that the construction of the 960-foot tunnel be undertaken with a provision for artificial ventilation. The work included placing 3,000 feet of dual tracks into a tunnel 105 feet west of the elevated railroad, along with filling, grading, and trestle work. [\[21\]](#)

On June 8 the National Park Service received eight bids for the railroad relocation project. Gathering in the east courtroom of the Old Courthouse, contractors, bidders, and Park Service personnel submitted and read bids respectively. Reading the bids took two hours, after which Park Service officials announced the low bidders to be MacDonald Construction Company, 1310 South Grand Boulevard, St. Louis, with a bid of \$2,426,115. This was well below the

Park Service's engineering estimate of \$2,940,919. Ten days after George Hartzog submitted the bids to the Park Service's higher offices for approval, MacDonald Construction Company was awarded the contract for the memorial's first phase of construction. [22]

Ground-Breaking

The long awaited ground-breaking ceremonies took place after the contract was awarded. At 10:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 23, 1959, special ceremonies marked the opening of memorial construction as Mayor Raymond Tucker took a spade in hand to dig the first bit of dirt while local business and civic leaders watched. Director Conrad Wirth attended as former Mayor Bernard Dickmann presented remarks. [23] The work began.

The \$500,000 placed in escrow by the Terminal Railroad Association the previous year was now turned over to the National Park Service as the TRRA's contribution for relocating the tracks. Using these funds, the MacDonald Construction Company started work. By August the company finished demolition of Manuel Lisa's Old Rock House, started tunnel excavations, and poured concrete. During the autumn a national steel strike made it difficult to get steel, but adequate pipe for piling had been obtained, causing no delay in the project. In November, about two weeks after a final Master Plan for the memorial's development received Director Wirth's approval, MacDonald Construction Company began pouring the concrete tunnel walls. All the work connected with moving the railroad was done entirely on preliminary plans. All the different interests could not agree on a final plan, so the National Park Service advertised the project on unit prices and built the project on preliminary plans. [24]

Under Superintendent George Hartzog, the construction moved like clockwork into the new year 1960. Tremendous amounts of work were done as the memorial development moved into gear for the first time in twenty-five years. In January contracts were issued to Eero Saarinen for design, working drawings, supervision, and preliminary designs for the visitor center and Arch. Core borings were under contract. The tunnel ventilation system was covered by a change order issued to MacDonald Construction Company. Plans were complete and ready for contracting in January for the embankment retaining walls north and south of the railroad tunnel at the steps. Ongoing research continued on the historical aspects of the memorial. Restoration, historical research, exhibit plans, installation of museum units, archeological investigations, and salvage occurred throughout 1960, 1961, and 1962. [25]

The railroad tunnel construction went well during the spring months. By March it was 29 percent complete. Other work progressed at an equally fast pace. The National Park Service cooperated with Eero Saarinen in supplying data for a utility master plan. Planned pedestrian overpasses were lowered in priority. In April regional staffing teams reviewed the interpretive development program while work began on exhibit plans. In the Old Courthouse, the judge's chamber adjacent to the east courtroom was restored and partially refurnished with period furnishings. [26]

Mayor Tucker met with Park Service officials to discuss the parking lot once more. They agreed in May to use \$300,000 in funds from the temporary parking lot to develop permanent parking facilities. The city and the Park Service had an agreement whereby the city operated the lot with the revenue going for work on the Old Courthouse and other improvements. Now, at Tucker's request, the National Park Service agreed to use the funds instead to construct permanent parking facilities. The initial contribution was \$250,000 with an additional \$50,000 coming from future funds. [27]

Museum Planning

A museum prospectus for the visitor center was completed and distributed for review to the Park Service and Saarinen offices in May 1959. The study represented a major revision of the previous museum plan included in the preliminary museum prospectus. More than a year earlier Eero Saarinen told Park Service staff that he needed basic data on administrative, interpretive, and maintenance requirements for the memorial. In April 1959 they supplied him with the narrative portions of the Master Plan, yet this document did not contain enough data for his purpose. Saarinen needed criteria for his architectural design. Only a museum prospectus could provide him with the information he needed; a prospectus covering all the memorial's features including the Arch, visitor center, overlooks, Old Rock House, and Old Courthouse. During this period, Saarinen and National Park Service staffers conducted a survey of outstanding museums in the United States, looking for qualities they wanted to incorporate into the memorial. [28]

The Old Cathedral stood on the memorial grounds and it too needed decisions on its interpretive features. Church authorities wanted a cooperative agreement with the Park Service on matters such as what portion of the church would be open to general visitor use, a possible correlation of visiting hours with those of the memorial visitor center, and accommodations for parking. Director Wirth approved a scheme that allowed for a small surface parking lot south of the church. [29]

As National Park Service officials planned the memorial's interpretive direction, their attention turned to the site itself as a historic resource. When the railroad relocation construction disturbed the site of old St. Louis, Park Service archaeologists commenced excavations on several promising locations. Archeologist Zorro Bradley test excavated the site of the 1835 American Fur Company warehouse and General William Clark's residence. No structural remnants were found, but fragmentary foundations were located for two other historic edifices: an 1802 stone bake house built by Joseph Robidoux III, and the 1840 Glasgow-Howard building. As construction accelerated, the Park Service expanded their efforts to locate and preserve historic remains. [30]

Realistically, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial was established to commemorate events in American history that occurred in buildings which no longer existed. In St. Louis there were few remains to be found on which to base an interpretive program. [31] National Park Service officials agreed that a museum should be built on the site. The museum, to be the largest in the park system, had to be effective and dramatic in interpreting the legacy of westward expansion as the Arch was in commemorating that event. George Hartzog's staff of historians, headed by William Everhart, had to plan the entire interpretive development program. Hartzog told his superiors that "It is entirely probable that we will be creating the outstanding memorial of the 20th century. If this is true the very finest creative effort in museum and interpretive planning should be employed." [32] To design the finest museum the Park Service needed "superbly inventive imagination and vision." Fortunately, the provisions of the governing acts that permitted the Park Service to use outside services without normal administrative restrictions allowed them to hire experts in the field. [33]

Armed with the museum prospectus and findings of the museum tour, the National Park Service staff in St. Louis pursued a research development program governed by three factors. First, the large scope of the task; second, the lack of planning data; and third, the time limits on the program. Data was needed for Saarinen to complete the design of the museum structure in addition to researching, planning, designing, and constructing the museum and the overlooks. Planning data proved scarce; the March 1959 interpretive plan only established guidelines and the Master Plan had only been approved the previous October. No determination of the museum's content had been made, yet construction was slated to begin in less than eight months. The project completion date for all this work was 1964. [34]

In June, work began on the second phase of the research studies for the visitor center museum to supplement the museum subject outline. Historians prepared individual research narratives along with exhibit layout plans for each unit topic. By August the team completed the memorial's interpretive prospectus, a document of 200 pages, which defined the objectives of all the memorial's interpretive features. The research team also started a study on the outline prospectus of the visitor center interim museum. [35]

A research and interpretive development seminar was held from October 11 to 12 in St. Louis, where the entire research program was reviewed and approved. Park Service staff members from Washington, Omaha, and St. Louis attended. The interpretive and museum phases were reviewed as well as the research program, with emphasis placed upon completion of the working drawings for the visitor center. John Jenkins, chief of the Western Museum Laboratory, was detailed to the memorial for six months to aid in this project. [36] A series of conferences held in Eero Saarinen's offices starting in December concerned the space arrangements in the proposed museum. His organization prepared the plans for the space and structural arrangements. Meanwhile, the Park Service staff finished the preliminary plan on the first museum unit entitled "Cattlemen Up From Texas." This method of preparing museum plans by units was used on all the remaining eleven interpretive topics. The historians had to work fast, because the opening of bids for excavation of the visitor center was scheduled for January 12, 1961. [37]

Perpetuating the previously established tradition of working in conjunction with city officials, George Hartzog briefed Mayor Raymond Tucker on the continued memorial development. Together these men agreed on the importance of developing the museum and visitor center simultaneously with the Arch. They publicly announced that these features would be included in the memorial plan. Now that railroad relocation was underway, the National Park Service planned for the Arch development while attempting to cut costs. At the end of June, in conferences in Detroit between the Park Service's Eastern Office of Design and Construction (EODC) and Eero Saarinen, the decision was made by EODC not to include excavation of the museum simultaneously with the Arch and visitor center in the initial contract. This procedure would effectively remove the museum from those major features that the city and the National Park Service announced would be finished by 1964. If the Park Service did not build the museum there would be no interpretive program. In Superintendent George Hartzog's estimation, this decision proved that the Park Service was more interested in building the architectural features of the memorial (i.e. the Arch) than the museum, which interpreted the purpose for which the memorial was established. [38]

Eero Saarinen agreed with Hartzog that the excavation of the entire visitor center, walls and roof of the museum should be included in the contracts. Mayor Tucker was also disappointed with the decision. George Hartzog, however, did not let the decision become a final verdict. He discussed the matter with Director Conrad Wirth, who agreed that the contracts should be changed to include the excavation and construction of the museum along with the Arch and visitor center. [39] It was up to Hartzog to convince the EODC staff of the necessity for the change. The decision in Detroit to schedule construction in two parts was made for two reasons. Support for the Arch construction required bracing on solid ground, and Saarinen originally wished to avoid having the contractor work over the museum exhibit rooms during the Arch construction. Secondly, it was not possible to design the exhibit space until Saarinen reviewed the historical narrative being prepared by the Park Service historians and until he developed a concept for exhibit presentation. Exhibit design had to precede building design. [40]

Superintendent Hartzog disagreed with these points. He did not understand how construction problems would be any greater in building the Arch over the completed museum than they would be in excavating and constructing the museum space simultaneously with the

construction of the Arch during 1963. Hartzog also thought there might be merit in designing a museum that would be adaptable to different exhibit arrangements rather than in building a static space. He did not understand why the walls and roof of the museum could not be designed and constructed before the exhibit design. Just as important, Hartzog believed that a second, later excavation for the museum would add to the cost of the project. To ignore the museum space was not in accordance with the program developed and furnished to Mayor Tucker earlier in the year, and it was not in accordance with the understanding between EODC and Saarinen that the museum was an integral part of the overall development. Both must proceed simultaneously; they should not be divided. Hartzog urged the EODC staff to consult further with Saarinen. [41]

The technical reasoning behind limiting the excavation during the Arch construction was explained once more to Hartzog. Edward Zimmer, chief, EODC, was assured that Hartzog knew why the intended use of a museum had to be known before the four walls were designed. Zimmer believed that the memorial would be completed by 1964. Further, he admonished Hartzog not to question the development:

Perhaps it is difficult for you to understand technology as you have indicated; however, difficult structures to construct such as the arch, which you must remember will be the only structure of its kind in the world, will take construction techniques never before attempted to complete. The best technical minds in structural design and erection, both here and in Europe have been employed to produce this marvel of modern technology. [42]

Such statements did not make George Hartzog give up, however. He asked Zimmer once again to discuss the issue with Director Wirth before plans were developed which did not carry out the program previously agreed upon. There was no doubt in Hartzog's mind that Director Wirth and Mayor Tucker agreed with him. Regional Director Howard Baker wanted to leave the question of plans and specifications up to EODC and Saarinen, believing the visitor center/museum construction to be secondary to the Arch. Despite this, he offered solace to Hartzog: "While the picture may look somewhat cloudy at the moment, I feel it will be all right. However, at any time you feel you should do so, you are right in bringing up the question of plans and timing and I want to keep informed of any problem at any time so that we can keep the project moving as it should." [43] Director Wirth now stepped in. Reassuring Hartzog of his concurrence with the Superintendent's thinking on the matter, Wirth agreed to meet with Hartzog, Mayor Tucker, Regional Director Baker, a representative of EODC, and Eero Saarinen in the latter's office on September 2. "We should be able to get things squared away at that time," Wirth assured Hartzog. [44]

At the September 2 meeting, the group made major decisions on the memorial's development. Director Wirth wanted the overall program to be confined to those items essential to completing the principal elements of Saarinen's plan. Rising costs dictated this policy, and meant that some items, such as complete rehabilitation of the Old Courthouse and construction of the grand east staircase, were dropped. Consideration of building the pedestrian bridges over Third Street was deferred, with the hope that the planned expressway would be constructed on a subterranean level through the area. Wirth stated that the museum development program should be kept firmly in the Park Service's control. During the course of planning the previous year, various elevator companies proposed schemes for a transportation system to carry visitors to the top of the Arch. Now Director Wirth was pleased with an "ingenious" proposal made by Richard Bowser who had been contacted through the Montgomery Elevator Company of Moline, Illinois, but took on the project as a private contractor. Wirth was also impressed with consulting engineer Fred Severud's structural studies of the Arch. Hartzog recommended a program to obligate the remaining funds available for the fiscal year. Funds totaling \$3,700,000 would be used for rehabilitation

work on the Old Courthouse retaining walls and cornices, the main steps of the riverfront overlooks, portions of the overlook structures themselves, and the levee retaining walls. Concerning the question of constructing the museum simultaneously with the visitor center and Arch, Director Wirth wanted early contracting in the fiscal year on at least the subfootings for the Arch and visitor center. More important, he did not believe the National Park Service should allow the Arch to proceed without constructing the museum along with it. [45] George Hartzog had won.

To keep control over the museum's content, Regional Director Baker believed Saarinen should serve as a consultant for the museum's interpretive development as well as the consulting architect for EODC. Because of the vastness of the interpretive theme and the minimal historic features within the area, Baker recommended that Eero Saarinen's contract be expanded to include the preparation of the preliminary museum plan. He wanted to defer preparing the detailed museum exhibit plan until Saarinen completed the preliminary. [46] Despite these wishes, Saarinen later declined the project.

Surrounding Development

Instead, Saarinen stayed involved with the memorial's peripheral development. In 1960 the city of St. Louis was poised to begin a major redevelopment of its downtown and riverfront areas. Zoning changes, the Mansion House and proposed Laclede's Landing developments, and the construction of the interstate highways added to the memorial construction in providing impetus to St. Louis' facelift. Eero Saarinen stayed involved with those projects that affected the overall riverfront development, such as peripheral zoning. The proposed interstate highway bridge, to be located south of the memorial area, subsequently attracted Saarinen's attention. He approved of the bridge's construction, thinking that this bridge, along with the Eads Bridge bordering the memorial on the north, would help tie the entire complex together. When the bridge was first proposed in the late 1950s, Saarinen had pushed for a close visual relationship between the bridge and the memorial. It was important to him that the bridge be of a design sympathetic to the memorial. National Park Service officials wanted a single-level girder deck bridge with clean architectural lines, hoping this bridge would block out much of the adjacent MacArthur Bridge from the memorial visitor's view. [47] Saarinen and Park Service engineers met with the Missouri and Illinois State Highway Departments, the Bureau of Public Roads, and Sverdrup and Parcel Engineering Company to discuss both the bridge and its approaches. They examined the possibility of depressing the expressway approaches on the Missouri side, and the Park Service had no objections. Their only concern was the lowered expressway's effect on the Old Cathedral. [48]

Another concern of the Park Service was the railroad tracks remaining on the east side of the memorial. Superintendent Hartzog met with the Terminal Railroad Association, the Missouri Pacific Railroad and city officials concerning the removal of the city track and the relocation of the Missouri Pacific track. The Park Service had long prepared for the removal of these tracks. After the railroad relocation contract was awarded, the Park Service issued a change order in January 1960, involving the establishment of substandard clearances over the relocated railroad tracks at the north and south ends of the memorial. The Park Service had to obtain Missouri Public Service Commission approval of the substandard clearances. The work included in the change order required a relocation of the tracks on the levee to reduce the encroachment on the levee, which would provide the additional street width required by levee automobile traffic. Negotiations with the unions, railroads, and city officials were expected to last several months. [49]

Work on the levee was accomplished by advertising a separate contract from the railroad relocation work. Most important, the work on the levee had to be finished before the MacDonald Construction Company could work on the north end of the memorial. The

MacDonald Company's construction of a retaining wall could not begin until after the levee tracks were moved. Further, those tracks could not be moved until the Wharf Street redevelopment was finished. The National Park Service operated under extremely critical, tight time schedules to maintain coordination between the several ongoing developments and keep the program on schedule. [50]

In 1960, three tracks remained on the levee. The 1958 track relocation agreement provided that the westernmost track, owned by the Missouri Pacific Railroad, was to be abandoned, and it had been by 1960. The Missouri Pacific owned the center track while the easternmost track was owned by the city and leased to the TRRA. Both railroads agreed to convert the two tracks into one, with switching arrangements placed north of the Eads Bridge and south of Poplar Street. They furnished the rails and ties for the new tracks while the Park Service assumed responsibility for constructing the new track. The Park Service also assumed the cost of the new track, provided that the Missouri Pacific conveyed to them its two existing tracks. Additionally, the railroad was to make a contribution of \$3,150 to the Government for an estimated removal cost of the railroad's westernmost track. Time was important because the levee construction contract was to be advertised on November 15 and awarded by December 23. By the end of the year the railroad relocation contract was approximately 50 percent complete. [51]

Appropriation Efforts

Congress had provided no additional funds for the memorial construction since the 1956 appropriation for the railroad relocation. President Eisenhower's 1958 authorization of \$17,250,000 had yet to be appropriated at the beginning of 1960. The local congressional delegation sought financing as the Park Service staff at the site planned the remaining development. The delegation asked Maurice Stans, director of the Budget Bureau, for an appropriation of \$2,503,125 to be included in a supplemental appropriation bill to finance the Department of the Interior operations for the rest of the fiscal year. The delegation believed the supplemental money necessary because of what they considered inadequate appropriations proposed in Eisenhower's budget. The President only proposed \$1,650,000 for fiscal year 1961 while Mayor Tucker and other leaders believed that a total of \$5,686,875 was needed to keep the development on schedule for completion by 1964. [52]

In late January 1960 Mayor Tucker, along with Senator Hennings, Representatives Curtis and Karsten, and Morton May of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, appeared before the Interior subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee seeking the additional funds. All of the available funds for the project were committed except for a \$90,000 reserve for contingencies. The 1961 budget then before Congress included \$1,650,000 that with city matching funds would make \$2,200,000 available for the year. The change order already issued to MacDonald Construction Company for construction of the crossover bridges and retaining walls required \$2,100,000 in financing. National Park Service officials believed that \$10,920,000 of construction could be undertaken between January and the end of the next fiscal year, June 30, 1961. Financing these projects required a Federal appropriation of \$8,190,000 with matching city funds of \$2,730,000. Funds totaling \$337,500 could be obligated during the remainder of the 1960 fiscal year. Tucker and the delegation sought a supplemental appropriation. [53]

Their requests fell on deaf ears. On February 12, 1960, the House Appropriations Committee refused to grant more than \$1,650,000 in funds, the amount specified by the administration. The House group believed that the serious fiscal situation then facing the nation dictated their action. The St. Louis delegation's attempts to acquire the supplemental appropriation also met with failure, for Maurice Stans said no. [54] Mayor Tucker tried again, testifying before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee on February 18. He painted a bleak portrait of the

memorial development, just barely creeping along without the additional funds. The one-man subcommittee, Senator Carl Hayden (Arizona) thought the situation difficult, but told Tucker to prepare a list of basic items needing completion and the least amount of money required to keep the project moving. Hayden might approve such an appropriation in between the administration's approved figure of \$1,650,000 and the full requirement of \$8,190,000. Meanwhile, other congressional members placed pressure on Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton. [55]

It was in this manner that the need evolved for keeping the memorial development to a minimum. Superintendent George Hartzog and Joseph Jensen of Eero Saarinen and Associates revised the schedule of operations to allow only a minimal development: the Arch, visitor center, and museum. The fund amount they used was the irreducible minimum, barely enough to keep the major features on schedule. Mayor Tucker wrote Senator Hayden stating that \$4,603,125 was needed to continue construction throughout fiscal years 1960 and 1961. This amount, added to the city's matching funds of \$1,534,375, would permit construction totaling \$6,137,500. [56]

The compromise worked only temporarily. On March 29 the Senate approved the \$4,603,125 in their version of the Interior Department omnibus appropriation bill on a roll call vote of 47 to 37. The under secretary of the interior then approved the appropriation and sought approval from the Bureau of the Budget. This move was expected to help the bill when it came up before the Senate-House conference, but the conferees failed to retain this amount. They approved only the House recommended amount of \$1,650,000. Senator Hennings subsequently asked the Bureau of the Budget to approve an additional appropriation of \$2,953,125, or, the difference between \$1,650,000 and \$4,603,125. Hennings felt this procedure might succeed, because under normal procedures, supplemental measures providing additional funds for Government agencies would be considered by Congress before the end of the session. [57]

The situation seemed crucial, with the Arch construction hanging in the balance. Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, called the first meeting of that group in two years to exhibit his concern over the potential postponement of the construction. [58] Weeks passed before the supplemental funds bill came before Congress. On June 23 the House approved the supplemental appropriation of \$2,953,000 for Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. The passage was by a voice vote after members struck an amendment offered by Representative H.R. Gross (Iowa) to cut the memorial funds from the bill. Representatives Thomas Curtis and Frank Karsten joined in the ensuing debate. The National Park Service was criticized for its failure to anticipate its monetary needs, but in actuality the mistake was the Budget Bureau's. It failed to ask for the necessary funds to keep the construction on schedule. [59]

The Senate approved the bill on July 1, with President Eisenhower following suit on July 19 by signing the document. The supplemental provision for \$2,953,000 added to the \$1,650,000 approved earlier, made a total of \$4,603,000 for continued work on the memorial. In November Mayor Raymond Tucker matched the Government contribution with local funds totaling \$984,333. [60] No sooner had the process been followed, the work done, and the funds obtained for fiscal year 1961 then the process began again. In December 1960 the Bureau of the Budget, determined not to get caught again, approved the full amount of \$9,497,000 in Eisenhower's budget for fiscal year 1962. [61]

The amount was subject to review by President-elect John F. Kennedy. He allowed the amount to stand and the House Appropriations Committee approved the expenditure on April 14, 1961. Four days later the full House approved; not a voice was raised in protest and from there the matter went before the Senate. Mayor Tucker and Missouri Senator Stuart

Symington emphasized to the group that the memorial was going to be finished within the original authorization. No construction plans required expenditures over 1958's \$17,250,000 authorization. The Senate went along with the request with no debate in June, and on August 3, 1961 President Kennedy signed the 1962 fiscal year Interior Department Appropriation Bill which included \$9,497,000 for the construction of the Gateway Arch. Only \$510,000 in Federal funds remained to be appropriated from the original Federal authorization of \$17,250,000. [\[62\]](#)

During the months of attempts for large appropriations, Superintendent Hartzog kept busy on other projects. All through the years of its existence the memorial never enjoyed the benefits of an affiliation with a historical association or cooperating which would sell interpretive literature and other items. In late 1960 the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association sponsored the formation of the Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association. Articles of incorporation were filed in Jefferson City, Missouri, establishing the organization as a non-profit corporation. Operations started by April 1961. The association began by selling postcards and publications, with the profits poured back into the memorial's interpretive program. [\[63\]](#)

The first items on the construction agenda for the new year, 1961, were the opening of several bids and the awarding of contracts. The Klaric Contracting Company of St. Louis was awarded a contract on December 30, 1960 for \$98,504 for repairs and replacements of cornices, pediments, and chimneys on the Old Courthouse. Delayed since December, bids opened for the second stage of memorial construction on January 12. The apparent low bidder was MacDonald Construction Company with a bid of \$3,796,015. Their bid was the only one under the Park Service engineer's estimate of \$3,888,000, with the contract specifying the construction of the Arch foundations, visitor center/museum excavations, and the levee redevelopment. The National Park Service assistant director approved the contract on February 9, and a notice to proceed was issued to MacDonald Construction Company the next day. [\[64\]](#)

The completion of the north and south overlooks was not included in the revised basic element construction program. Only the steps, east wall, and south wall were to be completed on the south overlook, with financing provided under both the railroad relocation contract and the levee contract. The overlook would be incomplete, yet it would look completed from the levee. At the north end the steps, east wall, and north wall would be finished to enclose the bridge over the railroad trestle in its relocated position. The National Park Service would then pour a floor and roof, but the structure's completion would have to wait. Much of the available funds would be used for ramping and landscaping to permit access of the maintenance equipment from the maintenance area to the memorial. [\[65\]](#)

Construction Decisions

The importance of keeping the construction on schedule manifested itself in view of the project's complexity. The strict time limits and intensified planning and programming demanded coordination between the various offices involved to solve some of the communication problems. Superintendent Hartzog suggested that EODC, the regional office, his office, and Saarinen's people meet at least every six weeks to review developments. Their efforts to maintain communication aided in keeping both major construction contracts on schedule throughout the first months of the year. By April the railroad relocation work was 70 percent complete while the just-started Arch and visitor center excavation work stood at 10 percent complete. [\[66\]](#)

In addition to keeping the project on schedule, the National Park Service had to keep it within the budget of \$23,000,000 Federal and city funds. Eero Saarinen deleted particular elements

from the contracts to save money and to preserve the memorial's basic design. He removed all the stone curbs, liners, and paving from the levee road with the exception of the stone paving at the main stairs. He eliminated the squared stone facing from the levee walls and overlook structures. The square footage of finished exhibit space was cut back. These deletions amounted to a saving of \$750,000, keeping the project within the budget and allowing it to continue with the least amount of interruption. Saarinen's principal concern was with the memorial's function and visitor circulation. He did not care for the idea of leaving the overlooks unfinished, for he considered the purpose and form of the structures to be a necessary part of the plan. Still undecided was the location of the maintenance yard. Saarinen believed it should be situated at the south end of the memorial.

Mayor Tucker and Director Wirth agreed with Eero Saarinen's deletions. They agreed that the major features of the memorial had to be built within the budget at the expense of other desirable but nonessential features. [67] At a June 14 meeting between representatives of EODC, the Washington office, Eero Saarinen and Associates, and Mayor Tucker's office, the final decisions on deletions were made. The visitor center, Arch, and museum complex would contain the following elements: one elevator cab, one finished theater, one rough theater, 41,500 square feet of finished museum space, lobby, restrooms, and offices for the memorial staff. The location of the maintenance area depended upon access from Poplar Street following construction of the Poplar Street Bridge; if proper access existed, the maintenance area would be placed on the south side. Landscaping and utility items were greatly reduced, leaving Conrad Wirth hoping that the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association could solicit nonmatching donations for the landscaping program. Wirth, pleased with the cooperation of all involved, expected plans to be pushed so that commitments to have the major features completed by 1964 would be met. [68] The National Park Service EODC moved quickly; six days after the conference, George Hartzog received a preliminary drawing of the visitor center for his scrutiny. [69] On June 30, 1961, Hartzog, along with John Cabot, supervising architect EODC, and representatives of Saarinen's group, met in Detroit to decide whether to separate the visitor center/museum interior work from the shell and the Arch. They agreed reluctantly to do so, for the Arch construction would have been delayed for months if included in the same contract as the visitor center/museum interior. The arrangement gave the National Park Service planning staff more time for exhibit design. [70]

By October 1961 most of the major decisions on Jefferson National Expansion Memorial's developments had been made. The National Park Service had \$23,000,000 to plan and complete the construction by January 1964. The railroad relocation project moved toward completion and posed no interference in other phases of the development. The Arch and visitor center excavation, along with the levee development contract, was modified to reduce wall heights and to omit all stonework except at the levee retaining wall. The north and south overlooks were both reduced in size. A decision for completing the grand center staircase was withheld until bids were received for the Arch and visitor center/museum shell. Any leftover funds could then be used for the stairs. Saarinen's recommendations for the elements of the Arch and visitor center shell complex remained the same. The Arch and visitor center shell was covered by one contract with the interior covered by another. Design of the exhibit spaces and exhibits was to be done by the National Park Service. The maintenance building was to be placed at the south end of the memorial. The Park Service would also perform landscaping, but Director Wirth stated on several occasions that no dunes, mounds, or lagoons should be included in the landscaping despite their presence in Saarinen's design. At this time the National Park Service completed their planning, bidding, and work schedules. [71]

MacDonald Construction Company had 95 percent of the railroad relocation complete in November. Operation of the trains over the new tracks started on November 17, and the Terminal Railroad Association notified the Missouri Public Service Commission of the fact.

[72] Total completion of this first phase of construction was expected by June 1962.

In view of the Federal appropriation and the need for a matching city appropriation, near the end of the year Superintendent Hartzog presented Mayor Tucker with a progress report on the memorial's planning schedule and financing. As of December 1, total authorization of funds stood at \$23,003,150. Appropriations and contributions amounted to \$19,657,483, leaving \$3,345,667 to be appropriated or contributed. These funds were in addition to the \$9,000,000 spent between 1935 and 1959. The National Park Service divided the memorial development into four phases in their attempt to coordinate the construction. Phase I, consisting of the track relocation, retaining walls, and cross-over bridges, was essentially complete. Phase II consisted of research, specimen acquisition and exhibit planning for the museum, redevelopment of the levee, and excavations for foundations of the Arch and visitor center/museum. Completion in November stood at 15 percent, with final completion of the excavation due in January 1962, the research October 1962, and the levee January 1963. Phase III covered the Arch construction and the structural portion of the visitor center/museum, interior finishes of the visitor center/museum, construction and installation of museum exhibits, and a portion of the final landscaping. The Park Service expected to receive bids on December 20, with construction scheduled to start in January 1962. Phase IV involved the final landscaping. With completion set for 1964, the program was on schedule. [73] This condition did not last long. The date to receive bids was extended from December 20 to January 22, 1962, to issue an addendum to the plans and specifications for the Arch construction. The delay would be only the first of many. [74] St. Louis would not see its dream finished by its 200th birthday.

Along with the decisions on development and the contractual procedures, the National Park Service staff made progress on their museum planning. At the year's start the staff launched a full scale museum planning program. The St. Louis staff, aided by Washington exhibit planning experts and John Jenkins, chief, Western Museum Laboratory, completed exhibit plans for four units during the month of January. With the program on schedule, both the Washington and Western Museum Laboratory exhibit planning teams worked simultaneously with the local staff to produce two unit plans per week in February. [75] A Museum Review Committee, consisting of members of the regional staff, during the month of March conducted the final review of the museum program. Regional Director Howard Baker approved the exhibit plan for the Museum of Westward Expansion on March 22. The museum planning program, started in November 1960, was completed on schedule with the exhibit plans for twelve separate museum units defined. [76] The research staff began the detailed research planning phase of the museum development with a scheduled completion date of July 1961. The final preliminary exhibit plan, complete with sketches of the exhibits for each unit, was distributed to interested offices at the regional office for comment. The report was in two volumes. [77]

Eero Saarinen had indicated that he could not assume the project of working on the museum design, but at the June 30, 1961, meeting he seemed to indicate that he was interested. Historian William Everhart hoped this was true, as did Hartzog. A systematic program was needed for both the museum design and an acquisition program while a final decision was also needed on the museum floor plan. Many more factors were involved. Whether Saarinen or EODC designed the museum, Hartzog still had to set up a schedule for completing the working drawings and the opening of bids. His estimated target date for completion of the visitor center interior was December 1, 1963. Hartzog wondered, however, how the interior finish deadlines could be coordinated with exhibit construction. This could only be accomplished through constant communication and coordination between Everhart, Jenkins and Hartzog. [78]

Exhibit design continued throughout the last months of the year, with the acquisition

program for illustrative material and documents for the museum demanding much attention. Regional Curator Newell Joyner and the St. Louis staff prepared a "want list" of objects to save as the first phase of the acquisition program. Several staff members traveled to Kansas City to confer with General Services Administration officials on the best procedures to follow in contracting for exhibit fabrication and production. [79] By December 11 research historian Don Rickey, Jr., and other members of the St. Louis staff submitted their research schedule, which established target dates for the completion of all the research reports needed for museum planning. These reports were the basis for the design and construction of dioramas, for the commissioned art work, and for the exhibit's informational material. On December 18 and 19, Regional Historian Merrill Mattes reviewed all phases of the research and museum planning program. [80]

At the end of 1961 Jefferson National Expansion Memorial was in very good health. National Park Service staffers continued their research, planning, and construction while the financial outlook appeared adequate for the moment. Cost cutting measures stripped Saarinen's plan of its refined details, but failed to cast a pall over the brilliance of its basic features. The railroad tracks were finally moved, thereby fulfilling former Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes' restricting condition. Now the memorial could be built. Ten years had passed since Luther Ely Smith's death and his dream now bordered on reality. But the year also brought tragedy, for Eero Saarinen died of a brain tumor on September 1, 1961, at Ann Arbor, Michigan. His partners Joseph Lacy, John Dinkeloo, and Kevin Roche supervised the completion of Saarinen's projects, of which the Arch was only one. The plans were set for the Arch, so Saarinen's death did not affect any major changes in them. George Hartzog firmly believed that Saarinen was just hitting his stride when he died, for he might have been the greatest architect the country ever produced. The work continued according to Saarinen's concept. [81]

Award of the Arch Construction Contract

The east courtroom of the Old Courthouse provided the setting for a special ceremony for the opening of bids for the construction of the Gateway Arch and the visitor center. Representatives of the press and other interested spectators attended the bid opening on January 22, 1962, in which four bids were received. Superintendent Hartzog, presiding, opened the bids, only to find that all of them were above the engineers' estimate. Eero Saarinen's engineers believed the cost of building the Arch within 875 days and the visitor center shell within 300 days to be \$8,067,000. The four bids ranged from \$11,923,163 to \$12,765,078. Because the bids exceeded the estimate, Director Wirth appointed a committee to study both the bids and estimates on the basis of the Government's requirements and to ascertain whether the bids were reasonable. [82]

Superintendent Hartzog headed the committee, which was composed of National Park Service Assistant Director A. Clark Stratton, Assistant Chief of Lands Harry Sanders, Supervisory Architect Robert Smith, and Joseph Jensen of Eero Saarinen and Associates. The group found the bids to be reasonable in view of the Government's requirements after meeting with the four bidders, MacDonald Construction Company, the low bidder; Millstone Construction Company; J.S. Alberici Construction Company and C. Rallo Construction Company, a joint venture; and Frazier-Davis Construction Company and Massman Construction Company, a joint venture. The committee's conclusion that the bids were reasonable meant that the National Park Service must either accept MacDonald Construction Company's low bid or reject all bids and re-advertise the work. Director Wirth wondered if the \$12,332,667 of appropriated funds would be enough to finish the work, knowing that re-advertising for bids would cause delay. [83]

Wirth accepted MacDonald's bid. On March 14, 1962, he traveled to St. Louis to sign the

contract for construction of the Arch and visitor center shell, and to accept the city's matching fund contribution of \$2,500,000 from Mayor Tucker. MacDonald Construction Company agreed to lower their bid by \$500,000; the contract awarded to the company totaled \$11,442,418. The Arch was to be a unique structure and its construction required the special attention and scrutiny that the National Park Service devoted to it. Nearly one hundred sets of specifications and invitations to bid had been distributed to approximately fifty construction firms which requested the plans in response to public notices. Director Wirth had ordered the four bids examined by the special committee in accordance with Federal Procurement Regulations and upon the advice of the General Accounting Office. [84]

At the contract signing Director Wirth announced that sufficient funds were not available to accept bids for the proposed elevator train system to transport visitors to the top of the Arch. The Bi-State Development Agency (established by the Missouri and Illinois state legislatures to promote the planning and development of transportation for the area in and around St. Louis) requested an agreement with the National Park Service, wherein Bi-State would issue revenue bonds to provide funds to install the transportation system in the Arch. When the bonds retired all proceeds would go to the Federal Government. On March 13 and 14 Superintendent Hartzog met with Colonel R.E. Smyser, Jr., executive director of the Bi-State Development Agency, to discuss the proposal. Other offers of financial aid came to Park Service officials. The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association offered to raise funds to complete the landscaping, while the Civil Defense Administration expressed interest in aiding the visitor center construction if it could utilize the structure as a fall-out shelter. [85]

Director Wirth accepted Bi-State's financing offer, and on May 14 he held a brief ceremony in his Department of the Interior office to sign the cooperative agreement between the two agencies. The cost of \$1,977,750 was to be borne by Bi-State. Members of the Missouri congressional delegation, who were in the midst of attempts to obtain more Government appropriations for the memorial, attended the ceremony. It was agreed that MacDonald Construction Company would build the transportation system. [86]

The \$510,000 funds remaining to be appropriated by Congress were slated for utilities and a limited amount of landscape and site work. The Missouri congressional delegation sought these funds, even though Director Wirth gave assurances that sufficient money remained to complete the project's basic features. He did not plan to ask for an increase in the congressional ceiling on the project. On March 16, 1962, the House Appropriations Committee approved the \$510,000 appropriation in President John Kennedy's budget request. The House passed the measure on March 20 and the bill went to the Senate where an appropriations committee had already heard testimony on the project without raising any challenge. The Senate acted favorably and President Kennedy signed the 1963 fiscal year Department of the Interior Appropriation Act, including the \$510,000, on August 9, 1962. [87] More financial good news arrived a month earlier, when the Bi-State Development Agency's \$3,300,000 Arch transportation bonds almost sold out the first day they were offered. On July 11 approximately 95 percent of the bonds were sold to insurance firms, banks, and individuals. The tax exempt bonds were due in thirty years and paid 5-1/2 percent interest. [88] At yet another ceremony in the Old Courthouse, the construction contract was signed on July 31 for installation of the transportation system in the Arch. [89]

Continuing simultaneously with the contract bidding and bond sales, the memorial's museum development thrived in the hands of St. Louis' National Park Service staff. The Smithsonian Institution cooperated in making surplus items available for the Museum of Westward Expansion. Superintendent Hartzog met with filmmaker Charles Guggenheim to discuss making an orientation film for the Museum of Westward Expansion. On July 12 Hartzog participated in a contract signing ceremony with Laclede Gas Company which donated

\$25,000 for Guggenheim's filming of "Time of the West." [90] The museum research staff developed plans for an interim exhibit gallery in the visitor center. This gallery would provide temporary interpretation for memorial visitors until the Museum of Westward Expansion opened. The staff proposed a floor plan and text that included research originally done for the museum. The interim exhibit gallery was placed in the visitor center lobby in 1967, and remained until 1976. [91]

The principal task of the National Park Service Planning Branch was the production of exhibit designs and construction drawings for the permanent museum. By the end of the year the exhibit designs for the last of the twelve major exhibit units was completed, with seventy-five percent of the construction drawings finished. Work progressed to the point where preliminary specifications for panel and case exhibits were prepared. Specimen and illustration acquisition progressed at the same time. The staff acquired artifacts that they catalogued and cleaned. Among the acquisitions were a chuck wagon and an original bronze casting of the "Bronco Buster" by Frederic Remington. Objects needed for the interim gallery exhibits were located and orders were placed for color photographs. A pilot draft was drawn up for negotiated contracts for commissioned art works, and procedures were established for reviewing the qualifications of candidates for these commissioned works. Material was supplied to Charles Guggenheim for textual and illustrative use in his movie production. [92]

The museum research staff finished another document — a thematic synopsis of the contents of each of the planned twelve exhibit units. The document, a highly condensed explanation of the museum's interpretive focus, served to give direction to the curatorial acquisition. Planning for the museum focused on four major subject divisions: the land, its acquisition, the people who mastered it, and the significance and meaning of westward expansion to the nation and its people. The exhibits were researched and designed to convey the western drama to the visitor in terms of personal experiences; to tell what it was like to be involved in the westward expansion experience between 1803 and the 1890s. The research team planned for the Guggenheim documentary film to introduce and summarize westward expansion, thereby preparing visitors for the interpretive story in the museum itself. The National Park Service staff believed that the completion of the twelve-unit museum and film would be a fitting companion achievement to the Gateway Arch. [93]

MacDonald Construction Company kept up the pace on the Arch construction, pouring the first concrete for the Arch foundations on June 27, 1962. Two months later the Park Service issued a stop order because of plan changes. Progress on the visitor center remained very good as several main lobby columns stood in place as well as 15 percent of the roof. Prefinal inspection of the railroad relocation project occurred in August. By December the levee development stood at 96 percent complete. MacDonald's subcontractor, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, made extensive preparations during the month for the receipt, storage, fabrication, and erection of the Arch steel sections. [94]

Superintendent George Hartzog did not wait to see the construction. On June 19, 1962, he announced his resignation from the National Park Service effective August 1. He left to accept the position of director of Downtown St. Louis, Incorporated. Twenty-six days later Jefferson National Expansion Memorial had a new superintendent, H. Raymond Gregg. [95] Within a year and a half George Hartzog moved on to become director of the National Park Service.

