

feet, a rare book room of 3,000 square feet, and a processing room of 855 square feet. Dewey Pruett is curator of the Mississippi Valley Collection.

To build its holdings of forest history sources, Memphis State is looking toward the collection of material on the hardwood lumber industry. A program of taped interviews has already been started by Charles Crawford, director of the University's Oral History Research Office. Mr. Crawford has written a doctoral dissertation on the history of the R. F. Learned Lumber Company, Natchez, Mississippi.

◆ "Crisis in Conservation" was the title of a symposium held at the New York Academy of Science on March 24. A panel of government and academic specialists discussed problems of minerals policy, pollution abatement, outdoor recreation, and land and water use. The panel was chaired by Frank Smith, former Congressman from Mississippi, a director of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and a member of the Forest History Society.

Chairman Smith began the symposium by stressing the paramount political importance of conservation issues during the remainder of this century. "A minimum of \$300 billion is going to be spent at various levels of government on water programs alone in the next 30 years," he said, and added that far more money will be needed. He predicted that future conservation programs "will be more related to problems of the total environment than they have in the past."

Professor Leonard B. Dworsky of Cornell University, who is currently serving on the President's Advisory Commission on Science and Technology, saw water pollution abatement programs caught between demanding national priorities in education, defense, and the cities and the rising expectations of the public for a quality environment. He urged the establishment of a useful set of priorities which would emphasize crisis areas like the Great Lakes "where we will need to proceed rapidly to install very high treatment technology to deal with the severe pollution problems."

Water pollution, drainage and navigation improvements were cited by Phillip O. Foss, chairman of the Department of Political Science at Colorado State University, as "destroying recreation water resources at a dangerously rapid rate." While commenting on the explosive growth of outdoor recreation in recent years, he noted that current programs in effect subsidize middle and upper income groups. Some ways should be found, he thought, to create recreation opportunities for the lower income groups who need them the most.

Professor William T. Doherty, chairman of the history department at West Virginia University, discussed several aspects of mineral conservation policy in the 20th century and concluded by saying that producers

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Letters

The letter by my old friend C. P. Cronk (October 1967) prompts me to add some remarks about the old sawmills he mentioned.

The so-called Nichols mill in Bow, N.H., was idle but still capable of operation when I last saw it before the 1938 hurricane. John and Mary Nichols deeded it to George W. Colby and John Ordway on April 17, 1863, so it was known as the Colby mill in Bow. A Mr. L. E. Stanyon of Goffstown called on me in 1963 and related how he had drawn logs to "Colby's mill in Bow" in 1916. (Miss Mary I. Stone of Dunbarton wrote an article about the mill in the *Concord Monitor*, July 9, 1963).

The model of the Colby mill in the Fox Forest Museum in Hillsboro, N. H., was made by Arthur Cheney about 1938 from working drawings and photos. He was commissioned to build it by the Society for the Protection of New Hampshire Forests when he was a master in manual training at St. Paul's School. The drawings were made by Ellsworth Philbrick in connection with the Historic American Buildings Survey. These drawings (Nichols Sawmill N. H. 31) were not included in the material deposited in the Library of Congress by the Survey but are in the archives of the New Hampshire Historical Society. There are seven books of drawings and a number of photographs. The drawings may have been made about 1935 when the mill was still intact.

Drawings and photographs of two other old mills listed in the Catalog of Measured Drawings and Photographs of the Historic American Buildings Survey were deposited in the Library of Congress on March 1, 1941, by Dick Sutton, chief architect:

(1) Saw and grist mill at Hampton Falls. 20 sheets of drawings, 32 photographs, and 3 architectural data pages.

(2) The James sawmill at Northwood Narrows. 26 sheets of drawings, 60 photographs, and 1 data page.

Many parts of the James mill are deposited under a roofed pavilion at the Fox State Forest, N. H. During the latter part of the Historic Buildings Survey, I was asked if these sawmill parts could be temporarily stored at the Fox Forest. I agreed to store them temporarily in the barn, and presently two CCC trucks arrived carrying two 40-foot rack timbers, frames, water wheels, and several cords of assorted iron and wooden parts, each tagged with the name of the part. These had been dug up in an alder swamp on the farm of Mr. James in Northwood Narrows. I saw the excavation in progress, and some of the boys were up to their waists in water. Unfortunately we did not then have the polyethylene glycol process for preserving water-logged wood, and many of the wooden parts have decayed.

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Forest History

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Moss-hung bigleaf maple (Acer macrophyllum Pursh) in Olympic National Park. National Park Service photograph. Inside front cover, pages 30 and 33, and back covers illustrated by Stefan A. Rudnicki.



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Olympic National Park

20 Years Of Controversy

ELMO R. RICHARDSON

MR. RICHARDSON is associate professor of history at Washington State University. He has written *The Politics of Conservation* (University of California Press, 1962) and several articles on federal-state resource policy. His "Federal Park Policy in Utah: The Escalante National Monument Controversy of 1935-1940" (*Utah Historical Quarterly*, April 1965) tells the story of one of Secretary Ickes' defeats. Professor Richardson is currently gathering materials for a study of the Civilian Conservation Corps.

PHOTO CREDITS: Pages 6, 9, and 13, *National Park Service*; page 8, *University of Washington Libraries*; page 10, *U.S. Forest Service*.



BY THE TIME Franklin Roosevelt's administration took office in 1933, Americans had learned to accept federal regulation of resource use as the prevention of monopoly and waste. Even the areas of the Far West, economically dependent upon natural resource industries, endorsed the policy in that sense. State governments and private enterprisers there, at first hostile to Forest Service jurisdiction over vast tracts of the public domain, were now satisfied with that agency's practice of regulating commercial access to the national forests. At the same time, however, the preservation concept embodied in the administration of a national park system was not as well favored. Westerners expressed opinions that were merely tolerant ("an adequate museum of big trees"), or condescending (a preserved site "would please the women and other interested parties"), or, as the economic Depression worsened, class-conscious hostility ("a Playground for the Rich—and a Dole for our Workers").

It is noteworthy, then, that the national park system doubled in size during the 1930's. By the end of that decade the public had learned to think of national parks as valuable retreats now accessible to the ordinary citizen. The change in attitude can be explained partly by population mobility, partly by the gradual renewal of individual well-being, and by the publicity given to parks by New Deal projects like the Civilian Conservation Corps. Yet the expansion of the national park system occurred also against a contrary background of efforts to stimulate the economy which often meant a greater use of natural resources for industrial purposes.

A good share of the credit for this change must go to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. They thought of themselves as the executors of the nation's best interests and sought to enlarge the scope of federal resource management. They had little patience with the patchwork of precedent and overlapping jurisdiction which formed the basis of federal conservation policy when they took office.

For Ickes the abiding objective was a Department of Conservation which would unite under one cabinet officer all government activities in the field of natural resources. Expansion of the national park system, desirable in itself, was a step toward that objective as well. Early in his administration, therefore, Ickes announced plans for six new national parks. These were to be total natural environments, wildernesses, with a minimum of lodges, concessions, and highways.

Since the new parks would be formed principally from existing national forest lands, the plan led inevitably to quarrels over administrative jurisdiction and to public controversy. Unlike Roosevelt, Ickes had a minimum of tact, personal or political, and less interest in educating the people than in exposing self-interest and dishonesty to them. He equated his critics with the enemies of the people and attacked them all

with the zeal of the one-time Progressive reformer that he was. Ickes managed his quarrels with striking effect. His greatest victory was the creation of Olympic National Park.

The Olympic Peninsula, lying between Puget Sound and the Pacific Ocean, is the farthestmost northwest extension of the continental 48 states. At the heart of the 4,000,000-acre peninsula are the Olympic Mountains, 50 miles of rugged glaciated peaks dominated by Mount Olympus (7,965 feet). The mountains are surrounded by forests of Douglas fir, western hemlock, Sitka spruce, western redcedar, and Pacific silver fir. Two of the region's unique natural attractions are the rangeland of the rare Olympic elk (*Cervus roosevelti*) and the moss-encrusted rain forests which run along the valleys of the Hoh, Bogachiel, and Queets Rivers to the ocean.

The Olympic Peninsula was discovered and named by the maritime explorers of the late 18th century, but it was not settled to any great extent for almost one hundred years and then only in pockets of arable land along the 445-mile coastline. The rest was nibbled at by prospectors, miners, lumbermen and trappers. In 1897 President Cleveland withdrew from entry 1,500,000 acres of public land on the peninsula to form the Olympic National Forest. The center of this national forest (615,000 acres) was proclaimed Mount Olympus National Monument by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1909. During the First World War the Monument was reduced by half to permit mining and lumbering. It was administered by the Forest Service until 1933, then transferred to the Department of the Interior.

SOON AFTER THE Monument came under the Department of Interior's jurisdiction a campaign began to give it full national park status. This campaign was largely carried on by the Emergency Conservation Committee, a group of New York City natural scientists and park advocates, whose efforts were financed by the philanthropist Mrs. Rosalie Edge. Chief publicist for the Committee was its secretary Irving Brant, a St. Louis newspaperman and later confidante of Harold Ickes. The committee's campaign was stimulated early by a burst of favorable public opinion. In October 1933 hunters killed 250 of the rare Olympic elk during a four-day open season on Forest Service lands adjacent to Mount Olympus Monument. Protests against this "slaughter" and demands for protecting the area in a national park were heard in the West as well as the East. In western Washington the park idea was supported by civic associations, some businessmen, and, most importantly, by The Mountaineers Inc., a Seattle wilderness organization headed by attorney Irving Clark.