The work continued through the change in leadership. Hartzog had worked to keep costs low, and to cut the development program down to the bare essentials to keep within the authorized funding. Funds contributed by outside groups helped provide extras; in October the American Iron and Steel Institute and Laclede Gas Company contributed \$100,000 to make a film about the construction of the Arch. [96] Despite this and other donations, signs of financial trouble

burst forth near the end of the year. On November 1 Superintendent Gregg wrote Regional Director Howard Baker of the serious nature of the problem. Gregg believed the financial situation to be desperate. A review of the files persuaded him that the minimal features could not be finished with existing funds. [97]

This left three courses of action in Gregg's view: 1) Raise the congressional fund ceiling and obtain 1963 deficiency funds. Gregg believed that the Park Service could go back to Congress for removal of the "unrealistic" ceiling, since the cost of the project had outrun the estimates upon which the ceiling was established by some 30 to 40 percent. 2) Limit the project's scope by either breaking faith with Bi-State Development Agency or limiting the power of Eero Saarinen and Associates. Gregg did not want to follow either course. He believed that the honor of the Park Service required that the Arch be built and Bi-State's contract be honored. Eero Saarinen and Associates held a contract with EODC, and would take the credit or the blame for the architectural integrity and completion of the Arch. Saarinen's group was meticulous in its demands to the point of disagreeing with the contractor, resulting in increasing change orders. They faced many unresolved details of construction and needed contingency money to solve the problems. The Park Service would have to decide what powers and prerogatives Saarinen's group could have. This raised the possibility that if the Associates felt they could not supervise the work with a degree of freedom in relation to their eminent standing, they would want no responsibility for association with the project. The Park Service had to decide if it could finance the Arch's completion to meet Eero Saarinen and Associates' needs. 3) The ultimate alternative was to stop the project. Gregg predicted with an air of surety that the Park Service would be disgraced if it had a partly completed Arch, useless catacombs, and a weed and rat-infested rubble field on the waterfront. [98] As far as Gregg could see, finding answers to three simple questions could solve the complex matter. How much funding could be found within the authorized ceiling to do the work? How much money should be set aside to cover the contingencies on the Arch? How much money would be left and what part of the construction program should be completed? [99]

Regional Director Howard Baker's first response was to tell Gregg not to obligate any additional funds until they both could discuss the funding situation with Director Wirth. He referred specifically to the museum contracts. In November 1962 funds needed to complete sufficient portions of the project to create the memorial totaled \$1,407,779 with no provision for any contingencies. An additional \$3,587,093 was required to complete the minimal features. The situation was critical; full consideration would be given to all possible means of financing the memorial, including a congressional request to increase the 1958 monetary ceiling. [100]

Director Wirth met with Regional Director Baker, Superintendent Gregg, and other Park Service officials concerning the problem. They reexamined the status of funds, concluded that they had an unobligated balance of \$469,031 in construction funds, and decided to make no further obligations against them unless required through adjustments in the contracts underway. The design office was to prepare an up-to-date program of the projects needed to complete the memorial, along with an estimated cost of each project. Whenever Park Service officials decided on the program objectives they would meet with Mayor Tucker and the Missouri congressional delegation to discuss seeking an increase in the project ceiling. [101]

Superintendent Gregg and Director Wirth reviewed the new draft of estimates developed by EODC and Eero Saarinen and Associates, eliminating items to cut costs. The two men, along with Regional Director Baker and Assistant Park Service Director A. Clark Stratton, met with Mayor Raymond Tucker on January 28, 1963, to discuss the memorial's funding. Wirth presented a program for completing the memorial totaling approximately \$8,000,000. Mayor Tucker accepted this as reasonable and agreed to try to raise city matching funds for any more Government appropriations. The National Park Service sought \$6,000,000, with

\$2,000,000 in city funds, for the memorial's completion. [102] Eero Saarinen and Associates re-estimated the completion costs, taking into account Wirth's revisions, his agreement with Mayor Tucker, and the work then under contract. The cost of completing the site development, landscaping, maintenance building, visitor center (including museum exhibits), and finishing the transportation system load zones and Arch structure stood at \$7,954,414. [103]

National Park Service officials did not publicly announce this estimate to the press until September. They considered making an attempt in Congress to authorize the entire \$5,965,809 Federal contribution to construct features of the memorial postponed for lack of money, as they wanted to complete the entire design approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission in 1948. An appropriation, however, would not be sought during the current session. [104] Mayor Tucker announced at the same time that two foundations established by the late Albert P. Greensfelder, a St. Louis businessman, had offered to contribute \$775,000 toward completing the visitor center and Museum of Westward Expansion only if the Federal Government authorized \$2,325,000 for the two features. [105] The Greensfelder offer later became a political issue as the National Park Service sought the additional funds from Congress. Threats of losing the offer accompanied the fight for the funds in several instances.

Now that the National Park Service had strengthened its financial standings regarding the St. Louis project, the local staff was assured that construction and planning would continue. Peripheral development remained in the staff's minds as being a crucial element in the project. During the summer of 1962 Park Service officials believed that the city of St. Louis should establish rigid regulations for development and operations on the riverfront for the length of the memorial. Without such regulation the riverfront would be cluttered with watercraft of all descriptions. The ideal situation was to have the riverfront devoid of boats and barges, but this being impractical the Park Service wanted a minimum distance of 1,000 feet in length in front of the Arch and steps to be free of watercraft and docking facilities. Under no circumstances could the craft moored north and south of this section have permanent anchorage. Only by establishing such regulations could the city assure that the quality of the riverfront would match that of the memorial. [106]

The idea of controlling the riverfront appearance also applied to the Illinois side of the Mississippi River. East St. Louis Mayor Alvin Fields received a letter in February 1963 from Mayor Tucker telling him of the recent St. Louis City Plan Commission resolution covering the zoning proposals for the area in front of the memorial. The city adopted the Park Service recommendations and wanted to apply their restrictions to the east side. Eero Saarinen's original 1948 memorial concept included development of the east side. Mayor Fields was assured of the cooperation of the St. Louis Plan Commission as well as that of the National Park Service in developing compatible plans. [107] National Park Service personnel met with Mayor Fields several times during the year to express their views on the east side development. On May 14 Superintendent Gregg conferred with East St. Louis City Planning Commission members, urging them to write an overall plan for development instead of allowing it to proceed piecemeal. In September George Hartzog, now associate director of the National Park Service, met with Mayor Fields' East St. Louis Riverfront Development Committee, which expressed interest in having the east side developments included in the memorial program. Hartzog explained that the authorization included only development of the west side and that additional legislation would be needed for National Park Service expenditures on the east side. He also suggested that Government standards for National Park Service development might be more restrictive than East St. Louis officials would want. The committee favored constructing a scenic road, but such a road's development, levee access, and railroad relocation would create many problems. Despite this, Superintendent Gregg considered the interest of the group commendable and hoped the results of their meeting

would be profitable to the memorial. [[108](#)]

Another project profitable to the memorial was the plan to depress the Third Street "Mark Twain" expressway. Superintendent Gregg conferred regularly with the Missouri State Highway Department about the expressway and the new Poplar Street Bridge. Gregg and Hartzog succeeded in May 1963 in forging a cooperative agreement between the National Park Service, the city of St. Louis, and the Missouri State Highway Commission on the questions of encroachment of the expressway connecting ramps on memorial property, the depression of the expressway in front of the memorial, and the relocation of Poplar Street. In August, Fruin-Colnon, contractors to the Missouri State Highway Commission, started work on the expressway by relocating utility lines in the right of way. Superintendent Gregg conferred with EODC and Eero Saarinen's group about a desirable color for painting the new free bridge (the Poplar Street Bridge) and recommended a gray-green color to Sverdrup and Parcel, the bridge's builders. [[109](#)]

Beginning Arch Construction

All the new construction on the riverfront stirred much interest in the press and the surrounding community. Superintendent Gregg kicked off the start of construction on the Arch by presiding over a press conference in which information kits were distributed concerning the memorial's total development. National Park Service staff members and representatives of Eero Saarinen and Associates, MacDonald Construction Company, and Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company (subcontractors for the Arch construction) were present to answer questions. Amidst the publicity, the first stainless steel section of the Gateway Arch was set in place on February 12, 1963. Members of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association held an informal ceremony at the south base of the Arch on April 9 when concrete was poured into the first above-ground section. President William Crowder and Secretary Minnette Forthmann poured water from the Columbia River in Oregon into the concrete, symbolizing the link between the Arch, marking the eastern gateway to the West, and Lewis and Clark's log Fort Clatsop, which marked their farthest exploration to the Pacific Ocean. [[110](#)]

The work started in earnest with construction of the visitor center/museum shell, proceeding simultaneously with the Arch. In the spring MacDonald concentrated on building the concrete walls and roof for the north and south entrances to the visitor center. Work started on waterproofing and covering the roof. By May, one section of the north Arch leg and two sections of the south leg were filled with concrete. The construction worked like an assembly line; each section was assembled, hoisted into place, welded to the section beneath it, filled with concrete and post-tensioned. Things moved smoothly until May 1 when the Hoisting and Operation Engineers in St. Louis went on strike, halting all work on the project. Both the Arch and the levee redevelopment were at a standstill until May 27 when the strike ended. A few days passed while operations went back to normal, and at the end of the month the Arch was two weeks ahead of the revised progress schedule. The new completion date was set for February 1, 1965. [[111](#)]

After each leg reached sixty feet in height, the crew worked to assemble the creeper cranes that were placed on each leg. These cranes, placed on moveable platforms, would carry and lift each section of the Arch into place. They were engineering feats in themselves. The interior framework and stair material arrived in June; their assembly started the next month. By the end of July the south creeper derrick was installed, tested, and ready for operation, ten days ahead of schedule. The north derrick was also expected to be finished ahead of schedule. [[112](#)]

Progress surged on the other contracts as well. The National Park Service made final

inspection on the levee and railroad relocation contracts, only to find items of exception. New invitations to bid on painting the exterior of the Old Courthouse and for cooling the offices were issued. Busch and Latta Painting Company was awarded the painting contract, with a bid of \$27,868, while Albers Construction Company won the cooling contract with a bid of \$27,667. Both firms started their work in July and made rapid progress. The National Park Service staff also took time during the month to prepare easements for the water mains and sewers and to meet with Union Electric to discuss electrical facilities and to send the utilities master plan to all interested parties for comment. [[113](#)]

On August 1, 1963, Superintendent Gregg, Assistant Superintendent LeRoy Brown, and Park Engineer Woody Zenfell met with city officials to hear their comments about the levee redevelopment project prior to the National Park Service's final acceptance. By September the project was accepted after review by the Park Service, the city of St. Louis, the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, and the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, subject to correction of minor deficiencies. The contract included the north and south overlook structures and approaching stairways from Wharf Street. These structures were already in public use. [[114](#)] By September another project was completed. The relocation of the railroad was approved and accepted by the Terminal Railroad Association, the city of St. Louis, and the National Park Service. The feat came more than twenty-five years after Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes declared the track removal to be a prerequisite to the memorial's development. [[115](#)]

Eero Saarinen and Associates prepared plans and specifications for the interior finish and utilities for the visitor center as the shell and a portion of the subfloor neared completion. Within a month the structure was in the final construction stages and ready for pre-final inspection. Overhead, the Arch legs in October stood at 120 feet. The creeper crane on both legs moved upward for the first time; the operation proceeded smoothly. Inside the legs the interior framing and stairs were installed as soon as possible behind the outside construction. At this stage the Arch was a week behind schedule and its completion date was moved to mid-February 1965. The National Park Service expected to have the elevators and trains ready for operation 125 days after the Arch was completed. Officials scheduled June 20, 1965, as the tentative date for the first rides to the top of the Gateway Arch in the transportation system. [[116](#)]

After the final inspection was made of the visitor center/museum shell on October 15, nineteen items of work still needed completion. Because the completion date for the visitor center portion of the contract was October 16, 1963, the contractor, MacDonald Construction Company, was assessed liquidated damages for each day of overage. After the National Park Service conducted a partial inspection of the levee redevelopment project, they discovered that many of the items that were excepted from the acceptance of the project had not yet been corrected. [[117](#)]

Near the end of October work on the Arch's south leg was held up because of problems with some of the tendons inside the stainless steel sections not being brought up to required tensions with the approval of EODC. MacDonald had to cut five holes or "windows" in the Arch in sections fifty-nine and sixty to relieve the blockage and allow the bars to be properly pulled and tensioned. The problems persisted in November despite these corrective measures. On November 5 Superintendent Gregg, Assistant Superintendent Brown, Park Engineer Zenfell, and Eero Saarinen and Associates' Ted Rennison met with MacDonald Construction Company representatives to discuss the south leg's construction problems. As the south leg construction fell behind schedule at 120 feet, the north leg proceeded piece by piece up to 168 feet in height. The Park Service now decided to halt work on the north leg until the south leg difficulties were cleared up. On November 18 MacDonald delivered the plans for correcting the deficiencies. One month later, at a press conference, Superintendent Gregg signed a

change order accepting MacDonald Construction Company's proposal. [[118](#)]

The company developed the plan after meeting several times with the Park Service and its consultants. It called for the abandonment of some of the inoperable bars, installation of new bars, realignment of others, and the installation of additional stiffeners above section forty-five. MacDonald faced a major problem in developing a satisfactory method for placing grout around the tension rods in sub-freezing weather. MacDonald faced another problem in that the National Park Service had yet to accept the visitor center. Corrective work had to be done on exceptions to that contract and also on the items of disagreement on the levee redevelopment project. [[119](#)]

At the end of 1963 the Arch's north leg stood at 168 feet, the south at 120 feet. For the first time since the demolition of the old warehouses on the site in the late 1930s and the restoration of the Old Courthouse in the 1950s, memorial backers could see visible physical evidence of their years of work. Progress was not limited to the construction program, however, as the National Park Service staffers completed much of the preliminary museum exhibit planning.

In the beginning of 1963 they concentrated on awarding contracts for artistic museum pieces. They commissioned Rudolph Torrini to sculpt a bronze casting of a Fifth Infantry bugler, William Traher for four large western scenic paintings, J.K. Ralston for a painting of Lewis and Clark meeting the Shoshone Indians, and Hillis Arnold for a manifest destiny eagle wood carving. National Park Service Regional Curator Newell Joyner collaborated with the museum planning staff to prepare an accurate want list of specimens for the museum. They also prepared a list of surplus property available for exchange with other park areas or institutions. [[120](#)]

Reviews of the designs and content of all units in the Museum of Westward Expansion were completed by April. On April 1 to 3 museum planners, designers, historians, and chief John Jenkins held conferences to resolve several important space design problems. Progress was made on the exhibit research program, while one staff draftsman took an extended trip in May through the Smithsonian Institution, the National Gallery of Art, and the Freer Gallery to seek their suggestions and theories of diorama design and construction. Memorial staffers hoped to have the museum exhibit plans and specifications ready for contract so that installation of the exhibits could occur before the end of St. Louis' bicentennial period. [[121](#)]

Staffers also set time tables for the rest of the memorial's interpretive program. The earliest possible date for the completion of the Museum of Westward Expansion was May 1966. Plans for a monetary exhibit entitled "The West and Money," slated for the Old Courthouse, called for its completion by June 1965, with the remainder of the exhibits in that building to be completed by May 1966. Staffers hoped to have the overlook museums completed by September 1967. They submitted a request for a \$25,000 allotment for Old Courthouse exhibits for fiscal year 1965. Proposals for the exhibits included a St. Louis architecture gallery featuring ironwork, small river and rail transportation galleries which would then be incorporated into the river overlook museums, and audiovisual installations for interpretation of the rotunda murals. [[122](#)] As St. Louis' bicentennial year of 1964 began, the memorial's research team still had seventy-nine major and minor research projects remaining before final design and drafting of the exhibits for the museum could be accomplished. Additionally, the staff carried out such correlative activities as administrative photography, research for portions of the Guggenheim film, audiovisual repair, and research and writing for revision of some existing exhibits in the Old Courthouse. [[123](#)]

The new year heralded St. Louis' anniversary, and attracted visitors to the memorial, most notably President Lyndon Baines Johnson on February 14. His visit kicked off the city's

celebrations and former Mayor Bernard F. Dickmann was there to greet him. President Johnson viewed the rising Arch legs whose very existence stressed that construction continue despite the problems on the south leg. MacDonald still had difficulty grouting the malfunctioning bars. All was not bad news, however, for a month earlier, on January 13, the National Park Service accepted the visitor center portion of the contract. [[124](#)]

Spring came to St. Louis and the construction began to move like clockwork. Section by section the cranes lifted the pieces. At the end of February the south leg stood at 168 feet, the north at 204 feet. By March's end the north leg stood at 228 feet and the south 192 feet. In April, when MacDonald's repairs to the cobblestones on the levee were inspected and accepted by the Park Service and the city, the north leg stood 264 feet high with the south leg not far behind at 216 feet. [[125](#)]

By May three problems cropped up which brought the St. Louis staff many headaches and delays in construction. In the long run, one of these problems served to benefit the National Park Service and the nation's black community. The first problem centered on the Arch transportation system. Bi-State Development Agency's Colonel Smyser announced in April that the system could not possibly be completed by July 1965. Instead he pushed the date back to the fall of that year. The trouble encountered in the post-tensioning bars installed in the concrete core of the south leg caused the delay. The extra expense stemming from the delay would be met from a contingency fund of \$500,000 set up when the project was financed, with revenue bonds. [[126](#)]

The second controversy held far-reaching consequences. The St. Louis Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) charged that the Arch contractor and subcontractor carried out racially discriminatory practices. In response to the charges, the National Park Service held meetings on May 4, 1964 to discuss the allegations. Superintendent Gregg announced on May 15 that the conference, held with the contractor, subcontractors, and a representative of the Department of Labor, revealed no evidence of racial discrimination. [[127](#)] Gregg insisted that further investigations would occur if the National Park Service received a formal complaint from CORE. That group's inspections of the memorial project showed that no blacks were then working on the project, that none of the project's subcontractors employed blacks, and that one of the unions had no black members and had never admitted any blacks into its apprenticeship training program. As a result of CORE's findings the Interior Department's Washington compliance officer visited the memorial in June to review the contractor's compliance with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities program. [[128](#)]

Once again the memorial's progress was affected by national and international events. World War II, the Korean Conflict, the national budget, and Washington politics all exerted pressure on what shape, form, and funding the memorial would assume and receive. During the early 1960s, when the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.'s method of passive resistance changed racial attitudes, the Federal Government embraced such policies as equal employment on all Federally funded construction projects. Such a massive Federal project as the Arch served to bring attention to the entire civil rights movement and its composite efforts in opening labor, housing, and public services for black Americans.

Throughout the year Federal compliance officers spent time at the memorial and in the city making compliance reviews of proposed contractors and subcontractors for the visitor center's utilities contract. Deputy Compliance Officer Paul Boyajian contacted many of the organizations and agencies involved in the situation, including contractors and subcontractors, union officials, training agencies, CORE, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and city, state, and Federal agencies. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity had issued a restriction against the National Park Service's proceeding with the utilities contract, but since these steps were taken

the restriction was lifted. [129] Much more work in terms of minority hiring needed to be done, but a first step had been taken at Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.

The third problem reached almost crisis proportions when the Arch reached nearly 300 feet in height. The National Park Service's Washington office issued a stop order on June 23 for work to halt at the assembly plant in Warren, Pennsylvania. The contractor was not to proceed with the fabrication or erection of an Arch section above the top of section forty-five, which was the top of the concrete core sections. This stop order was issued because two consultants to Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company (PDM) questioned the Arch's basic design. They believed the steel plates would buckle and be out of configuration when the Arch was jacked apart to allow the final section to go in. The Bureau of Public Roads made seismographic measurements of the Arch to study its movement and sway, and the National Park Service also brought in the Bureau of Reclamation, which performed a structure design study. Their recommendations, dated June 11, 1964, supported the PDM consultants regarding the Arch's design inadequacy. Upon receiving the bureau's report, the Park Service decided to issue the "not to proceed" order above section forty-five. After consulting with Eero Saarinen and Associates and Fred Severud and Associates, National Park Service Assistant Director Joe Jensen declared that the Bureau of Reclamation's conclusions were based on faulty assumptions and inadequate information and should be withdrawn. [130]

Jensen met with Bureau of Reclamation officials to clarify the Department of the Interior's position on the stability of the Arch. They agreed the work could proceed until further research was conducted and analyzed. Research was done on the structural properties of stainless steel, thermal flow characteristics between the inner and outer stainless steel skins, the testing of a prototype three-section panel, and final wind tunnel tests. The officials also reached a consensus that the structure as designed posed no danger to future visitors. Jensen, well aware of the criticism the Department of the Interior would receive if the buckling occurred, suggested to his superiors on July 2 that the contractor resume work. Fabrication started that day. The final tests and reports were not completed until mid-1965 with the Bureau of Reclamation continuing to question the Arch's stability and the Park Service and its consultants defending it. [131]

Several months later the contract architects and contracting officer rejected the north leg's section forty-five because of its failure to meet tolerances and aesthetic standards of the contract. In short, it wrinkled. The section was removed from the top of the Arch and placed on the assembly pod for reworking. The forty-fifth section of the south leg met the same fate. While still on the ground it was reworked to remove wrinkles before being placed. These sections did not wrinkle under compression. Rather, the contractor did not allow for enough distortion in the stainless steel to the welding. Whenever heat was applied to a weld it caused an expansion which did not shrink uniformly. This and the fact that a stainless steel plate could not be rolled completely flat caused the wrinkles to occur in the Arch's skin. At the end of the year the north leg stood at 335 feet, eleven inches, with the south at 347 feet, three inches. [132]

The historical research team also made progress in 1964. The manifest destiny eagle, the Ralston painting, and bronze Fifth Infantry bugler were finished and delivered, as well as Sigfried Reinhardt's triptych. The team now had two historic wagons for the museum; the chuck wagon and an overland wagon. The staff completed their research reports and began work on text and graphic materials. By September 25 a Park Service designer completed the gallery designs, including colors for maps, walls, ceilings, and floors. He made recommendations on the museum's lights and reviewed museum copy. The research team hoped to complete all drawings and exhibit requests quickly, in order to phase out the museum planning branch. On October 26 the National Park Service opened a new exhibit room in the north wing of the Old Courthouse, featuring several of the past year's acquisitions

including the 1860 overland wagon, chuck wagon, and Reinhardt's triptych. At the end of the year, the staff began work on the interpretive prospectus for the Old Courthouse. [[133](#)]

Public interest in the memorial remained high. The presence of the Arch's rising legs cast a shadow over the rest of downtown St. Louis. The Arch also issued a challenge for both public and private redevelopment. The area's interested governmental agencies, redevelopment corporations, and civic organizations met with Superintendent Gregg regularly to discuss and resolve mutual problems. Their interest stayed with the Arch transportation system project, for it was, in the minds of many, the key to the financial benefits St. Louis would receive from the project. The system's designer, Richard Bowser, kept in contact with both Bi-State and Bruce Detmers, the project architect for Saarinen's office. The high interest in the city's bicentennial year brought additional pressure upon the National Park Service to get the project finished and dedicated within a year of the city's observance. Assistant Superintendent LeRoy Brown, however, could give no guarantee for the completion of the Arch. [[134](#)]

The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission met on November 24 to review the memorial's progress. Confident that the National Park Service was diligent and that construction costs had been kept within reasonable bounds, the commission passed a resolution soliciting Congress for authorization to provide \$7,955,000 in funds to complete the project. The Federal Government's appropriated share would be \$6,000,000. Their measure passed unanimously. The remaining work, which needed funding, consisted of visitor center interior work such as flooring, interior furnishings, utilities, ventilation, heating, lighting, sewage, and plumbing. The preparation of exhibits for the Museum of Westward Expansion, landscaping, and completion of the grand center stairs was also needed. [[135](#)]

In December the National Park Service, now under Director George B. Hartzog, Jr.'s authority, drafted a bill amending the 1954 authorization, enabling it to raise the Federal ceiling from \$17,250,000 to \$23,250,000. Following a twenty-year old tradition, Hartzog contacted the St. Louis mayor and civic leaders. Mayor Tucker was especially interested in the grand center staircase. He wanted to see it finished in granite as planned and not in another cost-saving material. The city still had \$500,000 remaining from its present bond authorization and now Tucker talked of adding another \$1,500,000 to the memorial fund. This, added to Greensfelder's proposed donation of \$775,000, brought the available funds to \$2,775,000. Since the Park Service sought an increase of \$6,000,000 in their authorization, memorial staffers believed they would be in excellent financial shape to finish the project. [[136](#)]

The effort to authorize more funds was spearheaded in Congress by Senators Stuart Symington (Missouri), Edward Long (Missouri), Clinton Anderson (Arizona), Wayne Morse (Oregon), Roman Hruska (Nebraska), and Representatives Karsten, Curtis, and Sullivan (Missouri), Price (Illinois), and Glenn Cunningham (Nebraska). On March 18, 1965, they introduced bills authorizing \$6,000,000 in Federal funds to complete the memorial. The first action on the request came on April 8 from a House administration subcommittee, which lent a sympathetic ear to the witnesses' testimony that the rise in construction costs over the ten years of the project precipitated the need for the increase in funds. A Senate parks and recreation subcommittee on April 9 gave the bill a favorable hearing. [[137](#)]

The Budget Bureau protested the amount, insisting it would pay for nothing more than the project's basic features. Since 1961 it had granted the executive branch's requests for continued appropriation for the project as long as the \$17,250,000 ceiling was heeded. Now the Budget Bureau thought the only justifiable increase in the ceiling should be for higher construction costs and not to restore any features eliminated in 1961. Director George Hartzog fought for his favored park by explaining how the project had been cut back several times since 1954. The National Park Service could have lived with the curtailed plans until

the cost of the Arch construction soared \$4,000,000 higher than estimated. Thus the plans had to be changed, leaving the Museum of Westward Expansion an unfinished shell. Hartzog believed the museum should be finished, noting that the museum was "the heart of the memorial. . . ." [138] Hartzog's arguments worked, for Congress moved the bills through the legislative process. The Senate passed the bill on June 17 with no debate. Three months later the House Rules Committee endorsed the additional funds and on October 1 the full House approved the bill by a roll call vote of 250 to 12. Their action sent the bill to President Lyndon Johnson, who signed it into law on October 19, 1965. [139]

As the Arch crept upwards and civic interest in the memorial climbed with it, National Park Service officials prepared for the final stages of construction and its aftermath. The associate regional director attended meetings in St. Louis concerning dedicating the Arch. He met not only with the Park Service staff but also with Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association representatives William Crowds, Luther Ely Smith, Jr., and Morton May. The group's major goal was to invite President Johnson to the dedication. [140]

Construction continued, oblivious to the talk of fanfare. Four stainless steel sections were set during the first month of January 1965. Interior installation kept on schedule. A \$100,000 contract was awarded in March to General Steel Industries, Inc. of St. Louis to build the sixteen five-passenger capsules for the Arch transportation system. The company was to manufacture the capsules under contract to Planet Corporation of Lansing, Michigan, which was the prime contractor on the Arch train installation. By the end of the month work started on the elevator system as the north leg reached 436 feet four inches and the south leg touched 447 feet one inch. [141]

The delay in the Arch construction caused problems for Bi-State. The agency, which had issued \$3,300,000 in bonds to finance construction of the train and elevators, was paying interest of \$500 a day on those bonds. MacDonald Construction Company and Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company met with Park Service officials during March and April to discuss revising the Arch construction program. MacDonald asked for a 30-day extension, which the National Park Service had yet to grant. Several other extensions had been granted to MacDonald; the latest date for completion was May 15, but MacDonald could not meet that date. Bi-State protested against the issuance of any further extensions of time, because the transportation system was to be completed 95 days after the Arch shell was finished; thus Bi-State would have received revenues from the system on August 15, 1965. Since this date could not be met, Bi-State was entitled to start collecting a penalty of \$250 a day from MacDonald until the system was finished. Even if Bi-State collected the penalty, it amounted to only half of the agency's interest payment. If the National Park Service granted MacDonald another extension, Bi-State could collect no penalties until the extension expired. [142] MacDonald did not get its extension, but as construction slowly continued other projects were delayed. Acting Superintendent LeRoy Brown met with several civic groups to inform them of his and Director Hartzog's decision to delay dedication of the Arch until a later date. Both men wanted the Arch to be completed and the grounds maintained to National Park Service standards before visitors attended any type of a ceremony. [143]

Even though construction stayed behind schedule, LeRoy Brown completed several other projects. The Travelers Indemnity Company, bonding company for MacDonald, offered to conduct a safety inspection of the Arch construction project at no cost to the Government. They did so on May 13, and all the items listed in their report were corrected immediately by the contractors. Brown then attended ceremonies on May 24 officially opening the reconstructed Third Street expressway. The memorial's peripheral development was beginning to take shape as the Arch legs topped the 500-foot mark by the end of May, while installation of the elevators, trains, stairs, interior steel, and electrical equipment proceeded normally. [144]

As the visitor center shell took shape the National Park Service made plans to issue an invitation to bid on June 24, 1965, for partial completion of the interior of the Arch and visitor center. The work included partitioning, flooring, suspended ceilings, doors, painting, heating, air conditioning, plumbing, and electrical work. In the next month when the bids were opened the only qualified bid received was more than 50 percent above National Park Service estimates. This would add another two or three months delay in completing the Arch and the transportation system if the unexpected bid of \$1,126,391, by Hoel-Steffen Construction Company of St. Louis, was too high. [145] It took the National Park Service several months to make a decision and award a contract.