Governor Clarence Martin of Washington received the idea of a national park in the Olympics without enthusiasm. An oldline, localist Democrat from the

agrarian, eastern part of the state, he viewed the issue first as it affected the economic needs of the state's citizens and second as a matter to be determined by the state's administrators. Martin passed the proposal along to the State Planning Council for study. That agency, created during the depression emergency to coordinate state and federal economic programs, was headed by Ben Kizer, an energetic Democrat from Spokane. He in turn assigned the study to a special Committee on Parks and Highways consisting of businessmen, engineers, and one landscape photographer, Asahel Curtis, a longtime champion of the commercial development of Washington's scenic resources.

THERE WAS NO doubt about the importance of forest products to the regional economy. Sixty per cent of the peninsula's population directly or indirectly earned its livelihood from logging and milling. With the lumber industry in its worst slump ever, most of the timber was being converted into pulp products, and production was rising. The Olympic Peninsula was a major pulpwood source—considered then the largest in the nation—and the Forest Service had encouraged this transition from lumber to paper. Labor unions were as anxious to maintain commercial access to these forests as were mill owners and peninsula businessmen. Not surprisingly the Council's special committee found the needs of the state's economy paramount and endorsed existing administration by the Forest Service. The Committee's report was adopted unanimously by the Council and published in July 1934.

The park issue reached Congress in March 1935. Representative Monrad C. Wallgren, Democrat, of Washington's peninsula district, incorporated the recommendations of the Emergency Conservation Committee and the resolutions of his park-minded constituents into H. R. 7086, a bill to establish Mount Olympus National Park. The measure would create a park by adding 400,000 acres, most of it from the national forest, to the existing Monument's acreage. Further details, including protection of the elk, reflected the influence of an Olympic park study team appointed by Arno Cammerer, Director of the Park Service.

Chairman Kizer was well aware of the value of a national park on the peninsula. National parks commanded large appropriations from Congress. The Interior Department and its Park Service also controlled funds for construction in the state, especially the gigantic Grand Coulee Dam. Support of continued Forest Service jurisdiction, therefore, put the state "in the midst of one of those first class rows between two highly influential government departments." "In my heart of hearts," Kizer admitted to Governor Martin, "I would like to see the Monument turned into a National Park. I think it will get far more attention



GOVERNOR CLARENCE MARTIN

and be far more of an asset to the state . . . On the other hand . . . it would take far more timber land than the State can afford to surrender." If it went through as written, Kizer urged the governor to oppose it, "even though we found ourselves forwarding the interests of the Department of Agriculture at the expense of the Interior Department's interests." There was always the possibility of making trades and compromises to protect the state's vital interests.

By the end of 1935 the Wallgren bill had inspired hundreds of pamphlets, articles, and resolutions. The arguments pro and con were presented again in April 1936 at hearings held by Representative René DeRouen's House Committee on Public Lands. Forest Service spokesmen, including former Chief Forester Henry S. Graves, defended the policy of multiple use management and the preservation of particular wilderness sites. Spokesmen from mill communities produced figures showing that 85 per cent of the peninsula's residents supported the existing policy, while labor leaders predicted that thousands of men would lose their jobs if the bill passed. Photographer Asahel Curtis insisted upon a strict interpretation of the National Park Act of 1916, claiming that only the

topmost ridge of the Olympics was worthy of inclusion in a national park. He argued that the park was inaccessible and too near popular Mount Rainier to ever attract visitors (only 25,000 had visited the Monument in 1935).

Among those testifying on behalf of the Wallgren bill were Mrs. Rosalie Edge, chairman of the Emergency Conservation Committee, and Irving Clark of Seattle. Their argument emphasized the superior claim of the nation over the local needs of the peninsula, especially over the needs of the forest industries. The testimony of Park Service officials dwelled upon the uniqueness of the area and the need for keeping it inviolate. By implication and declaration the villain to these witnesses was the Forest Service, which they said was blatantly eager to please the mill owners. Secretary Ickes dismissed the notion of continuing Forest Service administration as tantamount to "putting a pig in a packing-house."

The DeRouen committee reported the Wallgren bill to the House favorably and without amendment, confirming Curtis' suspicion that Park Service lobbying had carried the day even before hearings began. The press of other legislation and the approaching

1936 election prevented further action on it by the House. Impatient for the park and characteristically seeking the shortest distance between two points, Roosevelt considered breaking the deadlock by transferring 400,000 acres from the Olympic National Forest to the Monument by executive order, but the Attorney General advised him that this would be illegal under the provisions of the National Monuments and Antiquities Act of 1906. For his part, Secretary Wallace proclaimed in July a "primitive area" of 238,930 acres in portions of the Olympic National Forest adjacent to the Monument.


IN WASHINGTON STATE, Governor Martin was alarmed by the progress of Wallgren's bill and asked the State Planning Council to study the matter once again in order to draw up an alternative proposal that would take into account some of the points brought out at the hearings. "We must not come out as the unregenerate advocates of wicked sawmills" Kizer wrote to Ross K. Tiffany, the Council's secretary. The Council's new report on the Olympic Park came out in December 1936. It concentrated upon two difficult conditions existing on the peninsula: the vital relationship between forest use and the local economy, and the mosaic of land holdings—state school lands, state and private forests, and marginal farms—which carried the tax burden of the area. To have a national park without destroying local interests, the Council proposed a variation of the "Cleator Plan." This was a plan adopted by the Forest Service in 1929 for wilderness-recreation management of 450,000 acres in the Olympic National Forest and the Mount Olympus National Monument. The national park, according to this modified Cleator Plan, would consist of 360,000 acres, principally the area of the existing Monument. Adjoining it to the west and southwest would be some 200,000 acres under Forest Service control but managed primarily for wilderness and recreation values.

Congressman Wallgren would not adopt the Cleator Plan but revised his park bill. The new bill, introduced on February 15, 1937 (H. R. 4724), showed the influence of the Council's report. The boundaries of the proposed park were reduced to 648,000 acres, an area only slightly larger than that recommended by the Council, but the bill retained a controversial southwestern extension into national forest lands containing accessible supplies of pulpwood.

Wallgren's new bill was a considerable let-down to at least one park advocate. Irving Brant wrote President Roosevelt in September 1937 about the "remarkable circumstances" of the bill. The Department of the Interior had submitted no report on the bill yet substantial government timber preserved by the first Wallgren bill was lost under the second. He urged the President to make a personal inspection of big

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR HAROLD ICKES





timber on the Quinault River, similar to that left out of the second Wallgren bill, during his trip to the West in the fall of 1937.

After a second round of public debate in 1937, federal and state officials realized that the national park issue would not be decided by public opinion but by the President himself. At the suggestion of Secretary Ickes, Roosevelt visited the Olympic Peninsula between September 30 and October 1. At frequent stops, he spoke with characteristic sentiment and optimism. Seeing some youngsters in one crowd, he told them, "I think you children are going to get your national park." Later in the day as his motorcade passed a logged-over hillside, he allegedly growled, "I hope the lumberman who is responsible for this is roasting in hell." To local businessmen, however, he expressed confidence that their lumber and pulpwood needs would be met by selective cutting in federal forests. He did not at the time specify which tracts would be available. On September 30, Roosevelt met with representatives of state and federal resource agencies at Lake Crescent. There, he defended a large-sized park and again said that details of boundaries and access could be worked out in subsequent discussion.

Encouraged by the apparent mood of compromise which followed this meeting, the State Planning Council passed a resolution (October 22, 1937) in favor of a national park. It went on record again, however, for dual administration by the Park Service and Forest Service and suggested that it be named "Mt. Olympus National Park and Demonstration Forest." The Council's resolution stressed accessibility to the park by requesting major highways along the river valleys and other entrances to the park.

BEHIND THE SCENES maneuvering preceded the introduction of the third Olympic Park bill in the final session of the 75th Congress. In February 1938, Washington Senators Bone and Schwollenbach together with Representatives Wallgren and Martin Smith met with Chief Forester Silcox and Park Service Director Cammerer. Irving Brant was also present. On March 21, Cammerer reported to the President that the Forest Service and Park Service were in "substantial agreement," the bill had budget clearance, and the rest was up to Congress. Responding to the administration's wish for a large park, Wallgren introduced his third bill on March 25, 1938 (H. R. 10024). It called for a park of 898,202 acres, substantially larger than the area in his two previous bills, and included westward extensions down the Bogachiel, Hoh, and Queets Rivers. There were no references to multiple use administration or entrance roadways.

The irreconcilable opponents of the Park were not likely to accept any bill, but if the state administrators meant to secure alternatives to the Wallgren measure, they would have to convince the President.