The month of June saw yet another goal reached when, the Arch legs reached the height where a stabilizing strut was necessary. The strut, measuring 225 feet long, 40 feet wide, and 14-1/2 feet high, was hoisted into place between the two legs at 9 a.m. on June 17, 1965. The operation went without incident with only 5/8 inch deflection of the Arch during the lift. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company received some free if not controversial publicity when the strut was situated in place high in the sky between the Arch legs, for the company placed 12-foot high letters bearing the initials "PDM" on the structure. National Park Service officials immediately ordered that the letters come down. They also ordered the removal of "PDM" signs on both the creeper crane platforms, because the letters violated a contractual restriction on advertising. [146]

Pittsburgh-Des Moines responded slowly, for almost a month later the letters still remained. The company arranged for the three letters facing east to be removed by mid-July because they could be reached. The three letters facing west over the city were very difficult to reach, the company asserted, and the letters seemed destined to remain indefinitely. LeRoy Brown did not agree. He stated that Pittsburgh-Des Moines would be charged a very large sum for advertising space seen by half a million people every day. Its subcontractors would deduct the sum from MacDonald Construction Company's payment for the continued wrongful use of Federal property. [147] Brown's action succeeded where his threats did not. When he deducted \$225,000 from MacDonald's payment, Pittsburgh-Des Moines promptly removed the "PDM" letters on August 24. If the letters had not been removed, Brown would have charged \$42,000 a month for as long as the letters remained. The smaller "PDM" signs remained on the two creeper crane platforms. [148]

LeRoy Brown began serving as acting Superintendent on June 19, 1965, when H. Raymond Gregg retired from the National Park Service. Brown actually assumed the duties of Superintendent in December 1964 as Gregg worked on other projects for the Park Service. On August 1, 1965, Brown was appointed Superintendent, thereby assuming the full title for his responsibilities. [149]

July was a busy month for Brown as he handled various projects accompanying the construction. He held further meetings with civic groups concerning ceremonies honoring the Arch's completion. On July 13th he and Director Hartzog met with Bi-State's Colonel Smyser over their cooperative agreement and related problems. The next day Brown met with representatives of Union Electric Company to discuss the possibility of floodlighting the Arch. Several days later he inspected searchlights and floodlights at the army depot in Granite City, Illinois. The army offered to move the lights to the memorial if Brown wanted them. On July 26 an official of the Federal Aviation Administration conferred with Brown to form a policy regarding preventing flights through the legs of the Gateway Arch. During July, Superintendent Brown watched the creeper cranes hoist eleven stainless steel sections into the sky. The north leg stood at 597 feet, one inch with the south at 592 feet, two inches. Installation of the interior steel work fell behind in July, while the train installation did not measure up to the expectations of the consultants. [150]

A decision on awarding the visitor center interior contract, pending since July, came in August when Hoel-Steffen revised its bid downward to \$849,629. Their previous bid was too high and the National Park Service also revised its specifications to keep the costs down. Two weeks were now required to check the bid figures and determine whether Hoel-Steffen was in compliance with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity law. Although Superintendent Brown was the contracting officer for the work, pressure came from the Washington, D.C. level for compliance with the law. The authority to approve the visitor center contract was thus located in Washington, and not St. Louis. [[151](#)]

Nine weeks passed while Hoel-Steffen's contract, revised once again to \$1,071,027, underwent scrutiny for its provisions for equal employment. Paul Boyajian, deputy compliance officer for the Department of the Interior, did not define what steps St. Louis contractors should take to promote affirmative action. Thus, there were no guidelines. The National Park Service was convinced, however, that Hoel-Steffen provided equal job opportunities. The point was important because of the significance of the Arch as a Federally funded project. The Government desired that black workers have a role in building the memorial, but the weeks passed, delaying public use of the Arch until possibly August 1966 and costing Bi-State \$500 a day. [[152](#)] Hoel-Steffen was awarded the contract in mid-November only after the company held two days of meetings with Government representatives, where it pledged to take steps to encourage more minority workers to enter the construction field. National Park Service officials expected work on the visitor center interior to be completed before July 1, 1966. [[153](#)]

The construction of the Arch moved ever upward, and completion was only a matter of weeks away. By the end of August both Arch legs stood at 617 feet, but the installation of the trains and stairs were still not to the expectation of the consultants. The Arch transportation system lagged almost three months behind work on the Arch and was \$318,000 in debt. Because the National Park Service denied MacDonald's request for a 322-day extension in June, Bi-State hoped to collect penalties. MacDonald said it would appeal the decision. [[154](#)]

The shortage of money caused yet another problem. Workmen inside the Arch reported that the sun bearing down on the stainless steel created interior temperatures of 115 degrees. Unfortunately, the National Park Service could not consider installing air conditioning due to a lack of funds. Every effort was made to cut down the cost of the visitor center's interior contract, and the cutbacks affected ceiling finishes, lighting fixtures and other work. No money remained to provide air conditioning. Bi-State thought the cooling system desirable but obviously could not finance such a venture because of its own financial deficit involving the trains. The best Superintendent Brown could hope for was to obtain some funds for air conditioning out of the city and Federal Government's authorization of \$8,000,000. [[155](#)] Less than two weeks later the National Park Service and Bi-State found a method by which to finance the air conditioning, when Bi-State decided to guarantee any money the Park Service needed to pay for the installation. Bi-State would be reimbursed later from riverfront parking lot revenues at a rate of \$5,000 a month. The cost of the air conditioning was \$167,000. [[156](#)] By October 1965 the Arch legs stood a mere 60 feet apart. LeRoy Brown wanted to set a firm date for the installation of the last stainless-steel section, for he believed the occasion would be a "major event in the history and accomplishments of a great city and a great nation." [[157](#)] He sought MacDonald Construction Company's and Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company's cooperation in establishing a firm date in October, preferably Sunday, October 17, or Sunday, October 24. The two companies' reward would be generated through publicity and the goodwill generated by the effort. [[158](#)]

They chose the week of October 24 and final preparations began. Civic leaders had set May 30, 1966 as the date for the formal dedication in hopes of having President Johnson attend. The St. Louis Ambassadors sponsored ceremonies at the Old Courthouse, where newly-

elected Mayor Alfonso Cervantes was the first to sign the sheets to be placed in a time capsule in the final section of the Arch at the "topping out" ceremonies. The sheets circulated throughout the St. Louis area, particularly in schools, for signatures. At the Arch itself installation of the interior work was back to normal and MacDonald placed temporary electrical service in the visitor center. The electricity was used to check and run the elevators and trains. [\[159\]](#)

On October 4 the first windowed section was set on the south leg to raise it to 628 feet. By October 17 workmen on the north and south legs threw a gangplank across the 10-1/2 foot gap at the 630-foot level. Only two eight-foot sections remained to be placed into the Arch. The final section on the south leg, called one south, had to be installed before the Arch was topped out with the last piece, designated one north. Now the scheduled date was Thursday, October 28, susceptible to change because of foul weather. The workmen's final task was to use hydraulic jacks, each with a capacity of 300 tons pressure, to spread the distance between the legs from 2-1/2 feet to 8-1/2 feet to insert section one north. [\[160\]](#)

A mild uproar occurred over the uncertainty of the topping out date. Civic leaders could make no detailed arrangements because of uncertainty, but they wanted to delay the date by two days to Saturday, October 30 to attract larger crowds for the ceremony. Superintendent Brown said no. It was left up to Pittsburgh-Des Moines to make the final decision and schedule the work accordingly, but the National Park Service did not want to approve a delay. The Federal Government consultants, including Eero Saarinen and Associates, felt concern over the excessive weight at the top. They worried that the 100-ton creeper cranes might cause sag or strain on the welded joints above the stabilizing strut. [\[161\]](#)

The St. Louis Ambassadors and the Gateway Arch Topping Out Committee bowed to the National Park Service's wishes and the topping out date remained set for 10 a.m. on Thursday, October 28. On October 26 work halted once more when members of the topping out crew refused to return to their jobs on orders from Iron Workers Union Local 396. The union wanted a safety check made, although the workers believed the structure safer than ever because of the jacking equipment. MacDonald Construction Company's project manager asserted that there was no justification for the refusal to work. It was true that the project stood at a critical stage, but Superintendent Brown explained that this meant the Arch was vulnerable to high winds or earthquakes; the project was not in itself dangerous. After conferences between National Park Service and construction company officials the Arch was inspected jointly by The Travelers Indemnity Company, insurer for MacDonald, Saarinen and Associates, and Severud-Elstad-Krueger Associates. The workers declared that the Arch was the safest job they had ever worked on. [\[162\]](#) More meetings were held on Wednesday, October 27, to decide when to perform the deed. The main question concerned the time of day; whether to top it in the night's cool, the early morning hours, or at 10 a.m. as planned. The contractors finally decided to start just a little earlier than 10 a.m.. [\[163\]](#)

Arch Topping Out

The big day came, October 28, 1965, and Luther Ely Smith and Eero Saarinen were there in spirit. The workers started at 9:25 a.m. to hoist the last section. The lift took thirteen minutes. To counteract the south leg's five-inch expansion from the sun's heat, the contractors and engineers had members of the St. Louis Fire Department come in. They used 700 feet of hose to reach 550 feet up the south leg, spraying water from 9:30 a.m. until the end of the operation. As one north rose 630 feet the crowds cheered, whistles blew, and the city rejoiced. The ceremonies celebrated the site's history. Undersecretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., spoke and Superintendent Brown served as master of ceremonies, while Vice President Hubert Humphrey viewed the proceedings from an overhead airplane. After the last piece was jockeyed into position at 11 a.m. the delicate job was almost over. In the afternoon,

at 2 p.m., workers released the twelve-ton bottle jacks and the full weight of the two legs secured the final section. The stainless steel did not buckle. Welding remained the final chore. [164] Superintendent Brown exclaimed to his co-workers, "No other comparable event is likely to occur in our lifetime." [165]

The work was not yet over. Even though all the attention focused on the Arch completion, other matters demanded Superintendent Brown's attention. Installation of the trains, stairs, elevators, and interior steel and electrical equipment continued, while work in the visitor center was essentially complete. Brown held a press conference to unveil the first capsule for the trains in the Arch legs as well as to authorize site surveys for the memorial's grading plan. [166]

Another of Brown's projects was promoting the interest in developing the east side river bank. The East St. Louis, Illinois, City Planning Commission had worked since the first discussions to provide zoning control guidelines for the levee and to prepare an attractive development plan. Their efforts were enhanced in January 1964 when one St. Louis corporation proposed building a hotel, restaurant, and marina south of the Eads Bridge. The proposal provided an impetus for the city's planning efforts. Then in 1965 Acting Superintendent Brown conferred with Mayor Alvin Fields to tell him of the National Park Service recommendation that a master plan be developed for the east side of the river to complement the west bank. Brown offered the Park Service's assistance in this effort. The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association announced its support by authorizing its officers to notify two railroads with substantial tracks on the east side riverfront of the group's interest in the area's redevelopment. The association sought the release of the railroad's property for development. [167] These discussions continued for several years, as East St. Louis struggled to share in downtown St. Louis' rebirth.

In the month after the Arch's completion, workers lowered the two creeper cranes and their platforms that had hauled up the stainless steel sections. The stabilizing strut was lowered on November 16 after electricians installed lightning rods and a two-foot high red blinking aircraft warning light on the top of the Arch. As the cranes descended, the Arch's steel skin was cleaned, the holes from the crane tracks filled, and the skin polished. [168]

All work inside of the Arch kept up the normal pace; installation of the trains, stairs, elevators, interior steel, and electrical equipment all progressed. In the visitor center the work was complete except for door painting and installation of hardware. During December Superintendent Brown met with MacDonald and Hoel-Steffen concerning contractual responsibilities. For Hoel-Steffen, who had just received the contract for the visitor center interior, talks concerned future work, while for MacDonald the meetings centered on completing the contract, releasing claims, and processing the final payment estimate. [169] The visitor center construction was about to move from the outside to the inside.

Such an obvious accomplishment as the Arch's completion tended to overshadow the work of the research staff. Planning for the Old Courthouse exhibit rooms and Museum of Westward Expansion continued on unobtrusively. Planning for the Old Courthouse was accelerated because \$4,000 was made available to the staff for exhibit construction during fiscal year 1965. Research started in April on three new exhibits: interpreting the rotunda, dome murals, and the Dred Scott case. The design of these exhibits was complete and the materials and services ready to be contracted for by May. [170] Research for the museum continued on an accelerated schedule; the staff wanted to be finished by the end of the summer. Their work would be used not only for the museum, but also as a basis for the interim exhibit plan for the visitor center. Exhibits from Museum of Westward Expansion planning documents were to be utilized in the visitor center temporarily until the museum opened. These plans were completed and prepared for submission to the regional office for review by the end of the

year. Also completed at year's end were several museum gallery plans, along with color mock-ups. [171]

National Park Service personnel made two decisions during the year that affected both the future uses of the memorial and its interpretive program. It had been a practice of city residents to use the Old Courthouse for amateur theatricals, champagne parties, debutante balls, and other similar activities. Such use resulted in extensive damage to the building. Superintendent Brown inherited the situation, but halted it after more than \$2,000 damage was done to a model of the Arch during a gathering. [172] The Old Courthouse regained some of its dignity when these activities stopped.

The Old Rock House on the riverfront, which had been restored in 1941 and dismantled in 1959, was supposed to be reassembled by the Park Service. Only 119 stones, along with some timbers were left, however, and controversy raged around them. Historian John Bryan and Architect Charles Peterson now stated that the National Park Service proposal to build a model of the warehouse was without value. The structure's historical and architectural significance rested on its standing at its original site. Director Hartzog, Superintendent Brown, Bryan, and Peterson disagreed on the significance of the salvaged stones. Hartzog claimed that the only fragments saved were those that Bryan determined were original, since much of the building had originally been constructed of uncut rubble masonry. Brown asserted that none of the timbers were original. Bryan reminded everyone that the timbers and stones had been salvaged and reused during the 1941 restoration. He did not think the salvaged stones to be more authentic than those that had been thrown away. George Kassabaum, president of the St. Louis chapter of the American Institute of Architects, agreed that the reconstructed building would hold no significance on another site. [173] The Park Service decided not to rebuild the structure and the stones remained stored in the Old Courthouse's basement. The necessity of moving the railroad had destroyed the integrity of one of St. Louis' most historic sites.

Local citizens, satiated with the glow of their achievement in completing the Arch, were asked to contribute still more funds to finish the memorial in 1966. Because the city's initial 1935 contribution was now totally committed, its citizens had to contribute further to match any more Federal Government appropriations. Unfortunately, the new year did not bring favorable administration action. President Lyndon Johnson's "Great Society" faced competition from overseas in the battle of the budget. Increased spending in Vietnam threatened domestic expenditures, and no funds for the memorial were included in the budget Johnson sent to Congress. Missouri's congressional delegation worked to get the item included. [174] Representative Leonor Sullivan sought the previously authorized \$6,000,000 needed to complete the memorial in a supplemental appropriation request, which was denied. The executive assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget notified Missouri Senators Edward Long and Stuart Symington that Johnson could not provide the funds either in a 1966 supplemental request or in the 1967 budget. [175]

National Park Service officials saw trouble ahead. They had entered into a contract for the interior finish of the Arch and the visitor center and now they had no funds. Additionally, the offer of \$775,000 for the museum still stood from the trustees of the Albert Greensfelder Trust, an offer still contingent upon a matching Federal contribution of three to one. The donation, matched by Federal funds, would provide \$3,100,000 for the museum. The National Park Service did not want to lose this offer, and despite the fact that they currently had a balance of \$114,000 for the memorial, earmarked for contractors, the acting director of the Park Service appealed to the secretary of the interior to make a renewed request to the Budget Bureau to reconsider the supplemental appropriation. [176]

Even this request did not meet with success. In March 1966 the House Appropriations

Committee failed to include the funds in the Interior Department's regular budget bill or in the supplemental for the fiscal year ending June 30. One chance remained to obtain the funds; another supplemental bill was expected to be introduced in Congress during the summer. The reason behind the cut clearly stood out: Vietnam. [177] Just as World War II and the Korean Conflict disrupted the memorial's progress, Vietnam threatened to do the same.

St. Louis proceeded with its plan to raise \$2,000,000 as its share for finishing the memorial. The city knew that its benefits from the memorial hinged upon the completion of the visitor center and museum. A bond issue election was scheduled for November 8, 1966, offering sixteen separate propositions needing a two-thirds majority for passage. On election day 56% of the voters favored the memorial position; this was a majority, but not a two-thirds majority, and the measure failed. [178] Less than a week later Representative Thomas Curtis and Senator Stuart Symington learned that the Budget Bureau had provided for an appropriation of \$2,300,000 in their preliminary 1967 budget. The two men hoped this amount would remain in the budget so as not to lose the private matching funds. St. Louis' Mayor Cervantes then announced plans to resubmit the memorial completion proposal to the city's voters. The aldermen unanimously agreed. St. Louisans would get another chance in 1967. [179]

Union Walkout

Hoel-Steffen Construction Company received the contract for the visitor center interior finish because of its bid and its compliance with equal opportunity requirements. Representatives of local building trade unions presumably were parties to Hoel-Steffen's agreement to provide more construction jobs for blacks. As soon as Hoel-Steffen began work, however, the Building and Construction Trades Council of St. Louis notified the company and the National Park Service that its members voted unanimously not to work on the project. This action came after Hoel-Steffen brought non-union black plumbers in on the project. [180] The Construction Trades Council's justification rested on the fact that building trade members only worked on projects where all workers were AFL-CIO. They insisted their decision had nothing to do with race, creed, or color. Hoel-Steffen found itself caught between the Government's push for equal employment and the all-white AFL-CIO building trades unions. Hoel-Steffen received editorial support from the *Globe-Democrat*, which believed the public to be the loser in the quarrel. [181]

Department of Labor officials stepped in on January 21, asking the Justice Department to take action to prevent the AFL-CIO and the St. Louis Construction Building Trades Council from interfering with Hoel-Steffen's efforts to comply with equal opportunity clauses in its contract. National repercussions resulted from the two-week work stoppage. The Labor Department's action was the first taken against a labor union under President Johnson's 1965 executive order on equal opportunity. On January 7, the day the unions walked off the job, the Government notified four of its agencies pursuing construction in the St. Louis area that builders must show affirmative action before any future contracts would be awarded. Robert Hoel had applied affirmative action when he hired the independent E. Smith Plumbing Company, which belonged to the Congress of Independent Unions, because he could not obtain a black plumber or apprentice from the AFL-CIO plumbers union in St. Louis. His action resulted in the AFL-CIO boycott, but removing the black plumbing contractor might bring court action by the Congress of Independent Unions and the NAACP. [182]

On February 5, 1966, the Justice Department filed suit in U.S. district court against the AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Council and five of its member unions for discrimination. It was the first suit filed by the Federal Government to enforce the nondiscrimination clause required in Federal contracts. The suit alleged that the defendants limited employment opportunities for blacks in the construction trades and that the trade

council interfered with the visitor center completion by ordering its member unions not to work with the Congress of Independent Unions. The National Labor Relations Board, in a separate move, sought a court injunction to force the unions back to work on the visitor center. [183] On February 6, a U.S. district court judge ruled that the St. Louis Building and Construction Trades Council and its four member unions were engaging in a secondary boycott at the project. [184] He issued a temporary injunction against them and ordered them to stop trying to force the E. Smith Plumbing Company off the job. The order was effective until the National Labor Relations Board disposed of the case. [185]

The action effectively forced the Trades Council back to work on February 9 when they declared they would comply with the court order. AFL-CIO electricians, however, disagreed with their employer and their union and refused to go back to work. Hoel-Steffen's electrical subcontractor, Louis Sachs of Sachs Electrical Company, requested that temporary lights be placed in the visitor center area, but the electricians refused to do the work. Their walkout lasted only a few days, for their local's business manager stepped in to install the electric lights. When the electricians returned, the other AFL-CIO laborers and carpenters followed suit. The electricians' union vowed to continue fighting against what it considered "improper and illegal tactics" used by the Federal Government in hiring a nonunion subcontractor. [186]

All the disruption in the visitor center did not affect progress on the Arch's interior work. At the end of February the interior steel and general electrical equipment was essentially installed. The cabs and control panels had yet to be placed on the elevators, but installation of the capsules for the transportation system had started as well as the system's electrical work. Installation of the tracks and machinery for the transportation system was almost complete. On the outside of the Arch inclement weather affected the process of cleaning the exterior stainless steel; nevertheless, the creeper cranes were halfway down the legs. [187]

Superintendent Brown now concentrated on planning the structure's dedication with civic leaders. Director Hartzog made the decision in March to postpone the formal dedication once again after meeting with Brown and Mayor Cervantes. The city had hoped for May 30, 1966, but this date was premature. The area around the Arch remained unsightly and the visitor center remained unfinished. Hartzog postponed the dedication for at least a year, but he stressed that the long delays in the project's completion were caused by construction problems. [188] Labor disputes had added fifty-one days to that delay. Mayor Cervantes wanted the transportation system to be opened by summer, but contractor Robert Hoel knew this was impossible. Bi-State stood to lose thousands of dollars if the transportation system was not in operation by July, while Director Hartzog promised to try and have at least one leg of the transportation system ready for the summer crowds. [189]

George Hartzog remained deeply interested in the memorial's progress. On behalf of the National Park Service he accepted a donation of \$25,000 given by the St. Louis Rabbinical Association to be used for a fountain in the visitor center lobby. He worked with Superintendent Brown on the dedication question and the delays in the transportation system, and he kept a sympathetic eye on developments. Brown, meanwhile, kept busy. He reviewed still more proposals for lighting the Arch, participated in civic panel discussions to evaluate the memorial's role in stimulating the city's downtown redevelopment, agreed with the City Park Department's plans to beautify the plaza opposite the Old Courthouse, and attended a news conference in New York for 150 New York-based editors, writers, and media personalities, sponsored by Downtown St. Louis Incorporated. Brown and Mayor Cervantes presented St. Louis' redevelopment story and stressed the city's resulting economic benefits. Brown also had to meet again with the St. Louis Bicentennial Committee to explain why he and Hartzog had decided to postpone the dedication. [190]

The biggest problem remained the visitor center interior contract. Brown held more meetings

with Robert Hoel and Bi-State's Colonel Smyser over finishing the project so that Bi-State could get some income from the operational system to defray the expense of their investment. In April 1966, proposals were made to Hoel-Steffen to accelerate the work. The National Park Service made a contract with the company providing for the completion of the transportation system in the Arch's north leg ninety-one days after the contract was signed. If the work were finished, Hoel-Steffen would be paid an additional \$97,500. If the north leg system was not completed in time the company would be fined \$750 a day for each day in excess of ninety-one. Hoel-Steffen originally had to complete the partial finishing of the visitor center and installation of the air-conditioning by October 17, 1966. The new agreement meant a completion date of July 15, 1967. [\[191\]](#) Inside the Arch itself all sixteen transportation capsules were assembled and pulled to the top of the Arch by a temporary hoist. Work continued on the electrical installation, tracks, and machinery. The system's doors and hardware for the walls in the upper load zones were placed in April. [\[192\]](#)

Outside the Arch a new problem developed in the stainless steel skin. Wrinkles appeared in the skin in March 1966, and for the next two months Superintendent Brown met with Federal and construction officials to discuss repair and responsibility for them. Several of the Arch sections had been damaged during shipment from Pittsburgh and the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company worked to correct the marks. By May, however, Brown learned that MacDonald Construction Company and Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel experts could not, by any known method, correct the damage. [\[193\]](#) The National Park Service did not let the matter of the wrinkled stainless steel sections drop, however. Eero Saarinen and Associates supplied a figure on the value of the damaged exterior surfacing, estimating \$367,631.20 for the damage, which MacDonald could not satisfactorily repair. [\[194\]](#)

The fast construction pace continued. Installation of the work elevator cab was completed in May, while the sixteen transportation system capsules stood in place. Even though the glass had yet to be installed in the windows on the Arch observation deck, the interior finish panels were complete except for painting. Superintendent Brown met with Planet Corporation representatives to plan the maintenance program for the transportation system. At the end of June workers started roping the cables for the capsules. [\[195\]](#)

Federal officials feared that the completed Arch would soon become too tempting a target for pilots, and their worst fears were realized in June, when a private plane flew between the Arch legs. The Federal Aviation Administration could charge any pilot with three violations of FAA regulations if the pilot was caught. [\[196\]](#) This was the first such stunt; it would not be the last.

The pace continued in June and July while Superintendent LeRoy Brown attended to several matters. The Park Service staff in St. Louis established an Equal Employment Opportunity Committee in June to discuss different methods by which to promote equal employment at the memorial. They placed their main emphasis on youth employment programs. Meanwhile, MacDonald Construction Company neared completion of their contract for building the Gateway Arch. The company began final cleanup of a section of the structure's interior, and upon National Park Service inspection, the section was found to meet contract requirements with a few exceptions. MacDonald proceeded with the interior cleaning. Around the bases of the Arch legs MacDonald poured 50 percent of the needed concrete. When this chore was complete the creeper cranes on the legs continued to move down, allowing cleaning of the exterior stainless steel as they went. [\[197\]](#)

Despite a sheet metal worker's strike then in effect, which held up Hoel-Steffen's progress on the visitor center, Bi-State decided to wait it out and not cancel the accelerated program now threatened with more delay. Bi-State looked forward to opening the passenger transportation system and planned for a reopening inspection tour and first rides for public officials and

guests. [\[198\]](#)

When autumn 1966 arrived, marking the first anniversary of the Arch's completion, MacDonald Construction Company still had not finished its contract. The Traveler's Indemnity Company inspected the company's work and met its representatives to discuss contract requirements. MacDonald still had to finish the work on the ramps and load zones and around the Arch legs, which held up Hoel-Steffen's progress. MacDonald sustained an exemplary achievement when it raised and lowered the north train by push button manual operation at slow speed. By September this feat had been accomplished with both trains. [\[199\]](#)

In October 1966, when attention focused on the unfinished project because of the upcoming bond issue election, the Park Service staff worked to clear MacDonald's contract. Contract inspector Ted Rennison completed a prefinal inspection on the main Arch portion of the contract. He noted 125 items that were not yet completed and should be considered exceptions to the work's acceptance. Rennison also prepared punch lists devoted to the interior steel stair and electrical work that he would give to MacDonald when completed. Hoel-Steffen was to have the north leg ready whenever MacDonald completed the trains, now set for December 1966. [\[200\]](#) Both construction firms ran into frequent conflicts over the use of work areas, specifically the hatchways when the trains were in operation. Hoel-Steffen could not work because of the high voltage dangers, but MacDonald needed to get the trains into operation. Both contractors met with the National Park Service as mediator to determine a work schedule. [\[201\]](#)

Inside the visitor center the fountain construction was 90 percent complete in November. Work progressed on the lobby, the north and south ramps, and the restrooms. On November 29, 1966 memorial officials conducted a final inspection of the Arch. Seventy-six items remained to be completed and they were listed as exceptions in the Park Service's acceptance letter. The final acceptance date was set for June 28, 1967. Hoel-Steffen kept shooting for completion of the north leg by December, and mid-month saw a flurry of meetings between Richard Bowser, Superintendent Brown, John Dinkeloo, and Bruce Detmers of Roche-Dinkeloo and Associates, successors to Eero Saarinen and Associates. The contractors could not meet their deadline once again. They had hoped to test the trains in mid-December, but the date was now pushed back to February 1, 1967. [\[202\]](#) The major problem now was humidity in the Arch leg. Moisture was so high that it affected electrical parts of the transportation system, making them inoperable. The feuds between MacDonald and Hoel-Steffen continued. MacDonald did not protect its equipment from the moisture, so the National Park Service ordered Hoel-Steffen to use the heating system (which was partially completed and under construction by Hoel-Steffen) to force heat into the north leg. This would dry up the moisture and protect the equipment. [\[203\]](#) These continued squabbles and problems tested everyone's nerves. Deadlines passed unmet, Bi-State lost money, and Park Service officials feared to answer their telephones knowing it was another problem. Meanwhile, the public waited for that first ride to the top of the Arch.

In the meantime, Superintendent Brown kept several proposals to illuminate the Arch under consideration. During November and December no less than four different companies demonstrated their plans to light the Arch. No plan was ever put into effect, even though much time was spent in review and consideration. The rising emphasis on energy conservation, the lack of a feasible plan, and the mirror-like reflective qualities of the stainless steel killed any consideration of lighting the Arch. [\[204\]](#)

The memorial's research staff met many of their museum planning deadlines in 1966. At the year's beginning the staff finished their plan for the interim exhibit gallery in the visitor center, with the exception of choosing colors and choice of materials. After revisions were

made in the museum documents and reports, the staff historian worked on compiling a list of objects needed for the museum. By June the staff had the museum floor plan 9% complete. At the end of the year, when Hoel-Steffen finished work in the visitor center, the museum staff moved in behind them to install the interim gallery. [205]

Still further planning for redeveloping the east riverbank occurred at the end of 1966. A group of business and civic leaders proposed a massive project to rebuild much of East St. Louis. The plans included levee developments and an expansion of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial to include forty-five acres on the Illinois side. Reaction to the plan was favorable, but many people expressed doubts about financing. [206] Monetary problems would continue to plague East St. Louis planning efforts throughout the coming years.

The memorial itself faced monetary shortages with the coming of 1967. The national budget included a request of \$2,325,000 for the memorial in the fiscal 1968 Interior appropriation bill. If the submitted bond issue passed in St. Louis, the combined amounts would sufficiently complete the visitor center. A total of \$6,000,000 was needed to complete all the memorial's features, but the memorial's supporters feared that the Vietnam budget would cut domestic spending. [207] The funds immediately ran into trouble in April when the House Appropriations Committee slashed the money from the budget. No further effort came on the House floor to restore the funds. The St. Louis delegation made no attempt to reinsert the money for fear they would annoy the committee members whose support could be vital in the future. Representative Julia Butler Hansen (Washington), who chaired the appropriations subcommittee, promised to review the request when the budget situation improved. [208]

The Senate held a different attitude toward the funds. On May 16 that body approved \$500,000 for museum architectural and engineering planning, \$54,400 for the memorial's management and protection, and \$50,000 for maintenance and rehabilitation costs. The action came after a favorable recommendation by the Senate Appropriations Committee. The appropriations now had to be cleared in a conference committee where the \$500,000 stood in danger of being slashed. [209] All the hopes for retaining the token amount were dashed on June 8, 1967, however, when the House-Senate Conference Committee cut the allocation. The House's will prevailed; none of the \$6,000,000 authorization would be provided in 1968. [210] The Vietnam War's high cost hit home.

Bond Issue Election

The city had a second chance to show its support for the memorial, and the project's backers went to great lengths to inform the voting populace of its merits. The city's contribution of \$2,000,000, when added to the hoped-for Federal appropriation, would finance the Museum of Westward Expansion, the visitor center with two theaters, the grand staircase, landscaping, and pedestrian overpasses. Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association members worked alongside the Committee to Complete the Riverfront Arch Memorial to advertise the election's importance. The St. Louis newspapers supported their efforts and the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission met on February 3 to review and endorse the pending election. [211] To publicize the election and give citizens a first hand glimpse at the work needing completion, the National Park Service held an open house for several hours at the site on February 26. Visitors saw the need for walkways, bridges, and steps because they walked through ninety acres of mud. [212]

Several black Democratic leaders opposed the proposition on the grounds that funds going for the Arch would be better spent in the city's poorer residential area. They viewed the Arch as a "white man's memorial," and refused to help a city which provided no jobs for blacks. The argument that the black community would not benefit from the issue's passage was challenged by the city's director of public welfare, who asserted that the Arch should be a

symbol for blacks in the sense that it provided a breakthrough in job opportunities in the AFL-CIO construction unions. [213]

As the bond issue election date drew near voters learned that as the Museum of Westward Expansion was completed the western displays in the Old Courthouse would be moved into the new space. The Old Courthouse displays on the Dred Scott decision, St. Louis ironwork, and the Louisiana Purchase would remain, while new displays would pertain to St. Louis' geography, history, architecture, and achievement. [214] Citizens had the chance to glorify their own city's contribution to westward expansion through interpretive displays in the Old Courthouse.

The populace listened and voted on March 7, 1967. The bonds passed by 69.5%. Former Mayor Bernard Dickmann, still playing an active role by heading the bond issue drive, celebrated along with four other previous St. Louis mayors. Representative Leonor Sullivan promised her total cooperation in obtaining the Federal funds. Her efforts were proved to be in vain in June, but at the end of the year Sullivan urged the Budget Bureau to include the \$6,000,000 in the next Federal budget. The local money could not be spent independently without being considered a donation. Additionally, the Greensfelder offer could fall through. [215]

Peripheral Building Height

During 1967, the question of peripheral building height emerged again, causing several memorial supporters to worry that the uncertainty over height limits could adversely affect the possibility of receiving Government appropriations. [216] The problem began in January when redevelopment plans were unveiled for the area immediately north of the memorial between the Eads and Veterans Bridges. The River Center Redevelopment Corporation proposed high rise apartment and office buildings costing \$101 million. Developers would be eligible for full tax relief under urban renewal programs. The alternative plan, stressing rehabilitation and preservation of historic structures in the area, was called Laclede's Landing and was sponsored by the Levee Redevelopment Corporation. Mayor Alfonso Cervantes favored the high-rise proposal, but indicated he would take the advice of the City Plan Commission. [217]

The commission, most of whose members were appointed by Cervantes, voted on January 19, 1967, to approve the high-rise proposal and recommend a height limit of 500 feet from the base line of the Arch. [218] National Park Service Director George Hartzog saw the potential danger. Although he favored development in the area, he objected to any height over 275 feet. Years before, the Mansion House controversy had effectively set the height limit at 275 feet when the Arch height was raised to 630 feet. Hartzog asserted that "Had that agreement not been reached, it is doubtful if the Arch would have been built at all." [219] He believed that any plan providing for a building height to exceed 275 feet could adversely affect the chances of obtaining additional funds. The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, meeting in Washington, D.C. on February 3, adopted a resolution supporting the height limitation. [220]

Former Mayor Raymond Tucker jumped into the controversy in March by informing Cervantes of his years-old agreement with the National Park Service that peripheral development height would not exceed 275 feet. The depth of the peripheral area had never been defined, but Tucker considered it to include the area north of Eads Bridge and east of Third Street. Cervantes felt committed to the principle but he wanted legal advice from the city counselor's office on two issues: how to legalize the peripheral area's height limitations and how to prescribe the boundaries of the limitations. [221]

Mayor Cervantes concurred with the commission's decision favoring the River Center plan over the Laclede's Landing plan based on the developers' detailed presentations, but by May the Levee Redevelopment Corporation submitted a more specific proposal which Cervantes believed to have merit. In view of this fact, the building height controversy, and the threat of a cutoff in Government funds, Mayor Cervantes requested the City Plan Commission to reopen its study of the two plans. [222]

After Congress failed to appropriate memorial funds in June the mayor had second thoughts about the height agreement. The Federal Government had not provided the funds to match local money and Cervantes did not see why they should have any say concerning building height. He intended to abide by the Tucker-National Park Service oral agreement but nothing existed in writing to define the periphery. He did not believe that the agreement applied to "buildings facing in the other direction on the blocks on the edge." [223]

In September 1967 a St. Louis alderman introduced an ordinance before that body to limit the height of buildings to 275 feet in the area bounded by Franklin Avenue on the north, Chouteau on the south, and Broadway on the west. The action was taken to force the city and National Park Service to resolve their problem. National Park Service officials wanted the bill worded so that the height limitation would include the buildings and superstructure. The Mansion House plans had shown just the parapet height of 275 feet, but when the penthouses were added on top the height reached 306 feet. The Mansion House height was thus officially 306 feet or 751 feet above mean sea level. Superintendent LeRoy Brown told Director Hartzog, "This is where Mansion House beat us ... John Dinkeloo tells me it was a deliberate act." [224]

On December 5, 1967, the Aldermanic Zoning Committee unanimously endorsed a bill setting the height limit of buildings in the peripheral area at the same height as Mansion House — 306 feet. The group believed that failure to establish the definite limitations would jeopardize further congressional appropriations. Ordinance 54846 defined the peripheral area as that bounded by Franklin, Chouteau, Broadway, and the river in addition to creating a new zoning district known as the Jefferson Memorial District. Mayor Cervantes signed the ordinance into law on December 28, 1967. [225]

Arch Transportation System

The same problems which haunted the memorial in 1966 continued on into 1967: the transportation system remained unfinished, MacDonald had not finished its contract, unique construction problems continued, and the Arch dedication was postponed once again. The National Park Service and its contractors set deadline after deadline for getting the transportation system into operation, but months passed before one was finally met.

Formal testing of the transportation system occurred on January 30, 1967. The first trip to the top proceeded smoothly, but a hitch occurred when the second train jammed. At this point Superintendent Brown hoped the trains would open to the public by March 1. Brown and Hartzog both met with Bi-State numerous times during the first months of the year to discuss opening the north leg and completing the accelerated work program on the interior finishes. Richard Bowser came to St. Louis to inspect the transportation work and to discuss his findings with Brown, while the Planet Corporation supplied the memorial staff with a list of spare parts they believed should be on hand at all times for the train operation. [226] At the end of February the memorial staff planned and commenced temporary landscaping in hopes of opening the transportation system within a few weeks, but delays set the date further back. Hoel-Steffen had turned on the steam for heat and was running the north leg air handling unit to keep down the humidity. The north train could be run only under these conditions. The National Park Service then had to issue a stop order to the company on January 20 to halt all

work in the Arch south leg until after the train testing. This was a necessary safety precaution because of the open electrical equipment. The Government expected the mechanical work in the visitor center and north mechanical rooms to be completed before Bi-State took over the north train. The testing, witnessed by the Detroit Testing Laboratory, lasted throughout the first two weeks of March. [227]

On March 6, 1967, Superintendent Brown and several staff members held a conference with representatives of the various AFL-CIO unions on the job to discuss opening the Arch transporters to the public. Several solutions were presented to solve the jurisdictional questions involved. The most practical solution for the National Park Service was to have the contractor complete all remaining work in the north leg after the train was accepted. Hoel-Steffen indicated that barring any unforeseen difficulties, all work could be finished six weeks from the time they were given full-time use of the north leg. Once that portion of the facility was completed, the unions could not object to its being operated and maintained by non-union employees. [228] The second alternative involved commencing operations in the north leg before the heating, ventilating, and electrical work was complete. This required extra costs. The third alternative also required Bi-State to start operations before the north leg was complete. The plan called for operating the ventilating system during periods that Bi-State carried passengers, involving even more costs. It was in the Government's interest financially to have the north leg completed before allowing Bi-State to operate the transportation system. The recurring factor in these alternative actions remained the ventilation/condensation problems. In case both legs of the transportation system were completed simultaneously, the unfinished north leg ventilation system could no longer be used to reduce condensation in the south leg. The absence of the ventilation would lead to considerable rusting of the south leg transporter. LeRoy Brown had to take notice of this fact when planning for the system's completion. [229]

Other construction projects continued. At the end of January plumbing and lobby lighting in the visitor center was completed. In February the Federal Government accepted the architectural and plumbing work in the lobby, the restrooms, and the fountain in anticipation of the open house event publicizing the bond issue election. MacDonald Construction Company still worked on its list of seventy-six items of exceptions. At the end of February they had completed 80%. [230]

The National Park Service and St. Louis city officials continued their tentative dedication planning. The city's police and civil defense officials met at the Old Courthouse to discuss the physical preparations necessary for the ceremony, such as the presidential stand, chairs, fences, police protection, and other items. Director Hartzog told Mayor Cervantes that the memorial would be ready for dedication about July 1, 1967. Both men desired President Lyndon Johnson's participation, but realized that the dedication also had to be coordinated with the mayor, the congressional delegation, the secretary of the interior, and the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. President Johnson sent word late in February that his schedule would not allow him to come to St. Louis any time in the months ahead. [231] The dedication was postponed once again.

In an attempt to get the two theaters built in the visitor center, Superintendent Brown proposed a plan in early March 1968 to let a private concessionaire build and run them. When Representative Leonor Sullivan heard this meant charging admission to the films, she vehemently opposed the plan. Brown and other Park Service officials believed that having the concessionaire build the theaters would be a way to provide the facility for the public faster than waiting for the money to be appropriated by Congress, but Sullivan thought the Federal Government had made the commitment to fund the memorial and the funds should come from that source. On March 14 Director Hartzog rescinded his order calling for bids on \$750,000 in construction work in the theaters, and told Sullivan he would look for another

way to finance the work. The local funds could not be spent until the Federal matching money was appropriated, so the project's supporters would try again before a House appropriation subcommittee late in March. [232] Local politics once again determined the course of the memorial's development.

MacDonald Construction Company suffered a postponement in the acceptance of its work by the Government in mid-March. The company told National Park Service officials on March 14 that their work on the trains, elevators, and stairs would be ready for inspection on March 20. Superintendent Brown and other officials started the inspection but they discovered so much incorrect and unfinished work, and workmen interfering with the inspection while performing their jobs that Brown decided to postpone the operation until the job was ready. He furnished MacDonald with a list of items needing correction. [233]

The construction company faced another problem when the visitor center's roof started leaking. This condition produced ceiling and wall stains and damaged the plaster. Superintendent Brown inspected a portion of the uncovered roof only to find defects suffered in the original roof installation. MacDonald attempted to repair the damage in March but progress was slow. [234]

Hoel-Steffen's January 20 stop order remained in effect in March. They did not work in either Arch leg through February and March so that MacDonald could finish their work. The National Park Service, however, decided on March 22 to have Hoel-Steffen start work again in the north leg because the Park Service's final inspection of MacDonald's contract would not interfere with Hoel-Steffen's work in the area. [235]

The Bi-State Development Agency kept losing money throughout all the delays. They wanted at least one leg's transportation system to be operational to obtain some relief from the financial losses they were suffering. The agency to date had paid \$800,000 in interest on the bonds without any sort of return. They borrowed to meet their January 1 interest payment, and had another \$90,000 due on July 1. In March 1966 they had provided the \$97,500 additional funds for the accelerated interior finishes program, which was supposed to insure the system's opening by July 15, 1966. Now nine months later the trains still were not finished. The agency had been deducting \$250 daily from MacDonald's payment since August 15, 1965, and continued to do so. MacDonald however, filed appeals saying it was not responsible. Bi-State had been initially promised a completion date of December 2, 1964. Three years later it continued to wait. [236]

Hoel-Steffen found it impossible to get air-conditioning and heating work finished in the south leg because of the constant testing of the trains in both legs. The company concentrated on getting the north leg done and probably would have finished earlier if the ducts in the Arch had not leaked in tests. The duct repairs added a month to the anticipated completion date of the north leg. [237]

MacDonald Construction Company worked in April to complete eleven remaining punch list items in hopes of having a final inspection in May. The company stopped repairing the roof in April and the roof's condition worsened. The National Park Service held them responsible for the damage. During the month Superintendent Brown directed most of his attention toward getting the memorial open to the public. [238] He came one step closer to that goal in May when he and other staff members inspected MacDonald's work on the transportation system. MacDonald received a punch list of the deficiencies which needed correcting, while Superintendent Brown met with Robert Hoel on the same day to discuss the early completion of certain portions of the interior finishes contract to allow the visitor center's to open shortly after June 1. [239]

Superintendent Brown accomplished another goal in May when his staff installed exhibits in the visitor center's interim gallery. Brown attended the premier showing of the two films to be shown in the visitor center: "Time of the West" and "Monument to the Dream," and these films, added to the interim exhibit gallery, served to present the public with a visual and physical preview of the future Museum of Westward Expansion's glories. The gallery officially opened on June 9, 1967, with the displays composed of farming implements, pans, picks, shovels, an overland wagon, Torrini's bugler statue, and Reinhardt's mosaic. [240] The visitor center was now open but it continued to leak. MacDonald worked to remove eighteen inches of dirt over the entire visitor center complex and LeRoy Brown estimated the cost at \$100,000. He blamed initial faulty installation for the leakage, but John P. Reuter, Jr., president of Missouri Roofing Company of St. Louis, who had done the work for MacDonald, disagreed with that assessment. A board of contract appeals would have to decide who was responsible for the repair bills. [241]

The National Park Service finally allowed Hoel-Steffen to start work again in the south leg on June 14, 1967. The stop order on the leg had been in effect since the previous January 20. Park Service officials proceeded further in the process required to open the north leg by having Sverdrup and Parcel Engineering Company inspect the system. The company presented their report on June 27 and made a series of minor recommendations. Due to the desire to have everything working perfectly on the trains, both Bi-State and the Park Service wanted to wait until everything was ready before announcing another opening date. The problems remained many and the procedures complex. Sverdrup and Parcel's report listed thirty-five items, seventeen of which were critical and had to be corrected before the system opened to the public. [242]

Hoel-Steffen Construction Company had severe problems. In July 1967 it was on the edge of default because of the endless delays, unique construction problems, and the labor disputes involving the third party contractors. The firm told the Park Service on July 6 that it might not be able to complete the work provided in the contract for heating and ventilating the Arch and visitor center. Robert Hoel filed a claim for Federal payments for the third party delays, but the National Park Service did not have liability under the contract. The Federal Government promised, however, to cooperate in every proper way to keep Hoel from defaulting on his contract. [243]

Despite this threat to the memorial's completion, the long-awaited opening of the transportation system took place on July 24, 1967. MacDonald completed the critical items, the National Park Service held a ribbon cutting ceremony, Director George Hartzog came in from Washington, D.C., and thirty dignitaries took the first ride up. The system opened to the public at noon. [244] Eight months passed before the south train opened for public use. It too suffered delays before it finally opened at 10 a.m. on March 19, 1968. The north leg was then closed for the installation of automatic passenger-handling equipment. Simultaneous operations did not occur in both legs' transportation systems until May 18, 1968. [245]

By the time the Arch's transportation system opened, contractors working on the Arch/visitor center complex had filed seventeen appeals before the Department of the Interior Board of Contract Appeals, totaling \$972,000. The contractors also filed suits and counterclaims in the United States district court totaling \$1,408,633. Superintendent LeRoy Brown was not troubled by the amount of money involved in the appealed disputes. He thought the amount small in comparison with the total amount of the contracts comprising \$13,500,000. [246]

Most of the problems between the contractors and the National Park Service occurred because of the difficulties encountered when MacDonald and Hoel-Steffen both had to work in the restricted space of the Arch legs. Work crews of other firms could not get into areas already occupied. Even though MacDonald, Hoel-Steffen, and subcontractors had completion

dates and penalty clauses in their contracts to consider, their work was often delayed through the imposition of make-shift work arrangements in the legs. MacDonald and one of its subcontractors, St. Louis Sheet Metal Company, made an agreement to work in four-hour shifts in one area, but set up and tear down of equipment every day consumed much of this time. The high humidity in the Arch legs continued to add to the deterioration of equipment. The contractors ran fans during the day, but on weekends and nights an electrician was needed to operate the electrical panel. Everything became dripping wet on the weekends, and the repairs cost more than overtime would have to pay an electrician. The internal squabbling and humidity helped ruin a lot of equipment. [247] Relationships between some of the firms deteriorated over the crowded working conditions, and several filed suits against other firms for third party contractor delays. Robert Hoel blamed the National Park Service for his company's precarious financial situation. He thought the Park Service's premature letting of the project created the crowded working conditions. Hoel would have been assessed damages if he delayed moving workers and equipment into the work area, even though MacDonald workers were already present. Hoel believed that the tempers flared and the job dragged on because too many people were involved. Richard Bowser estimated that the continual bickering, blaming, negotiations, and delays added one year to the construction of the Arch. In fact, the National Park Service had to go in with salaried staff to finish the little details to get the Arch trains running. [249]

Another essential reason for the delays was the perfection demanded by the National Park Service in the contracted work. All equipment had to be in first class condition upon acceptance, but as delays occurred the contractors had to maintain the equipment over a period of years with no pay for the service. The National Park Service also adopted the view that the guarantee period began after acceptance and not installation. Normal one year guarantees were extended to two or three years. Contractors disagreed with the National Park Service's demanding corrections of latent defects in the work. Park Service officials insisted that the contractors knew of these defects, and ordered them corrected at the contractors' expense. This served as justification for the leaking visitor center's roof repairs. The National Park Service's demand for special procedures and tests were thought to be unreasonable by some contractors. Superintendent Brown sympathized with the companies but he had an obligation to seek perfection. The contractors had a recourse for their legitimate claims through the contract appeals board.

The Bi-State Development Agency continued throughout this period to have its differences with the National Park Service. The pressure on the memorial staff was tremendous to get the trains running. Every day of delay meant money to Bi-State, and its officials did not agree with the Park Service's grant of time extensions and payment of additional costs to Hoel-Steffen. When the contractor requested a fifty-one day extension to its contract because of the AFL-CIO walkout (which lasted 34 days), the National Park Service granted them 45 days. Bi-State thought this extension and the other twelve change orders issued to Hoel-Steffen were overly generous. But despite the two-year delay in opening the Arch transportation system, Bi-State enjoyed heavy visitation, which exceeded its expectations. By January 1968, 250,000 visitors had traveled to the top of the Arch. [250]

After all the appeals and suits had run their course by 1972, Hoel-Steffen received some payment for its claims, while the Government and Bi-State were released from any claims by MacDonald. Both Superintendent Brown and National Park Service project supervisor Kramer Chapman believed that Hoel-Steffen should have been awarded more payment than it finally received because of the company's involvement with the AFL-CIO union walkout. One of Hoel-Steffen's subcontractors (St. Louis Sheet Metal) defaulted on the job, but Hoel-Steffen itself remained solvent. MacDonald corrected all items on its punch list and Chapman believed that none of the contractors or subcontractors ever short-cut any work or tried to cheat the National Park Service. [251]

Coping with the AFL-CIO walkout at the time it happened was "pretty miserable" for Superintendent Brown, but the ramifications of the action spread far. By 1968 most major American cities began the first steps to implement equal employment programs in their Federal construction projects. St. Louis' program began in 1964, when the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity began talks with the National Park Service geared toward convincing contractors and labor unions to hire blacks on the project. What ensued was the granting of a contract to Hoel-Steffen, the hiring of the independent black plumbers, the AFL-CIO walkout, and the Department of Justice suit against the Building and Construction Trades Council. All the Justice Department suits were eventually dismissed, but the department appealed cases against two of the unions in which lower courts ruled that the unions had not discriminated against blacks. Following the St. Louis project lead, affirmative action and pre-award conferences to assure equal employment from contractors became standard government procedure by 1968. St. Louis contractors by then were pushing programs to hire hard-core unemployables on summer construction programs. Additionally, most St. Louis AFL-CIO unions had training programs of their own for black workers. The Gateway Arch project served to show area businesses and unions that future Government construction expenditures in the community depended in part upon their drive for minority hiring. [252]

Arch Dedication

Solving all the problems connected with the construction of the Arch only made the official dedication sweeter. The energy and devotion geared toward completing the project now turned to planning a massive dedication ceremony. Original plans had scheduled the dedication for October 1965. Now, almost two and a half years later, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall and Mayor Alfonso Cervantes announced the date for May 25, 1968. Sponsors still hoped for President Lyndon Johnson to make an address, but no commitment came from Washington, D.C.. The mayor appointed all the former living mayors, including Bernard Dickmann, to serve as honorary chairmen of the Arch Dedication Committee. [253]

As the day drew near, plans evolved into a two-day celebration complete with parade, ball, and a regatta of boats on the Mississippi River. Dignitaries from the Louisiana Purchase states were expected to attend, along with the secretary of the interior, the chairman of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, and hundreds of representatives from patriotic and fraternal organizations. Hopes that President Johnson would honor the occasion with his presence were never realized. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey represented the Federal Government instead. [254] The date, May 25, was significant: it was twenty years to the day when the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission accepted Eero Saarinen's design for the triumphant Arch. [255]

The day dawned but the sun did not come out. Unusually heavy downpours began that morning which washed out the proceedings. The Arch grounds turned into channels of running water that flooded everything. Water ran down the walkways into the visitor center and stood several inches deep on the floor. It followed the visitors into the complex as they scrambled to seek shelter from the deluge. The National Park Service had prepared no alternative rain plan. Assistant Superintendent Harry Pfanz remembered it as being "just like the Red Sea closing on the Egyptians." [256] Inside the visitor center the ceremonies proceeded with a certain sense of decorum, despite the wet. Vice President Humphrey gave the address and went out smiling. The rain could not wash away the accomplishment. The controversy, delay, and pending suits did not dampen the celebration. Now thoughts could turn to developing an interpretive program suitable for the memorial, including completing the museum.

The new Arch signified a beginning for the city of St. Louis. It prompted rebirth, and

provided impetus for investment and growth. Its contribution and value to the city was immediately obvious. It was time now for the memorial's role as a national historic site to begin.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER VII: Footnotes

¹Interview, George B. Hartzog, Jr., 19 November 1979. Hartzog, a South Carolinian, worked as a lawyer for the Department of the Interior before joining the National Park Service as assistant superintendent at Great Smoky Mountains National Park. He came to St. Louis in 1959.

²Eero Saarinen and Associates, *Report on Conferences Held at St. Louis, Missouri in Reference to Progress Of Work on the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Project* No. 5802, 28 February 1959, JEFF.

³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 August 1958.

⁴*South Side Journal*, 5 August, 1959; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 September, 1959. The St. Louis newspapers led the campaign to save the Old Rock House. See: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 May 1959, and *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 June 1959.

⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 February 1959.

⁶Memorandum, Chief Research Historian to Superintendent JNEM, 10 September 1964, JEFF.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 4 September 1958; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 December 1959. The dirt came from excavations for a nearby expressway. The Missouri Highway Commission paid the expense of hauling and spreading the fill.

¹⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 June 1959; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 26 June 1959.

¹¹Eero Saarinen to A.F. Schwartz, 22 October 1958; Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 2599, WHMC.

¹²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 July 1959; Nell Marie Geders to Board of Aldermen, 24 April 1959, JEFF.

¹³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 2 October 1959, JEFF; Conrad

Wirth to Raymond Tucker, 20 October 1959, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 October 1959.

¹⁴Roger Ernst to Stuart Symington, 11 February 1959, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4930, WHMC.

¹⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 May 1959; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 June 1959; telegram, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Stuart Symington to William Crowds, 5 June 1959, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4932, WHMC.

¹⁶Interview, George B. Hartzog, Jr., 19 November 1979; *Master Plan, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, March 1959, JEFF; *Guidelines for the Master Plan, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, 10 March 1959, JEFF.

¹⁷Master Plan ... JEFF; Guidelines ... JEFF.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹For more information on Mission 66 see John Ise, *Our National Park Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 546-50.

²⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 March, 1959; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, NPS, 13 April 1959, JEFF.

²¹Hartzog to J.W. Thompson, 17 April 1959, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 April 1959; Pre-Advertising Notice of Construction Contract at Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, National Park Service, 29 April 1959, JEFF; *Before the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri, City of St. Louis v Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, et al.* 6 May 1959, JEFF.

²²Hartzog to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 8 June 1959, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4932, WHMC; *St Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 June 1959.

²³News release from National Park Service, 12 June 1959, JNEMA; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 26 June 1959.

²⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 July 1959; Walter Morehead, Narrative Report for the Month of August 1959, JEFF; newsletter, Morton May to Membership of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 19 November 1959, JNEMA; interview, George B. Hartzog, Jr., 19 November 1979.

²⁵Summary of Remaining Items For Development Program and Estimates of Cost, National Park Service, 5 January 1960, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4934, WHMC.

²⁶Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 April 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 May 1960, JEFF.

²⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 May 1960.

²⁸Memorandum, Regional Director, Region Two to Director NPS, 15 April 1959, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 June 1960, JEFF; Merrill J. Mattes, *Preliminary Museum Prospectus, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, April 1959, JEFF;

William C. Everhart, *Report of Museum Tour*, 6-11 June 1960, JEFF.

²⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 3 August 1959, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Regional Director to Superintendent JNEM, 4 March 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 7 September 1960, JEFF. The assistant secretary of the interior approved the Old Cathedral cooperative agreement on February 23, 1961. Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1961, JEFF.

³⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 June 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 September 1960, JEFF.

³¹Staffing Study, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 18-22 April 1960, JEFF.

³²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Region Two, 29 January 1960, JEFF.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Statement of Justification of Project Fund Requirements, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, Fiscal 1960 through 1963, JEFF.

³⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 July 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 September 1960, JEFF.

³⁶Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 November 1960, JEFF.

³⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 January 1961, JEFF. The museum unit names were: Miner's Frontier, Title to the West, Explorers of a Wilderness, Cattleman's Frontier, The Overland Experience, Trapper's and Trader's Frontier, Indian's Frontier, Soldier's Frontier, Face of the West, Impact of the West, Sodbuster's Frontier, Settlers to the Far West. For more information on the museum exhibit topics and on-going National Park Service research, see John Jenkins, "Gateway to the West," *The American West*, 1, 1, Winter, 1964, pp. 52-58.

³⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 12 July 1960, JEFF.

³⁹*Ibid.*; Hartzog to Tucker, 22 July 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 22 July 1960, JEFF.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²Memorandum, Chief EODC to Superintendent JNEM, 1 August 1960, JEFF.

⁴³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 3 August 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Regional Director to Superintendent JNEM, 12 August 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁴Memorandum, Director NPS to Superintendent JNEM, 22 August 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁵Memorandum, Regional Director to Regional Chief of Operations, 9 September 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁶Memorandum, Regional Director, Region Two to Director NPS, 16 September 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁷Saارينen to Wirth, 23 December 1958, JEFF; memorandum, Supervisory Park Engineer to Superintendent JNEM, 23 September 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁸Memorandum, Supervisory Park Engineer to Superintendent JNEM, 23 September 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 December 1960, JEFF.

⁴⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 December 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 18 January 1960, JEFF. The railroad relocation involved the largest building and utilities contract ever awarded by the Park Service. The change order, approximately \$2,500,000, was larger than the original contract in addition to being the largest change order ever issued. Staffing Study ... JEFF.

⁵⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 18 January 1960, JEFF.

⁵¹Hartzog to Robert Blackburn, 13 October 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Files, 1 November 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 December 1960, JEFF.

⁵²Thomas Hennings, Jr., Stuart Symington, Frank Karsten, Thomas Curtis, Leonor Sullivan to Maurice Stans, 12 January 1960, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., Papers, file No. 4934, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 January 1960.

⁵³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 January 1960; *Rolla News*, Rolla, Missouri, 26 January 1960; Newsletter to Membership, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 11 February 1960, JNEMA.

⁵⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 February 1960; Maurice Stans to Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., 17 February 1960, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4935, WHMC.

⁵⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 February 1960.

⁵⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 March 1960.

⁵⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 March 1960; telegram, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., to Raymond Tucker, 29 March 1960, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4936, WHMC; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 May 1960; Hennings to Harry F. Byrd, 27 May 1960, Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. Papers, file No. 4937, WHMC.

⁵⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 27 May 1960.

⁵⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 June 1960.

⁶⁰ *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 July 1960; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 July 1960; Raymond Tucker to Wirth, 23 November 1960, JEFF.

⁶¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 December 1960.

⁶²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 January 1961; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 April 1961; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 April 1961; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 May 1961; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 June 1961; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 5 August 1961; *St. Louis Post-*

Dispatch, 28 September 1961.

⁶³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 December 1960, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 February 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent to Director NPS, 13 June 1961, JEFF; interview, George B. Hartzog, Jr., 19 November 1979.

⁶⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 February 1961; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 February 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 March 1961, JEFF.

⁶⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 30 January 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Chief EODC, 2 February 1961, JEFF.

⁶⁶Memorandum, Superintendent, JNEM to Chief EODC, 2 February 1961, JEFF; newsletter, Morton May to Membership, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 18 May 1961, JNEMA.

⁶⁷Saarinen to Wirth, 22 May 1961, JEFF; Tucker to Wirth, 10 June 1961, JEFF.

⁶⁸Memorandum, Director NPS to Chief EODC, 15 June 1961, JEFF.

⁶⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Region Two, 20 June 1961, JEFF.

⁷⁰Memorandum, Bill Everhart to John Jenkins, 2 July 1961, JEFF.

⁷¹Memorandum, Chief EODC to Superintendent JNEM, 18 October 1961, JEFF.

⁷²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 December 1961, JEFF.

⁷³Hartzog to Tucker, 9 December 1961, JEFF.

⁷⁴Telegram, Hartzog to Frank Karsten, 20 December 1961, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2591, WHMC.

⁷⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 February 1961, JEFF.

⁷⁶Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 March 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 April 1961, JEFF. Staff members on the review committee were: Merrill Mattes, Ralph Lewis, Herb Kahler.

⁷⁷Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1961, JEFF.

⁷⁸Memorandum, Bill Everhart to John Jenkins, 2 July 1961, JEFF; Hartzog to Jenkins, 5 July 1961, JEFF.

⁷⁹Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director, NPS, 11 September 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 November 1961, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 December 1961, JEFF.

⁸⁰Memorandum, Assistant Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 January 1962, JEFF.

⁸¹Eero Saarinen, *Saarinen on His Work*, ed. Aline B. Saarinen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 104; interview, George B. Hartzog, Jr., 19 November 1979. Saarinen's contract with the National Park Service, dated 8 January 1959, was assumed five years after his death by the successor firm of Kevin Roche, John Dinkeloo and Associates. All services provided by the contract were finished to the Park Service's satisfaction in July 1969. The last invoice was for \$7,500. Memorandum, Chief Staff Architect and Contracting Officer to Regional Finance Officer, Northeast Region, 10 July 1969, JEFF.

⁸⁶Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 February 1962, JEFF; News Release, National Park Service, 14 February 1962, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2592, WHMC.

⁸³News Release ... WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3-4 March, 1962.

⁸⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 15 March 1962, JEFF; *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Project*, National Park Service, United States Department of Interior, 3 April 1962, JEFF; *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, National Park Service, United States Department of Interior [1964], JEFF.

⁸⁵*Jefferson ... Project* JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 5 April, 1962; Annual Report of Morton D. May, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 13 June 1962, JNEMA.

⁸⁶Annual Report ... JNEMA; Wirth to Karsten, 8 May 1962, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 2592, WHMC; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 7 June 1962, JEFF.

⁸⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 March 1962; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 March 1962; *Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*. . . JEFF.

⁸⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 12 July 1962.

⁸⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 August 1962.

⁹⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 5 March 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 August 1962, JEFF.

⁹¹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 July 1962, JEFF.

⁹²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 September 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM for Director NPS, 12 October 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 November 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 December 1962, JEFF.

⁹³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 July 1962, JEFF; *Thematic Synopsis Museum of Westward Expansion*, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior, June 1962, JEFF.

⁹⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 July 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 September 1962, JEFF; memorandum,

Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 December 1962, JEFF.

⁹⁵Hartzog to H. Raymond Gregg, 16 October 1962, JEFF.

⁹⁶Hartzog to H. Raymond Gregg, 16 October 1962, JEFF.

⁹⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 1 November 1962, JEFF.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹*Ibid.* Earlier in the year George Hartzog considered various plans to reduce costs on the Arch construction through redesign. One consideration was to construct the Arch as a welded steel frame and hang the stainless steel skin on the frame. This would require a redesign of the conveyance system also, so the estimated savings amounted to less than \$1,000,000. Hartzog considered reducing the Arch's height from 630 to 590 feet, which would save \$500,000. Thirdly, he considered bolting the structure rather than welding it. The cost of redesign alone was \$100,000 with re-bidding costs running the same. Fortunately, Hartzog did not have to resort to any of these moves. Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 26 January 1962, JEFF.

¹⁰⁰Telegram, Regional Programs Coordinator to Superintendent JNEM, 2 November 1962, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Regional Director, Midwest Region to Director NPS, 7 November 1962, JEFF.

¹⁰¹Memorandum, Regional Director to Regional Program Coordinator, 21 November 1962, JEFF.

¹⁰²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 1 February 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 February 1963, JEFF.

¹⁰³Estimates of Eero Saarinen and Associates for Completion of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 15 February 1963, JEFF.

¹⁰⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 September 1963.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*; Edward Greensfelder to Wirth, 4 September 1963, JEFF.

¹⁰⁶Memorandum, Chief EODC to Superintendent JNEM, 19 June 1962, JEFF.

¹⁰⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 1 February 1963, JEFF.

¹⁰⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 March 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, 17 May 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 6 September 1963, JEFF.

¹⁰⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 February 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 September 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 November 1963, JEFF.

¹¹⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 February 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1963, JEFF.

¹¹¹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 June 1963, JEFF.

¹¹²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 July 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 August 1963, JEFF.

¹¹³*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 September 1963, JEFF.

¹¹⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 September 1963, JEFF; Status of Development of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 1 September 1963, JEFF.

¹¹⁵Status ... JEFF.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 October 1963, JEFF.

¹¹⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 November 1963, JEFF.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 December 1963, JEFF; Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 January 1964, JEFF.

¹¹⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 January 1964, JEFF.

¹²⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 February 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 March 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 April 1963, JEFF.

¹²¹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1963, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 June 1963, JEFF; Status ... JEFF.

¹²²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 December 1963, JEFF.

¹²³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 February 1964, JEFF.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*; Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 18 March 1964, JEFF; Gregg to Dickmann, 31 March 1964, Bernard F. Dickmann Papers, file No. 8 (3403) WHMC.

¹²⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 18 March 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 April 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 May 1964, JEFF.

¹²⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 April 1964.

¹²⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 May 1964.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 July 1964, JEFF. In July CORE members drew even more attention to their allegations of racial discrimination. Two members, Richard Daly and Percy Green, staged a "climb-in" on the Arch's north leg for

several hours before they were arrested. *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 July 1964.

¹²⁹Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 January 1965, JEFF.

¹³⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 July 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 August 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Assistant Director, Design and Construction to Assistant Secretary, Public Land Management, 19 June 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Assistant Director, Design and Construction to Assistant Secretary, Public Land Management, 29 June 1964, JEFF; Conversation Between Ted Rennison, JNEM, and George Lucko, MWRO, Concerning Construction of the Arch, October 1970, (oral history interview) p. 13, JEFF.

¹³¹Memorandum, Assistant Director, Design and Construction to Assistant Secretary Public Land Management, 2 July 1964, JEFF. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* reported there was no question of the Arch's structural stability and that only its soundness and safety was being reviewed. According to the paper, the review dealt with the question of concrete shrinkage resulting from the earlier problems with the south leg's tensioning rods. The Park Service wanted to be sure that the concrete shrinkage was the same in both legs so their length would remain identical. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 3 July 1964.

¹³²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 October 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 December 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 January 1965, JEFF; Conversation Between ... p. 13, JEFF.

¹³³Annual Report of Rolla W. Streett, President, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 4 June 1964, JNEMA; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 May 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 September 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 October 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 15 December 1964, JEFF.

¹³⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 July 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 December 1964, JEFF.

¹³⁵Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission in St. Louis (draft), 24 November 1964, JEFF. National Park Service Director George Hartzog detailed the donations made to the memorial other than those made by the city and the Terminal Railroad Association: 1958-1961 - fill dirt contributed by general contractors (1,002,100 cubic yards = \$2,304,830); 1959 - top soil contributed by the State of Missouri (2,000 cubic yards = \$10,000); 1961 - Missouri Pacific Railroad for development (\$3,150); 1963 - Laclede Gas Company for orientation film (\$25,000); 1964 - Union Electric Company for development (\$5,000); 1964 - Seedlings Garden Club for landscaping (\$50,000); 1965 - city of Clayton, Missouri for acquisition and renovation of covered wagon (\$1,600). Additionally, the Rabbinical Association of St. Louis indicated to Hartzog that it would contribute \$25,000 for a fountain in the visitor center. The American Iron and Steel Institute and Laclede Gas Company together donated \$100,000 for the film "Monument to the Dream." Much of the utility work was also donated. Union Electric extended a steam line (\$75,000), the Metropolitan Sewer District performed sewer work (\$22,000), and the City Water Division donated work on water mains (\$25,000).

¹³⁶Hartzog to Luther Ely Smith, Jr., (December 1964), JEFF; memorandum, Acting

Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 January 1965, JEFF.

¹³⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 March 1965; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 March 1965; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 9 April 1965. Those testifying, in addition to the congressional delegation, were George Hartzog, Jr., LeRoy Brown, Raymond Tucker, William Crowder, Morton May, Ronald Foulis and Charles Nagle. Annual Report of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 15 June 1965, JEFF.

¹³⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 April 1965.

¹³⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 18 June 1965; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 September 1965; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 October 1965. Some unusual comments were made about the project prior to the House vote. Pennsylvania's Joseph Vigorito stated, "I've seen the Eiffel Tower and I've seen this steel monstrosity in St. Louis. I was appalled. Why don't we just take an old battleship and give it to them to stand on end out there?" *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 October 1965.

¹⁴⁰Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 February 1965, JEFF.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 March 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 April 1965, JEFF.

¹⁴²Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director, 14 April 1965, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 28 April 1965.

¹⁴³Memorandum, Acting Superintendent to Director NPS, 12 May 1965, JEFF.

¹⁴⁴Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 June 1965, JEFF.

¹⁴⁵News Release, National Park Service, 22 June 1965, Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. J 2596, WHMC, *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 29 July 1965.

¹⁴⁶Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 July 1965, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 30 June 1965.

¹⁴⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 14 July 1965; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 11 August 1965.

¹⁴⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 August 1965.

¹⁴⁹Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 July 1965, JEFF; *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, 2 August 1965. LeRoy Brown joined the National Park Service in 1942 and held programming and administration posts in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Omaha. He came to St. Louis in June 1963 as assistant Superintendent of the memorial.

¹⁵⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 August 1965, JEFF.

¹⁵¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 August 1965; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 7 November 1965.

¹⁵²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 7 November 1965.

¹⁵³*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 21 November 1965.

¹⁵⁴Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 September 1965, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 September 1965.

¹⁵⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 21 September 1965.

¹⁵⁶*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 October 1965.

¹⁵⁷Brown to R.K. MacDonald, 24 September 1965, JEFF.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹St. Louis Bicentennial Corporation, Decisions Reached at Meeting of Board of Directors, October 5, 1965 with Mayor Cervantes and the Dedication and Parade Committees, 8 October 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1965, JEFF.

¹⁶⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 5 October 1965; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 October 1965.

¹⁶¹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 October 1965; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1965, JEFF.

¹⁶²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 October 1965; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1965, JEFF.

¹⁶³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 October 1965.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1965, JEFF. For information on the technical engineering aspects of the arch's construction, see: J.E.N. Jensen "A Steel Arch ... Symbol of the Spirit of the Pioneers," *Civil Engineering*, October 1965, pp. 64-69.

¹⁶⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 5 October 1965, JEFF.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 14 January 1964, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 November 1965, JEFF; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to W.A. Johnston, November 1965, JEFF.

¹⁶⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 December 1965, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 November 1965; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 November 1965.

¹⁶⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 December 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 January 1966, JEFF.

¹⁷⁰Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 March 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 May 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 June 1965, JEFF.

¹⁷¹Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 June 1965, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1965, JEFF;

memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 January 1966, JEFF.

¹⁷²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 September 1965.

¹⁷³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 July 1965.

¹⁷⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 January 1966.

¹⁷⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 28 January 1966; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 February 1966.

¹⁷⁶Memorandum, Acting Director NPS to Secretary of the Interior, 17 February 1966.

¹⁷⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 24 March 1966.

¹⁷⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 18 October 1966; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 14 November 1966.

¹⁷⁹Thomas B. Curtis, Stuart Symington to Charles Schultze, 16 November 1966, Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 2598, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 November 1966; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 21 December 1966.

¹⁸⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 11 January 1966.

¹⁸¹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20 January 1966.

¹⁸²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 January 1966.

¹⁸³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 February 1966. The unions involved were: Pipefitters Local 562, Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1, Laborers Union Local 42, and Plumbers Local 35.

¹⁸⁴A secondary boycott is organized by one group against a party to force an action by a third party. The unions were trying to force Hoel-Steffen to stop doing business with E. Smith Plumbing.

¹⁸⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 February 1966. The fifth union, Plumbers Local 35, was not named in this action.

¹⁸⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 February 1966; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 10 February 1966; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 12 February 1966.

¹⁸⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 March 1966, JEFF.

¹⁸⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 March 1966.

¹⁸⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 March 1966.

¹⁹⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 March 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 April 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹¹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS 8 April 1966; *St. Louis Post-*

Dispatch, 8 April 1966.

¹⁹²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 April 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 10 May 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 April 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 August 1966, JEFF. Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, 10 June 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, 21 July 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹⁶*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 23 June 1966.

¹⁹⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 21 July 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 August 1966, JEFF.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 September 1966, JEFF.

²⁰⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 9 November 1966, JEFF.

²⁰¹*Ibid.*

²⁰²Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 December 1966, JEFF.

²⁰³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 January 1967, JEFF.

²⁰⁴*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 December 1966, JEFF; LeRoy Brown to George Gray, 11 July 1974, JEFF.

²⁰⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 February 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 8 April 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, 21 July 1966, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 October 1966, JEFF.

²⁰⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 December 1966.

²⁰⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 January 1967.

²⁰⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 27 April 1967.

²⁰⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 May 1967; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 18 May 1967.

²¹⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 June 1967.

²¹¹William Crowds to Friends and Members of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 19 January 1967, JEFF; *South Side Journal*, 1 March 1967; *St. Louis Post-*

Dispatch, 20 February 1967; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 March 1967; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 March 1967; Mrs. Aloys P. Kaufmann, Mrs. Fred Porterfield to Mr. and Mrs. Dickmann, 21 February, 1967, Bernard F. Dickmann Papers, file No. 13, WHMC; Ronald Foulis to Frank M. Karsten, 20 January 1967, Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 2599, WHMC.

²¹²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 February 1967.

²¹³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 March 1967; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 2 March 1967.

²¹⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 March 1967.

²¹⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 March 1967; Leonor Sullivan to Charles Schultze, 4 December 1967, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 December 1967.

²¹⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 July 1967.

²¹⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 January 1967.

²¹⁸*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20 January 1967.

²¹⁹George B. Hartzog, Jr., to William Crowdus, 30 January 1967, JEFF.

²²⁰*Ibid.*; "Minutes of the Meeting of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission," 3 February 1967, Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 2600, WHMC.

²²¹Press Release from Mayor Alfonso Cervantes, 21 March 1967, JEFF.

²²²Alfonso Cervantes to Kenneth Hyatt, 19 May 1967, JEFF; interview, LeRoy Brown, 17 March 1980.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 11 July 1967.

²²⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 September 1967; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 6 December 1967, JEFF.

²²⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 6 December 1967; William Crowdus to Clinton Anderson, 28 December 17, JNEMA.

²²⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 January 1967; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 February 1967.

²²⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 February 1967, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 March 1967, JEFF.

²²⁸LeRoy Brown, *Conference Summary*, 13 March 1967, JEFF.

²²⁹*Ibid.*

²³⁰Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 February 1967, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 March 1967, JEFF.

²³¹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 March 1967, JEFF; Hartzog to Cervantes, 20 February 1967, JEFF; W. Marvin Watson to Cervantes, 28 February 1967, JEFF.

²³²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 March 1968; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 March 1968.

²³³Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 13 April 1967, JEFF.

²³⁴*Ibid.*

²³⁵*Ibid.*

²³⁶*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 21 April 1967.

²³⁷*Ibid.*; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 May 1967, JEFF.

²³⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 May 1967, JEFF.

²³⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 12 June 1967, JEFF.

²⁴⁰*Ibid.*; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 10 June 1967; memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 11 May 1967, JEFF.

²⁴¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 21 June 1967.

²⁴²Memorandum, Acting Superintendent JNEM to Director NPS, 14 July 1967, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 27 June 1967; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 28 June 1967.

²⁴³Memorandum, W.T. Corbett to Associate Solicitor, 17 July 1967, JEFF.

²⁴⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 July 1967.

²⁴⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 March 1968; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 13 March 1968; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 March 1968. The 17 March *Post-Dispatch* article gives detailed explanations of the transportation system's functions and safety features.

²⁴⁶*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 January 1968.

²⁴⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 January 1968; interview, Richard Bowser, 20 November 1979.