Angered by the claims of eastern conservationists that most Washingtonians wanted the large park, Governor Martin decided to go to the White House immediately in order to "stoutly resist" their propaganda. Irving Brant argued against receiving the governor because it would delay consideration of the bill. But after Schwellenbach assured Roosevelt that Governor Martin wished only to discuss details of the westward extensions of the park, Roosevelt agreed to see him.

THE WASHINGTON DELEGATION—Martin, Kizer, and Democratic State Senator George Yantis—came to Washington, D. C., in April 1938 equipped with elaborate maps showing the pattern of land ownership on the peninsula and statistics concerning production and employment there. First they presented their case before the House Public Lands Committee, which was now holding its third series of hearings on the Olympic park. The hearings were cursory because even chairman René DeRouen admitted that all the arguments had been presented before. Then the delegation met in the White House with Bone, Schwellenbach, Smith, and Wallgren. The meeting was brief because Roosevelt limited discussion to the pending legislation. He was sympathetic to the idea of selective logging near the park's boundaries and suggested that such a provision might be introduced into the bill when it reached the Senate. As for boundaries, he thought the size of the park could be determined by consultation between federal and state officials after the bill was approved by Congress. But he insisted upon specific authority to enlarge the park after it was established.

Pleased with the interview, Martin and Kizer returned to their hotel accompanied by Senator Schwellenbach. As they discussed the meeting on the way, the Rooseveltian charm dissipated and was replaced by confusion and contention. To the Senator's surprise, Martin claimed that the President's suggestion about "consultation" meant that the state's executives could veto any unacceptable proposals for additions to the park. Schwellenbach hastened to point out that Roosevelt would hardly have agreed to such a limitation of presidential power. Consultation simply meant that final boundaries would be fixed after discussions with state and federal officials. Even Wallgren was confused by the meeting and thought that the President had agreed to a park near the size wanted by state officials. Ickes dismissed that assumption as "dumb." Roosevelt customarily used vague language to get factions to agree, but it was unlikely that he would give so much just when he was on the verge of getting the large park he had so long wanted. Nevertheless, when Governor Martin returned to Washington State, he assured the press that nothing would be done about final boundaries without the state's approval.

To save his Council's "face," Kizer now drafted amendments to the Wallgren bill which would make the Olympics "a regular National Park with highways, concessions, and everything." He was encouraged by John Boettinger, publisher of the influential Seattle *Post-Intelligencer* and the President's son-in-law. Ordinarily an administration go-between, Boettinger now wrote editorials opposing the Wallgren bill unless amended to coincide with the Council's recommendation. He quickly drew a long intemperate letter from Ickes. The Secretary then turned his fire on Martin and Kizer. In a radio address from Spokane, he accused them of willfully distorting the President's suggestion for consultation. It was all part of a scheme, Ickes said, to force the President into accepting a smaller park or stand accused of betraying his promise. Martin's response to the speech was brief: "Oh Ickes, he attacks everybody."

These disruptions merely served to muddy the waters, Kizer observed, and spread resentment just when reconciliation was needed. The administration forces now acted swiftly to push the bill through Congress before the end of the session. DeRouen's committee reported the Wallgren bill without amendment on April 25, though state officials had been assured by some Congressmen that no immediate action would be taken. Martin's optimism was suddenly destroyed. When Kizer tried to find out what happened, he learned from Schwellenbach that Wallgren had assured the committee members they need not be bound by any alleged private understandings between Governor Martin and the President. And DeRouen had insisted that the committee report out the bill for a large park because the Senate would amend it anyway.

The Wallgren bill passed the House on May 16 and was sent to the Senate Public Lands and Surveys Committee headed by Colorado Senator Alva B. Adams. At this point Acting Secretary of the Interior, E. K. Burlew, advised the President of an amendment submitted by Interior "which would authorize the President to add to the proposed park any lands within the boundaries of the Olympic National Forest." Because of the limited time before adjournment, Burlew added, the Senate Committee "should be influenced" and the Senators from Washington State "urged" to speed its passage.

NO LONGER TRUSTING assurances of Congressmen who told them that the bill would be altered or die in committee when adjournment came, Martin and Kizer reminded the President of their trust in his consultation suggestion. Kizer then suggested to Schwellenbach that a temporary measure could be passed now and details worked out later. But if the Wallgren bill passed unamended, the people of western Washington would consider it a humiliation of

Governor Martin by the Roosevelt administration. The Senator replied that he and Senator Bone were caught in an uncomfortable dilemma: "If we disregard the conversations at the White House, we will be accused of having double-crossed the Governor, and if we pass the bill in conformity with the actual language used by the President, the bill will be more unsatisfactory to you and to the Governor than the bill which passed the House." The President, he concluded, would never assent to delay or suspension of his determination to add to the total size of the park, but he told Kizer that Roosevelt had given his "complete assurance" that consultation would not be a mere formality.