²⁴⁸*Ibid.*

²⁴⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 January 1968; MacDonald Construction Company's largest single appeal dealt with the alleged damage to the Arch's stainless steel sections. Other appeals involved alleged defective workmanship on the concrete steps near the Arch legs, the National Park Service ten-day stop order, and problems concerning the capsule doors on the transportation system. Both the Planet Corporation and Pittsburgh Des-Moines Steel Company filed complaints against MacDonald seeking reimbursement for extra work and delays. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 January 1968.

²⁵⁰*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 January 1968; interview, Richard Bowser, 20 November 1979.

²⁵¹Interview, LeRoy Brown, 17 March 1980; interview, Kramer Chapman, 14 March 1980.

²⁵²Interview, LeRoy Brown, 17 March 1980; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 May 1968. Dr. Harry Pfanz believes that the whole controversy "got a little vicious" and that it is a "story that maybe never will come out." Interview, Dr. Harry Pfanz, 20 November 1979.

²⁵³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 March 1968; Cervantes to Dickmann, 30 April 1968, Bernard F. Dickmann Papers, file No. 14, WHMC.

??? is this a new footnote in the revised edition ??? ??? if so, the last footnote is 256 and not 255 ???

²⁵⁴Plagued with the Vietnam War, Johnson had declined to run for a second full term; Robert F. Kennedy and Vice President Hubert Humphrey tightly contested the Democratic Presidential campaign.

²⁵⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 19 May 1968; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 23 May 1968.

²⁵⁶Interview, Dr. Harry Pfanz, 20 November 1979.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER VIII: 1968-1980

In the years following the Gateway Arch's completion, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial staff members concentrated on two key areas: finishing the memorial according to Saarinen's plan and developing a comprehensive interpretive program. Efforts revolved around landscaping the grounds, opening the Museum of Westward Expansion, and integrating the memorial's interpretive programs into the surrounding community life. Money remained the key to continued development. The shortage of funds delayed the completion of the memorial's essential elements and disputes over priorities sometimes emerged. Being a part of the National Park System dictated that the memorial also be responsive to demands on the system as a whole. The evolution of environmental awareness in the 1970s partly determined the thrust of the memorial's interpretive program, as did the growing accent on the role of parks in urban areas.

St. Louis' congressional representatives worked before and after the dedication ceremonies to obtain more funds for the memorial. After the House-Senate Conference Committee failed in 1967 to appropriate any of the 1965 \$6,000,000 authorization, the representatives and other project boosters cut their request to \$2,900,000 and had a friendly hearing in March 1968 before Representative Julia Butler Hansen's appropriations subcommittee. Mayor Alfonso Cervantes and association member Morton May discussed plans with the subcommittee to use the city's 1967 \$2,000,000 contribution to finish the project as well as using Federal summertime anti-poverty funds to landscape the grounds. [\[1\]](#)

National Park Service Director George Hartzog assured Mayor Cervantes that the St. Louis money would be counted as matching funds and not as a contribution if donated before the Federal Government appropriated its pledge of \$6,000,000. The nation's war expenses once again put the squeeze on the domestic budget, but in May 1968 an Interior Department funds bill passed the House and Senate. Included in it was \$150,000 to be used during 1969 by the National Park Service to plan the Museum of Westward Expansion. As a result of this action and Director Hartzog's assurances, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance in December 1968 authorizing \$1,015,000 in bonds to continue the memorial's underground work. [\[2\]](#)

The shortage of Federal funds not only affected the memorial's construction, but its operation as well. Congressional directives calling for nationwide personnel reductions caused problems for the National Park Service. The agency had orders to eliminate 292 permanent positions out of a total of 6,290. During the five previous years, however, visitation to parks rose 48 percent, but permanent employment only rose 13 percent. Congress additionally authorized 42 new areas and an expanded program of historic preservation. The Park Service attempt to solve the problem resulted in the reduction of some visitor services in their areas

as opposed to lowering standards of service or protection for visitors and resources. [3]

The effect on Jefferson National Expansion Memorial was immediate; the Arch was closed for two days a week starting in October 1968. The Bi-State Development Agency accused the National Park Service of making a unilateral decision in closing the Arch. This constituted a "serious breach of cooperative agreement," because repayment of Bi-State's revenue bonds was based upon a seven-day a week operation. Appeals to their congressional representatives brought no relief, however, and the memorial remained closed two days a week until May 1969. Despite the closing, the transportation system remained ahead of its operating budget for the year. [4]

The outlook for acquiring more funds appeared bleak: President Johnson's budget included no money for the completion of the memorial. [5] Throughout 1969 the memorial remained a secondary priority even in the National Park Service. Their relatively small construction budget had to be stretched nationwide, and the memorial was not at the top of the list. Nevertheless, the project's supporters kept up pressure for more funds. When Representative Julia B. Hansen toured the site in June 1969 Director George Hartzog escorted her. She remarked that Federal funding for fiscal 1971 was contingent upon the completion of designs and plans for the Museum of Westward Expansion. Hartzog expected the contracts for designing and planning to be let in July. [6]

On August 8 the St. Louis Board of Aldermen voted to authorize the sale of \$1,000,000 in general surplus bonds under the 1967 \$2,000,000 matching funds bond issue for the memorial's use. A week later they adopted a resolution asking the Federal Government to meet its commitment. Representative Leonor Sullivan urged newly-elected President Richard M. Nixon to include the \$6,000,000 congressional authorization in his budget to match the city's contribution. Sullivan also informed Nixon that because Federal funds had not been forthcoming, the trustees of the Albert P. Greensfelder Trust had withdrawn their offer of \$750,000 for the museum's completion. [7]

The Arch remained mired in a sea of mud, since no funds were available for landscaping. Many St. Louisans considered the landscaping to be a substantial factor in the city's face lifting and resurgence. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* claimed that the city and its visitors were "victims of Washington procrastination." [8] Superintendent Leroy Brown defended his agency's actions by explaining that much work remained to be done before surface landscaping could begin. Underground utilities, a water distribution system, lighting, storm drainage, rough grading — all were mandatory before landscaping. He felt that priorities lay in the interior work in the underground area. The newspaper did not agree with him. In its opinion, the underground museum could be put off, with the landscaping and planting coming first. [9] This conflict over priorities continued throughout the rest of the decade and for the first half of the next.

Exhausted from his duties in successfully supervising the Arch construction, LeRoy Brown moved in the fall of 1968 from St. Louis to Omaha, Nebraska, to become the assistant regional director in charge of operations in the Midwest regional office. Dr. Harry W. Pfanz, who had been assistant superintendent at the memorial since August 1966, became the sixth superintendent in December 1968. [10]

Superintendent Pfanz's immediate attention in the new year was drawn to the riverfront, where mooring space had become a prime commodity. Existing attractions included a World War II minesweeper, three excursion vessels, a floating museum-restaurant, a heliport-marina, and a showboat, with several more proposals looming in the immediate future. A reconstructed three-deck sternwheeler restaurant, the *Lt. Robert E. Lee*, was an expected addition in August 1969, a reproduction of the *Santa Maria* would arrive in March, the

Southwest Regional Port District proposed to place a World War II submarine directly east of the Arch on the Illinois side, and a possibility existed that the *Delta Queen* would come to St. Louis to moor permanently upon its scheduled retirement in late 1970. Yet another proposal called for a huge bo-tel (boat-hotel) complex to be placed on the levee immediately north of the Poplar Street Bridge. [11]

A cooperative agreement between the city and Federal Government regulated the quality of development on the riverfront. Signed in 1961 by Mayor Tucker and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, the agreement's Article II (b) stated that the city of St. Louis agreed to maintain the riverfront in a manner that would not interfere with the memorial's purpose and objectives. The city also agreed to consult with the secretary of the interior before granting any use of the street or levee for other than street and railroad purposes. Further, no permanent structures could be built or placed on the levee without the joint agreement of the city and the secretary. [12] Superintendent Pfanz used these criteria to judge whether the proposed attractions would be given permits to moor on the riverfront. He recommended to Mayor Cervantes that permission to moor the bo-tel be denied because its design was not compatible with the riverfront's historic character. Further, it would complicate traffic and parking problems in front of the memorial. The city agreed and the project died. [13]

The controversy over the *Santa Maria*, a reproduction of Christopher Columbus' flagship, was not as easily solved. Its backers sought a permit from the city to moor the ship east of the Arch on the riverfront, a proposal that conflicted with National Park Service policy. To keep the area aesthetically pleasing, the Park Service decreed that no commercial interest or boat could be anchored within 100 feet of lines running east to the riverbank from both legs of the Arch. This established an 830-foot long open space along the river. Since the *Santa Maria* enjoyed the support of many city officials (including the mayor), a meeting was held in the mayor's office in an attempt to solve the impasse. City officials, the ship owners, and the National Park Service finally agreed to moor the vessel the required 100 feet south of the south leg of the Arch. The National Park Service policy stood, and continued to influence peripheral development. [14]

The memorial's boundaries underwent a redefinition in September 1969, when Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel established new boundaries to conform to the memorial's actual dimensions. Since 1935, the Park Service used a boundary description included in a letter to President Roosevelt from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. When acquisition occurred the Federal Government bought property outside the boundaries described in Ickes' letter. The new boundaries were necessary to assure that the Old Courthouse and some property along the riverfront were included in the site, as they were not recognized as such back in 1935. As a result of the change the memorial acquired a more perfect description on paper. [15]

Concern over the Old Courthouse did not end with assuring its legal inclusion within the memorial. As downtown St. Louis rebuilt itself, National Park Service officials worried that construction adjacent to the old building was inflicting damage. Ground displacement during pile driving at Broadway, Fourth and Market Streets produced vibrations that were felt by employees inside the Old Courthouse. This raised questions as to whether the vibrations negatively affected the building's dome structure. One hundred and twenty-one vibration observations were measured between September 26 and October 28, 1969, but the vibrations only registered .026 in/sec, well within the safe zone. [16] After 130 years the building still stood secure. As if to draw the city's attention to this fact, the National Park Service decided to install exterior lighting on the building in December 1969. [17]

East St. Louis Planning

During the last year of the memorial's most active decade, proposals concerning expanding

the memorial to the east riverbank were still being considered. National Park Service Historian John Bond finished a comprehensive history of the East St. Louis, Illinois, waterfront in January 1969, and Superintendent Pfanz followed in LeRoy Brown's footsteps by meeting with representative groups from that city regarding development. Several problems immediately became apparent to Pfanz and other Park Service officials involved with these negotiations. Even though they met with supposed representative local civic government and business interests, the city's black populace was not represented. CORE members took the floor in one meeting protesting this fact, and National Park Service officials were concerned over the lack of input from the black community. Pfanz did not think the situation promising because there seemed to be no purpose other than the idea of improving East St. Louis; no direction, no cohesiveness, and no money. The city suffered from a variety of ills and it appeared that any Park Service project would primarily be one of beautification to complement the west side of the memorial. This type of development would most assuredly be questioned. Further, many of the representatives present at the meetings failed to comprehend the National Park Service's purpose or planning process. They viewed the east side proposal as a local promotion without regarding its national significance. Since 126 different studies had been done in the city without any tangible results Park Service officials believed they had neither the time nor funds to undertake a study unless they meant to carry it through. [18]

By May 1970 a Park Service study team completed a report on alternatives for developing the East St. Louis riverfront. Final recommendations would come from Washington after the report moved through administrative channels, but the agency made no commitments to East St. Louis. Any large scale development required relocating railroad facilities. In October the Park Service made public a preliminary report in draft form suggesting four alternatives for the east side: a state park, an extension of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, a national Urban Demonstration Park administered by the National Park Service, and a city park. The urban demonstration park proposal received immediate endorsement from local interests because no local or state money existed for the city or state park alternatives. The National Park Service would make no formal recommendation for the proposal unless it obtained popular support. The Regional Industrial Development Corporation believed the urban demonstration park proposal to hold the potential to stimulate the East St. Louis economy. Extending the memorial to the east side did not carry the same potential, since it involved developing only a narrow strip of land. [19]

History repeated itself on the riverfront. Further development depended upon local support, moving railroad tracks, and balancing the interests of the national and local governments. Once again local interests concentrated on immediate financial benefits and saw the development only in the light of sparking an economic rebirth. East St. Louisans hoped to emulate St. Louis' success story. St. Louis had waited more than thirty years for its initial investment to deliver benefits, however, and East St. Louisans would realize in the coming decade how complex their investment would have to be to make any sort of progress on their riverfront.

Further Construction Concerns

The new decade brought some promise that Congress would grant a limited amount of funds for the memorial's continued development. Even though St. Louis had just appropriated \$1,015,000 of its \$2,000,000 contribution, President Nixon's budget did not reflect its share of the three to one ratio. The 1971 Interior Department and Related Agencies Appropriation Act would give the memorial only \$700,000. The National Park Service's priority for the year lay in completing more facilities inside the visitor center/museum complex, including an administrative area (locker rooms, restrooms, showers, storage, public sales area), a lobby extension, the north theater with projection equipment, sound system, screen, and seating,

and electrical, heating, and air conditioning equipment by 1971. [20]

In an effort to improve the appearance of the memorial grounds, the National Wildlife Federation in December 1969 offered to solicit \$400,000 of public funds for purchasing trees and shrubs. Instead of waiting for Federal appropriations, the federation would arrange for nurserymen to supply the trees and shrubs to the National Park Service at wholesale rates whenever the money was raised. Soon after this offer, the Park Service decided to use part of the city's contribution for planting trees on the grounds opposite the north and south legs of the Arch. Specifications called not only for tree planting, but grading, drainage of the grounds, seeding, and sodding. Four thousand trees of 22 varieties were to be planted, with half the ground grading being finished in 1970. [21]

The Park Service received five bids for the work, but rejected them in April 1970 when they far exceeded the Government's estimate of \$345,600. The lowest bid submitted stood at \$630,525. Park Service officials then proposed to reduce the work's scope by eliminating the planting items from the bid schedule and re-advertising for the grading and drainage immediately. A separate contract would be re-advertised later to allow for planting in the fall of 1970. The National Wildlife Federation's fund drive was delayed by the Park Service action in rejecting the bids, but the group wanted to launch their fundraising drive soon, retaining their goal. [22]

While waiting for the bid re-advertisement, Superintendent Pfanz dealt with opposition from local nurserymen who asserted that the Park Service's choices of trees would not survive St. Louis air pollution or the toxic riverfront dirt because of its heavy industrial use for 100 years. Pfanz thus had the contract specifications provide that the dirt not be filled with concrete or junk. [23] The principal tree to be planted was the tulip tree, and representatives of local nurserymen's associations, and state, city, and arboretum officials continued to insist that the tulip tree be replaced by other varieties. The National Park Service was thus caught in a sensitive position. If the tulip tree were used the Park Service would have to convincingly defend the tree because of public image and the fact that the work was financed by local money. Local attitudes would have an important affect on the success of the upcoming National Wildlife Federation campaign. [24]

The contract for the first phase of the landscaping went to Kozeny-Wagner, Incorporated of St. Louis in June 1970. City of St. Louis matching funds provided funds totaling \$474,064. Work specified included grading, seeding, drainage, and other improvements. The concrete roof of the visitor center leaked; it was repaired and recovered with dirt and grass seed. Bids on planting trees were sought later in the summer. When they were, the contract would call for pin oaks to be planted along the walkways surrounding the Arch. The National Park Service changed its mind about the pin oak, however, after consulting with professional botanical sources. [25] The decision to proceed with the landscaping constituted a change in priorities. Superintendent LeRoy Brown had insisted that the money be spent on the Grand Staircase and museum to accommodate the growing number of visitors. After the city released its money for the landscaping, however, that work became the priority.

Even though construction priorities and plans remained flexible, National Park Service policy concerning the riverfront did not. For several years Captains Roy and William Streckfus requested that two 20 foot openings be left in the street retaining wall along the east side of the redeveloped levee opposite their commercial operation, the *Admiral*. This request, first made in 1962, allowed them to lay gang planks on the Wharf Street curb to take on and discharge passengers during periods of high water on the river. Park Service and city officials considered the request and decided they could not comply because the levee was a part of the memorial's overall development. The openings would not be compatible with Eero Saarinen's symmetrical designs. The Park Service made efforts to give Captain Roy Streckfus special

consideration. Mooring rings were installed in the levee for his use. Also, in the late 1950s, development plans had eliminated Washington Avenue so that the memorial would extend to Eads Bridge, but largely through Captain Streckfus' efforts, the National Park Service changed its plans and kept the street in the memorial development. [26]

In 1968 Captain William Streckfus made the request for the openings again. Superintendent Brown believed that more access to the levee was needed as additional operations were authorized, but sharp disagreement with this view came from National Park Service Chief Staff Architect John Cabot. Eero Saarinen had intensively studied the levee's design, and its character affected the total memorial. Cabot believed that installing a breach in the levee wall on the north end would require a similar one on the south end since the design of the Mississippi riverfront elevation was one of strict symmetry, centering on the center of the Arch. Any breach would destroy the original design. Cabot believed that the levee adequately provided vehicular parking and that special pedestrian access was not needed. [27]

There was no change in this standoff situation until 1970, when a National Park Service staff member found that a ten-foot gap had been opened in the wall between Wharf Street and the levee opposite the north overlook. It seemed apparent that the gap was opened to provide access for the *Admiral's* customers during high water. Since the wall belonged to the city of St. Louis, Superintendent Pfanz could do nothing except inform the director of streets, who, in Pfanz's opinion, seemed concerned about the political ramifications of taking action against the Streckfus Steamers Company. Two and one-half weeks passed before Mayor Alfonso Cervantes was told of the breach, and even then, no action ensued. [28]

The St. Louis business community remained very interested in and involved with the memorial's planning, construction, and operations. In the five years since the Arch's completion, downtown St. Louis underwent a massive redevelopment. Estimates placed the total of new private and public development at more than \$700 million. [29] The memorial's construction and development as a cultural and historical resource spurred community involvement and interest.

While planning continued on the Museum of Westward Expansion, the National Park Service initiated new services and exhibits in the Old Courthouse. Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association money paid for the installation of a Great Plains farming exhibit in the building in 1967. Two more exhibit rooms opened in 1971. One featured an exhibit of the memorial's development while the other, a nineteenth century spinning, weaving, and quilting room, featured volunteers in period costumes. Landmark legislation in 1970 allowed volunteers to complement the work of the National Park Service's paid staff. Volunteers could not replace full-time permanent, or seasonal and part-time park staff members, nor could they be used in maintenance; but they could serve as living history interpreters and guides. [30] The "Volunteers in Park" program effectively allowed the memorial to expand its interpretive services to the public.

The emphasis on environmental awareness and pollution control in the early 1970s led to the establishment of environmental education programs at the memorial. Staff members developed and presented four types of programs. The first was the National Environment Education Development Program (NEED), a curriculum-integrated program designed to help teachers make ecological principles a central core of their teaching. The curriculum was being used in National Park Service areas on a trial basis, because the materials were still in a developmental stage in 1970. Second was the Gateway National Environmental Study Area (NESA), a cooperative environmental education venture between specific National Park Service areas and local educational communities. In a third program, natural and cultural sites were used by day for school environmental education programs, with materials developed for each study area by local memorial personnel and school systems. Summer

outdoor adventures provided inner city children with the chance to experience natural environments. The fourth program was General Aid to Environmental Education, which enabled the memorial staff to visit schools, assist with beautification projects, and provide workshops for teachers. During the summer of 1970 memorial staff members cooperated with the Missouri Botanical Garden in taking 1,450 inner city school children to the arboretum for environmental education. As if to underscore the memorial staff's attempts to bring environmental awareness to the St. Louis community, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association sponsored a ceremony on June 24, 1970, to dedicate the Luther Ely Smith Memorial Square east of the Old Courthouse. [31]

Further development depended upon President Nixon's budget; he requested \$770,000 to continue work on the memorial in 1972. This included \$140,000 for planning, lighting, and site improvements, plus \$630,000 for the continuance of rough grading that was already underway in 1971. The memorial received this money in a Department of the Interior appropriations act. [32] Along with the promise of more construction funds in 1971, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial received a new superintendent in January. Dr. Harry Pfanz moved to Washington, D.C., to head the Eastern Service Center's office of history and historic architecture, and Ivan Parker, a former St. Louisan, took over. [33]

The new superintendent continued the construction in 1971. Kozeny-Wagner Inc. received another contract on April 9, 1971, for \$553,200.54 to complete the underground visitor center's north theater, an extension of the main lobby, north and south administrative areas, a concessionaire area, and fountain equipment alterations. The project was scheduled for completion in June 1972. The National Park Service's 1971 fiscal year construction appropriation and City of St. Louis matching funds provided the money. The Millstone Associates Construction Company of St. Louis reserved a contract on June 30, 1971, for \$546,010 to provide 280 tree wells, north and south overlook walkways, concrete benches, lighting, irrigation work, and topsoil for the area. Trees purchased by the city's appropriated funds were scheduled to be planted in the spring of 1972 after the irrigation system and grading was accomplished. The city's plans effectively served to stall the National Wildlife Federation's "Trees for the Arch" program. Political considerations dictated that Superintendent Parker agree to the city reforestation program. In late January 1972 National Park Service officials planned with the federation to hold their program during the summer of 1972 after the city's program, but these plans never materialized. [34] The National Park Service, due to delays and conflicts, did not utilize the National Wildlife Federation's aid offer, like the Greensfelder Trust offer before it, in the memorial's planning.

Old Cathedral Controversy

Another conflict concerning the memorial grounds in 1971 strained the relationship between the National Park Service and the Old Cathedral church hierarchy. Bishop Joseph A. McNicholas, pastor of the Old Cathedral, requested that the cathedral's parking lot on the memorial grounds be expanded to solve the parking problems that occurred whenever special masses were held at the site. Superintendent Parker initiated a study of the lot to determine the feasibility of the request to extend the lot for 100 feet toward Poplar Street. He discussed the matter with the Washington, regional, and service center offices as well as the executive committee of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association. Their findings revealed that the major demand for the lot came on Sundays, Friday evenings and Saturday mornings, times which were off-demand periods for the surrounding commercial and private parking facilities. Nearly 400 spaces, requiring three and a half to four acres of memorial land, were needed in the cathedral lot to alleviate the problem, and Parker thought the proposition incompatible with the proper use of the land. Therefore, all the parties consulted believed the parking lot should not be extended. [35]

Bishop McNicholas approached Representative Leonor Sullivan in an attempt to change the National Park Service's decision. Sullivan thought the request reasonable, so LeRoy Brown, now director of the Park Service's Eastern Service Center, explained that if they approved the parking lot they would be constructing free parking to compete with the pay lots from which the memorial used income for capital improvements. Despite this explanation, Representative Sullivan wrote the association, asking the reason for their objection. Their answer was that they agreed unanimously that no request for parking on the site should be granted and had just passed a resolution stating so in November 1970. [36]

The association's executive committee agreed to meet with Bishop McNicholas in an attempt to solve the problem. If they did not succeed in finding a satisfactory solution, both Superintendent Parker and Director George Hartzog would recommend abolishing the existing Old Cathedral lot because of the availability of nearby parking and because of the traffic hazards involved. The executive committee and the bishop met on June 5, 1972. McNicholas' presentation detailed his reasons for requesting the parking lot's extension 150 feet south to provide an additional eighty spaces. The executive committee then voted eight to one to recommend to the National Park Service that the existing lot be enlarged. [37]

After this action, Superintendent Parker had his employees conduct an on-site study of the overcrowding situation. Results showed that overcrowding occurred only during one or two short periods, and that the lot remained free of congestion most of the time on Sunday mornings. He told Colonel I.A. Long, president of the association, that the land involved was part of a national memorial, and that the National Park Service had an obligation, not only to St. Louisans, but also to all people, to manage the land for the benefit of all. Environmental Protection Agency approval and possible public meetings would be necessary if the lot were extended. Therefore, to preserve the architectural and historical integrity of the memorial, Superintendent Parker disapproved any extension to the existing parking lot. [38]

Bishop McNicholas was stunned by the news. He believed that it was the executive committee's opposition he had to sway, only to have their decision overruled by the National Park Service. The "blatant threat" to close the lot entirely was a proviso for which it was beneath McNicholas' dignity to respond. He now had the executive committee's approval but not the National Park Service's to proceed. The situation remained unresolved. [39] Superintendent Parker requested that Regional Director J. Leonard Volz review the case and make an independent decision. Until the decision was made, Parker had his staff provide assistance in regulating unauthorized use of the lot by non-parishioners. Bishop McNicholas protested once again in March 1973, when the Park Service planted trees on the property south of the cathedral parking lot. Although this action enhanced the site's beauty, it was obvious to McNicholas that the trees' existence would later be used against any extension of the parking lot. Parker explained that the trees were donated and planted by St. Louis nurserymen without the Park Service's immediate supervision. Parker had his maintenance staff move the trees to where they would not be a factor in the final decision on the parking lot. [40]

Another potential change in the memorial's boundaries received increasingly greater attention in 1971. The preliminary study report on the East St. Louis, Illinois, riverfront moved through the various offices within the National Park Service for comment and consideration. Midwest Regional Director Volz recommended to Director Hartzog that the Park Service proceed with a further study based on the alternate plan calling for the 50-acre extension of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. He believed the concept should be enlarged so the 50 acres would be an integral part of other development within the total study area of 300 acres. The Park Service would have the primary development responsibility for the 50 acres with the remaining area to be jointly planned and developed by Federal, state, and local agencies. Volz stressed that any Park Service proposal should hinge on the remaining area's adequate

planning and development. Additionally, any Park Service proposal could not proceed without the area's present facilities (railroads, grain elevator, etc.) being removed by other than National Park Service funding. If Director Hartzog concurred in the recommendation, Volz would schedule a detailed master plan-type study by the Western Service Center for the area. [41]

Representative Melvin Price (Illinois) then requested drafting a bill proposing an authorization for a 50-acre extension of the memorial. Because the National Park Service deputy director believed the proposal would receive sufficient support to justify the programming of a master plan study, he told Volz on April 23 to begin the work in anticipation of the need for legislative support data early in 1973. [42]

The Department of Transportation announced in September that \$400,000 could be spent in determining whether the railroads along the East St. Louis riverfront could be relocated. Other projects besides the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial extension had been suggested for the site (including R. Buckminster Fuller's \$500 million geodesic domed city), and all were dependent upon the railroads' removal. The site was selected for the study under the direction of the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council, which hired private consultants to conduct it. The Department of Transportation supplied \$335,000 for the work, the Department of Housing and Urban Development \$30,000, and state of Illinois, \$35,000. [43]

Representative Price's bill (H.R. 8561) for enlarging the memorial came up before Representative Wayne Hays' Committee on House Administration in September. The assistant secretary of the interior requested, however, that action on the bill be deferred until the area received comprehensive study. Completion of the master plan was not expected until 1973, so National Park Service officials could not yet determine the potential or feasibility of adding the acreage. [44]

Two other factors in addition to Price's bill, the Department of Transportation study and the Park Service's in-depth analysis of the site, contributed to the attention on East St. Louis. Director Hartzog indicated that he supported the riverfront park idea in a St. Louis speech, and East St. Louis voted in a new mayor, James Williams, who wanted progress and not just "studies" for his city. [45] To back up his words, he offered to contribute \$25,000 from Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds available to East St. Louis to complete the master plan. Superintendent Parker indicated the National Park Service's willingness to accept the funds, and he prepared management objectives to provide guidance to any architectural/engineering firm to whom the Park Service would award the contract. [46]

The pressure was now on the National Park Service to accelerate the study's timetable. Both Representative Melvin Price and Illinois Senator Charles A. Percy questioned their request for deferment of Price's bill and the fiscal 1974 expected funding of the study. Both stressed moving ahead with the study. Percy believed that despite the increased local preparations, Federal interest and involvement was vital for real progress. Further, Percy believed that the "Establishment of the National Park Service area in East St. Louis would, from all indications, catalyze development along the riverfront and provide needed employment opportunities." [47]

Superintendent Parker made arrangements with Mayor Williams for the authorization of the \$25,000 donation to be used for a development and conceptual plan. The analysis would consider what the interpretive program should contain, what developments would best complement the memorial, and what would be the most advantageous to the community and to the nation in terms of historical preservation and interpretation. The plan was vital for

congressional review in consideration of the bill to extend the memorial. [\[48\]](#)

At the year's end the movement toward extending Jefferson National Expansion Memorial seemed to have gained enough impetus to push it toward a successful conclusion. New leadership in East St Louis and a contribution of funds, National Park Service commitment to contract an in-depth study, and Department of Transportation efforts to move the railroads, all promised to change the face of East St. Louis. But the studies would turn out to be mere paper; no progress would be made. Negative financial and political considerations in the next few years served to kill the project.

Museum Contract

The National Park Service met more success in its efforts to complete its interpretive message as manifested in the Museum of Westward Expansion. The Potomac Group of Washington, D.C. held the contract to design the museum, and the memorial's supporters met to examine the firm's design directive. Members of the Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, and the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission (which had not met since 1967) met in St. Louis on June 2, 1971, with National Park Service Director George Hartzog, Jr., and Potomac Group's chief of design Aram Mardirosian, who made a presentation of his proposed design plan for the museum. [\[49\]](#) The story of the West, the land itself, and the different people who came to know it became the interpretive purpose of the Museum of Westward Expansion. Its overall objectives were: to meet the needs and interests of visitors of all ages and backgrounds; communicate the museum's purpose and enable the visitor to set his/her own course and pace in experiencing the museum; communicate both a sense of history and a sense of the randomness of events within the infinite spectrum of the overall story; and the introduction of relevant temporary exhibits. [\[50\]](#)

More specifically, the museum was to tell the story from the point of view of the different people involved in the acquisition and settlement of the West. Visitors would be able to identify directly with the people in the story by either being placed in the role of a particular person or by participating in a particular historic situation as a contemporary observer. Within each category of people involved in the West (Indians, Soldiers, Settlers, etc.), the various parts of the story were to be told from different points of view: groups (expeditions, tribes, troops), typical individuals (corporal, farmer, miner), and specific individuals (George A. Custer, Thomas Jefferson). Particular situations and historic events were described in the words of their participants or contemporaries. Contemporary photographs would be used, with the images of historic events and the people involved to be exhibited life size. A sense of time and place in history would be furnished by a chronological order in the design and the relative order of material with respect to other exhibit subjects and material. The natural face of the land would be presented by the use of photographs, plants, and animals. Finally, the museum space would present a sense of order regarding the subject and exhibit material. Its design would provide a changing, essentially unlimited number of different views and experiences and would provide a broad range of opportunities for the visitor to view both the exhibit material and live performances in a relaxed manner. [\[51\]](#) Aram Mardirosian utilized most of the research prepared by the memorial's staff historians in the 1960s; their work provided the factual base around which Mardirosian developed his unique, indeed radical, museum design in 1972.

Additional funds were needed before the museum could be built, but National Park Service personnel proceeded with planning in anticipation of completing the memorial. The staff especially concentrated on continuing development in 1972 in commemoration of the National Park Service's 100th anniversary. Many special interpretive programs were planned and executed in honor of the centennial. Events ranged from St. Louis Symphony Orchestra

concerts on the Arch grounds to the opening of a fur trade post exhibit room in the Old Courthouse. By 1972 fifty volunteers offered their time in the building's exhibit rooms. Profits from the historical association's gift shop sales paid for repainting the Old Courthouse first floor rooms and East Courtroom, and carpeting the Homestead and Louisiana Purchase rooms. Staff members established an environmental education room in the Old Courthouse for teacher workshops and school classes, and hosted NEED and NESA workshops. The Missouri Botanical Garden's Arboretum was designated as a National Environmental Education Landmark in October with the memorial staff's planning help. Almost 100,000 inner-city children participated in environmental education programs at the Arch, Babler Park, and the arboretum. [52]

Continued construction on the grounds in 1972 culminated in the completion of the north and south sidewalks, and landscaping along them. Eight hundred trees were planted by the Suburban Landscapers of St. Louis County along the walkways and the slopes leading to the riverfront. No oaks were planted, only black pine, redbud, and white and rose hill ash trees. Final landscaping plans were to be developed in 1973 through a contract awarded in 1972 to Harland Bartholomew and Associates for \$78,430. The firm was to prepare comprehensive design plans, construction drawings, specifications, and cost estimates for completing site grading, sealing the decorative ponds, irrigation system, walk and walkways, paving the overlook, topsoil and seeding, and extending required utilities to service any future construction. [53]

The north theater in the visitor center opened on May 13, 1972, to show "Monument to the Dream" and "Time of the West." Its operation proved to be a successful addition to the memorial's interpretive programming. Superintendent Parker attempted to increase the memorial's interpretive services further by advocating reconstruction of the Manuel Lisa Warehouse (Old Rock House), the stones of which had been stored in the basement of the Old Courthouse since 1959. Association board members suggested rebuilding the structure for the nation's bicentennial in 1976, and Parker sent their request through Park Service channels for restoration funds. [54]

President Nixon's 1973 fiscal year budget provided \$900,000 for the memorial, which was only slightly larger than the 1972 appropriation. After the 1973 Interior Department and Related Agencies Appropriation Act granted the money, there still remained \$3,480,000 to be appropriated from the 1965 \$6,000,000 authorization. The city of St. Louis still held \$985,000 to be appropriated as soon as Federally appropriated funds reached the correct ratio. Superintendent Parker hoped to use any additional funds received over the \$900,000 for the Museum of Westward Expansion. Representative Leonor Sullivan kept up the pressure for more funds by writing Representative Julia Butler Hansen, chairman of the Interior House Appropriations subcommittee, seeking an appropriation of \$2,500,000 for the museum. Hansen sympathized and hoped that the amount would be included in the next appropriations schedule. [55]

Not only did the museum's completion depend upon future funding, but the East St. Louis, Illinois, proposal could not get off the ground without a financial commitment from the National Park Service. By January 1972, Superintendent Parker completed a management statement and planning management objectives for the East St. Louis extension. The Old Courthouse would serve as the extension's administrative headquarters. Visitor use of the area would be limited to picnic facilities and a visitor center, providing a presentation of river ecology and the history of human relationship to the river. Interpretation would consist of living history presentations and the use of the facilities for community cultural activities. The Park Service's Midwest regional director approved the plans. [56]

On May 24, 1972, East St. Louis city officials passed a resolution authorizing the city council

to enter into a contract with the National Park Service to develop the plan upon which to base congressional legislation for the riverfront's development. The resolution also authorized the appropriation of \$25,000 to pay for the consultant services. [57] As the summer passed, however, more problems developed which caused delay. The National Park Service's Denver Service Center worked to develop a scope of work acceptable to the outside architectural/engineering firm, R.W. Booker and Associates of St. Louis, which was to do the work. Only then could Superintendent Parker go to East St. Louis city officials for their approval and release of funds. By August, Mayor Williams asked Parker if he could hold up requesting the money for six weeks because the city was in a financial bind. Parker assured Williams that he could because of the need to finish negotiations on the scope of the work. Near the end of September the East St. Louis planning director wanted to know how much money the Park Service would provide for the master plan contract, because the city had several emergency projects for which they would use the \$25,000. [58]

These developments effectively set back the master plan's completion date from 1973 to 1974. Even though Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton visited the site in September 1972, the consulting firm was not scheduled to begin work on the plan for weeks. In January 1973, Representative Melvin Price introduced a bill into the House (H.R. 2379) authorizing the secretary of the interior to enlarge the memorial by not more than fifty acres in East St. Louis, Illinois. As R.W. Booker and Associates worked on the project during 1973, several problems arose concerning the size of the area to be considered and other minor matters. These were settled, but helped add to the delay in completion. [59]

In October 1973, Mayor Williams met with a representative from R.W. Booker and Associates, who presented him and other city and National Park Service officials with the results of his firm's planning studies. John Brancaglione displayed various plans and pictures of the proposed development. The central feature was an amphitheater that could be open or covered with a roof. The levee would provide a sculptured effect with fountains, pools, and lookouts to view the Arch. All facilities would be symmetrical on an east-west axis centered on the Arch. The riverbank would be sloped and covered with cobblestones, matching the west side. The entire extension area comprised sixty acres, and the use of portions of the land owned by private industry could be deferred until their facilities were moved. Mayor Williams was pleased with the proposal, and immediately instructed his subordinates to initiate zoning ordinance changes for the land. [60]

Museum v. Grounds Controversy

While all the planning continued, funding did not. President Nixon's budget for fiscal year 1974 contained no funds for work on the memorial. The chances for getting any money included in the Department of the Interior appropriation bill were slim despite the fact that work remained to be done on the visitor center, museum, landscaping, and pedestrian bridges. [61] In 1973, memorial employees were using the excavated cavern that was to house the museum as a parking lot. In an attempt to obtain funds for the museum, Superintendent Parker took members of the Ways and Means Committee of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen on a tour of the cavern. Parker hoped they would approve a bill authorizing the sale of the remaining \$985,000 in city bonds. On June 8 the aldermen unanimously voted in favor of the bill, which made Parker believe that the money could be in National Park Service hands by September. He wanted to proceed with contract specifications and bid requests by September 1, and he made a commitment to the Ways and Means Committee that the National Park Service would do this. To have the museum finished by 1976, work would have to start soon. [62]