On June 11 the Wallgren bill was reported out of committee with an amendment reducing the size of the park to about 648,000 acres but authorizing the President to make unspecified additions. It was passed by the Senate on June 13, rejected by the House, and went to a conference committee on June 16. The objections of all concerned were removed by a provision specifically requiring consultation and by another preventing the President from making additions for eight months, that is, until after consultations took place. The park was limited in size to 898,292 acres after additions. It was, Schwellenbach informed Kizer, the "best possible compromise." The bill was then adopted without a roll call vote.

ROOSEVELT SIGNED THE act into law with "special pleasure" on June 29 at Hyde Park. Ickes, too, had reason to be pleased. Nevertheless, he grumbled in his diary that the bill had passed "by the skin of its teeth." The defeat of his Department of Conservation legislation in the same session of Congress certainly contributed to this dissatisfaction.

On the day Roosevelt signed the Olympic Park act the men of the Martin administration were feeling decidedly low. Reminded of William Howard Taft's lament after the 1912 election, Kizer wrote: "I knew it was coming—but I didn't know it would be so big!" State officials now turned their hopes to the consultation procedures. But in this stage of the Olympic controversy the initiative remained with the Department of Interior. It was Ickes who supplied Roosevelt with a list of proposed additions to the park which were in turn based on recommendations supplied by Irving Brant and O. A. Tomlinson, supervisor of Mt. Rainier National Park. As for the Department of Agriculture, Secretary Wallace told the President in November that the Forest Service "would make no objections to existing or proposed Olympic Park boundaries."

The burden of defending Washington State's interests now rested on the State Planning Council. Its task was made no less difficult by Ickes' announcement in August 1938 that he favored extending the park boundaries to their maximum limits as soon as possible. To Washingtonians who thought the process

would take several years at least, this announcement came as a distinct shock. Kizer thought it violated the spirit in which the Wallgren bill had been adopted, but since the other side had "more guns than we have" he reconciled himself to the ordeal of dealing with his long-time adversary. In August, he invited the Secretary out to examine a "demonstration forest" under sustained-yield management by a peninsula lumber company. In an unusually mellow mood after his victory, Ickes accepted. After the visit, the two men had "quite an interview." The Secretary seemed impressed by the demonstration forest; he seemed to agree that similar cutting experiments could be carried on in the park; the "hard shell" seemed to be cracking. It was a false hope. In subsequent meetings, Ickes made it very clear that his position on commercial access to the park's forests "had not changed in the slightest."

Kizer also tried to close the gap of misunderstanding between federal and state officials by writing to Irving Brant. He pointed out the Council's difficulty in making its way between the conservative lumbermen who would not change their destructive methods and the "embittered witnesses of forest devastation" to whom there were no desirable methods of logging. Younger, more progressive men in the industry, Kizer assured Brant, could be depended upon to use the techniques of selective logging. This distinction between old and new methods of logging deserved the widest publicity, and he hoped it would become a topic for Brant's "extraordinarily brilliant and effective talent as a writer and a generous public spirit." The letter, doubtless painful to write, received no reply.

The details of consultation were handled by Ross K. Tiffany, representing the State Planning Council, and Frank Kittredge, regional director of the National Park Service. Their joint report of December 13, 1938, recommended additions to Olympic Park of 202,292 acres on the north, east, and south. The western boundaries were left open because no agreement could be reached. Ickes had already submitted to the President Irving Brant's recommendations for adding some 50,000 acres to the west which had originally been part of the Wallgren bill and had been eliminated from it by the Senate amendment.

THE WESTERN BOUNDARY of the park became the focus of attention in 1939. Besides the 50,000 or so acres immediately west of the park, Roosevelt wished to acquire rain forest corridors along the entire length of the Bogachiel, Hoh, and Queets Valleys to the ocean, as well as a stretch of Pacific shore line. Since he had no authority to add lands in these areas under the Olympic Park act, the President asked Ickes to draw up proposals for legislation. Eventually the Queets corridor and Ocean Strip areas were made a Public Works Administration project. There was not much



the State of Washington officials could do about these new administration thrusts, but they fought a rear guard action to keep land in the Bogachiel and Hoh areas out of the park.

In January 1939 Governor Martin suggested to the President that final boundaries of the Olympic Park be determined by the federally sponsored National Resources Committee. This suggestion was politely but firmly declined. When studies on the boundary question were completed, Roosevelt wrote Martin, there would be a meeting in Washington "to consider findings and recommendations of all parties." That meeting was not held until December 1939, and in the meantime both sides prepared their final arguments. Once again the state objected to the proposed western additions because they would withdraw vital resources from commercial development. These arguments were summarized and refuted, at least to the administration's satisfaction, by Brant in a long memorandum dated December 6, 1939. The same memorandum contained Brant's recommendations for the Olympic Park additions: 187,411 acres of which 50,625 would be added to the west side of the park and 136,786 acres to the north, east, and south sides. This was the administration proposal when the President met with Governor Martin, Kizer, Yantis, Ickes, and Wallace at the White House on December 9.

According to Ickes, Irving Brant carried "the ball for Interior because he knows the area better than anyone in the National Park Service." For one hour and a half the men pored over maps without reaching agreement. From administration accounts of the meeting, it would appear that the Governor and his representatives were looking for some concession on the western boundaries of the park that would put to rest suspicions on the peninsula that the government was planning other national parks "and the fear that this one would be too large." The meeting resumed the next day, Sunday, December 10, but this time neither Roosevelt nor Martin was present. The only area in question was 50,000 acres in the Hoh-Bogachiel Valley. Again there was no agreement.

In order to settle the question about rain forest, Roosevelt ordered the Park Service to take photographs of the Bogachiel Valley floor every one-half mile for three or four miles into the proposed extension. From the Forest Service and the Park Service he got figures on pulpwood supplies which proved that the proposed addition would not affect the peninsula's pulp industries.

Roosevelt was evidently impatient with any further delay in acquiring the western additions to the park. He also distrusted the Martin administration. For some time state Democrats had warned him that the

Governor had little sympathy for the domestic policies of the New Deal. They would soon seek to "purge" him from the party just as the President tried to remove other opponents that same year. There was, therefore, no reason to be solicitous of Martin now.

On December 21, the President informed Governor Martin of his intention to proclaim the Bogachiel-Hoh additions. He felt sure the Governor would agree to the inclusion of this western area in the park "since the only question that arose" at their recent meeting "was the factual basis of the decision." The Olympic Park, he concluded, was only part of a larger program of planned resource use on the peninsula: "Outside of the park this is primarily a question of timber management. It was plain at our conference that we see eye to eye on this matter, and I hope that some plan of action may soon be worked out."

The proclamation was announced on January 2, 1940. Assisted by press secretary Steve Early, who was holding maps of the peninsula, the President played surveyor as he pointed out the disputed areas to newspaper correspondents and summarized the arguments about rain forest and pulpwood supplies.

THE NEARLY COMPLETED park, roughly the size of Rhode Island, looked to Asahel Curtis like an "ancient mustard plaster" which "made you feel so bad in a new place that you forgot about the original trouble." The Olympic controversy had barely begun to cool when Washingtonians learned that Ickes was considering another national park in the Cascade Mountains from Canada to the Columbia River. "The Ickesan policy of grab has not exhausted itself in the State of Washington," proclaimed the Bellingham, Washington, *Herald*. Opponents of Olympic Park were again aroused to action because 1940 was an election year. In their state conventions that summer, Democrats and Republicans went on record against "any further encroachment by the National Government on the state's domain" and asked for the restoration of the former Monument boundaries. In the private correspondence of park opponents Ickes was usually cast as a Hitlerian dictator with Washington State pictured as the recently "blitzed" European countries. One such fantasy anticipated that he would be "stripped of all his power" in the forthcoming election and be reduced to "selling peanuts on a street corner." When the returns came in on November 5, however, it was clear that the controversy had been more noise than substance. The residents of the four peninsula counties, mainly concerned with larger issues of domestic prosperity and the war threat, gave a substantial majority to Roosevelt and sent Monrad Wallgren to the United States Senate.

Hotel operators doubted that the Olympic Park—equipped only with campground facilities and trails—would ever attract more than a few hundred visitors, but 75,000 came during the first season of 1938, a

third of whom stayed for trips along the trails into wilderness areas. (That total had doubled by the end of World War II and continued to double annually during the immediate postwar years). Finding themselves portals of the park, several peninsula communities abandoned their earlier opposition. The citizens of Port Angeles already considered the park an essential part of their city's economy. Indeed, they were to request that 20,000 acres—including Mt. Angeles and Lake Angeles—be added to the park. This confirmation of his original purpose pleased Secretary Ickes so much that he came out to the peninsula again in September 1941. "I wouldn't have felt quite satisfied," he said with something like charm, "if I had gone without looking the people of Port Angeles in the eye." Getting a national park for any community was "one of the toughest jobs" a man in government could undertake. "I have been accused of taking resources away from the people. They don't realize until you have hog-tied them and forced a park down their throats that you really have given them an asset that has present value and continuously increasing value." Now, as the city was the first in the area to realize, the park would be an "anchor to windward, to keep people coming, to keep trade moving."