The director of the Denver Service Center objected to the aldermen's action in providing funds explicitly for the museum. If no firm commitment had yet been given to the city, then

he considered the completion of landscape construction to be a more immediate objective. Parker disagreed. The city's \$985,000 municipal bond issue could not singly complete construction of the museum, but Parker believed that when parking lot, historical association, and other funds were added to the city's money, enough would be available to finish the museum. Further, Representative Sullivan, the Board of Aldermen, and other civic leaders wished to have the museum completed by 1976. [63]

Superintendent Parker saw no way in which the National Park Service would spend the money on any other project than that approved by the aldermen. Irreparable damage to the memorial's relationship with the city would result. The aldermen would not even discuss applying the funds for anything other than the museum. Plans for the museum were complete; all that was needed were the bids, obtainable as soon as the funds were available in mid- October. Parker saw the only other alternative as giving the money back to the city, indicating a decision on Regional Director Volz's part that the funds should be spent on the grounds. Another factor was \$500,000 in capital improvement funds from Bi-State Development Agency. Since payment of the bond issue exceeded the schedule by a year and a half, the fund had grown. Parker made an agreement with Bi-State's director that these funds could be used for the museum. In short, Parker kept the grounds green and planted the donated trees, but he wanted the museum. [64]

Unfortunately, the acting regional director supported the Denver Service Center's position that the grounds work should be finished before the museum. Parker asserted that he had proceeded with discussions with St. Louis Mayor John Poelker and the Board of Aldermen, had showed them the cavern, and had extensive media coverage of his actions because he was under the impression from past correspondence that the regional office and the service center concurred in constructing the museum if the city donated the \$985,000. What seemed to Parker now as a shift in attitude on his superiors' part left him in an awkward position. The repercussions from such a reversal could be embarrassing for the National Park Service. He asked Regional Director Volz to reconsider. [65]

In actuality, the Denver Service Center staff had no objections to proceed with one project over the other. But they, along with Regional Director Volz, saw no logic in proceeding with the museum construction and having two incomplete projects existing simultaneously. Since large amounts of money other than Federal appropriations were involved, Volz wrote to both Mayor John Poelker and Representative Sullivan asking their preference. He explained to them that he had reviewed construction cost estimates and logical construction priorities and sequencing with Harland Bartholomew and Associates, who agreed with him in recommending that the site construction projects costing \$1,563,000 proceed first. Volz anticipated having \$1,626,000 in construction funds available for the work. The museum construction costs were estimated at \$1,300,000, with exhibits estimated at another \$1,300,000. Thus the museum construction costs, site development costs, and anticipated fund availability were about equal. Availability of funds for the exhibits remained uncertain. Volz asked for Poelker's and Sullivan's recommendations in light of these statistics. [66] Mayor Poelker based his reply on politics. The Board of Aldermen had recently passed an ordinance authorizing the sale of the bonds after the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee advised them that the money would be used for completing the Museum of Westward Expansion. The bonds were scheduled to be sold on September 18, 1973, and an appropriation ordinance would have to follow to make the funds available. Poelker stated simply, "I see little likelihood that the Board of Aldermen will pass the appropriation ordinance unless it is specified that the funds be used for the completion of the Museum of Westward Expansion." [67]

Both Regional Director Volz and Mayor Poelker held the same objectives regarding the memorial; both wanted it to be outstanding. The same problem had emerged again, one that

had plagued the memorial in previous years, that of differing methods to achieve the same end. Volz's main concern remained priorities. He wanted to avoid having an empty museum structure for any length of time, preferring to construct the museum and its exhibits at the same time. Only a congressional appropriation could make this a reality. Volz believed the grounds should be finished to place the Arch in a proper beautiful setting, because the memorial staff already offered many interpretive services and activities to the public. Volz also had fifty other National Park Service areas in the region to consider for funding besides the memorial. [68]

Two weeks later, on September 20, 1973, Regional Director Volz informed Mayor Poelker that the National Park Service would proceed with the museum's construction, giving it priority over other memorial projects. Volz appreciated Poelker offering the advice that the Board of Aldermen probably would not pass the appropriation ordinance unless the funds were used for the museum. At the same time, Volz wanted Poelker to know the rationale by which the Park Service arrived at its priorities and to also realize that the Park Service was not acting arbitrarily. [69] On the next day, September 21, the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, meeting in St. Louis, adopted a resolution that Congress appropriate the remaining Federal authorization of \$3,480,000, and that the National Park Service assign priority to the use of the funds for the museum's completion. Senator Clinton P. Anderson had retired the previous year; Representative Leonor Sullivan now chaired the Commission. [70] The resolution sufficiently illustrated Sullivan's views on the priority question. The National Park Service heard the message; all available funds would go toward museum construction. [71]

Although the museum versus grounds controversy ascertained the memorial's immediate priority, planning still continued for long range development goals. Memorial staff members sent three different models of the proposed pedestrian overpasses to the Denver Service Center for study and approval. The Park Service also had plans to build Saarinen's monumental staircase from Wharf Street up to the Arch. Here again Superintendent Parker was in conflict with the Denver Service Center. Parker believed that the sweeping, uneven tread design of the staircase as originally conceived by Saarinen was aesthetically correct insofar as compatibility with the Arch was concerned, but the construction cost would be substantially increased because of the extra form work involved. In Parker's view, a safety hazard existed to children and to senior citizens because of the varied stride needed to ascend or descend the stairs. Generally speaking the public would be unaware of the aesthetic reasons for the design and Parker believed the Park Service would invite criticism and tort claims if it built the uneven stairway. [72]

The Regional Office agreed with Parker and so informed the Denver Service Center. Its manager protested. Like Dulles Airport and the Sydney Opera House, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial development was recognized as one of the great artistic achievements in architecture and engineering of the second half of the twentieth century. The entire development was the memorial's distinguishing character, not just the Arch itself. The Denver Service Center architects unflinchingly believed that Saarinen's concept should be executed as faithfully as possible. No unusual accidents or tort claims resulted from the similarly designed stairs leading to the overlooks, and Saarinen had tested the concept with a full scale mock-up. If the stairs were changed, Saarinen's great piece of art would be compromised, "and it is this art that is the prime physical resource of this unit of the National Park Service." [73] Superintendent Parker changed his mind after reading the Denver Service Center manager's comments, believing it would be in the Park Service's best interest to follow Saarinen's concept for the Grand Staircase. The acting regional director did not change his mind, however, as he believed the uniform stairs to be best from a management standpoint. [74] Thus, one of Eero Saarinen's key development elements was modified. His "monumental entrance" was cut in scale and built piecemeal over the next few years as funds became

available.

A hope of more funding developed in December 1973, when the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration designated St. Louis as a Bicentennial City. Representative Sullivan hoped this designation would clear the way for requesting Federal funds for the museum. Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton could not guarantee that this designation would insure full funding for the memorial in fiscal year 1975, however, because the National Park Service's Bicentennial program concentrated on historic areas of the Revolutionary War period. These areas held highest priorities for funding. Now that the decision was made to proceed on the museum, work could begin with the city's \$985,000, the National Park Service's prior-year unobligated funds totaling \$400,000, and \$850,000 of other donated funds. Thus, the Park Service had a total of \$2,235,000 available in fiscal year 1974 for the museum. [75]

Even though Superintendent Ivan Parker promoted the building of the museum, he did not stay at the memorial to see its completion. In February 1974, in the aftermath of a local incident, the Park Service offered him a new assignment in Washington, D.C., but Parker refused, resigned, and then retired. Assistant Superintendent LeRoy Brown, who had returned to the memorial in that capacity just the month before from a brief retirement, became the memorial's acting superintendent. [76]

Brown took steps to complete the memorial by letting contracts for grounds, exterior lighting, construction of a utility building, paving of the north and south overlooks, and the architectural construction of the Museum of Westward Expansion. Reconstruction of the Old Rock House and construction of the Grand Staircase remained in the plans, but no money existed for either project. Near the end of the year the overlook paving was completed, the outdoor lighting system installed, and construction progressed on the museum. Ninety-five percent of the floor slabs were laid, the wall lathes and studs erected, and some of the plumbing installed. [77]

Financed by the Federal Government and the city of East St. Louis, R.W. Booker and Associates continued work on the east side extension planning. The firm submitted its draft report to the Denver Service Center that reviewed it for technical adequacy during the summer of 1974. From there the report was forwarded to the Midwest regional director for review on whether or not it met the Park Service's management requirements. Some serious deficiencies in the report emerged quickly in the first step of the review process. Denver Service Center's Manager Glenn Hendrix pointed out to Representative Melvin Price that the study lacked justification for the expansion of National Park Service facilities, which met the Denver Service Center's management requirements. The city of East St. Louis planning staff reviewed the section of the plan concerning proposed land uses and redevelopment of those portions of the study area outside of the recommended National Park Service area; these were verbally approved as meeting the city's requirements. The proposals were also compatible with any future National Park Service developments in the expansion area. [78]

Glenn Hendrix's report to the Park Service regional director on R.W. Booker's efforts was negative. The Booker report simply did not justify the expansion. It was unconvincing and its proposal did not reflect the extensive resource data base that was gathered for it. Hendrix believed that more convincing documentation was needed if the National Park Service planned to recommend the expansion, let alone have it be approved in Interior Department, Office of Management and Budget, and congressional committee hearings. It remained difficult for a private firm to provide a planning document that the National Park Service could use to justify an addition or expansion to Congress. Hendrix recommended that a team of members from the service center, regional office, and the memorial be formed to prepare a final master plan and an environmental impact statement to submit before Congress. R.W.

Booker's work and Denver Service Center recommendations would form the basis for the submittal. Extra estimated costs for the work totaled \$44,500. [79]

On January 14, 1975, Representative Melvin Price tried once more to push the project by introducing a bill (H.R. 871) into the House of Representatives calling for the addition of not more than fifty acres to the memorial. Three days later the Midwest Region advisory committee to the National Park Service voted to oppose the memorial addition after hearing a status report on R.W. Booker's master plan. Although the National Park Service had yet to take an official position on the report, the advisory committee believed the area unsuitable for the expansion. The railroads would have to be relocated before the area could be added to the memorial. [80]

Despite the committee veto, Representative Melvin Price promised to continue supporting the project. East St. Louis Mayor James Williams believed the negative recommendation to be due to the committee's lack of awareness of the facts or a conspiratorial effort to deprive his city of the park. The committee objected to the plan's "urban renewal overtone," the need for railroad relocation before development, and East St. Louis' problems. Price thought of the recommendation as only a setback and Representative Leonor Sullivan promised to work with him to carry out the project. [81]

Even though the committee's report was negative, the National Park Service's Denver Service Center revised the Booker master plan and environmental impact statement to provide a viable document. By November 1975, however, Midwest Regional Director Merrill D. Beal recommended to the Park Service legislation division that Representative Price's bill be deferred until a more favorable time. Manpower and funding constraints in the National Park Service would make it difficult to extend the memorial, and final determination had to be made for removing and relocating the railroad tracks and facilities. Other than these exceptions, Regional Director Beal favorably recommended Price's bill to add the east side acres to the memorial. [82]

The proposal thus was effectively tabled. No extension could be made until the railroads were moved and the justification for extending the memorial made stronger. Developmental emphasis within the memorial could now concentrate on internal projects instead of expansion. Acting Superintendent LeRoy Brown retired, which enabled a new superintendent to supervise the museum's construction. Robert Chandler had three priorities to handle when he arrived in St. Louis: complete the museum, finish the landscaping and grading, and rehabilitate the Old Courthouse that was beginning to show its age. [83]

Chandler needed money for the museum exhibits and his superiors agreed. The item remained high in National Park Service priorities even though no money was granted in the 1976 Federal budget. House and Senate subcommittees had yet to determine whether any funds would be given and even if they were National Park Service officials believed that money allocated for the museum exhibits might be used in Washington, D.C., for bicentennial purposes. In March 1975 Park Service officials finally agreed to seek \$1,176,000 in Federal funds for use in St. Louis and not in Washington, D.C.. Political pressure came from Missouri's Senators Stuart Symington and Thomas Eagleton and from Representative Sullivan to keep the money in their state. Park Service officials obliged their wishes. [84] By July 1975 the House of Representatives approved the \$1,176,000 appropriation to complete the museum. After the Senate concurred, the \$3 billion 1976 Interior Department and Related Agencies Appropriation Act provided not only money for the museum, but \$1,605,000 for the memorial's operation. National Park Service officials expected the museum to be opened by June 1, 1976. [85]

Bids for construction of the first portion of the Grand Staircase were opened in May 1975;

the National Park Service awarded the \$555,889 contract to Kozeny-Wagner, Inc., in June. The contract specified the construction of the staircase in two parallel sections, with the center section to be built later when more funds were available. Electrical wiring was placed in the north part of the staircase to melt snow. Work also started on the Old Courthouse during the year, when the cornices and chimney stacks were repaired, sealed, and painted. All exterior doors and windows were refinished, repaired, and caulked. Inside the building a nineteenth century doctor/dentist office and pharmacy opened in January, offered to the Park Service by the St. Louis Medical Society. [86]

Underneath the Arch, the museum work progressed. Structural work was done under a \$1,500,000 contract for the largest single-space museum up to that time in the National Park System. Contracts for a Thomas Jefferson statue, Lewis and Clark mural photography, and object acquisition all were in progress. The National Park Service did not yet have congressionally appropriated money in hand when considering contracts for a visual wall, three-dimensional miniature landscapes, music recordings, graphics and the hanging of photomurals; local staff members anxiously awaited the outcome of the battle between President Gerald Ford's administration and Congress over the diversion of National Park Service funds to complete the Washington, D.C., visitor center. The museum's completion was assured only after the struggle's outcome favored St. Louis. [87]

Two significant events occurred for the memorial in 1975 that signified the years of human effort to create Luther Ely Smith's dream. The 1973 Federal Advisory Committee Act terminated all committees established by act of Congress for which no termination date was specified. The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission was such a committee and it was disbanded on January 5, 1975. Its last meeting had been on September 21, 1973. The commission's existence since 1934 served to insure that Jefferson's memorial would be nationally significant. Its prominent membership supported the project in its early years, giving credence to its ambitions. The Arch's construction served as the most prominent feature of the commission's accomplishments at the site. Secondly, in October 1975 the Arch celebrated its tenth anniversary. Ten years had passed since the Arch first began attracting visitors to its stainless steel walls. [88]

The Arch's impact on surrounding St. Louis was visibly apparent. More important was its impact on the nation. Its symbolism as a Gateway to the West, its architectural and engineering significance, and its overwhelming physical presence became known nationwide. St. Louisans rediscovered their riverfront, while the rest of the nation rediscovered St. Louis. The history memorialized in the Arch came into national prominence as 1976 approached and the national community looked back to reflect on its past endeavors. The bicentennial observances around the country focused on past individual, community, and national accomplishments, and Jefferson National Expansion Memorial planned to commemorate them, most notably by completing the Grand Staircase and Museum of Westward Expansion.

President Ford's budget for the next fiscal year included no funds for the memorial. Nevertheless, the previous year's allocation was sufficient to complete the museum. By January 1976 all contracts for the preparation and installation of exhibits had been let. Congress moved during the summer to include extra funds for the memorial when the House approved spending \$42,400,000 more than Ford's administration had asked for the parks. The Senate passed a similar bill. Included in the House measure was an authorization of \$9,500,000 for the memorial, an amount later approved. The memorial's Federal spending ceiling was raised to \$32,750,000 and an appropriation of \$200,000 made in the 1977 Interior Department and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. [89]

More funds were needed to correct the Old Courthouse's many problems. Damage from water

intrusion in and around the gutters threatened the interior rooms. Outside the rainwater crumbled mortar and bricks. Portions of the limestone cornices fell and the roof leaked. The external masonry surfaces required stripping the old paint, tuckpointing, and repainting. The estimated cost of the complete restoration was between \$8,000,000 and \$10,000,000. [90]

During 1976, improvements along Washington Avenue such as paving, bus parking, sidewalks, lights, and sitting areas were paid for by parking lot revenue funds. More contributed money paid for the installation of the St. Louis room in the Old Courthouse. This gift from the First National Bank in St. Louis opened in June and presented a photographic history of the city, its people, and the river. The memorial's historical association provided funds to improve the library and archival storage room. Saarinen's monumental staircase opened on June 24 at a ribbon-cutting ceremony. One-third of the stairs remained to be built pending further funds. [91]

As July 4 approached, numerous activities took place on and around the grounds. The Park Service provided space via special use permits for groups to hold bicentennial observances. Memorial staff members cooperated with area agencies to stage many activities, among them the Bicentennial Horizons of American Music and The Performing Arts (BHAM), which sponsored numerous music, dance, theater, film, and multi-media events. The St. Louis Symphony Orchestra presented concerts under the Arch to thousands of people. The Fourth of July Spectacular, sponsored by Famous-Barr department store and coordinated with Federal, state, and local officials, was held during the afternoon and early evening. It drew the largest crowd ever assembled in St. Louis. More than 800,000 people reviewed the boat racing, water-skiing (the river was closed to all commercial traffic for several hours), aviation events, stunt flying, parachuting, and a fifty-minute fireworks spectacle. [92]

Museum of Westward Expansion Opened

Along with the monumental staircase opening, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial's birthday present to the nation was the completion of the Museum of Westward Expansion. Many Park Service officials questioned the museum's unique concept, even after final official reviews and approvals. Superintendent Chandler had to defend the museum's design as late as July, one month before the opening. Security problems remained the main consideration because of Aram Mardirosian's unique, open design. Almost none of the museum's objects were placed under protective glass. Chandler believed the museum incorporated the same openness and free response as did the time and place it interpreted. He intended to maintain museum effectiveness and professionalism while insuring object safety by having park rangers on duty in the museum at all times. Artifacts were placed on the museum walls to reduce handling; many items were reproductions or replaceable originals displayed out of reach. Chandler sought ideas and alternatives within the approved design concept to increase security effectiveness as well as to utilize the museum's flexibility and potential. Despite Chandler's confidence that the idea would work, he had a nagging feeling that something would go wrong. If the National Park Service spent more than \$3,000,000 on the museum only to have people walk off with the artifacts, the organization would look foolish. But Chandler took the risk because he did not want a static museum. He realized that many of his park's visitors came to see and ride up into the Arch, and he wanted to offer them a taste of history. He believed the museum would grow in importance. [93]

On opening day, August 10, 1976, the artifacts spoke for themselves with no labels and no glass barriers. The story of westward expansion was told through the words of the people who participated, and through historic photographs of them, their work and their surroundings. When the museum was dedicated on August 23 Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppe recognized the cooperative effort that went into it. The city of St. Louis, Bi-State Development Agency, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, and the National

Park Service all expended funds for the project. National Park Service Director Gary Everhardt, Regional Director Dave Beal, Mayor John Poelker, Superintendent Robert Chandler, and Representative Leonor Sullivan participated in the ceremonies dedicating the museum, then the largest in the National Park System. [94]

Aram Mardirosian received much acclaim for the museum design, but his involvement with National Park Service contracts came under scrutiny by the Department of Justice in 1976. When Mardirosian was awarded his first St. Louis contract in October 1970, he had recently left a position in the National Park Service. This raised conflict of interest questions and allegedly violated the one-year rule which stated that a Federal Government employee could not for a year be involved with duties if they were under his official responsibility within a year before his quitting Federal employment. Mardirosian asserted that his position as chief architectural advisor and architect-in-residence with the National Park Service did not interfere with any authority involving conflict of interest. The entire issue had been explored and resolved in 1970 before Mardirosian accepted the museum contract, but was revived in 1976. A year and a half later, in March 1978, Mardirosian was absolved of the conflict of interest charge. The Justice Department looked into the matter, decided not to prosecute, and so informed the Department of the Interior. [95]

The museum's opening helped spur an increase in visitation at the memorial along with bicentennial events. A record 3,458,000 visitors came to the memorial during 1976. Aram Mardirosian's design was indeed a manifestation of the National Park Service's desire to build a museum important and effective enough to complement the Gateway Arch. Now that the memorial had built its main interpretive feature, priorities turned once more to the landscaping and the Old Courthouse repairs. In the spring of 1977 the area's congressional delegation urged House appropriations committees to approve funds to expedite the memorial's completion. National Park Service budget requests only included \$1,100,000 for site development, an amount which would fund only the initial steps of the needed grading and landscaping scheduled to take more than five years to complete. If more funds were available, the development could be finished in two years. The legislators sought the doubling of the 1978 budget request and the total \$5,095,000 estimated for the work's completion, to be appropriated over the next two years. They also sought emergency funding totaling \$406,000 for repairs to the Old Courthouse. Plaster was falling from the dome and the roof continued to leak. The delegation informed their colleagues that a recently completed historic structure report on the Old Courthouse showed that the building's total restoration would cost \$9,000,000. This request required a separate authorization from the one the legislators sought. [96]

The House subcommittee responded in May to the request and recommended an increase of \$1,273,000 over the budget request of \$1,273,000. The subcommittee also recommended \$1,874,000 for operating expenses and \$406,000 for Old Courthouse emergency repairs. The House approved the bill. On the Senate side Senator Thomas Eagleton succeeded in tripling the original request in June. He got \$4,288,000 added to Interior appropriations before the full Senate Appropriations Committee, which approved the bill on June 16, 1977. The bill passed the Senate and the Senate-House conference committee, and when passed by Congress, appropriated \$4,452,000 for the memorial. [97]

The money was used for grading, additional walks, lighting, topsoil, seeding, irrigation, and the construction of two four-acre ponds. Saarinen's landscaping plans were finally being realized. Underneath the grounds in the visitor center Superintendent Chandler started several more construction projects. Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning units needed modification to accommodate the increased visitor capacity accompanying the museum's opening. Acoustical panels and an improved speaker system were also installed in the visitor center. [98]

By August 1977 Chandler accepted bids to repair the Old Courthouse's roof. A team of National Park Service historical architects and structural specialists investigated the Old Courthouse's exterior and structural conditions to determine the scope of the needed work. The building was structurally sound. No evidence was found of any serious deterioration because of the roof leaks, or foundation settlement because of earthquakes. Inside the dome, Museum Specialist Walter Nitkiewicz, who had restored the paintings during the 1950s, looked again at the Old Courthouse's murals. Their condition ranged from good to extremely bad. All of the Carl Wimar lunettes were extremely damaged. They had been crudely and completely overpainted in 1921 and too little of the original paint remained to make an effective restoration. Nitkiewicz believed that all the murals should not be transferred because of cost and durability; instead, they should be reproduced on new surfaces. The 1955 reproductions in the upper dome were holding up well. [\[99\]](#)

Further Interpretive Development

The Old Courthouse's interpretive exhibit rooms needed attention as well as its dome and exterior. In 1977 the interim exhibits, designed to present the westward expansion story only until the main museum opened, either needed extensive rehabilitation or were obsolete. The National Park Service and the Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association planned a four-phase program to replace the Old Courthouse exhibits. Interpretive emphasis was to be placed on the Old Courthouse's history and architectural significance, St. Louis history, the courts' activities in the Old Courthouse, and the memorial as part of the National Park System. The exhibits were to avoid duplicating the contents of the Museum of Westward Expansion. National Park officials would choose an exhibit planning/design firm to produce a plan. [\[100\]](#)

Attempts to expand the memorial's interpretive efforts beyond the site and into the community resulted in the formation of a museum education program and the hiring of a museum education specialist in the spring of 1977. The program was aimed at creating a learning atmosphere for both school children and adult groups who came into the museum and Old Courthouse. Programs ranged from general museum tours to specialized presentations on St. Louis history and architecture. Films, slides, and walking tours were offered, in addition to a variety of learning slide packages, classes, workshops, and special programs. [\[101\]](#)

The memorial's interpretive division moved in a new direction over Labor Day 1977, when it sponsored a folklife festival on the grounds under the Arch. The Mississippi Valley Folk Festival featured American folk culture through American Indian, ethnic, Afro-American, and Anglo-American traditions utilizing music, dance, and crafts. The National Park Service cooperated in the venture with the Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association, Missouri Friends of the Folk Arts, National Council for the Traditional Arts, and the Missouri Arts Council. [\[102\]](#)

To guide the burgeoning memorial operation, its management staff prepared a "Statement for Management" to control the memorial's planning, development, and operations. The staff determined its management objectives by listing the influences on management, including legislative and administrative constraints, regional influences, and in-park influences. Some of the objectives affecting development in the next few years concerned the grounds development, the years-old visitor parking problem, and the growing interpretive program. The National Park Service wanted to complete the development so that the site's physical appearance and services reflected its purpose as a memorial to American westward expansion as planned by Eero Saarinen and approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission. Visitor parking was to be provided through an operating agreement with an appropriate agency. Interpretive programs were to enhance and enlarge the public's

understanding and appreciation of westward expansion, early St. Louis history, and the significance of the Arch and Old Courthouse. The National Park Service considered it imperative to work closely with the Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association to provide educational services to visitors as part of the interpretive program. [[103](#)]

To complete the grounds work, Superintendent Chandler advertised for bids in March 1978 for the topsoil, seeding, irrigation, walks, and pond construction. Schuster Engineering, Inc., of Webster Groves, Missouri, was the low bidder for the work and received the contract. Following the firm's completion of the contract in 1979, Chandler hoped to receive funds for final landscaping, including planting thousands of trees, shrubs, and acres of ground cover. The 1979 fiscal year budget contained no funds for the project, however, and the only funding request the National Park Service made was \$54,000 for continuing the Old Courthouse emergency restoration to prevent further interior deterioration. In addition to the landscaping, Chandler had two other projects with complete plans that could be started in fiscal year 1979, if the funds were available — the pedestrian overpasses and the reconstruction of Luther Ely Smith Square. [[104](#)]

Missouri's Senator Thomas Eagleton and Representative Richard Gephardt visited the memorial early in the year with House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill to discuss adding funds in fiscal year 1979 to equal the total remaining development, estimated at \$6,497,000. Even if these funds were not appropriated, Chandler believed the time was right to start seeking another authorization increase. The existing ceiling of \$32,750,000 would cover all development except the remaining Grand Staircase work, maintenance building construction, south theater construction, widening Washington Avenue, and restoring the Old Courthouse. When the 1976 authorization was requested the National Park Service decided not to include the funds needed for the Old Courthouse because architectural investigations were beginning and there was no accurate estimate of costs. Additionally, by adding this cost onto the authorization request the amount would seem extraordinarily high. As a result, the Old Courthouse work had to be completed with yearly appropriated funds. [[105](#)]

Congress failed to appropriate the total remaining development costs. On June 21 the House passed the Interior Department appropriations bill containing only \$1,655,000 for landscaping the grounds. The Old Courthouse renovation funds were dropped in the House Appropriations Committee. Upon investigation, Congressman Gephardt discovered that part of the problem rested with the National Park Service because of poor program development. Gephardt hoped that Senate or supplemental appropriations might pass, but he was to be disappointed. The fiscal year 1979 memorial appropriation remained at \$1,655,000. [[106](#)]

The National Park Service possessed developed plans for the staircase and pedestrian overpasses but no decision had yet been made on the parking lot. The city of St. Louis continued discussions with the Federal Government concerning replacing the existing lot at the site's north end with a three-level parking garage. During 1978 the planning firm of Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, Inc., determined the parking garage's feasibility and gave its report to the National Park Service and the city in August. [[107](#)] The study involved a number of complex and interrelated issues surrounding the parking garage, including how many spaces could be developed, bus parking, and cost estimates. The firm offered three alternatives in terms of spaces available, estimated cost, and annual deficits within the criteria set up by the National Park Service and the city concerning height, architectural treatment, and other factors. Superintendent Chandler reviewed the parking garage report and was pleased with the proposed design. Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum incorporated the basic elements required, made good use of the space, and suggested a design compatible with the memorial. Funds remained the key to the construction; the Park Service and the city had to decide on a method of financing and percentages of funding. [[108](#)]

Two other aspects of the development ran into difficulties. The Grand Staircase, installed only two years previously, began crumbling even though Kozeny-Wagner had followed specifications in the contract. Memorial officials debated the source and solution of the problem for more than a year before awarding a contract to Schuster Engineering, Inc., to repair the staircase. The work began in the summer of 1980. Construction of the middle section of Saarinen's monumental Grand Staircase remained low on the memorial's list of priorities, however. [[109](#)]

Local sentiment still existed for rebuilding the Manuel Lisa warehouse (the Old Rock House), and Superintendent Chandler submitted the idea into the memorial's construction program. The regional director failed to approve the plan despite the local support, because the project did not meet National Park Service standards for reconstructing historic structures. Uncertainty existed over the authenticity of the remaining stones stored in the Old Courthouse's basement, and the structure could not be reconstructed on its original site because of the railroad tunnel location. Strict reconstruction standards dictated that the National Park Service not rebuild the Old Rock House. [[110](#)]

By the end of 1978 contracts were out for stripping and repairing the lantern, dome, and drum section of the Old Courthouse, followed by tuckpointing, sealing, and repainting. At the same time memorial and regional staff members examined twelve different proposals for the Old Courthouse exhibit development project and paid three firms to develop preliminary plans. Of these three, Aram Mardirosian's Potomac Group developed a design which best reflected the use of the Old Courthouse as a resource. The building was not a challenge to exhibitry or something to be worked around; instead, the Old Courthouse itself was the main exhibit, the essence of the memorial's interpretive story. The Potomac Group's design reflected the building's history. In 1979 Mardirosian revised the plan after another memorial staff review. Plans called for a final review acceptance by early summer, 1980, with construction beginning that fall. [[111](#)]

The quality and quantity of interpretive programs gained strength throughout 1978, with the Museum Education Program developing classes, workshops for teachers, a publications program, accredited intern and research programs with area colleges, and slide learning packages in addition to its museum tours and programs. During the year more than 2,000 groups totaling over 92,000 people utilized the Museum of Westward Expansion's resources. The Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association continued to fund these programs in addition to sponsoring the Frontier Folklife Festival (successor to the Mississippi Valley Folk Festival) with the Missouri Friends of the Folk Arts on the memorial grounds over Labor Day. [[112](#)] The memorial's services and programs developed nearer their potential for an urban audience. Spurred by National Park Service Director William J. Whalen's Urban Initiative program, the Park Service staff increased its outreach to its urban constituencies. The Urban Initiative's objectives were to establish National Park Service programs to meet the needs of urban populations, to provide programs enhancing the understanding of America's natural and cultural heritage, the need to preserve and protect resources, and to spread information about National Park Service activities within the urban community. [[113](#)]

In response to Whalen's program, the memorial staff developed several proposals that were approved on the regional level for implementation under the Urban Initiative. During 1979 the memorial sponsored pioneer and traditional skills classes which provided neighboring community preschool and grade school children with the opportunity to work with traditional arts and crafts. Sessions held on the memorial grounds included drawing, painting, pottery, basketry, rag-rug weaving, Indian crafts and games, and frontier cooking. The children compared themselves and their environment with the pioneer way of life through these traditional art forms. A secondary goal was to teach the various community center teachers and staff the techniques and skills to continue these art and museum skills after the Park

Service program ended. [\[114\]](#) This program continued on a smaller scale in 1980. A second program initiated under Urban Initiative, titled the Visitor Access Transportation Program, provided bus service to senior citizens, people with disabilities, and other special audiences who otherwise would not be able to visit the memorial. These special groups preferred the bus service (provided by Bi-State Development Agency) because it overcame the parking and traffic problems involved with traveling to the memorial. From August until December 1979 the bus service provided transportation for 8,734 elderly and disabled visitors. [\[115\]](#)

Heading up the memorial's efforts in this direction was Jerry Schober, the site's new superintendent as of February 11, 1979. Robert Chandler left in December 1978 to take charge of the National Park Service's new Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area near Los Angeles, California. His accomplishments covered opening the Museum of Westward Expansion and beginning a reservation system for the transportation system ride to the top of the Arch, but Jerry Schober would have to finish the landscaping and Old Courthouse rehabilitation. [\[116\]](#)

Representative Richard Gephardt sought \$1,464,000 in the spring of 1979 from the House appropriations subcommittee to restore the Old Courthouse exterior. Thirteen coats of paint applied during nearly 150 years were peeling off the building. Because President Jimmy Carter's next budget failed to seek any new construction money, Gephardt had an upward battle to obtain any funds at all. The budget for fiscal year 1980 contained a congressional appropriation of only \$450,000 for the Old Courthouse. [\[117\]](#)

A near-disaster struck the Old Courthouse on June 14, 1979, when a fire broke out in the "lantern" portion of the building's dome. Started by smoldering wood after a lightning strike, the fire destroyed approximately one-fourth of the floor and shell. Fortunately there was no damage to the backside of the inner dome's plaster. Denver Service Center experts found no visible water damage in the paint or plaster in the weakest sections of the lower dome's upper portion. Tape placed over the cracks in the plaster the previous year when restoration investigations were conducted remained in place, holding the plaster together until more permanent repairs could be made. [\[118\]](#)

With repair work and investigations into the Old Courthouse's past physical appearance being conducted, the National Park Service moved to complete historic structure reports for the building's future management. The Old Courthouse as a cultural resource had to be managed on the basis of past administrative decisions and architectural investigations. Exterior restoration, courtroom furnishing plans, and interior exhibit development remained the memorial's highest priorities as the new decade began. Representative Gephardt sought \$2,500,000 for fiscal year 1981 to complete the exterior work. [\[119\]](#)

Since the Old Rock House was no longer on the memorial's construction schedule and the middle section of the Grand Staircase was so low on the list of priorities that it would probably never be built, the main construction challenges facing Superintendent Schober and the memorial staff were the parking garage and the pedestrian passes over the depressed interstate and Memorial Drive. The City of St. Louis informed Schober in May 1980 that it intended to build the proposed parking garage on the north end of the memorial grounds at a cost of approximately \$12,000. When the structure was built, parking spaces would increase from 320 to 1200. Consultant studies indicated that revenue derived from a parking garage of this size would not support the facility's operational and other costs. The city would have to sell \$12,000 in revenue bonds to finance the construction, but since there was no Federal tax on the bonds, there also was no Federal guarantee behind them. The city and the National Park Service would have to find a way to provide a backup source of revenue. [\[120\]](#)

The Park Service began changing the attitude of years past that it did not want to build a

parking lot or garage for the benefit of the local business commuters. With the increased emphasis on urban involvement and the realization that the local community deserved as much consideration in Park Service policy decisions as did the out-of-state and international visitors, the situation changed to where it would be in the memorial's and the surrounding community's best interest in terms of energy conservation for the garage to be built on-site. The unique situation existing in St. Louis, where the city had contributed one-fourth of the memorial's funds, also supported the fact that the city's needs should be considered in this type of a construction decision. [[121](#)]

Constructing the pedestrian overpasses posed a similar problem. Preliminary plans called for two overpasses to extend from the Arch grounds over the intersecting highways and into Luther Ely Smith Square. Their construction would require the redevelopment of the square and the estimated cost ran to several millions. Decisions had to be made as to whether or not building the overpasses was worth the expense and the destruction of the square as it stood. Perhaps another solution could be found, one not involving such a large redevelopment. [[122](#)]

Interest in adding acres on the east side to the memorial did not decrease after the 1975 Booker study was deemed insufficient. Instead, investigations into removing the railroads continued after they were identified as a key obstacle in the way of redevelopment. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) took the lead in determining relocation possibilities, which caused the National Park Service to keep the door open to increasing the memorial's size. By 1978 the FRA had completed phase I, the development of a physical plan, of the St. Louis Railroad Gateway Terminal Restructuring Project. Phase II of the project had no timetable since it included preliminary environmental impact assessments. The phase was still in an early stage of the work and the FRA could make no predictions as to when it would be completed. This gave the National Park Service additional time to review its east bank study because of the growing emphasis on urban parks and the possible railroad relocation. [[123](#)] National Park Service Director William Whalen considered the point irrelevant as to whether or not the National Park Service managed the East St. Louis site; his main concern was setting it aside in the public domain. Several problems were involved in planning and implementing a project of this size and complexity. As on the St. Louis side of the river, many interests were involved with the development. Railroads concerned about financing and competition, public concern centering on social, economic, and environmental impacts, and concern over costs contributed to the difficulty in designing a feasible plan. [[124](#)]

As the year 1980 began, various interests were still fighting for East St. Louis. On February 26, Illinois Representative Melvin Price introduced H.R. 6620, to authorize the secretary of the interior to enlarge Jefferson National Expansion Memorial by not more than 350 acres. Along with Price's legislative attempts to redevelop the site, other special projects were pursued to accomplish the same goal. The East St. Louis riverfront included more than 1,300 acres that could support a variety of compatible land uses. Development and profitable land use could occur around a central core of National Park Service property within the area. In addition to the potential for housing and recreational use, one proposal promised to foster the arts, humanities, and sciences in a cultural complex. The Institute for Humanistic Studies, which received much interest and support in the bi-state area, would provide educational enrichment programs not only on the local scale, but regionally, nationally, and internationally. [[125](#)]

National Park Service funds spent in urban parks served to reach a larger audience, which could not in any other way be touched by a Park Service program. Superintendent Robert Chandler believed that if the National Park Service was serious about urban initiative and providing recreation, then the memorial stood a good chance of developing the east side because of its location in the middle of 2,500,000 people. Superintendent Jerry Schober

believed that despite the years of past efforts and studies to rebuild East St. Louis, greater potential existed in 1980 because of expiring railroad leases, the national emphasis on urban areas, and the local interest in the humanistic institute proposal. [126] Jefferson National Expansion Memorial would lend its support to community efforts to develop the East St. Louis riverbank; such a development would complement the memorial according to Eero Saarinen's initial concepts.