BUT THE PARK was not to remain unchallenged. War-time demands for lumber brought renewed pressure to open Olympic Park forests to logging. At first the fears of conservationists were put at rest by the continuing Ickes administration, but as lumber grew short the demands, especially for accessible Sitka spruce, became too great. In December 1942 the acute shortage of logs for airplane stock in the Grays Harbor and Puget Sound areas caused Ickes to agree reluctantly "to sell, for war purposes, spruce and fir timber on the Queets Corridor and Ocean Strip lands in accordance with the principles of selective logging." (Ben Kizer must have smiled at that announcement.) The corridor and ocean strips were not yet part of the Olympic Park. Incursions into the park proper were still resisted by the Department under the watchful eye of Irving Brant who lamented "the unhappy results" of logging in the Queets Corridor during 1943 and promised worse if logging were permitted in the western extensions of the park which the administration had fought so hard to get.

Ickes left Interior in 1946, the same year Olympic Park was formally dedicated. Several bills to alter the boundaries of the park were introduced in Congress during the immediate post-war years, but none of them ever got out of committee. There was also little likelihood of boundary adjustments while Monrad Wallgren was Governor of Washington (1945-1949).

The hopes of the Olympic Park "revisionists" were rekindled when the 1952 elections placed Republican administrations in Washington State and Washington, D.C. Over Governor-elect Langlie's protests, outgoing

President Harry Truman signed the proclamation in January 1953 incorporating lands in the Queets Corridor and Ocean Strip to Olympic Park. Langlie's advisors first suggested asking the incoming President, Dwight Eisenhower, to revoke the addition. Instead, Langlie pursued a course more conciliatory to the Department of the Interior by appointing in March 1953 an Olympic Park National Review Committee to report on the need for boundary changes.

The committee represented all shades of opinion and was chaired by William B. Greeley, former chief forester of the U.S. and then head of the West Coast Lumbermen's Association. In the months that followed, committee members traveled to peninsula communities where they collected predictable testimony and time-worn arguments from anyone wishing to offer them. Greeley soon realized that the committee was deeply divided and not ready to make recommendations to state or federal officials. Eventually nine members—lumbermen, foresters, and labor leaders—signed a report which merely asked the Secretary of the Interior to arbitrate the demands of all parties concerned. With this request the state administrators in fact abdicated their former insistence on being ultimate decision-makers. A minority report, signed by five members of the committee, maintained that no changes should be made in the park's boundaries. Cutting timber in parts of the park, the minority

found, would hardly be sufficient to stabilize the forest industries or provide substantial employment.

The last hope of park opponents was the new Secretary of the Interior, Douglas McKay. As Governor of Oregon, he had been aware of the needs of the forest industries. A short time before he entered the cabinet, he had denounced "those mistaken souls who preach that our forests should be socialized." When advised of the request made by the Review Committee's majority, however, he declined to reopen the controversy. Already sensitive to the label "Give-away McKay" pinned on him by Democrats and conservationists, the Secretary decided that sustained yield logging inside the boundaries of the park was incompatible with the purpose of the national system. Moreover, these reservations were becoming "increasingly important and economically valuable attractions." If they were reduced in size "for the benefit of commercial lumbermen," he told a forestry official in the Pacific Northwest, "we certainly would be in for some unusual criticism." For these reasons he concluded that the Olympic National Park "should be left alone."

As early as 1937, the state administrators realized that once the park was created there would be little if any chance for its modification. The inertial force grew stronger as the years passed. Should they have stood adamantly on the Council's first resolution for no change in the status quo of 1934? Could they have convinced Wallgren and Schwollenbach to support the "Cleator Plan" instead of alienating them just when their assistance was most needed in 1938? Perhaps there was no possible alternative open to them once the area was completely in the hands of the Park Service. Anyone who has seen the Olympic Park might agree that Harold Ickes had the "right cause." But as he well knew, that "cause" did not triumph automatically. □

Note on Sources

This study is based upon research in the departmental, personal, and political files of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., and the files of the Governors and State Planning Council of the State of Washington at Olympia. Essential information was taken from three personal manuscript collections: the Ben Kizer Papers, University of Oregon Library, and the Irving Clark Papers and Asahel Curtis Papers at the University of Washington Libraries. Additional materials were found in the papers of Arthur Langlie, Corydon Wagner, and the Washington State Conservation Society at the University of Washington; the papers of William B. Greeley and Douglas McKay at the University of Oregon; and the records of the West Coast Lumbermen's Association at the Oregon Historical Society. Source citations for this article are on file in the editorial office of *FOREST HISTORY*.

DOUGLAS MCKAY