The story of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial is one of people, beginning with Thomas Jefferson and thousands of nameless if not forgotten western settlers. Some of them paused only briefly in St. Louis, others forged their permanent homes here on the edge of the frontier. The descendants of those who stayed cherished their elders' heritage by preserving the Old Courthouse. They honored those who headed west by building the Gateway Arch.

The memorial did not begin or end with the construction of the Gateway Arch. Thirty years of work preceded it. The memorial as a whole affected St. Louis in ways greater than even Luther Ely Smith could have imagined. The city's national image benefited in terms of identification, visitation, and a sense of place in American history. The memorial's educational and cultural resources provided lasting imprints upon the local and national community. Because of its location in a metropolitan area, the memorial met the needs of the National Park Service to provide park experiences in the urban environment, even though it predated that emphasis.

The early local opposition to the memorial ceased and was forgotten. Questions remained, however, as to the razing of so many historically significant buildings and the heritage lost in the destruction of the Manuel Lisa warehouse. Portions of St. Louis' heritage were lost because of the emphasis on the site's national rather than local significance.

The memorial's influence spread far, from recreation to zoning to education to memorialization to economic rebirth. The Old Courthouse and the Gateway Arch of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial embodied several generations of American men and women: the generations which, through sheer fortitude and courage settled the West, and a generation which through its own mixture of genius and persistent effort managed to memorialize its forbears' achievements.

Jefferson National Expansion

Administrative History



Administrative History Sharon A. Brown

CHAPTER VIII: Footnotes

¹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 26 March 1968.

²*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 4 April 1968; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 17 May 1968; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 May 1968; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 December 1968.

³Statement, Cutback in National Park Service Operations, United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service, n.d., Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 168, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20 September 1968.

⁴Colonel R.E. Smyser, Jr. to Frank M. Karsten, 4 October 1968, Frank Karsten Papers, file No. 168, WHMC; telegram, Robert S. Knapp to Frank Karsten, 20 November 1968, Frank M. Karsten Papers, file No. 168, WHMC; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 April 1969.

⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 15 January 1969.

⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 1 April 1969; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 June 1969.

⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 26 September 1969.

⁸*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 26 February 1968.

⁹LeRoy Brown to Joseph Pulitzer, 29 February 1968, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 March 1968.

¹⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 November 1968; Dr. Harry Pfanz earned his Ph.D. in history at Ohio State University. He joined the National Park Service in 1956 as a historian, serving for ten years at Gettysburg before coming to St. Louis.

¹¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 23 February 1969.

¹²Cooperative Agreement between the City of St. Louis and the United States of America through Secretary of the Interior, 3 February 1961, JEFF.

¹³Harry Pfanz to A.J. Cervantes, 14 May 1969, JEFF; Kenneth D. McCall to Colonel Edwin R. Decker, 26 June 1969, JEFF.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 12 June 1969; Pfanz to Cervantes, 12 June 1969, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 19 June 1969. In 1972 the St. Louis Board of Public Service approved five twenty-five year leases for the use of city-owned wharf space. The leases went to the James B. Eads Corporation, Santa Maria Historical Center, Streckfus Steamers, Fighting Ships, Inc., and Specialty Restaurant Corp.; *St. Louis Globe Democrat*, 24 May 1972.

¹⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 September 1969.

¹⁶Memorandum, LeRoy Scharon to C.E. Rennison, 14 November 1969, JEFF.

¹⁷Minutes of Pre-Construction Conference, Exterior Lighting Old Courthouse, 8 December 1969, JEFF. Belt and Given held general supervision of the work; Hannenkamp Electric Company was the contractor.

¹⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 12 February 1969, JEFF; memorandum, Assistant to Regional Director, Cooperative Activities and Public Affairs to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 27 October 1969, JEFF.

¹⁹*Metro East Journal*, 24 May 1970; News Release, National Park Service, 23 October 1970, JEFF; *Metro East Journal*, 11 December 1970; *East St. Louis Riverfront Suitability, Feasibility Alternatives* (preliminary draft) U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Western Service Center, n.d., JEFF.

²⁰*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 February 1970; William L. Bowen to Leonor K. Sullivan, 5 March 1970, JEFF.

²¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 December 1969; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 5 February 1970; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 February 1970.

²²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 3 April 1970; Harthon L. Bill to James W. Symington, 22 April 1970, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 21 May 1970.

²³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 February 1970.

²⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, Midwest Region, 28 May 1970, JEFF.

²⁵*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 20-21 June 1970; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 September 1970; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Development Status Report [1971], JEFF.

²⁶Paul McG. Miller to Leonor Sullivan, 16 February 1962, JEFF; Conrad Wirth to Leonor Sullivan, 13 March 1962, JEFF.

²⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Regional Director, 15 March 1968, JEFF; memorandum, Chief Staff Architect to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 29 March 1968, JEFF.

²⁸Memorandum, Superintendent JNEM to Director, Midwest Region, 22 May 1970, JEFF; Cervantes to Pfanz, 12 June 1970, JEFF.

²⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 10 November 1970.

³⁰LeRoy Brown to Donald Fraser, 12 September 1967, JEFF; Superintendent JEFF to

Members of U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 25 June 1971, JEFF; memorandum, Director NPS to Directorate and AR Field Directors, 17 November 1970, JEFF.

³¹Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 10 September 1970, JEFF; Pfanz to Mark Paddock, 14 December 1970, JEFF; Annual Meeting Report, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 24 June 1970, JEFF.

³²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 January 1971.

³³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 January 1971. Ivan Parker joined the National Park Service in 1966. He had been chief of the division of personnel management in Washington, D.C. in 1970, before coming to JEFF. Parker graduated from Washington University and served with the Veterans Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Civil Service Commission before joining the Park Service.

³⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 August 1971; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Development Status Report [1971], JEFF; Parker to Cervantes, 23 April 1971, JEFF.

³⁵Joseph McNicholas to Parker, 8 April 1971, JEFF; Parker to McNicholas, 2 June 1971, JEFF.

³⁶McNicholas to Leonor K. Sullivan, 28 October 1971, JEFF; memorandum, Director Eastern Service Center to Director, NPS, [1971], JEFF; Sullivan to Colonel I. A. Long, 11 November 1971, JEFF; Long to Sullivan, 9 November 1971, JEFF.

³⁷Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 12 November 1971, JEFF; Special Meeting Executive Committee, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 5 June 1972, JEFF.

³⁸Parker to Colonel I.A. Long, 26 June 1972, JEFF.

³⁹McNicholas to Parker, 14 July 1972, JEFF.

⁴⁰Leonard Volz to McNicholas, 25 August 1972, JEFF; McNicholas to Parker, 23 March 1973, JEFF; Parker to McNicholas, 29 March 1973, JEFF.

⁴¹Memorandum, Director, Midwest Region to Director NPS, 12 March 1971, JEFF.

⁴²Memorandum, Deputy Director to Director, Midwest Region, 23 April 1971, JEFF.

⁴³*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 September 1971.

⁴⁴Harris Loesch to Wayne L. Hays, 24 September 1971, JEFF.

⁴⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 6 October 1971, JEFF.

⁴⁶Memorandum, Director, Midwest Region to Director NPS, 4 November 1971, JEFF.

⁴⁷Charles H. Percy to Harris Loesch, 27 October 1971, JEFF; Melvin Price to Rogers C.B. Morton, 27 October 1971, JEFF.

⁴⁸Parker to Robert Mays, 15 December 1971, JEFF.

⁴⁹Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director NPS, 6 May 1971, JEFF; Parker to Members of U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission and the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 25 June 1971, JEFF. The National Park Service originally hoped that Charles Eames, a close associate of Eero Saarinen, would undertake the project, but his workload would not permit it. Park Service officials also considered Kevin Roche, who was Saarinen's chief of design on the memorial and now a member of the successor firm to Saarinen, Saarinen, and Associates, but he also could not accept the commission. The Potomac Group then came under consideration; Aram Mardirosian had previously worked with Kevin Roche. Memorandum, Assistant Director, Administration NPS to Assistant Secretary for Administration. 12 June 1971, JEFF.

The Potomac Group, *JNEM Museum: Design Directive* [1971], JEFF.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Parker to Members of U. S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, Jefferson National Expansion Historical Association, 7 September 1972, JEFF; Meeting Minutes of Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 20 July 1972, JEFF; Ivan Parker, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Activities, 1972, 13 February 1973, JEFF.

⁵³*Metro East Journal*, 8 February 1972; Ivan Parker, Jefferson ... JEFF.

⁵⁴Parker to Members of U.S. ... JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 June 1972; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 June 1972.

⁵⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 January 1972; Parker to Crowdus, 22 March 1972, JEFF; Parker to Crowdus, 23 June 1972, JEFF; Sullivan to Julia Butler Hansen, 7 July 1972, JEFF; Hansen to Sullivan, 24 July 1972, JEFF.

⁵⁶*Statement For Management and Planning Management Objectives, East St. Louis*, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 10 February 1972, JEFF.

⁵⁷Resolution Authorizing Agreement for Technical Services with the U.S. National Park Service, 24 May 1972, JEFF.

⁵⁸Memorandum Ivan Parker to Director, Midwest Region, 20 July 1972, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 3 August 1972, JEFF; memorandum, Administrative Officer JEFF to Superintendent Parker, 25 September 1972, JEFF.

⁵⁹*Metro East Journal*, 10 September 1972; Bill, H.R. 2379, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, 18 January 1973.

⁶⁰Memorandum, Assistant Chief of Maintenance JEFF to Superintendent JEFF, 1 October 1973, JEFF.

⁶¹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 29 January 1973.

⁶²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 May 1973; memorandum, Missouri State Director to Director, Midwest Region, 11 June 1973, JEFF.

- ⁶³Memorandum, Director, Denver Service Center to Director, Midwest Region, 29 June 1973, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 3 July 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Director, Midwest Region, 3 July 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 1 August 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁶Memorandum, Regional Director, Midwest Region to Superintendent JEFF, 17 August 1973, JEFF; J. Leonard Volz to John H. Poelker, 17 August 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁷John Poelker to J. Leonard Volz, 22 August 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁸Volz to Poelker, 7 September 1973, JEFF.
- ⁶⁹Volz to Poelker, 20 September 1973, JEFF.
- ⁷⁰*Resolution of United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission Adopted at a Meeting of the Commission on September 21, 1973 in St. Louis, Missouri*, JEFF; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association *Report of Nominating Committee*, 27 June 1973, JEFF.
- ⁷¹Memorandum, Acting Regional Director, Midwest Region to Associate Director, Administration, WASO, 8 November 1973, JEFF.
- ⁷²Meeting Minutes, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, 17 July 1973, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 28 November 1973, JEFF.
- ⁷³Memorandum, Acting Regional Director, Midwest Region to Manager, Denver Service Center, 13 December 1973, JEFF; memorandum, Manager, Denver Service Center to Regional Director, 27 December 1973, JEFF.
- ⁷⁴Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 3 January 1974, JEFF; memorandum, Acting Regional Director, Midwest Region to Manager, Denver Service Center, 18 January 1974, JEFF.
- ⁷⁵*St. Louis Globe Democrat*, 20 December 1973; Rogers C.B. Morton to Leonor Sullivan, 17 January 1974, JEFF.
- ⁷⁶Notification of Personnel Action SF-50, 14 February 1974, JEFF; News Release, National Park Service, 25 January 1974, JEFF. Ivan Parker was placed on leave and thereafter offered the transfer to the Washington post after allegedly being involved in a shooting incident at his home the morning of February 3, 1974. *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 4 February 1974; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 5 February 1974.
- ⁷⁷Meeting Minutes, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 31 July 1974, JEFF; News Release, National Park Service, 21 November 1974, JEFF.
- ⁷⁸Glenn Hendrix to Melvin Price, 31 July 1974, JEFF.

⁷⁹Memorandum, Manager, Denver Service Center to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 23 September, 1974, JEFF.

⁸⁰Bill, H.R. 871, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st session, 14 January 1975; News Release, National Park Service, 17 January 1975, JEFF.

⁸¹*Metro East Journal*, 20 January 1975; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 January 1975.

⁸²Memorandum, Regional Director, Midwest Region to Associate Director, Legislation, WASO, 10 November 1975, JEFF.

⁸³*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 23 March 1975; Robert Chandler's National Park Service career began in 1958 when he served as supervisory horticulturist in Washington, D.C.. He served as assistant superintendent at Mount Rainier National Park for three years, and before coming to St. Louis was associate director of the Chicago field office.

⁸⁴*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 6 February 1975; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 March 1975; interview, Robert Chandler, 29 December 1978.

⁸⁵*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 July 1975.

⁸⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 May 1975; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 18 June 1975; "Meeting Minutes," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 31 July 1975, JEFF; News Release, National Park Service, 31 January 1975, JEFF.

⁸⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 24 June 1975; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 8 July 1975.

⁸⁸Robert S. Chandler to Harry S. Havens, 12 December 1977, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 October 1975.

⁸⁹*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 22 January 1976; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 June 1976.

⁹⁰"Meeting Minutes," Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 8 September 1976, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 25 October 1976.

⁹¹"Meeting Minutes" JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 9 June 1976.

⁹²*Midwest Region Bicentennial Activities, National Park Service*, 3 October 1976, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 26-27 June 1976; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 July 1976. Famous-Barr sponsored Water and Sky Spectacles on the waterfront beginning in 1964 to celebrate the city's centennial. The activity continued for five years until halted in 1970 because of landscaping. The Bicentennial started the practice again until halted in 1979, once again because of landscaping.

⁹³Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 1 July 1976, JEFF; Interview, Robert Chandler, 29 December 1978.

⁹⁴*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 August 1976; News Release, Office of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, 23 August 1976, JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 24 August 1976. The museum cost \$3,178,000 with \$1,910,000 for construction and \$1,268,000 for exhibits. The city provided \$985,000, Bi-State donated \$550,000, the parking lot supplied \$150,000, and the Federal Government provided \$225,000 for construction. Exhibits were

purchased with \$270,000 from the memorial association, parking lot funds of \$100,000, and Federal funds of \$898,000. The Museum of American Immigration on Ellis Island has since supplanted the Museum of Westward Expansion as the largest in the National Park System.

⁹⁵*The Washington Post*, 16 June 1976; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 December 1976; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 14 March 1978.

⁹⁶*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 12 January 1977; Thomas Eagleton, John C. Danforth, William L. Clay, Robert Young, Richard Gephardt, Bill Burlison to Sidney Yates, 3 May 1977, JEFF.

⁹⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 May 1977; record of phone call between Robert S. Chandler and Vickie Kessler, 16 June 1977, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 17 June 1977; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 24 June 1977.

⁹⁸"Meeting Minutes" Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 10 August 1977, JEFF.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*; Memorandum, Program Coordinator, Midwest Region to Associate Regional Director, Administration, Midwest Region, 8 August 1977, JEFF; memorandum, Museum Specialist, Division of Museum Services to Chief, Division of Museum Services, 6 October 1977, JEFF.

¹⁰⁰*Exhibit Development Project for the Old Courthouse*, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, St. Louis, Missouri, November 1977, JEFF. The four phases of the development referred to the method in which the contracted firm would be selected. Estimated cost of the project was in the range of \$250,000, with 15 percent devoted to planning.

¹⁰¹Norman G. Messinger to Roger Kurtz, 12 April 1977, JEFF.

¹⁰²News Release, National Park Service, 8 July 1977, JEFF.

¹⁰³*Statement For Management, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial National Historical Site*, 31 March 1978, pp. 10-25, JEFF.

¹⁰⁴Robert Chandler to Richard Gephardt, 15 March 1978, JEFF; *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 March 1978.

¹⁰⁵Memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 4 April 1978, JEFF.

¹⁰⁶*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 June 1978; Richard Gephardt to Chandler, 27 June 1978, JEFF; Jefferson National Expansion Memorial National Historic Site, Authorization and Funding Summary, JEFF.

¹⁰⁷*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 16 April 1978; Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, Inc., George L. Crawford and Associates, *Parking Garage and Feasibility, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial*, City of Saint Louis, National Park Service, 18 August 1978, JEFF.

¹⁰⁸Chandler to John C. Thompson, 20 October 1978, JEFF; interview, Robert Chandler, 29 December 1978.

¹⁰⁹*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 June 1978; interview, Norman Messinger, 20 May 1980.

¹¹⁰Memorandum, Regional Director, Midwest Region to Superintendent, JEFF, 22 February 1978, JEFF.

¹¹¹"Meeting Minutes" Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, 1 September 1978, JEFF interview, Norman Messinger, 20 May 1980.

¹¹²"Meeting Minutes" JEFF; *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 2 August 1978; *North St. Louis Community News*, 31 January 1979.

¹¹³Memorandum, Director NPS to Directorate, Field Directorate, WASO Division Chiefs, 25 October 1978, JEFF.

¹¹⁴Memorandum, Acting Superintendent to Regional Director, 17 November 1978, JEFF; memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Regional Director, Midwest Region, 6 August 1979, JEFF.

¹¹⁵Memorandum, Ray Breun to Charles Ross, 12 February 1980, JEFF.

¹¹⁶News Release, National Park Service, "Arch Superintendent to Leave," 15 December 1978, JEFF. Jerry Schober, a native of Vicksburg, Mississippi, served as superintendent at Gettysburg and was superintendent for four years at Golden Gate National Recreational Area in San Francisco before coming to St. Louis.

¹¹⁷*St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 7 May 1979; interview, Norman Messinger, 20 May 1980.

¹¹⁸Memorandum, Structural Engineer, Midwest/ Rocky Mountain Team, DSC to Assistant Manager, Midwest/Rocky Mountain Team DSC, 19 July 1979, JEFF.

¹¹⁹Interview, Norman Messinger, 20 May 1980; interview, Jerry Schober, 22 May 1980.

¹²⁰Interview, Jerry Schober, 22 May 1980; memorandum, Superintendent JEFF to Assistant Regional Solicitor, Denver, 8 May 1980, JEFF.

¹²¹Interview, Robert Chandler, 29 December 1978; interview, Jerry Schober, 22 May 1980.

¹²²Interview, Jerry Schober, 22 May 1980.

¹²³Randall R. Pope to Melvin Price, 26 May 1978, JEFF; Merrill D. Beal to Melvin Price, 12 July 1978, JEFF.

¹²⁴William Whalen to John Kramer, 28 August 1979 JEFF; William E. Loftus to J.L. Dunning [November 1979], JEFF.

¹²⁵Bill, H.R. 6620, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd session, 26 February 1980; William Reichert to Malcom W. Martin, 11 February 1980, JEFF; Institute For Humanistic Studies, *A Proposal for the Institute for Humanistic Studies, a Cultural Arts Complex*, February 1980, JEFF.

¹²⁶Interview, Robert Chandler, 29 December 1978, interview, Jerry Schober, 22 May 1980.

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APPENDIX A: Executive Order

Executive Order

ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A HISTORIC SITE TO BE KNOWN AS THE JEFFERSON NATIONAL EXPANSION MEMORIAL.

WHEREAS the act of August 21, 1935, Public No. 292, 74th Congress, declares it to be a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service has determined that certain lands situate on the west bank of the Mississippi River at and near the site of Old St. Louis, Missouri, possess exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of the United States and are a historic site within the meaning of the said act, since thereon were situate: the Spanish Colonial office where, during the administration of Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States, all the first territory comprised in the Upper Louisiana Purchase was transferred to the United States; the Government House at which, on March 9, 1804, Charles Dehault Delassus, the Spanish commandant in St. Louis, transferred possession of Upper Louisiana to Captain Amos Stoddard of the United States Army, who had been delegated by France as its representative, and at which, on the morning of March 10, 1804, Captain Stoddard, as the agent of the United States, took formal possession of the Louisiana Purchase and raised the American flag, by reason of which transactions the Spanish, French, and American flags waved successively over the site within a period of twenty-four hours; the old French Cathedral of St. Louis, earliest home of religion on the western bank of the Mississippi; the place where Laclede and Chouteau established the first civil government west of the Mississippi; the place where Lafayette was received by a grateful people; the places where the Santa Fe, the Oregon, and other trails originated; the place where Lewis and Clark prepared for their trip of discovery and exploration; and the Court House in which the Dred Scott case was tried; and

WHEREAS the City of St. Louis has agreed to contribute for the project of acquiring and developing the said site the sum of \$2,250,000, which is one-

fourth of the entire amount to be expended for such purposes; and

WHEREAS I find that the said project will be a useful project, and will provide relief, work relief, and increased employment:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, approved April 8, 1935 (Pub. Res. No. 11, 74th Cong.), I hereby allocate to the Secretary of the Interior from the funds made available by the said Act the sum of \$6,750,000, which with the sum of \$2,250,000 to be contributed by the City of St. Louis and accepted by the Secretary of the Interior under authority of the said act of August 21, 1935, will make available for the said project the total sum of \$9,000,000; and the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service, is hereby authorized and directed to expend the said sum of \$9,000,000 in acquiring the said property and in developing and preserving it for the purposes of the said act of August 21, 1935, if and when the City of St. Louis shall make the said sum of \$2,250,000 available to the Secretary of the Interior for such purposes.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The White House,
December 21th, 1935

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APPENDIX B:

U.S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission

ACT CREATING UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL EXPANSION MEMORIAL COMMISSION.

(Public Resolution—No. 32—73d Congress]
[S. J. Res. 93]

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing the creation of a Federal Memorial Commission to consider and formulate plans for the construction, on the western bank of the Mississippi River, at or near the site of old Saint Louis, Missouri, of a permanent memorial to the men who made possible the territorial expansion of the United States, particularly President Thomas Jefferson and his aids, Livingston and Monroe, who negotiated the Louisiana Purchase, and to the great explorers, Lewis and Clark, and the hardy hunters, trappers, frontiersmen, and pioneers and others who contributed to the territorial expansion and development of the United States of America.

Whereas Thomas Jefferson, as President of the United States, insured, through the Louisiana Purchase and the Lewis and Clark Expedition, the expansion of our national domain to the Pacific Ocean; and

Whereas the early exploration and occupancy of these vast territorial additions of diversified climate and great riches, down the Ohio and up the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers and over the Santa Fe Trail and the Oregon Trail to the Pacific, stirred and broadened the Nation to a vision of our safety against encroachment from without and of our economic independence from within, that would come with a rounding out of the national boundary by the annexation of Texas and the acquisition of California; and

Whereas the national expansion of our country westward from its original confines along the eastern seaboard to include a continental empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific is due in large part to the vision and genius of Thomas Jefferson and the other patriotic citizens who worked to the same end; and

Whereas there exists no adequate permanent national memorial to Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, the Lewis and Clark Expedition, or the

other important movements and achievements connected therewith in the Mississippi Valley or elsewhere in the United States; and

Whereas the American people feel a deep debt of gratitude to Thomas Jefferson and all those who contributed to the territorial expansion of our Nation; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby established a commission, to be known as the "United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission" (hereinafter designated as the "United States Commission"), for the purpose of considering and formulating plans for designing and constructing a permanent memorial on the Mississippi River, at Saint Louis, Missouri, said Commission to be composed of fifteen commissioners as follows: Three persons to be appointed by the President of the United States, three Senators by the President of the Senate, three Members of the House of Representatives by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and six members of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association to be selected by such association.

Sec. 2. The United States Commission may in its discretion accept from any source, public or private, money or property to be used for the purpose of making surveys and investigations, formulating, preparing, and considering plans and estimates for the improvement, construction, or other expenses incurred, or to be incurred.

Sec. 3. The United States shall not be held liable for any obligation or indebtedness incurred by the United States Commission, the State of Missouri, the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, the city of Saint Louis, Missouri, or any other agency or officer, employee or agent of them, or any of them, for any purpose.

Approved, June 15, 1934.

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
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APPENDIX C:

Photographs and Illustrations



President Harry Truman, center, confers with Luther Ely Smith at the memorial's dedication June 1950. William Crowder of JNEMA is to the president's left.



The architectural competition jury of award stand on the Old Courthouse steps. From left: S. Herbert Hare, Roland A. Wank, Charles Nagel, Jr., Louis La Beaume, Fiske Kimball, Richard J. Neutra, George Howe and William Wurster.



Eero Saarinen's first stage entry in the architectural competition's second stage.

Jefferson National Expansion




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APPENDIX C:

Photographs and Illustrations (continued)




Eero Saarinen's prize winning entry in the architectural competition's second stage.



Eero Saarinen.



The Arch's triangular sections are composed of stainless and plate steel, concrete and steel tendons.



The Gateway Arch is "topped out" as the final section is inserted on October 28, 1965.

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APPENDIX C:

Photographs and Illustrations (continued)



The Old Courthouse and Luther Ely Smith Square as seen from the top of the Arch in 1979. Photo by Joseph L. Matthews.



Visitor Center and Museum of Westward Expansion Floor Plan. (*click on image for an enlargement in a new window*)

Jefferson National Expansion

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APPENDIX D:

Chronology of Events Jefferson National Expansion Memorial

- December 15 1933** A Civic Committee is formed by Mayor Dickmann at a luncheon to work for establishment of a federal memorial to the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and pioneers of the Mississippi Valley on the central riverfront. Luther Ely Smith made chairman of the committee.
- April 11 1934** The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, non-profit corporation, was organized by the citizens of St. Louis to assist in the movement for the construction of a permanent memorial on the banks of the Mississippi River.
- June 15 1934** President signed Joint Resolution, establishing United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission "for the purpose of considering and formulating plans for designing and constructing a permanent memorial on the Mississippi River, at St. Louis, Missouri."
- June 19 1934** Vice President John H. Garner appointed to the Commission from the Senate:
Hon. Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky
Hon. Frederick Van Nuys of Indiana and
Hon. James J. Davis of Pennsylvania.
- June 21 1934** Speaker Henry T. Rainey appointed to the commission from the House of Representatives:
Hon. Kent F. Keller of Illinois
Hon. John N. Sandlin of Louisiana and
Hon. Lloyd Thurston of Iowa.
- October 25 1934** President Roosevelt appointed to the Commission:
Gen. Jefferson Randolph Koan of Washington, D. C.
William T. Kemper of Kansas City and
J. Lionberger Davis of St. Louis.
- November 15 1934** The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association appointed to the Commission:

Newton D. Baker of Ohio
William Allen White of Kansas
Amon G. Carter of Texas
Charles E. Merriam of Illinois
Matthew Woll of New York and
Luther Ely Smith of Missouri
- December 19 1934** The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission met in St. Louis and organized by electing Senator Alben W. Barkley, Chairman; Dr. Charles E.

Merriam Vice Chairman; Russell Murphy Secretary; and an Executive Committee, consisting of Newton D. Baker, J. Lionberger Davis, William Allen White, William T. Kemper and Luther Ely Smith, Chairman.

January 31 1935 Mayor Dickmann, Senator Barkley and other members of the Commission conferred with Secretary Ickes in Washington. Secretary Ickes inquired as to the number of men that could be employed, and how soon work could begin, how the Memorial would be maintained. We replied "by the National Park Service."

February 1 1935 Mayor Dickmann, Senator Barkley and other members of the Commission conferred with President Roosevelt in regard to the Memorial. President Roosevelt asked about the architectural competition, the number of unemployed in St. Louis within a radius of 50 miles, how soon we could begin the work and how long it would take to complete it. President Roosevelt stated that it would be impossible to ear-mark funds for the entire cost of such a project but under any additional Works Relief Fund the government's policy would be to allot that amount of money which could be expanded in the first year's work.

April 10 1935 Governor approved H. B. 445 authorizing City of St. Louis, upon approval of the voters, to issue bonds up to \$8,000,000 "for the purpose of providing funds to pay by way of assistance to the United States, or its qualified authority, in consideration of and in order to induce the location and establishment within such city or such Park or Plaza. . . ." Laws of Mo. 1935, p. 93.

April 13 1935 The Executive Committee of the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission received and approved report on Plan and Scope, setting forth the boundaries of the area for the Memorial, an analysis of the historical significance of the Memorial and an estimate of \$30,000,000 as the cost of the acquisition of the area and development of the Memorial, plans for a national architectural competition, self-liquidating features of the project, and other phases of the plan.

April 19 1935 Senator Barkley, Mr. Smith and Mr. Murphy conferred with Mr. Hopkins regarding the Memorial as a Federal work relief project. Mr. Hopkins stated that the project was unique and of such vast extent that only the President could approve it. He expressed an interest in the amount of work relief that would be done included the time within which the site could be acquired, and the number of men that could be employed.

April 30 1935 St. Louis Board of Aldermen unanimously adopted Resolution, committing City to hold bond issue election and to take necessary steps to vacate streets and alleys in Memorial area. Journal of Board of Aldermen, 1935-36.

May 1 1935 The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, at a meeting in Washington, D. C., by unanimous vote, adopted the report of its Executive Committee of April 13, 1935 (copies of this report were filed with the President, the Vice-President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives).

May 2 1935 The formal application of the Commission was filed in Washington with the Works Allotment Board.

May 2 1935 Mayor Dickmann, Senator Barkley and other members of the Commission conferred with Mr. Frank C. Walker and Dr. Rexford Tugwell.

June-July 1935 City of St. Louis passed the necessary ordinances permitting its citizens to vote upon a bond issue to contribute up to \$7,500,000 for a United States Territorial Expansion Memorial. Ord. 40,592.

July 1 1935 The Board of Aldermen of the City of St. Louis passed a bond issue in the amount of \$7,500,000.00 for the acquisition of the site, setting the date for the election as September 10th, 1935.

July The Board of Estimate and Apportionment of St. Louis authorized the

expenditure of \$65,000.00 for registration for said bond issue election.

August 1 1935 At a conference in St. Louis, Col. Hackett of PWA discussed with city officials and members of the Commission the beginning and prosecution of work for first year, we agreeing that if the government approved the plan and then allocated funds for the first year's work (roughly estimated by Col. Hackett at \$15,000,000), it would meet the requirements of our situation.

August 7 1935 Senator Clark, Mayor Dickmann, and members of the Commission explain to Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins that an additional authorization of \$75,000 for the required legal advertising and other election expenses was necessary at once in order to hold the bond election on September 10, 1935. Mayor Dickmann stated that the City Officers and citizens were reluctant to have that additional expense incurred without some sort of an assurance from the government that it approved the project and could proceed with the work of the Memorial. Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins agreed that they appreciated this feeling, but Mr. Ickes explained that only those funds which could be expended in one year could be allotted. Mayor Dickmann and Mr. Smith stated that they understood this policy and that approval of the project the city would be willing to turn over the \$7,500,000 for the site. Mr. Ickes asked how much money could be expended in one year's work. Mayor Dickmann answered it was Mr. Louis LaBeaume, Advising Architect's estimate that the figure would amount to approximately \$10,000,000 or \$12,000,000. After asking on the telephone for information regarding funds available, and after consulting with Mr. Hopkins regarding his part in the preliminary work of demolition, grading, leveling, etc., Mr. Ickes stated that the government would go ahead with the project on the basis of those funds which could be expended in the period of one year.

Mr. Hopkins asked how the Memorial would be maintained and Mr. Ickes replied "by the National Park Service."

Mr. Hopkins told Mr. Ickes that St. Louis would want a letter from him confirming this understanding and Mr. Ickes replied, "I have made a lot of commitments since I have been here, but I have never put any of them in writing." Mr. John asked Mr. Ickes if he would make a statement to the Press. Mr. Ickes said "No, Senator Clark is here and he can make the announcement." Mr. Murphy inquired if an announcement could be made by the Works Allotment board. Mr. Ickes stated such an announcement would be forthcoming after the City had voted its bonds. At the conclusion of the conference Senator Clark made the announcement to Mr. Childs of the St. Louis Post Dispatch who was waiting in an outer office."

August 9 1935 The Board of Estimate and apportionment authorized the expenditure of \$75,000 necessary for the election.

August 15 —17 1935 Mr. Nagle of the National Park Service visited St. Louis and made a thorough examination of the project and reported favorably.

August 21 1935 President signed Act on "Historic Sites, Buildings, Objects, and Antiquities."

September 10 1935 Citizens of St. Louis, at a special election, passed the \$7,500,000 bond issue by more than a two-thirds majority.

September 16- September 26 1935 Conferences were held in Washington by and between Mr. Ickes, Mr. Hopkins, Officials of the Department of Justice, Representatives of the United States Commission and the St. Louis Committee. An executive order, authorizing the project, was drawn by P. W. A. and Department of Justice Attorneys, but the ordinance was disapproved by Secretary Ickes because it provided for an

allotment of \$22,500,000.00, which was more than could be spent in one year.

September 23 1935 Mayor Dickmann, Senator Clark, and a group of local citizens conferred with the president, Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins at the president's train in East St. Louis. Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins, at that time, stated that they would be glad to furnish the funds necessary for the first year's work.

September 23 1935 Suit was filed in St. Louis Circuit Court to test the validity of the bonds.

September 23 1935 Mayor approved Ordinance 40,651, directing issue of \$7,500,000 bonds.

September 26 1935 Mayor approved Ordinance 40,656 declaring result of bond issue election.

September 27 1935 Senator Clark, Mayor Dickmann, and Mr. Edgar L. Wayman, Associate City Counselor conferred with President Roosevelt, Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins on their special train in East St. Louis. President Roosevelt suggested that the State Enabling Act be "interpreted," and Mr. Ickes and Mr. Hopkins stated that when the funds were provided for the acquisition of the site, they would be willing to allot the amount that could be expended by July 1.

September 30 1935 Test bond suit argued before Judge O'Malley in St. Louis.

October 1 1935 Judge O'Malley sustained City's demurrer to petition in Bond Test Suit.

October 1 1935 Appeal taken to Missouri Supreme Court by opponents, and case specially for hearing October 15, 1935.

October 15 1935 Suit argued and submitted in Missouri Supreme Court.

November 2 1935 Missouri Supreme Court handed down decision affirming validity of bonds.

November 3 1935 Missouri Supreme Court, in test case, sustained validity of City's Bond Issue.

November 4 1935 Executive Order drafted.

November 7-19 1935 Mayor Dickmann, with Mr. Hay and Mr. Wayman of the City Law Department, Mr. Smith, Mr. La Beaume, and Mr. Murphy of the Commission conferred in Washington with Department of Justice, Mr. Ickes, Mr. Hopkins, P. W. A., National Parks Service. Mr. Ickes stated that the funds advanced would last for the fiscal year ending July 1, 1938, and asked us to see Mr. Foley with reference to draft of Executive Order and Col. Hackett with reference to the amount that could be allotted.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he was ready to start the minute the site became public property.

November 18 1935 Attorney General Cummings rendered an opinion to the President recommending that the draft of Executive Order then under consideration be not signed, but that we seek authorization from Congress for the project.

There could hardly have been any misunderstanding in the important meeting of August 7th, since after the Supreme Court decision, Secretary Ickes understood to do exactly what was agreed upon in that conference—namely, to have the general plans approved and funds allotted up to July. He requested Mr. Foley and other lawyers of the latter's PWA legal department to draft the Executive Order for the President. This order was accordingly prepared.

At no time in the history of the negotiations was it ever suggested to a representative of the United States Commission or the City of St. Louis that the Attorney General be consulted. Presumably, Mr. Ickes always believed that his own PWA lawyers would be able to tell him what could and what could not be done under the provisions of the Emergency Relief Bill of 1933. That there was no doubt in their mind or in the Secretary's mind about the project being approved. This is indicated by the fact that they prepared the Executive Order and that Secretary Ickes took it to the White House for signature. Even as late as November 5, Mr. Early, Assistant Secretary to the President advised the City to "See Secretary Ickes."

On Wednesday November 13, Mr. Childs of the Post Dispatch called Mr. Murphy and stated that Mr. Brandt, also of the Post Bureau had asked the president if he had seen the Executive Order. The president said that he had not. He also said, "You know we have an oral agreement to do the initial work on this project." On November 15th Mr. Childs again called and stated that at the Press Conference that day Mr. Brandt had again asked the president if he had seen the Executive Order. The president answered, "I haven't seen it, but I discussed it with Secretary Ickes at luncheon. I expect to sign it this afternoon." It was that afternoon that the Attorney General held up the signing of the order. Cummings said that he would not accept \$7,500,000 from the city due to provisions of Enabling Act.

December 19 1935 Cummings changes mind—under Historic Sites he can justify the park's establishment.

December 21 1935 President signed Executive Order 7253, designating Secretary of Interior to acquire and develop Jefferson National Expansion Memorial with allocation of \$6,750,000 of Federal funds to be matched by \$2,250,000 contributed by City of St. Louis.

The allocation of \$6,750,000 was made upon application of U. S. Commission to Public Works Administration. The Memorial project was one item of a comprehensive program of public works prepared by the Public Works Administrator, under direction of the President, pursuant to provisions of Emergency Relief Act.)

December 24 1935 Suit to restrain city from selling bonds filed on behalf of Edward A. Coleman, taxpayer.

December 30 1935 Circuit Court throws out suit.

Jan-March 1936 Injunction suits in State Courts to restrain City officials from proceeding with Memorial, decided and suits dismissed.

January 2 1936 Second suit to block memorial bond sale filed by Harry L. Rothschlaeger.

January 20 1936 Second suit thrown Out of court.

January 22 1936 WPA announces that \$6,750,000 had been released for the riverfront.

February 1 1936 Mayor approved Ordinance 40,746, authorizing payment of \$2,250,000 out of bond issue funds, to United States Government.

February 4 1936 Paul O. Peters, head of Independent Citizens' Committee opposed to St. Louis project, announces he is beginning a propaganda campaign to convince

Congress President Roosevelt was "duped" when he signed executive order authorizing Jefferson Memorial.

May 1936 City of St. Louis deposited in the treasury of the United States, \$2,250,000 realized from the sale of that amount of City bonds, making a total of \$9,000,000 available for acquisition and development. (Leaving \$5,250,000 of City bonds unissued—available to match further Federal Funds in the ratio of one dollar of St. Louis funds to three dollars of Federal funds.)

June 1 1936 Injunction suit filed by objectors in the United States District Court in Washington, D. C., to restrain Secretary Ickes and associates from using the funds and proceeding with the work (*Balter v. Ickes*).

June 1936 The National Park Service established an office in St. Louis for the development of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. John L. Nagle is first superintendent.

June 24 1936 The District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia dismissed a suit to enjoin the National Park Service from proceeding with the project. (Appeal taken.)

June 24 1936 Riverfront objectors lose injunction suit filed by 38 firms and individuals.

August 17 1936 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted a temporary injunction, pending appeal, thereby preventing land acquisition until appeal was disposed of.

1936-1940 Historical and planning studios made concurrently with the program of land acquisition.

September 1936 Bond issue election fraud expose in *Post-Dispatch*.

June 1937 to July 1938 Forty Petitions (one for each block) filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to condemn lands in the area to be acquired for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.

January 1937 First consideration of including Old Courthouse.

March 8 1937 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed District Court's decree denying injunction against use of funds for land acquisition for Memorial. (*Balter v. Ickes*) Petition for Certiorari to review this decision was filed in United States Supreme Court.

March 31 Frank Wright hired as negotiator between TRRA (Terminal Railroad Association) and NPS.

June 1 1937 Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court (*Balter vs. Ickes*) thereby completely terminating the case and dissolving the injunction of Aug. 17, 1936, leaving in full force and effect the decision of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia which had been rendered on March 8, 1937.

June 3 1937 First condemnation suits filed to acquire land in 37-block riverfront area.

July 1 1937 Mayor approved Ordinance 41,142, authorizing Mayor and Comptroller to deed Old Courthouse to U. S. Government. Ordinance declares it is consensus of Board "to cooperate with the Government of the United States and its officers in the presentation of and perpetuation of the site of the National Expansion Memorial. . . ."

July 12 1937 to July 11 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied application for a temporary injunction in a new suit which sought to hold up the project.

1938

January 1938 to June 1939 Commissioners appointed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri returned an aggregate appraisal award for the area under condemnation of \$7,012,554.

May 23 1938 Ickes insists on removal of elevated tracks. Mayor Dickmann says tracks only minor point.

June-October 1938 Three cases heard in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in which the constitutionality of all laws and orders authorizing the Memorial were questioned. All three were decided in favor of the Government's right to proceed. (Appeals taken).

July 11 1938 TRRA directors discuss ruling that elevated tracks must be removed but take no formal action.

August 10 1938 Tunnel proposed by park service for tracks.

January 27 1939 United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the first condemnation suit to reach that Court (*Barnidge v. United States*) upheld the validity of all steps taken by the Government in acquiring the land (certiorari to United States Supreme Court was not applied for.)

March 17 1939 Representative Cochran beats move to block riverfront aid by Representative Lambertson of Kansas and Representative Rich of Pennsylvania.

April 22 1939 Terminal has agreed to co-operate with city in plan to remove elevated tracks, Dickmann announces.

June 1 1939 The Government, though free to act, made no move toward taking title or acquiring possession of the lands in the Area until the full period of ninety days within which petition could be filed to the U. S. Supreme Court for writ of certiorari to review the decision in the Barnidge case. No such petition was filed, thus terminating that case, leaving the decision in favor of the Government in full force and effect.

June 14 1939 Funds, totaling \$6,183,480 were deposited in the Registry of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri as the reasonable value of the lands to be acquired for the Memorial under a Declaration of Taking, and title to 37 blocks and portions of 3 others was thereby vested in the United States.

January 1940 "Orders of Taking" were requested and granted by the United States District Court at St. Louis in each of the forty condemnation suits, and the estimated reasonable value of the various tracts of land was paid into Court, thereby vesting in the United States title to the land comprising the area. The estimated cost of acquiring the land was approximately \$6,000,000.

February 5 1940 Balance of funds still in U. S. Treasury, contributed by St. Louis from its bond sale, ruled NOT subject to being lapsed back into U. S. Treasury, and still available for expenditure.

March 1940 All appropriations unexpended held to have lapsed back into General Treasury. \$417,000 not checked out of the \$6,750,000 Federal funds held to be unexpended, and under the rule to have lapsed back into the U. S. Treasury.

March 15 1940 Government gets title of all of site; 37 blocks for total of \$5,970,000.

June 13—30 1939 Meeting between city officials and Terminal ends in franchise deadlocks.

June 30 1939 Demolition begun—the first building in the area (No. 7 Market Street) was demolished. Demolition began Block 6, directly on the riverfront. A two-story brick building of no architectural or historical consequence was the first to go,

and Mayor Dickmann was on hand with several members of the Memorial Association, newspaper photographers, JNEM staff, and others. The Mayor autographed bricks for several souvenir-hunters in the crowd.

- June 30, 1939** The demolition of all buildings to be removed from the Memorial area was completed in May 1942.
- July 19 1939** Demolition contracts covering the entire area have been let, which should complete the removal of the buildings by the Spring of 1941.
- August 18 1939** State Highway Commission meets with Dickmann to discuss removal of elevated and street level tracks .
- October 9 1939** Cost estimates indicate that the original allocation will pay for the land, demolish the buildings and provide \$750,000 for stabilization and improvements.
- October 1939 to May 1942** Of the 479 parcels under condemnation, 78 per cent thus far have been settled satisfactorily as to price, by agreements with the owners.
- March 15 1940** As result of negotiations with owners, the aggregate amount paid into Court as just compensation is \$6,248,935.
- May 1940** Acceptance of Old Court House approved by President, thus rounding out and completing the Memorial area.
- May 10 1940** Dickmann sees Ickes on moving tracks, suggests that parking area be built under west section of Memorial.
- July 3 1940** New plan sought for removal of tracks; three-man (one by the City, one by terminal, one by NPS) engineering board to work on problem; Terminal proposal rejected by Ickes.
- July 25 1940** City Board of Estimate and Apportionment votes to notify Terminal Association it must find another route for trains than the levee's elevated tracks.
- November 1940** Julian C. Spotts succeeds John L. Nagle as superintendent of Jefferson Memorial Expansion.
- December 4 1940** Mayor approved Ordinance 41,950, authorizing cooperative agreement with United States Government for improvement, construction and maintenance of Third Street.
- December 1940** Bids were opened for putting a new roof on all four wings of the Old Courthouse, using a new steel frame, over which a new lead-sheathed copper roof was laid. Early in 1941 additional contracts were let for plumbing, heating, and electrical work in the whole building; for the painting of the entire exterior of the building; and for plastering, painting, floor finishing and museum cases in the South Wing, first and second floors; and a part of the second floor in the East Wing.
- December 1940 to July 1942** Contracts for work in the Old Courthouse were performed, involving the construction of a new steel frame and lead-sheathed copper roof; installing plumbing, heating, electrical and fire protection systems; the restoring of portions of the building; and the painting of all exterior surfaces. The contract work, together with force account work and construction material purchased, required an expenditure of \$183,389.
- December 1940 to November 1941** Presidential approval was granted for Works Projects Administration projects for: Restoring the Old Rock House; the General Improvement of the Memorial area; the Construction of National Memorial Drive (widening Third Street); Partial Restoration of the the Old Courthouse; Preparing Museum Exhibits; and constructing New Facilities in the Memorial area.
- January** Projects for Restoring the Old Rock House, General Improvement of the

1941 to January 1943 Memorial area and Preparing Museum Exhibits were started, the first-named project being completed on March 6, 1942, whereas the latter two were officially closed by the terminating of the W. P. A. activities on January 30, 1943. The grading project had been virtually completed in October 1942.

January 14 1941 Demolition of historic Old Custom House begins.

March 26 1941 Chief engineer of Missouri Pacific Lines describes plan to remove elevated and surface tracks from riverfront.

April 12 1941 Mayor approved Ordinance 42,059, vacating streets and alleys in Memorial area.

July 1941 A contract was let with the Kramer Construction Company for the remodeling of the South Wing of the Old Courthouse.

July 10 1941 Ickes has agreed to Mayor Becker's plan to remove elevated and leave surface tracks.

September 26 1941 Terminal officials listen as city officials outline proposal for re-routing passenger trains over Munny bridge to remove elevated tracks. Cold reception given plan.

October 21 1941 Mayor signed Ordinance 42,139, designating Third Street as "Memorial Highway."

December 1 1941 The offices of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, National Park Service, were moved into the restored south wing of the Old Courthouse.

December 3 1941 Prodding letter sent by city administration to TRRA as to plans for track removal.

January 23 1942 Mayor Dee Becker rejects TRRA proposal that removal of tracks be postponed until after war.

March 18 1942 Becker announces city will ask I. C. C. for order directing TRRA to remove tracks.

May 1942 The demolition of all buildings to be removed from the Memorial area was completed in May, 1942.

August 4 1942 Ickes urges I. C. C. to approve track removal plan.

September 17 1942 Track removal hearing opened by I. C. C.

October 20 1942 The Museum of National Expansion was opened to the public in temporary quarters in a portion of the south wing of the Old Courthouse.

April 4 1943 Examiner recommends I. C. C. dismiss city suit.

February 29 1944 Last suit over riverfront area ended, winding up seven years of litigation for 37 —block site at cost of \$8,804,048 for land, razing of buildings and clearing of site.

May 4 1944 City, Park Service and Memorial Association propose demolishing elevated tracks and diverting traffic to Washington avenue tunnel and East Side.

July 7 1944 City, Park Service and Memorial Association propose demolishing elevated tracks and diverting traffic to Washington avenue tunnel and East Side.

January 29 1945 Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association opens \$225,000 competition for design for Memorial.

1945 to 1947 The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association solicited funds to finance a nationwide architectural competition to obtain the best idea for developing the Memorial area. A subscription of \$225,000 was completed in

February 1947.

August

1945 to October 1945 The first floor of the west wing of the Old Courthouse was restored at a cost of \$4,173.

June 6 1946 Parking project on riverfront opens.

January 1947 The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association engaged Mr. George Howe, F. A. I. A., as Professional Advisor in conducting the competition.

May 1947 The United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission approved the plans prepared by the Professional Advisor for the nationwide competition. The program of the competition was mailed to the competitors.

September 1947 Five prizes of \$10,000 each were awarded the winners of the first stage of the competition.

December

1947 to February 1948 The dome of the Old Courthouse was resurfaced with copper. Total cost \$17,723.

February 1948 Mr. Eero Saarinen and Associates was adjudged winner of the second and final stage of the competition.

May 25 1948 The U. S. Commission approved the winning design of Mr. Eero Saarinen and recommended to the Secretary of the Interior that the design be adopted and Mr. Saarinen be employed as architect.

The Secretary of the Interior accepted the recommendations.

June 1948 The Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association donated \$15,000 to the Department of the Interior for the purpose of preparing estimates of the cost of the proposed development of the Memorial and the employment, on a temporary basis, of Mr. Eero Saarinen to assist in preparing the estimates.

July 1948

to September 1948 The U. S. Engineers made a topographic survey of the Memorial area and supplied the National Park Service with a contour map.

December 1948 A contract between Eero Saarinen and the National Park Service was entered into for the purpose of preparing preliminary estimates of the cost of the Memorial.

December

1948 to February 1949 The U. S. Engineers made core borings into the foundations for the Memorial arch.

January 7 1949 TRRA abandons May plan for removal of tracks and offers substitute plan to place three tracks on earthwork embankment east of and level with Memorial.

May 17 1949 The U. S. Commission received the report of the Executive Committee on progress of the drafting of an authorization bill for introduction in the Congress and directed that committee to proceed with utmost speed to complete a final draft and report it to the Commission at the earliest possible moment.

May 17 1949 Mayor Darst tells Memorial Commission he hopes riverfront will be dedicated in four years.

July 8 1949 TRRA and other railroad officials agree to placing tracks in tunnel after Mayor Darst says he will use site for housing if he cannot get agreement on relocating

tracks.

December 6 1949 Memorandum of Understanding in regard to relocation of Missouri Pacific and Terminal Railroad tracks signed by the City of St. Louis, U. S. Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, Eero Saarinen and the National Park Service and Missouri Pacific Railroad.

December 9 1949 National Park Service approves memorandum of understanding for removal of TRRA two elevated tracks to modified tunnel.

December 23 1949 Interior Secretary Chapman approves track relocation agreement.

January 1950 An authorization bill was introduced in Congress to provide for the construction of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial at the site of Old St. Louis Missouri, in accordance with the plan approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, and for other purposes.

In the House of Representatives the bill was introduced by Hon. John B. Sullivan, member of the U. S. Commission, identified as H. R. 6573, and referred to the Committee on House Administration.

In the Senate the authorization bill was introduced by Hon. Clinton P. Anderson (for himself, Senators Martin and Morse, all members of the U. S. Commission), identified as S. 2784, and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

January 6 1950 Bill authorizing construction of Memorial introduced in Congress by Senators Anderson, Martin and Morse; aims to complete project by 1953.

January 10 1950 TRRA directors ratify track relocation agreement.

May 10 1950 Hearing on authorization bill for construction of Memorial, H. R. 6573 was held in Washington before the Library Subcommittee of the Committee on House Administration Hon. Ken Regan, Chairman.

May 16 1950 Library Subcommittee reported favorably authorization bill H. R. 6573 with City, Committee and Government amendments.

May 22 1950 Amended authorization bill, as reported favorably by Library Subcommittee, introduced in the House of Representatives by Hon. John B. Sullivan . . . identified as H. R. 8591 and referred to Committee on House Administration.

June 10 1950 Jefferson National Expansion Memorial site dedicated by President Harry S. Truman.

June 15 1950 Hearing held in Jefferson City before Missouri Public Service Commission on Case No. 11,935. City of St. Louis and JNEMA complainants, appealed for Commission's approval of an 18-foot vertical clearance in proposed railroad tunnel for Terminal and Missouri Pacific Tracks. Hearing continued to July 17, 1950.

June 29 Committee on House Administration reported favorable authorization bill H. R. 8591 . . . Mary Norton, Chairman.

June 29 1950 Mrs. Norton asked for unanimous consent of House for consideration of H. R. 8591. Inasmuch as the bill involved a cost exceeding \$1,000,000, Representative Francis Case's objection was heard and the bill referred to the Rules Committee for ruling . . . Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois, Chairman.

July 6 1950 Amended bill (counterpart of H. R. 8591) introduced in Senate by Senator Clinton P. Anderson (Senators Martin and Morse, co-sponsors) and identified as S. 3867 . . . referred to Committee on Rules and Administration.

- July 17 1950** Hearing (continued from June 15, 1950) held in Jefferson City on Case No. 11,935 . . . request for approval of 18—foot vertical clearance in railroad tunnel.
- July 20 1950** The JNEMA, in view of the Korean War and international situation, adopted policy of making a determined effort to obtain passage of the authorization bills in the Second Session of the 81st Congress; however, requests for appropriation bill or bills would await such time as the President of the United States or the Secretary of the Interior felt that the time was propitious.
- July to December 1950** Efforts were continued and arrangements made to procure a hearing before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration but upon the Chinese intervention in the Korean War these efforts were necessarily dropped upon the advice of Vice President Barkley, Senator Anderson and others.
- January 8 1951** Senator Clinton P. Anderson (with Senators Martin, Morse and Hennings as co-sponsors) introduced authorization bill in 82nd on Interior and Insular Affairs . . . Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming, Chairman.
- February 27 1951** Representative Frank M. Karsten introduced authorization bill in 82nd Congress . . . bill identified as H. R. 2937 and referred to the Committee on House Administration . . . Hon. Thomas B. Stanley of Virginia, Chairman.
- March 1 1951** Agreement between the City of St. Louis and the Department of the Interior was entered into for the purpose of temporary landscaping and beautifying the Memorial area.
- April 2 1951** Luther Ely Smith dies.
- June 1 1951** Upon the advice of the sponsors of the legislation, other Congressmen and friends . . . to wit: that it would be unwise to seek a hearing because of the number and nature of matters pending before Congress, and that the bills could be heard in a more propitious atmosphere either later in the year or during the 1952 Session of the 82nd Congress; the Association decided to defer requests for hearings on S. 230 and H. R. 2937.
- August 7 1952** The Missouri Public Service Commission approved the 18—foot vertical clearance in the tunnel for the relocation of the railroad tracks extending in front of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial. Case No. 11,935.
- August 8 1952** Missouri Public Service Commission approves riverfront rail relocation and tunnel.
- January 29 1953** Five (identical) authorization bills were introduced in the House of Representatives to provide for the construction of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial at the site of old Saint Louis, Missouri in general accordance with the plan approved by the United States Territorial Expansion Memorial Commission, and for other purposes. The Bills were numbered H. R. 2215; H. R. 2216; H. R. 2217; H. R. 2218; and H. R. 2219; were introduced by Mrs. John D. Sullivan, and Messrs. Melvin Price, Frank Karsten; C. W. Bishop, and Thomas Curtis, respectively; and referred to the Committee on House Administration.
- February 18 1953** Bill introduced in the Senate by Hon. Thomas C. Hennings (for himself, Mr. Anderson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Morse and Mr. Symington) authorizing the construction of an appropriate memorial upon the Jefferson National Expansion memorial National Historic Site. The bill was identified as No. 970 and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
- March 6 1953** Argument held in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, on the Railroad Unions' petition to refuse the order of the Public Service Commission of Missouri authorizing the 18—foot clearance in the riverfront tunnel.
- May 18** Hearing on authorization bill for construction Memorial, S. 970, was held in

- 1953** Washington before Library Subcommittee of the Committee of the Committee on Rules and Administration—Senator William A. Purtell, Chairman of the Subcommittee.
- May 18 1953** Mayor Tucker in Washington with group of St. Louisans asking Congress to authorize immediate completion of memorial.
- May 19 1953** Hearing on authorization bill for construction of Memorial, M. R. 2316 (one of five identical bills introduced January 29, 1953), was held in Washington before the Library Subcommittee of the Committee on House Administration—Hon. Robert D. Harrison, Chairman of the Subcommittee.
- May 23 1953** Tunnel method for relocating surface and elevated tracks challenged by rail unions, upheld in Cole County Circuit Court.
- July 27 1953** Following the hearing before the House Subcommittee a revised bill was formulated out of alterations and revisions of H. R. 2216. The bill limited authorization to only five elements of the plan as accepted by the U. S. Commission and the Department of the Interior and was introduced in the House of Representatives by Mrs. John B. Sullivan. The bill was identified as H. R. 6549 was reported out by the Committee on House Administration and passed by the House of Representatives by Mrs. John B. Sullivan. The bill was identified as H. R. 6549 and referred to the Committee on House Administration.
- July 31 1953** H. R. 6549 was reported out by the Committee on House Administration and passed by the House of Representatives.
- August 1 1953** H. R. 6549 was introduced in the Senate of the United States and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
- August 1953** A contract was entered into between the National Park Service and Continental Construction Company in the amount of \$47,513.00 for restoration of the first three balconies in the Rotunda; and re-plastering the Dred Scott Room in the West Wing.
- February 1954** A contract was let to the Ideson Construction Company for replacing exterior doors and windows in various parts of the building, and their contract totaled \$15,522.00.
- March 1954** A contract was let to Puckett Flooring Company for asphalt tile in the Dred Scott Room in the amount of \$439.50.
- March 1954** LeCoutour Construction Co. began restoration of the North Wing and Part of the West Wing for \$43,400.00. The same Company in the same month got a contract for restoring the Oval Courtroom in the East Wing for 14,696.00.
- March 1954** The Alberice Construction Company was awarded the contract for new granite steps at the four entrances to the building—their contract amounting to \$17,886.90.
- May 10 1954** House accepts Senate riverfront bill and sends it to President Eisenhower; Government aid limited to \$5,000,000 instead of the \$22,500,000 originally planned.
- May 17 1954** President Eisenhower signs Public Law 361 (H. R. 6549) an Act authorizing the construction of the memorial in accordance with the Saarinen Plan approved by the U. S. Territorial Commission on May 25, 1948, and authorizing an appropriation of \$5,000,000 to complete certain elements of the memorial.
- May 1954** Stanley Hanks Painting Company was awarded the contract for painting five second floor rooms in the south Wing for \$478.00.
- June 1954** One hundred folding chairs of special design and finish for the Oval Courtroom in the East Wing. Chairs bought from National Chair Co. for \$780.00.

- June 1954** Old box locks on the large doors of the building were restored and some of them replaced in kind by Tobe Monday of Webster Groves for \$495.00.
- July 1954** R. F. Koedding Painting Co. was awarded the contract for painting the exterior of the Courthouse, in the amount of \$9,726.00.
- August 1954** Hasemann Manufacturing Company was authorized to proceed with making and installing special millwork in the Oval Courtroom, East Wing, and in the light wells of the East and North Wings. The two contracts awarded to Hasemann totaled \$1,399.00.
- August 1954** Contract for furnishing and laying linoleum in the large rooms and halls of the North Wing was let to Val Baker for \$4,387.00.
- October 1954** Contract was let to the Continental Construction Company for laying a new brick sidewalk on all four sides of the Courthouse Square, following the pattern that is shown in the Boehl photograph dated 1868. The amount of the contract was \$43,445.00.
- November 1954** A contract for wrought iron window guards at all the basement windows was awarded to the Ludlow-Saylor Co. in the amount of \$3,260.90.
- November 1954** Another contract was the furnishing and laying of linoleum around the Judge's Bench and the Jury Box in the Oval Courtroom, East Wing. Amount of contract \$401.40.
- 1955—1956** Murals in the rotunda of the Old Courthouse were restored.
- March 1955** One of the most important contracts in the restoration program was begun. This was the restoration of the Rotunda and West Courtroom on the second floor. Elaborate scaffolding had to be put in place first before removal of old plaster could begin. The contract for this again went to LeCoutour Construction Company, whose bid was \$62,600.00. By the latter part of May it was possible for restoration work on the mural paintings to begin, under the supervision of Walter Mitkiewicz, of the Museum Division, National Park Service.
- May 1955** Contract was let to Carl Schaefer for electrical work in the Rotunda for \$3,570.00.
- June, 1954 and November 1955** Payments totaling \$665.27 were made on the steel scaffolding.
- November 1955** A contract was let to the Ted Puckett Flooring Company for green carpet on the Judge's platform and the Jury Box. The amount of the contract was \$483.50.
- March 1 1956** Cooperative agreement for parking lot—NPS with St. Louis City.
- May 19 1956** The president signed a supplemental appropriation bill making available \$2,640,00 for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.
- June 1956** A contract was signed with Pring Brothers for the landscaping of the four yards within the Courthouse Square. The amount of the contract was \$5,800.00.
- October 2 1956** TRRA, Missouri Pacific, National Park Service and city agree to finance engineering study for the relocation of tracks on tunnel.
- November 1956** Contract was let to Smith-Cooke Construction Company for the creation of the fence surrounding the Courthouse Square. This totaled \$120,637.00—about \$50,000 being for the gray granite base which came from Minnesota; and the for the ornamental iron railing, posts and gates fabricated by Kupferer Brothers Ornamental Iron Company of St. Louis.
- May 1957** Contract was let to Smith-Cooke Construction Company for providing a

concrete floor in S19 and S20—a large space on the south side of the hall on the first floor of the East Wing. The amount involved was \$495.90. Other work in these rooms, including plastering, involved \$398.00.

- May and June 1957** Work was begun on the Reception Room, north side of hall on first floor of East Wing. Butler Kohaus Company got the contract for ceiling light fixtures at \$336.00; Contemporary Furniture Company chairs and small tables at \$1,424.00; while Hill & Hill for special cabinets and desks got \$11,929.00.
- May 6 1957** Alfred Benesch & Associates recommends memorial be built but that decision on track relocation be postponed until after memorial is in use.
- May 12 1957** TRRA President Chinn admits he proposed Benesch firm to make relocation survey.
- May 19 1957** National Park Service announces it has decided to go ahead with the Saarinen plan, including the arch, and will ask Congress for approval.
- October 2 1957** The National Park Service announced a revision of the Memorial Plan whereby the tunnel for the relocation of the elevated tracks was shortened, thereby reducing the costs. This revised plan also showed abandonment of the Museum of Architecture and the early St. Louis buildings to be reproduced near the Old Cathedral.
- October 4 1957** U. S. Territorial Expansion Commission approves revised memorial plans: Missouri Pacific will accept them.
- November 15 1958** Railroads, Department of Interior and city accept general terms of revised plans for track relocation.
- February 21 1958** Railroads reported studying new plan for relocating tracks that would eliminate tunnel and open cuts.
- March 1958** A contract was let to Butler-Kohaus Company for new bracket, lights in the West Courtroom and also desk lights in the West and East Courtrooms.
- March 21 1958** U. S. Territorial Expansion Commission voted to request Congress to appropriate additional sum of \$14,610,000 to be extended by the United States for construction of the Memorial at the ratio of \$3 of Federal funds for each \$1 of money contributed by the City of St. Louis or other non Federal source.
- April 15 1958** Terminal, City of St. Louis and National Park Service in substantial agreement on all phases of track relocation including distributions of costs.
- May 1958** LeCoutour Construction Company was awarded the contract for plastering the basement in the North Wing of the Old Courthouse in the amount of \$6,193.00.
- June 2 1958** Track Relocation Agreement between City of St. Louis, National Park Service, Terminal Railroad Association and Missouri Pacific Railroad, signed.
- June 16 1958** Escrow Agreement signed whereby Terminal Railroad Association deposited \$500,000 in escrow as their contribution toward relocation of elevated railroad tracks.
- June 19 1958** Mayor Tucker approved an ordinance of the Board of Aldermen of the City of St. Louis providing for the sale of bonds to match the Federal appropriation of \$2,640,000.
- June 26 1958** Public Service Commission modified their order of August 7, 1952 and approved the relocation of the elevated tracks in a 960 foot tunnel with an eighteen (18) foot overhead clearance above top of rail.
- June 1958** Bensinger Supply Company delivered the special chairs and tables for the West Courtroom for which they were paid \$1,365.00.
- July 1958** The Federal Office Furniture Company delivered the specially made walnut chairs for the spectators' section of the West Courtroom. Price for 50 of these was \$1,750.00

- July 1 1958** Six (identical) bills were introduced in Congress to amend the authorization Act of May 17, 1954 (Public Law 361) to provide for construction of the entire Jefferson National Expansion Memorial project by authorizing a total appropriation of \$17,250,000. Bill S. 4085 introduced in the Senate by Messrs. Stuart Symington, Hon. Thomas C. Hennings and Clinton P. Anderson and referred to Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Bills H. R. 13242, Mrs. Leonor K. Sullivan; H. R. 13243, Frank M. Karsten; H. R. 13244, Thomas B. Curtis; H. R. 13245, Mr. Melvin Price; H. R. 13246, Mr. Kenneth J. Gray—referred to the Committee on House Administration.
- August 1958** Contract was let to Ted Puckett Flooring Co. for linoleum in north room, first floor, of West Wing in the amount of \$1,250.60.
- September 1958** Contract was let to Ernest Lay for providing and setting a new fountain in the Southeast yard of Square, and also repairing and re-setting the antique sun dial in the same area. Amount of contract \$13,837.00.
- September 6 1958** President Eisenhower signed the bill on funds for the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, authorizing expenditures totaling \$17,250,000 for riverfront development and removing restrictions on design of arch, also permitting appropriations without the Federal budget being balanced.
- September 6 1958** President Eisenhower signed Public Law 85—936 authorizing \$17,250,000 for construction of the Memorial in the ratio of \$3 of Federal funds for each \$1 of City money.
- March 10 1959** At a meeting held by the National Park Service, Mayor Raymond R. Tucker presented Mr. Howard W. Baker, Regional Director, Region Two, National Park Service, with a check for \$880,000 representing the City's contribution for financing the First Phase of development. The money came from a bond issue voted in 1935 to provide \$1 City money for each \$3 Federal money for developing the Memorial.
- June 18 1959** The contract for the Railroad Relocation Project was awarded to the MacDonald Construction Company of St. Louis. The bid submitted by MacDonald was \$2,426,115.
- June 23 1959** Groundbreaking ceremonies for the Railroad Relocation Project were held within the Memorial grounds at Third and Market Streets. The event was sponsored jointly by the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Association, the Advertising Club of St. Louis, and Downtown in St. Louis, Inc. Many civic, professional, City, State, and Federal Government officials were in attendance. Mr. Conrad L. Wirth, Director of the National Park Service, was the principal speaker at a noon luncheon at the Hotel Statler.
- January 1 1960** Change Order No. 4 in the amount of \$2,506,199.30 for the North and South Crossover Bridges and Retaining Walls was approved.
- June 1960** President Eisenhower signed a Supplemental Appropriation Bill making available an additional \$2,953,000 for the development of the Memorial.
- June 21 1960** Vice President Richard M. Nixon visited the Old Courthouse and the Memorial development project.
- December 30 1960** Klaric Contracting Company of St. Louis was awarded a contract in the amount of \$98,504.00 for repairs and replacements of cornices, pediments and chimneys on the Old Courthouse.
- January 12 1961** The contract for Gateway Arch and Visitor Center excavations and Levee Redevelopment, was awarded to MacDonald Construction Company in the amount of \$3,796,015.
- August 3 1961** President Kennedy signed the 1962 fiscal year Interior Department Appropriation Bill. Included in the bill was \$9,497,000 for construction of the

Gateway Arch and Visitor Center. Matching funds amounting to \$2,835,667 from the City of St. Louis are available.

- March 14 1962** MacDonald Construction Company was awarded a contract in the amount of \$11,442,418 for construction of the Gateway Arch and Visitor Center shell.
- March 14 1962** A Cooperative Agreement between the National Park Service and Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District was executed, providing for the construction and operation of the transportation system in the Gateway Arch by the Bi-State Development Agency.
- July 12 1962** A contract between Laclede Gas Company, Charles Guggenheim & Association, Inc., and the National Park Service was signed for the production of the film, "Time of the West," for showing in the Visitor Center's theaters.
- July 31 1962** A construction contract for the installation of the transportation system in the Gateway Arch was signed by the National Park Service, Bi-State Development Agency, and MacDonald Construction Company in the amount of \$1,977,750.
- August 9 1962** President Kennedy signed the 1963 fiscal year Interior Department Appropriation Act. Included in the bill was \$510,000 for construction of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.
- February 12 1963** First stainless steel section of the Gateway Arch was set in place.
- February 26 1963** Letter Agreement between American Iron and Steel Institute, Laclede Gas Company, Charles Guggenheim & Associates, Inc., and National Park Service was signed for the production by Guggenheim of a motion picture, "Monument to the Dream," documenting the conception, fabrication, and construction of the Gateway Arch.
- February 14 1964** President Lyndon B. Johnson was welcomed at the Gateway Arch construction site on the occasion of his St. Louis visit to address the City's 200th birthday banquet.
- October 19 1965** Funds authorized to be appropriated for construction of the Memorial were increased from \$17,250,000 to \$23,250,000 by Public Law 89—269.
- October 19 1965** The contract for Interior Finishes of the Gateway Arch and Interim Visitor Center was awarded to Hoel-Steffen Construction Company, St. Louis, in the amount of \$1,071,027.
- October 28 1965** The exterior shell of the Gateway Arch was completed. Under Secretary of the Interior John A. Carver, Jr., was the principal speaker at ceremonies at the Arch.
- November 8 1966** The voters of St. Louis rejected a \$2,000,000 bond issue which was to provide the city's share of funds necessary for the completion of construction at the Memorial.
- June 1967** The interim Museum of Westward Expansion in the Visitor Center beneath the Gateway Arch was opened to the public.
- July 24 1967** The transportation system of the Gateway Arch was inaugurated and the north leg transporter was opened to the public.
- March 19 1968** The south transporter of the Arch was opened to the public, and the north leg was closed for completion of finish work in the load zone.
- May 18 1968** The operation of the north leg's transportation system was resumed, both transporters being operational from this date.
- May 25 1968** The Gateway Arch was dedicated by Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, with Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall as master of ceremonies.
- June 11 1970** Luther Ely Smith Memorial Square, the park east of the Old Courthouse, was dedicated.

November 9 1972 A contract was awarded to Suburban Tree Service, Manchester, Missouri, to perform the first phase of planting on the Memorial grounds, including furnishing 573 trees.

May 13 1972 The newly completed North Theater at the Gateway Arch was officially opened to the public for the premier showing of Charles Guggenheim's prize-winning 35mm film, "Time of the West."

August 1972 The Living History Fur Trade Room, Loom Room, Pioneer Cab Room, and Environmental Education Workshop-Library were opened in the Old Courthouse.

October 1972 Mayor James E. Williams of East St. Louis, Illinois, and Superintendent Ivan D. Parker of the National Park Service initiated a comprehensive study and master plan for a proposed expansion of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial to east bank of the Mississippi River directly across from the Gateway Arch.

November 26 1974 Completion of the paving of the North and South Overlooks and associated walkways.

February 5 1975 The historical doctor/dentist office was opened in the east wing of the first floor of the Old Courthouse, by the St. Louis Medical Society.

August 12 1975 "Gateway to the West," a 30 minute, 35mm film, first shown to the public in North Theater of the Gateway Arch.

March 23 1976 A contract was let in the amount of \$107,000 for improvement to the bus parking area and for landscaping on Washington Avenue.

April 13 1976 Dedication of Tucker Theater and unveiling of the Jefferson statue at the Gateway Arch.

April 15 1976 House Omnibus Bill No. 1 was introduced in the U. S. Congress increasing the development ceiling for the Memorial by \$9,500,000.

June 8 1976 Dedication and opening of the St. Louis Room exhibit in the Old Courthouse. Funds donated by the First National Bank in St. Louis.

June 24 1976 Mayor John H. Poelker, St. Louis, participates in the ribbon-cutting ceremony opening phase 1 of the Grand Staircase from Wharf Street to the Gateway Arch.

July 4 1976 Special all-day Bicentennial celebration at the Memorial with approximately 800,000 visitors in attendance.

August 10 1976 Museum of Westward Expansion completed at a cost of \$3,178,000 and opened to the public.

August 23 1976 Dedication of the Museum of Westward Expansion by the Secretary of the Interior, Thomas S. Kleppe.
